THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM 1951 - 1963

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-06365A000200070001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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EVOLUTION OF THE JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM
1951- 1963
"I am trying to build up a corps of well valified men here who are
interested in making a career with the Central Intelligence Agency. To effect
this, I recently established a training section which functions - as much as I
dislike the term - as a sort of career management office." Thus wrote
Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, then Director of Central Intelligence to
Hon. John Mdeloy on 17 March 1951.
Back up a bit more. When Col. Matthew Baird, USAF, left his interview with
Gen. Smith in November 1950, it was understood that on assignment to the Agency,
his responsibilities would be (1) to create the framework for and help to
administer a Career Corps and (2) to establish a program for the recruitment and
training of junior officers who at the time were referred to as Professional
Trainees.
On reporting for duty in January 19511 he found, with some surprise, th t
he had been made Director of Training with many responsibilities in addition to
those discussed in November. This turned out to be an exceedingly fortunate
decision for the Agency and, later, a happy one for me personally. For Col. Baird,
I suspect, it vas something else. He was cheated of some of the fun I had by
being given a job which was a greater test of his abilities and purposefulness.
In ?? hew saddled. with all kinds of training problems in addition to
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THE PROPOSAL
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"1st BOdorsenen To General Davison - I. I do so approve. - /s/
It is leportent to point out that the Career Corps and the Professional
Trainee Corps were planned as interacting or complementary components. The primary
objective was to make the best possible use of all embers of the Agency through
effective management, appropriate training, and accurate assesement of their
qualifications and performances as individuals. If with good personnel management
employees did not show promise in work situations, they would not be selected for
the Career Corps The Professional Trainees were to be Only one source of bighXY
qualified personnel. Eligibility for selection for the Career Corps was to come
after two years of service.
Col. Baird recommended "that the Career Corps Program be antatered by a
Career Development Staff, and that a man, experienced in this field be brought
in and aorte4 by an adequate staff."
He then bred the problems as,
"A. To devise a plan to select, recruit, and train young nen and women of
great promise, and to place then in the Agency where they be of the greatest
but be adds that "the Agway will continue to employ specialists abo maybe
selected as careerists an the basis of their perfOrmance."
B. To devise a method of identifying those Imployees of the Alessi who have
the t potential for farther development; to train and rotate them within and
tatd* the Agency in such a way that they will develop the greatest usefUlness to
the Agency; and to place thew in the most important pooltions. ---"
The Proposal of the Career Corps for Obi& young recruits were to be
prepared is important because it set up the fendamental purposes, ideals, and
methods *slab eventually helped to make the JOT Program sucoesSfUl. Ualike the
JOT Program, however, no one officer was appointed, an recomnended to guide its
development through the network of varying Agency functions, activities,' and
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General Davison soon moved out of his post to be followed by five other incumbents,
none of whom remained in the job long enough to put his *print firmly on the
policies of the Office of Personnel. Then the appointment of Mt. Emmet D. Scholz,
too late, gave some continuity to the direction o
practices.
Without some aggree
the Agency's personnel
continuous leadership convinced of the need for a
viable. uniform Career Corps, all attempts to develop one were casual and ineffective.
Meanwhile, most of the substantive offices and staffs were aoquiring qualities which
were, for better or for wort., characteristic of their leaders. Among other things
they developed their own career services and policies relating thereto. Wily of
the suggestions in the Proposal for a Career Corpe were neglected. The
disparities in personnel policies in various components reminds one of
Stephen Leacodes general vtoiiellhis horse and rode off in all directions".
So much for the career Corps. At first, its companion in the Proposal, the
Professional Trainee Program, was all but ignored by the bureaucrats. Later on,
as the Junior Officer Training (JOT) Program (its new uame) gained recognition,
they moved in with a vengeance, nibbled away at some of the principles and
procedures which made it effective, complicated its administration, forced partici-
pation in its operation, and attempted to make it "all things to all people" which,
in my view, cut down its efficiency.
During its evolution, the Program remained flexible in its procedures. It
profited from its own experiences and the improved opportunities offered by the
expanding Office of Training as well as the increased cooperation of the
substantive offices it served. It is interesting to note that the principles of
its structure as originAlly stated by Col. Baird remained inject. There was,
indeed need to change
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Look at these headings in the Proposal -
"I Criteria for Selection of Professional Trainees". This stresses
"vary high (academic) standing, language skill or learning facility,
leadership and breadth, good personality, sound health and morals;
previous military service or willingness to enter a service motiva-
tion for government service, willingness to accept anonymity. (Also
there are notes on "Negative Criteria".)
"II Recruitment of Professional Trainees". This includes the use of up
to 50 University Consultants who "must be men of the highest quality"
since they will be nominating students of the highest quality. Other
sources are suggested such as separation centers of Armed Forces and
CIA Personnel Procurement. Selection of applicants would be made "by
DTR after consultation with the D/Pers."
"III Basic Training "to provide - - the necessary skills and knowledge
to make the most of on-the-job training". This included a 12-week
course in the fundamentals of intelligence and of Rusaian, and
improvement of reading and writing skills. Continuous evaluation
up or out - unsatisfactory trainees will be dismissed if a suitable
low-grade job cannot be found for them.
rv Initial Placement (after basic training). "Place trainee in the most
suitable position available" - study his various qualifications,
personality, aptitudes and interests, and performance in basic training.
After 4-6 months 'valuate his performance in and suitability for that
work. (It was also suggested that a number of slots for training
overseas be set up for PT's.)
Hers are additional quotes which served as the guidelines for its operation
as the Office of Training itself developed. Parenthetically, let me emphasize
that they wAppr.rbtstreerficassuoceutaritnnewpmweGa051100620esicepocahetieal
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question, "had, under ideal conditions, would you satisfy some of the particular
and peculi r requirements for first rate professional* in our business?" These
refinements were indeed the guts of the plan. They, more than anything else
stimulated enthusiasm for the Program of administrators, instructors, supervisors,
and the JOT's themselves. Not so with the bureaucrats who were offended by the
discrimin-tions implicit in the selection and training of high potential employees.
Such a system created second class citizens and, with it antagonisms toward the
Program'.
(a) "A professional, trainee is a young man or woman who appears to hove
great ability and promise, wishes to make a career in CIA and is receiving
basic training."
(t) The chief problem is to choose from among the many applicants who
will meet the selection criteria those whose less tangible qualities
justify Mem expeettions of success in the Agency". (This, incidentally,
was a prominent source of difficulty in interpre ing our actions to
recruiters.)
(c) "A first-rate man must not be excluded because his category is full
nor may a second-rater be brought in merely to fill a slot."
(d) Students in college or graduate school who will later apply for CIA
"should not be subsidised by us since anyone who is good enough for this
program will have no difficulty in obtaining a fellowship or assistantship."
(e) "At no time w_illte._s2attst_OtyA_Ihs_2WissLthp_isp!amion that he
Al_klialtelected as a member of an elite corps.' but Father that he will be
given an opportuoity to prove by his own performance that he DB entitled to
training and opportunity for advancement. (The underlining is Col. Baird' s)
(f) "The (Consultant) contict will recommend a few of the beat students as
professional trainees and the remainder for other more specific employment
in theA
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immediately to the covert offices, so aa not to compromise their cover. To
give the program hi prestige and wide range, every effort will. be made to
recruit trainee" from many colleges amd universities.
(X) "The treasele initial (on-the-job) assignment in of great importance,
not only in terns of his own development, but of the efficiency of the
office/ and the agency as a whole.
(b)
This program is built around two theses (a) that the price of
admission into. the Career Development Program should be on-the-job survival
ability, and (b) that the program is directed- toward the really able."
(The firet promotion should come in 6 to 8 months and the second in from
12 to 18 months after the first.)
(i) *The Professional Trainee Program in, in affect, a hi gh-lavel-potential
recruitment program, coupled with a basic educational or training effort to
ground the individual in intelligence and area. It is proposed that at the
end of an initial course, the participant be assigned to one of the offices."
Under the contemplate& plan, trainees would be required to demonstrate a
Wellman', and an ability to rise in order to be picked up at GB-09 level in
proposed Career Development Program. This would appear to meet effectively
crttciam of "favoritism" in the Profeseional Trainee Program. Tn thin
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undertook his work as first chief of the Professional Tr inee Pom
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In a smell office in North Building.
In the course of the next ten years, the Program evolved, perhaps slowly,
but with little if any deviation from the original projected methods of operation
to the point where in 1961 its objectives were outlined in the following
recapitulation given to all successful candidates. In so doing, we hoped to
provide them with a clear understanding of 'What we expected to accomplish and
how we wentAopPe4e/ftr-or Migibmintbsoniacieptia-Reptibeenewitanutoini hid the
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Ing =teal understanding and cooyerat on
ON
enter the Central Intelligence Agency to serve your country, not
public recognition, or an exciting lif, in exotic parts
Ours is difficultlmmek, requiring a keen mind, selfless effort
ifice, and the utmost dedication. You should not enter itunless
you enmeot to work border and under more difficult conditions than most of your
friends, whatever their occupation. You should not enter it from a profit motive,
because you moot aspect to accumulate wealth. At the outset we do not expect
you to be highly motivated for a service about whiCh.you know so little, but we do
expect you to be, the kind of person who has the capacity for developing that
motivation. It is our responsibility to train you tar those activities which
constitute dedicated Berrie, in CIA.
