JPRS ID: 10121 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070036-1
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 36
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ ~ 0121
17 November 19~ 1
- Sub-Saharan ~frica Re o~t
p
FOUO No. 749
~~IS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVECE
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NOTE
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JPRS i~/10121
17 November 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AF~ICA REPORT
FOUO No. 749
CGNTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
West's Involvement ia Soviets' Ad�~antage in A~rica
- (Willi.am Gutteridge; NEW AFRY�'.AN, Oct 81) 1
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Kolingba, Dacko Believed To Have Plotted Transfer of Pawer
(Alan Rake; NEGI AFRICAt?, Oct.81) 3
~ LIBE RIA
; Executed Syen Linked With Self-Exiled Tipoteh
i (Nazia Humasi; NEW AFRIGAN, Oct 81) ..........................e... 7
' NAMIBIA
' SWAPO Seen Developing Military, Political 'Muacle'
_ (P?ter Kat~avivi; NEW AFRICAN, Oct 81j 9
SENEGAL
Alleged Involvement of PD6 With Libya Posi~g Problem for Regime
(Sennen Andrlamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21 Oct S1) 11
Wade's Attendance at Libyan Congresa
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 21 OcC 81) 15
Briefs
Economy Causing Concern 16
SOUTH AFRICA
A1liailce Witi~ United States Called Unholy
(Mark August; NEW AFRICAN, Oct 81) 17
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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' ANC Guerrilla.s Said To Be Undeterred by Torture, Death
(Suzanne Cronji; NEW AFRICAN, Oct 81) 23
- Police Raids on Squatters Expected To Prove Counterproductiv~:.
(Bob Hitchcock; NEW AFRICAN, Oct 81) 25
- b -
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: INTER AFRICAN AFFAIRS
WEST'S INVOLVEMENT IS SOVIETS~ ADVANTA,GE IN AFRICA
London NEW AFRZCAI~1 in English No 169 Oct 81 p 39
LArticle by William Gutteridge: "Russia in Africa: The West's Reply"~
~Text~
THERE ARE SOME politicians bath in neceesarily prove laeting friends to tHeir
the West and in Africa who regard the patrons or become sound ideological
'Soviet Union as inexorably committed to allies, even temporarily. On the face of it,
a grand design of global domination there is no reaeon why Oliver Tambo of
within some unapecified time acale. the ANC or Sam Nujoma of SWAPO
There are othera, whoae number has been should not be just as realistic as those
progreseively reduced by Hungary, who from time to time supply their
Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, who weapons. Where elae should they turn for
believe the USSR to be eseentially benign military ee opposed to economic asais-
and altruistic. ~ tance?
Both extremes eeem to exeggerate the It is, however, their well-documented
importance of ideology and neglect old- link with Moscow which haa enabled the
fashioned national aelf-interest. The best government of South Africa continually
explanation of Soviet policy, especially in to ascribe the Republic's troubles almoet
regions like Africa dietant from the exclusively to the Soviet threat. This
heartland, liea in the determination of assumption led first to the generic label-
Moacow's leaderehip Lo eneure national ling of all opponents white and black, of
; survival on the beat terms poesible. the regime as "Communist". Prime .
+ The means often ruthlessly employed Minieter Botha in a recent election
to this end inevitably include, in the epeech lumped together "Communism,
historical context of Russia's develop- Marxism and radicalism" and claimed
ment, the eetabliahment of friendly that by their criticisms-tlie V~~iite oppoei-
regimes of a Marxist-Leniniat character tion newspapers w+ere doing the Soviet
of which one object may be the control of Union'e work for her.
sources of raw materials partly to be able The failure to distinguish between
if neceasary to deny them to a potentiel African Socialiem, Marxism or Black
enemy. nationalism on the one hand and a cloae
dedication to Moscow's cause on the other
Help likely has also effeciiaely dietorted judgments
' in South Africa on R,obert Mugabe's
Aaeiatance to arme~ etruggles f.or lib- accesaion to power in Zimbabwe, in spite
eration is also likely, provided that a of hie patently cautious approach to the
satisfactory vutcome in terms of Soviet Soviet relationship.
self-interest ie reasonably predictable. By fOC11881i1g on and ueing as a
An important question is whether ecapegoat the extet~nat threat, the Pre-
- those who ac~ept Soviet military aesis- toria Govemment has not only distorted
tance to achieve their nationalist enda its policie6, internal and external, but
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become hung on its own rhetoric and put in};areat8 prevailed and expanded in
obstaclea in the way of any serious Aigeris, �even during the revolutionary
reform. period.
"Communists did not invent discrimi- Zintbabwe in eome waya continues, in
nation, they merely capitaliaed on it," Sir spite of an extraordinary Britieh reluc-
_ David Scott, formerly Britieh ambas- really generously to support the
sador to South Africa, wrote recently. By new state, to exemplify the balance. The
doing eo he highlighted Pretorie's real gritish at least are right not to make a
problem - how to perauade white South major iesue, as the Amei~:ane ~hould if
Africans that the problems stemming they could, of North Korean military
from apartheid are mainly of their own training foa a Zimbabwean army con-
creation. t~ngent.
It ia one thing for Afrikaner South
A&ica to think in terms of radical IZLCOmpreheas3ble
change. It is quite another to forget the
paet and think of "peaceful ccexiatence" Robert Mugabe eymbolisea the priority
with neighbours like Zimbabwe, Angola of national development over ideological
and Mozambique. The Republic's crose- coneiderations and, in the circumstances,
border rgids are progressively forcing at the pressures againat Zimbabwean
least the latter two back into the arma of labour working in South Africa are
Soviet oriented friends and eo increasing incomprehensible. Pretoria, especially in
the ~irect military risk to SouLh Africa. view of the proclaimed concept of a"con-
It is surprieing that the old lesaon of ~llation of atates", seems to be acting
Vietnam and many other places neede to 8g~nst ite own self-intereat, of which
be learnt again - that in the end, faced presumably a main instrument ie
with passionate nationaliem, Marxiet- ~notnic interdependence.
tinged or not, there is no lastin~ military ~e Soviet Union has no in-built
victory, advantage in ite dealing with African
The fact is that stability in Southern ~~8 other than the West's involvement
= Africa and other parts of the continent ie with South Africa. It has the power and
not in the end a matter of the imposition inclination to aeaist in liberation strug-
of authority by alien powera; whether of gles, it has not the capacity to coneolidate
East or West. An admittedly uneasy ~e preeumably coneequent peace. Afri-
balance of forces ia only going to emerge can leadere, eapecially in the immediate
on the basis of the emerger?ce of politi- post-independence atage, naed invest-
cally independent African statea en~joy- ~ent and the capacity to trgde.
ing the right to develop and to trade on a Historically, in spite of the apparent
reasonably equitable baeie. circumstances, in particular the inertia
The lessona of Suviet involvement in ~
Africa and of American intervention of South Africa s white population
elsewhere are that permanent towardaradicalreform,theinitiativelies
suzerainty, is a rare achievement. Over ~th Weatern countries who could if they
tried now emerge as the championa of
20 years, from Guinea via Angola, independent Africa:
Mozambique, Somalia and Et~iopia, the The weakness is in the continued
_ Soviet Union has suffer.ed more aetbacka Weetern response to imagined, or at least
than succesaes. Even where communiet unproven, Soviet plans and motivation
political influence for the time being rather than the development of a con-
- remains, economic links with the West structive approach to the problems of
have generally continued. Gulf oil qfrican statea based on mutual economic
remaina active in Angola and other US intereet~
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Ltd
CSO: 4700/217
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
KOLINGBA, DACKO BELIEVED TO HAVE PLOTTED TRANSFER OF POWER
London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169, Oct 81 pp 50, 51
[Article by Alan Rake]
[Text]
DAVID DACKO wae the firet Preaident following a bomb exploeion i~i a Bangui
when h:s country at the very heart of the cineraa earlier in the month in which
- African continent became independent in three people were killed and 38 wounded.
_ August 1960. He was to~pled from power Dacko declared a etat,e of emergency
the first time when hie Chief of Staf~'and and banned the oppoeition parties and
cloae relative Jean Sedel Bokasea seized Koliagba~ warned looters and "those
power in the St. ~ylvester's Day coup on building barricadee" of the dire consequ-
January 1, 1966. eaces. He prnmoted many loyal off'icera
Last month the tired, reluctant ruler, aad thoroughly re-organised the 2,000-
suffering from high blood presaure and atrong army. But he streaeed that the
totally diailluaioned with trying to run military rnuld not save the country and
his impoverished country., was persuaded whst wae needed was new political lead-
' hy hie army chief to abandon power, erehip.
' bloodlessly. 3aid Kolingba in his first interview: "I
have tried to iacreaee the awareness of
T~~~~ the Central Af~ican people, but I kept
, coming up againet the political partiee.
