JPRS ID: 10117 KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070032-5
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• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 32
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 101 17
16 November 1981
Korean Affai rs Re ort
p
(FOUO 4/81)
FBIS FOREIGN ~ROADCAST INFORMATION ~ERVICE
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~
JPRS L/10117
16 November 1981
- KOREAy AFFAIRS REPORT ~
(FOUO 4/81)
. CONTENTS
SOUTH KOREA
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Japanese Paper Cautions on Politicization of Aid
(Shinsuke Samejima, 17 Aug 81) 1
Disuse of Japanese in Koreati-Japanese Diplomacy Urged
(Nishiyama Takeshi; MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 2 Sep 81) 4
'YOMIURI' Interviews ROK 'Dissident Poet' Kim Chi-ha
(Kikuchi; YOMIURI SHII~BUN, 2 Sep 81) 8
- a - [III - ASIA - 109 FOUO]
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S.KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
JAPANESE PAPER CAUTIONS ON POLITICIZATION OF AID
Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 17 Aug 81 p 1
[Article by Shinsuke Samejima, chief staff researcher: "Politicization of Aid to
Korea�' ]
[Text] Japanese aid to the ROK is on the ~ray to becoming pol:i.tical; ROK arguments
that such aid would be a"compensation for security" and "a ~~artial standin for
defense spending" are being heard frequently.
Recently, Deputy Prime Minister Shin made the followirig statement to a group of
reporters visiting the ROK at the i.nvitation of the Koreans.
"The peace of the KOK affects Japan directly. It is desirable for Japan to give
economic cooperation as reciprocal payment for the ROK's contribution to the peace
of Northeast Asia."
~mergence of Security Viewpoint
- There are two main problems connected with the large-scale aid to be sought from
Japan by the ROK on the occasion of the Japan-ROK foreign ministers' conference on
the 20th and 21st.
- The first problem is that Japanese economic aid, handled so far at the working level,
is about to take on a strong political Goloring with the addition of the viewpoint
- of security. In the discussions about ~i~d between the two countries these last few
years, the details of the ROK economic development plan were made clear by working-
level probing and negotiations, and the Japanes~ aid plan was determined in response.
This time, it may be taken directly to the political level, at the foreign ministers'
meeting, without going through hardly any of this process. An aggressive postur,e~
on the part of the ROK is evident. It is aiming at politicization of aid.
The second problem is that the amount of aid requested is likely to be exhorbitant.
If we differentiate by referring to government development aid (ODA) centered on
long-term low-interest borrowings as "aid" (what the ROK calls nublic borrowings)
and commercial loans from the Export-Import Bank or city bank as "economic cooperation"
(what the ROK calls comanercial borrowings), the amount of aid to be requested by the
ROK is expected to be as much as $6 billion over 5 years, beginning next year.
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This would by $1.2 billion or 210 billion yen per year. The amount of aid for the
last couple of years has been 19 billion yen (approximately $84 million) annually.
That means that it will jump to 10 times the cuxrent figure.
Fear ~f Foreign Policy Change
Actually, a more difficult problem for Japan than the size of the expected fund
request is the desire of the Koreans to approach the problem from a political point
of view.
The problem of the amount of money can be largely handled in discussions and
negotiations on the working level, no matter how large the total amount of the aid
and the economic cooperation, by saying: "The aid will go this far. After that
commercial sources must be used." The ROK is a semideveloped country with a per
capita GNP of over $1,500 per year. It is easy to argue that there is a natural
limit to aid.
However, the R4K's presentation of the problem, as it seeks to politicize the aid,
has an implication that inevitably threatens to shake the foundations of Japanese
economic foreign policy, wnich has been devoted solely to economic aid. If this
argument of "security compensation" or "reciprocal payment" is accepted without
resistance by Japan, there is a danger that Japanese foreign policy will move far
beyond t~~ problem of aid. Once it changes, t believe it will be impossible.to
go back.
- I wrote that Japanese aid has been "devoted solely to economic aid." However, there
are some who would disagree with this view. Certainly, Japanese aid has been
directed selectively toward developing countries which are strategic targets for the
. Western camp within the overall framework of the cold war between East and G~est.
