NFAC SUPERGRADE CEILING

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP81-00142R000600100003-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 4, 2001
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 6, 1978
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP81-00142R000600100003-5.pdf559 KB
Body: 
- , F r ~+~ PENS 78-2529 Approved Foetal V%8r07~11 L1RL4002L00 - n01 03- 6_a 6 sE DO/A Registry File MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence FROM . F. W. M. Janney Director of Personnel SUBJECT . NFAC Supergrade Ceiling REFERENCE . Memo for DDCI fr D/NFAC dtcl 8 Aug 78, same subject 1. This memorandum contains my comments regarding reference, as you requested. It should be noted that the supergrado ceiling allotted to NFAC is not necessarily a sum of the number of supergrade positions in that component. Supergrade positions are established or disapproved on their own merits. Supergrace ceiling is allotted by assigning a pro rata share of the Agency supergrade ceiling to each Directorate in order to establish the number of promotions available at each level. 2. The comments which follow must be prefaced by the fact that some of the positions referred to in reference are as yet unevaluated. The positions in the Requirements and Evaluations Staff, for example, were addressed in the survey of the Office of the Comptroller when the staff belonged to that Office.-_e survey indicated that three of the five supergrade positions in that Staff should be downgraded to GS-15. While it is possible that the re--r anization impacted on those positions, definite determinations can -e made after the positions are analyzed as they now exist. NFAC Review Panel Reference proposed three super-grade positions be attached to the Office of the Director, to provide him with an independent review of major intelligence - oduction. PMCD will evaluate these positions as soon as position descriptions are made available to them and my recommendations will be forwarded as soon as those evaluations are complete. Consideration rust also be given to the impact of those positions on existing NFAC review panels and senior positions, as well as whether the positions might be more appropriately implemented in some other employment category such as Contract Employee, Independent Contractor, etc. Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600100003-5 Is ra ive .- Internal Use, Only $.' bait Use "r, Approved For Releae 2001/08/07`:'-CIA- 81- 14 ODWO100003-5 Senior Intelligence Specialists The concept of establishing supergrade positions for "Senior Intelligence Specialists" is the subject of a separate memor.:,dum (attached) . As stated in that memorandum, I have serious reservations as to the legality and propriety of implementation of the concept as proposed by NFAC MAC. Viewing that same proposal in the context of reference generates further reservations on my part. The functions of the "Intelligence Specialist Corps" must be weighed against those of the National Intelligence Office and the NFAC Senior Review Panel, with full consideration given to the possibility of duplication of effort at senior levels. ORPA Division Chiefs These positions have also been addressed in a separate memorandaii and will be implemented by 1 October 1978. 3. In summary, my recommendation is that the Director, NFAC submit position descriptions for evaluation at his earliest opportunity. Should we find justification for additional. supergrade positions, we will so recommend to you. I would suggest that you defer any additional allocation of supergrade ceiling to NFAC pending an Office of Personnel review of their additional supergrade requirements. F. W. M. Janney Dist: 0 - Add 1-ER 1 - DDA 2 - D/Pers 1 - OP/PMCD OP/PMCD/ jdc (29 A T8) Retyped: 'crs: jmk (5 Sep -S) Approved For Releas 00.1/Q8/07 : CIA:RDP81.-00142R000600100003-5 ' n s r i e- Internal Use Only Approved For Release 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81-00142R000100003-5 4 ? IUG 1978 )EIDRANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence FR OR F. W. M. Janney Director of Personnel SUBJECT : NFAC Management Advisory Group Proposal to Establish an Intelligence Specialist Corps within NFAC REFERENCE : Memo for.,DCI fr NFAC MAG dtd 6 Jun_73,_ subject: f I 11' Q S a1 t Co c i r s Creatlan o an me i~ence peci P within NFAC . "1. I 'have had an opportunity to review the proposal contained in the reference memorandum and offer the following comments for your consideration. The concept of high-graded analysts with no supervisory responsibilities, was, established in the 1960 's . The NFAC MAG is proposing to enlarge the concept in numbers and more formally insti- tutionalize it by creating an "Intelligence Specialist Corps." We have no problem with the concept of senior analysts. To increase the numbers, however, MAG would convert supervisory. slots, for example, GS-15 Branch Chiefs to GS-14, and allocate senior analyst slots within NFAC by the size of the Office. The :Agency is not exempt from the principle of "equal pay for substantially equal work, Title V, U.S.C., Sec. 5301, Pay Comparability Systems Principle, nor the Job Evaluation Policy Act of 1970 which provides a coffin approach for ti` :e evaluation of positions.. Each position is classified on the basis. of some nine cormon factors, raging from knowledge required. to span of authority and, where pertinent, supervisory responsibility is added. The complexity of, each. Victor can be converted to a point scale nick in the aggregate Bete rmznes the grade. To assign a lower grad to a Branch Chief classified at GS-1S without diminishing the importance in one or more factors would quite simply violate the principle of "equal pay for equal work." Apprroved For Release 2001/08/07 