2. During the two years of your JOT status you will be under the direct,
sipervision of one of the training officers of the Program. BO is responsible
to Chief of the Proven and to the DTR for your training and development as an
intelligence offioer. It is his interest to provide you with the best opportwiity
and to use your talent. consistent always with the need* of the Agency to progress:
in this profession. Your formal training will consist first of general orientation
to the Agency, during which evaluations of your capacities are mode. Ton will then
be given intensive training in a fUnctionel area where you will. learn the
requisite skill.. Than you will be assigned to a desk for a period or about a
year to apply your akilla and demonstrate your worth. The determination of these
assignments is first and above all based on the needs of the Agency; second, the
opinion of the JOT Program of where you can most appropriately apply your talents
based on the principle of effective use of manpower; and third, your own interests
ant desires. It is during the ow-the-job phase of your training that we hope you
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will ome motivated for serioe in CIA. Much of this incentive will be
derived from the example set by your immediate eupervioor. Accordingly, it is
of great importance that your on-the-desk training program be well considered
and well administered. Your training officer and your component supervisor is
responsible for this, as well as other elements of your development.
3. There will probably be several members of your class who hold higher
wades than those normally assigned. These people will fall into two categories:
a. Enployees of the Agency who have been accepted for the JOT Program
at the grades which they currently hold. They are called "internnl" trainees.
b. Specially qualified individuale who have been recruited and hired
for a special task and are on "directed amsignment". They have had prior
eqerience or possess Skills in areas for which there in specific demand.
"Directed assignment trainees enter training with the approval of the component
to which they will be assigned. They will be transferred to that component as
soon as their formal training is completed, and become subject to its promotion
policies.
4. It is normal end proper for a young man contemplating a career to think
about advancement and personal reeponsibilities. The Office of Training has
established the policy of hiring and promoting junior officer trainees. The
following relates to present conditions which are subject to change. Most JOT'S
are hired at 08-7. A few of the more mature candidates are hired at 08-8.
Irrespective of the date on which you enter on duty, you will become eligible
for a one-grade promotion at the conclusion of the formal training period, some
32 to 34 weeks after the class begins. This is not automatic, but is based on
your performance and attitude. Raving been trained for a certain type of work,
you. viii. then apply this training to a specific job, normally for about a year.
During this period, you are on trial with the supervisor to whom you have been
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a. to prove your value to the Agency in a work situation,
b. to convince your supervisor that you are a desirable addition to his
as a permanent employee,
O. To evaluate your own fitness for this particular kind of service
During this on-the-desk training period you remain a JOT. At its conclusion
you will become eligible for your next promotion. Again, this is not automatic
but based on the quality of your performance and your attitude. It must be
recoemended by your on-the-job supervisor. You will then be transflerred to the
task for which you have been trained and become the responsibility of that
component. You will be in competition with your peers for whatever recognition
you will later receive. The Office of Training no longer has 11.13,V control over
your promotions and you become subject to the policies of the part of the
OntialtlitiCel to which you have been reassigned. As in the Office of Trelnirg,
the higher the grade, the longer you will wait for advancement. Outstanding
performance is recognized by accelerated promotion.
5. It is a fundamental principle of the JOT Program that the trainees
produce the highest quality performance of which they are capable, whatever the
task assigned. All JOTts, except those on "directed assignment", must be ready
and willing to accept any assignment. Due regard is given to family considerations
and personal circumstances.
6. Security is the cornerstone of this business. Discretion in discussing
any subject anywhere is mandatory. At all times you must be on guard to protect
yourself from breaking security restrictions, particularly when you are in the
company of outsiders. You must conduct your life in such a way that you are not
subject to public censure or private blackmail.
7. Your initial experience will largely determine the value and importn
to you of a career in intelligence. Your reward for entering this service vU
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need the most able people we can get. Those who are selected should possess
a deep desire to serve their country knowing that rewards can only be in the
intangible area of personal satisfactions.
8. There is a difference between training and education. Assumably
members of the Program are fairly well educated when they enter it. This
education will, of course, continue as they mature. The purpose of the training
is to provide tools whereby their education and mental acuity can be put to work
in this business. The skills you will gala, added to your knowledge and
intellectual ability, will with experience give you the equipment to become an
efftetive intelligence officer. Your job will be to become as expert as possible
in each area of training and experience you undergo. The cumulative total of
these bits of expertise will produce a first-rate officer. You cannot know in
advance when you will be called upon to use any part of your professional equip-
agent whatever it may be. Your principal objective is to become truly professional
(--__ at the earliest possible moment.
The validity of Col. Bairdla carefully considered and highly detailed plans
had been demonstrated.
FORMAL TRAINING
The evolution of the Program had followed the outline and philosophy stated
in the original Proposal. The formal training paralleled the evolution of the
Office of Training itself. From the outset, the training comprised two elements,
(1) formal classwork or instruction and (2) actual on-the-job supervised
experience. In each of these the indtvidual was to show his ability and aptitude
for some phase of intelligence work by his performance in it. As far as the
Office of Training was concerned, if he failed in either he did not deserve
membership in the Program or the Career Corps.
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It is important to recognise that the Office of Training was working to fulfill
the needs of a very rapidly growing organisation. These were to equip its
personnel, many of whom were untutored in intelligence matters, to compete with
the products of the well-established and sophisticated espionage and analytical
agencies of Communist and other unfriendly countries. In 1951 and 1952, the
courses offered by OTR were few and necessarily aimed at satisfying immediate Agency
needs. Many supervisers at all levels did not "believe in" the usefulness of
formal training to the individual or to their component. Furthermore, each
component was trying to prove its usefulness which meant that the sooner people
were put to work on some project, the better the chance of gaining recognition;
hence no time for training.
Originally, the formal training of the PT's was a "play-it-by-ear" affair.
They were brought on board at their convenience, given "make work" or routine jobs
to occupy their time until an appropriate course opened. In it they worked or
studied with a conglomerate group of students from many parts of the Agency,
ranging from secretarial levels to 08-13 or 14. Almost invariably the PT's,
fresh from top notch scholarly work, completed the course in a cluster at the top
of the class.
The first "class" of Professional Trainees reported in July 1951 and
numbered 17. They attended a course in intelligence techniques for half of each
day and spent the other half studying Russian at Georgetown University. After
fourteen weeks the trainees were assigned to some division for a 60 - 90 day tri 1
period. At the end of the trial, they were reassigned as permanent transfers if
found qualified. The fact that many trainees either would never use Russian or
needed to be trained in some other language eventually led to rescinding the
requirement that all Professional Trainees study Russian.
Those were the days of "Training-General" (overt) and "Training-Special
(covert). Pflzprt1vitilferfite1etze12d0406031t: Ullaltaa178494%8A000210ViAtcprzatinuity to
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trainine, program for several years. Gradually, the PT's were admitted
given by "Trainievepecial" and officers of the Program were allowed
he1A1ngs reserved for them and later to go to
on business.
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The op-the-jog) trial period was also a haphazard affair. The attttMss of
supervisors toward the arrangement variedevennore than when the Program became
established. Few were willing to think of it as a training procedure. Wet
looted on it as an easy way to pick up a cleared "bode, ready to go to work.
And the sooner he coed be transferred frost the OTR T/0 the better. On several
occasions transfers were put through witb3ut our knowledge or epproval. On the
OX hamd, some an". having heard from the grsPewimm about oPPortunities that
seemed iippealing would "shop" themeelves, inter*iew supervisors (instead of
atemase) and maks arranesmento of their own, all of which tended to give the
Program a bed name.
As T/D's booms restricted fact that the JOT remained.on the roster of
Middle working for some office during the trial period helped to popularise
the Program. Supervisors maw a chance to get additional jobs done by "training"
the JOT. Some tried to take advantage of the. JOT to kmock down beck logs of
routine work. This was not training. One of the duties of our Training Officers
was to insist on his having a reel training experience.
la retrospect, the Program at first was an unorganized and hit-or-miss juehle
whose only redeeming features were Col. Bairdts eagle-eyed supervision, his
insistence on making it successful, and the high quality of the PT's themselves.
But the very rapid expansion in numbers in the Agency, the empire building that
absorbed the attention c,t so many supervisors, and the need for ever more personnel
gave us a Chance to get our bearings. AS the Office of Training grew, more and
better courses were developed. Gradually we acquired the means whereby the
stated objectives of the Program could be put into effect,
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The first significant step was the establishment of a course in Intelligence
Teehniquee for JOT'S only and pitched at a higher level more commensurate with
their ability. It was an immediate suocess. The JOT'S (the name had been Changed
by now) responded favorably to the increased maturity and intensified pace. (No
repetition of materials, much more required reading, advanced vocabulary, far
greater coverage, in a word more nearly a graduate school level approach.)