_ Using the Southeast Asian countries as examples, we can observe that the yen loans
to Indonesia began after the Suharto government took over. The aid to Thailand
- expanded when the American military got bogged down in Vietnam and began to pull o~~t. '
However, if we look carefully at the content and purpose of the aid, we can say that
it was generally economic aid for economic development and stability of the
livelihood of the people of the co~mtry involved.
Even though the general framework of t:ze Ea.st-West cold war existed, politics was
always pushed into the background at the stage of discussion of aid problems, and
from the point of view of the North-South problem economics was always brought to
- the fore. At least this was the previous strategy of Japanese aid. The important
thing is that reasons such as "the safety of Japan" or "the security of Asia" were
- eliminated from the 3apanese position when actually giving aid.
Now Is the Time To Establish Principles
'I'he ROK has raised the banner of "security" t~ attack the Japanese fortress flying
the flags of "economic aid" and "the North-South problem." The ROK has brought
two large signboards to the base of the fort. One shows a graph of its poor
economic growth, which fell last year, for the first time, to minus 5.7 percent.
The other depicts a firm handshake between the presidents of the ROK and the United
States, with a smaller picture of a handshake between the American president and
Prime Minister Suzuki.
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_
If we look carefully outside the fortress, we can see the flag of the Philippines
Elyin~; in the distance. In .7anuary this year, when Prime Minister Suzuki visited
the ASGAN countries, Presic~ent Marcos told him: "The U.S. bases in the Philippines
contribute to the safety of Japan," indirectly asking for increased aid. It may
be an exaggeration, but it seems that we are surrounded by a chorus of voices ~
prozlaiming East-West confrontation and the need for security in the Western camp.
- I used the phrase "the fortres~ of Japan," but it can hardly be maintained that
there has been a solid concept with a clear view of the North-South problem behind
Japan's aid policy. Another ominous fact is the strong posture of the United
States, with which Japan has recently reconfirmed an alliance relationship.
The Unites States places great importance on political aid which gives.overwhelming
priority to security considerations. However, we must not forget the American
security assistance has almost never been successful, either in Latin America or in
- the three countries of Indochina.
Japan seems to be comfortably enjoying peace and ~rosperity. However, it must gain
a deeper understanding and awareness of the economic difficulties of neighbo~:ing
countries. I believe that it is necessary to build up the viewpoint that policies
which emphasize "North-South" over "East-West" are the real road to peace and
safetyo The present problem should force us to consider this anew.
- COPYRIGHT: Asahi Shimbun Tokyo }Ionsha 1981
9651
CSO: 4105/-21
J
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S. KOREA/POLI'TICS AND GOVERNMENT
DISIISE OF JAPANESE IN KOREAN-JAPANESE DIPLOMACY URGED
Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 2 Sep 81 p 5
[Article by reporter Nishiyama Takeshi: "To Commence a New Era of Japanese-
Korean Relationship, Eliminate Japanese Language Diplomacy Above All"]
[Text] This su~ner several groups of Diet members visited South Korea one
after another. In South Korea generational change among members of the
legislature is said to have been rapidly advanced by the birth of the Chun
Doo Hwan administration. Members of the "Korean language generation," who
received anti-Japanese educations after the war and do not understand the
Jupanese language, have become the numer3cal majority in the South Korean .
Parliament. Though only for a brief period, I accompanied a Komei Party
group visiting South Korea. In covering the story, I have come to ask how
long the old form of exchange in the Japanese language wi11 last if we take
into account the actual situation of generational change in South Korea.
After all, does not diplomacy between Japanese and South Korean parliamentarians
in the Japanese language narrow the scale of exchange between Japan and
South Korea in the long run? I think we should make a new start in Japanese-
South Korean relations by abandoning "Japanese language diplomacy."
