PROPOSED DCID TO ESTABLISH A USIB SECURITY COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004300170055-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: November 5, 1958
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Proposed DCID to Establish a
USIB Security Committee
CCi?kieSi.
5 NOV Nst-,
Vxecuttve kleg A
-44e. 47?
1. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for
DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph (11).
2. The publication of the 15 September 1958 revision of NSCID
No. 1 (New Series) places certain responsibilities in the security
field upon the DCI and the USIB. Since there is neither a committee
within USIB nor a regularly constituted inter.Agencymedium through
which actions might be initiated, it appears ne ce s sary that a mechanism
be established for this purpose.
3. In view of the increased emphasis upon the protection of in-
telligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized dis-
closure, it must be assumed that both the DCI and the USIB will review
present directives and may initiate action for the further development
of policies, procedures, and practices to provide the necessary safe-
guards for the protection of community intelligence.
4. The security responsibilities under NSCID No. 1 are as follows:
FOR THE USIB
In Section 2 paragraph a (5) the USIB shall
"Develop and review security standards and
practices as they relate to the protection of
intelligence and of intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure."
FOR THE MEMBER DEPARTMENTS
AND AGENCIES
In Section (5), "Each department and agency,
how ver, shall remain responsible for the
et"
%1ORI/CriF Pages 1-8, 1 0-1 -
9-27, 30-37, 30-45.
xii
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protection of intelligence and of intelligence
sources and methods within its own organi-
zation. Each shall also establish appropriate
internal policies and procedures to prevent
the unauthorized disclosure from within that
agency of intelligence information or activity".
FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
c. In Section (5) "The Director of Central
Intelligence, with the assistance and support
of the members of the U.S.Intelligence Board,
shall ensure the development of policies and
procedures for the protection of intelligence
and of intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure".
In addition to the above the Director has been
given a special responsibility as follows:"The
Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon
the departments and. agencies, as appropriate,
to investigate within their department or agency
any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or of
intelligence sources or methods. A report of
these investigations, including corrective measures
taken or recommended within the departments and
agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the
Director of Central Intelligence for review and
such further action as may be appropriate, in-
cluding reports to the National Security Council
or the President".
5. These responsibilities will require a continuing review of security
practices and procedures by both the USIB and the member departments
and agencies. In this regard Executive Order 10501, effective December 5,
1953, sets the minimum standards for the safeguarding of classified
defense information and thus provides uniformity in. the basic procedures
among the departments and agencies of government. Most departments
and agencies in the intelligence community have supplemented Executive
Order 10501 with additional internal control procedures, particularly
-2-
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where intelligence and special source material is involved. These
supplemental controls have usually been instituted on the basis of
security requirements peculiar to the department or agency con-
cerned and not necessarily on the basis of a security problem
common to the intelligence community.
6. There is no present authorized committee within the intelligence
community to deal with security matters relating to the overall protec-
tion of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from un-
authorized disclosure and the development of uniformity where appropriate
in security procedures. The IA.0 did not have a committee for security
matters of this nature. The USCIB did have a special committee on
Comint Personnel Security Standards but this committee has been in.
operative for the past two years. There was also an established USCIB
Security Committee (USCIB SECCOM) largely concerned with procedural
matters, however, this committee, since the formation of USIB, has
been inoperative and there is no security committee in USIB to which
its functions can logically be assigned. NSCID No. 6 provides in con.
formity with Section (2) NSCID No. 1 that the USIB shall study standards
and practices of the departments and agencies in protecting Comint;
and determine the degree and type of security protection to be given
ELINT activities.
Security directives carried over from the 1A.0 and the USCIB which
are currently in effect are DCID No. 11/1, Control of Initial Informa-
tion Regarding Foreign Nuclear Explosions, DCLD No. 11/2 Control of
Dissemination and Use of Intelligence and Intelligence Information, and
USCIB No. 5 Standards and Practices for Clearance of Personnel for
Comint.
The continuous review of security directives and concern with over-
all security matters affecting the intelligence community must necessarily
be provided for by the USIB to carry out its responsibilities.
7. In the past several years there have been serious unauthorized
disclosures of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods. The
investigations of these unauthorized disclosures have been carried out
under difficult circumstances by the informal cooperative efforts of the
security officers in the affected agencies and departments through their
-3.
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normal security channels. The informality of this system has retarded
the investigative function in that there was no established central coordi.
na.tin.g point to channel the investigative activities and exchange timely
investigative leads and in.formation. The results of these investigations
revealed several violations of existing security regulations but more
importantly, revealed certain weaknesses in the security systems of
the intelligence community in the dissemination and the handling of in-
telligence infornzation. Certain corrective recommendations resulted
from these investigations but there was no single committee or mechanism
by which action on these corrective measures could be taken on. an. over-
all community basis.
8. It is felt that there are more unauthorized disclosures of infor-
mation than is apparent to the intelligence community and some of these
are accordingly never reported and investigated. The intricacies of the
intelligence community structure with its specialized committees and
special channels of information have aggravated this problem. The
discovery of a possible unauthorized disclosure is frequently discerned
by those intelligence officers dealing with substantive intelligence in-
formation who recognize their information. in unauthorized hands. Often
these suspicions are not immediately forwarded to the professional
security officers who must take investigative action. The wide spread
and timely exchange of information in the intelligence community makes
it impossible to readily identify, in situations involving an unauthorized
disclosure, those departments and agencies involved, as all have been
recipients of the identical piece of intelligence information. In the
absence of a system for the reporting of suspected violations on a com-
munity basis, much valuable time is lost from the investigative stand-
point in determining the principal agencies involved and organizing the
informal liaison contacts in order to pursue a mutual investigative
effort. Lacking a clearly defined procedure on a community level,
there is certain resultant confusion and duplication of effort. In
circumstances where the violation is suspected but not evident and
no department appears to have primary responsibility or interest,
there is a natural hesitation in the intelligence community to suggest
through liaison channels that the violation may have occurred in another
department. Accordingly, inaction is likely to be the final result.
-4-
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Approved For Release 2006/10 A-RDP80B01676R004300170055-9
9. In view of the rapid developments in the intelligence complex
and frequent adjustments in the organizational structure to meet these
changes, the security practices and procedures to be effective must
be kept under constant review. Weaknesses that are permitted to
develop in the security system will sooner or later lead to un-
authorized disclosures and the resultant investigations will generally
reveal these weaknesses. Failure to eliminate the weaknesses on a
community level will merely compound the security problems involved.
The individual security Officers of the member departments and agencies
cannot solve these problems by unilateral action but should have a
committee mechanism whereby the security officers can focalize their
mutual problems and more effectively develop and coordinate corrective
actions.
