AFTER THE INVASION: HANOI S VIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000800090001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Assessment
Center
After the Invasion:
Hanoi's View
Researchfor this report was completed
on 19 March 1979.
Secret
RP 79-10158C
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March 1979
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Until recently, the world must have looked
reasonably promising to Hanoi. A little more
than a year ago, Hanoi's relations with its
non-Communist Southeast Asian neighbors
were improving and there was even movement in
its relationship with the United States. Although
aid from the West was not as great as had been
hoped, a large package deal with the Japanese
was nearing completion and foreign oil com-
panies were anxious to exploit Vietnam's
offshore resources
The one cloud on the horizon was Kampuchea,
where the Pol Pot regime's raids across the
border were proving both bloody and costly to
the Vietnamese economy. After proposals
for negotiations and a limited punitive strike
failed to change Phnom Penh's behavior, Hanoi
concluded in early. summer that a military
solution was its only option. Vietnam's relations
with China, which had been deteriorating
as the Vietnamese-Kampuchean conflict
mounted, were substantially reordered when
Coo eration
Hanoi signed the Friendship and I
Treaty with Moscow in November.
Following the signing of the treaty, Vietnam's
leaders rejected the cautious approach of slowly
building a guerrilla force to topple Pol Pot in
favor of a bold strike designed to quickly
destroy all vestiges of the Pol Pot regime.
Hanoi's invasion in late December proceeded
very rapidly and, at least superficially, appeared
to be devastatingly successful.
Since then, developments have been uniformly
negative from Hanoi's point of view. With the
invasion, Hanoi's international image was
transformed from underdog-an impression it
had sustained throughout the previous Viet-
namese war-into aggressor, despite the brutal
nature of the Phnom Penh regime. As time
passed, it became increasingly clear that most of
Pol Pot's forces had evaded the Vietnamese
onslaught and regrouped as an effective guerrilla
force. More ominously, Beijing began a major
military buildup,
In making their fateful decisions of the past
several months, Vietnamese leaders may have
anticipated heavy costs to Vietnam and some-
what less-than-optimum results. But Hanoi
almost certainly did not foresee its present
degree of difficulty. Indeed, at this juncture,
Vietnam faces a set of very serious, interrelated
problems:
? A prolonged and bitter war in Kampuchea,
which Hanoi will have great difficulty in pros-
ecuting or extracting itself from.
? A continuing state of high tension with China
that could easily lead to a renewal of fighting.
? An increasingly dependent relationship with
the Soviet Union, which provides some im-
mediate benefits but has already brought de-
mands for concessions that Hanoi is reluctant to
grant and which limits opportunities to improve
relations-and procure aid-elsewhere.
? An economy that was sorely taxed even before
the invasion of Kampuchea and that can only
hope to develop in peacetime.
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Kampuchea
The failure of Vietnam to deliver a knockout
blow to Pol Pot has mired it in what seems
certain to be a protracted and bloody guerrilla
war. Its opposition is well organized, adequately
armed, and highly motivated. The Vietnamese
are overextended and plagued by morale and
supply problems. Hanoi's puppet government in
Phnom Penh is incapable of ruling and has failed
to attract any significant international support.
For a variety of reasons, the Vietnamese have
been unable to capitalize on anti - Pol Pot
sentiment in Kampuchea. Moreover, the longer
they must remain in the country to shore up
their puppet government, the more the tradi-
tionally anti-Vietnamese populace will regard
them as an army of occupation.
Despite its difficult position, Vietnam is unlikely
to abandon its long-term objectives in Kampu-
chea. Vietnam sees itself as the rightful heir to
France's Indochina empire, and it has long been
a fundamental foreign policy goal to bring
Phnom Penh into the same "special relation-
ship" Hanoi has with Vientiane-that is, de
facto Vietnamese control. Hanoi has been
strident-even moralistic-in justifying its actions
in Kampuchea. While the latest reporting in-
dicates Vietnam now realizes it is in for a
tougher and longer struggle than it originally
planned, the reporting also makes clear that
Hanoi intends to maintain its equities there
come what may.