The improvement is standards in OTR courses spread from school to school.
I think the presence of JOT'. in many of the courses was helpful but more
important was the assignment at increasingly better Agency personnel to tours in
OTR as instructors.
The next important event was the development of the first detailed on-the-
job training program late in 1952. This outlined, the objectives to be attained
and how they would be accomplished, specified readings and office tanks to be
handled, and the estimated approximate time which would be required to master
each technique. Provision was made (a) to alter the Program with approval of
C/JOTP as conditions, developments, and needs of the Agency dictated and (b) to
provide C/JOTP with periodic reports of the JOT'. progress. Such an arrangement
for on-the-job training gained almost immediate acceptance.
Soon the JOT training followed a coherent meaningful pattern viz: courses
in orientation to the Agency, Intelligence Techniques, International Communions
and the six weeks basic operations course called Phase II (later Operations
Familiarization), all in a given sequence and beginning at specific times.
These were followed by the spelled-out on-the-job training experience after which
those in the DDF. who had been successfUl during the trial period were given the
full operations course. Note that op to this point, JOT's entered courses open
to all qualified members of the Agency except that in Intelligence Techniques.
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As the Program prospered Mt. Baird continued to press for the best training
in sic techniques, methods, and tradecraft it was possible to produce. 018
efforts culminated in the development of the First Integrated Program which
started in September 1558 and which is a unique chapter in the history of the
Office of Training. of the resources of the office were focused on this effort
to provide the very beet training to produce effective intelligence officers
each with proper preparation in an area where he could excel.
The class was divided into /mall groups to each of which was assigned a
senior and experienced melber of OTR as an adviser, consultant, and observer. At
the end of the headquarters ;Iwo individual interviews in depth were held by
picked officers of the Operations School to determine which JOT'. had the
qualities and interest which qualified them to he trained in depth for the DDP
and which for the DDI or DDS. On completion of the specialised training, oa-
ths job trials were arranged as venal.
The most important element in the plan wee that he entire Integrated Program
WIZ devised for JOT'S exclusively and presented at the highest level that could be
devised. And it worked: When instructors could keep these exceptional people
working bard, paying attention to lectures, participating actively in field
problems, and competing vigorously, sometimes heatedly among themselvee AS 1nsy
DID, they produced very high quality results. It should be noted that the JOTP
staff did not participate in the planning of the courses; such matters were the
province of the experts in each subject.
ON-THE-JOB TRArNING
From the beginning of the Program the importance of the on-the-job training
vae obvigas. In spits of our own inexperience in intelligence matters, it became
clear early in the Program that "some Jobe in the Agency are most interesting and
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but a very largn Tort of our work is deadly uomatonous, drudging
? (IO 's Survey of the CIA Career Service 30 Jeenary 1960.)
In planning the on-the-job training, all agreed that a certain amount of
ine gave basic uoderstanding of the job and tested the staying qualities of
the individual, a very important characteristic of the effective officer. But to
auto a highly capable young person for a protracted period to a job that could
--- be dens by a good high school graduate defeated the purposes of the Program as
defined by Oen. Smith. Furthermore, it served to quench the enthusiasm of the
neW officer at the time when the question of his trne intermit in our business
was being determined awl should be stimulated. For these reasons, the tY110 of
on-the-job training program that was proposed for him and the attitude of the
office snperviser were of vital importance to the OWC41118 of our effort.
On the otherhimad, we forma the dangers inherent in giving the JOT his own
way and spoiling him for the disciplimedinmek he would eventually do. And as was
not infrequently the case, some supervisor' resented our efforts to biro some
stimulating work included in the training aasigneent.
We Owed a continuing need to adjust the relatively delicate balance between
the.. two attitudes. There were frequent contacts by the training officers with
supervisors as well as with the JOT's themselves. Our purposes had to be
=plains& ; we had to find good positions for our people, and we had to serve
the divisions as well as possible. To keep a reasonably coherent approach by
all training officii, we held short staff meeting, at the beginning of each day
when we discussed reactions, opportunities, criticisms, new ideas, etc.
Neeptiating for on-the-job training was an individual matter. By the time
this phase of the Program was reached the training officer h d gotten to know
good deal about the JOT. If the supervisor had had saTerience with us and was
sympathetic the task was simple. In general, we approached him with the following
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The JOT who is attached for on-the-job training knows that he must prove his
worth and demonstrate his fitnesm for employment. At the same time, the super-
Visor has the opportunity to evaluate him in the actual work of the desk without
being et:omitted to accept him at the end of the training period.
Inasmuch as during this training the JOT is the responsibility of the Office
of Training, we request from the supervisor a formal statement of the objective,
of the cm-the-job training and the type of assignment which he may expect. This
ill allow no to monitor his progress and provide for effective personnel manage-
ment of the JOT.
In this cooperattre effort we ask that should the JOT show inadequacies or
deficiencies which an that he will not be acceptable for permanent employment
the supervisor report the fact to um promptly. We do this in the hope that a
re-assignment can be effected which would be more appropriate to the interests
of the Agency and the individual.
The Office of Training looks upon the supervisor during the on-the-job
training as an integral and very important participant in the JOT Program. As an
expert in his field, it is through his influence that the JOT will, we hope
become enthused to continue and develop a career in CIA.
We recognise that these young people are in the process of testing not only
their abilities to cope with the unusual needs of the Agency but also their
fitness for a career with us. They are perforce examining the rewards and
satisfactions of this service in terms of their own life objecttves. Their
decisions about continuing in the Agency are often made during thiS period.
Experience lino shown that JOT's who have begun their careers under supervisers
who have taken interest in their development, who have provided them with
opportunities for growth coamensurate with their ability, and who in the
Clandestine Services have plannedcmerseas experience as soon as possible after
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adequate training --- such JOT's have for the most p.xt continued in the Agency.
Those, however, who for one reason or another have not been handled as individuals
who are expected to make discriminating decision/ have resigned.
Nothing in this should be interpreted as a plea for special treatment,
coddling, softness, or favoritism in dealing with: the individual. Wther we are
attempting to say th4t the JOT respects the supervisor who makes stringent require
menta of him, sets high standards for the performance expected of bin, requires
herd work, and demands his beat effort. We believe job satisfaction will result
from such treatment and hem told the candidate at the time of his recruitment
that this was one of our principles.
It was important for the training officer always to maintain control over
the JOT. In a situation characterised by close contact and the effort to provide
him with an interesting and rewarding experience, it was easy for the JOT to try
to "use" the TO to gain his own ends. Prom the outset, steady insistence thnt
the needs of the Agency took precedence over all considerations helped mightily
in keeping the balance between service and selfish interests.
As long as there were appreciably fewer JOT's than openings for them it was
relatively easy to find an appropriate assignment from among the opportunities
available. Being in a favorable bargAning position we could carry out our non-
bureaucratic objectives and, at the same time, serve the Agency well. But, years
litter, after the Program had been radically expanded and the idea or principle had
been established that all intelligence officers should have JOTP training if
possible, the problem of devising and supervising effective on-the-job training
programs became much more difficult. And the efficiency of the Training Officers
was being eroded.
EXPANSION
The Program began as a pilot operation. Because of the "Korean Incident
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a large number of slots, never fully used, were set acid.. ror the severe]. niilit ry
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the full quote of civili
lots was not filled. With
the auec*sa of the First InbmpratedProgran, the validity of the original Proposal
was established. Soon two large classes a year vire inaugurated. This required
doubling the number of slats for the Prograawith further increases contemplated
and later authorised. As the militaryimasse began to phase out, it developed
that the use of the Program for employees already on board *Intervals* increased
merkeely. Mutually the various directorates etipulated the number of JOTs that
were to be recruited and trained specifically for their components --- a tar cry
from the earlier techniques of placement after the individual's characteristics
had been determined and direct oantact between the Training Officer and on-the-
desk supervisor vas the rule. Other chomps verve taking pleoe. By 20 Jule 1963
the new problems that the Program was about to fact were summarised in the
following memo for the record.
*The strength of the Program has evolved from the careful interpretation
of its purposes and objectives to an-the-job supervisors. These are the parties
responsible for creating an experience vhich motivates the JOT for long service
in the Agency. Giving bin formal training to do the job does not and oennot
give him a real ciation of its being worthwhile. Simply to train bin only
to have bin leave the Agency is a vests of all the money, time, energy, and
Wart that goes into the *election, processing, and training of the JOT.
*During the years vies, we yore able to pay better attention to on-the-job
training we had our greatest success in this regard. More recently with the
expansion of the Program and a minimum increase in the number of training
officers, the attention of the latter has been absorbed by recruiting and
selection processes rather than the more important function of creating a
constructive attitude on the part of aupervisors toward the co-the-job training.