On the morning ofTueaday 3epteraber They and the governmenE xv.ere like two
_ 1, head of the army, Generel Andr~ punch-drunk boxere. 9omeone had to
Kolingba announced that he had taken ~top them; the public was waiting. In the
over. A 23-member committee of "milit� public interest I intervened."
ary recovery," all soldiera was aeL up. The He said that what was needed was
civilian conetitution was suepended and diacipline and a period that would "leave
an entirely military Cabinet wae formed. our hands free to re-organise the country
Early reporta eaid that General and ley ~he foundationa for ita economic
Kolingba would organiee electione recovery~'. He did not know how long the .
within a few weeke to return a new military would have to etay in power.
civilian government to power. Since
then, however, it has become clear that ~eS~@~'~ IIe@~~
the new man intends to stay in power
until his country is an the way to recov- Commenting on hia all-military
ery. He said recently: "Let the politiciane Cabinet, he said: "Perhaps not all the
stay in their cornere. When order is minieters are qualified, but they are
restored I will see what hae to be done to leadera and we have the technici~ns
pasa power back to them." atready. Above all w~ ~eed leaders and
Andre Kolingba has only recently when everything ie in order the rest will
emerged into the limelight. Dacko had follow."
promoted him head of the army in July,
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Meanwhile, he hea appealed to the againat Dacko and loat the presidential
J French Government to pay the salaries of elections in M~*ch.
the civil servanta for at least a year. He Dacko spent his time in political man-
added: "We would like to keep the ceuvres fighting for survival. He dismis-
privileged relations we have always had sed hia Deputy Premier and Vice-
with France, and it would be ungrateful Preaident and re-shuffled his Cabinet
of us to wish anything else, given the many times.
sentimental and historical links that He clashed with the unions and stu-
unite us." dents and though he tried to maintain a
Significantly, the French were not semblance of democracy he occasionally
obviously involved in last month's Iapsed into Bokassa-style represaion. He
putsc~t..Their garrisons, totaNing 1,600 w,~ ~ompromised because he depended
troops near the capital and at Bouar in on too many Bokassa men in the top and
the r,orth-west of the country, remained middle ranke of his government and
in their barracks. The Mitterrand Gov- could not govern without them.
ernment does not want to be accused of iowazde the end he showed how tired
intervening in African affairs in the style hA wes of the political treadmill. "It
of his predecessor, Giscard d'Estaing, cannot go on like this," he once said in an
who actually toppled Bokussa in "Opera- unguarded moment to a journalist. He
tion Barracuda" in September 1979. gave the impreaeion of a man atthe end of
But though the French Minister for his tether, unable to achieve ,political
Co-operation and Development Jean stability or economic progress.
Pierre Cot has stated that "France had no And each month he had to face the
business to intervene in an entirely persiatent humiliation of begging hia
int~rnal problem", his government was French mentors for euff'icient money to
relieved to see Dacko go. pay the civil servant8. When last month
A new French ambassador presented his tim8 came to go and take up reaidence
his credentials to Dacko only 24 hours again at his coffee plantation in
before he was ousted. France had been Mokinda, he was a man relieved of a
prooping up the crumbling edifice since great burden.
Dacko came to power two years ago. But will ~.ndre Kolingba be able to do
- any better?
Hnqe eleScit Though the French took no overt part
in actually carrying out the coup - their
The econorny has been a disaster. The troops stayed in barracks throughout -
balance of payments and government evidenr.e is now emerging which shows
budgets were in huge deficit and heavily that the ouating of Dacko was done with
dependent on French subvention. The t:~eir connivance. Indeed it seems likely
principal exports of cotton, coffee and that Decko and Kolingba mutually
timber collapaed. At the same time, agreed to a peaceful tranafer of power,
diamonds were being smuggled to such French disillueion with Dacko eet in
an extent that actual production or ahortly after he returned to power. But it
export E3gures are almoet amposaible to wae not until the Giecard Government
assess. was replaced by that of President Mitter-
Bokassa bankrupted the country with rand in May that Dacko's performance
extravagance and mismangement. His was re-appraised.
coronation as Emperor cost f 14-million
in a country where the average income Ciaema blast
per head at �?.50 per year is among the
lowest in Africa. But David Dacko was Inatead of progreeaing towarde democ-
able to do little to improve the situation, racy, Dacko had ueed the excuae of the
He had political trouble from the out- July cinema exploeion for a complete
set, being harassed by opposition partiea crackdown, banning the oppoeition par-
both inside and outside the country. It ties of Dr Abe] Goumba, leader of the
was the Oubangui Patriotic Front (FLO), Uubangui Patriotic Front (FPO) and the
led by Adolphe Idi Lala and supported by former Prime Miniater Ange Patasse who
ex-Minister Abel Goumba, that claimed ~ leade the Movement for the Liberation of
responsibility for the ~uly bombing. the Central African People (MLPC).
Inside the country opposition crystallised Patasee had an interesting record. He
around Ange Patasse, the man who st~od had been Bokassa'e Prime Minister in the
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mid-1970s. He resigned in 1978 aPter doing that he knew he was unprotected.
quarrelling with Bokasea and left the Even hie 100-strong preaidential guard
country to set up an opposition in Parie. was left behind at the palace.
He returned from exile in October 1978 Well-informed Paris eources go even
but was immediately detained. He further. They aay that Dacko's deposition
escaped, but was caught last November was indeed fixed mutually between him-
tyring to croes the Chad frontier. A year eelf and General Kolingba in advance.
later, Dacko released him from prison in Dacko had learnt that the French would
November 1980 becauee his health had not suppork him and wanted Kolingba to
deteriorated, but he recovered enough to take over eo he took the opportunity to go
stand against Dacko in the presidential peacefully. ~
- elections of March 1981, in which Lacko The F~ench newepaper Lib~r+ation
scraped home with just over 50 per cent of reported that a few daya before the coup
the votes in an election wher~ there were the President of Gsbon, Omar Bongo, had
allegations of coneiderable electoral telephoned Pteaident Mitterrand to tell
malpracti~e. He then left to live in Paris. him that he had been in convereation
The ban on Patasae and Dr Abel with one of Dacko'e eons who had told him
Goumba was later lifted, but neither that hia father plaaned to retire. Bongo
leader was able to play a proper part as a had earlier been preseing Dacko, at the
constitutional opponent as Dacko wes instigation of Paris, to puah for more
bitterly auapicioua of them both. democsacy.
_ Dacko tried to preeerve hia poeition by Thougk~ Dac:~o had lifted the atate of
putting his faith entirely in the army. He emergency and had lifted the ltan on
promoted Kolingba Chief-of-Staff and oppoeition parties, this actually sdded to
allowed him to reward hia subordinate's his feeling af ineecurity end made him
- with siaeable promotions and more pay. even leea inclined to continu~e the unend-
Kolingba was already close to the French ing etruQgle with hie political opponents.
and soon demonstrated that he was a , b1aIILQ
typical product of French military train- did L~acko and Kolingba plot the
ing - tough, disciplined and sure that a
clean sweep by the army could purify the tranafer of power between them? All the
nation. He has total diedain for all politi- evideace pnints to thia direction. Since
cians. his aseumption of powsr, Kolingba has
goae through the ritual of condemning
~i OS@ COAtBCt corruption of the old regime -"the cock-
In August, Kolingba and the French fighting politicians" - and the general
were already in close contact. The French leck of discipline. But he hae not imprie-
Government sesured him that they oned hie opponents or purged the civil
would not interfere if he could take over. service.
_ quickly, with the minimum of bloodshed. Bangui radio reports daily on the
- It appears that the new French ambas- energy of the new ruler who is "working
sador, Pierre Couturier, knew all about tirelesa}y to cleanse the nation," There
Dacko's planned overthrow when he pre- are aleo verbal attacks on "corrupt offi-
sented his credentials 24 hours before~ cials who embezzle and steal" - but
There is also~evadence that Dacko con- nothing ia directed pergonally againet
nived at his own downfall. He was tired of Dacko, who has hie feet up at his farm.
- governing, of failing health, and felt that Meanwhile Kolingba and the new
he could not resist the challenge of Ange French ambaseador Couturier are as
patasae and the other rivals indefinitely. cloee ae peas in a pod. The French troops
He decided he should hand over peace- remain in their barracks and Bangui is
fully to his own soldiers - whom he had reported calm, with the police and cus-
promoted - rather than wait for a violent tome oPf'icials acting ae if nothing had
coup. If he went peacefully his safety and changed under the bright African sun-
domestic tranquility would be aseured, if ehine.
he hung on he could be killed or forced
into exile.
So after seeing the French ambassador, ~
and probably discussing the handover
planned for that same evening, he lePt for
his farr.z 60 milea away at Mokinda. In
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MAIN QPPOSITION LEADER
GftOUPS syl~�c~ .