10. It is, therefore, proposed that a USIB committee composed
of the responsible security officers of the member departments and
agencies be established to act upon the security responsibilities estab-
lished for USIB under NSCLD No. 1 and to serve as a support mechanism
when requested, to the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise
of his special responsibilities set forth in. Section 5 of NSCID No. I.
II. It is recommended that the attached proposed DCID be sub-
mitted to the USIB for approval.
25X1
Distribution:
v6rig tt 1 DCI
1 - DDCI
I ER
1 - DDP
1 DDI
3 w DDS
1-DDC
Attachment:
Proposed DCID
Et
iaLyre).e iu x.uw ru s
Director of Security
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25X1
25X1
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CONCURRENCES:
Deputy Director(Mans)
epu y rector
ty Director Support
IC()De-O-CP
Date
Date
Date
Deputy Director(Coolciin.ation) Date
,
r-'
The recommendation contained in paragraph 11 is approved.
e
,:r72) 0 4, e
Q
25X1
25X1
Date
Director
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO.
Security Committee
)5'
Pursuant to Section 2, sub-paragraph al 5) and Section 5 NSCID
No. 1(/%Tew Seriegrrevised 15 September 195:9an.d for the purpose of
preventing unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and 9,f,..inle114ence
sources and methods, a,standing committee of the US-IB, is hereby
established.
1. Composition and Organization
The committee shall be knoNT991sith%lia-5-4.narIcty: Cptrn5itteeAand
shall include representatives of the USe13Agencies. It is expected that
the5,espoilii?le secvity pfficers of the member departments and agencies
t,t
of U-5-tb, w 1 lerve as the representatives on the committee. Other'''
agencies of the government may be inAvj.ted by the committee to participate
as appropriate. The CIA member/4W! chair the committee.
2. Mission
The mission of the committee shall be to promote means by which
the intelligence community may prevent the unauthorized disclosure of
intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods.
3. Functions
a) To develop and review security standards, practices and
procedures as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of
intelligence sources and methods from 9.44tho1ized disclosure,
and to make recommendations thereon to le Board. T e?Cornmittee
A tf
shall coordinate closely with other Committees of the Board with
4
related security responsibilities.
b) To assist, as requested, the Director of Central Intelligence
in the exercise of his responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, NSCID
No. 1.
c) To recommend security policy to the (CIS113 as it pertains
to the intelligence community. Such policy recommendations
shall be consonant, however, with the responsibility of each
department and agency for the protection of intelligence and of
intelligence sources and methods within its own organization and
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the establishment of appropriate internal policies and procedures
to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that depart-
ment and agency of intelligence information or activity.
d) The Commi ttel shall make such other reports and
recommendations to the Oacict as may be appropriate or requested.
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Executive Registr,1
28 January 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer, 0/DCI
SUBJECT : Proposed USIB Security Committee
1. Attached is the memorandum from General Truscott to
the Director, dated 21 January, and the memorandum to the Director
from the Director of Security, dated 5 November 1958, attaching the
proposed DCID on a security committee. I take an exceedingly dim
view of the fact that this memorandum and the proposed directive
have been circulating approximately three months and were never
called to the attention of this office. Not only is the subject a matter
of interest to this office, but it directly relates to our work. I recog-
nize of course that the original fault is with the Office of Security
for having prepared a concurrence sheet which called for the signatures
of the four deputies but not the Inspector General. It is my opinion,
based upon what the Director has said both internally and externally,
that matters of a general nature such as this affecting the over-all
work of the agency are properly within the purview of this duce.
Consequently I think the Inspector General's name should be included
for concurrence. Further, I would point out that there have been
several instances lately where matters of direct interest to this staff
have only inadvertently come to my attention, and I would assume
that there are other matters of interest which have failed to come to
our attention.
2. As far as the substance of the proposal is concerned, I
concur in the proposed directive and believe that it will not conflict
with other established committees dealing with security matters
as long as its charter is specifically restricted to section 5, NSCID-1.
I also reiterate my oral suggestion made at the deputies me eting on
27 January that in presenting this to USIB the Director call to the
attention of the Board the memorandum from Gordon Gray on the 25X1
subject, dated 26 September 1958.
249 / a-w?oe
4:74-cdr-"_4,4 las a ex,
yllIcill
Inspector General
2 5X1
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21 January 1959
MUORANDUK FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Proposed USIB Security Committee
1. This memorandum contains a suggested course of action with
respect to tabling a proposed DCID at a future USIB meeting. This
suggestion is contained in paragraph 2.
2. A succession of recent disclosures jeopardizing sources
and methods clearly indicates a need for a security committee
such as Edwards recommends in his memorandum attached hereto.
Since there is no such committee in existence to propose such
Terms of Reference, I suggest that the best procedure would be
for you to table the proposed DCID at an early USIB meeting with
an oral statement
(a) pointing out the lack of such a committee
at the present time and emphasizing the important
assistance such a committee might render;
(b) suggesting that the Board members and their
staffs study the draft proposal;
(c) invite suggestions and indicate the availability
of Shef Edwards and his staff and other CIA offices for
consultation; and
(d) consideration for approval at a meeting about
two weeks hence.
L. E. ThUSCOP2, JR.
General, USA (Ret.)
Deputy Director (Coordination)
cc: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Attachment
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17 3 -0 n
u
SUBJECT
Off=6-058 58
Director of Central Intelligence
Proposed DCI) to Establish a
USIB Security Committee
memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for
Such recommendation is contained in paragraph (11).
. The publication of the 15 September 1958 revision of racrp.
No. 1 (New Series) places certain responsibilities in the security
field upon the DCI and the USI. Since there is neither a committee
winkle USIB nor a regularly constituted inter-Agency medium through
which actions might be initiated, it appears necessary that a mechanism
be established for this purpose.
3. in view of the increased emphasis upon the protection of in-
telligeace and intelligence sources and
closure, it most be assumed that both the DCI and the US!) will review
present directives and =ay initiate action or the further development
of policies1 procedures, and practices to provide the necessary safe-
guards for the protection of community intelligence.
hods from unauthorized din-
4. The security responsibilities under MGM No. I are as follows:
FOB TAKE US=
a. In Section Z paragraph a (5) the MI5 ekaU
"Develop and. review security standards and
practices as they relate to the protection of
atelligence and of intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure."
b. 1011. THE IdEMBLII DEPAR r 1.4.&NT S
A
In Section
however.
meat and agency,
remain responsible for the
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protection of intelligence and of intelligence
sources and methods within its own organi-
eation. Each shall also establish appropriate
internal policies and procedures to prevent
the unauthorised disclosure from within that
agency a intelligence information or activity
FOR THE DIRECTCR OF CENTRAL
T L L LIGLNCE__
In Section (3) The Director of Central
Intelligence, with the assistance and support
of the members of tne U.3. Intelligence Board,
shall ensure the development of policies and
procedures for the protection of intelligence
and of intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure".
