SIGNIFICANCE OF CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000050015-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 6, 1953
• Content Type: MEMO

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3 URI II fORMA.TION
APR 6 1953
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I O E N C E AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTI TES
6 April 1953
DOCUMENT NO.
STAFF i i1 .NfUH NO. 341 NO H NGE IN CLASS. ^
D cGLASSBFtED
CLASS. CHANGED TOF TS $~ 6vt
St1$JIT p Significance of Current Communist Tactics NEXT REVIEW DATEF
AUTH. HR 70.2
DATEF c RV- BEYIEWERF_01855Z
1, There is no longer any reason to doubt that the recent acts
and statements of the Soviet and Chinese Communist governments mark
a change of Communist tactics. The number and nature of these acts2
the swiftness with which they have followed one upon another, the
prominence given them by the Communist press and radio, the high
authority of the Communist leaders involved,, and the fact that these
unexpected developments began to occur almost immediately upon. the
death of Stalin all indicate, and were probably intended by the Kremlin
to 3 idioate, that a change has taken place in the manner of conduct-
ing Soviet policy. For the time being the Communists have adopted a
conciliatory approach both at home .and abroad.
2 There is no evidence that the ultimate objectives of the Soviet
rulers have changed. or that they have hitherto been misunderstood in
the West. The threat of Soviet armed forces remains as great as before;
the mmnace of communism to the free world is undiminished, and the
hostility of the Kremlin to the West is almost certainly unaltered.
It is Communist tactics and not Coanist aims,which have changed.
30 This change of tactics may indicate no more than that the
i3 c < ass series of conciliatory moves involving no substantial
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oon~cessions to weaken military strength and political coheesicros of the
'estern alliance and to postpone or confuse the decisions of the new
US administration. The Soviets have already seized the diplomatic
and propaganda initiative by their maneuvers 'By continuing to make
minor gestures at little expense,, such as the release of sick and
woun d prisoners in Korea,, the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of
warr and Japanese flahermeen the freeing of Oatia and Sanders, the
settlement of lend-lease obligations,, and similar moves, the Kremlin
may expect to keep the now peace offensive alive for a considerable
time.
t On the other hand,., the change In Communist tactics may signify
that the Kremlin has decided to make sub,tantiai concessionss, and to
negotiate on some Important issues with a view to reaching agreement
rather than solely with a view to waging political warfare. The aims
of such a policy would be the same as those mentioned in the preced-
ing paragraphs but in addition this policy would be designed to
insure an extended period of calm for building the strength of the
Soviet Floc and for consolidating the power of the mw Soviet rulers,
while confidently awaiting the inevitable deecline5 and fall of capitalism.
This is not to say that. the Soviet will accede to all dosteern demands,
or that they will press on to a settlement of all outstanding issues.
The Kremlin would undoubtedly dtive the hardest possible bargains, but
it would do so with the intention of arriving at an agreement
5 The situation is developing so rapidly., and new evidence is
appearing so abundantly, that any estimate of the meaning of the new
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CONFIDENTIAL
IDENTIAL
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Soviet tactics may be out of date before it is written, The entire
series of events since the announcement of Stalings death has occu-
pied less than a month. It would be futile to expect that a change
of Soviet policy could, in such a short time, produce anything more
than gestures and statements. On balance we believe that the Soviets
have in fact changed their approach to the West, that they intend to
make substantial. concessions on some points,, and to negotiate agree-
ments if possible on various important outstanding issues o In particu-
lar we believe that the Communists are now prepared to accept voiuna
tart' repatriation of prisoners in Korea and a Korean armistice, pro-
vided this can be done in such a way as to conceal the Communist abandon-
ment of principle and provided the West in willing to pay the Communist
price, This price will probably seem high to the US9 but it will
almost certainly be designed to appear reasonable to the allies of
the US and to the rest of the non-Communkst world.
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