Adolphe Idi Lala
PART'Y Dr Abel Goumba
Oubangui Liberat3on ~nnt (FLO) -
Oubanaui Patriotic Froat (FPO) An~e Patu~e
5sni Cole
Movement for the Liberation
of the Oentral A[rican People (MLPC) Note: Patei~e and Goumba came to~ether
Student Movement (ANECA) to form the Proviaional Political Commit~
Union Generale des'I~availleuri tee (CPPI in Parb recenUy, callinQ for
Centrafricaine (UGTC) Dacko'~ resi~aafion and tree elect[otu~
CUPYRIGHT: 1981 TC Magazines Limited
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LIBERIA
EXECUTED SYEN LINKED WITH SELF-EXILED TIPOTEH
- London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169 Oct 81 pp 17-18
[Article by Nana Humasi: "Liberia: The Drama Behind the Execution of Syen"~
rText~ ~
THE EXECUTION in August of Liberian - 5yen was an outspoken radical.
Deputy Head of SLate Me~jor-Generaf Cheapoo was considered to be the most
Wey Syen, charged with plotting a feared of the hardliners. And Tipoteh's
counter coup, pointed to tensions foned socialist economice did not please Master
by the People's Redercaptior~ Council Sergeant Samuel Dce.
(PRC) a~nce it came to power eome 17 Dr. Tipotel? resigned while on a mis-
months ago. The PRC is composed of a sion to the World Bank in the Ivory
military council and a civilian Cab2net n~" Coaet. His letter, which reached Mon-
all ahades of politics. This has comp1i- rovia while Syen was on trial said: "The
- cated the smooth running of government enemies of the revolution are using the
machinery. old but effective strategy of sowing the
"Wey Syen turned out to be on the seeds of suspicion in the council and
other side of almost every deciaion the Cabinet and (have) become stronger
Chairman would take," said John and stronger until key members of the
Morais, the Liberien information attache government hnve eliminated themselves .
at his country's London embassy. "Sy~n I have been working under great
would sometimes call preas conferences presaure and eevere riska."
to contradict decisions taken by the coun- The government replied charging the
cil and Cabinet." He referred to the former minister with betrayal of the
deputy head's bitter oppoaition to the Liberian people, and with deserting the.
council's decision to sever links with ~my into which he was, along with his
Libya and to ~lose that country's People'8 Cabinet colleagues, inducte~ last July as
Bureau in Monrovia. , a metjor.
Master Sergeant Doe said in the
~'18COV@Z'y ~I1eY~t8ble statement that the resignation had many
implications, ba.sic to which was
This kind of tension increased. Syen's Tipoteh's fear of coneequences ~ince his
faction tried hard to push his ideas to the name was principally linked with the
front. This became embarraseing. Syen Wey Syen abartive coup attempt. He
became a hindrance. Witt~ such rnistrust went on t: say that Dr. Tipoteh's own
between the two heads of any junta, the pereonality and eceialiet orientation
discovery of a coup plot wae almoet rendered him incapable of negotiating
inevitable. lt indicates profound divi� much needed loana with international
sions within the ranks of the PRC. financiere and donor countries.
The killing of Syen, the firing of Chea I)r. Tipoteh's letter, however, claims
Cheapoo, the resignation of Economic that during his office the meagre $5-
Planning Minister Ar Togbah Nah million found in the vaulta of the Bank of
Tipoteh, seem to diagnoee a houae clean- Liberia at the April 1980 takeover had
ing act against the very hardliners of the grown giving Liberia over $1-billion in
PRC.
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recurrent expenditure, and a four year
development plan to the tune of $600- tion t~e
vf
ory
Coast Goverament. The
million. country still harbours Adolphus Benedict
A report from Liberia descri~bed the Tolbert, stepeon-in-law of Preeident
elimination of Syen as the completion of Houphouet Boigny, and aon of Liberia's
the removal of all serious oppoaition to ex-Preaident William Tolbert, executed
Doe. But it also leavea the PRC without a during the Doe takeover.
backbone. So far, the council has tried "~e min~ater was smart t� smell a
and executed five of its original band of rat," said an obeerver fra~ the London
17. Tipoteh's reaignation constitutes a ~hool of Oriental and African Studies.
severe blow to Doe's atrength, an "~e eilencing of the Left within the PRC
observer commented. He was a key is clear to everybody. Such power atrug-
finance policymaker, he said. gles are inevitable in a grouping like the
Contrary to initial press reports from ~C. It was aimilar with Jerry Rawlings
~ Monrovia, Dr Tipoteh has not sought and Boakye Djan: Mengiatu Mariam and
asylum in the Ivory Coast. A senior Brigadier Teferi Bante, and Lieutenant
government off'icial in Abidjan told New Colonel Atnafu Abate.
African that under the free movement of 'rhe house-cleaning theory holde when
persons clauses in the ECOWAS agree- ~iewed within the conte:t of Liberia'e
ment, Dr Tipoteh was free to arrive at heavy dependence on American aid, and
and depart from the Ivory Coaet without the rieing anti-Leftist foreign policy gen-
_ any contact with the government. The erated the R,eagan Administration.
source who aeked W remain anonymoue, Cheetor Lra:i.er, the US Secretexy af
said Dr. Tipoteh has not sought asylum, State for African Affairs would be more
and did not need to if he wished to stay in at esee with the eocialist or Marxist
the coun Dr. Ti teh himaelf could elementa out of the PRC.
~J'� P� Liberia may reeiat a swing to the Left.
not be reached for comment in Abic~jan or But if the soldiers, whom noted aociolog-
Dakar. ist Ali Mazrui deecribes as the lumpen
militariat lay their handa on the goodiea
Asylnm reqaest of high living and political privilege, the
~ Liberiaa maeses might begin to think of a
A requeat for asylum from Tipoteh second revolution.
would have created an intriguing aitua- For it would mean that the Mesaiaha
had become the taskmasters�
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Ltd
CSO: 4700/218
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NAMIBIA
SWAPO SEEN DEVELOPING MLLITARY, POLITICAL 'MTTSCLE'
, London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169 Oct 81 pp 25-26
_ [Article by Peter Katjavivil
C Text l AT THE HEIGHT of the South African SWAPO's skills have also de~eloped at
invasion of Angola some 3,000 membere , diplomatic and international levels.
and eupporters of the South West Africa There ie no doubt that it was the com-
People's Organisation (SWAPO) bined pressurea of these political, milit-
gathered at a rally in Namibia's capital ary and diplomatic actions which forced
Windhcek. The sim: to demonstrate their the 9outh African regime to negotiate
political muecle in responee to South directly with SWAPO at the Geneva
Akican repreasion and to commemorate conference laet January.
- Namibia Day (August 26). It is alao the increaeing presaure from
The rally was broken up by South SWAPO and from the international
African policemen and immediately community which ia frustrating South
afterwarda aix leading SWAPO members Africa's attempts to install a client-
- including high-re~king nationaliata regime of ita choice in Namibia.
_ Emmanuel I~Tgatjizeko and Gabriel SWAPO'seuccess,itseems,haspuahed
Shikongo - were arrested and held with� South Africa into its recent deaperate
out charge. attacks on Angola simed, the South Afri-
The significance of euch an event cane claim, at cutting off S~NAPO's logis-
should not be miaeed. It wag 15 yeare ago, tic lines. This claim mekea South Africa
in 1966, that SWAPO embarked upo~ look etupid becauae SWAPO'e base is not
~ direct armed atru661e as a meana of in Angole but in Namibia whe~e its
~I winning independence and ending the euppnrt lies. SWAPO's miaitary wing,
' illegal South African occupation of the pL,eSI, remains intact and, it is evident,
- territory.. This followed yeara of pmteet its determination to continue the war of
demonstrationa and marchee, including liberation remains undimmed.
some of the moat vigoroue actiona ever $outh Africa itaelf is ii. no doubt about
eeen in the hietory of the Namibian the strength of support for SWAPO
etruggle. All these peaceful demonstra� within Namibia. Its response is to inten-
tiona were, however, then as now, sup� aify police and army victimisation of the
_ pressed violently by the South African civilian population, with the aim of
regime. intimidating people from supporting
As SWAPO marke the lb years of SWAPO. Also, it is stalling negotiationa
armed st~uggle in a eeries of evente in over implementation of the United
Namibia and throughout the world, we Nations plan for fair and free elections in
can look back and obee*ve the significant Namibia.
achievementa it hae made at home and Contrary to the optimistic pronounce-
abroad. During those yeare SWAPO hae menYs of the US Secretary of Stat~, A.lex-
grown in size and ecope, traneforming ander Haig, no real progreRS has been
-itself into a formidable movement with made on the negotiation front. The South
exteneive political and military net- p~.ican euppreeeion of peaceful demonat-
works,
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rationg and refueal to heed the aepira- I at least had that to fall back on. When
tions of the Namibian people, came to a we failed after years of waiting, I had no
fiead in the Windhoek shootings of ~wer to give to my people."
