JPRS ID: 10133 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070048-8
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• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 48
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10133
23 `Navember 1981
West Euro e Re ort
p p
(FOUO 61 /81)
- F~~~ FOREIG~i BROADCAST INFORMATION SER~ICE
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- JPRS L/10133
23 November 1981
- WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 61~81~
. CONTENTS
= THEATER FORCES
ITALY
'NOVOSTT' Reaction to Silvestri's Article, His Reply
(EUROPEO, 14 Sep 81) 1
~ TERRORISM
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Frenc?~ Officials Allegedlv Involved in Arms Sales to ETA
(c~zo 16, 19 oct 81) 6
Thorough Investigation of Arms Traffiking Urged
(Juan Tomas de Sa1as; CAMBIO 16, 19 Or_t 81) 13
ECONONLICS
FRANCE .
Uri, Attali, European Views: Nationalizati,ons, Inflation ~
(Ugo Piccione; IL SOLE-2~+ ORE, 2~+, 29 Sep; 1, 6 Oct 81)........... 15
ITALY .
_ Agnelli Interview on EMS, FIAT-IRI Accord, Contracts
(Giovanni Agnelli Interview; LA STANfPA. 9 Oct 81) 28
- a - , [ III - WE - 150 -FOUO]
Cl1D /1C~~!`~ ~ T T TCL' /~AiT V
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THEATER FORCES ITAI,y
'NOVOSTI' R~ACTION TO SILVESTRI'S ARTICLE, HIS REPLY
Milan EUROPEO in Italian 14 Sep S1 pp 92-93 �
~NOVOSTI letter and Sylvestri reply published in "Letters" section under heading
"USSR and Nh.TO: Which Has tdore Atomic Bombs?"~ ~
~Text~ We can agree neither with ths method used to calculate the nuclear forces
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact nor with the figures arrived at in the article that
appeared under the heading "We Compare Lineups in the European Theater" (EUROPEO ,
34, 24 Aug 81).
In the first place, the author's affirmation that the USSR includes in its cal-
culation all of NATO's tactical weapons, regardless of range, does not correspond
� with the facts. The fact is, instead, that the Soviet Union calculates only those
weapons that can reach the territory.of the Warsaw Pact countries.
In the second place, the figures also do not correspond with reality. From what
_ source do these monstrous figures on the Soviet preponderance emanate? The author
prefers to.not indicate any source. He himself, however, recognizes the fact that
such figures are not objective and sudden~.y begins to talk of.the need for a"more
_ refined calculation" and of the need to consider the "percentage of inoperative-..
ness, of impossibility of effective utilization, and so forth."
In the third place, the author does not mention the delivery vehicles of the ad-
vance American bases in Europe. Yet, the F 111 and F 4 nuclear bombers of the air
bases in Europe, the FB 111 A and the A 6 ard A 7 American aircraft-carrier planes
have a cruising radius or effective action range of between 1,000 and 4,500 kilo-
meters; in other words, they constitute a threat to the territory of the i7SSR and
of its allies. In all, there are over 700 nuclear warhead delivery vehicles. In
aeldition, the United States's Atlaritic allies have over 300 medium-range vehicles
of their own.
To these forces, the USSR contraposes its SS 20, SS 4 and SS 5 missiles and medium
- bombers. Their to'.:al number does not exceed that ot NATO's medium-range vehicles.
But if 600 new American missiles are brought in, the West will acquire a greater
than 50 percent advantage over the Warsaw Pact. This, the Soviet Union, of
course, cannot accept. As regards nuc:lear warheads, NATO's means of delivery now
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can carry at any one time 50 percent more payload than the corresponding USSR
means. The ~eployment of the Pershing 2's and the Tomahawk's will increase NATO's .
preponderance of nuclear warheads even more.
' In the fourth place; it is n~t trus that "the Warsaw Pact total is growing" aiid ,
that "that of NATO is diminishing." The SS 20 missile is indeed a modernized
, wPapon, but NATO is also modernizing its medium-range nuclear weapons. England is ;
using improved missiles for its Polaris submarines and will be gettin~ Trident
missiles. In France, 7-warhead missiles will replace the single-headed ones. The
nuclear delivery vehicles of the advance 1~merican bases in Europe are also being
modernizQd. The USSR, however--and no one knows why--is being asked by NATO to ~
_ renounce the modernization of its weapons and to dismantle its SS 20 missiles, al- :
though it is well known that the USSR, in modernizing its missiles to maintain
parity, is not increasing by.as many as one its medium-range weapons, since its !
obsolete missiles are beir~q dismantled and are not being moved to other regions.
Each time one new SS 'l0 is deployed, one or two preexisting missiles are dis-
mantled. ~
~Signed~ Dmitr.ij Ardamatskij
NOVOSTI Agency, Moscow
Stefano Silvestri, author of the article, responds:
Mr Dmitrij Ardamatskij's letter shows, above all, that he has not read carefully
what was published in EUROPEO .
I have not laid claim to absolute accuracy. I wrote: "The calculations with
respect to quality and quantity of weapons are in�inite and none of them are
totally convincing." That notivithstanding, those figures may be taken to be much
closer to the truth than Mr Ardamatskij (who however does not say: The Russians
= appear to be enemies of figures) would have us believe.
A) Mr Ardamatskij affirms that the USSR includes in its calculations all those
tactical nuclear weapons "that can reach the territory of the Warsaw Pact coun-
_ tries." That is exactly what is written in EUROPEO as well, namely, that the USSR
"calculates al1 the tactical weapons in existence in the East as well as the West,
of all ranges." Obviously, even a cannon with a range of 30 kilometers, if placed
at the eastern border of the FRG, can strike a Warsaw Pact country such as Czecho-
slovakia or the GDR. When we speak of "Eurostrategic" missiles or weapons, how-
ever, NATO refers only to those weapons that can strike the USSR: And this is
- because the USSR is the sole nuclear country in the Warsaw Pact.
B) Mr Ardamatskij complains about our sources. They are Western sources: I have
referred to the figures of the IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies)
of London. Those figures are confirmed by the Pentagon and by the American Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. Those also must be taken in a critical spirit,
- but they remain the most reliable and least proven wrong known to date. Unfor-
tunately, the Soviets, who complain about the Western figures, do not publish
their own figures.
~
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C) Mr Ardamatskij claims the figures given in EUROPEO are "monstrous," intending
by this to say that the disproportion they reflect as favoring the USSR is exces-
sive. We provic3ed three types of figures. He criticizes above all the first set:
5,330 "Eurostrategic" nuclear warhead delivery vehicles for the USSR versus 1,512
for NATO. Let us see now how we arrived at those figures. The breakdown is as
follows: For the USSR: 160 SS-20 missiles (The Americans say 200 out of a total
= of 250; we applied a discount.); 60 SS-5 missil~s and 380 SS-4 missiles; 668 SS-12
missiles and Scud-B's (18 of which are in the GDR); 69 SSN-5 and SSN-4 missiles
(on G-I, G-II and H-II class submarines, not considered part of the Soviet stra-
= tegic nuclear force). Total missiles: 1,337. To these are added: 75 Backfire
(TU-22M/-26)bombers, 318 Badger (TU-16), 125 Blir~der (TU-22) and the fighter-
bombers that can carry Fencer (SU-24?nuclear bombs. totaling 370, Flogger
_ (fti~ 23/27) totaling 1,300, Fitter (SU-17) totaling 640, Fitter A(SU-7) total-
ing 165, and Fishbed (MiG-21) totaling 1,000. Total aircrafts 3,993. Grand
total: 5,330 vehi~les.
D) Mr Ardamatskij states that in the NATO total we have not included the nuclear
vehicles at the advance American bases in Europe (the bombers, the F 111, F 4 and
_ FB 111A fighter-bombers, and the A6's and A7's of the aircraft carriers) and the
medium-range aircraft of the European Allies, totaling 1,000 "Eurostrategic"
delivery vehicles. That is not the case. On tY?e contrary, instead of 1,000, we
have included 1,170 vehicles. Thus, we were more diligent than our interlocutor.
And let us see now the breakdown for NATO: 18 French SSBS S-2/-3; 180 American
Pershing lA missiles in Germany (even though they.can only reach the USSR's
western border); 64 British Polaris A3 missiles; 80 French MSBS M-20 missiles on
nuclear submarines; total missiles: 342. Let us go now tb the aircraft: 57 Brit-
ish Vulcan B-2 (which are about to be retired from service); 156 American
- F-111 E/F in Europe (The USSR might wish to add 65 FB 111A which, however, are
normally counted in the SALT tally, that is, as strategic weapons, and 126 F-111 D
that could arrive in Europe from the United States, but that are normally not
counted among the ready-to-use weapons; Mr Ardamatskij cites the FB-111A but must
not be counting other weapons, since he arrives at a total of 1,OOO,wtiicki is lower
i than ours; these figures therefore do not make much of a difference~; 33 French
- D4irage IV A(even though their Eurostrategic use is highly doubtful); 60 British
Buccaneer (some on aircraft carriers); 318 F-104 belonging to NATO countries (i~he
famous Starfighter, only a few of which are equipped for nuclear use); 40 Turkish
F-4; 324 American F-4 (in Europe or on rapid reinforcement status); 80 Anglo-
French Jaguar (of a total of 219, only 80 of which are equipped to carry a nuclear
warhead); 30 French Mirage III E; 20 American A-6E and 40 A-7E aboard aircraft
carriers, as well as 12 French Super ~tendard aboard aircraft carriers. Total
aircraft: 1170. Grand total: 1,512, as we set out to show.
