JPRS ID: 10115 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070030-7
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• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 30
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 101 15
13 November 19~ 1
Sub-S~haran Africa Re ~rt
. p
- FOUO No. ?48
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JPRS L/10115
13 Novemher 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 74~
CON?ENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
_ East Bloc Economic-Political Aima~ Actiona in Africa
(Pierre Voillery; JEUNE AFRIQUE~ 30 Sep 81) 1 �
CAMEROON
Cocoa Season Begins; Producer~' Price To Increase
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 25 Sep 81) 4
CONGO
Soviet Ecor.omic Impact in Congo '~airly Minin?al'
(Bryan Pearson; NEW AFRICAN, Oct S1) ~ 6
_ 'EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Opposition Leader Discusses Political, Economic Situation
fDaniel Oyono Interv~ew; CAMBIO 16, 28 Sep 81) 8
Regime Said To Be Undergoing Profound Deterioration
(Gonzalo San Segundo; CAMBIO 16, 28 Sep 81) 11
Spanish Official Discusses Spanish Aid to Regime
(CAMBIO 16, 28 Sep 81) 13
GABON
Briefa
Suggested Bluff 15
IVORY COAST
~ Briefs
Coffee~ Cocoa Campaigns 16
- a - [III - NE & A- 1.20 FOUO]
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SENEGAI.
Diouf Discuases Recent Developments in Political Situation
(Abdou Diouf Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 28 Sep-11 Oct 81) 17
TANZANIA
Ujamaa Said To Be Backed by Vas.t Majority
(Omar A1-Amoody; NEW AFRICAN, Oct 81) 25
ZAIRE
Western Countries Continue Support; Opposition Liquidated
~ (Jacques Wiame; PQURQUOI PAS?, 24 Sep 81) 27
ZAMBIA
Auatrian Development Project Deacribed as Successful
(Monika Brenner, Reinhardt Engel; NEW AFRICAN,N Oct $1) 31
Bumper Maize Crop Politically Helpful for Kaunda
(Guy Arnold; NEW AFRICAN, OcC 81) 33
~
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
EAST BLOC. ECONOMIC-POLITICAL ATMS, ACTIONS IN AFRICA
- Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1082, 30 Sep 81 pp 46-47
[Article by Pierre Voillery: "A Lung for Moscow"]
[Text] Willingly setting ideology aside, in l~frica the countries
of the Soviet bloc are inter.ested first of all in strategic raw
materials.
i
~ The military interventions in Africa by the Soviets and their allies have brought to
~i light, in recent years, t~at continent'~ importance to the Kremlin. With more dis-
~ cretion but just as much effectiveness, military advisers are officering and train-
ing the armed f~rces of certain countries in accordance with a~?odel characteristic
of the Warsaw Pact: the Russian directs, the Bulgarian transmits, the German organ-
j izes, and the African...executes. But while these facts are of great importance,
i they tend to conceal a fundamental reality: the economic and technical relations ~e-
tween Africa and the Soviet bloc.
The USSR and its all~es of East Europe, linked to 39 OAU member-c~uai:ries, have con-
- siderably increased the financial volume of their trade with Africa over the last
decade: from index 1Q0 in 1970, they have reached 260 todrty for exports and 232 for
imports. Nevertheless, this growth is far lower then the growth of exchanges with
the Third World as a whole (OPEC countries included): the proportion for Africa--
25 percent of exports and imports in 1970--was in 1980 only 15.5 and 16 percent, re-
spectively.
~ ror certain countries (Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
' Zambia), this growth is synonymous with greater indebtedness; for others (Congo,
_ Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Senegal, Tanzania, Zaire), trade exchange is in balance; and
for some, finally (Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Ghana, Guniea, Sudan, Togo), there is a
positive balance.
East Europe, as one sees, favors ita exchanges with the wealthy countries, suppliers
of strategic products, independently of their political options: among its big trade
partners, Morocco and Nigeria are close to Algeria and Libya.
Inversely, of the five African countriea that the World Bank places among the poor-
est in the world (Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Burundi, Upper Volta), only Ethiopia bene-
- fits from consid'erable East �sropean aid.