Militarily, Hanoi has some flexibility. It could
choose to try to maintain its control over as
much of Kampuchea as possible-a task that will
drain badly needed manpower and resources and
almost certainly result in higher casualties. Or, at
some point, it could draw back some of its
forces scattered about Kampuchea, consolidate
its hold on the major towns in the central
region, and establish firm control over the
eastern portion of the country while it builds a
Kampuchean infrastructure to front, and per-
haps eventually to fight, for Vietnames:~ in-
terests. Retrenchment, however, would provide
Pol Pot's forces with a totally secure sanctuary
from which they could rebuild and eventually
pose an even greater military threat.
Either option could be combined with a call for
a coalition government in which all the inter-
ested parties would be represented but gerry-
mandered so that Hanoi's forces would dom-
inate. Hanoi would then hope that such a
government could attract the international
support its present puppets lack. Hanoi ap-
parently has :extended feelers to Prince Sihanouk
about heading such a coalition, but he has
turned them aside.
Hanoi probably will have to bleed far more than
it has so far before it seriously considers nego-
tiating a genuinely neutral Kampuchean Govern-
ment. It would be especially difficult for Hanoi
at this time because it would appear that Hanoi
was capitulating to Chinese pressure. A settle-
ment in any case would be extremely hard to
come by; Hanoi almost certainly would insist
that Pol Pot not be part of a compromise
government, a condition the Chinese could
readily accept, but one that neither Hanoi nor
Beijing may be able to bring about. As far as we
can determine, Pol Pot remains the effective and
unchallenged leader of the Kampuchean resist-
ance and his removal would be difficult to
engineer.
China
China's invasion raises the fundamental question
for Hanoi of whether it can afford to go much
longer without reaching some modus vivendi
with China, Although China's troops have been
withdrawn, they remain poised across the border
for future incursions, their presence there
underscoring the point that Vietnam cannot
disregard Chinese interests with impunity nor
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fail to see the hardly subtle inference that Viet-
nam, in the last analysis, must acknowledge
Chinese primacy in the region. This is not a
new problem but an attitude Hanoi has faced
and dealt with for hundreds of years in a con-
stant struggle to assert its independence of
Chinese suzerainty
Vietnamese distrust and animosity toward China
has been a continual underlying strain in the
relationship of the countries, submerged for
political reasons during the war but inevitably
surfacing afterward as Hanoi began to more
forcefully assert its national prerogatives. Signs
of friction appeared quickly over competing
claims to the Spratley and Paracel Islands and
multiplied as Vietnam and China began to
compete for influence in the region
Rapprochement would involve trimming some
basic foreign policy goals. Hanoi and Beijing are
natural competitors for political influence in
Southeast Asia, and the rivalry has come to a
head in Kampuchea. Hanoi is determined to
establish in effect, if not in name, an Indochina
Federation. Beijing is just as committed to an
independent Kampuchea that would help
contain Vietnamese influence. Hanoi's close ties
to Moscow add a special intensity to the rivalry,
but it would have developed to some level even
without Vietnam's tilt toward the USSR. Thus,
emotions and politics have combined to produce
a tension that may fluctuate but is unlikely to
dissipate and that will always underlie--if not
undercut-any modus vivendi.
For now, Hanoi may simply hope to reduce
some of the tension in the relationship and with
it the potential for another confrontation with
China by entering into negotiations on the
border problem. While talks seem likely to begin
shortly, any negotiations are likely to be dif-
ficult and unproductive, at least at first, while
Vietnam assesses anew the Chinese threat and its
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own position in Kampuchea. Initially Hanoi may
have as its main goal simply to keep the talks
going in the belief that China is less likely to
resort to force while the negotiations continue.