La addition to the above ta*Director has been
given a special responsibility as follows; ''The
Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon
the departments and agencies, as appropriate,
to investigate within their department or agency
any unauthorised disclosure of intelligence or of
intelligence sources or method,s. A report of
these investigations, incioding corrective measures
taken or recommended within the departments and
agencies involved, ehall be transmitted to the
Director of Central intelligence for review and
such further action as may besppropriate, in-
cluding reports to the National 3ecurity Council
or the President
5. These responsibilities will require a contMuiing review of security
practices and procedures by both the USIA and the member departments
and agencies. In this regard Executive Order 1.)S01, effective December
1953, sets the minimum standards for the safeguarding of classified
defense information and thus provides uniformity in the basic procedures
among the departments and agencies of governnsent. Most departments
and agencies in the intelligence community have supplemented Executive
Order 10501 with additional internal control procedures, particularly
-
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Approved For Release 2006/10/03 : IA-RDP80B01676R004300170055-9
where intelligence and special source material is involved. These
supplemental controls wive usually oven isstiteted on the basis of
security regairements peculiar to the department or agency con-
cerned and not necessarily on the basis of a security problem
common to the intelligence community.
b. There is no present authorized committee within gence
community to deal with security matters relating to the overall protec-
tion of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods
from un-
authoriud disclosure and the development of taniforraity where appropriate
in security procedures. The IAC did sot have a committee for security
matters of this nature. The USCIll did have a special committee on
Caudal Personnel Security Standards but this committee has been in-
operative for the past two years. There was also an established USC/13
Security Committee (USCIB SECCOM) largely concerned with procedural
matters, however, this committee, e MC* the formation of 1131B, has
been inoperative and there is no security committee in USW to which
Its functions can logically be assignee. Di 'SCID No. 6 provides in con-
formity with Section (2) NSCID No. .1 that the IISIB shall study standards
and practices of the departments sad ageacies in protecting Comint;
and determine the degree and type of security protection to be given
ELINT activities.
Security directives carried over from the ZAG and the U5CII whi
are currently in effect are DCLI, No. LI/I, Coatrol of Initial Informa-
tion Regarding Foreign Nuclear .1.xplosions, MID No. 1hZ Control of
Dissemination and Use of Intelligence and Intelligence Information, had
USC/B No. 5 Standards and Practices for Clearance of Personnel for
Comint.
The continuous review of security directives and concern with over-
all security matters affecting the intelligence community must necessarily
be provided for by the USIE to carry out its responsibilities.
1. in the past several years there have been serious unauthorized
disclosures of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods. The
investigations of these unauthorised disclosures hive been carried out
ender difficult circumstances by the informal cooperative efforts of the
security officers in the affected agencies and departments through their
Approved For Release 2006/10/03: CIA-RDP80B01676R004300170055-9
Approved For Release 2006/10/03: CIA-RDP80B01676R004300170055-9
normal security channels. The informality of this system has retarded
Use investigative function in that there was no established central coordi-
nating joint to channel the investigative activities and exchange timely
Investigative leads and information. The results of these investigations
revealed several violations of existing security regulations but more
importantly, revealed certain weaknesses in the security systems of
the intelligence conunuaity in the dissemination and the handling of in-
telligence information. Certain corrective recommendations resulted
from these investigations but Were was no single committee or mechanism.
by which action on these corrective measure* could be taken on an over-
all community basis.
8. It is felt that there art more unauthorized disclosures of infor-
mation than is apparent to the intelligence community and some of theee
are accordingly never reported and investigated. The intricacies of the
intelligence community structure witz its specialised committees and
special channels of information nave aggravated this problem. The
discovery of a possible unautnorixeci disclosure is frequently discerned
by those intelligence officers dealing with substantive intelligence in-
formation who recognize their information in unatatiorized hands. Often
these suspicions are not immediately forwarded to the professional
security officers who must take investigative action. The wide spread
and timely exchange of information in the intelligence community .nakes
It impossible to readily identify, in situations involving an unauthorized
disclosure, those departments and agencies involved, as all have been
recipients of the Identical piece of intelligence information. In the
absence of a system for the reporting of suspected violations on a com-
munity lassie, much valuable time is lost from the investigative stand-
point in determining the principal agencies involved and organising the
informal liaison contacts in order to pursue a mutual investigative
effort. Lacking a clearly defined procedure De a community level,
there is certain resultant confusion and duplication of effort. In
circumstances where the violation is suspected but not evident and
no department appears to have primary responsibility 4.?Ir interest,
there is a natural hesitation in the intelligence community to suggest
through liaison channels that the violation may have occurred in another
department. Accordingly, inaction is likely to be the final result.
- 4 ?
T
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9. In view of the rapid developments in the IateUieace complex
and frequent acklastments in the organisational structure to meet thsse
changes, the security practices and procedures to be effective must
be kept under constant review. meekness.' that are permitted to
develop in the security systeart will sooner or later lead to un-
authorised disclosures and the resultant investigatiomt will generally
reveal these weaknesses. Failure to elimiaate the weaknesses on a
comnatiazity level will merely compound the security problems involved.
The individual security officers of the member departments and agencies
cannot solve these problems by unilateral action but should have a
committee mechanism whereby tne security officers can Localise their
mutual problems and more effectively develop and coordinate corrective
actions.
i). It is, therefore, proposed that a MID committee composed
of the responsible security officers of the member departments and
agencies be established to act upon the security responsibilities estab-
lished for USIB under NSCID No. 1 and to serve as a support mechanism
when requested, to the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise
of his special responsibilities set forth in Section S of NSCID No. I.
II. It is recommended that the attached proposed DCII) be sub-
to the USIB for approval.
Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security
Distribution;
Orig & 1 - DCI
- DM!
1 -
1 - DD?
DDI
3 - DDS
1 - DDC
Attachment:
Proposed DCID
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ILLEGIB
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(.0 -1410ES:
nich:rd Nalita
.1 9 NOV '1958
*in
Deputy Dire
/57
egigence
Deputy Director (Support)
25X1 Deputy rector (Coordination)
The reconn
Date
AVALit
7 NOV 1958
/$/ (?-
c
??-
ion contained in paragraph 11 is approv
/
STZ .40 4?
-
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. 3 .