E) As we have said, these figures were taken from the IISS. They are considered
to be authoritative; indeed, they have been criticized in some cases as being too
favorable to the USSR. Nevertheless, even adding 10 percent to the NATO figures
and subtracting 10 percent from the USSR ones (a very, but very, arbitrary opera-
tion) we get 1,664 for NATO and 4,797 for the USSR.
F) But it may be that Mr Ardamatskij, while agreeing with our calculation of the
NATO forces, does not agree with the inclusion of so many USSR forces; he is very
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imprecise and also difficult to understand. Nevertheless, he affirms that versus
the Western forces the USSR deploys "the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles and the
medium-range t~ombers. Their total number does not exceed that of i~ATO's medium-
~ range vehicles." As is evident, he overlooks many types of missiles as well as
the fighter-bombers (which he nevertheless includes when he talks of the Western
forces). At another point he increases the number of future American Cruise and
Pershing 2 missiles, saying they total 600. Their total will be 562. Or less,
- if some countries refuse them.
G) Mt Ardamatskij affirms that we, perhaps taken aback by our own calculations,
have brought the NP.TO and USSR figures closer together. This is not the case. We
have simply gone from a calculation of delivery vehicles (that is, missiles and
aircraft) to a calculation of warheads, applying a set of criteria suggested by
the above-mentioned IISS. Some vehi~les can carry only one warhead, others more.
Some Soviet fighter-bombers presumably will be used conventionally and not as
. nuclear vehicles; and on this E~asis, for example, we have assumed that the 3,475
USSR fighters suited for nuclear use would carry only 611 nuclear warheads.
Have we perhaps been too generous? In any case, in this way the calculation
changes (although the imbalance remains): USSR 1,995, NATO 768. We have then made
another gift to the USSR, increasing the NATO total by 400 warheads for the Ameri-
can Poseidon C-3 missiles aboard submari.nes. These units are already calcul.ated
in the strategzc weapons total an8 are therefore being counted twice (as strategic
and as Eurostrategic). This then brin~s the iJATO total to 1,168. The next figure
given by us (819 for the USSR versus 267 for NATO, or 555 including the Poseidons)
is the one calculated by the TISS taking into account also such factors as anti-
airc.raft defenses, the coefficient of error, the coefficient of technical attri-
- tion, and so forth. The result is thus a very "refined" analysis of the effective
number of Eurostrategic bombs that would strike their target.
H) Mr Ardamatskij complains, saying that the USSR total is not on the increase and
that the NATO total is not on the decrease. The USSR total is indeed growing.
because SS-20's and Backfires are still being produced (at a rate of 3-5 a month
- for the missiles and almost 3 a month for the bombers) and these ~~ehicles carry
more warheads than the older ones. Meanwhile, the British Vulcans and possibly
the French Mysteres and Mirages will be dismantled. The Italian and German
nuclear equipped F-104's will also be dismantled. The Vulcans and F-104's will
be replaced by Tornados, but in lesser numbers and not for some years to come.
The NATO total will grow in the future, with the Euromissiles, the new French
nuclear submarine and the British Trident, but this will not be for at least
another 10 years. Should the USSR prefer to negotiate reductions prior to their
entry into service, it may do so freely. NATO has already offered to do this.
However, even with its projected future reinforcements, given the rate of growth
of Soviet arms, NATO will not catch up with the USSR.
I) Mr Ardamatskij~'s statement that /each time ~in boldface~/ an SS-20 is installed
one or two older preexisting missiles are dismantled is is not correct. I would
like, however, to call attention to the fact that in the USSR total we have in-
cluded 440 Soviet missiles of the older SS-4 and SS-5 types (out of a total
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originally calculated at between 800 and 900~. Furthermore, NATO's new Euromis-
siles will not increase the Western total, as Mr Ardamatskij seems to think they
will, since NATO will be withdrawing (and is in fact already withdrawing) 1,000
American nuclear warheads (and possibly also a certain number of British tactical
nuclear warheads) from the European theater, including all or part of the Persh-
ing-1 missiles and some aircraft with a nuclear capability.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Arnaldo Mondadori Editore S.p.A. Milano
9399
CSO: 3104/23
,
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run urri~ltu, u~r, uivL~. .
TER1tORISM INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
FF.ENCH OFFICIALS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN ARMS SALES TO ETA '
Madrid CAIrB IO 16 in Spanish 19 Oct 81 pp 28-31
[Text] Trusted officials of former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing
and of former French Prime Ministers Michel Debre and Jacques Chaban Delmas
have been involved in arms traffic with the terroriat organi~ation ETA
[Basque Fatherland and Liberty] and in the flight of Spanish foreign exchange.
This was the conclusion reached by some of the French investigators who looked
into the "Touton Affair," the case r~f a customs inapector stationed in
Bordeau x whom the Spanish police accuse of getting rich by selling arms to
ETA.
- But Henri Touton was not the only one who struck it rich (until he was
arrested in 1978) in the arms traffic. Under the umbrella of the "Touton
network," the famous SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence
Service] created its own network in 1975 and alao did busineas with the
Basque terrorists. This is the story.
The "Touton Affair"
The initial investigations leading to the discovery of the network of
weapons trafficking bound for the Basque terrorists and~in which French
customs officials are involved, began on 14 November 1978.
On that day, police officers arrested DNED [National Bureau of Customs
Investigations] inspector Henri Touton in Bordeaux and brought him before
the courts on charges of corrupting public officials and tax evasion.
Two days later, while Touton was in jail, the Directorate of Territorial
Surveillance (DST),Fran~e's domestic counterespionage service, which comes
under the Interior Ministry, sent a document to the judge accusing the
arrested customs official of "being in contact with well-known international
smugglers and of being inv~lved in the traffic of weapons bound for the
Basque movement ETA."
In a second document, bearing neither address nor date and with an illegib:e
signature, the DST pressed its case a few weeks later. According to this
document, Touton was, in addition, an international smuggler with links to
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~
the Basilo association in Basel, Switzerland, from which he obtained 12 ship-
ments of cigarettes and whiskey that he smuggled into other countries.
These two written charges cunstituted the conclusive proof by which the
French courts sentenced Henri Touton, a SO-year old native of Soustons in.
Les Landes Department, to 5 years in prison and fined him 180 million French
- francs (some 3 billion pesetas).
The French police found ].6 million francs (27 million pesetas) in two
checking accounts that Touton had in his name in the Caisse d'Epargne and
in Credit Paysan d'Aquitaine, plus another 3 million francs (about 50
million pesetas) in a Swiss bank.
When he was arrested, inspector Touton was unable to explain where he had
gotten the enormous fortune discovered in his name, nor couZd he account for
the 300 cases of cigarettes uncovered in his house or the funds that enabled him
to pu rchase a Citroen CX R200 and a luxurious chalet in Merignac.
His only explanation was~that in 1972 three Spaniards, Amador Rubia Palacios,
Isidro Gallart Pujol and a fellow named Ramon, had contacted him about taking
money out of Spain and that he had served as a middleman because he was very
good friends with Henri Echeverry, a French Basque and on~e of the "capi"
running the money smuggling operation from the French Basc}ue Country.
.
According to his statement to the judge, the ma~ey that he had in the Caisse
d'Epargne and in Credit Paysan d'Aquitaine had been handed over to him in
100-peseta bills by Amador Rubia Palacios and Isidro Gallart Pujol in a bar
in the French town of Bayonne.
According to Spanish police sourcea, his atory ia true, but only partially.
Both Amador Rubia Palacios ar~d Isidro Gallart Pujol are wanted in Spain
for taking currency out of the countr,y and for arma trafficking to ETA, in
connection with Touton's gang.
According to the Spanish police, Amador Rubia Palacios was born 48 years ago
in Polopos (Granada) and currently lives in Les Eycaldes (Andorra); there
are three court requisitions and one police requisition pending against him
for taking money out of the country and for arms trafficking.
Gallart Pujol is in the same situation. Two courts in Madrid and one in
Barcelons have requested hia arrest, and accordin~ to Spanish police sourcES,
"he'd better stay in Andorra because if he feels like showing up in Spain,
he's going to have to explain a number of incidents involving arms trafficking
to Basque terrorists."
According to Spanish police, the fellow named Ramon is none other than Ramon
Ubalg Entregues, a 50-year old waiter born i?i Tarrasa who was indicted in
Barcelona in 1971 for currency trafficking and is thought to have links with
the "Touton network."
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rvn vrri~i~w uo.: v.r,.~
All of them, plus a fourth person, ~ Spanish national whom they called
- Michelena, a hotel owner in Calella (Gerona), met quite often with inspector
Henri Touton in Bordeaux, Barcelona and Calella, where they planend to take
capital out of Spain and to smuggle in weapons for th~ Basque terrorists
and di~ided up their profits.
There was a sixth individual involved in the trafficking of weapons bound for
the Basque military organization ETA: Paul Errandonea, a 40-year old French
Basque who until recently owned Le Suisse baX in Saint Jean de Luz and now
runs E1 Caserio in Urugne.
Errandonea, whom the French DST had under surveillance for more than a year,
' was the intermediary between ETA and Tc,uton,, according to the prosecution
case against customs in.spector Touton.
Paul Errandonea had set up a small bu*_ effective amuggling network to ~ransport
~7eapons and other merchandise from Bordeaux to Spain.
