SE-43: REACTIONS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD TO CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000050006-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 17, 1953
• Content Type: PAPER

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SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
17 April 1953
SUBJECT t SE-43t REACTIONS OF THE NONN C( ,'RJIUNIST WORLD TO
CURRENT COMMUNIST TACTICS
To estimate the probable effects of current Communist "peace"
tactics on the peoples and governments of the non-Communist world.
to The Communist shift in tactics has been manifest for so
brief a period that there is as yet little evidence on-which to base
an estimate of the effects upon the peoples and governments of the
non-Communist world. The popular reactions have been on the whole
at least guardedly hopeful,, while the reactions of most governments
and political leaders have been tentative and cautious,,
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 iz!lnediately C .P. Jta't_ n drmth ccr1l d ea. it r be th er?x~reted by ttda'
~ ~ a real c''c :rtY ti :o iet po1iry ?cr e cwerc th
In ethic.. L? a /;overn n is and peoples, of the non-
Cit31 ~ : :.,;, a':1d are I i i:cly to be receptive to conci .iatot,j es
by the K mlin betuu.ise they we pre&:~r t ,- confronted wi :i ~-3.icti
p 'Lama as uneas ss cver` pos.ible U, zm asures to end t1h4 Korean
e delay irs the ratI.f"tcation c` the 'Curopear, fle"ense T.re;:ty- anal,
the :=eri.an Cor. tractuaa grper-fents,a and cccnomir s trairis attenuant.
Upon e:f 'orts to raise def~:nse p:rc'i;raar to higher 1cvels,'
concessions on the IMI i3sue suf'iciaxtt to trim, ab_at an ar eti
truce in 1Lo ea ;corabinL, :..w tt , .irFvr cencesc:i,ons ul,s :whe.r_c~ ,and?
'series of conciliators ge * tares;; and st.aternents
The pecjles and TovN.rnrr r is of feu tern Eur cpe could we
even .3nor? ccmcessiona as e ecntribi,tion to peame., but the ~ e.t rn
to play upon this ro:eptivi,ty.
gtvarr tents would be disposed to arc t furttter f.'riviet w.ts In the
cc victicn that minor ccncessionsj and even the s1 tng m
Austrian peace treaty, wo}aia not end the r en&ce preseratc:d
i uropr, b ? omrnunism and Novi t power Tiowover
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that the Kremlin offerod to surrender its control over East Germany
and agreed to the establishment of a united, democratic and
neutralized Germany, the governments of Western Europe, including
the West German Government, would almost certainly accept such a
proposal as evidence of a genuine shift in Soviet policy,
1 If, as we believe probable, the Kremlin is unwilling to
accept any solution of the German problem which would Jeopardize
soviet control over East Germany, we do not believe the "peace"
tactics of the USSR would wreck NATO or have other decisive results
in Western Europe, However, the '//astern defense effort would
ti
probably slacken,, military budgets would be cut,, and present force
levels would be reduced.
54 A relaxation of tension, no matter how slight, would be
used by the French as an excuse to delay ratification of EDC, The
French reaction to SIC would be even more negative., if the USSR went
beyond conciliatory gestures and minor concessions and,, for example,
agreed to an Austrian peace treaty, However, over the long run,,
pu y Director or ntelllligence, The Joint Staff, believes that
with respect to Germany the Kremlin may be willing to withdraw its
troops from East Germany, if the Soviet Union considered that by
doing so it could farce the Western Powers to withdraw their troops
from West Germanys and frustrate the EDC program and the rearmament
of Germany, The Communists may also make proposals for free elections
and for the reunification of Germany, in the hope that they would be
able to secure a demilitarized and neutral German state,
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French action on }DC would probably be determined by the
unwillingness of France to jeopardize the alliance with the
U'eM or to risk a German-American "aunderatarnding" from which France
would be excluded0
6a Far Eastern issues which may arise in connection with
or subsequent to an armistice in Korea are likely to be the most
Immediate source of danger to the relations between the US and its
European allies, The views of the US and these allies might
seriousltiy diverge on a political settlement its Korea, on the
future of Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist Government, on
Comm mist China&e admission to the UN, and on trade with Conv=Lst
China, The consequences of such divergence would be most serious if
the European allies of the US believed that the US was responsible for
the failure to settle Far Eastern issues, and that this failure
prevented the settlement of other pressing issues, particularly
in uropeo
7o . If an armistice were concluded in Korea, there would prabw~
ably not be fundamental shifts in the alignment of the nai.Communist
Far Eastern states, An armistice would result in a widespread belief
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in Japan that a major barrier to normsl political and economic
'relations in Asia had been removed., and while the aliment with
the US would continue., there would be strong pressure for the
resumption of economic and political relations with Communist China
and the USSR. Jan armistice would create serious problems for the
Chinese Nationalists and the Republic of Korea, In Southeast Asia,
the effects of an armistice would be determined in part by Communist
ability to convince the governments in that area that the Indo-China
war was a colonial war and that the. Viot Minh was not an instrument
of Communist imperialism., In any case, the neutralist governments
of Burma and Indonesia would probably support Chinese Communist efforts
to gain tiN membership.
