THE OUTLOOK FOR PRESIDENT PAK AND SOUTH KOREA'S DISSIDENTS (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A001100080001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

National
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NOFORN-NO00NTR.iCT-
Assessment ORCON
Center
The Outlook for President Pak
And South Korea's Dissidents (c)
Research for this report was completed
on 4 June 1979.
The author of this paper is East
Asia/Pacific Division, Office o o rtica nalysis. It
has been coordinated with the Office of Economic
Research and the National Intelligence Officer for
East Asia and Pacific. Questions and comment;
may be addressed to the author at - (t!)
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Secret
PA 79-10253
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National Security
Information
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
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Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subiect to Criminal Sanctions
NOFORN (NF)
NOCONTRACT (NC)
PROPIN (PP)
NFIBONLY (NO)
ORCON (OC)
REL...
FGI
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Derived from multiple
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The Ojutlook fo .s: de it Pak
And South Korea' , ) s nts
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ORCON
The Outlook for President Pak
And South Korea's Dissidents (c)
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Key Judgments President Pak Chong-hui's government has come through another s=.)ring-
historically the time for increased antigovernment activities in Sout 1
Korea-without serious trouble or large-scale protests from the country's
dissidents. Earlier this year, Pak's security advisers were concerned hat the
release from prison of Pak's longtime adversary, Kim Tae-chung, w"uld
encourage greater political unrest this spring. They also feared that ? he
country's high inflation rate and the prospect of President Carter's 1 isit to
Seoul this summer would further embolden human rights activists. (c)
The failure of the underlying malaise to disrupt domestic tranquilit} in
South Korea so far reflects inherent weaknesses of the dissident mor ement,
including the inability of Pak's critics to articulate goals with broad ippeal
in Korea. Beyond this, the massive precautions taken by government
security forces to head off disturbances and the positive economic atd
political initiatives the Pak government has taken to strengthen key bases of
support-initiatives that have recently been receiving greater recogrition
from foreign observers of Korea-have been especially important. (s NF)
The "Saemaul Movement" -a multifaceted government program tlf, at
promotes both economic development and grass-roots political partic ipa-
tion-has been an especially successful mechanism of the Pak goverment
in strengthening support in the countryside. Pak's overall manageme nt of
the country's rapid economic growth has also fostered the emergence- of a
more influential urban middle class in Korea, which, for the most pa,t,
supports Pak and has a growing stake in the political and economic s_atus
quo. (c)
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June 1979
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NOFORN-NOCONTRA
ORCON
As he begins his 18th year as South Korea's national leader, Pak seems fully
capable of retaining his firm grip on power into the 1980s. Pak is not
invulnerable, however; if he should suffer from a major policy failure-a
severe down turn in the economy, another escalating crisis in relations with
the United States, a mishandling of some other key national security issue,
or an overreaction to dissident activities-the now diffuse signs of domestic
dissatisfaction could coalesce, and Pak might not have a sufficiently deep
reservoir of support to maintain his political position. (c)
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NOFORN-NOCONTR rCT-
ORCON
The Dissidents' Base of Support
Students, Christians, and Workers
The Dissidents' Goals and Tactics
The National Assembly Election
President Pak's Goals and Tactics
The Saemaul Movement
Pak and the Middle Class
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ORCON
The Outlook for President Pak
And South Korea's Dissidents (c)
The Dissidents' Base of Support
The essential problem faced by South Korea's
dissidents remains how to marshal popular support
beyond the relatively small circle of students, Christian
activists, and intellectuals who are active primarily in
Seoul. Some dissident leaders felt that conditions
conducive to broadening their movement were begin-
ning to develop early this year. In their view, these
included:
The return of Kim Tae-chung. Kim is an able speaker
and talented politician who has been in and out of
prison for alleged political crimes since 1971, when he
nearly defeated Pak in the presidential election. When
Kim was released by Pak late last year, South Korean
dissidents hoped that Kim's presence would provide
their movement with badly needed leadership.
Inflation. South Korea's dissidents have been frus-
trated in recent years by the country's economic boom
but, with inflation rising at a 20-percent annual rate,
some believed that they finally had a bread-and-butter
issue they could exploit politically.
The ROK-US Summit. Few Korean dissidents believe
that the meeting between Presidents Carter and Pak
will prompt any major liberalization in Seoul, but some
evidently hoped that Pak would avoid harsh repressive
measures to ensure a smooth summit, thereby creating
better opportunities for them to challenge the system.