CIA-RDP81-00142R000600100003-5 .11 41.1 e 1 I I ' S , LS Sitt. t1~4 v4 Jall'i Approved For ReI a 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP81-00142R0O 00100003-5 STATINTL STATINTL The same is true at the supergrade level only more so because of the finite ceiling imposed. The ceiling on Agency supergrades is erpositions classified at that level. An. increase in the or,- ty n o ~upergrade analysts means a decrease in the number who are currently paid at that level as a result of determining the aggregate ? responsibility-point-count of the position. The principles involved preclude simply converting established supergrade positions. whether non-supervisory staff in an office or the NFAC Front Office or Deputy Division or Division Chief. The classification of each position is determined by the content of the position. While we can look at a newly designated position and determine that it is in fact at the GS-16 level, we can today only pay =employees at the supergrade rate . The organizational structure of NFAC is established with a number of managerial positions and staff positions at supergrade levels.. Our way to extract supergrade ceiling for analytical positions would be to telescope the current structure by melding existing Divisions and/or Offices. 2. It is of particular relevance to keep in mind current House Appropriations Committee inquiries and review of our supergrade requirements and the importance of our ability to justify these requirements to the RAC and OMB based on accepted position classifi- cation methodology that promotes. "equal pay for substantially equal work." In the past our position classification system. has stood the test of external review and, in effect, has provided the basis for defending our grade structure when it has been questioned. I am concerned that the NFAC MAG method of allocating supergrade positions based on organizational strength would cause internal position grade inequities as well as increased concern for various external review organizations. I.believe our classification system can continue to accommodate senior grade levels for non-supervisory analysts where the position requirement can justify the higher grade. 3. In conclusion, it is essential to protect the Director and ..the Agency with a viable and consistent job classification methodology for all Agency supergrade positions in order to minimize external criticism and to provide a sod basis for external justification of new supergrade requirements. 7 / F. F. W. M. Janney Approved For Relea e.2001/08/07 CIA-RDP81-Oil 42R00460p100003-5 is; i'' tllitS,ics.4.tt Iltulti .. 1 Executive Registry 7 ran NFA,C # O n G 1978 U Efn MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Directo01r'oreign ral Intelligence FROM . Robert R. Bowi Director, NatiAssessment Center SUBJECT Supergrade Ceiling REFERENCE . Memo from DD/NFAC to DCI dated 9 June 1978, Subject: NFAC Review Panel--Supergrade Ceiling 1. Action Requested: This memorandum requests that additional supergrade authorization be made available to NFAC. 2. Background: The former DDI had a supergrade ceiling of With the establishment of NFAC, 21 supergrade positions were trans erred from the O/DCI for the NIOs. Subsequently, 5 supergrade positions were transferred to NFAC with the Requirements and Evaluation Staff. (One supergrade position was converted to SPS at our request.) Thus, NFAC should now have an authorization of E supergrade positions. This represents only =percent of the Agency's supergrade ceiling, and is allocated as follows: Positions Percentage STATINTL NFAC Management Office Heads and Deputies NIOs Assistant NIOs Division-level Supergrades SALT Support Senior Rep-London Congressional Support Collection Liaison We have reviewed the above distribution and find no satisfactory way of satisfying the new requirements discussed in the following paragraphs. ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP81-00142R000600100003-5 s Approved For Relpai44> Approved For Re1eme*IN6QTZ CiAUPMIJQOT45$A600100003-5 NFAC Review Panel. The establishment of a senior review panel represents an important step toward enriching the intelligence produc- tion process by drawing upon the skills, knowledge and insights of highly respected authorities residing outside of the Intelligence Community. The panel will consist of a small group of generalists serving full-time; they will be attached immediately to the Office of the Director, NFAC, to provide him with an independent review of major intelligence production. We will only be able to acquire the requisite level of experience and expertise at the supergrade level. Referenced memorandum to the DCI discussed this problem who acknowledged his commitment to provide an additional three or four supergrade billets for this panel. Senior Intelligence Specialists. One of the most vexing of NFAC's personnel problems over the years has been its inability to reward its most talented analysts with senior positions without bur- dening them with supervisory responsibilities. As far back as 1971, for example, the President made clear his concern that an improved intelli- gence product was. imperative. He stressed the need for "more rewarding careers for intelligence analysts, including the opportunity to reach higher salary levels while remaining analysts...." This view was recently endorsed by the Senate Select Committee, which recommended that the then DDI provide a more flexible, less hierarchical personnel system as a means of rewarding analytical excellence. Finally, a recent study by the NFAC Management Advisory Group recommended the establishment of an "Intelligence Specialist Corps" to accomplish this. This report has been approved in principle by the DCI who has instructed the DDCI and D/NFAC to provide recommendations for