The Chairman of the Republic of Korea-Japan Parliamentary Union Who Did Not
Come to Offer a Greeting at the Airport
An "incident" occurred in the rush of the visit to South Korea. On 14 July,
a group led by Ken Yasui, the former chairman of the House of Councillors who
has been newly elected chairman of the Japan-Republic of Korea Parliamentary
Union, arrived at Kim~~o Airport. However, Mr Yi Chae-hyong, the chairman of
tlie Republic of Korea-Japan Parliamentary Union, did not show up at the airport
to offer his greetings. A South Korean newspaper reported this fact with the
comment l-t~at "It is time to estabJish a new relationship between Japan and
South Korea. Chairman Yi should have gone to the airport to offer his greetings."
It also cr.iticized his "impoliteness." I personally met the South Korean
_ newspaper rep~rter who wrote the article. When ~ inquired, he explained as
follows:
"Among the supporters of Chairman Yi, there is a group who hold strong anti-
.iapanese feelings. If Mr Yi had gone to the airport for greetings, he would
}iave stirred up the opposition of these supporters. In any country, a
legislator depends on votes."
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If he had gone to the airport, his appearance would look like polishing an apple
for Japan. Although he occupies the positi~n of chairman of the Republic of
Korea-Japan Parliamentary Union--the "face of South Korean side in parliamentary
~ exchanges--he had to be aware of the "anti-Japanese feelings" of his supporters.
_ Of course, Mr Yi was constantly with Chairman Yasui during the rest of his stay
in South Korea. Can it be said that "not going to offer greetings" is one
aspect of cop~ng with Japan that cannot be discussed apart from a dark history?
Japan control.led the Korean Peninsula for the 36 years prior to the end of the
war. It has been 36 years since the end of the war. Instead of "the Japanese
language generation" that can understand Japanese, in South Korea today "the
Korean language gener~tion" that cannot understand Japanese constitutes ~n
overwhelming majority ~ This fact can be proved from the population structure:
people under 30 years old number over 29 million of the total Korean population
of 38 million.
Five Cabinet Members Cannot Speak Japanese
Incidentally, according to a source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
average age of tlie new administration's cabinet members (23 members) is
' S0.9 years, younger than that (53.6 years) of the Park Administration's cabinet
members (22. members). Of the cabinet members, 11 "can use Japanese without
difficulty" {18 in the Park administration), 7"can speak a little" (4 in
the Park administration) and 5"cannot understand" (none in the Park
administration),
_ During their visit of S days and 4 nights the Komei Party group visit~;ng'
South Korea had a great number of formal and informal talks with many high
- officials in the South Korean Government, political parties and economic
~ organizations. Among them, the speech of Minister of Foreign Affairs No Sin-yong
gave us.the impression that "he did not mince his words."
I will quote some of his principal remarks here.
"In South Korea now, people in their forties are the leaders. 'Phey are the
ones wlio objected to the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan
- and South Korea (1965). Have things in South Korea become better as a result
of normalization? We cannot say they have become worse, but has South Korea
not been transformed from a political culony to an economic colony?"
"We m~ist reflect ttiat in South Korea, too, there has been an impression of
collusion in tlie rel,9tionship with Japan. However, no matter how often the
relationst~ip is said to be a collusion, South Korea after all has a$20 billion
trade deficit, and has only received $1.2 billion in economic aid."
"The method of economic cooperation that borders on looking down on Koreans
and doling out food to tt;em has no effect at all."
Sin~~e Foreign Minister No is directly involved in the issue of Japanese economic
aid to South Korea which is the present focus of bilateral political relations,
he mig}~t have had tlie intention of publicizing the South Korean Governmen~'s
` tougti attitude through meetings with the Komei Party, The Takeiri-No meeting
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was neld on the 16th. On the 28th, No Sin-yong was questioned in the South
Korean Parliament's Foreign A~fairs Committee for 5 hours about "a stumbl.e"
during the previous Japan-Republic of Korea Foreign Ministers' Meeting in
Tokyo. Of the 276 members of the South Korean Parliament, two-thirds are
said to belong to the Korean language generation. The speeches of Foreign
_ Minister No s2em to be made with consideration for the legislators of the
Korean language generation.