December 10, 1959. Eleven people were
killed by the South African army and wQll.~g~~
police as they demonstrated againat their
forced removal to the apartheid-atyle ~nt montha have seen a seriea of
townehip now known as Katutura, liter-
� continuous military encounters between
ally "no dwelling place of our own . the South African occupation forcea and
Those cold-blooded murders served as 3WAP0 fightera. The well-trained and
one of the many bitter lesaons learned in ~~p~ ~emllas are tying down more
the history of the Namibian struggle for 50,000 South African troops. The
freedom. They hardened the attitude of ri~ in the tempo of' guerrilla actions in
Namibians as far as the tactics of their Namibia, coupled with the recent highly
, struggle were concerned. So, too, will the su~~ful military operations of the
hearts of Africans in Angola be hardened ~'~can National Congresa of South
in resolve after this latest round of brutal Africa, has taken ita toll on the South
and unprovoked South African attacks. African raciat regime. The recent
Although Angola has borne and con- increases in defence spending (now
tinuea to bear, human and material loe- ~,8-billion) announced by South Afri-
ses, it continues to atand firm in support can Finance Miniater Senator Owen
of the liberation struggle in Namibia. Horwood confirme theae successea.
Equally significant wae the decision of A W~hington-based journaliet who
the Internntional Court of Juatice at The returned from an extended visit to
Hague on June 18, 1966. Thie sidestep- Namibia last month described the situa-
ped the issue of South African misrule in tion there as eimilar to that in Vietnam
Namibia and refused to pasa judgement, j~t ~fore the collapse of the regime in
thus adding i~jury to the already eore $aiqon.
hearts of Namibians. He was not only struck by the extent of
It was immediately after the World the 9outh African military presence
Court's indecision that SWAPO launched throughout the places he viaited, but also
the armed struBBle. The reactions of by the type of atoriea he piCked up in local
Namibians to the failure of the interna- b~, which were reminiscent of those
tional community to come ta their aid told by demoralised A?mericans and their
was expresaed during his trial�in Pretoria allies in Saigon.
in 1966 by Herman ya T~ivo, one of the If thete is a certainty in the confused
SWAPO leaders condemned to 20 years Namibia situation it is that if interna-
imprisonment on Robben Island: "While tional negotiationa over independence
the World Cour~t judgement was pending fail, the war will escalate to new
heighta~
COPYRIGHT : 1981 IC Ma.gazines Ltd
CSa: 4700/219
~
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SENEGAL
ALLEGED INVOLVEMENr OF PDS WITH LIBYA POSING PROBLEM FOR REGIME
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1085, 21 Oct 81 pp 18-21
~Article by Senaen Andriamirado: "Seaegal: Is Wade Guilty?"~
LTextl A police investigation has revealed that the PDS
- ~Senegalese Democratic Par.ty~ had a"Mi.litary Council" in
liaison with Libya. What is the truth in this?
"We brought weapons into Senegal from Mauritania and the Mauritanian Government
knew it. We crossed the river at Rosso (northeast) and handed over 40,000 CFA
' francs to the boatman. Once on the Senegalese shore at Saint Louis, we paid
150,000 CFA francs to the customs officer. On 5 August, we hid the weapons at
- Keur Massar (about 25 kflometers from Dakar) in the orchard of Wade (lawyer).
We went back to get them on 7 August so we could distribute them.throughout the
regions."
This, in essence, is the reported admission of Amadou Fall, a former Senegalese
' Army officer who was originally arrested (on 28 August) for fraud and who called
himself a member of a"Military Council" (secret) of the PDS and bodyguard of
Abdoulaye Wade, national secretary general of the PDS. Fall subsequently
recanted, stating that these "admissions" were reportedly forced out of him under
torture. However, given the seriousness of the revelations, the legal machinery
was already in motion. For the firet time in 20 years in Senegal, a government
appears to apply the law to the letter to fight an opposition party. Questioning
of PDS members has been conducted on a lasge scale and, according to the MinisCer
of Justice, a preliminary investigation "concerning an attack on the security of
the state" was opened on 20 September.
On 12 September, i.e. less than a week after the alleged importation of the
weapons, police appeared at Wade's secondary residence in Keu Massar. The villa
was thoroughly searched by the team headed by Lieutenant Diop. Abdoulaye Wade's
chauffeur and the property guard were arrested. Three workers who were picked up
on the premises were released the day after following an interrogat~on. Late in
the morning af Monday, 14 September, police appeared at the pDS headquarters on
7 Tiong Street which also houses Wade's office. The latter was at that time out
of Dakar. Ousma.ne Ngom, deputy national secretary for foreign relations, Talla
Fall and Sheikh Tidiane Sene,~the latter two mere employees in the office of the
politician-lawyer, reportedly attempted to prevent the search. They wEre i~edi-
ately taken away and were subsequently ch~rged wl.th resisting police authorities.
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On Tuesday, 15 September, the police thvught they had put their finger on the
"boss" of the famous PDS "Military Council," Allassane Sissoko, d~rector of the
ISEFI ~Senegalese Institute for Training and Information~ who reportedly, together
with a certain Ndiak Dieng, channelled weapons from Mauritania with Amadou ~all..
Alassane Sissoko's home as well as the ISEFI offices were searched during the
entire day of Thursday, 17 September.
Also on Thursday, PDS regional officers were also questioned; Papa M~oussa Faye
and Moussa Ba of the Saint Louis communal section; Boubacar Sall, chairman of
the Thies section; and especially Doudou Camara, deputy from Kolda and member of
the national secretariat whose parliamentary immunity was lifCed on 1 October
prior to his arrest. Doudou Camara also reportedly confessed. The list is not
complete and certain individua,ls who were released were once again questioned.
At the end of the first week of October, eight militants were charged, including
two former officers, Amadou Fall and Gana Mbengue, and the deputy, Ca.mara. The
- PDS leaders showed calmness. Abdoulaye Wade told us in Paris, "We have requested
our militants to be ready for the investigation and not to object to questioning."
He added, "The officers in charge of the investigation have not found any weapons
and they will not find any."
Presumptions were nevertheless strong if one were to believe certair. high-ranking
PS ~Socialist Party~ officers in power. On 24 September, the political office
of Presi3ent Abdou Diouf's party brought up the subject. However, ~-o show the
split between government and party, no reference was made in the communique
- published at the end of the meeting. Nevertheless, according to some indiscreet
remarks made, the PS leadership is convinced "that the affair is very serious,"
- and it is affirmed that frc~m the admissions made "it is apparent that several
a PDS militants reportedly had undergone tr~:ining in the handling of explo~ives in
Libya." Confirmation of this was officially made on 1 October by the Minister
of Justice. The word Libya has been let out and the specter cf Qadhdhafi~floats
over Dakar. This doubtlessly explains the Senegalese government's vigorous
reaction.
- The uneasiness of the Abdou Diouf team is real. This is not the first time that
a Libyan network has been indicted in the xe~ion. In Senegal itself an "ayatollah"
showed up 2 years ago in Kaolack and proclaimed total war against the Leopold
Sedar Senghor regime....to begin in the first part of 1980. Nothing happened.
. On the other hand, neighboring Mauritania experienced grave difficulties that year
when Libyan liaison with certain high-ranking officials was discovered. Above
all, Senegal is not ready to forget the coup attempt in Gambia in which Daka.r
has always seen Qadhdhafi's hand. The Senegalese have therefore remained on the
alert and it has sufficed that the revelatiflns of a more or less shady char~acter
would bring into play the self-defense reflex. The immediate objective: estab-
lish proof of a connection (military and financial) between the PDS and Tripoli.
To believe the PDS leaders, the investigation will not establish ~his proof.
The number two man in the party, Fara N'Diaye, told us, "The police searched my
office. I had a Libya file which they took away. However, the file contained
only ordinary documents. I was also in Libua 2 years ago on a very official
basis and I brought back, for example, Qadhdhafi's Green Book. How oould this be
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proof of compromise?" Moreover, the PDS does uot hide the fact that it has
'4iormal" relations with Tripoli. 1~ao years ago, a delegation of 14 party leaders
went to Libya. Included among these leaders was, besides Abdoulaye Wade and Fara
N'Diaye, Deputy Doudou Camara, who is today presented as the link pin between
the PDS and Qadhdhafi.
Nevertheless, nothing--at least on the aurface--has as yet been able to be really
established. In the beginning of October, the investigation appears ,justified
only through the admissions made. However, what belief can there be in the
latter?
The man who started the affair, Amadou Fall, the "conveyer of weapons," has
recanted. However, he had already gane too far when he introduced himself as a
- member of a PDS "Military Council." Mr Wade~s party answers, "We do n~t ha.ve a
Military Council. On the other hand, it is true rhat Amadou Fall was responsible
for the close protection of the secretary general." Wade himself nevertheless
recognizes that he acted with some "thoughtlessness" when he confided his security
- to such a questionable character whom he now suspects as being an agitator infil-
trated into his ranks by his adversaries.
Amadou Fall was actually a lieutenant in the Senegalese army. Fara N'Diaye told
us that Fall had offered his services to the PDS by stating that "he had been
transferred to reserve duty in the army. He was discharged in December 1980."
