Trends in Military Imports to North Vietnam

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000400160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 8, 1973
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80T01719R00040 OPUecret
No Foreign Dissem
Sensitive
-7C s 3 a,37 7 3
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
intelligence Memorandum
Trends in Military Imports to North Vietnam
,NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.
Top Secret
Handle via
Talent -Keyhole - Comint TCS Nov 3 2 3 7/7 3
8 March 1973
Channels jrointly
Approved For` Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80T01719R000400~AWf 1* ,G,5
 Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400160001-3
WARNING.
This document contains information affecting the national security of the
United States within the meaning of the espionage laws U. S. Code Title 18,
Sections 193, 794 and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the reve-
lation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as
its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United
States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the
United States. It is to be seen only by personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive information in the designated control channels.
Its security must be maintained in accordance with regulations pertaining
to the TALENT and Communications Intelligence Controls. No action is
to be taken on any communications intelligence which may be contained
herein, regardless of the advantage tia be gained, if such action might
have the effect of revealing the existence and nature of the source, unless
such action is first approved by the appropriate authority.
Classified by 015319
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 58(1),(2),(3)
Automatically declassified on
Dote Impossible to Determine
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400160001-3
 TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
11 ANlWio$rEJ4 dTR'Jr 'gAGW6yt&W L4a Rf jP f 1 ? ?4()%JW "1'
No Foreign Dissem
TCS-3237/73
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM'
TRENDS IN MILITARY IMPORTS TO NORTH VIETNAM
CONCLUSIONS
1. Current restrictions on overflights of North Vietnam preclude the
collection of direct evidence of the extent of military deliveries to North
Vietnam from either of its traditional suppliers - the USSR or the People's
Republic of China. This fact notwithstanding, it is possible to develop a
strong case that such resupply activity is presently under way, and at a
pace which permits Hanoi to retain a considerable degree of flexibility in
its policy decisions regarding peace or war. Furthermore, the current level
of military imports does not appear to be greatly below that of the six
or so months immediately preceding the cease-fire, a period of time during
which we believe record amounts of military hardware poured into North
Vietnam.
2. It is likely that the current pace of military imports will slacken
in the months ahead, barring a resumption of heavy military activity. The
need for air defense materiel has, of course, been drastically reduced, and,
once stocks are rebuilt, further imports of these expensive items presumably
will cease. Also as stockpiles in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam are
built back up to desired levels the presently heavy flows of supplies into
these areas should taper off.
3. These judgments must be viewed as estimates of the situation
rather than firm fact, based, as they are, on very fragmentary evidence,
given the proscription of one of our major sources of information - aerial
reconnaissance over North Vietnam. However, the judgments are made in
the context of a continuing and intensive study of North Vietnam's import
Note: Comments and queries regarding this publication are welcomed. They
may be directed to of the Office of Economic Research,
Code 143, Extension 6469.
Approved Fcsrl~p ash /LD5 I ITPUTAIMK000400160001-3
No Foreign Dissem
 TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
11A ravvd,Fcr' amel@DDMOV/135 COIYI ~PBQT [1 ~f2~ 11I X160 ~ LY
TCS-3237/73
activities over the course of the war since 1965, and thus we feel confident
in assigning them a high order of probability.
25X1 D
Source Limitations
4. Over the years, there has been little direct evidence of foreign
military aid deliveries to North Vietnam, which are made almost entirely
by overland transport. Except for occasional solid evidence received in
COMINT military aid estimates have been based
rimarily on indirect evidence from a variety of sources.
traditionally provided fairly reliable evidence of increments to
inventories of these large items. However, determination of imports of small
arms and ammunition could be made only on the basis of observed use
of such ordnance in actual combat plus estimates of losses from Allied
air and ground actions and estimated expenditures for training in rear base
areas.
5. Since the cease-fire, our estimating problem has been even further
compounded by the suspension of aerial reconnaissance over North Vietnam.
