SE-39: PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PASSING OF STALIN FROM POLITICAL POWER (DRAFT)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79S01011A001000010024-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: March 5, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL
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S URIT! INFORttTION
L E N T R A L I TELLIOENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
5 Moxch 1953
SUE T SE 9s ft*obable Conecs uen?es of the Passing of Stalin
f rc Political Power (Draft)
a. The prob11, i of transfer of authority from Stalin is' one of
hs most aampL= and dangeraus which the Soviet system could face
We boliove that thin traefea' will be initially effe@ta d in an orderly
mm. esp and that there will be no Immediate es rrnal e'idaane of dis
g: aion within the ruling group of the USSR. Agreement seem to have
boon reached within the ruling group for a eollastive exerrrciae of
pior in the name of the Centrra1 Co mittee4 In view of the ocnapicuaim
and appar&Atlly planned elevation of Malenkov since 19I89 and partiou-
larly his prominent role at the 19th Party Congress in October 1529
it Is likely that Malenkov will be the dominating figure for the
imdia future.
2 0 ' After the first fats month, however, a vigorous struggle for
fur mty deveop within the Soviet hierarchy. Given the nature of
the Soviet state8 this struggle will probably be ca> ised an mainly
within the w ss of the Krolin., and it is unlikely to develop into
o.u civil ware Out of the content one man is likely to emerge as
upr , At present )lal,enkov so most likely to be the amnq but
It .is is ssiblle to predict his success with confidence.
DOCUMENT NO.
CONFIDEN AL
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3? -T ho ;passing of St&iin ,AIL romos an ai rat whop w'hiibo
and datoxt aired to spread Soviet swerrd wars not TWk1o13C
He was aou 1y oonoima both of the noaossity to vi4 a ?trM9
indu triii base f military berg and of the o sWwo of exch a
zo in the US. F t?thorno D he was able to impose hia caution on
11, agents of the UUSSR.
Sm It would be unsafe to assay that Stew a suoo?ssorrj, or
aepocesoa , will have his caution,, h rvapwt for the poor potent .
of the S q or his ability enforce caution upon all agents of the
USSR. H noo it is poesihle that a shift in Sovidt policy M n eur,
leading to more roc kless oou rge of action.
50 In tho near future, however., the now Sov t leadership viii
of t @artain foRk the foroi n and doamastio pol ins established
daring cent years. The scent 19th ?arty Casnpares pro dod an
authoritative o
351ti of these poiioien o they oa11 fors (),I) the
avoid 9 of di nt military cch onge to the Western aware,, while
etriving through political warfare to divide them; (2) the continua-
tic of :tha forced development of the Soviet Indus iai
aratton .~fdr any eventuality.
e in prep.-
6o We believe t t# on balancep the death of Stalin makes war
i the near futi e leas rather than more likely.
The prdbable etxua.Ie for her within t h@ Soviet hiaraaf 9
and t ho co in a iffioultie attora ling the eetablishment of the n
gix.9
event then. frrr
will pro oupy the un kl Y td r P,"'
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a time,, from giving energetic and vigorous attention to the conduct
of foreign affairs.
8. The death of Stalin removes not only the dictator of the
Soviet Union, but the undisputed header of World Coe eanism No
successor is liked - .to achieve comparable statue or similar ? signifim
canto as a symbol at the worldwide movement o If the struggle for
der within-the USSR should be prolonged, Soviet control over the
C *nmunist movement outside the Bloc would almost certainly be eer-
iously shaken; in any event it is likely to be somewhat impaired.
9. Kremlin control over the Satellites is so firm that we do
not believe it will be immediately impaired by the death of Stalin,
unless there should be such a prolonged and violent struggle for poorer
in the USSR as gravely to weaken the Soviet state.
10. Relations between Tito and Moscow are unlikely to change
as a result of the death of Stalin. The antagonism was not purely
personals, but arose, from a genuine clash of national interests.
t oreovers, Tito has taken action and adopted positions which it would
be extremely difficult for him to reverses and the Kremlin could not
recognize Tito aw pan independent Communist ally without undermining
its position, in the European Satellites.
11.E Tftoca prestige and influence as a schismatic Communist
leader will expand with the passing of Stalin* This may be most
apparent . in the increase of Tito0 s influence over individual Conu-
waists and left-wing feller-travellorso particularly in Western Europe,.
?3?
cQENTIA1.
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We do not believe that Titots influence within the- Satellites Will
increase, unless there should be a prolonged and violent struggle
for power in the USSR.
12. We believe that Stalin's death will have no inmadiate effect
upon Sinn-Sos-#et cooperation or upon Chinese Communist foreign Policies-
However,, no successor to Stalin will have prestige and authority in
Asia comparable to his. The stature of Mao as leader and high priest
of Asiatic Communism will inevitably increase with the disappearance
of the former supreme leader. Mao will almost certainly claim more
influence in the determination of Bloc policy, especially in policies
affecting Asia, but he will not seek or obtain leadership of the
International Communist moveme