MIXECTOR or Cis
Security Committee
to Section Z. sub-paragraph a ( 5) sad Section 5, NSCID
No. I ries) revised 15 September 1958 and for the par a* of
Preventing unauthorized disclosure of intelligeece and of intelligence
*mimes and methods, a standing committee of the USIB is hereby
established.
L Composition and QrganLatton
The committee shall be known as the LIMB Security
shalt Laclede reprimestatives of the U3115 agencies. It is expec
the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies
of USIS will serve as the representative* on the committee. Other
agencies of the government may be invited by the committee to participate
as appropriate. The CIA member will chair the committee.
. Mission
The mission of the committee shall be to promote means
the intelligence community may prevent the unauthorized disci*
intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods.
3. Functions
a) To develop and review security standards,practices and
procedures as they relatie to the protection of Intelligence and of
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorised disclosure.
and to make recommendatioas thereon to the Board. The Cornmi
shall coordinate closely with other Committees of the Board with
related security responsibilities.
b) To assist1 as requested, the Director of Central
in the eacercidie of his responsibilities pursuant to Section
No. 1.
C
?
c) To recommend security policy to the LJ3 as it pertains
to the stelligeace community. Lkich policy recommendations
shall be consonant, however with the responsibility of each
department and agency for the protection of intelligence and of
intelligence sources and methods within its own organisation and
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the 'stabilskrnent of *pproprtate interaml policies and procedures
to prevent Lh. unauthoriged disclosure from within that depart-
ment and agency of intelligence infornaation or activity.
d) The Goa:mitt*. shall make such other reports and
recommendations to the Board as may be appropriate or requested.
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This
respect to tibl
suggestion is oontained Lupcmgraili... 2.
21 January 1169
Dirc-
iregosed.uaSeeur-Ity Cesseitlee
tr...iirl 1.Z.V;-
__ /-
',-
Li f '. . : - ftg- ' 4 ? 1
2. succession of =cent disocsures Jeopardising sources
sad methode clearly ihileates a need for a security committee
such as Samaras resemmeads is his memmandsma stteched hereto.,
Since Shore is no such committee is esistecce to propose such
Terme of Reference, I suggest that the hest proeedure would be
for you to table the proposed XIS at aa early Villk meeting with
an oral statement
(s) pointing mut ti tatof suck a commi
at the pesos% time and emphasising the 14Portout
aesistance such 4 comm4ttee mip)tt render;
smostlAs that the board seekers and their
uteri'i study the draft 2ropose:14
(e) invite suggestions end. indieste the ceaUabi11
of ober Sdumeds aled his staff and ether CIA offlees for
consultation; aird
(1) consideration fano approval at a rasti.D. about
tro reeks hence.
cot Deputy Director of Cie
El
Distribution:
3&3. -Addeo
1-mcI
1 "' Dir/Secur via DD/S
1 - La
1---iNerummelt
1 - chrono
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=scow,
Oeseral USA (Set.
Dtputy Director (Coordination)
Itiglesee
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6.131:447`
No
IDA r0.6.4
CIV to Letablish a
Committee
DEM
6
9e1/74;
1. Tiot? mournereedum scotaina a reconmsedetien submitted for
ippeopal,Sunk recenunendstian coudnbeed is paragraph 11).
publication of the 15 September 19511 *whiten of N8CID
Serie* pieces certain mapeeelbilliiise in the security
the DCI *ad the WIS. Since them is aeithera committee
nor a regalarly rmastitated ister.Agencymadinm *rens
might be Waisted. it appears necesaarythat a mechanIsrl
for this perpose.
of the increased eraphaaie wpm the pothactionof la-
intelliipunce sources and methods frown asenthoriseft e
be nesureed tint booth no DCI and the USIS will review
a and any buttiate action for the farther deve1op-n*4
se mud practises* to prewide the soceesary iafr-
of connnutdty latelliffence.
4.
a.
eopeasibilities soder NSC'ID No. I are a foil
I tam, USIS
1?01040410 a (5) tho tflB shell
Develop mud review security standards and
practice* es they relate to the protection of
intellisonce wed of Letelligesce soarces and
methods from onactioarised disclosure.
Lt)t,"44,TIV ENT5
; '
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protection of hotollianace nod4 isiteibigrasor
owes sM 0446.4* wad* its owa wiped-
astioa, Emit doll atm ortidelott onsmpristo
intormat peatio* aod prociodorm to sortriont
the useuesomobsed diechoonare IMP, within that
wpm7 of lotioitiviara* istormotioa et octirtryr.
VOA THE DIA% *LCTOtt OF 4,134TRAL
hoottin (1) The Dirontor StGear**
)atoblisoaco, oh& the or oestoemo *ad sopport
4 the moombers of tboo U. SJeac.Seards
*ban mom* 1 votoposoot of polities and
prosolores for the yoratfothia 4 ifitOilligosee
oad 4 tstolifirsim iroortui and rnationdoi from
ammiterfood diectootore-.
lo addible* to the ohms lb. Dirootor be. be
glum a spacial rowposofiglity as folharos "The
Viroabor 4 Costral beloiligooso elan coil woo
tin doaramato mod oposeloo. am oppropriabo.
to a11 *i Asir dosirtaine or onvory
say umallbsoisod itiociosors 4 fitoltisosco or of
boioillisuroo $ooroor or roolimio. poor. 4
Sono imoreobliptioaes kadvallas earirealivit mooraroe
taboo or ofisomonomiad *Ws tbs doportameo *ad
omen, inoolvoito stall be trommitiod to Ito
Dirootow 4 Cemotrol billotlisomi for swim nod
mob foOkbor astiatam obey be oppropriabo.
sbaito roan* to the Pinttemil Sociarlty Cellitd1
or the Prosidost
sa,
flora roopfoulihor will rover* * mationlios roriorio ment4ty
proctiouis
sat proomborm by both the ISSN satilmo amabor doportame*
sod osomfoolo roast .Mocottive Ord** Mai, nitetetve Deannbor 5#
1953. Me dos nare adard* for the of odasot
didesoo liodomeetim out dm providoe la the book premium,
onto* the dopostomoir *ad ogaranim at yoversminottc Meiot dosponenionts
*ad opoodos to lbro fistelliorms unanimity have ropytemootod Executive
Order 10501 w iititosal iratemai fentrial procodnom. yortiorlarty
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*here isteWoonse sad spode' sour*. zistodil is isweived. Thee*
eoppiarseotsik osotrele bore siesity bees hatitelot os the Iasi* of
security simpoironteats peadier to the dsmasawast or sorawy cow
cereal tad not arcessavey on the taste of a iscurity problem
retureas to the iwastlineace consweseity.