The Sino-Soviet transshipment points and the key entry gate along the,
Chinese-North Vietnamese border -- the P'ing-hsiang/Dong Dang complex -
have not been photographed since late January
The Pattern of Military Imports
6. Prior to 1972, the peak of military aid to North Vietnam was
reached in 1967 with the import of large quantities of small arms and
ammunition (principally from China) and SAMs and antiaircraft artillery
(from the USSR). The level of military aid tailed off through the subsequent
three years but began to move up again in 1971, as shown in the following
tabulation:
2
Approved For RP6y 200?1 ~Q~ (O f 1t1 TjQTt'M OX400160001-3
25X1 D
25X1 D
 TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
II~~~IFA?rl'~~1 1: G13~1QF~C~R~~~~g~J TLY
TCS-3237/73
Total 125 85 50 35 45
Monthly average 10 7 4 3 4
7. By applying the same methodology used to derive this data
series - that is, by combining information on observed shipments and
known expenditure rates on the battlefields and in air defense - the level
of military imports for 1972 appears to be about 70,000 tons, or
6,000 tons per month. However, there is convincing evidence that the actual
level of imports, particularly in the past six months or so prior to the
cease-fire, may have been as much as double that average monthly figure.
This evidence is three-fold: COMINT indications of large volumes of military
shipments through rear base areas in North Vietnam in support of the 1972
offensive; large expenditures of SAM and antiaircraft artillery ammunition
from April through December; and numerous sightings of military weapons
moving into North Vietnam across the Chinese border.
8. During the period October 1972 through January 1973, COMINT
revealed that some 50,000 tons of military supplies moved through the
North Vietnam Panhandle toward front lines in northern and southern Laos
and South Vietnam. Of this total, more than half comprised ordnance,
including both small arms and heavy weapons ammunition. Ammunition
in these shipments included large quantities for 122-mm and 130-mm field
guns; for antiaircraft artillery of all sizes; and for mortars, rockets, and
all types of small arms. Weapons, in addition to the normal complement
of individual and crew-served varieties, included nearly 200 detected field
artillery weapons, mostly 122-mm and 130-mm pieces. On a
tonnage-per-month basis, this level of activity represented nearly 7,500 tons
of ordnance. In addition,, in North Vietnam itself, more than 3,600 SA-2
missiles (with a gross weight of 9,500 tons) were fired during the bombing,
along with large quantities of antiaircraft artillery ammunition. In addition,
substantial numbers of associated launchers, radar vans, and transporters
were destroyed.
9. It is, of course, impossible to sa what part of this war materiel
was imported during 1972, but strong evidence that
much of this materiel or replacemen components or it arrived after the
mining. In the period from Ma 1972 through January 1973, armored tanks
were observed in the Ping-hsiang railyard and across the
border at Dong Dang rai yar in North Vietnam.
3
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400160001-3
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
 TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
1/ ,N~l~?~rB^t d a ~~!2~on~ ~~b~r~ %~9 9 9919! 9 L
10. All things taken together, we estimate that during the last half
of 1972 -- and possibly through January 1973 - the Communists
maintained one of the highest average monthly rates of military imports
of the war.
Military Imports Since the Cease-Fire
11. Direct hard evidence of military shipments into North Vietnam
since the cease-fire is virtually nonexistent. This limitation notwithstanding,
4
Approved For Release 2001/09/05: CIA-RDP80T0'F719R000400160001-3
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
 TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
TCS-3237/73
we can make some judgments on military imports since the cease-fire and
what the prospects are for the near term. This is made possible by combining
available current information on trends in the Communist resupply effort
in Laos, South Vietnam, and North Vjetnam with certain facts about Hanoi's
traditional attitude toward military logistics and stockpiling. Throughout
the war, the North Vietnamese have practiced a very conservative materiel
policy -- for every type of ordnance or military equipment provided to
front line forces, they have maintained very large stockpiles in rear base
areas. Thus, we feel confident in the judgment that, as supplies are
continuing to be moved out of North Vietnam into base areas in Laos,
Cambodia, and South Vietnam, the large stockpiles in North Vietnam are
being maintained.
12. There is impressive evidence that a high pace of logistic activity
is continuing. A recent COMINT intercept, for example, revealed that some
6,600 tons of military supplies mostly arms and ammunition - were
moved through the central Panhandle of North Vietnam to the battlefront
in northern Laos during the first three weeks of February. Military supplies
are also continuing to
13. The high level of logistic activity has surged deeper into the
Laotian Panhandle network. During February the flow of supplies through
the entry corridors into Laos peaked, reaching heights at least equal to
that of the same period in both 1971 and 1972, when the Communists
were rushing supplies south to support their opposition to Operation Lam
Son 719 and when they were preparing for their 1972 Spring Offensive.
Within the Laotian Panhandle, supplies currently are moving in all directions
toward all of South Vietnam's major battle zones. Hundreds of trucks are
on the move carrying all types of supplies, including ordnance. Currently,
large numbers of armored vehicles and artillery pieces are en route through
Laos to Cambodia and South Vietnam.