However, according to military sources, Lieutenant Fall~s name was stricken from
' the army cac3res list because he reportedly had been surprised in the act of photo-
copying documents of interest to national defense. Since that time, however,
according to Abdoulaye Wade, "He has been drawing his salary from budget of the
army general staff." The army admits that "he is ~ctually receiving a pension
as a former officer."
In any case, Fall was at the side of the PDS secretary general in July. Not
without reason, the latter states that he needed security. However, the bodygua.rd
- was led astray in a common case of fraud: an unpaid debt to a Dakar company to
which he had shown his officer card so as not to pay anything. Hence, his arrest
"for fraud and unauthori.zed use of title" (he had to hand over his officer card
when he left the arury) .
According to some sources, it was while looking for this card that the ~fficers
in charge of the investigation reportedly discovered the documents which led to
the suspicion of the PDS relations with Tripoli: military instruction handbooks
in Arabic "relating to sabotage techniques," and a"diary describing the life of
PDS militants in a training camp in Libya." Amadou Fall not only admits that he
brought wea.pons into 3enegal but also that he reportedly underwent training in
Libya together with six PDS militants to be instructed in urban guerrilla warfare.
The PDS affirms that it has acted in good faith: it is not a crime to go to
Libya. Nevertheless, Wade questions "how Fall could have taken along with him
PDS militants to Libya." The PDS boss, in fact, now recognizes the fact that
some of his comrades could ha.ve gone to Qadhdhafi's country without his knowledge.
However, for him "the Amdaou Fall" affair is a provocation of certain elemerits of
the Socialist Party to discredit his own party. "An agitator has been infiltrated
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into our ranks. An attempt is being ma.de to establish that we are in the pay of
Libya." In fact, if proof could be established that the PDS has received
subsidies from a foreign power, that would mean his death sentence. Fara N'Diaye
told us, "All hypotheses are possible. Attempts are perhaps being ma.de to divide
us by proving to us that our secretary general acted alone (with I,ibya implied)
without informing us of anything whatsoever.`:' Fara N~Diaye knows that he is
looked upon in Kakar not only as the ideal successor of Wade to head the PDS but
also as more respected interlocutor in the eyes of President Abdou Diouf.
For the moment, however, the two PDS leaders are in basia agreem~nt; "Certain
bigwigs of the government or the Socialist Party want to liquidate us." For
Abdoulaye Wa~e, the ma.neuver is clear: "Everything is being done to discredit
us because they are afraid of us. Between now and the 1983 elections (presiden-
tial and legislative), certain parallel insCitutions want us to disappear. The
Socialist Party does not wand tha PDS opposi~e it. It wants only small parties
as interlocutors." Wade considers the latter as "the remainder, thaC is the
theory," whereas the ~ib parties are only the PS, the PDS and "the cell of
ylarxists."
Either through ma.chinations of the government or thoughtlessness of the opposi-
tion, the a~fair can now no longer be covered up. A dismissal of the case
pronounced by the court would risk discrediting the government somewhat and
restoring the fortune of Wade who would not complain about that. If, on the
other hand, the thesis of Libyan collusion were to be proved, Senegalese demo-
cracy would suffer from it: some could profit from it by saying that the Africans
do not know how to practice democracy. It would be a 11 the more detrimental since
- it all started not with the capture of a freedom fighter but with the arrest of
a swindler.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRiJPJLA 1981
5671
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SENEGAL
- WADE'S ATTENDANCE AT LIBYAN CONGRESS
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in FrEnch No 1085, 21 Oct 81 p 20
fArticle by M.S.: "Wade in Tripoli"~
~Text~ Having come to the Libyan capital to participate in the Congress of
Solidarity with the Jamahiriya (28-31 August), the PDS ~Senegalese Democratic
Party~ secretary general extended his visit. First of all, to attend the
1 September festivities and possibly to meet with Col Muammar Qadhdhafi. This
meeting, which ~in the end did not take place, wo~ild not have been anything
special. The Jamahiriya leader always receives, ?.n similar circumstances, tTie
heads of foreign delegations who had come to offer him their support. Wade was
not especially happy with this meeting but it had been proposed to him.
However, he waited in vain for 15 days without leaving, or almost so, his hotel
room so as not to miss the fateful moment.
Abdoulaye Wade was nofi mysterious about his presence in the Libyan capital.
He received ~ournalists, granted interviews to one and all, most often on the
hotel terrace.
I myself inet him several times. We wpoke at length about Senegal, Africa}
Libya....Wade confided to me his preoccupation concerning ties between Tripoli
and certain members of his party. He confided to me on several occasions,
"I would really like to know who in the PDS is in t.ouch w:tth the Libyans."
The PDS leader did not benefit fram any special treatment. Even though he was
constantly escorted by a"guide," nothing mQre was done for him than for a
hundred or so paliticians present at the same time in Tripoli. He nevertheless
kn~w that this trip did not please the Senegalese Government.~ He told me, "You
will see. There will be much speculation on my trip to Libya..."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
5671
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SENEGAL
BRTEFS
ECONdMY CAUSING CONCERN--In West Africa, it is the economic future of Senegal
which is causing the sponsors of international funds and the other member
states of the UMOA LWest African INnnetary Union~ the most concern. For the
ium+ediate future, the country does not have resourc~s which would permit its
development. HowQVer, being politically ma~ure, the Senegalese would not be
able to accept the fact of permanent econon~~ic underdevelopment. ~Text~
~Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1085, 21 Oct 81 p 32~ (COPYRIGHT: Jeune
Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 5671
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SOUTH AFRICA
ALLIANCE WITH UNITED STAZ'ES CALLED UNHOLY
- London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169 Oct 89. pp 10-13
[Article by Mark August: "The Unholy Alliance in Action in Africa"~
[Text~ SOUTH AFRICA'S latest invasion of in the region, sees itself enacting the
Angola, and the developments following same role as the Israelis in the Middle
~ that action, have effectively turned East. It has been noted in diplomatic
- Southern Africa into an even more vol- circles and by military analysts that
atile and highly militarised sub- there are several striking similarities
continent - preparing the ground, as it between recent aggressive actions of the
were, fur more widespread, intenaive and South Africans and thoae of the Israelis.
bloodier battles to come. Intereatingly, the reaction by the US
It has done something else. It has Administration has also tended to be
revealed to the world an alliance between similar in both situations.
South Africa and the Reagan Administ- Like the Israelis, who have installed a
ration of the United States which, despite sunogate Christian Lebanese presence
its predictability, is quite breathtaking in South Lebanon led by Major Sa'ad
in its concept and so potentially danger- Haddad, Pretoria appears to have plan-
ous it has been dubbed "unholy" by some ned that the pliant Jonas Savimbi, leader
_ Western nations as well as by most Afri- of the rebel UNITA faction, should be in a
can leaders. position of control in southern Angola. In
doing thie, the South Africans probably
The misadventnse intend to weaken Angolan Government
control - a position from which Pretoria
The invasion has thrown light on the hopes to force Luanda to compromise on
direction of the hitherto vague Africa ita strong support for SWAPO. The other
policy af the [Jnited States. There is purpose of the invasion was, ostensibly to
- growing evidence that the South ~?frican maul SWAPO so much that it would be
action was undertake~, in part anyway, incapable of playing an active role in
as a result of current ultra-conservative support of the Namibiana inside that
a~~Litudes do-ni:iating ~he WhiGe House. much-disputed territory.
The Reagan Administration is consi- According to South African and other
dered by the Suu�h Africans to be amen- eources, Pretoria opted for a military
able tu the general thrust of its own solution in Namibia after intelligence
designs in Southern Africa. reportsindicatedthatSWAFOwouldwin
South Africa's misadventure in Angola more than 50 per cent of the poll if an
has several aims. The Pretoria Govern- internationally-supervised election was
ment, contrary to its tired claims that it held in Nambia.
had mounted the operation in pursuit of The report, coming in the aftermath of
SWAPO guerrillas, is known to be set on the humiliation of South African-
de-stabilising the Angolan Governmene supported Bishop Abel Muzorewa at the
- and, indeed, some of the other indepen- polls in Zimbabwe and in which Robert
dent Af'rican governments in the region. Mugabe's ZANU won a landslide victory,
There are many who believe that Pre- sent cold shivers down Pretoria's spine.
toria, wtiich acts as if it has c�arte blanche White minority rulers in South Africa
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are determined to resist a government eup~~ �proven friends" and tie known as
led by SWAPO in Namibia - and they a reliable partner; to maintain open
have chosen a military alternative in a m~rket opportunities, acceas to key
desperate bid to solve the problem. T~ources and contribute to expanding
- Buffer state . ~d American economies; to suP�
pprt a negotiated solution to the problems .