Iran. Only Pak's most extreme opponents see advan-
tages in fostering the kind of upheaval that took place
in Iran. Even so, a wider spectrum of dissidents has
taken heart from the fact that a figure as powerful as
the Shah could be unseated. (c)
Despite these developments, dissident activity did not
increase this spring. Kim Tae-chung is still a popular
figure in South Korea; and his support appears to have
helped Kim Yong-sam, an aggressive member of the
National Assembly, to win the presidency of South
Korea's major opposition political party. But since his
release, Kim Tae-chung's activities often have been
circumscribed by security officials, and some dis-
sidents believe that his long years in confinement have
reduced his political skills. Although popular concern
with inflation continues, Pak has moved to dissipate
potential unrest by reshuffling his economic ministers
and launching a highly publicized anti-inflation cam-
paign. (c)
Dissident hopes that President Carter's visit wa;ild
bring greater opportunities are also fading. On May
Kim Tae-chung and other dissident leaders issued a
statement opposing the summit on the grounds That it
would provide support for President Pak's "dictato-
rial" rule rather than aid the cause of human rights.
Finally, the movement's attention to events in Lan
seems to be ebbing, although the perception of that
trauma may have left a residue of feeling that Pak is
not invulnerable in the longer term. (c)
For the present, the number of South Koreans v ho
associate themselves with antigovernment statements,
attend protest meetings, or are otherwise engag'd in
struggle against the Pak government, is small. I xclud-
ing the students, whose involvement in politics i~ 25X1 C
intermittent, active dissenters probably number from
the hundreds to perhaps a few thousand out of a
population of some 37 million
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Over the years, dissident leaders have tried doggedly to
enlist the participation of Korean industrial workers in
the struggle for liberalization, but with only the barest
glimmerings of success. Most skilled and unskilled
Korean laborers see improvements in their status and
appear more interested in upward economic mobility
than in politics. The majority of these dissident
activists still seem to come from the intelligentsia-
writers, ex-professors, and journalists-and a small
group of the more militant politicians and Christian
leaders. (c)
Students, Christians, and Workers
The dissident ranks can swell quickly when the
university students mount demonstrations, as they
often have after the winter vacation and the resump-
tion of classes in March and April. The university
students led the marches that unseated President
Syngman Rhee in April 1960, and students and other
activists organized sizable political protests in the
latter 1960s and again in the early 1970s. The harshest
criticism of Pak has often come from the university
students in the Seoul area who now number more than
70,000. (c)
Many South Koreans, however, appear less sympa-
thetic toward student demonstrators now than in
earlier years. There are signs that the average Korean
wage earner, who formerly tended to regard students
as the "conscience of the nation," now sees student
protest as a reflection of immaturity and lack of "real
responsibilities." Moreover, many students who ac-
tively oppose the government while in college abandon
their militancy after graduation when they join busi-
ness firms or enter government service.
South Korea's Christians, about 5 million people, or
about 14 percent of the population, comprise another
minority that plays a significant role in the Korean
dissident movement. Church leaders have long had
contact with US and European missionaries, and, like
the students, they have been exposed to and attracted
by Western political ideas. Selected Christian leaders
have continued to speak out strongly against President
Pak's authoritarian rule, although the established
hierarchies of both the Protestant and Catholic
churches generally have been reluctant to take a
leading role in the dissident struggle in recent years.
Christian militancy seems to have been dissipated both
by the church's concern that excessive involvement in
politics might result in a loss of privileges ad by its
grudging respect for Pak's accomplishments in improv-
ing general living standards. (c)
The Dissidents' Goals and Tactics
The best known intellectuals among Pak's critics have
been able to make their positions known in Korea,
although governmentcontrols over political dissent,
including continued-albeit informal-press censor-
ship, have limited the dissemination of their views. For
example, three prominent government critics-Kim
Tae-chung; the elder statesman of the opposition,
former President Yun Po-sun; and militant Protestant
clergyman, Ham Sok-hwan-managed to issue a
harsh antigovernment declaration to foreign journal-
ists and a few Korean reporters shortly after the
Korean Independence Day anniversary in early
March. (c)
Catholic Cardinal Kim Su-hwan, another longtime
prominent figure in the dissident movement, also
strongly criticized the Pak government on 5 March in a
sermon at the Myongdong Cathedral in Seoul. The
opposition has often used that pulpit to express its
views. A major anti-Pak manifesto in March 1976, for
example, resulted in the prosecution of its 18 signers in
a highly publicized trial. (c)
These dissident declarations, and more recent state-
ments by new opposition leader Kim Yong-sam-
which have not been reported fully in the Korean
press-have reiterated several familiar themes:
? The 1972 authoritarian Yushin constitution has
established a dictatorial system.