In a word, investment.is being made in the countriea capable of f.urnishing what it
needs (or will need). Algeria, Libya ar_d Nigeria will alleviate the energy diffi-
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culties that the USSR may encaunter in the coming 3ecade and that certain people's
democracies ar~ already experiencing. A few weeks after CoZonel Qadhafi,and ther~iger-
ian minister of external affairs, Ishaya Audu, made ~ tour of the capitals of the
socialist bloc, with a matter of oil doubtlessly involved. As for Morocco, its
pho~phates will enrich East Eur.opean and Soviet agricu~ture, which is seriously
short of fertilizers. On the other hand,EastEurope is in a position to provide cer-
tair. African countries not only with credits (whi~h are rare) but also with tech-
niques and technologies, and to proeide for the trainzng of their ca~res.
- The USSR is present economically in more than 30 of the continent's countries, Hun-
gary and Romania are proving very dynamic there, and Poland was also until recently.
And last July, Bulgaria entered into some 30 bilateral agreements with Angola, Mo-
zambique, Tanzania, Guinea, the Congo, Ethiopia, Algeria and Nigeria. Multilateral
agreements have been made with the African countries of the CEMA [Council for Eco-
nomic Mutual Assistance]: Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique. In certain cases, highly
specialized action is inv~lved: from April to July 1980, for example, the CEMA coun-
tries sent 79 veterinarians to combat an epidemic of brucellosis, and Bulgaria regu-
larly supplies Algeria and Ethiopia with sizable contingents of doctors.
Speculation
The USSR and its allies are getting established in places where the West is slow to
do so, balks at the idea, or is prevented. The credits granted vary from a little
to very large amounts, depending on the creditor's interest: in 1978, Morocco ob-
tained a loan for $2.089 billion, and Mali got only $1 million.
~ Specialization is the rule. Thus, Bulgaria works in the agricultural, geological
= and maritime fields (Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Somalia,
; Tunisia), and.in a s~econdary ~,~ay in industry (Tanzania) and building construction
~ (Nigeria). Hungary is involved in mines (Algeria, Sudan, Togo), roads (Libya), and
~ community facilities (Nigeria). East Germany installs factories (Algeria, Angola,
MozambiquQ), as does Poland (Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria), which also does equipment
projects (Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Senegal). Czechoslovakia also does them, as well
- as studies (Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, Nigeria, Zambia). As for Romania, which is
established in Algeria, Burundi and Mauritania, it builds dams, manufactur.es engines
and orgariizes agriculture.
Direct investment is not excludnd from this cooperation. Romania ia present in 31
companies, Poland in 14, Bulgaria in 12. The USSR owns all or part of 8 companies;
tt~e number for Hungary is 6, and for Czechoslovakia, 4. East Germany, for its part,
declines to export its capital. Out of 75 enterprises and companies whose capital
comes from the European countries of the CEMA, 20 are installed in Nigera, 9 in
_ Libya, 8 in Morocco. In Africa as elsewhere, money attracts money: those who pay
well get the investments--and all the more so if they settle their debts in strong
currencies, which the countries of the East need for their exchanges with the West.
The number of cooperation personnel and civilian technicians v~ries significantly:
while there are 22,000 in Libya, 11,000 in Algeria and 1,600 in Nigeria, there are ~
only 125 in Sudan, 95 in Ghana, 20 in Sao Tome and Principe, and so on.
But there is a marked difference between the "allies" and the others. In Mozam-
bique, for example, the CEMA has begun development of inetallurgy and steelmaking in
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Tete province, as well as development of the Limpopo and Inkomati plains. In Ethio-
pia, an agriculturai improvement plan has been launched.
The desire to get established politically in Africa is linked to the overriding
search for an area capable of absorbing know-how and solid technology, of making use
of products that are difficult to get into the more demanding Western market, and of
procuring strategic raw materials. Little by little, Africa is becoming a lung for
East Europe, wrich, turning to account its political ruptures with Egypt and Somalia,
is henceforth accentuating its establishment in the rest of the continent.
