THE GAZA STRIP: A PRIMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80T00942A000800070002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Gaza. Strip:
A Primer
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.~TF 79-10153
,aareh 1979
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 A Primer
The Gaza Stri :
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Foreign
Assessment
Center
Information as of 16 March 1979 has been used
in preparing this report.
The author of this paper is
Office of Re ional and Political Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be
directed to the author on
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The Gaza Strip:
0
While the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations have
tended to address Gaza and the West Bank together,
the two areas are quite different. For example, an
estimated 80 percent of Gaza's more than 400,000
residents are Palestinian refugees-or their
offspring- and about 44 percent of the West Bank's
700,000 residents are refugees. Gaza is also a political
anomaly. Once a district of Palestine, the area has
since 1948 been a questionable spoil of war detached
from any larger entity. Today Israel administers Gaza,
but does not regard it in the same emotional or
historical light as it does the West Bank. Nevertheless,
Israel, for security reasons, believes it must retain a
military presence in Gaza for the indefinite future.
Egypt advances no claim to sovereignty over Gaza, yet
it considers Gaza its responsibility because of its
former role as administrator of the territory.
President Sadat's search for creditable Palestinian
residents of the West Bank and Gaza to participate in
negotiations to establish a local self-governing entity
has so far been unsuccessful. The traditional Gazan
elite-led by members of the Shawwa clan-is
tempted by the offer of autonomy, but it is shackled by
refugee support for the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion, which opposes the accords. Political dynamics in
Gaza are essentially a struggle between these two
groups. The PLO hardliners so far have the upper hand
on the question of negotiations by reason of their
numbers and their ability to intimidate opponents.
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International boundary
- Armistice line
All-weather road
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The Gaza Strip:
A Primer (U)
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President Sadat talks of negotiating a comprehensive
settlement with Israel, even if King Husayn of Jordan
"does not accept his responsibility." Sadat's meaning is
vague, but he presumably intends, at least in part, to
see that a local self-governing entity is established in
Gaza, where he can legitimately claim to play a role.
Success will depend on Sadat's finding local Arabs
,willing to participate in the negotiations.
No individuals who have a credible political base in
Gaza have so far come forward. We believe, however,
that there are Gazan politicians who are tempted to do
so. It is, therefore, possible that Sadat will be able to
proceed with negotiations for the autonomy of Gaza,
offering the results as a model for what might be
achieved on the West Bank. This paper is intended to
serve both as a primer on the Gaza Strip and as an
assessment of its political dynamics, in anticipation of
negotiations to resolve its status.
History
Before 15 May 1948 the Gaza district of Palestine
comprised the entire southern half of the country and,
as a part of Palestine, was administered by the United
Kingdom under a mandate from the League of
Nations. On 15 May 1948 the British mandate was
terminated and the Arab-Israeli war began. Egyptian
forces entered Gaza city, which became the headquar-
ters of the Egyptian expeditionary force in Palestine.
The area of Egyptian control was reduced by the
fighting to a narrow strip of coastal territory 25 miles
long that became known as the Gaza Strip. Its borders
were demarcated in the Egyptian-Israeli armistice of
24 February 1950; its southwestern limit was the
prewar boundary between Egypt and Palestine.
During the 1948 fighting, the Strip became a haven for
Palestinian refugees. Egypt did not annex the territory
after the armistice, but administered it through
governors whose rule is remembered as harsh.
Between 1949 and 1956 there was a gradual escalation
of violence between inhabitants of Gaza and the
neighboring Israelis. Israel temporarily occupied the
area during the 1956 war, but relinquished control to
Egypt in March 1957 under US and UN pressure
Anti-Israeli activity accelerated in the Strip in the
mid-1960s with the formation of the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization. The Palestine Liberation Army,
Fatah, and the forerunner of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine were all active in mobilizing
the population against Israel up to and during the 1967
war. After the Israelis occupied the Strip in 1967, these
groups went underground and used the refugee camps
as bases for attacks on the occupation forces. Israel
crushed the guerrillas in 1971 and rooted out the PLO
organization. Armed resistance has since mostly
ceased in the Gaza Strip.
Israel regards the Gaza Strip as an anomaly. In its
view it has neither the emotional and historical
associations of the West Bank nor is it part of Egypt.
But because of its proximity to Israel's populous
coastal plain, Israeli leaders strongly believe they must
retain some measure of control over the area to prevent
it from again becoming a staging base for Palestinian
terrorist attacks.