6. There is se pesueut aretheriee4 ceonsittes whhie the tidellisence
essanumity to deal with searitty ansitare roletfas to the oresall praise.
this ishstilmeoce eat of intalligonee esereca sod methods trees cep
autheateed dlocieaure sad the dereispieesa of usitonalty where esigeoptiste
tosolgOT PrellOeMPles, The IAC dild met Uwea atoundakes Otir secerity
watters of thie sabsett, The 'USCiS did have a special ccaradtte* an
Conde. loorsaama Seourity Steadarde but this asuratitse he. bees law
eposotbre ger the pail tem years* There use also as satehilished U$CIS
Socsaily Cenuedibee POGO LECCOM) largely coacessed grab precederat
suattar1e. beirever, this cownshaee, sloeo the hareetbas of t1872? he.
bow fooperetire sad dart is a* security wanweithoo to 1YA3 I.'thigh
litostiora am lesiodly be asetipsed. 773Cttt No. 6 ipswriohe In ten*
feessity rah Swam (I) MOW he. I that the MIS Atli study stewhirdn
sad peattiose of the deputliceouts sod ageociat in pretectiog COmalki
sod detessahte the doves sod type at recuray protection to be Oven
user aativities?
Security disestives carried ever frau the inG snot the US= which
IWO asentely ha ollset ere DC11) No, 11 Cigars* ei MOW Worms-
dos asisaltas tereisu ttufsfear itapieetass, DUO No. 1 1 /2 Caere& et
Diseessisatieu sal Use at latidibgeoce sad lateiligesscs lationnation, sad
usica No, S tileaturde awl Practices ler Cleasonce of Persomei tor
Coesiat.
The comtiosats review of socutity disectiess sad camera with ever-
;
all recuthy roatioare sdhathog the hasiiiseuto oseseruaisy east steoesmoseelly
be puirbied tor by the USN to carry tat its reepousibehteso
7. 111 the post eivrerat Tows there bee* bee* sostess akautherised
discloasees ofhatellisamice oaf istaniseues seureos sad nwahode. The
ieweetiptiese
of these amadherieed disallow** have luta carried out
wader difileeft circoustasonse by the loferausl coopearattre efforts of the
eeserity effleare Ow affected souscies sad departmosee tbree10 OM,
-3.
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!IL, I
9. be vise of the rapid
sad boom* odjaidaseate be the orpoisotismal etrociore to
cliompos, the socosity peectices sad printaddgell to be eillealbre must
bs hoot sodior ososioce rovivr, ealmosees tbst are pormillied to
develop
to the ~loft system will 041411?11? or later load to Ma-
sualkorisfell dioadommee asid lbo rooallact isamotiipstiesswW generully
rewind ileum l000luessees. tenor* to ellsoloots the Arsobsosess so a
comosadity horst gent sooredy cocupossal ere security problems tareilrOdl?
The seemity deicer* a/ ihe member departoesote oat itgonciss
comet maw. /boa" proldome by oolloteral action bet shoed hers a
sesemillloo siselmadam robseidey the sociality oillisers coo gocalios their
1111,411141 problems an WIMP Ottegitbritly develop sad eserdiasta corroders
action
sow It IS illersiet? MVO* th a USEScasne ssinposod
falf the roopeoellike ifsourity efileere .4th. membor dopartmemis and
ogesegeobe oetobiladoed Is slat soma lbw aftersofty rospoodbUltios *stab-
UAW' Oa Win wader lt9CID N. isad to *WA as a support MOtbsidarea
%ben 21011164114. to Oho Dliestor el Ceara lMstUe to tbe exercise
of Ms special respeosibialties *et fora to Bectioa 5 141;CID No. I.
11 is socomosselled tbat the ottarbed proposed Dcw be sub-
WOW is the MIR /or approval.
cirmEn
Shoilnold tAamrds
Director of Security
Distribuliesa
Oris I DCI
1 DDCI
1 La
1 ? DD
I DDI
DDS
DDC
1.
Propesod DCIE
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(S4;4 Richard Rehm
Dismay bitool*A Plass)
ILLEGIB
25X1
25X1
D?Put7
40440,
WAY bir
Support
f) NOV 1958
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TOR OF T
CIL DIRICTIVZ
Pirstiant to Sectiea Z. sub-pa g aph a Section 5, NSCID
No. 1 (New Seriesrevised 15 September 195 and for the purpose of
preventing unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence
sources and methods, a standing committee of the USW is hereby
*stabil shed.
Cmnpoafttott and Orr.
The committee shall be knows as the UM! Security
shall include representatives of the U313 agencies. It is
the responsible security officers of the member departments and agenc it
of U31B will serve as the represeatatives on the committee. Other
agencies of the governroest may be invited by the committee to participate
as appropriate. The CIA member will chair the committee.
Z. 141081o*
The mission of the committee shall be to promote means by which
intelligence community may prevent the unauthorized disclosure of
Uigence and of intelligence sources and methods.
3. Functions
a) To develop and review security standards, practices and
?dares as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of
igence SOU rces and methods from unauthorized discloser*,
make recorrunendations thereon to the Beard. Thsi
Committee shall coordinate closely with other Committees of the
Board with related security responsibilities.
b) To soviet, as requested. the Director of Central Intelligence
la the exercise of his responsibilities pursuant to Section S. NSCID
No. 1.
c) To reconsatend security policy to the US= as it pertains
to the intelligence community. recofmmenclations
shall be consonant, however, with the respoititbflity of each
department and agency for the protection of intelligence and of
intelligence sources and methods within its own organisation and
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the eetablishreent of appropriate internal policies and procedures
to prevent the unauthoriaed disclosure from within that depart-
ment and agency of intelligence information or activity.
d) The Committee shall make such other reports and
commendations to the board as may be appropriate or
requested.
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-
nExecutive .
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central 1atellIg.nc.
SUBJECT: Proposal by Director of Security, CIA, to
Establish a USD3 Security Committee
1. It is recommended that the proposed DCII) be amended
as follows:
Par. Zt Mission: Reword to read:
"The mission of the committee shall be to formulate
and recommend to USD3 measures for the prevention
of the unauthorised disclosure of intelligence and of
intelligence sources and methods. Excepted, however,
are the fields of Atomic Energy Restricted Data and
Communications Intelligence."
Z. The reasons for the proposed change are:
a. The Atomic Energy Commission is by law responsible
for the control and dissemination of Restricted Data under
appropriate safeguards established by that Commission.
b. USIB has properly assigned COMINT Security ander
NSCID 6 to the COMINT Committee.