The world crisis and the specific problems of the Eastern countries have shown that
those countries do not form a bloc free of faults and rivalry.
In certain of them, the desire for independence takes on an ecnnomic form. On the
occasion of the recent tensidns over raw materials prices ~oil, coffee, etc), the
USSR and Bulgaria did not hesitate to speculate, building up stocks, closing down
the domestic market, and reselling rsw products, derivatives or processed products
to the Western countries at high prices.
- In others, African foreign trade constitutes the underpinning of an original poli-
tical project. Romania for a long time, and Hungary mflre recently, have been plan-
ning to use their African positions to play a role as intermedia~y favorable to the
Third WQrld in the North-South dialogue.
-I, Profit
' For East Europe, military presence and strategic control are therefore not the only
~ two foundations of its approach to Africa. This appr.oach is above all, of course�, a
political phenomenon. But the partn~rs never lose sight of the economic-financial
~ interests. Nevertheless, even among faithful allies, the national interest always
; takes precedence over socialist solidarity. In thia sense, the African countries'
ties with East Europe are hardly different from those they have with the West: pro-
fit and interest outweigh the serious reality of the unequal development of Africa.
I COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
~
~
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11267
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CAMEROON
COCOA SEASON BEGINS; PRODi~C~RS' PRICE Td INCREASE
Paris MARCHES TROPI~AUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1872, 25 Sep 8]. p 2449
[Text] The 1981-1982 cocoa season was opened 14 September in all producing areas.
At a meeting of the governors and prefects concerned, the Cameioonian minister
for economic affairs and planning, Mr. YoussouiEa Daouda, urged the growers on
12 September to "arm ther~selves with courage and devote themselves faithfully and
zealously r..o cocoa cultivation, so that the next harvest will be a positive response
to the ceaselessly repeated appeals of the head of state." The minister of eco-
nomic affairs and planning asked the administrativP authorities in the cocoa areas
; to give cocoa growers trainin,g "sufficient to encom~ass all aspects of cocoa culti-
vation particularly the operation of plantations, timely harvesting, fermentation,
' drying and sorting, in such a way tha.t the product to be marketed is of good quality."
~ The minister noted the figures on the 1980-1981 season: 117,000 tons,~compared
~ to 122,000 tons in 1979-1980. The minister said: "This slight, 5,000-ton decline
; is basically the result of the phen4menon of letting land rest fallow, and of cli-
~ matic conditions. In reality, the poor distribution of rainfall, both in time
and in place, impeded the progress of the cocca growers and thus brought abou~
reduced production. It should also be acknowledged that a certain number of irreg-
~ ularities were noted in the geographical distribution of fertilizers and in the
~ provisioning of ~agricultural supplies to the growers."
i Mr. Daouda put C.he accenC an the decision by the head
For the upcoming season,
of state to raise the price paid to producers per kilogram of Grade 1 and Grade
2 cocoa to Fr CFA 310. The minister noted the particularly difficult international
situation. In that connection, he said that "the trend toward decline in world
, market prices whl.ch we have witnessed since 1977 has been aggravated during the
1980-1981 season, which ended with price levels we have nz~t seen in 5 years, while
during the same period of time all production costs have consiaerably increased."
7 The decision by the head of state to increase the price paid to praducers by FR
1 CFA 10 per kilogram of cocoa shows his concern to preserve the real purchasing
power of the growers. It is a'lso intended to provide and lay the foundations for
harmonious econ~mic development based on agricul*_ure, in order to discourage the
rural exodus and move toward a redistribution of income without which "the govern-
ment's goals with respect to socia'1 ~usti~e would rema~n nothing but words."