_ According to the indictment, the network consi3ted mostly of apparently
ur.suspecting truck drivers who earned 250,000 pesetas a month employing
the Chinese method, tr.at is to say, using light trucks that most often crossed
the border at Col D'Echegaray an~ delivered the contraband to San Sebastian,
Bilbao, Vitoria and Madrid.
Mysterious Death
r~nother French Basque member of the "Toutan network" allegedly involved in
arms traffic to ETA ~aas Hen~i Echeverry, who died as a result of a traffic
_ accident: according to the indictment in Bordeaux.
Well-informed sources have told CAMBIO 16, however, that Echeverry died on
a 18 November 1975, a day after the Financial Crimes Squad had shot him in
the rear during a confrontation at Barajas Airport.
Henri Echeverry was taken to La Pa~ Hospital in Madrid, where Franco was to
die 2 days later, treated successfully and released.. The next day, he was
found dead inside a car that had crashed on the outskirts of Madrid.
According to the same source, someone had tipped off the Spanish police to
the trafficker and smuggler, who as he was set to leave Spain from Barajas
Airportp was carrying a suitcase with 80 mi~lion pesetas that he was going
to bring illegally into France and a 9 millimeter pi:;':ol. ,
Who was the informer? While some sources point to t'ne French DST, there
are those who see the hand of customs inspectar Henri Touton in this
mysterious affair, which does not appear in Spanish police files.
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More Traffickers
In point of fact, 'L months before Echeverry's death, Touton's former mistress,
Henriette Castillon, who was having sn affair with Henri Echeverry, had
shown up at Bordeaux customs and reported inspector Touton's "irregular"
course of action in connection with arms traffic bound for Spain.
Henriette Castillon's accusation gave rise to an investigation of inepector
Henri Touton. However, even thcugh the French customs inapector had already
amassed much of his fortune selling az~s to ETA, the Bordeaux police did
not consider him a suspect. ~ ~
What is more, they decorated him. On 11 February j976, 8 months after the
charge by his former mistress, Andre Pignot, the head of the National
Bur~eau of Customs Investigations and s man who enjoyed the complete trust of
French Presi3ent Valery Giscard d'Estaing, pinned the medal of honor on
inspector Henri Toutor..
But Touton was not the only person engaged in arms trafficking to ETA in
1975. The customs inspector's setup must have seemed very lucrative to
officials in the French SDECE, ~aho started their own in the mid-1970's.
According to the inforn~ation in the indictment, the SDECE had selected three
individuals in 1974 to penetrate the Bordeaux underworld and learn the
techniques iised by Touton and Errandonea to get acroas the French-Spaniah
border, in order to set up a parallel arms trafficking network to smuggle
weapons thror~gh Spain to the French-speaking countries of northern Africa,
should the need arise.
The three individuals ~oho set up the network were Claude Cabot, a wealthy
man from Norniandy who owns a renowned stable of horsea as well as extenRive
property in northern France; Jacques Berthelot, a pQOr spy who r~nta a room
in the Paris slums and who had begun his career during the war in Algeria,
and Patrick Laurent, a childhood friend of Cabot's who supported the
operation technically through a company he owned in Switzerland.
In setting up their network, Berthelot took the assumed name of Louis Hamon
and started a company called Sara on the outskirts of Paris to handle the
arms trafficking and smuggling activities into Spain.
Using the front he had set up in Paris, Jacques Berthelot-Louis Hamon
contacted Paul Errandonea, and making use of the netw~rk of truck drivers
that the French Basque ran from Bordesux, they began bringing cigarettes,
firearms and liquor into Spain.
Crossing the Border
The French foreign counterspies brought a total of 11 clandestine shipments
into Spain, delivering smuggled weapons to Vitoria and San Sebastian, until
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an internal report of the DST, the SDECE's rival agency, put an end to
Cabot's and Berthelot's underground network.
The report seems to be part of the domestic war that France's two secret
services, the DST and the SDECE, are waging.
In November 1978, as the Bordeaux police were jailing customs inapector
Henri Touton pursuant to a~confidential document of the SDECE, the DST was ~
drafting an internal report that it sent to the French suthorities, openly
accusing Cabot and Berthelot of "helping" weapons deals with ETA.
In breaking up Cabot's and Berthelot's network, the DST was accusing the
agentsof its rival, the SDECE, who are officially answerable ta the government
of former President Valer,y Giscard d'Estaing, of openly supporting the
Basque terrorists by supplying them arms.
Roundabout Routes
Most of the weapons smuggled into Spain by both Touton's and the SDECE's
network came from the socialist countries, mainly Czechoslovakia and the GDR,
where, according to the case against Touton, the police escorted the trucks
right up to the border.
The original destinations of the weapons were points in the FRG or Switzerland,
where Touton's or the SDECE's men picked them up and forwarded them to other
countries, primarily Spain and Italy, where there are major terrorist markets.
That was not always the route they followed, k~owe~er. At times the weapons
came from Western countries like Belgium or West Germany and arrived in
Switzerland by ship or plane from Artwerp, Rotterdam or Hamburg. From there
they~traveled to East Germany or Bulgaria, then through Austria or Czecho-
slovakia into France and later to Spain.
By making use of these roundabout itineraxies, whose primary aim was to
outsmart the Wester~, authorities in charge of ciacking d~wn on illegal arma
sales, the traffickers ran little risk, inasmuch as they were treated like
kings in the Soviet bloc countries, through which most of the route passed.
Jean Coelsch, one of the truck drivers in Touton's network, admitted as much.
He described, for exaznple, how in crossing the Bulgarian border with a
shipment of revolvers, the army escorted him the entire time and invited him .
- to stay at a luxury hotel for 2 days, which was precisely how long it took
the troops to unload the guns from his truck onto another to ship them back
to the West.
Friends in the Eas.t
Moreover, in exchange for smuggled whiskey, butter, perfumes and cigarettes,
the authorities in the Eastern bloc countries furnish the truck drivers the
forged documentation they need to bring contraband weapons into the Western
nations.
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Judge Georges Sengelin, who has been hearing the case against Touton for a
little more than a year now, has cited testimony such as that given by a
Spaniard named Roubalaya. Roubalaya asserted that he never had problems
with arms trafficking in Romania because "there was always some official who
in exchange for a case of whiskey would provide you with documents with
which you could travel through half of Europe without being bothered."
Jean Coelsch, one of the "Touton network's" haulera, told Judge Sengelin
that he got 10,000 francs (some 170,000 pesetas) for each weapons shipment
and that on one of the occasions that he had to deal directly with Swiss
traffickers, on the outskirts of the city of Basel, he was astonished to see
that a heavy machine gun had been mounted on the balcony of the house that they
were in and tha t 10 armed bodyguards accompanied the organization's top
"capi" everywhere they went.
Judge Georges Sengelin corroborated this assertion to CAMBIO 16; he has met
more than once in Switzerland with traffickers, who, in his own words, "are
always very elegantly dressed, looking their part and heavily protected."
They can certainly afford it. According to the statements that several
- weapons traffickers have given to Judge Sengelin, each of the networks
operating out of Bordeaux and Marseilles brings at least five truckloads of
cigarettes, whiskey and firearms into Spain every week.
Just as many cross the Italian border bound for Rome, Venice, Naples and
Sicily, where the "Touton network" had also sold arms. According to all the
- investigations, the jailed customs inspector is only the tip of the iceberg
of a much more extensive network with connections in the FRG, Switzerland
(where the SDECE had set up several business fronts for smuggling purposes),
Spain and Italy.
Inspector Touton was obviously not alone in smuggling weapons to ETA. Proof
of this is that in 1975 Grobs, one of the top men in West German customs
(in the Investigations Bureau, ZFA), made it known to the French Government
that a high-level French customs offic.i:~l ~aas involved in arms traffic bound
for Spain.
This high-level official was none other tt:an Saint-Jean, one of the assistant
directors of France's National Biireau of Customs Investigations (DNED) an~i
Andre Pignot's right-hand man. In spite of this serioua charge, Saint-Jean
is still in his post.
The other assistant director of the UNED, Rene Navrault, whom CAMBIO 16 has
identified in a photograph taken while he was dining at Henri Touton's chalet
with two of Bordeaux's leading smugglers, did r_ot come out looking too good
from the statements that his boss, Andre Pignot, made to Judge Sengelin last
23 April.
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Close Friends
AcCording to the head of the DNED, Navrault and Touton had very close ties,
and he, as head of the DNED, was extremely puzzled that a17 of.the
investigations into arms smuggling in the Bordeaux region always came to
naught. ~
It is likely, of course, that additional accomplices in the arms trafficking
bound for ETA are to be found ar even higher levels. The French presa has
brought this up again in recent weeks. , ~
The "Touton affair" took place in Bordeaux, the fief of former Prinie Minister
Jacques Chaban Delmas, who muat have been on top of the matter for some time,
since the authorities in this region come under him.
~ President Valery Giscard d'Estaing must have also been posted on this ugl}
business. From 1959 ~on, when he was appointed secretary of state for finances,
Giscard ran the customhouses that come under this ministry, and therefore
tiie director of D;dEB, Andre Pignot, and assistant directora Saint-Jean and
Rene Navrault must have enjoyed his confidence. .
With regard to the SDECE, which is also linked to arms sales to ETA, the
former French chief of state must have also been informed about its activities.
The SDECE comes under the office of head of state, Alexandre de Marenches, ~
who was chosen on 14 October 1970 by Georges Pompidou (Jacques Chaban Delmas
was prime minister) and confirmed by Valery Giscard d'Estaing when he became
president some years later. All of the top-level officials in the~SDECE were
. later chosen by Giscard..