HU'NTINGTON D. SHELDON
Acting Deputy Director, intelligence
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Spec
LE?xocu?v?..
j_222.40 ,
17 December 1958
ligence Staff
SUBJECT : Proposal by Director of Security. CIA
to Establish a USIB Security Committee
1. Reference is made to your note of 11 December 1958 concerning
the rewording of Paragraph Z, (Mission) of the proposed DCID. In light
of the exception that you wish to place on the Committee mission and
responsibilities, it is felt that your ideas could be put in other words
and provide, at the same time, for the USIB, in its discretion, toassign
security problems in the future as may be appropriate.
Z. Accordingly, it is proposed that under Paragraph 3, Functions,
that a new sub-paragraph (d) be added to read as follows:
The Committee will not concern itself with those
matters of a securitynature assigned to other committees
of the USIB, except as may be directed from time to
time by the USIB."
Sub-paragraph (d) of Paragraph 3, Functions, as
presently written would consequently become sub-
paragraph ( e) .
3. This office proposes to request a meeting of the DDI and DDC
in the next few days for the consideration of this problem with a view-
point of presenting a proposal agreed upon by all components of the
Agency.
Deputy
4- aE0
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actor of
2 5 X 1
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Peoposoci DM to hetablish a
US= 5imuelty Cosataftt?
3. The pablicadiess of the IS September
Ns, I (New Settee) pieces mortal* respeuelhinitee 7
field Apes the DCI sad the U3I21. Name there is assidher o coeurnittc-e
I:add& 161.2, suer * regulatily constitated iater-Ageneytnedivar. brtttih
whichadisese might he laddiated. It appsore mote serf that * medusa/ err,
be esdabliehed far this purpose,
NOV1953
3, la view of the imereosed emphasis *pea
telligesee *ad letelligesee seams* awl esethede fr iso
clessaro, mad be aseolused that Ise* ta. DCI sod the USIII will review
psreeesot directives sued may inate tidies tor the farther develoinnent
of policiee, pr000duree, and practices to prowide the necoemary oafs-
oasts ler the protoidies of cossuessuity latelligance.
4. The oecarity reepeasibilities wader PLAAD No.
b.
la Seetioa Z paragraph*
-Dovelep aid review severity staadarda and
practice* as they relate to the protection of
isielligonee sad a letelligeace eouseet and
eared* &OM anautherieed
tit. LPAi&T1v1NTS
ik*AtficiES
Each department sad aossecy
it, itoh remote respousible for 1,*
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protoritatiatinkrfligooto and of latellittete
SIMIe.04
$ad seethed* vitalist ite era *neat-
soliou loth then also eateidish oppropriete
Utmost pansies and precedes** Se WPM*
the wootbovieed dissiewere boo wallets that
aptory ofialtelligenes bdereteetiee or eoUvity-.
VOA TIM DliaCT OIL OF SIM *AL
C. hi Stoetioa (Si The tatOrgeer Of Ceara"
bitontlionc*, witit the seelabusoe sod mope*
et the sessardhers et the U.S.lotelliseftee besid.
shall emu* the hotreieselootatpelieles and
protol*** her the proteottes lebiditipoose
sad of totelthipiere seerses and roottords from
oesetborteet dieelemorie
Is edditim to the ahem tb, Direether hos Uwe
giros a *pedal tospoomthility cc iellowes rTise
Director
at Costoot Isiontigeore Audi cell wow
the deportee**, sae wed*** a* apportootate,
to hereetimehe *We their depertates* or opeory
WWI overothorieed disetwoore at Welfigeso, or at
hikeillgerate seeress or toothed*. 1- report of
those iterwatipeetees, larbeilas torametire seeeseree
takes or iratOkewnesied *Ohio the depoetteotte and
oireattior iareehred. Anil be tromoraitted to the
Disooter
at Cootrat tollollisoato kw review and
omit iterthor *Moo as easy be epprepoirde?
*loft report* to the Manama Seserity coeseit
or the Protaitirst
roopournallites lent rottatrat aowebostos
pereetisitosad prosederes by both the UM net the erwroloor 4144,artrotets
and sa*dee hithis reserg tmaimtitivo Order Mel eitestker, Deerrettor 5,
MI. este tho emildeaue stoadards her the ortersordb% at obtaosi
dohase iehenoethie sod throe priorities regiorelity is the bode pipetteUre fl
MOWS the depere sod itionsies et pereemseedf, most deperteseeds
out wade* is the bdollippenee roolosseity hey. supplemented Esseestirt
Order IOWA with obiltisea bettrasi cestral proosberes p * ecub Eft,
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EGRET
al security dia*ettres aad camera yen weers
a.intelligente eaumennally mud aecautaati Ly
to tarry oat *a roapanalbes.
pea** Morse have bona andoos tamanthariaed
and imeallivince *ammo and asetbaela. The
disclinsure. have Wee carried out
intermal 000peritive Edfacte el the
a ant dapartrosata througL their
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atoomet twiesetty The
the beewooltObre Met
oath* OM to elibtool t benosieliptIve aeliterbtee emd
toceelliplire bola eat letiosesties? The ~eke ot those bereedipettoe
evereobet somol eteletteseei strieurtor reipastines tot *ore
barbotently, voraelot vestals weetaeseeso ta the eeemailty system. et
IMet liteThiroaeo osesszemedkr ta ltes itlietaalsolleo awl Ito h000lnes et bb.
tentiposso bethenesetteo. Cometeela correetiev* IVOMMUSSeiestienke Votioubod
trews Own towereitsittafte tag theft logas se elaile comeatibee inectemaiern
byeeblek 64116.1 4111.0400 comereettbe aware* coed be Woo an an ibv
an emebaremeity basta?
14JP80B01
so *1. 1* ghat time are mare eaealbortatot diteelosersed bible.
emelitao time to swam* to Ow Wooftereeto asreoessaltreeel some ot time.