Since moving to the new building we have been in closer touchviththe supervisors
andfeelAthveliWeRebb15029.01041111gebpdethibles06313Atbg2ggePOOP4bowelerfve
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have been deluged with applicationa and interviews of applicants. Toward the end
of the current fiscal year we have been short-banded and over loaded. As a result
we are now lagging inour attention to the JOT'S who are on board and whose careers
are being Shaped. Too much in being taken for granted by the supervisors not only
in the DIR, but in the DDI also. There are aome indications that our control is
being usurped.
'With the move to the Broyhill Building our contact with JOT's during
training and on-the.-job training and contact with the supervisors will be most
difficult to maintain. The trip from the Broyhill Building to Headquarters and
return cannot itself be 0?840144,d in much less than one hour's time. This will
be unproductive time, unless way* and means- are provided whereby we can compensate
for this loss of time wide:hp I might add, must be taken during working hours when
others are available; it will become pbysically impossible for the training
officer to perform the functions which have characterized the Program and which
have made it what it is today.
In the course of the last two or three years, the Agency had altered the
demands it was making of the Program. The move to the Broyhill BullAing now
necessitated extensive changes in its methods of operation and, perhepe, its
philosophy. In any event it could be said to syMbolise the end of an era.
In his book CIA", Lyman B. Eirkpatrick, Jr. speaks of the "Agency
junior officer training program that was ultimately to become one of the finest
in the government". The Program's success was the direct result of Matthew Baird 's
drive to make it just thnt.
Over a twelve-year period, there were very few fundamental differences
between the Program as originally planned and its composition in 1963. This was
not for lack of experimentation or of suggestions from many quarters. There had
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been three Directors of Central Intelligence four Deputy Directors* seven
Directors of Personnel, timorous reorganizations, many changes in the Assistant
Directors and Office Heads nearly all of whom had interests in the evolution of
the. Program. Not infrequently. innovations were urged and wire tried out. But
in the final analysis the care, thoroughness, practicality, and imegination
of his original plan were validated by over a decade of exacting trial. This is
fair index of the ability of the man. One wonders what might hwe developed if
his ideas about a Career Corps had been implemented.
For a number of years, be reported directly to the DCI. This allowed him to
implement his non-bureaucratic proposals more effectively than otherwise would
have been the case. But even so a strange paradox existed: - more than any head
of a training or educational facility I know of, be had to work:persistently to
sell" his product to the very people who would, profit from it most
He instated that the Office of Training was meant to serve the other elements
of the Agency. This was the basic orientation of every component of OTR, melding
JOTP.
One of hisfrustrations was the difficulty he experienced in his attempts to
anticipate Agency needs such as developing a capability in difficult and/or
unusual languages, e.g. Swahili. Since there were no current demands, funds and
slots were denied him. Ha liked to think he was dealing with "men of good will"
to use his own phrase. Nothing irritated him as much as when "operators" tried
to take advantage of his cooperative attitude as, for example, when they tried
to persuade him to accept the assignment of an inferior person as a training
officer.
He instated on seeing every new employee of OTR at HOD including each JOT.
Furthermore, he interviewed many JOT's when they left the Program in order to get
their views on their experiences in it. No one in the Office of Training worked
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as hard as he or ;eve of himself more freely. MO set the example. People of
all levels had easy access to him. High standards of qualification and performance,
particularly for the JOT's and the Program were axiomatic in his thinking.
He urged the recruitment of negroes for the Program long before General Cabell
directed that at least three be brought on board in each clasa.
He tried to be fair and to cooperate. On occasion when OPEPS would try to
gain control of the jOTP he would say in effect "When you can show me that you
can run the Program as well as OTR can, I shall let you hey* it".
Among many of his subordinates, he generated a high senate of loyalty. These
comments which were sent me by one who knew him well for many years illustrate
this point. Baird led by example. He bent aver backward to understand colleagues
of negative attitude and often bent his own position to accommodate theirs - up
to the point where bedrock principle became involved. There be was adamant.
"For he was a man of principle and probity. Nothing of hypocrisy was
permitted to touch his character. He shunned personal publicity but showered
recognition upon others. When Baird gave his word, it was his Bond.
"Employees dependent upon his decisions concerning their hatures knew that
Baird kept his promises. That trait gave his subordinates a firmer grip on
reality and helped them to have surer understanding within their families.
"Further, Baird fought for what VAS right for the individual the Agency,
and his Country. He was untiring in his search for quality in human beings. When
he found it he pushed forward the person who possessed it. By his unselfishness,
be served his purposes beyond the achievements open to narrow self interest."
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AND ?THUS
Was assignment to the JOTP as a training officer the kiss of death to the
fUrther development of an intelligence officer's career? As I saw it, the
experience gained in working with JOT's would not enhance a man's qualifications
for a technically professional job. The JOTP could be, so to speak, a tangent of
no return. I always suggested this possibility when interviewing men for the
job. And yet, first-rate men, experienced in some phase of Agency work accepted
appointment end made telling contributions to the Program.
That the training officers had had different types of professional experience
give breadth to the thinking and direction of the Program in general and, because
of our daily interchange of ideas, helped in the appropriate treatment of the
individual JOT's by the several men.
One other thing. The JOT's were bright, capable, already successful in the
many and varied specialties they had thus far undertaken and, therefore, were
confident about their abilities to succeed. Furthermore, these young men and women
were experts in the art and science of learning. With them there VOA no need to
use "pre-view, view, review techniques; they got it the first time They could
bedifficult". To be effect ve in directing their training and in dealing with
them personally, the training officers had to earn their individual respect and
confidence personally and professionally. And they did!
These men and also the representatives of the Office of Personnel early
developed strong approval of the Program. AA their support grew, so also did
their enthusiasm with the net result of continued progrerls. It was they, who in
their dedicated and enthusiastic attack on doing the job for each of their own
trainees, combined their talents to make the Program a success. The Training
Officers were the active heart of the Program, and a big heart it was.
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And last but not least, the JOT's themselves. There was no prototype. They
came from all walks of life, all parts of the country, all types of educational
institutions (granting at least a valid bachelor's degree), all social levels.
Each had fundamental qualities of good brains, sound health, psychological and
psychiatric stability, a record of fine performance in some field, an honorable
record as a U. 8. citizen, some well-defined area of interest, a strong sense of
responsibility, and willingness to serve his country, if need be in any part of
the world. Furthermore, we actively wanted him in the Program for some reason or
other.
There is nothing so outstanding about anyone having some of these characteris-
tics, but when concentrated in one person, they constitute the base of a very fine
and desirable individual. On top of these, practically every JOT was exceptional
in some area of his or her make-up or experience.
The proof of the pudding was in the eating. Many of those who have made their
careers with the Agency have been highly successful, achieved distinction, positions
of influence, and outstanding awards. Those who have transferred to other elements
of the Government have performed equally well. And many who returned to civilian
life have proven by their successes that they could have attained prominence with
a
regret has been that because of my completely overt status I could
not keep in touch with many of these friends for fear of "blowing" their cover.
IN RETROSPECT
In retrospect, the conditions under which the Program "grew up" were just
about perfect for the evolution of a non-bureaucratic concept in a bureaucracy.
Everyone was building his own empire. Few substantive division and branch chiefs
were interested in any form of training other than that directly related to their
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own work. Each wanted to get him mission, whatever it was, started?Isoonest.
AS a pilot program, no one paid much attention to tie.
This, too, was the period of most rapid expansion. Korea was on us. People
experienced in the business were relatively rare. While the numbers in the Agency
were increasing rapidly, its overall professional competence in intelligence
matters seemed to remain about static for some time. This gave us a chance to
learn our end of the business even as our consumers were learning theirs.
No one could predict what the needs of the Agency would be for any given time.
Thus the JOT Program could not make firm plans to recruit and train anyone for a
given position and have him accepted for it. Accordingly, the Program was literally
forced into the procedures and standards as originally planned.
In effect, we were almost driven into one of the strongest aspects of the
Program which was also a striking selling point, viz; we did not pretend to predict
what the individual's job would be before we had gotten to know him. We made no
promises about job assignments except that we would work diligently to effect
eventual appropriate placement and job satisfaction,
TBE MILITARY PROGRAMS
The Military Programs were worked out by General W. B. Smith, DCI and
General George C. Marshall, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. At first, the U.S.
being at "war", a large number of slots were assigned to the programs. As we
found we could not fill them with bona fide career-intentioned man the number was
greatly reduced.
Although the programs varied in detail, they were fundamentally alike.
Candidates had to be employees of the Agency, fully cleared and on duty. Then
came voluntary enlistment with leave of absence from the Agency, assignment to the
next Officer Candidate School, and after commissioning about one year of active duty
service. After this, they were assigned to CIA as part of the Agency's military
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component for the remainder of their tour of dutv _DurtgAris last period, they
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would resume their formal training where it left off when they enlisted. In the
first year or so some men were returned to the Agency as soon as they were
commissioned while others spent the entire tour on active duty. (This was early
regularized as above.)