Egypt presently considers Gaza its responsibility until
Gaza achieves self-determination as part of an inde-
pendent Palestinian state or as a self-governing entity.
Cairo does not include annexation of the Strip among
the options available to Egypt, in part because of the
large refugee population in Gaza.
Jordan, which took control of and ultimately annexed
the West Bank portion of Palestine after the 1948 war,
maintains economic links with Gaza, but advances no
claims of sovereignty.
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The Gaza Strip is a narrow rectangle of land along the
Mediterranean Sea between the Sinai Peninsula and
the Israeli border. Only about 25 miles long and 4 to 8
miles wide, Gaza's area of 145 square miles is slightly
more than twice the size of Washington, D.C. Gaza
city is 40 miles by road from Tel Aviv, 62 miles from
Jerusalem, and about 240 miles from Cairo.
The topography is characterized by sand beaches along
a straight shoreline, sand dunes and sparse vegetation
in the west, and sandstone ridges in the east. Alluvial
soil is found inland, which supports citrus plantations
and field crops; agriculture is the major economic
activity. The small areas of loess soil in the eastern part
are the most productive; the soil in the south tends to be
saline and more sandy. Coastal areas are covered with
sand dunes, though there are some pockets of soil that
retain moisture and are cultivable. Water supply is
precarious; it is dependent on wells tapping under-
ground aquifers fed by rainfall seepage. Average
annual rainfall is about 14 inches.
Gaza has no known commercially exploitable natural
The Gaza Strip, with about 2,000 persons per square
mile according to a 1967 census, is among the more
densely populated areas of the world. By comparison,
the population density of Bangladesh is about 1,400
persons per square mile.
Gaza's population is estimated to be over 400,000 and
growing at an estimated annual rate of 3 percent. The
exact growth rate is obscured by the migration of
Palestinians to the West Bank and other Arab states.
It is a young population, with nearly half the people
under 15 years of age. It contains more females than
males, especially in the 20-to-30 age group. Gazan
towns-Gaza city (1967 population, 87,793), Khan
Yunis (1967 population, 29,522), and Rafah (1967
population, 10,812)-have become artificial urban
centers in that they are dense residential areas for
native and refugee o ulations who work elsewhere.
Principal population movements were the influx of
Palestinian refugees between 1948 and 1949 and a
much smaller exit of these refugees from Gaza since
1967. Present outward movements consist largely of
workers commuting daily to jobs in Israel and the West
Bank and the temporary migration of young males to
study in Arab universities or take jobs in other Arab
countries. Over 95 percent of Gazans are Arab and
Muslim.
The influx of refugees raised the population from
72,000 in 1946 to 280,000 in 1949; the natural increase
of the 1948 refugee population is largely responsible
for the area's current population of more than 400,000,
of whom the refugees comprise over 80 percent. About
60 percent of the refugees continue to live in the eight
camps administered by the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA). The camp refugees, espe-
cially, remain a distinct social and political element
that has not been absorbed into the surrounding
communities, regarding themselves as temporarily
separated from their homeland.
There are between 500 and 600 Israelis in the Gaza
Strip. They are associated with the military govern-
ment, security, or the six Israeli settlements. A new
settlement was recently established in the southern tip
of Gaza. Israeli settlements are located near main
traffic arteries and interspersed at regular intervals
between major towns.
The emphasis in Israeli settlement planning since the
1967 war has been on the Jordan Valley and Jerusa-
lem. Settlement activity in the Rafah approaches along
the northeastern Sinai coast and in Gaza began about
1971, after armed resistance in the Strip had been
crushed.
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All Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are
administered by the Israeli Defense Force under
martial law. Gaza settlements are of two types-the
nahal and the moshav. Nahals are paramilitary
settlements established by the Nahal (Fighting Pio-
neer Youth Corps) of the IDF. They are normally
converted to civilian status after a few years. Two
Gaza nahals, Netzarim and Mora , are exceptions to
this rule
A moshav is a farming community in which each
settler has a separate home and works his own piece of
land leased from the state. Produce is marketed jointly.
There are two moshavs in the Gaza Strip and another
under construction, all affiliated with the National
Religious Party of Israel
Set against the refugee population is a traditional Gaza
social structure-politically conservative, landowning,
and with economic links to Israel and Jordan. The
Shawwa clan stands above the others in economic and
political influence. Its wealth rests on ownership of
large portions of Gaza's arable land and control of the
citrus export business. The Shawwa clan numbers
about 5,000. Its titular head and wealthiest member is
71-year-old Rashid Shawwa. As mayor of Gaza city,
he augments the clan's economic power with control of
political patronage.