The French press has gone much further in the case of Michel Debre, the
former prime minister wi~c~ also served as finance minister under Pompidou and
ciefense minister under Chaban Delmas. The weekly MINUTE has accused his son,
Vicent Debre, of links with international arms trafficking and of being
directly involved in the "Touton affair."
Meanwhile, inspector Touton has 3 years left in jail, and his only consolation
and hope is that Judge Georges Sengelin will push the r.ase much further than
his colleague Annie Leotin, who initiated the prosecution, and bring to light
all of the hidden accomplices in this sordid affair, which, by all
indications, could tarnish much of Valery Giscard d'Estaing's administration.
_ Tn any case, only the socialists, who in the 1972 common platform called for
_ the abolition of ~the SDECE, can, if they ~aant, clear up the links between
French customs, the SDECE and ETA. For the time being, the fact is that the
Mitterrand administration does not seem that anxious to get to the bottom of
the matter.
COPYRIGHT: 1981, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
$743
CSO: 3110/28
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TERRORISM INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF ARMS TRAFFICKING URGED ~
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 1:9 Oct 81 p 3
[Editorial hy Juan Tomas de Salas: "France Must Explain Itself"]
- [Text] The frightening article that we have published in this issue, based
on evidence and documents in the possession of the French courts, increasingly
confirms the disturbing suspicion that Giscard d'Estaing's administration
was helping and arming ETA. Specifically, there is evidence that France's
counterespionage service ran a network that smuggled weapons and other combat
materiel to ETA from Eastern Europe. Moreover, a high-level customs official
- from Bordeaux collaborated with another smuggling ring that also supplied
ETA with arms. This is just the top of the iceberg in the French Government's
- complicity in the subversive war on Spain's democracy, but based solely on
what we are publishing in this issue, the Spanish Government should
unquestionably demand prompt explanations. It's bad enough for them to burn
our trucks and to vote yes one day and no the next on our membership in the
European Community, but it's muct~ worse for then to secretly abet and
promote a subversive war an our soil. With "friends" like this, we would be
better off permanently surrounded by enemies. Richelieu Giscard d'Estaing was
aiding Spain's democracy with one hand and sCabbing it slowly in the back with
the other. And the worst pazt of it is that the available information on
French Government complicity in arms trafficking includes not only Spain but
Italy as well, and there is also a German connection ~hat might perhaps explain
the Baader-Meinhof gang's terrorism. What the devil w~s the French
Government trying to do by taking part in this shameless and sordid war on
its three neighbors and two allies? A shady affair like this demands an
in-depth explanatic~n.
Mr Mitterrand's assumrtion of the presidency has enabled this iniCial
evidence of French Government complicity in the subversive war against Spain
to come to light. Publicizing the details of Giscard d'Estaing's dirty wars
is not enough, however; the current French Government must also explain in
detail what happened, punish the culprits and assure our government that France
has stopped knifing us in the back. It is true that since the advent of
Mitterrand the police links between the two countries have improved
radically, and the French Government's desire to help ETA seems to have
vanished, but we need firm guarantPes that what happened will not happen again.
Such guarantees will be sufficient only if the Mitterrand administration
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I
~~ux ur~r~lc;lai. U5~ U.NLY
carries forward the investigation into the government agencies that aided
ETA. If 20 years ago the Ben Barka afFair bro~ught to light the hi.dden
activities of French counterespionage and 'if the unfortunate operation that
cost the life of the Moroccan opposition's leader culminated in a purge of
the Frenchmen responsible, then today more than ever the government must purge
, the bizarre French spies who have not only guaranteed ETA's immunity on French
soil but are also arm~ng it to slay Spain. If France under Mitterrand has
truly abandoned Giscard d'Estaing's shady imperial battles, then it has to
convincingly demonstrate this. Otherwise,.the Spanish Government would be
more than justified in going before the European Parliament, the Council of
Europe, the UN or wherever to tell the world that this supposed friend is
promoting subversive wars across its borders.
COPYRIGHT: 1981, Infarmacion y Revistas, S.A.
- 8743 .
CSO: 31i0/28
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ECONOMICS FRANCE
URI, ATTALI, EUROPEAN VIEWS: NATIONALIZATIONS, INFLATION
- Milan IL SOLE-'l4 ORE in Italian 24, 29 Sep; l, 6 Oct 81
~Series by Ugo Piccione, foreign correspondent for IL SOLE-24 ORE, in-
cluding interviews with economists Pierre Uri and Jacques Attali]
[24 Sep 81, P 3~
[Text] Travels in the New France
Socialist economist Pierre Uri talks. Mitterand
keeps close watch on the monster. "If the Elysee
- doesn~t change policies, inflation could soon hit
~ 18 percent."
PARIS: We begin our travels in the present state of the economy in
Mitterand's socialist France, and in its possible future scenarios
with Prof Pierre Uri, ~0, socialist economist and world-renowned au-
thor, an expert in matters of industry and government finance, and
Third-World advocate, a member of the Italian Socialist Party~[PSI]
economic commission and of thc; cc+,~?unittee set up by Prime Minister
Mauroy to draft tax reform legislat;ion. Optimistic over the recent
_ political turnabout in his country, Uri is still fai.thful to his image:
and, ~ith his usual intellectual r.;.~or, he doesn't even try, in this
interview, to hide his deep conc,�rn and serious reservations about a
~ socialist economic management that has thus far neglected the problem
of inflation to concentrate its hitherto unsuccessful efforts on abo-
lishing unemployment.
Our first question is about industrial policy. Mauroy's government's
rationale f.or nationalizing the biggest af France's industrial conglo-
merates and its major banks cites the urgent need to "revitalize" the
nation's industry and construct an industrial policy more responsive
to its economic, social, and industrial ambitions. What, we asked
Prof. Uri, is the major thrust of that policy, and what innovations
does it embody?
- ~Answer~ Industrial policy wi11 be developed essentially on two fronts.
_ The first is what we c~ll "recapturing the domestic market." This daes
not mean we shall be engaging in protectionism, nor that we shall
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rvK vrCt~.iAi, U~r, UIVLY
relax our efforts to spread the "made in France" label over an in-
creasing share of foreign markets: very simply put, it means that
we shall make a total commitment to restore the competitive edge to
many sectors of the national economy which, like furniture or shoes,
are barely managing to subsist without reacting to competition from
foreign manufacturers who have thus managed to take over an up-front
share of the French market. The idea is to find out what these in-
dustries lack so that, given parity in economic and social conditions,
they can produce and sell like their Italian or German competitors.
I am certain that, in many instances, we shall have to proceed with
corporate restructuring that will be facilitated by government in-
centives for investments and will have no untoward impact on employ-
ment, since a11 will be aimed at increasing production.
The second front for developing ~he government's strategy for indus-
i;ry will be the area of technological innovation and diversification.
Let me make that clearer. The public sector of industry will have
to make a f ar mor~e decisive commitment than in the past to what are
generally referred to as the hi-tech industries. But, in this fiEld
again, we shall have to make choices. We can no longer afford to
_ copy often after years of delay what is being done in the Uni-
ted States, thus setting our sights on nuclear power or color TV.
France has tremendous technologica~. and industrial capacities in sec-
tors that will be adequately expanded: I am thinking, among others,
~ of our expertise in oceanographic exploration, in natural-gas-search
ing equipment, and marine oil-drilling platforms. In the meantime,
We must abandon the road of industrial specialization the preceding
government chose. It's a question of scale. A small country can be-
come totally specialized in one area; a country like France cannot
base its specialization on anything but a diversified industrial fab-
ric. Exces~ive specialization would inevitably lead to unemployment.
And there is absolutel.y no contradiction between modernizing produc- ~
tion metltods, boosting productivity, and raising employment levels
and market shares iri the traditional sectors on tiie one hand, and a
firm commitment to the hi-tech areas on the other~
[Questionj Over the last 4 months unemployment in France has risen
markedly, as have inflation, the national debt, and the trade deficit.
Doesn't it look to you as though the way the new coalition is manag-
ing the economy might, at least in ~-�~e short term, aggravate the
country's present difficulties?
LAnswer,J There you touch a very sensitive point. It is true that
the decision to i~icrease the guaranteed minimum wage, family subsi-
dies, pensions, and so on has meant an increased burden on the State
and a rise in the amount of currency in circulation. And it is also
true tha~ we have neglected the problem of inf lation. Obviously
there is nothing ~o be gained by increasing the nominal purchasing
potiaer and then seeing it get soaked up by mounting inflation. I con-
fess I am very much concerned at the methods adopted to curb infla-
tion. They are methods and here I am speaking my personal view
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altogether too reminiscent of the ones the Barre government tried.
There was a decision, for example, to make dra~tic changes in a lot
of public utility rates, when it would have been wiser to spread them
out over time. On the other hand, I should have preferred to see the
bud~et-drafting process not limited to forecasting, and, ~i;o some ex-
tent, informing the economic system of a specific rate of inflation
3vhich, furthermore, everything seems to indicate will be far higher.