With the Korean war going on the OCS Programa were very easy to recruit for.
We were swamped with files of applicants whose real motivations for continued
service in CIA were difficult to discover.
Only about half of the men in these programs converted to civilian employment
at the end of their military tours. Attrition was highest of any group, but
consider that -
1. Without this program, we would never have seen ANY of these people.
2. Those who entered civilian employment with us have made unusually strong
contributions, and to this degree validated the program.
3. Their military salaries (which we reimbursed) were much less than what
we paid other just-as-able trainees during the exploratory-training period.
For a relatively short period, we processed, on request, some qualified
"draft bait" from other components with the written understanding that they would
be returned to the original office on reassignment to the Agency.
The Navy program, was discontinued first because the Navy insisted that we
reimburse the pay of JOT's while they were on duty with the fleet (before coming
to us).
The Army program was abandoned when the Army Changed its method of evaluating
candidates. Until then, we used it in preference to the others because many JOT's
elected jump and ranger training after OCS. During the five years we were in it,
two JOT's won the Patterson Award for the best OCS performance of the year.
The Air Force program was weakest: it was relatively soft. When AF changed
from OCS to OTS, it became even weaker-. One JOT won the top OCS award in competi-
tionwithAppnisvii0MORetizats2001112e13AEGIDUREMES-Wafte0(0606;006143iscontinued
it on my recommendation. f:Inr NT! I
my
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The Marine Corps program was tops. USMC cooperated well and held JOT's to
very high standards.
I am not sure about this, but out of a great many who went through the OCS
schools, I can remember only three who failed to earn commissions. Several others
did not get commissions because of duty-incurred physical disabilities.
TBE INTERNAL PROGRAM
The Internal Phase of the JOT Program originally was the Junior Personnel
Career Development Program. This matter was the subject of long discussions by
the CIA Career Service Board in 1953 and early 1954: Then a task force was
established consisting of seven senior officers with secretarial help to study
the problem in the best bureaucratic tradition.
Their report fills six pages plus a covering letter and a plan outline of
four pages. There is a "Memorandum of Understanding of Additional Policies and
Procedures for Administering the Program for Career Development of Junior Personnel"
of more than three pages of single spaced material duly signed by AD Pere and DTR.
Then came organization and implementation meetings of AD Pere( and DTR each with
assistants who wrote up memos of understanding and memos for the record. The
first consists of notes of agreement on 17 separate items. There tollows an
outline of items involved in processing candidates - 28 of them amplified by
explanatory notes "a" through "n". It even suggested that any member of the Agency
who was good enough to be considered for this training Should also qualify for
placement on the "Junior Executive Inventory" which as far as I know died quietly
years ago.
And this was just the beginning of the papers dated from 2 April 1954
through 29 July 1954. These were augmented by an Agency notice of fbur pages
(distribution AB including overseas personnel) and Changes in the Regulations.
Application forms had to be devised and approved and ME testing Chanisms devised
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and approved by both offices. Everything, but everything, had to be spelled out
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in writing. Bence, cumbersome procedures, elaborated beyond reason, and unnecessary
if people had trusted each other and worked together.
In implementing the Program, we went through the prescribed and complicated
bureaucratic acrobatics at a great rate -- for awhile. The predicted rush of
candidates did not materialize. A and E's preparations to test 500 people were
wasted. The elaborately planned meetings of the joint selection committee took
place with increasing infrequency. Reasons: good candidates were discouraged by
supervisers (even AD's and Division Chiefs) who didn't wieh to lose their able and
productive youngsters. For the most part, those who were encouraged or allowed to
-apply were ordinary types who couldn't qualify. But a few good ones did come
along.
The first JCD's were trained and placed in 1955. Sometime before the summer
of 1958, the program with slots was, transferred to the TO/JOTP. One of the JOTP
Training Officers was put in Charge of the group along with his other duties which
were reduced.
Then, several thinge that gave point to the value of training for a CIA
career seemed to happen at about the same time. The JOT Program's authorized
T/0 was doubled more or less on the theory that we should or could be all things
to all young professionals (to which I took strong exception). Kennedy economies
called for reductions in force. There was the infamous 701 Program. C/RID/DDP
began nominating some of his better people for the Program. Alao, more and more
the DDP looked toward us as an escape valve for their personnel troubles. The
numbers of "internals" nominated by the DDP increased rapidly and the training
officer became occupied with them full-time. As quotas were established for the
numbers of JOT's to be assigned to various components a greater proportion of
vacancies was filled by internals. This in turn reduced the amount of new blood
brought in through the Program externally.
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UNIVERSITY CONSUIMANTS
Theoretically, the University Consultant (later University Associates)
Program for the recruitment of professional trainees made sense. In actual
practice, it produced relatively few men or women who became career employees.
Yearly briefings of the consultants at Headquarters were given by top level
officials and were well done. The DCI met with them for perhaps an hour. The
"show" at was always very well received. To give them an idea of the
standards of the Program, groups of 4 or 5 met for round table discussions with
some 6 or 8 JOT's on board, with no questions barred and no Program officers
present. Avery effective technique, far better than any statement of require-
ments and left the consultants enthused and impressed.
The consultants were very fine, cultivated people; but it was difficult to
keep up their enthusiasm. There was no satisfactory way of informing them of the
progress of their cases. Their contacts with the Agency were infrequent.
Recruiters tried to see them, but sometimes this was difficult.
25X1A6a
THE WIVES PROGRAMS
Early in the Program, we found that a sizeable proportion of JOT wives were
apprehensive about having their husbands in CIA. Some were misinformed about
the Agency; others were just plain scared about their physical safety. Being in
Washington, it was not surprising that they heard all kinds of disturbing rumors.
Examples: (1) children of Agency employees might be kidnaped by Communist agents,
and (2) one of the requirements of the operations course was to seduce a woman in
the neighborhood. Secrecy, cover problems and lack of experience in handling them,
and being strangers in the community made life uncomfortable for them. Many felt
that as the wives of able men, other opportunities were more attractive. What to
do to make the wife less uneasy, more interested, and within the limits of security
more knowledgeable and understanding of her husband's duties? We worked on the
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assumption that the better she understood the basic nature of his work, its
importance, the need for security, and the function of the Agency, the better
she could support him and the happier all would be.
Gradually, a aeries of activities were developed for the wives aimed at
making them feel more a part of the family,-
(a) At 110D, the wife was invited to the JOTP office to meet her
husband's Training Officer and the Chief JOTP and to get to know the
girls in the office with whom she might talk by telephone.
(b) At the start of each formal training program, all wives were
Invited to a briefing on CIA, the JOT?, security, and the cover aspects
of the job. The Director of Training addressed them on the importance
of their husbands work and later met each of them. Questions were
answered, was hostess. Coffee was served by JOTP staff
girls at the break. The wives got to know each other. Some husbands
joined them; some did not. A feeling of mutual confidence and under-
standing was generated.
(d) Cocktail parties restricted to CIA employees at the home of C/JOTP
or some Training Officers.
(d) A "no-host" picnic for the class, their families or dates and run
by members of the class.
(e) Briefings and directions in case of emergency at the time their
husbands went out of town for traini
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25X1
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We also found that once overseas, some wives were very helpful to their
husbands. It seemed reasonable that the better a wife understood the Agency, the
more helpful she could be. If she had worked for the Agency, so much the better.
So, we hired some wives whose husbands had been assigned to DDP for on-the-job
training, gave them basic courses, assigned them to aome other desk (to avoid
competition) until the husband went overseas. It was agreed that the wife would
resign when be was transferred and that there was no assurance that she would be
employed when she was overseas. The husband was the focal point of our interest.
I felt this was a valuable program. The TO/DDP worked to have it eliminated
and succeeded on the ground that we should not spend the money or use the space
in our classes for these ladies.
Note: The logical extension of these successful efforts was the inclusion
of the wives of candidates at recruiting interviews
It proved to be a particularly effective recruiting technique. Wives
were offered the opportunity to participate in interviews, but, at the same time,
it was emphasized that this was not a requirement. In the course of eight months,
I saw 43 wives. Many could not come to the meeting because they could not get
away from work, or leave the children, or could not afford to join the husband
on invitee travel for which I could not reimburse them.
One of the most significant aspects of this procedure was the added confidence
with which both husband and wife faced the uncertainties of CIA employment. The
wife did not have to depend on the husband for second hand answers to her
questions. There was opportunity for me to "sell" the wife which, if accomplished,
made his decision easier and firmer. And seeing the husband and wife together gave
a better basis for making a decision about him.
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SELECTION
In selecting candidates we had our standards, but they were not well-defined
because such things just can't be. Where statistical measurements are involved,
you can always set cut-off points, but eventually a subjective judgment has to be
made. We were pretty confident that those whom we did select could do well some-
where in the Agency. We wondered, however, about some whom we did not select,
but bad no opportunity to study the question. Some "rejects" did very well in
other work.