*es elidairithosty weer irepoweet eat loweeltgebet. Tko lobetseeiss the
beeeltigtemee eamoomilky etsemeteret "kbUtopeetelbeekt oesembillobe sot
siettlat eill000** beguemotess leave Ibis prebtesa. The
otteoevery el a posellte 1.teeopieasey diebueeeed
lotatUseeto ottleore deolteg via welbeteadtve boetalgeoes
feseeedbee view reeeksolee thole tabeematioe in esaulltoetoot lanrsti, Ater
*see soesitabio* are test teneeettately torestted to** preleeeteval
esebalty etilionke *be meet ebbe lavestlipette* ultimo Tho wide Clotosid
sod WWI sothaawa at is *be fir aeattopoice caourgooky mak**
bostooatheat to roatitly bitomOty, is etheati*** lawaivtas aat matuthatioad
41001110.11111*, those dkosortenseas said ogoasta. tartitrad, as tali bay* belga
reelpteete et timie bleetteol Amy el toteakpaseo botaereetteem In the
simmootili tit a sysliess for 4111.vepst et eesseetied etelettens an tom.
isaamily %Woo moth mholita Ono* to lost been tbe beneettes shut&
peiell to Eistarsatatag Ube ipeliebpol epodes towetreit mai orsentatog the
taikotaisl isseiszts la *vibes? to ;wow a atudaaat larroWeaddare
eillemit.Lod*" a elesitirdetteot peteireateues eo a essembuity
there le combeie reesolteak comireeka wed dielplteetion et eltort.
eleavareloemeo aim* the trialsidee le eatveeted lad *et ovtibest sad
oe depaistmot appesere be tom lotteety reepastalbtatty latorest.
*wee Ia * oetoest loestimitoo la the latelittessio coassomity to seiggeet
ttereolb Wee* Obemente *et the etelettme soy bay. otearamt la ebeetbei
Ettoirtrimmets. Atbeesediaglits loateetee iv Moly to be the- OW real*.
I
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9. In vim ef the rapid derrelopeneete to the intelligenee complon
end frogreal a4setssonte in the argamisotimmal structure to Most thou
chealpea the eeensity penctices aml irresederes to he effectire must
he kept 111111101P reasteat review. ealuseeue time aro remitted to
derelop is the eecurity system win roomer or later lead to un-
milhorised dierlantres and the reesitut isreetigatimme sW gamoraltly
rural these eovehnessee. falba* to elinsineme the **amours ea a
sememeity lera will surely comromed the seeurity publeme imrobsed.
The ledisishmi eemerity ofiture of the member deparbesente rad agoacks
aranet ode* these problems by smilateeol retina hal eltenhi hove a
eremnittoe meabasalau whouhy the oecartly eilbaere SSA imam their
Mina problems anti rater* !effectively dweller and coordinate correetiev
actions'
le. it te. therederes pcierseed the** essomtu mareard
el the uopeneihis rompity Onus% of the rember departmets mad
agestellea be established to riot area the seaurity reermaribilltios utak-
tidied for USZ3wedrx NICID Zia* and to mire as a support mochontani
*ohms respiested to the Direnter of c.;ontrol bikelligmace in the emerciat
of Ma special rosmisibilittes set forth is Suttee3 of NS= bin. 1.
11. it le verommended thst the attached siespottoi DCID he **b-
rained to the USES fat approwal.
Distribetions
Orig Ai I - DCI
1 DEMI
1 -
1 DDP
I - DE4
- DDS
1 - DDC
Attachmeett
Proposed DCED
IFCHF
3iGNE13
Sheffield Ldwards
Director of Security
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CONC UltiCEINIC ES:
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r1r-1
MILLGTO14.
A. pa 1,1Z4G
main'
The simessittoe shalt be imams a? the Lt Sieeraiity Cr-.. seat
*bail haelage espreesetatiess et the 011.1, eipsiorieee ie especeral thee
the roepessible security edlisers 4 the smamber ileportmeers amid asomit
el UM MIS some as the rupreessiatives ea the setemittee. Other
esawriee et the golterstesail may be Isartied by tbe easmalitee to peva:Laws
as appropriate, The CU Member wig Adair the esassallioe.
Tlea sellestea at the sammittee *ben
the iseellhgesco semeramay may provost the finiketheillied
talkthWeilee lad o Sialtarkaar* 44%Sirre. and reerboola.
11?Th***01141*
a) To aloweisia and review oecurity
istecerearee **they rotate to the protectios
beanies** ~co* ear reethoda tress suourberited, discietatre
b) To asolate as reepaosteas doe Direetor at Gotetts1 b*tiligente
In the amastso at his tikikpadt$11411418 puuaM to -4COSIOU So MAUI,
No.
e) To roseatmeed soeurity policy to the &?
to the horeillapesce senansesity, loch policy VOCOISIM0111114410:11rt
laisai be tosemmit. bevaswer, wink the respessibairy el each
d*pata d wary ler the pasteetiva el tutelligesse oar 4
iabellisesse scarce* Teethed" within its ears eniMaseka &bet
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SECRI
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MEMORANDUM F
SUBJECT
ctor of Central Intelligence
: Proposed DC1D to Establish a
(15113 Security Committee
,____,.. ._........_
OCI- (a.C.-56
Lsce;fuilvo :.? .-i:1)1
\.._
I-4. - - ? -
958
I. This memorandum contains a reconunendatiort submitted for
DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph (11).
Z. The publication of the 15 September 1958 revision of NSC1)
No. I (New Series) places certain responsibilities in the security
field upon the DCI arid the USIB. Since there ii neither a committee
within USIB nor a regularly constituted inter-Agency medium through
which actions might be initiated, it appears necessary that a mechanism
be established for this purpose.
3. In view of the increased emphasis upon the protection of in-
telligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized dis-
closure, it must tie assumed that both the DCI and the USW will review
present directives and may initiate action for the further development
of policies, procedures, and practices to provide the necessary safe-
guards for the protection of community intelligence.
4. The security responsibilities under NSC1D No. 1 are as follows:
FOR THE U5115
a. In Section 2 paragraph a. (5) the US1B snail
"Develop and review security standards and
practices as they relate to the protection of
intelligence and of intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure."
b. FOR THE MEMBER DEPARTMENTS
AND AGENCIES
In Section (5), "Each department and agency,
however, shall remain responsible for the
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protection of intelligence and of intelligence
sources and methods within its own organi-
zation. Each shall also establish appropriate
internal policies and procedures to prevent
the unauthorised disclosure from within that
agency of intelligence information or activity".
FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
c. In Section (3) "The Director
Intelligence, with the ass Lstance and support
of the members of the V.3. intelligence Board,
shall ensure the development of policies and
procedures for the protection of intelligence
and of intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure".
In addition to the above the Director has been
given a special responsibility as follows: The
Director of Central Intelligence shall call upon
the departments and agencies, as appropriate,
to investigate within their department or agency
any unauthorised disclosure of intelligence or of
intelligence sources or methods. A report of
these investigations, including corrective measures
taken or recommended within the departments and
agencies involved, shall be transmitted to the
Director of Central Intelligence for review and
such further action as may beappropriate, in-
cluding reports to the National 3ocurfty Council
or the President.