Only Austria can boast of success, and at relatively modest budgetary
cost, in curbing inflation while showing a certain rate of economic
- growth: it succeeded thanks to an agreement that allows it to di-
vide the growth in national income among profits, wages, and social
transfers. If you look carefully at the machinery of inflation in
the various European countries, you see that it is affected by t.wo
major phenomena. The first is that of the spiral: not only the
wage-price spiral, but the price-price spiral. The suceessive rises
in oil p~~ices, in industry prices, in f arm pri~ces, in wholesale pri-
ces, in consumer prices, in wages, and so on. It is one of the rea-
sons why we cannot slow inflation and why there is always ane sector
lagging behind the others and which in turn sets off a new round of
increases. The Austrians' secret is that they make these adjustments
simultaneously. It is a method we tried ourselves back in the days
of the "Fourth Republic" and one to which, I think, we ought to start
thinking about going back.
The second phenomenon that fuels inf lation lies in the machinery for
structuring prices and in business practices which skew and distort
free competition. Here in France, for example, businessmen and in-
dustrialists do not always ask themselves what the price level should
be which, if sales were increased, would allow them to make an ade-
quate margin of prof it. The current practice is, instead, to pick
a percentage of profit based on cost. And so when costs go up there
- is an inunediate rise in prices to prot~ct that specific pro~it per-
centage.
[Question~ What do you think, then, of the request from organized
_ labor for a"temporary and selective" price-freeze?
[Answer] It is a system which has turned out to be not very effec-
tive and wnich has often contributed to slowing development in the
basic sectors. I have a lot more faith in the effie.:acity of steady
and complete consumer education. The French and ~they are iiot the
only ones haven't the faintest idea of tlie profit margins of tele-
visinn dealers, of clothing stores, or of the shop~ that sel.l Italian
shoes. And they are unaware that restaurant prices are going up
twice as fast as the price of food at wholesale.
[Question] The recent decline of the dollar is causing increased
tensions between the franc and the German mark, which has been rising
witti respect to the other EMS currencies, too. Do you think that the
technical n?easures taken by the government will succeed in containing
the pressure on the fr.anc and avoiding, in the long run, an adjustment
of the central parities within the EMS?
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rVK Vrrll..tAL UJ~ UIVLY
~Answer] I, too, oppose any revision in the franc-mark exchange rate:
at least in the present situation. In these last several months, all
the EMS currenciE~ have declined in value vis-a-vis the dollar, thc
pound, and the ynn : and even though there have been signs of a turn--
around in the las~ few days, th~ dollar still retains ~ome of the ed;e
it had accumulated. I don't think therefore, that the situation calls
- for moving to a double adjustment of the franc, one vis-a-vis the dol-
lar and.the other vis-a-vis the mark. The inflationary impact of such
- a move on the French economy would be too s~;rong. I do not rule out,
_ though, the possibility that, if we were to go on for 2 or 3 years to
show inflation rates sharply higher than those of Federal Germany, it
would then be necessary to move to adjustments wi.thin the EMS. It is
precisely for this reason that I hope the government wi21 make a more
practical commitment to the fight against inflation: I do not t~~.ke it
for granted that we are going to see an 18-percent inflation rate, but
I frankly fail to see how what the government is do~.ng today is going
to avoid it.
` [29 Sep 81 p3]
[Text] In the Wake of the Nationalizations
What if business were to pull out of Paris? Employ-
ers are scared, and the unions have a pistol at the
government~s head. And meanwhile, the international
financiers are threati.ng to turn their backs on Mit-
terand.
_ PARIS: "It was a political decision which penalizes industrial and
financial groups that have displayed remarkable efficiency. A futile,
costly, and dangerous operation; futile, because the State already
had pr~etty fair control of the economy; costly, ti~cause it soaks up
tremendous resources which the State could have put to better use in
encouraging investments and boosting employment; and dangerous, fin-
ally, because i.t concentrates 40 percent of France~~ industrial produc-
tion in t;he public sector and vests almost total control of credit in
the State. That control will accentuate industry's already heavy de-
pendency on the government."
This was the bitter and anxious comment of Francois Cayrac, president
of the Fr~ench Confederation of Industry, on the massive nationalization
of a vast sweep of the nation's economic structures, imposed by social-
ist President Mitterand to keep his campaign pledge to use greater State
interven~;ion in industrial management in order to build a."new society,
and, above all, a more equitable one." Bitterness and anxiety which
stem less from ideological preconceptions than from a reali~tic assess-
ment of the risks to which it leaves open an economy that, while today
it is an integral part of a competitive, liberalist international sys-
tem, could slide tomorrow toward patterns not unlike those Qf the "real
- socialist" countries.
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The move the French socialist-communist government has taken is unparal-
_ led for intensity and scape in all Western postwar history. With na-
tionalization, the public sectAr takes over sole control of seven ma,;or
industrial conglomerates (Saint-Gobain. Rh$ne, Youlenc, Thomson - Brandt,
Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann, General Electric [CGT], Sacilor and Usinor) and
of the two most prestigious financial houses (Paribas and Suez) in the
nation, plus $1 percent interest in Dassault and Matra (companies active
in aviation and def ense), and about 95 percent of the entire natior~al
credit system. The State will thus be handling almost all management
in sectors such as steel, electronics, refined chemicals, and aluminum,
and will further consolidate its position in many instances already a
dominant one in the areas of electrical power construction, specia-
lized metallurgy, data processing, housing, glass, pharmaceuticals, au-
tomobiles, and petroleum. Not to mention the fact that it will control
_ better than two thirds of France's technological research, and as much
as S$ percent of it in data processing and 6'l percent in chemicals and
- electronics, and an actual 93 percent in aeronautics.
This is, thus, a"revoJ_utionary" nationalization operation (the adjec-
tive is riitterand's own) which, on a number of counts, justifies the
extreme mistr.ust evinced by French private industry and by the interna-
tional busi;~ess community. This is not only because it remains to be
seen what wil~ become of the French subsicli aries of such big multina-
tionals that are based abroad (such as Roussel Uclaf, CII-Honeywell,
Bull, and ITT) and foreign subsidiaries of French conglomerates which
have been nationalized, or the criteria which will govern the selec-
tion of the considerable highly diversified industrial holdings of
Paribas and Suez which would be ceded to the private sector. Another
and far more important reason is that they f ear the disruptive effect
on the nation~s ~ntire economic system of what may turn out to be a
bureaucratic managementc~it~ welfareist and patronage-oriented leanings
running public industry and credit, as well as the policies which may,
througli the publicly owned companies, be forced on private-sector man-
_ agement in the areas of industrial relations, investments, prices, tech-
nological research, distribution, and even foreign tmade.
These fears are more than understandable, at least in the light of the
discouraging experiences to say the least of the British and Ita-
lian rounds of nationalization. Nobody in France, thflugh, challenges
the efficiency of Renault, the State-r~i.n railroads, the gas and elec-
tric utilities, or the banks which have been run by the State for years
now. Nor do we forget that two nationalized companies Renault and
Volkswagen have stood up best under the severe buffeting the world
_ automotive industry has been taking. It is nevertheless obvious that
nationalization can succeed only if it is not perceived as a simple
short-term operation, but is viewed as the instrument of a consistent
industrial, t~ch~ological, and social policy for the long term which,
in tu.rn, implies sound economic management.
This is an argument which will very shortly be put at least partially
to the test. The restructuring operations which will be necessary to
streamline and order the highly diversified and sometimes redundant ac-
tivities of the new nationalized conglomerates (which will be running
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more than 1,200 companies) should logicall,y result in some cutbacks
in payrolls. That is a hypothesis which the unions are in no way
disposed to entertain. Henri krasucki, depixty secre~tary-general
or the communist CGT, leaves no ronm for doubt on that score" It is
clear." he~says, "that some restructuring will be needed: but it won't
be done at the workers' expense. Particularly not at a time when we
have clo~e to million unemployed. The way we ses it, restructuring
cannot be made another word for layoff s. And it is ridiculous for the
left, now that it is in power, to decide to pursue the very same me-
thods as private capitalism di d: in other words, a strategy which,
through plant automation or other streamlining formulas, aims prima-
rily at increasing productivity in order to get the samA volume of
production and profit with fewer people on the payroll. What restruc-
turing ou~ht to mean is replacing economically obsolete operations
with sounder ones: but without leading to payroll slashes in the com-
panies involved."
This is a view which, in view of the expanded influence of the labor
unions on the government, would seem to support the many perplexities
= in private enterprise circles over the nature of the future management
of the public sector, with which, in acidition, the workers will be
brought into association through more direct participation in the
decision-making bodies. As t he days go by, we witness mounting union
pressure on the government for radical replacement of the people at
all corporate summits, not only those newly nationalized, but also the
poli.tically suspect people appointed by the previous government
of the corporations which were already part of the State participation ,
area. The upshot of that is that, amid the consequent state of pro-
found uncertainty, the decision-making process is to all intents and
purposes blocked at the corpo rate level. "It's paralysis," we were
told by Michel Develle, deputy director of the economic studies office
of Paribas, "becaus.e nobody wants to or can assume responsibility for
making an decision at all." And thi~, of co~xrse, is beginning to
affect the enthusiasm of fo reign bankers and industrialists about
tightening, preserving, or strengthening their ties with the French
St�ate-owned companies.
There are symptoms galore of a kind of rejection syndrome internation-
_ ally toward the nationalization wave. There have been several exam-
ples over the past few weeks. The U.S. colossus, Continental Tele-
phone~decided to scrap its plans to set up a jointly owned subsidiary
in the United States with the biggest corporation in the Thomson-Brandt
conglomerate. .And it would appear that there is no longer any serious
talk of the joint vent�_re wh ich was to have joined Thomson-Brandt and
Germany's Telefunken, Britaints Thorn, and Japan's JVE in common pro-
duction of a very broad range of sophisticated electronics products
for television and high-fidelity sound systems. America's Becker Bank,
fourth in the U.S. ratings for investment banks, just the other day
announced that it was ready to buy back the 20 percent interest Paribas
owns in Becker, because, explained Becker president Wender, "We cannot
keep a company that has been taken over by the State as a partner."
