APPENDIX 1 PRECOGNITION - A MEMORY OF THINGS FUTURE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: STARGATE
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96-00787R000100130003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 26, 1974
• Content Type: RP

Approved For Release 2000/08/10: CIA-RDP96-00787R000100130003-6
PRECOGNITION - A MEMORY OF THINGS FUTURE?
G. Feinberg
Department of Physics
Columbia University', New York, N. Y. 10027
To be presented at the Confr- en?e on Quantum Physics and Parapsychology
Geneva, Switzerland, August 26 -27, 1974
Approved For Release 2000/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000100130003-6
 Approved For Release gO/08/10 : CIA-RDP96-00787R000100130003-6
2.
is quite different than the above picture would suggest. Instead of forbidding
pr cognition from happening, these theories typically have sufficient symmetry to sug-
esr r,.ct phenomena akin to precognition should occur in a manner qualita..,iely,
i;?:, uh not necessarily quantitatively, similar to the occurrence of retrocognition.
irrc:,ecl, phenomena involving a reversed time order of cause and effect are generally
cxcluoed from consideration on tr,e ground that they have not been observed, rather
n because the theory forbids them. This exclusion itself introduces an element of
..s. mmetry into the physical theories, which some physicists have felt was improper,
c:; required further explanation? Thus, if such phenomena indeed occur, no change
i,i -;?:e fundamental equations of physics would be needed to describe them. Only a
cs,cnge in the solutions used would be necessary
The details of these aspects of physics relevent to this possibility will be
;,iven balow. However, it is worth noting first that the occurrence of physical effects
propagate backwards in time may be related to precognition very indirectly. To
saw this, we note that the information about the past that is available to any person
at a given time does not mainly consist of his sense data at that instant. Indeed, we
usually do not think of sense data as g;ving '^;orr..:~tion about the past, although
strictly speaking if is the past we are observing, because of the finite time required
ror any