implementation. As things now stand, for supergrade analysts to move into supergrade ranks, by and large they must become resource managers. However, this may not be their strong suit; in effect, we are sometimes required to give up a good analyst for a poor manager in order to reward the analyst. It is our strong belief that if NFAC is going to be successful over the long run in improving the quality of intelligence analysis, we must find effective means for rewarding our top analysts sb that their substantive experience and expertise can be retained where it is most needed--in the analytical ranks. We are not proposing great numbers of supergrade analysts and would hope to be able over time to provide some ceiling ourselves. But to get this program off to a reasonably good start, we need to provide at least one such analyst for each of four major analytical offices (OER, OSR, ORPA,.OGCR). Approved For ReleaW $/ f YFc A-kbTgf 91TA2 0100003-5 Approved For Reteerse 2001/08/07: CIA-RDP81-00142ROW00100003-5 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY ORPA Division Chiefs. The Office of Regional and Political Analysis (ORPA) has a total of 8 positions approved at the supergrade level. In order for all ORPA division chiefs, plus the Chief, Strategic Warning Staff, to have supergrade positions we will require an authori- zation for six additional supergrade positions. TINTL 3. Recommendations: It is recommended that the NFAC su er rade authorization be increased by 13--from the current level of The additional authorization would be allocated as follows: NFAC Review Panel (+3); Senior Intelligence Specialists (+4); and ORPA Division Chiefs and Chief, Strategic Warning Staff (+6). STATI NTL. cc: Director of Personnel APPROVED: DISAPPROVED: Distribution: Original - DDCI return Director, NFAC 1 - DDCI 1-ER 1 - Director, NFAC 1 - NFAC Registry 1 - AD-Mgmt, NFAC 1 - C/NFAC Admin 2 - NFAC Exec Officer NFAC (7 Aug 78) Approved For Relelb6$N#uFCh4S*td06M0100003-5 1 01..O BAYN. IND.. CHAIRMAN ADlA1 X. STEVEhe .r LDWAppr"QMecC ase 2001/08/07: CIA-R yy R~"`Fr-r MORGA44. N.C. JOHN H. CHAP19%, R.I. GARY HART. COLO. RICHARD O. LNGAR. IND. DANIEL PATRICK MOYNINAN. N.Y. MALCOLM WALLOP. WYO. DANIEL K. INWYE. HAWA" SELECT COMMITTEE ON 1r4TXLUGF-N4= ROAEAT C. li'/RD. W. VA.. EX OFFICIO HOWARD N. RAKGR. JR.. TENN.. ETC OFFICIO WILLIAM G. MILLER., STAFF DIRECTOR EARL D. E169104OW EA. MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR (PURSUANT TO S. RES. 00. MTh CONGRESS) WASHINGTON. D.G. 20510 August 25, 1978 IN REPLY PLEASE REFER TO Q-'+5 *f Admiral Stansfield. Turner Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 I forward for your review a. Report' on the Frank Sneppl Vietnam Case which the Committee's stta has prepared in response to former Chairman Inouye's directive to investi- gate this case. This Report has been prepared with care- the Committee has taken sworn statements from Messrs. Frank Snepp and Thomas Polgar; staff has examined a large body of documen- tary material, including CIA's own Working Croup- Report (of April 1978) oh the Snepp matter and the various court documents generated by U.S. ' v.' Sne ; and staff has inter- viewed more than 40 Vietnam-related officials, senior and Junior, representing various vantage points and attitudes. Above all, staff has pursued this investigation dis- passionately, seeking to hear all sides and to be fair to all participants. There is no question that Mr. Snepp was deceitful and violated his Secrecy Agreements- The Report's focus, however, is on the substance'of his allegations, apart from his unfortunate conduct. As the Report judges, a few of Mr. Snepp's allegations have no validity; a few others are valid; most of his allegations -- and these concern the most important questions -- are each a mixture of valid-invalid. The principal. Findings developed by the staff's inves- tigation relate to matters broader than the Snepp case itself. These Findings ask (1) whether present CIA procedures for dealing with grievances, dissent, and publishing are adequate; (2) whether CIA may be employing double standards concerning the release or clearance of materials by CIA or. ex-CIA officers; and. (3) whether CIA U C ^ T (EXECUTIVE FE";S; hY F.E It 3~' Approved For Release 2001 P 142R000600100003-5 Approved For FeIase 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP81-00142ROWi00i0O0 Admiral Stansfield Turner August 25, 1978 Page Two places adequate stress on the necessity for its Stations to report local situations fully and objectively. The Report also includes Recommendations,... I should add that the Report represents the agreed views of the staff. task group which.prepared this study.. They have conducted their inquiry responsibly, and.such questions as they raise about the performance and practices of CIA are not a. look back .in anger,. but, are offered in, = the interests of drawing lessons which can help CIA to enhance its performance and avoid-future cases of irresponsible action on the 'part of serving or former., On behalf of. the Committee I wish to thank you. 'and your officers for the assistance you have given our inquiry into this case. I will be interested in receiving your, comments on this Report in the very near future, so that the Committee can then forward a revised, final version to the White House. At such time,' the Committee will also wish. to consider whether to publish a suitably sanitized version for the public, checked in advance with you and so worded as scrupulously to avoid interfering in continuing court processes. I will enjoy hearing from you on these questions in the near future. Thank you for assisting the work of the Committee. Sincerely, BL VlaZE Zi 1E5~1 VVI Approved For Release 2 Birch Bayh Chairman FP -00142R000600100003-5