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These are symptoms, however, which do not seem to trouble the French
left. "It's merely a passing phenomenon," says Pierre Uri. I person-
- ally do not believe things will really turn out as the various Cassan-
dras say they will. Take Renault, for example: it's a State-owned
corporation, it has branches in the major world markets, and it is as-
sociated in the United States with American Motors, the fourth largest
automaker in the United States. Or take Ford which has long been
working on a joint undertaking with SNIAS, another public-sector com-
~ pany that is active in the aerospace field. It is true that some small
or medium foreign companies are saying right now that they don't
want to do business with State-owned corporatioris : but I am certain
that, sooner or leter, they will wind up taking their cue from the big
multinationals. We know from experience that the decisions of cus-
tomers and partners are not affected e:ven minimally b,y the fact that
~he stock of this or that French corporation is controlled by the
State. Otherwise, how would you explain the fact that the three major
lending institutions, the Banque Natianale de Paris, Credit Lyonnais,
and the Societe Generale, which have been in the public sphere for
years, have managed to expand their international activities and ties?"
This is optimism shared, albeit with some reservations, by Develle, who
believes that nationalization may well expose France to intense politi-
cal pressures which would, inevitably, have repercussions on the d'omes-
tic economic and financial levels. "Who can say," he asks, "that some
fine day the Arabs, for instance, won't decide to use a Paribas assoc
- ciate in that area of the world our banks, I mean, that operate ir~
the Gulf Emirates and in Lebanon to bring pressure to bear to influ-
ence the policies of the Frenc,h government towa;rd Zsrael
That is anything but an abstract assurnption. At least it is if you
consider the position recently taken by the monetary authorities in Sau-
di Arabia who, as LE FIGARO reported, last month turned down a request
from the French treasury for a~'~-billion loan for a transfusion into
tlie currency x~eserves of the Bank of France. That was a decision Mit-
terand hopes to reverse in the course of conversations he will shortly
be having in Ryiaclh with the top political leaders of that country, who
will mos~ assuredly not let slip the chance to ask, in e~cchange, for
some sort of c~.~mmitment on their f inancial participation in the newly
nationalized Dassault Aviation group. Th~ Saudis are counting heavily
on that participation for political and strategic considerations, so
as to diversify their sources of supply for military materiel and thus
' t;o cut back on their strategic dependency on the White House which,
witness the stifF resistance in the Congress in Washington to the pro-
posal to sell Ryiadh the AWACS radar surveillance planes, is subject
to heavy influence from the strong U.S. pro-Israel lobby.
[6 oct 81, p 3~ ~
[Text] Mitterand ; a Pink Protectionist
One point the socialist government, organized labor,
and business and industry all agree on: there must be
brakes on imports.
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PARIS: Today we've got the "wine war." Tomorrow maybe it will be
the automobile war, the knitwear war, the furniture war, the toy war,
the major appliance war, the machine-tool war, or the surgical instru-
ment war, the hospital equipment war, and so on: war, in short,in all
the sectors where, over the years, French products have lost ground in
the face of international competition. From the .ridge of the ship of
State in the Elysee Palace, Captain Mitterand has decreed oeneral mo-
bilization for France from captains of indust;ry to merchant princes,
from bankers to consumers for a massive offensive aimed at winning
back from foreign manufacturers the space they have carved out for
themselves on ~he French market and, at the samc: time, gettingthe eco-
nomy rolling again and, with it, the nation~s employmer~t levels.
This is what Mitterand has called "winning back the domestic market."
- An operation based on the assumption that the in+ernational division
of labor and production can be decided upon only in France: it must
be made to bow only to French interests. And everyone is cal.led upon
to see that it succeeds: the State Participation corpor.~tions ("The
recent nationalizations are a defensive weapon for French production"),
selectivity of credit and investments ("Because our industries must
succeed in making products that are on demand in the domestic marketrr~~
and the consumers ("Because for every foreign product bought there is
one French worker without a job)."
In practical terms, the offensive should not involve traditional pro-
tectionist measures such as quotas or surtaxes, which would expose
France to trade r~taliation authorized under the GATT and in the EEC,
'tnzt in their place steps to beef up the already sophisticated machin-
ery of border controls t o make sure that foreign products meet the
. standards of their count ry of origin as to quality, safety, etc.
Attached to this machinery, which has been successfully tested in con..
nection with Italian wines, will be others. Like the one devised in
September� to "revitalize" the furniture industry, this, in addition
to a pledge from distributors to replace at least 30 percent of their
foreign purchases with French products, calls for tax breaks for CODIFA
(an ad hoc agency for technological and marketing expansion in the
sector), aid for streamlining and automati~~~g plants and production
procedures, national advertising campcigns on TV, special savings
- passbooks for furniture issued only to pur~hasers of French-made fur-
niture.
Specific instructions would be give;~ to all government agencies (minis-
tries, hospitals, schools, etc.) and to State-owned corporations to
place their order~s for supplies with domes~ic sources: presumably
by more selective channeling of their contract capital and, in the case
of the banl~:s, through len ding policies which would give priority to
purchases of French products.
The steady deterioration of the domestic economic situation whose
outstanding f~atur~es are irresistibly risirig inflation, unemployment,
and trade and public spending deficits, in addition to a sharp drop
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in the exchange rate of the franc and a steep parallel increase in
wage and production costs has certainly contributed in France to a
quickening in the embers of protectionism that have smouldered for
so long beneath the ashes. Even before the recent Franco-Italian
"wine war," this was evidenced in the countless technical-administra-
tive cavils trumped up by French customs to stem insofar as pos-
sible the rising tide of imported tape recorders, shoes, knitwear,
amd television sets.
But that's not all. The off ensive launched from the Elysee finds a lo-
gic of i~s own even in the rhetoric of candidate Mitterand, which even
then foreshadowed something of a protectionist phi.losophy (in its plat-
form, the Socialist Party promoted a campaign to back the "Made in
France" label which the new president dare not disavow. Most particu-
larly, he cannot renege on it now, when he feels himself caught in a
pincers movement between business raistrust and a rising tide of dis-
appointment in the rar_ks of organized labor: business takes issue
with his economic timing for the latest round of nationalizations, not.
to mention rising wage costs and tax pressures on corporations; labor
blames him for failing to restore full employment (job levels are ac-
tually declining) or to do something about the purchasing power of
wages (because infl.ation has practically swallowed up the recent suc-
cessive rounds of iiicreases irr. nominal wage levels, pensions, and all
the other welfare mechanisms).
"I thinl. it extremely unlikely," we were told by Yann de 1~Ecotais,
co-publisher_ of L'EXPRESS, "that the Mauroy government can or even
knows how to hold out against the blandishments of protectionism, at
least in certain sectors. Frankly, I am persuaded that this is the
very road they will choose in their Ffforts to protect the franc
which is plummeting vis-a-vis both the dollar and the German mark,
which is the currency of our most important trading partner and to
kePp at least a few of their campaign pledges. First among those is
the promise to provide jobs and to build up the domestic demand which
constitutes the core element in the government's economic strategy."
It is clear that, insofar as it assigns top priority among all the
var.iables to jobs, this strategy cannot much less in the present.
recessionary slump in international trade help but turn.to some
reliance on a little protectionism. It will do so in the understand-
able conviction that counting on inereased levels of plant capacity
utilization and the higher profit return stemming f rom an "exclusive"
access to the domestic i;iarket business and industry will be persua-
ded to make those fixed investments upon which, in turn, depends the
gradual recovery from unemployment, as do more adequate growth rates.
This is a view that is shared, albeit with varying degrees of inten-
sity, by organized labor and by the employers: labor supports it
because it anticipates the imminent creation of new jobs and, in the
long run, higher wages; business and industry l~.ke it because it
promises new market outlets and a more thoroughgoing policy of sub-
sidies and government contracts.
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_ "We, " said Henri Krasucki, deputary secretary-general of the communist
CGT, "do not favor any autarchic and protectionist policy. But we do
believe that it is indispensable to adopt measures which will enable
us to control and limit the excessive imports which are hurting French
industries and thereby threatening our jobs. And it was with this
view in mind that, in a document we sent to President Mitterand, we
asked him to take measures that would block the transfer abroad of
products and technolugies that could be made and developed in France.
I know that it would be absurd to consider any return to protectionism:
but I am just ~s sure that the time has come to put the brakes on the
invasion of our market by German, Italian, or Belgian companies that
sell us products made in their factories in such cheap-labor countries
as Hong Kong or Singapore
fiow, we asked, does the "wine war" fit into all this? Krasucki chose
to duck that question, and shifted the discussion over to the EEC ~ s.