The religious makeup of the Gaza population is
overwhelmingly Muslim. The Christians (fewer than
4,000) are mostly Greek Orthodox. The Greek Ortho-
dox community consists largely of educated
professionals; it is quite prominent in the Gazan court
system. A small Roman Catholic community of 250
consists mostly of poor refugees from northern Pales-
tine. The Baptists, supported by foreign funds, manage
a major hospital, although the local Baptist community
is small.
Medical care and education are adequate and provided
by UNRWA to the refugees and by Israel and private
charitable groups to both refugees and native Gazans.
Educational levels are higher in Gaza than in the West
Bank and slightly higher among refugees in Gaza than
nonrefugees. UNRWA provides free education to
male and female refugee children through the ninth
grade. About 50 percent of all Gazans have had five or
more years of schooling; 17 percent have 11 or more
years of schooling. Each year several hundred students
attend vocational schools operated by UNRWA or by
Israel. Of the 10,000 Palestinian students studying at
Egyptian universities in 1977, 9,000 were from Gaza.
The Egyptian curriculum is used in Gaza, and access
to Egyptian universities is an important factor in
sustaining Egyptian influence in Gaza.
Local health conditions are typical of those in a
developing society-high fertility and mortality rates,
and poor sanitation. UNRWA and WHO maintain
good health conditions in the UNRWA refugee camps.
Food appears to be available in sufficient quantity and
quality.
The Economic Setting
Gaza is basically a commercial center, with some
agricultural activity and a few small industrial plants.
Surrounded by the wastes of the Sinai and the Negev,
Gaza has a poor location as a transportation cross-
roads. At present, the economy is almost totally
dependent on labor, trade, transportation, and power
ties to the Israeli economy.
Gaza's economy has grown rapidly in the past decade.
Per capita annual income is estimated at $500 to $700.
(Jordan's is near $500 and Egypt's around $300.)
Growth of real gross national product since 1968 has
averaged an impressive 13 percent annually.'
The rise of the standard of living in Gaza is less a
product of economic development than a derivative of
full employment and worker remittances from abroad.
Full employment became possible after 1968 when
Israel allowed Gaza's surplus labor to work in Israel,
mostly as unskilled day laborers in the construction
and agricultural sectors. About half of the employed
labor force works in Israel-mostly as unskilled day
laborers in the construction and agricultural sector.
'GNP measures total output of an economy, all goods produced and
all services rendered. GDP, by contrast, excludes income earned
abroad by residents of a territory-a particularly important factor in
the case of the Gaza Strip-an overseas investment income.C
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Worker earnings from Israel-roughly $100 to 150
million annually-account for perhaps-40 percent of
GNP. In 1978, per capita GNP surpassed $700, well
above the average for less developed countries.
Such unemployment as does exist in Gaza is centered,
ironically, among the better educated, because the
demand in Israel is for cheap, unskilled labor.
Trade Patterns
During the 1948 war Gaza was cut off from its natural
hinterland, which became part of Israel. Economic
links were then forged with Egypt, which at that time
administered the territory. After the 1967 Israeli
occupation of Gaza, economic ties again shifted. The
old links to Egypt were reduced, and a gradual
integration of Gaza's economy with that of Israel
began. Gaza became a source of cheap labor and a
protected market for Israeli manufactured goods.
Israel has also become a market for Gazan agricultural
exports. Exports to Israel have jumped threefold since
1974. About 60 percent of all exports now go to Israel,
including products such as wicker furniture and soft
drinks that would be difficult to market elsewhere.
Arab restrictions on trade with companies that invest
in Israel have encouraged a few international firms to
locate in Gaza. These companies produce largely for
the Israeli market. Some exports, primarily citrus and
other agricultural products, are trucked to Jordan for
reexport to Iran and other countries in the Middle
East.l
On the import side, Gaza is almost totally dependent
on Israel. Although this is due largely to Israeli
controls, the poor port facilities in Gaza would make
trade with other areas difficult in any case. In addition,
in contrast to its Arab neighbors, Israel produces a
wide range of manufactured goods demanded by the
Gazans.
Gaza's communication, transport, and power systems
are now tied to the Israeli systems. Differences remain
in the areas of tax and finance.
Jordan is economically important to Gaza because it is
the funnel through which Gaza markets its citrus crop
in the Arab world.
Gaza's inflation rate-25 to 30 percent annually-is
somewhat lower than that experienced by Israel. Most
of the inflation is attributable to theeconomic links
that have evolved with Israel. Most goods and services
are purchased from Israel, and higher wage rates in
Israel have forced up wages in Gaza.