When we were young and small and highly personal we were trying to prove our
point, trying to survive. This meant be as sure as possible that theme JOT's
would make good somewhere. We didn't gamble; "when in doubt, reject". By the
time we completed our selection procedures, we had much data about the JOT, but
we had no crystal ball to determine his potential for long term service.
We must remember that young people are exploring. For the able young man or
woman, CIA can't compete financially with business or industry. Soon after EOD,
they learn that much of the work they will do with us will not add to their
competence for civilian jobs; or put it another way, five to ten years hence their
opportunity to shift jobs to their advantage will be more limited than if they had
remained in civilian life. The better the candidate, the harder the look he will
take.
There are a great many young Americans who do not want to "sell soap" or
having done it, wish to get out of that racket. Job satisfaction becomes their
goal. Such people come to CIA very hopefully. We know that if they are capable
enough for the JOT Program, they are able to make a good living elsewhere. The
differential in salary is tolerated but not enjoyed and in a way, it sharpens
the individual's evaluation of his experience. Thus, if job satisfaction is not
forthcoming, he will return to the business world. We learned early that
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appropriate placement includes placing the able young officer under a superviser
who understands these things.
The significance of this concept is suggested by the following paragraphs
taken from one of the critiques of the First Integrated Program (provided
anonymously by members of the class at the request of C/JOTP).
_Nilsen I accepted a job with the agency I did not know what to
expect. Eight months later I'm still pretty much in the dark. With
this inherent uncertainty go certain questions which I imagine ill
be with me for a long time:
"How strong is my dedication to work? Will I in ten years be
able to look back and feel I've done the right thing not just for
myeelf but for my wife and children as well?
"If I am forced after several years of work to find another field,
what am I qualified to do?
"What is my SNAFU tolerance?
"I could go on listing questions which come down ultimately to
the problem not so much of whether this is whet I want, but of how
much I want it, and of what I am willing to go through to do it."
As a matter of interest, he concludes his memo by saying,
"I am convinced that this is one of if not the best Government
Training Programs in effect today. I am deeply proud of being able
to take part in it, and it is my sincere hope that it will continue
to improve as it must to remain at the top."
TESTS
From the earliest days of the Program, the psychologists on the Assessment
and Evaluation Staff worked on the development of intelligence and diagnostic
tests. Their quality and usefulness in the selection process depended on which
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sub-tests were used, who interpreted them, and the form in which the results were
reported. For years (during the aeries of experiments in testing the tests) all
scores were reported to JOTP, often with penetrating and rather specific observa-
tions. Later on, less revealing data were reported in more guarded terns and the
*valuations were much shorter. Eventually, a standard, rather short format was
developed. As new Training Officers came on board the test results were used more
as absolute determinations of suitability than as generalizatione or estimates
designed to contribute to the over-all evaluations of individual candidates.
During the experimental period it was interesting to compare the differences
in the reports on a given individual. I remember one very unusual case in which
a man (Phi Beta Kappa) was tested once. The data were interpreted for ta three
different times, - when he was a candidate, when he left for Officer Candidate
School, and when he returned from his military tour. Each analysis was based on
the statistical figures and sub-tests then in use. These successively classed him
intellectually as near the top, near the bottom, and in the middle of JOT's on
board. Sane guy, different interpretations of one battery of tests! The tests
would not have been any good had this not been the case; but which series to use?
That was the question.
When the Medical Staff began using psychiatric examinations to decide on the
acceptability of JOT candidates, a new dimension was added to the selection process.
Delays in processing resulted because every case had to be written up in detail
and passed on by Chief/MS, and then written approval given before JOTP could take
further action. This was bad enough; but when the psychiatrists began selecting
rather than simply qualifying or disqualifying, we were in trouble.
The teat results were certainly useful instruments. In the h-nds of certain
diagnosticians, they were extremely accurate and revealing. A candidate who was
rated high usually turned out to be first rate; but I learned that some who were
rated low /pp ey eventually
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undertook. The assessments which were made after EOD were of most value in
determining suitability for permanent assignment.
PROCESSING
For years we were encouraged at the highest levels not to lower our
selection standards. Numbers were not particularly important until after 1959.
Quality was what counted: Our slogan: "Don't take him unless you want him."
The big problem about selecting a JOTP class was that we could never know who of
those approved would EOD.
Originally, the cumbersome and time-consuming methods of processing papers
and the requirement to check them in and out of each office (sometimes each desk
in an office) caused delays and mistakes. Later, a personnel officer was placed
in the office of the JOTP and he organized processing in such a way that files
remained there most of the time.
The most significant improvement in processing candidates came when JOT's
were placed in the same "hard-to-get" category as economists and scientists.
This allowed us to bring a candidate to Headquarters for JOTP interviews and
medical and security examinntions at government expense.
When the candidate came to the JOT? office, be was first interviewed by the
Personnel Officer (representing the Director of Personnel) who also told him about
procedures, applicable regulations, benefits of employment, and so on. He then
was interviewed by one of the training officers who decided if be was to be
rejected (checked this with the Personnel Officer) or approved, subject, of course,
to confirmation by the Medical and Security Offices. Generally speaking, if the
Personnel Officer and Training Officer agreed on rejecting him, I did not see the
candidate. If they were in doubt, I made the final decision. I interviewed every
approved candidate because (a) I was the responsible officer (b) I wanted to
identify immediately with those who would join the Program (c) I acted as a sort
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of balance wheel on the standards for the Program an they were interpreted by the
various Training Officers (d) I wished to be sure all questions in the mind of
the candidate were cleared up, thus avoiding misunderstandings.
For a time, we had an agreement with the Security Office that normal cases
would be completed in about 60 days. But this was discontinued in 1961 and was
never resumed. We also had agreements with the Security and Medical Staffs that
a few appointment slots would be kept available for US so that when a candidate
was fully cleared in the field, he could be brought promptly to Headquarters for
final examinations rather than make him wait his turn which sometimes delayed his
case as much as an additional six weeks! They too, were given up.
About the first. of April each year, I would begin to estimate the size of
the July class. This guess was based on the stage of processing each candidate
had completed. We got to be pretty good at it and usually came within about
5 percent of the actual count. (But not with the July class of 1961! Cuba!)
The number ordeclinee and "postpones" would increase in May and shoot up
in June; (over 80 one year -- many more than the number who EOD'ed). The waste
in processing candidates to the point where they could EOD only to have them
decline has been enormous.. Much could be done to simplify the procedures as well
as to place increasing emphasis on those eases which, as they develop, show more
and more likelihood of affirmative action both by the Agency and the candidate.
For example: once JOTP "confirmed" its action on a candidate, he should be placed
in a special processing category actively supervised by an officer who would be
given authority to insist on prompt handling,. From then on every reasonable
effort should be made to complete processing as soon as possible.
The Peace Corps lost nothing by telegraphing a successful candidate: -
"Congratulations! You have been selected for the Peace Corps. Such a device
would be impossible for us; but to give our successful candidates priority in
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handling arid let them know they had a "friend at court" would encourage them when
they need it most. There is no law against being highly professional.
OD
Assignment to Unclassified Training Group A" UTGA as the holding mechanism
in 1952 for those who had been employed provisionally subject to full medical and
security clearances. I entered on duty in this category.
We met in Wing A, second floor, of Alcott Hall. The Intelligence School/OTR
was quartered behind locked doors in 41lmg1B. Their instructors would speak to us
on international affairs or reminisce about their experiences overseas.
OTR Briefing Officer, sometimes called "the Irish Thrush", and
a master of the mixed, metaphor harangued us occasionally "--and these, ladies and
gentlemen, are the rewards of fishing in the fields of Central Intelligence".
While we were waiting for clearance, many things seemed fittingly mysterious.
There were exaggerated rumors about "Building 13". After a visit there, most
people returned to UTGA for only a day or two; others just disappeared. Among the
latter was said to be one JOTP candidate who had been exposed an an attempted
communist penetration of the Agency.
Provisional ROD sorted a useful purpose but when clearances were denied it
became embarrassing. After several married men who had left good jobs and moved
to D.C. had been disqualified, DTR discontinued using the procedure.
PAY 8CAXE AND PROMOTIONS
In 1952, EOD rates for JOT's generally were fixed at 08-05 for AB, 08-07 for
MA, and 08-09 for PhD irrespective of the major subject. Also, at this time, some
JOT's on board were promoted three months after EOD whereas others were ignored
for over a year. Atter the drive to become "more competitive" with industry had
begun, the JOTP adopted a GB-07-08-09-10 system and also became more orderly about
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promotions while in the Program.
But after a JOT was transferred to a substantive division, there was no
established basis for his promotion as proposed in the 1951 plan. This became a
sensitive problem in our effort to support OUT graduates in the DDP where each
division was accustomed to handle its own cases.
In 1959 or 1960, the Clandestine Services established a central panel to
evaluate all nominations for promotion. The DDP would authorize a given number
to be promoted and the panel would dole them out. This method worked against the
progress of DDP/JOTts in their first tour of professional duty and discouraged
a number of them.
