REASONS FOR THE IMPACT OF SOVIET ORBIT'S MILITARY, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL DRIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R004200030004-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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REASONS FOR THE IMPACT OF SOVIET ORBIT'S MILITARY,
ECONOMIC, CULTURAL DRIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST,
SOUTH, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
Following a recent briefing of the NSC on Conwm: nist offers of
aid to the countries of the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, the
question was asked: "Why do the Communists programs appear to have
such an impact in these areas while our own substantially larger programs
over the past five years or more have failed to win the area over to our
side'? "
Some tentative answers to this question are given below:--
1. The issue of "colonialism" is vigorously urged against us in
these areas. They consider that the U.S, is tied in with the colonial
powers. in the West through NATO and have been closely identified with
them in the East through SEATO. They also see a concerting of action
in the U.S. and U.K. In the Near East. As a consequence people in these
areas are susceptible to the claim made by the Communists that our aid
programs constitute a form of economic imperialism or colonialism.
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The people and officials in the countries of these areas suffer
from an inferiority complex in dealing with the West which causes them
to react in the classic way of self-assertion and opposition. This
complex stems in part from the colonial past and from the fact that over
=&ny decades Westerners have too often acted toward these people in
a tactless and overbearing manner. They do not quickly forget the
piing -concept of "lesser broads."
The Communists have been very astute in their approach to
these countries. They have not created the impression that they look
upon them as "backward" or "undeveloped", phrases which we have too
often used. The opposition between the Soviets and Western Europe and
the U.S,, together with the racial and geographic background of the Soviets,
have made it possible for them to make themselves accepted an non-
Europeans, as fellow Asians. Furthermore, the Sovjets have been most
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eir negotiations. They have required no obvious qui sro
quo in terms of political alignments and MDAP type agreements; they
have no Battle Act problems.
4. Tice trade factor is of considerable importance. The U.S. has
e interest in acquiring the surplus products of these countries
on, rice and rubber -- for which Egypt, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia
and even Thailand require a market. The Bloc on the other hand will
take these commodities in exchange for arms and other aid. They can
also offer low interest rates and very easy terms of payment
accept large quantities of local currency which will be a most convenient
war chest for their subversive activities.
5. The countries of this area believe that the West, particularly
the European countries, has in the past and will in the future tend to
discourage their indu(rtrialisation. hoping to keep them as sources of
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Lal and as a market for consumers goods.
6. These countries now see our aid tapering off and hear our public
discussions regarding the termination of aid, discussions which are often
phrased in terms x*i=k offensive to them.. Also they see the bulk of
U.S. aid going to individuals and regimes which they do not like, e. g. ,
Rhee, Chiang, Diem, Japan and Israel.
. 7. Our pattern of alliances, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO are
resented by countries not included even though their non-inclusion is a
their own choice.
In some countries there are particular causes for opposition
to the U.S. Once the Soviets took a definitely pro-Arab and anti-Israel
the Soviets had a new basis of appeal to the Moslem countries
it position in this controversy became clear. Our position appears
ambiguous or even hostile in the Arab world. Our support of Pakistan
alienates India and Afghanistan.
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Perhaps more important than any of the above factors is the
attitude of these countries toward the achievement of their economic
revolution. Many of them thought that when colonial status, or protected
ceased, their economic advance would progress rapidly. It did
e have tended to remind them that progress is slow and requires
the laying of sound foundations and the undertaking of long term projects.
countries in the areas under discusion have been
greatly impressed by developments in the Soviet Union. The USSR was
30 years or more ago almost as backward industrially as they now are.
The Sohiets have, in this relatively short space of time, achieved a
position which in the eyes of many of them is that of the second mYilitaary,
industrial and prestige power in the world and a leader in science and
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The Soviets claim this transformation is the result of the
Communist system and through subtle and persistent pr
ganda,
Soviets have tended to make many people in these countries believe
a true and that possibly, by cooperating with the Communist
they too can somehow achieve a measure of growth similar to that
which they see in the Soviet Union. Communist China is following the
same course as the USSR and many of these people believe that, within
mited space of time, Communist China will achieve a somewhat
of the undeveloped countries to achieve a rapid advance in economic
development and to attain the prestige and position which appear to go
with such development.
mparable goal. This Communist appeal plays on and feeds the desires
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10. Finally, many of these countries believe that they can now
of both the free and the Communist worlds, can playbne
off against the other, and that very likely the fact that they are the
beneficiaries of Soviet aid will make the U.S. even more anxious to give
them coer_balancing or even greater aid. Having in general adopted
a neutralist role, they feel that they can best continue to maintain this
if they accept both U.S. and USSR aid.
*
While this analysis may l k discouraging, there are many counter-
balancing factors. The Communist program is at yet mostly in the
promise and offer stage. These countries have yet to experience the
ie s between Soviet promises and performance*, and the impact
frustrations aid failures of dealing with the Soviets, the
of Soviet technical missions in their midst.
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their envy of Soviet development they have overlooked the fact
that the U.S., in addition to maintaining a large military capability.
has never stopped raising its living standards and supplying all the wants
of its people in consumers goods. They have yet to realize fully that the
Soviet Union has only achieved its advances in the military and Industrial
field through a system which has repressed all freedom and throw
the desires and standard of living of the people to the
armament program.
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