Agriculture is Gaza's most important economic sector,
accounting for 26 percent of employment, 28 percent
of the gross domestic product, and about 90 percent of
all export earnings- Industry is mostly restricted to
traditional crafts, small workshops, and assembly
operations for Israeli manufacturers.
Gaza is administered by an Israeli military governor
assisted by 130 civilian technical personnel and 150
Israeli Defense Force personnel who supervise a local
policeforce of several hundred.
Gaza has no elected officials-the last election was in
1964-and organized political activity is banned.
Local government is provided by Arab mayors in four
municipalities and seven villages, each assisted by a
council. Mayors and councilmen are appointed by the
Israeli governor.
The governor meets regularly with about 30 Gazan
notables, the mayors, and the heads of the city
councils. Israel allows Gazan officials some leeway in
local matters and patronage power in return for a
degree of cooperation. The officials are wary of
appearing openly to be doing Israel's bidding because
Gazans tolerate but do not accept Israeli rule.
Because political organizations are banned, most
political activity takes place in ostensibly nonpolitical
societies. The Benevolent Society for the Welfare of
Gaza Strip Inhabitants is probably the most important
of these because it is run by the Shawwa family and
represents the interests of the conservative traditional
elite.
Rashid Shawwa, Mayor of Gaza city, is the most
prominent member of the Shawwa clan. He acts as
Jordan's unofficial representative in Gaza. He derives
considerable political leverage from his control of
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permits for shipping goods to Jordan and of the
Jordanian passports and identity papers that are
necessary to travel from Israel or the occupied
territories. Shawwa was first appointed mayor by
Israel in 1971, but was dismissed in 1972. He was
reappointed in 1975.
Shawwa's health reportedly has grown more delicate
during the past year. He has not groomed a successor,
and there does not at present appear to be a strong
leadership figure waiting in the wings in the Shawwa
or other major clans, the Gaza civil administration, the
religious establishment, or the refugee community.
Rashid Shawwa's departure in such circumstances
would thus, at least in the short run, probably lead to
an unraveling of political power in Gaza and some
fragmentation of the re ion's moderate leadership.
The mayor is a pragmatist who clearly recognizes that
he is a bit player in a high stakes game in the Middle
East. He has so far managed to walk a narrow line
between the conflicting demands of the Israeli occupa-
tion and his constituents, mostl b cultivatin an
improved image with the PLO.
The mayor's economic interests-and those of his clan
and other traditionalist backers-are built on the
export of citrus products, mostly to Jordan, with lesser
exports to Israel and Europe. In past years, Shawwa
has expressed support for a federation of Gaza and the
West Bank with Jordan. He has said that a resolution
of the Palestinian question must include an interna-
tionally guaranteed corridor between Gaza and the
West Bank. He looks to Egypt only for trade and
education and not for political links. Shawwa has
indicated he would accept, as an interim step, Palestin-
ian self-rule under the supervision of the United
Nations or the United States for a period of four to five
years to prove that a small Palestinian state represents
no threat to Israel.
Shawwa and his supporters must be very tempted to
join Egypt and Israel in negotiating autonomy for
Gaza. Participation would entail great personal and
political risk if the PLO opposed, but it would also offer
Shawwa the prospect of preserving his clan's power at
the expense of younger, more radical political rivals
whose base is in the refugee community. The Mayor's
final position is likely to be determined by his reading 25X1
of the attitude of King Husayn, the PLO leadership,
and the Saudis. The pro-PLO and antiautonomy
forces in Gaza are the dominant voice at present in
part because of their tactics of intimidation. I
In the wake of President Carter's breakthrough on a
treaty this month, Shawwa has publicly rejected the
idea of holding autonomy negotiations first in Gaza,
claiming that this could spark serious divisions among
Palestinian leaders. He has stressed that the Israeli
plan for autonomy does not go far enough in the
direction of Palestinian self-determination. I
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The first prerequisite Shawwa has attached to his own
participation in a Gaza autonomous regime is that it
must have "real substance," including in probable
order of importance:
? Arab control over Gaza water sources and state
lands.
? A moratorium on new Israeli settlements.
? An Egyptian liaison office and security force.
? A more effective Arab-controlled Gaza police
force than the area's current ragtag outfit.
? Arab control of the Gaza civil administration.