The i nvasion of Angola had several of Southern Africa; to seek to expand that ,
group of nations whose development
objectives. The South Africans had plan- polici~e produce economic progress and
ned to divert the Angolan armed forces to �~,]~ich have democratic institutions; to
give Jonas Savimbi's UNITA a free hand help meet Africa's humanitarian nee~s
for its campaign of terrorism in southern and foc';er basic human liberties in keep-
Angola. It was Pretoria's reasoning that ing with American principles and Ameri-
if Savimbi could establish a buffer zone ~~n intereats.
the activities of SWAPO could be checked $ill Gray, the US Democratic con-
since Savimbi is an arch fce of SWAPO ~.eBBm~~ expressed his doubte about
and would deny the guerrillas accesa pmerican policy on Africa. He told New
through southern Angola. pfriC~n that the Reagan Administration
- Don McHenry, former US ambassador had missed ita priorities. "US priority" he
to the United Nations, told New A~'rican said, "should be to demilitarise the Afri-
that the attitude of the Reagan ~Qn continent, not encourage a military
Administration has given Pretoria the build-up."
impreasion that the US supporta ita r,~ay believes that the "almost
actions in the region. "I fear that the a~quiescent ZJS official position" has
South Africans will take the atmosphere encouraged intransigence by .the Pre-
now created as a blank cheque to do what ~M8 ~~~ment. Gray cites the US veto
they like". in the UN SecuritY Council of a resolu-
McHenry strongly criticised the US tion, condetnning South Africa for its
Adminiatration's policy on Africa. He invaeion of Angola as one of the factors
said: '"This administration's policy is giving "white" South Africa ita feeling of
extremely shortsighted. It will eucceed in confidence.
isolating the US not only from the reat of He cites the visit to Washington earlier
Africa, but also from our allies in thia year by senior South African milit-
Europe". , ary intelligence officers as further proof.
He charged that the US had reverted to '"fhe United Statee ia clearly aupporting
a policy of placing material values over ~u~ pfrica and, therefore, apartheid.
moral values. The Reagan Adminietra� We in the US eimply cannot talk of
tion was paying only lip-service to moral democracy and freedom and racism and
issues, he said. McHenry queetioned apa~heid in tlie une br~ath," said Grray.
America's official determination to In a policy statement, widely consi-
achieve a peaceful solation in Namibia. dere~ to k~e ths fulleet on t'~ie present
administration's view of its African
Delaying tacties objectives, Asaistant Secretary of State
for African Affaire Chester Crocker said
R,andall Robinson, executive director ~he Uniied Statea w4uld not choose bet-
of the lobby group Trans-Af'rica, said in �,~n white and black in Africa. (It will be
- an interview withNewAfrican that there T~~11ed that Zimbabwean Prime Minis-
were no aigns that the US was deter- ~r g,eb~rt Mugabe told Crocker that the
- mined to achieve a peaceful solution in US would have to chooae between black
Namibia. He added: "The United States and white).
- has se much intereet as South Africa in There are many who believe that the
delaying the peace process in Namibie". US has already chosen to back the white
A highly placed off'icial in the US State minority regime of South Africa. Said
Department elaborated on the objectives Randall Robineon: "The trouble with the
of Reagan policy on Africa. The official, g~,~n policy on Africa ia that all he
- who asked not to be named, said the (~agan) knows about the problema of
" Reagan Administration was committed the dit'ferent regions ie that he is on the
to the following: side of the white man in South Africa."
To eeek to promote peace and regional Like many others in Washington, Con-
epcurity and to deny opportunitiee to greaeman Gray is convinced that the
thoee "who seek contrary objectivee"; to R,eagan Adminietration is obsessed with
its militarietic approach and its growing
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fever to contain communism. ~ Gray ~~~et meaace"
argues that it is because of this that the
US Government :~as declined to recog-
nise the Angolan Govemment. In eome Af'rican countriea, notably
Kenya, Somalia and Egypt, United
The Amendiaent States intereat is largely strategic - a
' b~rning deaire to contain the "Soviet
The congressman has introduced a Bill m~esace". Eleewhere in Africa, partic~a-
to normalise relations with Angola. Gray l~ly in Nigeria and Zaire and to some
is undeterred by current efforts of the extent Zimbabwe, the United States'
Reagan Administration to repeal the mejor concern is ite corporate interests.
Clark Amendment. The amendment Saya Robinson: "The Reagan Administ-
prohibits American asaistance to rebel ration intends to eatablish a strong
factions until it has recogniaed the pree- alliance with South Africa."
ent Angolan Goveanment - and until a South Africa, in turn, has become
solution is found to the Namibian dispute charged with a sense of miseionary zeal,
= regarding South African control in the believing that the US Government will
territory in terms of UN Security Council eupport it in its controvereial undertak-
resolution 435. ings in the region.
The Clerk Amendment has been a sore Robinson fears that the Reagan
point with the Reagan Administration Administration has bequeathed to the
because it prohibits it by law to support South Africans a caretaker role in Africa,
any of the rebel factions, including particularly in Southern Africa, where
UNITA. United Statea Government offi- Pretoria has r~esumed the role of police-
cials told New Ajrican that the Reagan man of the Cape eea route. "The new
Administration would continue to seek to Reagan Administr~tion appears to trust
repeal the amendment. This comes Pretoria," he says. "They eee 'white'
against a background of reporta euggest- South Africa as~ a permanent fixture in
ing that the United Ststes ho~s warmed to developmenta in that region."
the posaibility of having Savimbi as an Don McHenry believes that the United
~ alternative to the present Angolan Gov- Statea attitude to the rest of Africa is
ernment, which it believes to be"com- bound to be one that says "we will do
~ munist" and firmly in the SovietlCuban whatever we want to do and you (the
camp. African nations) will do nothing about
Chester Crocker told a conference ear- it".
lier this year that events of the last Asked whether the US did not fear
decade had proved only too clearly that posaible African retaliation, uaing
- the objectives sought in Africa by t?he weapons euch as oil or strategic minerals,
. United States were increasingly being McHenry said it was the view of some
threatened by political instability, officials in the R.eagan Administration
external . intervention and declining that African countries hsirdl~+ had a
economic performance. Said Crceker: weapon they could use efFectively agair.st
"Soviet/Cuban/Eastern Bloc interven- the United Statea. Commenting on this,
tion in African affaira, the preeence of I;andall Rc~bineon said: "The trouble with
Libyan troops in Chad and the maasive all this is that tihe,~T5 arrogantly believea
tranefers of arms by Eastern Bloc it has whst the Africans badly need."
nationa, all eerve to undermine US and Moet of the politiciane and political and
Weetern intereets in Africa and to thwart militaty analyats and advieers inter-
our - and Africe'e - objectivee." viewed byNewA frican said they believed
But Don McHenry and Randall Robin- that the U3 had managed to introduce an
son are at variance with the etatad US atmoephere of capitalism versus com-
off`icial position on Africa.,It is felt in a munism in Africa. The Pretor:a Govern-
number of circles that present American ment had aucceeded in exploiting the
intereat in South Africx is both ideologi- preaent atmosphere. By presenting itaelf
cal and corporate. That ia not the aitua- ae a violently anti-communi~t country
tion with regard to America'e position in energetically resiating Soviet influence
the reet of Africa. in ~?fiica, it had touched the soft under-
belly of the Reagan Adminiatration.
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But, cau~ions McHenry, "he who Congreesman Bill Gray has introduc~d
believes that a friendly policy towarde another Bill iatended to ban new invest-
South� Africana will influence them to ment by US firms in South Africa. I~tra
find a peaceful solution in Namibia, and ducing it, Gray told Congresa: "If we are a
that they will begin to dismantle apar- people and a nation of moral conscience,
theid within �,outh Africa, knowa no We ~not carry on business as usual
better. South Africa is about to do ~�ri~ ~8 government (South Africa)."
neither. Gray noted that SouCh African oppres-
McHenry believes that the US played sion of ita black citizens was harsh and
right into South African hands. "They unrelenting. "Not only would it be mor-
have clouded the issue, making it one of ally wrong for us to stand silent in the
communism or the presence of Cuban face of such suppresaion, but it would
troops in Angola, instead of what it really seriously endanger our relationship with
is - self-determination. He said the US the African continent on which we are
had conveniently forgotten that the ~oming increasingly dependent for oil,
Cuban presence in Angola was the reeult other natural resourcea and expanding
of Portuguese intransigence. He added: "I trade opportunities".
believe that the Soviet Union likea to fiah In the aftermath of the Angolan inva-
in troubled watera� America ie stupidly ~s
on by the South fricans, Congressman
encouraging the waters to remain trau- Gray has been seeking support among
bled." fellow congresemen to get legislation
Destabilisation chat would restrict the granting of
American visas to South Africans.
"It is already hard for black Americans
Like many other obaervers, McHenry to get visas for South Africa, while it is
fears that the situation in Southern even more difficult for black South Afri-.
Africa will deteriorate further. He pre- cans to come to the United Statea because
dicts that the South Africans will extend of restrictions in South Africa. Why
their campaign of de-atabilieation to should it be so easy for the whites? It is
- Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. also neceasary to introduce legislation
'"They may weaken SWAPO in thia pro- banning landing righta for South African
cese, but for how long?" Airways in the United States."