Now, for some time, we had been asking for a stable promotion progrsa for
all junior professionals to no email. In what might be called an act of
desperation, we suggested a plan for a time table and a system of semi-automatic
promotions from GS-07 through GS-11. This was proposed solely as something to
shoot at. It was rejected as unworkable, but - - -
25)(9
Meanwhile, a difficult situation had developed for the IIIJOT's required 25)(9
each year.. There were in the DDP some GB-09's of all types. Division chief
would nominate perhaps 85 for promotion at each semi-annual meeting. About 15
would be approved, or a total of 30 per year. This then boiled down to the
25)(9 amazing condition that even if everyone who was promoted to GS-10 were a JOT
there would still be of our graduates who would NEVER be promoted: neither
would any other GS-09: A paper exposing this situation wee bootlegged "upstairs".
Eventually, General Cabell directed that the Career Council solve this problem.
Believe it or not, the Council adopted the very proposal which we had
suggested as a sample of what might be done except that it omitted the semi-
automatic "up or out" provision (also in the 3.951 plan) which put teeth into the
system: It worked well with strong cooperation from the DDP for several years,
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NEGROES
Col. Baird insisted on the recruitment of negroes years before Gen. Cabal'
decreed that we EOD a minimum of three a year.
Recruitment was difficult because in general (a) relatively few negroes were
interested in foreign affairs or had high quality academic recordm in subjects
useful to um, (b) the recruiters themselves were rather apathetic about attempting
to interview them because of the low yield per unit of effort, (c) the Security
Office applied the same criteria established for other JOTs thus causing a good
many technical disqualifications of otherwise acceptable candidates,and
(d) Northern negroes did not wish to live in a southern community such as Washington.
At the initial interview, I explained tht unquestionably there had been
prejudice toward Negroes in the Agency which we were overcoming to some extent;
that there were very few Negro officers in the Agency; that DTR and the JOTP would
support them 100%; that they were, in effect, ambassadors of their race to CIA.
Even under the best of circumstances we had problems of placement. Some
operators preferred not to send negroes to Africa because they said (a) they were
not well received by the host country, (b) negroes would object to the living
conditions sometimes necessary to maintain cover, and (c) good cover was difficult
to arrange for negroes.
So General Cabell's orders were difficult to carry out. We kept careful
records of the disposition of each applicant and reported regularly on them.
There were several (6-8) top-flight negroe JOT's who did first rate jobs.
They were respected by their classmates and were on good terms with them. One was
covertly recruited, trained, and put in place overseas by the Program. Only once
was I aware of demonstrated prejudice against a negro While he was in the Program.
We never were able to enroll a negro girl.
and I entertained them and their wives at our home with other
JOT's. DAVI-mud Nordltlesosep26114/03010/61A-R13078408363400328000d0026t1ngs, always
sent "my love- to your wife".
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WHY TiE DI)??
In the days when the demand for JOT 's was greater than the supply, we were
criticized by some (including high level DDI and DDA officers) betaume most of
our placements were in the DBP. But it was a simple fact of life that the less
active components just did not appeal to the energetic, leadership-type, or
adventuresome young men and women whom we, had recruited and who also were interested
in foreign affairs.
Such people usually have a great drive to see the countries of their interest
and to get to know conditions at first hand. Indeed, one reason for their joining
CIA was to get overseas; and as soon as possible at that. Those who had been
overseas, such as Fulbright scholars, wished to return.
When JOT's came on board, they found very quickly that the easiest way to
get overseas was to enter the DDP. Furthermore, OTR courses given by DDP personnel
were often more stimulating than those offered by DDS and DDI representatives.
Then, too, the DDP cooperated in developing more interesting and effective on-the-
job trial training programa than the others. In addition, they had more vacancies
open to junior officers. For many, service in the DDP was the normal fulfillment
of their decision to join CIA.
Something that bothered Administration Officers was the fact that most of
the Joni who had had business training rejected that area of employment. I
believe- still that able graduates in Business Administration who want that kind
of experience will NOT go near government. They can make more money, have a more
stable life, and get better and more practical experience in industry. In any
event, our JOT's having been exposed to business training, had decided they wanted
anything =EFT adminiatration, Furthermore, many of the basic jobs in the DDS
and also the DDI were so routine that our highly trained and gifted people had to
be shifted out of them else they would have resigned. There was one period when
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25X1A9a the "to get DDS youngsters Overseas went fairly well, but it
involved very few JOT's and was short-lived.
VARTERS
For the first eleven years, we "lived" in shabby quarters in various
temporary buildings near the Reflecting Pool. Leaky roofs and windows, drafty,
rats inside and out bare board floors, poor parking, and scattered buildings.
It is impossible to know how many candidates rejected appointment on seeing these
conditions, but the interesting fact is that during these years, we recruited
many top-notch JOT's. We had a first rate program and we believed in it. We
tried to tell the truth about it and our sincerity in this belief was obvious.
Once we got face to face with a good candidate, we made a good impression.
While quartered in the old World War II buildings, our training officers
could, with moderate ease, maintain head-to-head contact with supervisors and
with JOT's during the on-the-desk training. It was something of a "track meet"
at times, but the distances were not so great that inter-office visits were
difficult. These meetings reinforced our policy of knowing the JOT's personally
and keeping directly informed on their progress. During the transition period of
the moves of various components to Langley, we could not continue these procedures,
but they were resumed when we, in turn, moved to the new building. The "permanent"
divorce took place, unhappily, when OTR was moved to the Broyhill Building, far
distant from the focus of the Program's interest.
CONCENTRATION ON THE EAST
We were accused of favoring candidates from the East and, particularly,
the Ivy League colleges. Our distribution was uneven in the early days not
because of prejudice, but the conditions dictated it. After all: -
(1) there was a much greater concentration of recruiters in the East
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(-goodly number of westerners came east for college or for graduate
school;
(3) many living west of the Mississippi couldn't or wouldn't invest the
money in a new job requiring them to move east (later we paid their moving
expenses);
(4) except for a few places on the west coast student interest in
foreign affairs diminished in general with the distance west and south of
Washington, D.C.;
(5) the private colleges and universities of the east could and did fight
McCarthyism more successfully than the public institutions of other sections;
(6) Washington as easy and cheap to reach from many eastern cities for
preliminary interviews not so with those from the South and West;
(7) family traditions for dealing with foreigners, particularly Europeans
were greater in the east than elsewhere.
NOTES AND COMM=
In the course of these years, we became involved in many kinds of activities,
learned many things that were not general knowledge to Agency personnel, were able
to give some JOT unusual experiences. 25X1X4
It is not surprising thyt we tried out ideas with varying degrees of success
that our experiences touched on many aspects of this very complex business and
generated many thoughts about it. The following notes give some indication of
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the ramifications Of the Program.
1. The DTR had hoped to set up an extended program for the very beat JOT's
which would give them breadth of experience, intensive training including language
in considerable depth and a tour overseas, for as much as five years under JOTP
control. This would have involved rotation among directorates. In another scheme,
be suggested that to give people on board the training they needed, we replace
them with JOT's for the period of that training. This would help the division
with some manpower, give the individual the training he deserved, and provide the
JOT with some practical experience. Neither idea came to anything. Without someone
at the executive level to direct and coordinate such long range programs among
divisions, these plans could not work, -- too many vested interests. The Career
Corps- would have been the vehicle for these sorts of things.
2. Rotation of the trainee from office to office (as recommended in 1951)
was impractical because supervisors were reluctant to cooperate, the Clandestine
Services were unwilling to give experience to someone destined for another career
service, and the manpower shortage meant that there just was not time for this
"luxury".
3. Basic Russian for every Professional Trainee was given up as the
Language and Area programs developed, as Agency competence in Russian increased,
and as need for other languages developed.
4. Intensive Language and Area study paid for by the Agency at universities
(stateside and overseas) specialising in some country proved to be not good for
untried JOT's who were too likely to resign after fulfilling the requirement that
they put in time-repayment.
5. The First Integrated Program (October 1958 - July 1959) was made up of
the following courses: - Intelligence Orientation (1 week), International
Communism (4 weeks), American Heritage* (2 weeks), Intelligence Techniques
(5 weeks), Algulatnefifsw Relivisai000MigtighekilDRZ8A916WiligARioNieele (6 months)
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or intensive preparations for DDI work. Note that women always took the Operations
Familiarization Course even when headed for the DDP.
One idea, eventually turned down by the DCI, Was to have the class addressed
by a nuMber of distinguished citizens of various political and philosophical
persuasions as part of the section on the American Heritage. (Something of the
same sort was later incorporated in the Mid Career Course.) Substituted for this
were briefings by senior representatives of various agencies of the Government, not
always effective.
6. After the expansion had been authorized, the extended courses of the
Integrated Program were given twice a year, thus complicating the administration
of the JOTP and also increasing the problems of coordinating the courses and other
training problems. A "coordinator" for the Program was appointed (a man of great
experience in operations as well as in education) who made a very significant
contribution. He left for important duty in the Pentagon and was not replaced.