? An end to the Israeli veto on Gazan development
In addition, Shawwa wants Egypt and Israel to appear
to impose autonomy in Gaza. By this line of reasoning,
the two countries would conclude their negotiations
over the powers of the self-governing authority and
then declare their intention to implement the arrange-
ments with or without the participation of Shawwa and
other major Gazan leaders.
Shawwa would argue with the PLO that he joined the
autonomous regime in order to prevent a takeover by
nonentities or Israeli collaborators.
by the peace process.
A major consideration for Rashid Shawwa must be the
attitude of the Palestinian refugees (over 300,000) in
Gaza. Most are pro-PLO, and it is doubtful that an
effective governing body could be formed without their
cooperation. Pro-PLO Gazans tend to repeat publicly
the hardline PLO position opposing Camp David, but
we suspect some are concerned about being left behind
The exact strength of pro-PLO sentiment in Gaza is
difficult to measure. Israel destroyed the formal PLO
organization in the camps during its crackdown in
1971, and it is not likely to allow a reestablishment as
long as Israel has a political role in the territory. Some
covert organization may still be present.
The PLO viewpoint today is often expressed through
the Red Crescent Society, the Muslim counterpart of
the Red Cross. The society is led by two native Gazans
who were former members of the PLO Supreme
Council of Gaza, Dr. Haydar Abd al-Shafi and
Abd al-Shafi is president of the Red Crescent and on
the board of trustees for Bir Zeit University, the only
four-year university on the West Bank and a center of
PLO support. Abd al-Shafi is a longtime political rival
of Rashid Shawwa. He severed his official connection
with the PLO in the early 1970s in order to avoid bein
deported from Gaza by the Israelis.
Abu Sitah is another longtime PLO official and a
former member of the Executive Committee of the
Palestine National Congress. Israel linked him to
bombings in 1969 and deported him from Gaza. He
remains active in Gazan affairs and is believed to have
been allowed to return to Gaza.
%-VI11111u111J1-a11u a VIUbl, t:ullauulalul Vl ill-JlIa11. F-1
Rayyes' family reportedly controlled Gazan politics
during the Egyptian occupation when many of the
Shawwa family were imprisoned
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Other sources of tiro-PLO sentiment in Gaza are
Zuhair el-Rayyes, a lawyer and editor of the pro-PLO
Jerusalem daily, al-Fajr, and Fayyez abu Rahme,
head of the Gazan bar association. El Rayyes is a
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Pro-Egyptian Sentiment
Pro-Egyptian opinion in Gaza is much less strong than
pro-PLO opinion. It is fostered by Gazan access to
Egyptian universities and by an overriding desire to
end the Israeli occupation, which translates into
support for Sadat's peace policies. Shawwa clan
leaders and some mayors support Sadat's peace
initiative, though political realities preclude their
publicly taking that position. Sheik Hashim al-
Khazeidar, the Imam of Gaza, is Sadat's most
outspoken supporter, and he led a delegation to Cairo
following Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. Rashid Shawwa
refused to participate unless the PLO approved. They
did not and instead accused Khazeidar of being an
"Israeli stooge." Israel has indeed boosted
Khazeidar-they appointed him Imam-and he has
little standing in Gazan politics.
The local Arab administrators of the UNRWA
program, who are relatively free of both Israeli
influence and that of the traditional power structure,
constitute another political force in Gaza. The
UNRWA group's importance would probably increase
if Gaza were faced with the practical problems of self-
government because UNRWA has the experience and
machinery to administer the area.
Local UNRWA officials are drawn almost exclusively
from among the refugees. They preside over a
multimillion-dollar operation that is in constant touch
with the population through the administration of
schools and hospitals; control of housing, food, and
vocational training; and the dispensation of consider-
able patronage. It is the most thoroughly organized,
largest, and best funded administrative structure in the
Strip.
UNRWA was established in December 1949 by the
United Nations General Assembly to assist persons in
the Gaza area, West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria who were displaced by the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Field work began in May 1950. The agency serves all
eligible refugees whether or not they live in the camps.
UNRWA services are supplied directly to individuals
not through the governing authority.
The United States has no official presence in Gaza, but
it is active in providing aid through the UN and various
private relief agencies. US assistance for the West
Bank and Gaza began in fiscal year 1975 under the
Middle East Special Requirements Fund, established
after the 1973 war. Funding for West Bank and Gaza
development projects has in recent years been set at $3
million.
The aid program is a bilateral US-Arab effort, and
assistance is channeled through US voluntary agen-
cies, not the Israeli Government. The principal agen-
cies involved are the Catholic Relief Services and the
American Near East Refugee Aid.
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