Randall Robinson, who has called for Many observers have expressed dis-
enore action from other African nations, may at the muted reaction of the OAU
told New African that he believes "Afri- delegation which met American Secret-
cans are abused when South Africa ery of State Alexander Haig in Washing-
moves into Angola with apparent impun- ton last month. The delegation, led by the
ity". Kenyan Foreign Minister Robert Ouko,
There have been other calls for Afriean reportedly told Haig that "Af'rican
countries to take stronger action in con- nations are running out of patience wait-
der,~ning the current drift of Reagan's ing for South Africa to graa~t Narnibia
policy on Africa. Said Robinson: "It's one independence".
thing to be vociferous ~+ithin the Organ- But aRer a two-hour meeting with
isation of African Unity. But it is a Wtally H$ig, the delegation refrained from
different matter to take the issue out into direct criticism of Reagan's Africa pulicy.
the open. Individual countries can make The delegation also avoided making
- a far stronger impact. There ib neeci for dfrect cr~ticiam of the US veto at the
countriea with a high pro~ile in Africa to Security Council. Ouko said only that
make their individual positiona knovm "Haig told us the United States is com- .
on the isaue." mitted to implementing the UN resolu-
Many believe that the gauntlet has tion calling for independence for
been thrown down. That it is now up to Namibia". He added: "We must take him
the African countries to respond. It is the at hia word." Later, when presaed by
gen~ral view of many intelligent and journaliets, the Kenyan minister added:
- enlightened people that the problems in "All I can say is we have had a frank
South Africa have littie to do wiLh com- exchange of views."
munism. Several groups in the United
States are planning action to voice their D$IIQ@l0118 ~ft
oppoaition to the Reagan policy and
South Africa's campaign of de- There are many who now fear that the
stabilisation in Southern Africa. United 3tates Adminiatration will uae
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the muted criticism of tt'ie-6AU delega- $aid one VVashington observer: "These
tion to mean that the African countries two interests are in the end going to
are not really concerned by the new and ~j~. ~ey ~e atrange bedfellows." It is
dangerous American drift in ita Africa generally believed that it is the
policy. fdw]ogues who now hold sway in the
American conservative connections United States Administration.
with South Africa date back to last p]~.eady there have been eigns that a
November when Ronald Reagan won the confrontation ie not far away. During the
US presidency. This gave South Africa ~nate hearing on the Clark Amendment
encouragement, a new confidence. ~~y corporations testified in favour of
The new consen+ative adminietration the US normalising ita relations with
coming in th~ aftermath af the slightly Angola. A stable Angola would make for
more liberal and enlightened Carter 8~�"~ing relationship between the
Administration, has provided South United States and Africa as a whole, they
Africa with the "big brotherly" eupport it ~~d, If the Angola boat is rocked too
had energetically sought from Weshing- much it would be to the obvious disad-
ton for a long time. Suddenly Pretor~a vantage of the corporations with Angolan
was being deacribed ae a"friend" by the interesta, the chief amang them being
new American President. It ia no coinci- Gulf Oil.
dence that America's ultra-
conservatives, including that guru of $g~d d@~Ol~
American Right-wing sentiment Jease
Helms, are coming in from the political ' Elsewher~ on the African continent, it
cold. ie considered that the Reagan policy will
Following the ascendency of Reagan at inevitably be militarist, reactionary and
the White House - and coupled with the violently anti-communiat. Reflecting on
South African intelligence report warn- the likely future prnspects for Africa,
ing politicians that SWAPO would win at Congressman Gray told New African he
~
least 50 per cent of a Namibia pol] - apprehensive. Put it tkiis way' , he
South Africa soon scuttled the Geneva ~id. ."Under Reagan the going will be
UN conference in January. Almost rough, very rough. Africa will have to
immediately, cross-border raida into d~ide how it will react. No one elae can
Angola by South African troops doitfortheAfricancountriea.Iamafraid
increaeed - allegedly in hot-pursuit of ~ere will be eome hard decisions to be
SWAPO inaurgents. made soon," he said.
In the April meeting between Chester Meanwhile, there is concern at the
Crocker and South African Defence UnitedNationathattheWesternContact
Minister Magnua Malan, the South Afri- Group of fi~~e natione (United States,
cans made it clear that they considered Britain, France, Canada, and West Ger-
winning a war againat SWAPO an easy m~y) is r.o longer in harmony. This,
game. According to leaked documents officigls say, has followed� sharp differ-
(Neu.~ A/'rican, Augustl Malan told ences within the greup after the United
Crocker: We will reach e stage where s~~ he.d unitat.~rally vetoed the r4ec~1-
internal forces in Namibia can militarily ution condemning South Afizc~ for its
defeat SWAPO." invaeion of Angola.
- There are an increasing number of at the UN told New A{rican it
Africa specialists who believe the Reagan not known how long the group, which
Africa policy could easily come unstuck. for yeara has negotiated witli the Pre-
That policy is largely influenced by ~~a ~vernment over the future of
Reagan's own brand of untra- N~ibie, would remain in disarray�
conservatism dogma. He is ably aup- gp~kir,g at the CTN, Zimbabwean
ported in the US Senate by the likee of Foreign Minieter Simon Mangwende cal�
Jesse Helms, Strom Thurmond and led on the contact group to fulfil their
others. The other side of the coin repree- �moral obligation" and preeaure South
ents corporate intereate in Africa. There A~~ ~ aubmit to the UN plan "without
are many obaervers who feel that in the p~varication".
- end it will come to a tusele between the Mangwende rapped propoeale to
busineas community, which has dealinga e~b?iah epecial guarantees for the
with Africa, and the ideological coneer- �~,hite minority community in Namibia.
vatives.
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He added thati it was "very etrange logic right and'wrorig, between justice and
and perhape a new interpretation o~t' jNe- injustice."
tice" to propose this while the m~jority The Zambian minieter said that peece-
lacked basic right8. ful or violent change depended on the
Zambian Foreign Miniater Lameck Weatern Powers and the~r contact group.
Goma branded the US veto on the Sec- "Individually or collectively they have
urity ~ouncil resolution as a"ehameful tremendoue human and other resourcea."
exerciee of power". He also atLacked the He lamented that all this ye~r the Weat~
US policy statement of Chester Crocker, ern nations had shown no political will
that the United States would not chooee and had now compounded the problem by
between black and white in Africa. "being helpful to South Africa, the
oppreasor."
'j'~le C~LO1C@ SWAPO referred to the United States
veto and eupport for South Africa - as a
_ ~ Didmissing the US poeture, the Zam- "new unholy alliance".
bian mir.ister said: "We in Africa never l:onseneue in foreign diplomatic circlea
asked (the United States) to take sides in the iTnited Statea-and among Ameri-
between blacks and whitea, nor are we cen Africa-watchers in Waahington and
asking any countries to make that New York - seems to be, albeit unof~`i-
choicQ." Citing the former Lueaka man- cially, that the Reagan Adminiatration
ifesto, he went on: "Our policies are not and America generally will regret their
baeed upon a racist premise. Africa is eupport for the Pretoria Government, a
asking for a choice to be made between regime regarded internationall~ ae a
polecat~
COPYRIGHT: 19$1 IC Magazines Ltd
CSO: 5100/5605
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SOUTH AFRICA
ANC GUERRILLAS SAID TO BE UNDETERRED BY TORT~RE, DEATH
London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169 Oct 81 p 34
[Article by Suzanne Cron~i: "T'he Other War: Torture and Death Will Fail To
Break Guerillas"~
~Text~ THE THREE young ANC freedom fight- Yet another sign of Washington's
ers sentenced to death in Pretoria for increasing support for the Pretoria
high treason were "hung head down by regime. But a Security Council appeal on
leg rrons from a tree" during their inter- l~half of Tsotsobe and the others was
rogation by the South African Police, eventually made.
according to a spokesman for the ANC The day after the sentences were pas-
office in London. sed, the ANC office in Dar ea Salaam
_ The three Africana - Anthony Bobby gledged vengeance if the executions were
Tsotaobe, Johannes Shabangu and David carried out. The tone of this threat
Moise - had been tortured by security reflected the much tougher line adopted
policemen in a bid to force a confesaion, in recent months by the ANC. Earlier,
the ANC claim. Later in the interroga� ANC President Oliver Tambo predicted a
tion process the accused were choked sharp escalation in military activity
with masks until they were unconscious. against South Africa's raciat regime.
- The High Court rejected the defence Tambo's statement wae notable for
- claim that the men had been tortured. what appeara to be a fundamental change
The death sentences were passed on in policy. Aa he himself noted, the ANC
August 19. The freedom fighters were has so far done its utmost to avoid any
tried for being involved in last year's losa of civilian life in its attacks on
spectacular attack on one of South military and key industrial targets (see
Africa's Sasol oil-from-coal plants, and New Afrir,an, July 1981).
other acts of sabotage. But in warning of the increaee in milit-
ary activity, he said that this "is going to
Tonqher liae involve combat situations in which, I am
afraid, civilians are going to be hit".