7. When Mr. Dulles authorized doubling the size of the Program, I made note
in my weekly report that perhaps this "prosperity" might lead to adversity. I
felt it was a big mistake to expect the Program "to be all things to all people".
It would be an unkind twist of fate if through the increase in numbers we were to
be forced to abandon the very qualities of the Program which had made it successful
and desirable.
8. The difficulty in establishing the composition of an incoming group (hence
recruiting and training against predicted requirements) is shown by this typical
example. Among those whom we approved for the class of 1959, subject to
completion of clearances there were 61 who entered on duty, 51 who declined
appointment for their own reasons, and an appreciable number of others who were
disqualified by the Security or Medical Offices or. the Panel.
9. Pressure from Agency officials to admit special cases to the Program
diminished in inverse proportion to their rank. Mr. Dulles and General Cabell
always took the trouble to indicate their desire for objective handling of the
case. But, if and when a person was rejected, it was wise to have sound reasons
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25X1A14a
U. Of the Jon, classes, usually between five and ten percent were women.
In order to get a certain degree of maturity among them, we required either a
Masters degree or at least one year of significant work experience after the
Bachelor's degree. Melly had fine competence in a language. In a few cases, they
did outstanding work overseas and many did very well in the DDI. But many married
and left while others became dissatisfied because they were not promoted as
rapidly as the men in equivalent jobs. Others left because they could not get
overseas. It was not always easy to arrange satisfactory placements for them.
12. Attrition of JOT'S for all reasons while in the Program (up to two years)
was less than 2%. This does not include those in the military programs who did
not accept employment as civilians at the end of their tours of active duty.
13. If a person were good enough to be recruited for the Program, he was
also bright enough and active enough to react very strongly against any misrepre-
sentation in the recruitment pitch. This points up the need for all concerned
in the processes of recruitment to be scrupulously honest about everything they
say and do in this connection and also the need at Headquarters for business-like
action, prompt and direct treatment once action is initiated.
14. It was easier for recruitment to sell a candidate to almost any
substantive division than to JOT?. Files of economists were sett directly to ORR,
scientists to OBI, business admins to Log and so on. As a result, the number of
well-qualified specialists nominated for jOTP was small.
15. As candidates, Mormon missionaries had valuable built-in assets such
as: ability to get along well with natives of a foreign country and sound knowledge
of its spoitiar9efeWeMrtkail@WallaIGIN7gPetWqRagiingiAn capacity to
adjust to difficult conditions and conscientiousness and loyalty. COAnate.NTIAL
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16. The better the JOT (intellect, aMbition, academic background, interest
in performance, accomplishment to date, and general promise), the more difficult
it was to give him job satisfaction, hence to stimulate his interest and, in the
long_ run to retain his services in CIA.
17. Problems of our serving the DDP and at the same time maintaining the
principles of the Program grew out of the frequent rotation of those who super-
vised the on-the-desk training. We would reach mutual understanding of its
purposes with ,a desk chief only to have him transferred to an overseas post:
Then we would have to start all over again to cultivate his replacement who,
unhappily, usually knew little about the Program.
18. Pre-employment polygraph and medical examination were combined with the
Headquarters interview of candidates thus saving travel expenses for later inter-
views and giving candidate provisional decision pending final clearance. For a
time, we had an arrangement whereby we were notified by telephone soon after the
candidate had completed his examination if his approval was clearly not in
question. This allowed many candidates to consolidate- their plans early, hence
accelerated EODs.
19. Not infrequently we learned from able, relatively new employees that
they had not been told of the JOT Program during recruitment. After EOD and upon
learning of the Program, they often sought transfer. This was one reason for
establishing the Internal Program.
20. Recruitment for the class of July 1961 was disappointing after we had
expected a full quota. It was not until after the Bay of Pigs that we learned
that processing of our candidates had been greatly delayed because the Security
Office assigned priorities to that operation.
21. In the early days, the Chief of Recruitment arranged trips to Europe
(complete with miniature tape recorder) to interview possible candidates who were
overseas oNpOenesta1tpRelembul20UNKNOPme644ROMMIOOSSA00420460966Yq3for JOTP
purposes.
JT1AL
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a I
25X1C
23. Recruiting those es ra
awards: was attempted. They were first-rate prospects but by previous agreement
we couldn't approach theta before the selections were made and by that time it Waa
too late.
24 The Medical Office proposed psychiatric examinations for wives before
husbands E0Ded. I opposed it as impractical, expensive, and would hinder recruit-
ment in several respects.
25. At one point when the Assessment and Evaluation Staff was a part of
the Office of Training, a pretentious effort was made to establish a nation-wide
testing program in collaboration with another agency. For many reasons, it was an
impractical and unproductive venture and the elaborate joint project was abandoned
after two recruiting seasons.
26. It was suggested that graduates of the military academies who were not
oMmisaioned be recruited for JOTP in spite of the fact that the reasons for
withholding their commissions, usually medical, were also disqualifications for
the Program. EVentually two graduates of Annapolis came on board. Because of
their medical histories they were given restricted duties. They soon saw that
their chances of competing with JOT's for good jobs were low and they resigned.
Also, one young man was brought East from the Air Force Academy and given the red
carpet treatment to no avail. This experiment was a failure.
27. The idea that the JOT's should not be counted on the operating Tb O of
the Agency was not accepted. I argued that they werehired to be trained and until
they were trained they should not be counted as effectives. Like the cadets and
midshipmen at West Point and Annapolis, their duties were to learn and to prepare
themeekreARTHIentestifite liNeyse 10161/016/1 nediftEREIRM*1045ACIO82113030001tbe JOT
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4FIDEN
out
side the Agency operating T/0 reduced our opportunity to be more useful. We
could not plan to set up competencies in anticipation of needs.
25. Some recruiters claimed that the term "Junior in the name of the
Program made it difficult to recruit mature people as we requested. I claimed
that as far as being professionals in intelligence was concerned they were and
would be junior officers for some time. The original proposal stated that 'TGs-09
embraces Journeyman Intelligence Officers". Eventually, the name was changed to
the Career Training Program and JOTis became Career Trainees.
29. There were occasions when a substantive division which had spotted a
candidate would ask us to train him for them on "Directed Assignment". He would
come into the Program with the explicit understanding that on completion of his
training, he would be reassigned to that division. Sometimes as the individual
learned more about other opportunities in the Agency, he would ask to be relieved
of his agreement. This then became a matter of negotiation between the sponsoring
division and him. We kept out of it.
30. Occasionally, Career Agent status was urged on trainees by some DDP
divisions which were having "numbers problems". I advised against this course:
there were too many chances that someone at Headquarters would take advantage of
a JOT while he was overseas.
31. A Summer Intern Program for graduate students was impractical at the time
because: costly to clear, difficult to find interesting short term assignment for
a complete neophyte, unwillingness of DDP to have him around and of DDI to grant
SI clearance. The only time we tried it, it backfired in several ways.
32. A SPAT Program- (Special Assignment Trainee) was a proposal which
amounted to modification of basic JOTP requirements in order to employ unusually
qualified specialists who might not be physically fit for FD/G. It never got off
the ground. Some opposed it on basis that these people might be considered "second
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33. If there is one thing a bureaucrat dislikes it is the concept of a second
class citizen. Furthermore it is almost impossible to make him understand that
in any group half of its members are below average. By the WM token, he resents
the idea of special treatment for a Chosen few. In the early days, when the JOT's
were referred to as members of an "Elite Corps" there was trouble. We did our
best to play down this reputation, but prejudice toward our kind of "discrimina-
tion" continued for years, happily in decreasing amounts. We bad to live with
it; that was what the Program was all about.
34 I call attention to what I suppose can be described as the resiliency
of the recruiters.. Their problems were far more complex than those of the
ordinary man in their profession and the rewards fewer. In selling Agency employ-
ment they were hampered by secrecy requirements, non-competitive salary scales
in many types of work, uncertain promotion predictions, the long clearance waits
the indignities of the polygraph and psychiatric examinations, and security
restrictions in general. They suffered many frustrations, too. They were the
only- *sty contact with the Agency a candidate had for a number of months, and
frequently had to apologize or make excuses for inadequacies of the organization
they had been building up. This was embarrassing at best and it happened
frequently. Yet somehow they stuck to their jobs, showed enthusiasm, and worked
hard.
35. Mt. Dulles wrote that " ---the ability to judge people is one of the
prime qualities of an intelligence. officer". Our problem was to obtain for the
JOTP staff training officers who could judge people who in turn could judge people.
36. As a matter of interest, a copy of the graphic outline of the original
Proposal of 1951 is attached.
37. In 19611 one supporter wrote: "The JOT is essentially one type of
animal whose breed must remain relatively pure lest he become a mongrel".
'?imr-Junr
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP78i0MiNC1012A470001-3
LC