5. These responsibilities will require a continuing review of security
practices and procedures by both the USIB and the member departments
and agencies. In this regard Executive Order 10501, effective December 3,
1953, sets the minimum standards for the safeguarding of classified
defense information and thus provides uniformity in the basic procedures
among the departments and agencies of government. Most departments
and agencies in the intelligence community have supplemented Executive
Order 10501 with additional internal control procedures, particularly
-2-
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where intelligence and special source material is involved. These
supplemental controls have usually been instituted on the basis of
security requirements peculiar to the department or agency con-
cerned and not necessarily an the basis of a security problem
common to the intelligence community.
tt. There is no present authorized committee within the intelligence
community to deal with security matters relating to the overall protec-
tion of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from un-
authorised disclosure and the development of uniformity where appropriate
in security procedures. The 1AG did not have a committee fee security
matters of this nature. The (AGM did have a special committee on
Camila Personnel Security Standards but this committee has been in-
operative for the past two years. There was also an established USCIb
Security Committee (1.75C18 SECCOlvi) largely concerned with procedural
matters, however, this committee, since the formation of LISIB, has
been inoperative and there is no security committee in USIB to which
its functions can logically be assigned. biSCID No. 6 provides be con-
forriefty with Section (2) NSCID No. 1 that the WIZ shall study standards
and practices of the departments and agencies in protecting Comint;
and determine the degree and typo of security protection to be given
EL1NT activities.
Security directives carried over from the 1AG and the USCIB wide
are currently in effect are DCIL No. 11/1, Control of Initial Informs.-
tion Regarding Foreign Nuclear Explosions, DCLD No. 11/2 Control of
Dissemination and Ilse of Intelligence and Intelligence Information, and
=CIS No. 5 Standards and Practices for Clearance of Personae/ for
Coniint.
The continuous review of security directives and concern with over-
all security matters affecting the intelligence community must necessarily
on provided for by the EIS133 to carry out its responsibilities.
7. In the past several years there have been serious unautaorized
disclosures of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods. The
Investigations of these unauthorized disclosures have been carried out
under difficult circumstances by the informal cooperative efforts of the
security officers in the affected agencies and departments through their
4
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normal security channels. The informality of this system has retarded
the investigative function in that there was no established central coordi-
nating point to channel the investigative activities and exchange timely
investigative leads and information. The results of these investigations
revealed several violations of existing security regulations but more
importantly, revealed certain weaknesses in the security systems of
the intelligence community in the dissemination and the handling of in-
telligence information. Certain corrective recommendations resulted
from these investigations but there was no single committee or mechanism
by which action on these corrective measures could be taken on an over-
all community basis.
S. It is felt that there are more unauthorized disclosures of infor-
mation than is apparent to the intelligence community and some of these
are accordingly never reported and investigeted. The intricacies of the
intelligence community structure with its specialized committees and
special channels of information have aggravated this problem. The
discovery of a possible unauthorized disclosure is frequently discerned
by those intelligence officers dealing with substantive intelligence in-
formation who recognize their information in unauthorized hands. Often
these suspicions are not immediately forwarded to the professional
security officers who mast take investigative action. The wide spread
and timely exchange of inforxnation in the intelligence community makes
it impossible to readily identify, in situations involving an unauthorized
disclosure, those departments and agencies involved, as all have been
recipients of the identical piece of intelligence information. In the
absence of a system for the reporting of suspected violations on a com-
munity basis, much valuable time is lost from the investigative stand-
point in, determining the principal agencies involved and organizing the
Informal liaison contacts in order to pursue a mutual investigative
effort. Lacking a clearly defined procedure on a community level,
there is certain resultant confusion and duplication of effort. In
circumstances where the violation is suspected but not evident and
no department appears to have primary responsibility or interest,
there is a natural hesitation in the intelligence community to suggest
through liaison channels that the violation may have occurred in another
department. Accordingly, inaction is likely to be the final result.
4 -
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9. 111 view of the rapid developments in the intelligence complex
and frequent adjustments in the organizational structure to meet these
changes, the security practices and procedures to be effective must
he kept under constant review. Aleaknesses that are permitted to
develop in the security system will sonner or later lead to un-
authorized disclosures and the resultant investigations will generally
reveal these weaknesses. Failure to eliminate the weaknesses on a
community level will merely coir,pound the security problems involved.
The individual security officers a the member departments and agencies
cannot solve these problems by unilateral action but should have a
committee mechanism whereby the security officers can focalize their
mutual problems and more effectively develop and coordinate corrective
actions.
10. It is, therefore, proposed twit a USIB committee composed
of the responsible security officers of the member departments and
agencies be established to act upon the security responsibilities estab-
lished for USLB under NSCLD No. 1 and to serve as a support mechanism
when requested, to the Director of Central Intelligence in the exercise
of his special responsibilities set forth in Section S of NSCID No. I.
11. It is recommended that the attached proposed DCID be sub-
mitted to the USIB for approval.
Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security
Distribution:
()rig & 1 - DCI
- DDCI
1-ER
1 - DDP
1 - DDI
3 - DDS
- DDC
Attachment:
Proposed DCID
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CONCURRLNCES:
Sigaed) Richard EcialS
f
Deputy Director
Plane)
ueraty tnrector untepige
/57
Deputy Director (Support)
Deputy (Coordination)
1P NOV 1959
ILLEGIB
Date
7 NOV 1958
Date
Date
The recommendation contained in paragraph 11 is approved.
Date
Director
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DIR.ECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO.
Security Committee
Pursuant to Section 2, subparagraph a (5) and Section 5, NSCM
No. I (New Series) revised: 15 September 195$ and for the purpose of
preventing unauthorized disclosure of intelligence and of intelligence
sources and methods. a standing committee of the USD3 is hereby
established.
I. Composition and Organisation
The committee shall be known as the U3II5 Security Committee and
shall include representatives of the USW agencies. It is expected that
the responsible security officers of the member departments and agencies
of USIB will serve as the representatives on the committee. Other
agencies of the government may be invited by the committee to participate
as appropriate. The CIA member will chair the coramittee.
Mission
The mission of tae committee shall b? to promote means by which
the intelligence community may prevent the unauthorised disclosure of
intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods.
3. Functions
a) To develop and review security standards, practices and
procedures as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorised disclosure.
b) To assist as requested. the Director of Central batelliseect
in the exercise of his responsibilities pursuant to Section 5, N3CID
No. I.
c) To recommend security ?Jolley to the 13131B as It pertains
to the intelligence community. Such policy recommendations
shall be consonant, itowever, with the responsibility of each
department and agency for the protection of intelligence and of
intelligence sources and methods within its own organization and
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the establishment of appropriate internal policies and proceduree
to prevent the unauthorized disclosure from within that depart-
ment and agency of intelligence information or activity.
d) The committee shall make reports to the USIB as may be
appropriate or requested.
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