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The price paid for substandard [cc~coa~ has been held to FR CFA 100, in order to
discourage mixing different grades of cocoa and dirty tricks thereby pt'oviding
further incentive to improve the quality of the product. In tandem with these
measures to improvz quality, Minister Daouda sa~d that efforts to provide for a
successful restoration af agricultural productivity will be pursued without let-
up during the upcoming season. "In that connect~on," he disclosed, "a sum of approx-
imately FR CFA 4 billion will be devoted to fighting capsids, fighti~g brown-rot,
to setting rural young people up in agriculture, to the creation and maintenancE
of cocod roads, and to competition for recognition as the best plantation."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
951b
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CONGO
SOVIET ECONOMIC IMPACT IN CONGO 'FAIRLY MINIMAL'
_ London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169,Oct 81 pp 30, 31
~Article by Bryan Pearson: "Frustration Lies Behind Cantented Brazzaville"~
CExcerptsl
THE RHYTHMIC s~un~i of OK Jazz lights and traPfic lights throughout
t~ '
~ blares out nightly into the warm Brazza- city free of charge, on candition that a
; ville air. Socially it appears to be a great carnival was arranged. The carrot
' contented city. But cosmeti~ gaiety fails proved too tempting and the government,
; to hide completely the economic and deapite its anti-colonialist Marxist-
~ political frustrations of the people. /Leniniat standpoint, agreed to the deal.
I The Congo has seen more than its In one month, imported French man-
share of changes in recent years. Yet power, working all hours of the day,
despite an oil income, the promised installed an impressive anay of street
~ rewards have yet to filter through to the lights, and traftic lights araund the city.
i people. It was a mammoth task, well done, but
' the political price to.the Congo was steep,
~ Second conc;aest and it left the peop!e a little confused as to
~ their government's avowed socialist
~ The "revolution" planned by Marien intent.
Ngouabi and the National Revolutionary The Congo today suffers from a nortTi-~
Council in the late 1960s never really south divide. President N'guesao heads a
- took root. The centenary celebrations last predominantly northerner government,
~ year to commemorate the foundation of whose ascent to power can be traced to
~ Brazzaville by the French colonialist the Fren~h student unrest in the late ~
I Savorgnan de Brazza in 1881, are witness 1960s. At that time, the northerners wei�e
~ to that. Many called it the "second con- the "bootboys" in the army of Marien
- yuest". Ngouabi, a eoutherner. Ngousbi's error
Oil output has riaen by 44.6 per cent in wae in filling the army with the norther�
the last six months, and figures for tr~e ners whose business acumen was not
last 18 months have been encouraging. rated.
But apart from civil servanta receiving
their salaries regularly rather than sev- S~alist ideals
ergl months in arrears, and a series of
skyscrapers now growing daily, little is to The consequence was that they slowly
be seen of the wealth. grew in power, if not in stature, and
There is an interesting story behind eventually many went to France to study.
the centenary celebrations. France, an- They returned fully inculcated ~vitn
xious that sucli a landmark in the history socialiet ideals. Theirstrength within the
of its old colony should not be missed, army ranks ensured them the leadership,
promised the government of Denis Sas- ae Ngouabi's socialism stuttered.
sou lY'guesso that it would install street Today, the road~ to the north of the
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country are good, yet the route from tide of urban immigrants may for once be
Brazzaville to Pointe Noire the stemme~.
economic nerve centre of the country - is Central Africa is not a poor region.
still in poor shape, unpassable in the Indeed, if carefully managed its
rainy season. The southerners, who were resources point to it becoming the most
just as guilty when they were in power, wealthy region in Africa. The dilemma is
resent the northern dominance and seem in attracting the right foreign invest-
reluctant to throw their weight into ment and technology.
national economic development.
A unique aspect of the economy is that $1g~t p1E~8
employment is not overwhelmingly
agriculture-based as is the case in most At present the oil companies operating
African countries. Worryingly though, in the country and its offshore waters -
agricultural production is falling and, Elf of France and Agip of Italy - are
inevitably, imports are rising. Fresh veg� reportedly yielding some of the higheat
etables are not as easily available in the outright profits per barrel in the world,
capital as they were. Only recently have though the government 3~as T~ecently
state Marketing Boards begun to pay increased the equity atake of its own
farmers a reasonable price for their pro� company, Hydrocongo. .
duce. France remaina the domina~t trading
Previously, uneconomic prices had partner, with Italy, Weet Germany as~d
resulted in a decimation of the agricul� the United States follow~isg ~well behind.