14. There have been no indications in the post-cease-fire period that
the Communists have felt it necessary to conserve supplies while rebuilding
their military capability in South Vietnam. Relatively heavy firing from
130-mm guns and other weapons, including the new Soviet SA -7 Strela
antiaircraft missile and the Soviet AT -3 Sagger wire-guided antitank missile,
continue, and some new SA-2 sites have recently been established near Khe
Sanh.* The continued pattern of such activity indicates that ordnance and
Approved For R, 613e ~ 11pff TU . t' 0J?I7 913000400160001-3
EC M
 TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA
IIr1A~ r~v~c~~~r arse ~ f~5 P6WWP8 WR66646 44 0 f L Y
TCS-3237/73
military equipment are not in short supply, and there have been no signs
that Communist forces deployed in Laos or South Vietnam are expecting
any reduction of supplies in the near term. On the contrary, a late February
report from COSVN - Hanoi's military command for southern South
Vietnam - stated that military forces are to "continue to be supplied,
reinforced, and developed as they were before the cease-fire." In order to
pursue this course, military forces were told to maintain sizable stockpiles
of military supplies.
15. Indeed, there have been several indications that preparations for
future logistic activity are under way.
_a newly constructed segment of petroleum pipeline leading from
Laos toward the A Shau Valley. When completed, this pipeline will
appreciably upgrade the Communist's logistic ca abilit in that area. In
addition, by late February, new Communist
construction of a 70-mile-long is ,wen competed, will provide
a motorable link from southern Laos to the coastal regions of southern
Military Region I in South Vietnam, enhancing enemy capabilities there.
16. This, then, is indirect but convincing evidence that Hanoi's
logisticians have continued a "business-as-usual" attitude since the cease-fire.
The direct evidence - that is, specific indication of military imports into
North Vietnam - is very sparse, but supports a judgment that Hanoi, at
this point at least, has no immediate concern about the foreign sources
of its military supplies.
17. Since the cease-fire, both the USSR and China reaffirmed their
intention to continue sending aid, presumably including military aid under
the terms of agreements signed with North Vietnam late last year. Extremely
fragmentary evidence from COMINT suggests that these aid commitments
are being carried out. Thus far in 1973, about 900 trucks have been detected
in COMINT arriving in North Vietnam via rail from the USSR and China,
as shown in the following tabulation (this rate is somewhat above that
detected in 1972):
Number of Trucks
Total 1973
279
613
892
January
0
181
181
February
279
432
711
Approved For FP@4%eRPPMBT. Cj MF80 (80400160001-3
 Approved F4,Qea,?
I ?-200Ti,5gr,pp 9A
1 AANDL E VIA TALENT - KEYHOLE - CC711 INT-C LV UI: ' ~4' 1j-
TCS-3237/73
18. While some of these trucks may be destined for the civilian
economy, there is little doubt that many of them are going to military
units. A majority of North Vietnam's estimated 23,000-28,000 trucks are
devoted to moving military supplies, and the fact that military logistic
activity is continuing at a high level clearly supports this judgment. COMINT
also has provided evidence of continued deliveries of other types of supplies
for military purposes.
Outlook
19. At present, nothing in North Vietnam's current pattern of
behavior suggests any sense of concern in Hanoi about the availability of
military imports from China and/or the USSR, certainly not the kind of
concern that could of itself constrain North Vietnamese choices with respect
to the level of military activity chosen to further Hanoi's political objectives.
20. In any case, whether or not North Vietnam and its allies intend
to abide by the spirit of the cease-fire and curtail military imports, it seems
likely that there will be a slackening off of such imports in the months
ahead. For one thing, with the halt in US air operations over North Vietnam,
Hanoi's requirement for antiaircraft artillery ammunition, SA -2 missiles, and
other types of air defense equipment has fallen to only a fraction of its.
previous level. These are the most bulky and expensive items in Hanoi's
military aid bill and the most easily detected. It is also likely that, as the
rainy season approaches and ammunition and weapons caches are built up
to desired levels in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, the movement
of supplies into these areas will decline. Even if Hanoi's allies are willing
to sponsor the buildup and maintenance of relatively large weapons
inventories, such imports in the future - assuming no large-scale resumption
of hostilities - might not exceed 3,000-4,000 tons a month - about the
level of the 1969-71 period.
7
Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000400160001-3
TOP SECRET RUFF UMBRA