POLAND: THE PAPAL VISIT (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

,,Approved-For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
 Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
National Security
Information
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions
NOFORN (NF) Not Releasable t Lalvie. and Ldhuania irda the
Sov;e; Union. Names .;ntl hountlary represairfal~n
J {~ \
i.~~r~~~ ~~ ,<
Gniez o
Pazna~i~Iune ~ ? --, ~ '~
~, ~~. _ WARSAW
{~ ~ ~' ~r0$ecie
~~ ~ - -' ` P o ~I a n d ~~ Avport
Arrival /une 2
1
ioa
Milometers
AilStfit.~ ih 'r _ __- ~
Confidential ii
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
 Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
Confidential
Poland:
The Papal Visit (U)
Key Judgments The visit of Pope John Paul II to his Polish homeland from 2 to 10 Jure- -the
first papal visit to a Communist country -promises to be an occasio ~ for a
demonstration of Polish religious and national feeling, much of it wish anti-
communist overtones. Thi has made Communist authorities-botl: Polish
and Soviet-uneasy, but they presumably have concluded that perry fitting
the visit is less risky than denying it. At this stage all sides involved n the
event-church, state, and ?he Vatican-have a stake in an untroubled visit:
? The Polish regime has opted, after some initial hesitation, to associate
itself with the visit, hoping to dilute the visit's inherent anti-Communist
content and to garner some popular good will.
? The Polish episcopate hopes the visit will bolster its efforts to secu-e
further concessions from the state.
? For the Vatican, the trip is a bold gambit in what is developing into an
active papal foreign policy, particularly toward Communist countries. (c)
The visit will draw the largest crowds in the history of Communist I"oland.
This raises the possibility that, despite the best efforts of all involve~~., an
untoward incident could turn pervasive popular discontent into antic egime
disturbances. Moscow will be watching for signs of any significant ~ hift in
popular Polish attitudes toward the USSR and the Gierek regime, and for
any ripple effects elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the USSR. (c;)
iii Confidential
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
 Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020~~f~lentiat
Poland:
The Papal Visit (u)
The visit is an outgrowth of the Pope's personal interest
in celebrations of the 900th anniversary this year of the
martyrdom of St. Stanislaw, Poland's patron saint. As
Archbishop of Krakow, the Pope (then Cardinal
Wojtyla) took a strong hand in propagating the
commemoration of Stanislaw, an 11th century bishop
of Krakow whose death at the hands of an unpopular
king has become identified with Polish patriotism,
national unity, and the primacy of religious over
secular values. The visit, moreover, will be an emo-
tional one for the 59-year-old pontiff, the first Polish
cleric ever to head the Roman Catholic Church, and
will include a stop at his birthplace in southern Poland
near the Czechoslovak border. (u)
A joint state-church committee has been hammering
out the details of the visit for several months, and these
negotiations have continued to the eve of the Pope's
arrival. The state authorities, who reportedly antici-
pate that upwards of 2 million people may gather at
any one time, have been trying to limit the crowds for
both political and security reasons. The church shares
the latter concern, and the two sides have agreed that
to maintain order:
? The visit, at least major portions of it, apparently will
be carried live on Polish television, even though this
will further erode the state's restrictions on church
access to the broadcast media.
? The Pope will appear in four regions of the country,
reportedly traveling between cities by helicopter.
? Teams of clergy and uniformed police reportedly will
share responsibility for crowd control in order to
reduce the danger of an incident precipitated by
overzealous police restraints.
? Admissions to some outdoor masses will be limited
and sales of alcoholic beverages will be banned from
1 to 3 June.
Some local officials are also trying to keep workers at
work and students at school during the visit. These
efforts probably have done little more than annoy the
populace, and are not likely to reduce significantly the
size of the crowds. (c)
The visit should give new strength to a chura~ that,
despite the hostile official environment in wh!ch it
functions, is among the most vibrant in the ~~rld. The
extraordinary strength of Polish Catholic_~sm is attrib-
utable in large part to its strong identificatia; with the
culture and history of Poland's highly natio~~listic
population. (u)
Church leaders in Poland undoubtedly hope i hat the
visit, and indeed the whole reign, of a Polish (pope will
give new momentum to its efforts to roll bac>f
numerous and longstanding restrictions on ct:urch
activity. Among the episcopate's goals are:
? More permits for building and renovating c hurches.
? Greater access to the media, including som= new
church publications, less censorship of existing publi-
cations, and permission to broadcast masses +~n radio
and television.
? Increased opportunities for the religious ed~~cation of
young people.
? An easing of state restrictions on the churc is social
and charitable work. (c)
f he Pope may use the visit to tell party leads r Gierek
and the Polish episcopate about his preferred choice of
a successor to the ailing Stefan Cardinal Wyazynski,
who has headed the Polish church for more t?~an 30
years. With the departure of Wojtyla from the Polish
hierarchy, the 78-year-old Cardinal has no oi~vious
successor. (c)
'The regime's initial obstructionism appears t > have
reflected differences within the party leadera~iip over
the acceptability of the visit, sensitivity to tltt~
.~ntiregime symbolism of the St. Stanislaw cxlebra-
tions, and an unwillingness to let the Vati:,an alone
decide the timing of the visit. Several reports claim
that party leader Gierek personally gave the.;:o-ahead
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
 Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
other end oi~ the spectrum, conservative party, police,
and veterans groups, wnsidering the visit an
unacceptable boost to the church's position, might
attempt to provoke incidents to embarrass both the
Pope and regime leaders. Few Poles, however, would
wish to spark widespread civil disorder that raised the
possibility of Soviet intervention. (c)
The new Pope undoubtedly sees his visit as a
convenient way to emphasize his keen interest in the
condition of the Catholic Church in the USSR and
Eastern Europe and his intention to press this interest
forward in a vigorous matmer. He has already taken
steps to review the status of the church in each East
European country and to develop strategies for
normalizing relations between the Vatican and the
individual regimes. (c)
The direct impact of the visit elsewhere in Eastern
Europe and in the USSR itself, depending largely on
the availability of Western or Polish media coverage,
will probably be felt in regions bordering Poland,
especially in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
Poland's visa-free travel agreements with both coun-
tries raise the possibility of a large influx of religious
pilgrims, especially from strongly Catholic Slovakia.
