WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T01719R000100060005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 30, 1971
• Content Type: PERRPT

Approved For Release 2001/09/05 : CIA-RDP80TO1719R000100060005-3
C,SA/ SA VA /W VS'vb 7/ 40/47)o
MEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS
Week Ending 30 January 1971
NSA Declassification/Release instructions on File.
For the President Only
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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS
1968-1970
Weekly average for each month
OCTOBER 1970 - JANUARY 1971
Weekly data as reported
October November December
US BATTLE DEATHS dropped to 28 from the 50 report-
January ed last week.
600 600
500 500
z_
r
400 400
200 200
100 100
7000
6000
5000
4000
7000
0
600
5000
~
4000
A Rev
~K*.~?~~;
r ~?
2000
2000
0 0
JFMAMJJASOND
SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS decreased from last week's 232 to
October November December January 144 -- the lowest total since the
November December January
... week of 22 August 1970. The of-
ficial total will change as late re-
- ports are received and will be lower
than the figures released to the
press by the GVN.
continue at a low level with one
battalion-size group and one small
group being detected for a com-
bined estimated strength of 600.
The total number of infiltrators
since 1 October 1970 is now an
estimated 40,400 - 42,800.
ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS rose slightly to 472 from last week's
December January 432.
ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION dropped sharply from last week's
November December January 51/2 month high of 1,996 to 776,
reflecting the lull in fighting in
South Vietnam and the decreased
ARVN presence in Cambodia.
6000
5000 --
4000
3000
2000
1000 1
SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS as measured by the percentage of
October November December January enemy killed by GVN forces de-
3 10 17 24 31 7 14 21 28 5 12 19 26 2 9 16 23 30
Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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Enemy Activity
Enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam was at a low level during
the past week and consisted of light, scattered attacks by fire and
small ground actions. On 1 February (after the technical cut off date
of this report), the tempo of Communist activity increased sharply. We
have received preliminary reports on 58 enemy attacks by fire and ground
probes on 1 and 2 February. Several major U.S. installations such as
the Danang Air Base and Cam Ranh have been hit. No major units appear
to have been committed in this current flurry of attacks, nor does the
enemy appear to be capable of mounting large-scale offensive operations
against major population centers in South Vietnam. Nonetheless, this
surge of harassment is likely to continue over the next week or so and
it may be augmented by rocket attacks against major population centers
and/or attempts at headline-seeking actions by small terrorist or sapper
units.
Communist-initiated activity in Cambodia during the week has been
at a moderate level, following the dramatic attacks on the. Phnom Penh
airfield and a flurry of terrorist acts. Recent Cambodian military
messages have reported large enemy concentrations all around the capital,
but these, so far, are largely unconfirmed. Over the near future, the
Communists probably intend to continue terrorist activity within Phnom
Penh and to conduct small-scale attacks on its outskirts. Attempts to
get petroleum supplies into the capital have met with mixed results.
The first convoy from the oil refinery at Kompong Som to Phnom Penh
along the recently reopened Route 4 was ambushed by the Communists 20
miles north of Veal Renh on 30 January, and lost over 10 trucks in the
action. A Mekong River convoy, however, delivered a large shipment of
petroleum products to the capital safely on 29.January after experiencing
only minor harassment during the journey. In northwest Cambodia, the
enemy conducted only light harassing activity against government posi-
tions and lines of communications.
In north Laos, friendly units (both Lao Army and irregulars) patrol-
ling west of the Plain of Jars continue to search for enemy forces there.
In the south Laos Panhandle, the government has begun a drive back toward
Muong Phalane, which fell to the enemy on 26 January. Farther south and
east in the SILVER BUCKLE area, irregular forces operating along Route 99
have not been attacked since 28 January. On 1 February, irregulars on
the Bolovens Plateau successfully repulsed an enemy attack on one of
their sites.
Enemy Infiltration
The lull in detections of infiltration starts in North Vietnam (NVN)
continues, but recent intercepts from the Vinh area, though not providing
the detail previously received, suggest that a realignment/relocation of
infiltration-associated entities in southern NVN has been completed and
that the southward movement of personnel may again be detected at the
"Vinh Window." During the actual reporting week, however, one regular
infiltration group and a special purpose group were detected in Laos
with a combined estimated strength of 600. The designator number carried
by the regular infiltration group observed in Laos strongly suggests that
at least 10 other groups may have moved undetected through the system in
NVN. Thus, it would seem that the apparent lull in starts in the recent
past may have been more. of a slow-down occasioned by the realignment of
the system in NVN than a true stand-down. Acceptance of the above 600
personnel brings the total number of infiltrators to an estimated 40,400
43,800. These totals would be some 5,700 higher if the 10 gap groups were
included. Meanwhile, the enemy continues to press on with what he terms
his "crash program" and "general offensive" for moving supplies through
the Laos Panhandle.
South Vietnam Developments
With the Tet celebrations in full sway, political activity last
week was largely confined to maneuvering and'planning for next fall's
Lower House and Presidential elections. With Ky undecided whether to
run for the Presidency, and given only a slim chance even by his own
entourage, the prospects of a basically. two-man race between Thieu and
Big Minh seem to be steadily increasing. The An Quang Buddhists, who
helped produce 1.2 million votes for the Vu Van Mau senatorial slate
last fall, met with Big Minh but.remain uncommitted to him because of
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uncertainty over his chances. None of the three potential Presidential
candidates has selected a running mate. A Ky aide floated a report that
Big Minh. has sounded out Ky as a possible running mate, but this may be
a ploy to encourage Thieu to sign him up again for a Thieu-Ky ticket.
Meanwhile, Thieu is continuing to gear up the governmental machinery on
his behalf, e.g., quietly arranging for the Ministry of Information to
organize seminars for local officials and institute other promotional
activities. Our Saigon Station believes that Thieu's success in con-
25X6A taining domestic unrest and in providing at least temporary economic
stability has given Thieu the edge
could change in the coming months.
Communist Developments 25X6A
Although the Communists in Paris have suggested in the past that NSA
they could do business with a Big Minh government, they appear now to
be taking the line that the outcome of South Vietnam's Presidential 25X1X6
election is of little concern to them. A senior Viet Cong negotiator,
Nguyen Van Tien, in the NSA
unlikely event o a Minn victory, in m g the the
war. Tien implied that Minh was tainted in Communist eyes because many
of his Buddhist supporters, were under some degree of American influence.
Tien's remarks jibe well with those of his superior, Xuan Thuy, who re-
cently came close to a public assertion that the Communists would not
deal with the 1971 Presidential election winner no matter who he turned
out to be. Both Thuy and Tien stressed that the war was going to last
a long time and that the Communists were prepared to see it through.
For several years Hanoi has not publicized meetings of the Party's
Central Committee -- the last meeting publicly acknowledged was the
12th Plenum in December 1965. It is thus interesting that Hanoi news
media have announced that the Central Committee's 19th Plenum was re-
cently held. The wide publicity being given to this plenary session
and its associated communique is probably a device for emphasizing the
Party's determination to carry on with current policies relating to
both the war and to domestic programs.
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