- Last year, after death sentences were Tambo was speaking at the state fun-
passed on three other ANC fighters, UN eral in Salisbury of ANC representative
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim Joel Gqabi, who had been murdered by
appealed to the South African Govern- South African agents, according to the
ment to "refrain from the executions of Zimbabwe Government. The killing of
persons for acts arising from their opposi� Gquabi was no d~ubt a warning to Zim-
tion to apartheid". The Security Council babwe not to harbour any ANC "terror-
appealed for clemency. iats".
The latest death sentencea were alao 'The effect appears to liave been the
- brought before the Security Council, but rever9e: a few days leter the ANC mia-
a resolution in terms almoat identical to sion in Saliabury issued ite ~rat official
the previous one was blocked by the US communique from Zimbabwe. This con-
representative, who objected to the word- cerned an ANC rocket attack on South
ing. Africa's vast military complex at Voor-
trekkerhooghte near Pretoria.
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"A taste of things to come" in the words Yet another was the ANC raid last
month nn a police station only 20 miles
of n~ne other than South Africa's Defence from Pretoria, in the "homeland" of
Minister, General Magnus Malan. In its gophuthaTwana.
initial reaction to the attack, the South
African Government specifically blamed . .
the ANC. But subsequently the South 1VIa~o~ty snppax t
African media were told to delete any
reference to the ANC. Tn General Malan's There. is no doubt that the ANC com-
view, "the primary sim of the enemy is to mands the support of the majority of the
unnerve, through maximum publicity". black population. When the death sen-
The attack on the military base is only tences were passed on August 19, the
one of many this year. The military condemned men gave the raised fist
authorities in Pretoria admit to 37 ANC salute, while demonstrators outside the
acts against key targets in South Africa court, who sang nationalist songs, were
in the first eight months of 1981. On July dispersed by police dogs.
21, 15 explosions rocked two important The funeral of three ANC men last
power stationa in the Eastern Transvaal year, killed during a raid on a bank,
causing extensive damage and plunging attracted vast crowds who wished to dis-
large areas into darkness, including the play solidarity. This belies white South
town of Ermelo. African claims that the ANC operations
The ANC selects its targets with care, are hit-and-run raids across borders from
to underline the weaknesaes of South neighbouring countries, without popular
A.frica's industrial structure. The attack backing inside the Republic.
on the power stations came at a time But there is no doubt that Pretoria will
- when electricity supplies were danger- take revenge against neighbouring coun-
ouslylow-downby22.5percentoverthe tries, as it has already done. Tambo
previous year - and old, uneconomic predicted that South Africa would try to
power plants had to be brought back into promote coups in those states: "Already
use to meet the demand. After this inci- Mozambicana, Zimbabwean~ and black
dent the press was warned not to publish South Africans are being trained in their
security details because the damaged campa .
installations were regarded as "key He hoped, he said, that the White
points" by the Defence Force. authorities would show themselves to be
A few days later ANC bombs damaged vulnerable to the ANC campaign much
two car showrooms in Durban - outlets sooner than internationally e~cpected
for two motor assembly plants which had but, in the meantime, "the, burden will
- victimised striking workers: another cal- become heavier all round because the
culated political point. burden increases for South Afriea
itselF'�
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Ma.gazines Ltd
CSO: 5100/5605 - ~
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SOUTH AFRICA
POLICE RA.IDS ON SQUATTERS EXPECTED TO PROVE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169 Oct 81 pp 45-46
~Article by Bob Hitchcock: "How the 'Clowns~ of Pretoria Are Fouling Their Own
Nest"~
IText] THE PRETORIA GOVERNMENT has a
The object of the exercise was to
knack of upaettir,g South Africa's black "deport" the camp'e 2,000-odd occupants
mejority at a time most strategically - all of whom are South Africans in every
disastrous to itaelf. sense escept legal definition - to their
In 1976, for instance, when additional poverty-stricken Tranakei and Ciskei
o~cial repreasion in the country's Afri- "homelands" which already are over-
can townships became intolerable, espe- crowded and where employment ia
cially in Soweto, young Blacks revolted ~mposeible to find.
and the uprising left a trail of blood Like old Nazi Stormtroopers and the
~ throughout South Africa juat as the then present-day secret police of fascist and
Prime Minister, Balthazar John Vorater, communist states, South African o~ cials
was having what to him were vital talks invariably chooee the "dead" period just
in Germany with Dr Henry Kisainger of before dawn to launch their raids againat
the United Statea. squatters. "A matter of psychology", as a
As a aenior West German foreign Cape police chief once told me with a wry
affairs official remarked to me in Bonn at smile.
the time: "The Afrikaners in power in No newsman who has witneased police
Pz~etoria are clowns. tJnfortunately, their raids on squatter camps in South Africa
clowning ie lethal and millions of people can forget the hurt and bewilderment in
are suffering dreadful hardships through the eyes of the victims. Nor the uglineas
~t"� of the contorted faces of their
~ camouflage-clad peraecutors.
At It 8~83A I have seen paesive old men and
women, and pregnant women and girls,
Last month, and in Auguet, the picked up bodily by burly policemen
"clowns" were at it again. Just ae the both Whites and Blacks - and dashed to
Defence Department and the Defence the ground in screaming heaps.
_ Force were launching yet another rela- Infants, toddlers and primary school
tively large-scale invasion into the heart youngsters, stiff with fear, are left
of Angola, another department in Cape ecreaming amid the rubble as parents are
Town was opening a wound which over herded together like prisoners of war and
the years has turned septic. ordered to aquat on their haunches, later
With armecl police forming the van- to be heaved like bags of inealies into
guard, the inappropriately named~ potice vehicles.
Department of Co-operation and
Development moved in at dawn on a T@81' Q89~
aprawling makeahift squatter camp eitu-
ated between the black towneh~,p of Unprotected women and children -
Nyan~a and the aite of the once .^.ele- guilty of no other crime than that of
brated Crosyroads c~smp. wanting to live with their huebands and
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fathera - are attacked by policemen with WaBhingt~on viewed 3outh Africa's apar-
dogs, and by that particularly virulent theid policy as repugnant and that the
brand of tear-gas that blinds them tem- "US goal is to asaist forces seeking con-
porarily and forces them to their knees to g~ctive change in that countr}~'.
choke and vomit. Later, the bulldozera Meanwhile, back at the Cape Town
are brought in to demoliah the last ves- gquatter camp near Nyanga, the
- tige of the squattera' sanctuary. authorities were busy burning the tat-
To top it all these raide are often ~red plastic, canvas and cardboard
ordered by the au'thoritiea in mid-winter, used by the aquatters to shelter
when keen air chills the bones and, in the ~m the winter storms.
Cape, vNhen torrential rain and gale-fo~e ~d the cnnfusion, the man who ini-
winds are common. tially ordered the demolition of the camp
'Y'he raids on the African squatters on ~d the "deportation" of its inhabitants -
the outskirts of Cape Town in August and Co-operation and Development Minister
last month followed this now familiar piet Koorn~of - was blaming the squat-
- pattern. But there was a new twiat to the for their plight, claiming that the
traumat:c proceedings. action had been necessary to "defuse the
~ituation" after the aquatters had
~@~ rejected a compromise suggested by the
- government.
For the first time, the South African- This had contained two elements, he
born squattera were treated ae full aliene said - the legalisation of those equattere
under a law controlling foreign immigra- who could show they had jabe, and an
' tion. They were traneported out of the of'fer to find work for others elsewhere.
country of their birth under the same law ~y h~ the squatters not ahown inter-
that would be uaed against illegal est in the propoeition? Minister Koornhof
immigrants from Europe, the Soviet aeked. He did not have to wait long for a
Union or Vietnam. reply.
Hundreds of black squatters were
caught in the net and the South African ~e lps@Y
authoritiea erected road blocks near the
South Africa-Transkei "border" in a bid $aid a squatters' spokeaman: "The
to prevent the homelesa, hungry people offer has been rejected because the legal-
from returning to "white" South Africa. isation would not have extended to wives
The 'IYanskei authoritiea, howevex, and children of those men in work. Nor do
told Pretoria it could not accept the the squatters wish to leave the Cape
"deportees". Many of the squatters To~ ~ea~~,
returned to the Cape Town area almoat as is a contest of wi1ls.Some obser-
soon as they were off-loaded in the sterile vers believe the squatters - battered as
Transkei, bypassing the roadblocks. they are - won the confrontation.
So appalled was France by reports of Meanwhile, as tens of thousand of Afri-
- the brutality and hegrtlessness of the can, "Coloured" and Asian squattera
South African Government that it sug- throughout the country become increas-
gested a joint Western diplomatic ingly etubborn and vocal, they conetitute
approach to Pretoria about the treatment a major part of a looee-knit nationwide
of the equatters. The idea waa coolly p~aive resiatance campaign.
. received by Western envoys, but it drew Ultimately, in thie battle of wills, there
from the ultra-conaervative Reagan can be only one loser - the South African
Adminiatration a reaftirmation that ~vernment~
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Ma.gazines Ztd
CSO: 5100/5605 END
26
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070036-1