COMMUNIST REATIONS TO US ESTABLISHMENT OF A 'VOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000020002-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 13, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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SPECIAL ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US ESTABLISHMENT
OF A "VOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS"
Published 13 April 1953
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 9 April 1953. The FBI abstained, the subject
being outside of its jurisdiction.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. p
o DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO,. TS S? ipq
NEXT REVIEW DATES l 1
AUTH: HR 10.2
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WARNING
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COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US ESTABLISHMENT OF
A "VOLUNTEER FREEDOM CORPS"
PROBLEM
To estimate Communist reactions to US establishment of a "Volunteer Freedom
Corps" (VFC) composed of anti-Communist "escapees" from European Satellite
States formed into national units under the command of US officers, and to psy-
chological warfare measures designed to stimulate escape and enlistment in such a
Corps.
ESTIMATE
The Kremlin's Estimate of the Corps'
Significance
1. The Kremlin's primary concern with the
establishment of the VFC would be to de-
termine its significance as an indicator of
over-all US intentions toward the USSR and
toward Soviet control of the Satellite States.
Much would therefore depend upon the gen-
eral context of US policy and action in which
the VFC was presented. Regardless of the
terms of enlistment, the national groups
established, the degree of US control, and
other related factors, the Kremlin would cer-
tainly regard the establishment of the VFC
as a further indication of US determination
to liberate the Satellites. However, it would
regard the VFC as part of a long-term pro-
gram, not as an indication of imminent US
military action.
2. The Kremlin would be unlikely to regard
the VFC as in itself a militarily important
force. It would appreciate the difficulties
inherent in the recruitment, administration,
and utilization of such a force, and it would
probably estimate that Communist counter-
action could prevent it from becoming a large
and effective military organization. The
Kremlin would probably estimate, however,
that in the event of general war the VFC
could have significance as a rallying point
for defectors.
3. The Kremlin would probably estimate that
the most significant aspect of the VFC would
be its psychological and subversive potential
within the Satellite States. At the same time,
the Kremlin would estimate that it could
exploit psychological warfare opportunities
arising from establishment of the Corps by
the US : e.g., by contrasting Soviet efforts
for peace with US preparations for a new war,
or by stressing US recruitment of European
manpower to fight US battles. It would al-
most certainly estimate that establishment
of the VFC would generate new strains
within the Western alliance.
Probable Communist Counteraction
4. The establishment of the VFC would be
unlikely, of itself, to cause the Kremlin to
adopt countermeasures which, in its judg-
ment, would involve increased risk of general
war. Neither would the Kremlin be moved
by the VFC to make concessions designed to
bring about a relaxation of tensions.
5. The principal Communist counter-effort
would probably be an intense propaganda
campaign, within and beyond the Bloc. This
campaign would be designed to frustrate the
US propaganda effort in support of the VFC
by discrediting the VFC as a device for re-
cruiting European "cannonfodder" to fight
for US imperialism, by discrediting the US as
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preparing for new aggressions, in contrast to
Soviet efforts for peace, by stimulating re-
newed effort and vigilance within the Bloc to
counter hostile US designs, and by creating
fear and dissension within the Western alli-
ance. In the course of this campaign the
Soviet, Satellite, and West European Commu-
nist agencies of the Kremlin would probably
evince a greater alarm than the Kremlin
actually felt.
6. In coordination with this propaganda cam-
paign, the Satellite governments would al-
most certainly take political action in the UN
and elsewhere to indict the US for subversive
intervention in their internal affairs. The
Satellite governments would further restrict
the movement of US nationals within their
territories and might even sever diplomatic
relations with the US, with a view to termi-
nating all US access to Satellite territory.
7. However, if the Kremlin at the time of the
establishment of the VFC were engaged in an
attempt to reduce international tensions, its
reaction might be more moderate in character
and might be delayed.
8. The Communist authorities would of course
exercise their ample police powers to prevent
effective recruitment for the VFC from the
Satellite States. They would reinforce their
already formidable frontier and internal po-
lice controls, terrorize prospective recruits,
and threaten retaliation against their families
and friends. However, they would probably
arrange for a minimal and controlled flow of
recruits designed to penetrate the Corps, sub-
vert or intimidate its members, establish clan-
destine control within it, and destroy its use-
fulness. The Communists would also seek to
use the VFC as a means of extending their in-
telligence activities, particularly if elements
of the VFC were to be trained in the United
States.
9. If for any reason the VFC were not a suc-
cess, the Kremlin would certainly exploit to
the full the psychological advantage thus
obtained.
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