Soviet Union
The Vietnamese-Soviet relationship is an uneasy
one. Hanoi is suspicious of Soviet intentions in
Vietnam and believes Moscow would be pre-
pared to sacrifice key Vietnamese interests to
advance Soviet ends. Hanoi began a tilt toward
Moscow after the end of the Vietnamese war in
1975, because it believed the Soviets could
better provide badly needed economic assist-
ance. Hanoi moved even closer to the USSR as
relations with China deteriorated, in the hope
that the relationship would serve as a check
on China.
Not only did the relationship fail to act as a
deterrent to China, it greatly increased Chinese
hostility and complicated Hanoi's relations with
other countries. Many Western aid donors began
reconsidering their pledges to Vietnam. Hanoi's
carefully cultivated image of independence
suffered greatly, both in Southeast Asia, where
it was attempting to allay fears of creeping
Soviet involvement in the region, and among
nations of the Nonaligned Movement, where it
was seeking support for its actions in Kam-
puchea and its position vis-a-vis China. Hanoi's
chances of improving relations with the United
States were also dealt a severe setback
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Finally, Hanoi may not be entirely pleased with 25X1
the support it received from Moscow during its
border war with China.
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The Soviets have provided Hanoi with military
equipment, and they
have sought an increased military presence in
Vietnam in exchange, perhaps a naval base or a
Soviet-run logistics facility. A decision to
grant such a privilege would be most painful for
Hanoi. It has stated repeatedly that it did not
fight for 30 years to expel the French and
Americans only to turn the country over to the
Soviets. The increased Chinese threat, however,
makes it difficult for Hanoi to reject Moscow
out of hand, and the port calls now being made
by Soviet naval ships on an ad hoc basis may
represent a compromise.
If Moscow insists on more, Hanoi is sure to raise
its price as well-most likely by calling for a
Soviet statement that it will not tolerate another
crossborder operation by China. The Soviets
may well be hesitant to make such a commit-
Hanoi has few options other than Soviet sup-
port. It could conceivably attempt to improve
relations with the West, particularly with
France, which sympathized with Hanoi during
the Chinese incursion; but the West offers less
protection against China than do the Soviets.
Vietnamese dependence on Soviet patronage is
also likely to grow apace as a result of the
cumulative strains on the economy caused by
military needs diminished Western aid, and bad
weather. r77 I
The Economy
Vietnam has already paid a high price for its
invasion of Kampuchea and the need to increase
its defenses against China. Badly needed human
and material resources have had to be diverted
from Vietnam's faltering economic development
program, and many Western aid donors either
have cut, or are considering cutting back, their
aid pledges. These costs can only mount in the
months ahead.
The indirect costs to the economy of the present
situation may be even greater and more im-
portant in the long run.
ie nam as
little chance of becoming se -sufficient in food
under prevailing conditions.
The war has taxed Vietnam's already over-
burdened administrative system.
ecisions im-
portant to the management of the economy are
being dela ed or made by less qualified erson-
nel.
ome o the slack will a pic a up
by Soviet ai , but as the war increases, Viet-
namese aid requirements are likely to grow.
Are Changes in the Offing?
We know very little about how decisions are
made in Vietnam, and Hanoi is very good at
concealing debate. The problems Hanoi faces
and the questionable decisions that have been
made nevertheless suggest that political re-
criminations and debate over future policy may
be the order of the day in Hanoi. But, before
prophesying leadership instability and dramatic
policy reversals, a word of caution is in order. In
the past, the fortunes of individual leaders have
risen and fallen, but there have not been whole-
sale purges at the top. It is conceivable that
hardliners on the Politburo, who seem to be the
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principal architects of current policy, may lose
some influence as a result of Hanoi's predica-
ment, but it is important to remember that in
the past Vietnamese leaders have shown remark-
able unity in the wake of major policy blunders.
Moscow. But once again its history shows that
Hanoi is prepared to persevere and make the
necessary sacrifices when it believes its basic
interests are involved. While some in Hanoi may
be arguing for major changes, Vietnam's great
national pride, its traditional hatred of China,
and its own feelings of manifest destiny in
Certainly, Hanoi has overextended itself and Indochina are powerful factors working toward
faces some pivotal decisions regarding Kam- revision of present policies rather than dramatic
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