The Average Age of Members of Parliament Is 47
In the case of the Komei Party just as in the case of the Liberal Democratic
arid ttie Democratic Socialist parties, the counterpart in the exchange of Diet
members is naturall_y [the ROK memb ers of] the Korean-Japan Parliamentary Union.
MIOIl~ Z76 members of [the ROK] parliament, approximately 190 belang to the
Korea-Japan Parliamentary Union. On 25 March, the fir~t parliamentary election
was held under the Chun voo-hwan administration. More than 80 percent of the
seats are occupied by freshman members, and the average age among all members
is now 47. The present Korea-Japan Parliamentary Union was organized after the
' election. Member of Parliament Pak Kyong-sok, who is the regular executive
secretary of the union, emphasized the following: "We must change the style of
activities to which the old union is acciunstomed. We must increase the posts
of vice chairman and vice general secretary and ask members bf the opposition
_ parties to be actively involved, The basic principle of our act~vities is, in
a word, to avoid approaching Japan as our older brother."
- According to member of parliament Pak, members of the union have reached a
consensus on the following:
1. 'Co widen the scale of exchange.
2. To sween away the image of collusion or closed door diplomacy.
3. To stop restaurant politics involving alcoholic beverages and to act
with good manners.
4. Except for limited occasions, to talk with Japanese Diet members througr
int erpret ers .
- South Korean legislators who used to be called the Japan-Korea lobby have been
displ.aced from active service thro~,.gh a purge or other reasons. As member of
par.liament Pak pointed out, the way 5outh Korean legislators approached the
~ Liberal Democratic Party group led by Mr Noboru Takeshita, who happened to
visit South Korea at the same time as the Komei Party group, suggested that
they were f illed with the spirit of a"nera parliamentary exchange."
- t~owever, one thi.n~ bothered me. That is the problem of language. I wondered
wlleti~er or not the ~~r.inciple of talking through interpreters was actually
observed. Among 190 members of the union, only half tend to go and speak to
t}io~e who ~an speak Japanese. The members of parliament who played main roles
in discussions witl~ the Komei Party group were also those who could speak
.Iapanese, The members of the Japanese language generation and young members
wlio have had the experience of living in Japan (many of them are former
- jourilalists) all have a positive attitude toward exchange between Japan and
South Korea. Moreover, they are well informed about Japan.
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For example, as one of them asserted the i~mportance of mutual understand3ng
between the young people of Japan and South Korea, he proposed the following
~ specific suggestions. "We cannot erase the history of Japanese and Korean
relations. So, what is important is if in the Japanese education [system]
this history is taught with critical attitude, and if South Korean education
focuses on grudges and bitterness as the history is taugPYt. In educational
problems of this sort, parliamentarians of both countries have a role to play."
At the same time, however, he conf ided the following concerns:
"We meet Japanese and speak Japanese for the sake of South Korea. But, to
South Koreans this attitude appears to be an attempt to protect our position
by becoming a tool of Japan."
"The generation that understands Japan should speak out openly. When there is
no prablem in South Korean-Japanese relations, all is well. But, when
relations deteriorate, we are accused by the young people and placed in a dile~na."
"Right now, the focus of attention is the issue of Japanese a.id to South Korea.
Wt?en we enter parliament, we are looked upon coldly by members who do not speak
.Ta~anese."
T}ie reason I mentioned the problem of language is that I thought direct exchanges
in the Japanese language actually would obstruct the advancement of Japanese-
South Korean relations. As I commented previously, in South Korea the Korean
language generation is the majority now. The problem is not that the Japanese
language generation is the minority, but that a dialogue in Japanese reduces
ttie opportunity for contact with the Korean language generation. After all,
we are only ~nformed indirectly of the Korean language generation's views:on
Japan and their way of thinking.
"Japanese Can Be Understood in Korea" Is Haughtiness
It is not clear whether Japan or South Korea is responsible for the failure to
consistently observe the consensus of the Republic of Korea-Japan Parliarnentary
Union on "conversing through interpreters." i~owever, this problem can be
= solved simply by the way in which the Japan side responds. Certainly, there is
an inclination to ask why we resort to such a troublesome method when we can
communicate in J