- agricultural policy . "It is precisely to prevent the occurrence of
crises like the wine war t~iat w�e are pushing for a review of Community
farm policy. It is a system which, thus far, has been confined essen-
_ tially to supporting producers' price levels and has turned out to be
_ extr~emely expensive : what it boils down to is that the taxpayers are
paying for the dubious privilege, as consumers, of paying even higher
prices for their groceries. We are convinced that there must be far-
reaching reform in the Community's agri.culture policy which has con-
tributed to inflation and which, furthermore, has widened i;he gap be-
tweenfood producers in the various EEC countries and, within indivi-
dual national agricultural communities, between big farms and little
ones. It is a policy that has created all the premises for situations
which witness, for that matter, t;he "wine war" --_will eventually
plunge us into very touchy economico-social conflict amoiig bhe .poorest
farmers in the EEC. It is time for them to realize up there in Brus-
sels that the mass of producers in no wa.y coincides with the mass of
production, and that it is therefore socially unacceptable to go on
pouring ever more massive sums into a mechanism which, while it satis-
fies the former, has only very modest impact indeed on the latter."
Understandably less forthright is the opposition from the business
community which is refraining from any official embrace of the pro-
tectionist temptations of the socialist government; it dozs not.hes-
itate, however, to underscore the negative impact on industry of the
steadily growing p.resence of foreign products on the French market.
"Over the past 5 years, " we were told by Michel Develle, deputy direc-
tor of Paribas' studies office, "French industry has lost a major
share of the domestic market. Only over the past 12 months, the mean
rate of market penetration by imports has risen by 1 percentage point
to reach 30 percent, with peaks of 33 percent for means of transport
and o� 48 percent for orfice equipment. During 1979 and 1980, foreign
producers cornered 51 percent of the major appliance and furnishings
- market, as compared to their 43-percent ahare in 1978� There is no
grounds for astonishment, therefore, if some sectors of the economy
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share with the government the view that we must have more effective
control over imports, to make sure that the terms of the trade agree-
ments France has entered into with the Third-World bloc and the regula-
- tian~. adopted by the EEC are respected to the letter. More specifi-
cally, so that we can cope with the increasingly frequent phenomenon
of products sold to us, for example, bearing "Made Germany" labels,
but which are in fact made in Asia or in South America.'~
[ 6 oct 81 p 5]
[ Text ] "Mitterand' s not the one who' s sabotaging the EEC, "
says economist Jacques Attali. ~
PARIS: Special adviser to President Mitterand, economist Jacques
Attali is only 38, yet he is the Grey Eminence of the Elisee. Pro-
fessor of ecanomic sciences at the prestigious Paris Polytechnic School,
and a successful author among the most eclectic of his generation
(he has written, among other works, such disparate books as "Three
- Worlds," "The Word and the Tool," "Rumors," and "The Cannibal Order,"
the latter two dealing with the political economy of music and medicine,
respectively). Attali is a theoretician of the classi~al socialist
school. And our talk with him concludes this inquiry into the change
of course under the new leftist government, which it is determined to
stamp on the economic and social structures of France.
- [Question] A careful assessment of the records of experience accumu-
lated in Italy and Great Britain lead to the conclusion that nationali-
zation is very bad business for western-style economic systems. Their
management consistently shows losses, and hence requires massive trans-
fusions of government funds, and delivers no dividends worth mentioning,
either in industrial development or in generating new jobs. This ex-
plains why eminent socialist economists are pushing now for returning
broad reach?s ~f i=ndustry now under State control such as steel and
chemicals to the private sector. What makes you think that nation-
- alization in France will work wonders which it has f ailed to produce
elsewhere?
[Answer~ Nationalizations are a key instrument in employment policy.
In the present recession phase, we must seek the solution to the cri-
sis in getting investment funds flowing again into the cutting-edge
or hi-tech sectors. And if it is to 1ast, that flow of investment
money wi11 be posited on the belief that industry will have access to
adequate financial resources, that it will operate in a context of eco-
nomic stability, and that it will have solid prospects for growth. All
this, however, does not f it with the logic af the industrial capitalist
system, essentially because, rather than selecting specific territorial
turfs, the big industrial conglomerates tend to look for growth through
policies rooted in the multinationalization of their productive struc-
tures. I am convinced that some day the "French model" of nationaliza-
tions will be copied by other western countries, including those that
are already highly efficient. For that matter, Japanese capitalism is
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very similar to what we are planning to do in France at least to
the extent that there is in Japan a high level of convergence between
corporate strategy and that of the State. Why do I have such faith in
our model? Because and this is extremely important we are not
nationalizing failing companies so as to socialize their losses: on
the contrary, we are nationalizing the dynamic and efficient firms so
as to accentuate their energy and their competitive stance and, by so
doing, to put them in a position to make a greater contribution to the
- economic and social reforms to which the nation~s overall development
is subordinate.
[Question~ The cost of all these reforms is going to show up, though,
and very heavily, in the national budget: the upshot of that will be,
predictably, swift expansion in the money supply at home in response
to the marked growth in the national debt, and will finally add fuel
to the already roaring flames of inflation. How do you think i.t will
be possible to reconcile the goals of providing.more jobs and rais-
ing demand with the equally fundamental goals of economic stability?
[Answer] For fiscal 1982 we have predicted a budget deficit of 95 bil-
lion francs. This is not in the least excessive: it represents a
scant 2 percent af the French GIP. That leaves us, then., well-below
the defi~i:t-to-GIP ratio of most of the other western industrial na-
tions, which averages around 5 percent. I do not believe we are ask-
ing the French economy to make in~olerable financial efforts. The
nationalizations themselves will involve very limited overall costs,
in terms of both revenues and budgeted spending. As for inflation, I
wi11 tell you that I do not share at all the thinking that holds a
budget deficit to be inflationary per se. Take, for instance, the case
of Japan and Austria: here you have two countries which have both
managed to run substantial budget deficits and to keep inflation at
- very moderate levels. On the other hand, though, we have the example
of Great Britain, i�rhere they hatire a substantial budget deficit coupled
with runaway inf lation. Therefore we must not do as traditional eco-
nomic theor�y would have us do, and blame budget deficits for automatic
effects which they do not always produce. Inflation is the result of
a combined lack of competitiveness and of social consensus: and a bud-
get deficit, properly handled, can work to restore both.
[Question] Getting industrial production rolling and boosting employ-
ment levels means an adequate flow of long-term investrnent money, and
hence relatively low interest rates: protecting the exchange value of
the franc abroad and its purchasing power at home means, on the con-
trary, f airly high interest rates. How do you think you can get around
the obvious incompatibility of these two economic requirements?
[Answer~ You are perfectly ri~ht. And it is these two considerations
which have repeatedly spurred the French government in every mnterna-
tional forum to underscore the heavy negative impact of the restric-
tive monetary policy of the United States on the economies of the other
western nations. President Mitt erand, for that matter, has instructed
Economy Minister Delors to do whatever must be done so that, on the
European level, we start looking for formulas that will let us, together,
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take steps to stabilize interest rates and currency exchange rates and
thus to neutralize, insofar as possible, the impact at once infla- .
tionary and recessionary of American monetary policy on the econo-
mies and recovery programs of all our countries. As for France, we
have managed to make sure that our businesses are able, through machin-
ery for selective intervention, to find the financing they need for
their own investments at lower interest rates than they can find on
the market right now.
[Question~ Will it be possible, in your view, to reconcile the priori-
ties of France's economic pol~cy, which center first on relieving unem-
ployment, with those of Federal Germany~s policy, whose prime target
is inf lation?
[Answer] I am ~onvinced that France and Germany but of course this
applies to the rest of the Western world as well ought to deal on
a priority basis with the problem of unemployment. This is the key
to the solution of the problems of recession and inflation. As I said
earlier, inflation is essentially a matter of competitiveness and of
productivity. Hence there is no inconsistency between the economic
policy of France, of Germany, of Italy and that of the other industrial
powers, provided that the goal we all set ourselves is that of boosting~
the competitive stance of our systems. And i fail to see any risk what-
soever of any significant divergence in.the relative value of our several
currencies.
COPYRIGHT: ,1981 Editrice Il Sole-24 Ore s.r.l.
6182
CSO: 3104/ZS
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rvic vrr~a,ir?~ wc uivi.t
ECONOMICS I TAI'Y
AGNELLI INTERVIEW ON EN1S, FIAT-IRI ACCORD, CONTRACTS
Turin LA STANIPA in Italian 9 Oct 81 pp 1-2
[Interview with ~iovanni Agnelli by Marion Pirani, Turin, date not given]
[Text] Exclusive interview with president of FIAT. Agnelli gives
FIAT's vrescription for keeping Italy an industrial power.
Italy is in danger not only of dropping out of the EMS, but
~ of shattering it. We don't need brokers: we do need unit-
lateral government initiative. The FIAT-YRI a~reements will
not force us to change course. Skewed markets led to the
unde�rstanding with Alfa Romeo. Firing the 61 workers for in-
plant violence was a plain duty, whereas laying off 23,000 is
a painful necessity.
lU'tZl~i~ In good times and bad, whatever happens to FIAT is an index to the
national trend in the economy.and in our society. These days the news coming
out of Via Marconi is a mixed bag. We hear that anather 80,000 FIAT employees
_ axe beir~ put on compensated furlough, that there has been a deal with IRI in
the automobile, steel, and elec�tronics sectors, that updated~market forecasts
reflect the devaluation of the lira, that the deadline Por contract renewal with
the metalworkers is nearing. Giovanni Agnelli consented to answer our questions
on these and other matters.
[Questionl One newspaper report says that the woes besetting FIAT, with the new ~
request for income supplements for laid-off ~rorkers, has reached its most peri-
lous point yet, while other observers claim to see a way out, along the lines of
the way it has b~en handled in the United States, where Ford, Chrysler, and Gen-
eral R~otors have moved back into the black. Is this an opinion you would share?
