Prospects for Afghan-Pakistani Confederation

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000200010011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 15, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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%OF
Z'E )RANDUH! FDR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECTS Prospects for Afghan-Pakistani Confederation
1. Afghan Foreign Minister Raft's recent appeal to Am-
bassador Lodge in New York, urging US encouragement of Afghan-
Pakistani confederation as the "only way" to keep his country
securely in the Free World, is one of several indications that
important Afghan and Pakistani officials are considering this
possibility. We believe that the idea of confederation does
and will continue to have a certain attraction to leaders on
both sides. As indicated in our 4 October memorandum to the
DD/I, however, we consider the chances less than oven that the
two goverranents will reach any formal agreement on the desira-
bility of a confederation and, in any event, believe that the
practical difficulties involved, both internal and external,
would make actual implementation of such an agreement highly
unlikely.
2. This assessment of the confederation question is sub-
etantially accepted by the working level specialists in O/CI,
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M/P, and OIR, and is reflected in the draft estimate on Af-
ghanistan passed by the IAC representatives on Tuesday. A final
draft of the estimate, in which we plan to insert a greatly
expanded discussion of the confederation question, will be ready
for presentation to the IAC after a cleanup session of the IAC
representatives today,
3, A summary-evaluation of the evidence available on the
confederation question is given below:
as Within the last year there have been several indi.
cations that the confederation question has been under
discussion in Afghan and Pakistani official circles:
(1) in February 1954 the Agha Khan wrote Governor
General Ohulam Mohammed of Pakistan strongly
urging a confederation in which the King of
Afghanistan would also serve as President of
Poldstaa,
(2) In April a Now York Times Karachi dispatch
stated that a merger of the two countries had
been under secret consideration for a year and
was reportedly imminent, This report was
denied by the Pakistani and Afghan Governments
but follow-up cables indicated that Pakistani
Ambassador Shah had discussed confederation in
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Kabul and Atig, his Afghan opposite number
in Karachi, had done the same with Pakistani
off icials.
(3) In September Pakistani Prime Minister
Mohammed AU reportedly told the Agha Khan
in France that six months after Pakistan be-
came a republic it would confederate with
Afghanistan, with the King of Afghanistan be-
coming President of the Pakistan Republic.
This report was rated possibly true.
On 9 October Prince Naim asked Aaassador
Lodge to have the US exert its influence on
Pakistan in favor of federation. Contrary
to the previous report, he said that Mohonued
Ali had been cool and suspicious toward the
scheme when Haim had broached it to him?
b. The idea of confederation almost certainly has a csr-
tain attraction in both capitals. Afghan leaders ray see in
it a means of escaping not only from the dangers posed by the
USSR's heightened interest in their country but also from the
difficulties they have brought on themselves through their
espousal of the Pushtoonistan camgaign; they may further hope
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that under confederation the Pathan tribal areas of Pakistan
will once again fall into Kabul's sphere of influence.
Various Pakistani leaders, for their part, may sea in con-
federation a means of advancing their anti-Soviet defenses
to the north side of the formidable Hindu Kush range.
Religious-minded men in both countries may share the Agha
Khan's unhappiness over the spectacle of two Islamic states
engaged in fraternal bickering and may be attracted by his
vision of a united Moslem nation stretching from the Oxus
to the sea.
C. We are impressed, however, by the lack of evidence
that the confederation question is being seriously and offi.
ciaily considered in any practical fashion. Despite the
importance and complexity of the subject, the four episodes
summarized above represent the only major indications we have
that the subject is under active consideration at all, and
the information they provide is far from conclusive. Both
Shah and Atig, in their pro-confederation activity last
spring, appear to have advanced the idea on an informal and
personal basis, The report that Mohamed Ali not only talked
sympathetically to the Agha Khan about the latter's confedera-
tion scheme but actually promised to put it into effect is
at least indirectly contradicted by Prince Naim's testimony
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. 'rte
and is otherwise completely uncorroborated. Even Prince
and
*in's plea for US support for the confederation was ad-
vanced on a personal rather than an official basis. We
are left with the impression that at most various Afghan
and Pakistani statesmen are talking inconclusively and
somewhat wishfully about the desirability of confederation,
much as Arab leaders in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan have tal1ad
about the ideal of Arab unity over since World War 1,
There is no indication that either the Afghans or the
Pakistanis have considered confederation as a practical
prepositien,
d. Even if responsible Afghan and Pakistani officials
do reach agreement on the desirability of confederation,
the scheme would be extremely difficult to put into effect:
(1)
The USSR would almost certainly regard such
a development as threatening its position
and rights in the area and would take determined
action to prevent it. Under its treaty with
Afghanistan, which is considerably mars sweep-
ing than that with Iran, it could argue that
the new state had inherited obligations in-
consistent with the Turk-Pakistani agreement
and Pakistanis acceptance of US military aid
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! ice!
and that Soviet military intervention was
therefore Justifiable. At a niniim m, the
USSR would probably increase its subversive
activities in Afghanistan.
(2) India would almost certainly oppose a union
of Afghanistan and Pakistan, both because it
would remove an impediment to Pakistani free-
dom of action - the Pushtoonistan dispute -
which India has covertly encouraged in the
past, and because it would further stimulate
Soviet military interest in the area. India
would probably use diplomatic pressures in an
effort to prevent a confederation by diplo-
matic means and might also seek to bribe key
Afghan government aid tribal leaders in an
effort to wreck the scheme.
(3)
Finally, there would be difficult internal
problems to work out. The Afghans would almost
certainly want to have the Pathan tribes of
Pakistan's northwest frontier province released
from direct Pakistan Government control - an
Afghan aim which Karachi has stoutly resisted
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ever since its establishment, Frictions
would arias over the division of spoils and
office in the new governmental and econmic
structure. In addition, the new setup would
greatly increase the problems of uwieldinese
and regionalism in Pakistan ands while the
idea of confederation might be acceptable to
some Pakistani leaders it would almost certainly
be vigorously and possibly violently opposed
25X1A9a
by others.
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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