8. Communist"peace"tactics would probably have only minor
effects in the Middle East and South Asia, whore the importance of
the East-West struggle has tended to be overshadowed by local concern
over more immediate problems such as the Palestine dispute, the
Kashmir issue,, and the vestiges of colonial power in the area. Greece
and Turkey would remain committed to the West., India would feel
vindicated in its refusal to align itself with either power Bloc,,
In Iran it is unlikely that the Soviet "peace" tactics would include
a lessening of Tudeh agitation against Western influence., and this
agitation would probably be more effective if Iranian fear of Soviet
aggression declined. In Egypt and Iraq, the Communist "Peace" tactics
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would strengthen Nationalist arguments against Western control of
military base facilities. The prospect for the conclusion of
regional defense arrangements involving "iestern participation,
such as LEflO, would be further diminished,
;1 c
Ust,o'risibly attrar ti v trade (,f fer 'Ml l Ch could be
to acconpan the "peacef' tactics mirht constitute an increasingly
fcrnldable Communist wcaponti, particularly if there v:erc ecc>no':dc
reverses in the W est0 Japan would be particularly recept'ivc to
Corcanuriist traf+p offers following a ?Forean armistice because any
reduction in 'rmerioan mlit.,*iry expenditures in Japan would brir4~
serious economic problems to the fore almost at once,, In ?vst
Germany any contraction of export markets would grcntly tncre:xse
the pressure for trade with the Bloc G
10., We believe t'iat Kremlin proposals on disarmament are not
likely to find acceptance in most non-Communist countries or to
divide the, Western allies so long as major political issues renain
outstanding between 'ast and V-'est,,
U,, The reactions of nnnnCommunist peoples and governments will
ze infiuerced greatly by the manner of the U. response to the new
Communist tactics? S' ould the US response be seen abroad as
adamantly negatives tt ere would be a decline in the Willingness of
other states to follow' US :leadership;, On the other hand, if it
appeared that the US9 relying on Communist professions of peaceful
intent, was about to reduce drastically its defense effort and its
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aid to its allies, the confidence of the i.estern Pourers in US leadership
would be shaken. Ifs,: however
y the US appeared willint* to negotiate,)
in consultation with its allies, but at the same time appeared
determined to maintain its military readiness and defensive postare,
there world be little likelihood that the Communist "peace's
tactics would separate the other t7estern Powers from the US,swhich
is almost certainly a primary aim of these tactics e
c EIN1 IAA.
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10, With the important exceptions of Korea and Indochina,
the Comunists have for some time attempted to guide the
Cosal:,unist struggle in Asia more into political channelso
Further "psi" movese such as a Korean armistice may, therefore,
be viewed as a major projection of these Cow unist tactics*
Continuation of the Indochina warp which mat Asian nations
regard as a national struggle for independence rather than as
an instrument of Comrmuni.st inperialtsm8, would probably not
undermine the oftectiveness of Communist peace moves elsewhere
in Aa i$o In particular, a truce in Korea woul4 create a belief
In Japan and Southeast Asia that the major barrier to the
normalization of political and economic relations in Asia
was rem ovedo
Ito In japan,, there would be increased concern over the
eountryes economic future and an intensification of internal
o
pressures for A reexamination of Japans s alignment with the US
and of its present degree of isolation from the Communist 'Bloch
In Southeast Asia the neutralist governments of Burma and
Indoc inab would probably support Chinese Communist efforts
to gain UN membershipo "Peace" moves are not likely to effect
the situation in Malaya although it is possible that local
Communist morale will declin and a curtailment of guerrilla
activities will occuro~ A~-l"~'ae in Korea irobab~ly would create
vu,~~ycx- t
serious problems for theNational' and the
Republic of Korea since it would Jeopardize the pplei~ ieTs nd
DO NO.
aspirations of these government o ^ DECLASSIFIED
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17 Apel.l 19 )
(pg rag aph 7b as rased at clUn-1p session bar IAC rspresentat&ros'
7o If an armistice were concluded in Korea, there would pro.
bably not be fundamental shifts in the aligraaent of the nook-C mist
Far Eastern states. An armieti oe would result in a widespread belief
in Japan that a major barrier to normal political and economic re.
lations in Asia had been ramovsd, and while the alignx ent with the
US would continue, there would be strong pressure for the resumption
of economic and political relations with Communist China and the
USSR. An armistice would create serious problanus for the Chinese
Nationalists and the Republic of Kbreao In Southeast Asia, the
effects of an aitmisticei would be determined in part by Cunmunist
ability to convince the gover;ments in that area that the Indo-China
war was a colonial war and that the Viet Minh was not an Snetrment
of Caenuni.st imperialism. In any case, the neutralist gover ants
of Burma and Indonesia would probably support Chimes Comm mist efforts
to gain UN membereldpo
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9. Ad pti n by the Communist Bloc of-more positive peaceful tactics
toward the non-Communist world would tend to lessen US effectiveness in
the Near East,, South Asia,, and Africa. Greece and Turkey would remain
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unequivocally committed ageax te- USSR,, imt India would feel vindicated
in its refusal to align itself with either power bloc ,d would probably
pose as mediator in any outstanding differences between East and West.
The US position in Iran would be seriously compromised: with the
attraction of increased trade and adjustment of political differences
with the Soviet Union and with the prospect of decreased American interest
in the country,, Iran might be expected to orient its outlook more to the
north. With the apparent passing of the Soviet threat to the Near East?
the West would suffer considerable loss of its bargaining power with
the Arab States. The prospect] for a? regional defense arrangements,,
such as MEDO, would become dim,, indeed. In North Africa,., tensions
between the metropolitan powers and native nationalists would probably be
intensified by increased French resolution to suppress autonomy movements
and by increased nationalist expectation of US support. Throughout the
Near East, South Asia,, and Africa,., local Communist Parties would tend
toward integration with front organizations and thereby accelerate the
progress of social revolution within the countries of the area. With the
apparent passing of East-West tension,, Middle Eastern expectations of
American economic assistance,, following any reduction in American military
expenditures,, would probably be beyond US capabilities? The Small Powers
of the area would tend increasingly to align themselves in regional blocs
in their relations with the Great Powers,, both in and out of the UN.
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