? The longer Pak remains in power, the greater the
danger of a major upheaval in South Korea.
? The valued goals of anti-Communism, national
security, and economic growth must not destroy
democracy.
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Kim Tae-chung, dissident leader
upon his release from confinement
in December 1978
? The present corrupt and exploitative regime would
not be supported popularly if war broke out.
? The restoration of democracy should precede
reunification.
? Negotiations with the North must be based on the
moral strength stemming from real democracy at
home. (u)
The dissidents' goals and concerns clearly demonstrate
that Pak and his critics agree on important elements of
Seoul's economic and defense policies. Their differ-
ences lie in their attitudes toward political freedom.
Emergency Measure 9, which bans "false rumors" and
any criticism of the authoritarian Yushin Constitution,
is particularly disliked. Also condemned are the
provisions of the constitution that permit Pak to
appoint one-third of the membership of the national
legislature and to secure an unlimited number of ix-
year terms as president simply by obtaining the
endorsement of a hand-picked electoral body. Mc -e
recently, the continued detention by the Pak gove n-
ment of some 200 political prisoners, who were nc t
released in the general amnesty late last year, hai
become a prominent issue. (c)
There are conflicting reports on the specific tactic; the
dissidents will adopt this year. Kim Tae-chung at d
Yun po-sun,
fined an ambitious plan for
con ron a ions wt the government, including co rdi-
nated nationwide student strikes, widescale labor
agit.ttion, and the formation of a broad front o+ va -ious
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Kim Tae-chung's reentry into partisan politics recently
suggests he is indeed interested in a more conventional
approach. Kim's move marks a shift for South Korea's
dissidents; in recent years, the dissidents have been
scornful of the opposition New Democratic Party,
criticizing it for saying that the present political system
is unjust while, at the same time, participating in and
profiting from that system. Now, Kim's involvement
with the NDP raises the possibility of a broader
cooperative relationship between a more moderate
dissident movement and the opposition party. (s NF NC)
Such an alliance could have advantages and disadvan-
tages for both partners. The dissidents might gain a
measure of legality for their activities, greater public-
ity, and access to the National Assembly. The NDP
image, in turn, could benefit substantially from an
infusion of idealists, many of whom have served time in
prison for their convictions. (s NF NC)
On the debit side, the dissidents would have to accept,
however reluctantly, a measure of legitimacy for the
present Korean political system, and the New Demo-
crats would risk opening themselves up for retaliation
should the dissidents press the party to challenge
President Pak's authority. In any event, both the
dissidents and the NDP will be held back by their
narrow bases of support and their lack of success in
identifying issues with broad appeal in Korea. (s NF
NC)
4
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the main opposition group-the New Democr,tic
Party (NDP)--outpolled the DRP by nearly 2 t( 1;
overall, the NDP won 32.8 percent of the vote,aining
an edge over the ruling camp for the first time.
NF NC)
South Korean officials close to President Pak ..t-
tempted to put the best public face on the election.
They claimed that the substantial voter turnoa t-77
percent-showed that Korean voters took the ? lection
seriously. They noted that a democratic election had
ieideed taken place, and also pointed out that respite
the overall popular vote, the DRP actually won more 25X1 C
seats than its rival NDP, by 68 to 61. The officals
emphasized that the election was one of the fairest in
Korean history,
Additionally, Pak's supporters argued that rer I power
:t std the direction of national policy were not actually at
stake in the election and that, should an electi in
involving these matters be held, the voters would give
Pak a renewed mandate. (s NF NC) 25X1 C
a growing number ?5X1
t-
South Koreans cast their votes in the 12
ecember National Assembly elections. Only 31.7
percent of the voters endorsed candidates explicitly
identified with President Pak's ruling Democratic
Republican Party (DRP)-6 percentage points less
than the DRP received in the last assembly election in
1973.
been many changes in Japan's political leader hip 25X1 C
without any interruption of economic growth, and that
development would continue in South Korea even with
Pak absent from the scene.
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President Pak's Goals and Tactics
military officers seized power in the spring of 1%,I, the
consolidation of a stable political order --along - it.h
the defense of South Korea against North K