MIDDLE EAST AFRICA SOUTH ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00865A000900280002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 13, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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Middle East
Africa
South Asia
Secret
N 0671/75
May 13, 1975
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Background Use Only/Controlled Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
? 513 (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA - SOUTH ASIA
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Middle East - Africa Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
Fedayeen: Palestinians Disappointed with
Arafat' s Visit to Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Afghanistan-Iran: Daoud's Visit . . . . . . ... 3
May 13, 1975
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Fedayeen
Palestinians Disappointed with
Arafat's Visit to Moscow
The meager results of Yasir Arafat's recent
trip to Moscow have prompted Palestinian leaders
to question the extent of Soviet backing for the
Palestine Liberation Organization.
The Palestinians are particularly concerned
over Moscow's attempts to elicit from them some
recognition of Israel in return for an invitation
to the Geneva talks. They suspect that the Soviets
may be. working with the US to minimize the
Palestinians' role at Geneva as a means of satisfy-
ing the demands of Egypt and Syria without forcing
the Israelis to boycott the next session of talks.
In the communique issued at the end of his
Moscow visit, Arafat in effect acknowledged that
the Palestinians would go to Geneva if invited to
participate "on an equal footing" with the other
parties. This indirect statement of willingness to
negotiate with Israel represents--in Palestinian
eyes--a significant concession.
Leaders of the PLO feel they can go no further
toward announcing a willingness to negotiate or
acknowledging Israel's right to exist without
Lalienating their Palestinian and radical Arab backers.
Some of Arafat's moderate colleagues are raising
questions about the wisdom of going to Geneva under
any circumstances, and spokesmen for the "rejection
front" have launched a new attack on him for his
implied acceptance of the Geneva conference.
Arafat reportedly indicated to the Soviets that
the PLO is willing to show some flexibility on the
"frame of reference" for its participation at Geneva,
but only after the principle of PLO participation
is accepted by the other parties. With the prestige
he won late last year by his UN appearance now fad-
ing, Arafat needs such a victory to bolster his
personal stature and to gain more negotiating room.
(Continued)
May 13, 1975
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Arafat apparently has concluded that until he
wins s n he dares not give an
inch.
Arafat, while in the Soviet Union:
-- Reaffirmed that the PLO cannot accept
Security Council Resolution 242, which refers
to the Palestinians only as a refugee problem,
as the basis for the Geneva conference.
-- Vetoed the idea of seeking a new UN resolu-
tion affirming the equal right of the Pales-
tinians and Israelis to secure borders.
-- Quashed as premature any discussion of in-
creased Soviet military and economic aid to
the PLO, presumably suspecting that such assis-
tance would be tied to unacceptable political
concessions.
PLO spokesmen and information media are never-
theless describing Arafat's visit to the USSR as
the "most successful ever" in an attempt to minimize
the damage to Arafat's reputation and draw attention
away from the embarrassing lack of concrete accomplish-
ments. Pro-fedayeen newspapers in Beirut have claimed
that the long-delayed opening of the PLO office in
Moscow will take place in two weeks, and have alleged
that the Soviets promised a variety of unspecified
economic, military and political assistance to the
Palestinians. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM
ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
May 13, 1975 2
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Afghanistan-Iran
Daoud's Visit
A
Afghan President Daoud scored a major success
in obtaining large-scale Iranian economic assistance
during his visit to Tehran in late April.
A memorandum of understanding committed Iran
to provide a minimum of $720 million in long-term
credits for specific industrial and infrastructure
projects to be begun this year. Terms will vary
according to the project but a large portion of the
aid reportedly will be interest free. Financial
assistance for other major projects, including a
railway link between the two countries was promised
once feasibility studies are completed. Afghan
officials with whom US embassy officers have spoken
have been effusive in their praise of Iran's gen-
erosity, and are newly optimistic about prospects
for developing their country's primitive economy.
The visit also appears to have helped ease long-
standing Afghan apprehensions about dealing with
their large and wealthy neighbor. Afghanistan's
dominant ethnic group, the Pushtuns, are orthodox
Sunni Muslims, many of whom have recoiled at talk
of close ties with Iran's Shias. Recognizing these
sensitivities back home, Daoud's public statements
in Iran regarding brotherly ties between the two
nations were far more restrained than the Shah's.
The two leaders reportedly discussed Kabul's
dispute with Islamabad over the status of Pakistan's
frontier provinces and the Shah, as in the past,
counselled restraint on both sides. There is no
indication, however, that the Iranian leader pro-
posed taking any new initiatives to mediate the
dispute.
Most politically conscious Afghans probably
feel that the Shah's . warm. treatment of Daoud, com-
bined with their president's dignified performance,
while acting essentially as a supplicant, have en-
hanced Afghanistan's international image. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM)
May 13, 1975
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