[Answer] Look: what we are facing here is not ~ust a crisis in one automotive
company, but one tnat affects the entire world market. General Motors, Ford,
and Chrysler have undergone drastic restructuring, cutting back their payrolls
by nearly half from the previous million-man level to 600,000 today. And
for these people there is no longEr any chance of getting their jobs back. FIAT
has faced the situation squarely, on the one hand cutting back on production, mak-
ing use of such devices as the compensated furlough fund which, although very
expensive indeed, still work as social shock-absorbers and do not give rise to
_ major trauma; on the other hand, we have demonstrated our great vitality, mov-
ing aggressively into the markets with new models and winning the top spot in
sales in Europe. Unfortunately, the crisis looke as if it will hit bottom in
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1982, when we may no longer be able to count on the extraordinasily high level
of the domestic market (where we sell 60 percent of our output) that has marked
the last 2 years. We are, in other words, bracing ourselves for a period of
tightening, perhaps as drastic as 10 percent.
[Questionl Is it this outlook that pushed you to seek the agreement with IRI,
_ in spite of the danger of tarnishing the private-enterprise image you have a1-
ways boasted, and condescending to play footsie with the bankrupt sectors kept
~.live by transfusions from the public funds?
[Answerl The principles of private enterprise are still the bedrock of our opera-
tions. For that matter, why should we abandon them when even the top spokesman
for a eocialist government, like France's minister for industry, DL. Dreyfus, has
been making a point specifically to make nationalization more acceptable
of emphasizing that all industries taken over by the State will be run accord-
- ing to sound private enterprise criteria? On the other hand, it is very seriaus
indeed when private entrepreneurs start behaving like government managers. And
in this country we have altogether too many examples of that sort of thing.
[Question~ If that is the case, why did you strike a deal with a debt-laden
outfit like Alfa Romeo?
[Answer] Here in Italy, one of the two protagonists in the automotive sector
is, by its very nature, free of the pitiless laws that govern the marke~. Tak-
- ing it as a given that it will perforce survive, come what may in the way of
the financial losses and market distortions it involves, we had no option but to
seek the best solution for putting some order into the iuture, at least, and for
getting the maximum yield for the minimum investment.
[Questionl tiYhat does that mean, in practical terms?
LAnswerl That FIAT, for instance, can sell Alfa its chassis, and that Alfa can
- move up the date for unveiling its new models. Instead of scrambling axound
looking for endowment funds, we can, by joining forces, put together an automo-
tive industry policy and implement it.
[~;iiestion] But isn't this the road to a joint application for financial back-
ing from the State?
(Answer] All we would like to see is State aid, particularly in connection with
tehcnological research, brought into line with what our foreign competitors get
irom their governments. Thus far, we haven't got a lira.
(Questionl To wind up this point; doesn't it seem to you, in any case, that
the IRI agreement marks an a11-time low for a company like FIAT, which thus far
has vaunted its lofty multinational ambitions? Don't you perceive in this turn-
about the dread possibility of a forced retreat into prot~ctionism on the domes-
tic market?
~Answerl Back in the Sixties, we were the first to offer France's Citroen a mer-
ger agreement, but even then we discovered that we were dealing with a country
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rv~~ V~'P~L.~HL IJJL' VIVLI
fax more chauvinistic than we had ever expected. Furthermore, even in the other
EEC countries, there have been only in-country mergers. Y~e, on the other hand,
with our Inveco,and FIAT-Al1is deals, and with the plan for the FIAT-Peugeot en-
gin, have striven to block this tendency wherever we could. As for the component
sector, we axe continuing to move forward along that road and the agreement with
Alfa in no way conflicts with thr~t policy. We must not, though, overlook the
protectionist peril, and, while right now the French seem to be leaning in that
direction, We also know full well that the temptation to follow bad examples
_ can grow very strong indeed in a country with an economy as fragile as ours.
And I say this to you with deep anxiety.
[Question] This latest devaluation of the lira, though, will be to FIAT's advan-
tage. Do you have some conception, even now, of what it will mean?
~Answer] Our experts reckon that it will boost inflation by one or 2 points.
From the purely commercial point of view it is clear that our competitive stance
vis-a-vis German.y will be improved over some months. But this is now, as it has
been in the past, merely a stopgap remedy which does not go to the root of the
ailment. We have simply g~t to realize that sooner or later the time will come
when that machinery will break down, never to run again.
[~uestion] FIAT was one of the big powers in the Italian economy most in favor
of our joining the European NIonetary System. Do you still feel that way?
[Answer] When we at FIAT came out in favor of Italy's joining the EBl[S we were
concerned with only one thing: keening our country wi.thin the context of the
more advanced European powers. To do this, though, we needed a iittle time
a year or so no more for Italian.s to get into step with the methods of
economic management in common use among industrial. nations. In other words, if
Italy was to be part of the EBQS, it would have to draw rein and deal resolutely
with the main bottlenecks in its own system of economic a social relations. Un-
fortunately we must admit that Italy has not managed to keep pace; we have lacked
the courage or perhaps the ability t;o swallow the proper medicine in time. Now,
in fact, just as a man who can.not keep up the cadence drops out of the pl~toon, ~
so our country is in danger not only oP dropping out of the E~S, but of shat-
tering it. The consequences may be grave indeed to our economy and to our posi-
tion in the world. ~
- [~uaetion_] Devaluation of' the lira makes the government's commitment to hold
dou~n the inflation rate even more binding. Juet what odds would you give on
Spadolini's success?
[Answer] His initiative must get all~ou~r support from every side. But we can-
not longer cling to the illusion that good offices and negotiations between in-
dustry and labor can get us anywhere. We need unilaterfsl action by the govern-
ment. 2`he prime minister's resolve is unquosti~nable, and his commi.tment is
total. It remains to be seen whether or not he will get the necessary backing
from the political majority.
[Question) Agreement with the unions on labor costs would seem out of the ques-
tion, given the way things stand now. Does your open quarrel with the top peo-
ple in Confindustria stem from the fact that you think it is behaving too rig-
idly, or not demonstrating enough flexibility?
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[Answer] If you ask me to judge the behavior of the parties involved, this whole
- negotiation is totally useless. LYe are looking here at a no-exi.t situation~
unless, of course, the government steps in and directly takes the initiative.
[Question] Starting with the firing of the 61 FIAT empl.oyees charged with vio-
lence in the plant, and right up to the sensational squabble over putting 23~000
workers on compensated furlough, FIAT seems to have been ta.king a harder line
tha.n has been its wont in the past. Are you planning to stick to this attitude
when you go to the table for renewal of the metalworkers' contract?
[Answer] Firing those 61 workers was something we owed to FIAT workers: we had
- to make life in the plant bearable. Furloughing those 23,000 people, though, was
a painful necessity, dictated by the behavior of the market. The workers clearly
understood this, since they are keenly aware of the real problems hanging over
the company's future. As for the contract negotiations, I have only this to say:
how can ~ve possibly believe we are dealing with it, when we cannot manage to undo
the fundamental tangles that, willy-nilly, govern our entire productiv2 system?
Take one example: Italy is the only country where, in 10 years, real wages have
~ risen steadily while compensational recognition of vocational skills has steadily
declined? We cannot go on like this, and I mean we cannot go on any longer. We
must make a break in the very next round of contract negotiations.
[question] The unions today are pursuing a tactic of militancy in the plant
which is less extreme than in years past. In your view, does this attitude open
up new vistas for the Red Brigades (BR), or will it help to isolate the terror-
ists? .
[Answer] I am certain that a less extremist attitude will also hel;~ to set up a
vacuw:i around terrorists in the p]..atits.
[Question) In recent articles and speeches some of the top people in Confindus-
tria, ranging all the way from Carli to De Benedetti, have hinted at the ide&
that the communists must be taken into the majoritv if wt~ are to achieve the so-
cial consensus indispensarle for rendering the national governable again. There
was a time when there was an ongoing albeit long-distr~nce dialogue between
you and such communists as Giorgio AmPndola. Do you think it would be possible
to reopen that dialogue with Berlinguer today7 ~
[Answer] There are two recipes for governing; one is global, or totalitarian,
and the other is that of parliamentaxy democracies, in which the criterion is
the majority. I still believe in the latter, and I ttiink that the communists can
.form a goverruaent of their own only if and when they get a majority of the votes.
[Questionj Do you too subscribe to the opinion that our economic troubles stem
primarily at least rigk~t now from Reagan's monetaxy policy?
(Answer] The habit of continually complaining abou_t the Americans used to be
confined to the underdeveloped nations of Latin America, and I am confident that
it vri11 never take root here. Of course, nobody who who preaches policies of
- d.iscipline and rigor is going to please a congregation used to letting itself be
swindled. On the other hand, if you want to protect and improve your country's
_ prosperity you cannot escape the consequences of a fight against inflation. A].1
.
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60 million Italians must be brought to the awareness that, of the 4 billion 4G0
million people on this earth,they live in the tiny enclave of those who enjoy
the benefits of an industrial society (a mere 17.5 percent, according to OECD
figures). Well, now: do we want to compromise this happy state of affairs out
of sheer inability to discipline ourselves for a couple of years7 Do we want to
blind ourselves to the fact that it would not take very much, ~iven the present
international situation that impinges on us in so many ways, to plunge ourselves~
down among the number of countries where depression is eternal, and where pros-
perity and freedom are still in the realm.of dreams?
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editrice LA STANIFA S.p.A.
61.82 ~
C S0: 310~+/22 END
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