Political considerations and the enormous problems of
assuring facilities for so many visitors may prompt the
Polish or other East European authorities to restrict
travel to Poland. (c)
Pope John Paul II, left, greeting Unclassified
Cardinal Wyszynski shortly after the pontiJ.f's
Investiture in Ocdober 1978.
for the visit, but even then the regime stubbornly
insisted that the visit not coincide with the annual St.
Stanislaw celebrations in early May. The church
conceded, but then simply extended the celebrations to
encompass the period of the Pope's trip. (c)
The regime's objectives seem mostly of a damage-
limiting nature. Gierek's decision to meet with the
Pope seems to reflect his hope of turning the visit into a
testimonial of church-state cooperation, projecting a
general sense of self-confidence and political strength
that the regime in fact lacks. (c)
The regime and probably the church hierarchy remain
concerned that dissident groups in Poland might try to
use the Pope's visit to advance their own causes. At the
The Soviet authorities undoubtedly take a much more
ideological view of the papal visit than do the Poles.
For the Soviets and some other East European
regimes, the visit will be an unpalatable demonstration
of faith in a radically different set of beliefs by people
nominally under Communist rule. The possible travel
of high-ranking clergy from elsewhere in the region,
moreover, presents additional delicate political prob-
lems. The Czechoslovak regime apparently is pressur-
ing Cardinal Tomasek, head of the Catholic Church in
Czechoslovakia, to stay home; Hungarian church
leader Lekai, on the other hand, intends to go to
Poland, probably with regime approval. The Soviet,
and presumably the Polish, leaderships are evidently
not eager for John Paul II to be host to a summit
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
 Confidential
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
Polish primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski Unclassified
and Polish Communist leader Edward Gierek
have met twice to the last six months, largely
in connection with the papal visit.
meeting of East European churchmen in the heart of
the region. (c)
The visit is not likely to produce any dramatic rollback
of restrictions on church activity in Poland. Indeed,
initially there may even be a period of cooler church-
state relations. After the visit, Gierek may feel the
need to make a show of tougher policies at a time when
the episcopate-still basking in an outpouring of
religious fervor-might be expecting some immediate
gains from the visit. (c)
Both sides will probably exercise their customary
caution and in the longer term the visit may encourage
a continuation of the piecemeal concessions that have
characterized Gierek's conciliatory policy toward the
church. For a party that officially disdains religion as
the "opiate of the masses," the Polish party is
singularly dependent on the good will of the chu*ch.
The episcopate, for its part, undoubtedly valuesthe
influence it has on a weakened regime, but shams the
state's fear of civil unrest that could provoke Se~~iet
intervention. (e)
Another consequence of the visit might be further steps
toward diplomatic relations between Warsaw ar~d the
Vatican. The two sides agreed to establish "per~ranent
working contacts" in 1974. Warsaw quickly staaioned
a representative in Rome, but the Vatican did nF~t
reciprocate. The Vatican may now be interested in
going as far as full diplomatic relations, because of a
desire to aid the church during apost-Wyszynslk.i
succession period in Poland and a general cone n with
church-state relations in Eastern Europe. The 13s~lish
regime, which had long favored the presence of r_ papal
nuncio in Warsaw to help undercut Wyszynski':,
position as Polish primate, presumably is less
interested now that the possibilities for thus ~ow~ng
discord between the church in Poland and the Vatican
arc; substantially reduced. Wyszynski's fears ab?:~ut his
role being diluted by the presence of a Vatican
representative in Warsaw may lessen now that his
former loyal subordinate is the Roman pontiff, and he
too may see value to Vatican representation in ~%arsaw
for the long-term strength of the church. (c)
Relations with Moscow will be the Pope's major
concern, however, both because as an East F:ure~pean
he realizes the importance of the Soviet attituch to
developments in the region and because of the Catholic
Church's very poor situation in the USSR. The Pope
does hold some cards. The Soviets presumably ~~~ould
like to obtain. formal Vatican recognition of the union
in 1946 of the Orthodox and Ukrainian Catholic
(Uniate) Churches, the regularization of the dixacesan
boundaries that presently overlap the Soviet-Polish
border, and the general appearance of a coat~er!tive
relationship with the Vatican. Moscow will be reluc-
tant, however, to allow the church more leeway n the
heavily Catholic areas of Latvia, Lithuania, ar~i
Belorussia, because religious faith is closely inter-
twined with nationalist aspirations and dissident activ-
ity. (c)
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
 Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
Sources of Copyrighted Photographs
Page 2: Stern
Page 3: Zai Przecis
Confidential 4
Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
 Approved For Release 2002/01/03 :CIA-RDP80T00942A001100020001-0
rApproved For Release 2002/01703 `. CIA-RDP80T009~42A00'f100020001-0