tural sector, and had heightened the It is mistakenly believe~ that the Soviet
problems of urban over-population as Un;on is a powerful economic Sorce in the
many young, productive workers fled country. Apart from the size of ita
from the rural areas in search of a living. embassy compound - probably one of the
The government has shown itself to be largest in the world - its economic impact
aware of this and has responded by giving appears to be fairly zriinimal. I~i'Guesso is
the largest single slice of the national a pragmatist, and he knowe that to
investment budget to the Ministry of encourage the Soviets is to ensure a
Rural Economy. If this is sustained, valuable inpu,t of'Western investment.
agricultural production ahould be aeen to He plays their game ehrewdly, never
rise again, and the seemingly endless overdoing it~
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited .
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
OPPOSITION LEADER DISCUSSES POLITICAL, ECONOMIC SITUATI~N
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish No 513, 2$ Sep 81 pp 63, 64
[Interview with Daniel Oyono, former minister of the Macias govemment and opposi-
tion leader in exile, by Gonzalo San Segundo in Paris; date not specifi.ed]
[~ext] He was an all-powerful man under the Macias dictatorship. He held the posts
of minister to the presidency, minister of finance, security, information and
tourism. I~ow, he is in the oppabition, heads the Executive Co~matttee of the
_ Revo?utionary Command Council of Patriots and Guinean Socialist Cadres (CCRCGS)
and sees himself as one of the most representative a;?.d cha~ismatic leaders among
the Guinean people. His name is Daniel Oyono, 36 years of age, married, father of
two daughters and he gave an exclusive interview to CAMBIO 16 in Paris.
CAMBIO 16: From being a minister under Macias, you have become the leader of the~
opposition. TYiat is somewhat unusual.
' Daniel Oyono: You are right. But there you have Adolfo Suarez, the man who brought
about the politicai transition in Spain. And if it can happen in Spain, then it
~ should be much more logical to happen in Guinea where we only have a handful of
qualified men.
I
~ C15: In 1974, you created INFORTURS n~w integrated into the CCRCGS alongside w~th
the Socialist Front and the Front of Independent Democrats.
~ D.O.: Yes, this is a movemer:t formed by yoimg cadres from *_he army, the civil
, service and the population of Equatorial Guinea. It was set up as an alternative
for change. In 1976, it was dismantled and mo~st of its leaders and members were
arrested.
C16: Including you?
D.O.: Including me. That is why I was in ~ail from November 1976 until June 1977.
- I lost all ny posts except for the portfolio of finance.
C16: Being Macias' "heir apparent" as ~vell as his nephew, you were vexy powerfu~.
in Guinea.
D.O.: First of all, I am not Macias' nephew. I was not born in his native village
and I am not directed related by blood to him. My grandfather was a member of the
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Sangi bribe which was also Macias' tribe and the tribe to which the current presi-
_ dent, Teodoro Ob~ang, belongs. It is true that there was a time when I was his
protege, the reason for that being--and you will excuse me if I sound presumptuous--
- that I was one of the few people in my country who knew about finances. That is
why under the present regime I became secretary for international economic relations,
governor of the World Bank, delegate to the EEC and governor of the African
Development Bank until August 1980 when I resigned from all ffiy posts and voltmtarily
left the country where I have secretly returned on three occasions.
C16: It is said that you are one of those responsible for the anti-Spanish
campaign launched in Guinea durirg the Macias period.
D.O.: I am surprised that the Spanish Government remains silent when I am attacked
in the Spanish press, unless these slanderous reports originate from the government
its~lf. I was the only member of the Macias Government who kept close relations
ti~ibh the Spanish Embassy in Malabo. I was also the only one who~~.dared to accept an
invitation from the Spanish Emb assy to attend the celebrations marking the first
anniversa.ry of Juan Car�ios as King of Spain. At that function, I made a speech
calling for normal relations b etween Spain and Guinea. It cost me to be penalized
with a 10-month salary suspension. But I also got my reward in August 1980 when
King Juan Carlos congratulated me as he gave an audience to a delegation from
my country after CoI Teodoro Obiang's military coup. His Ma~esty told me thar he
would not forget that I was the only member of the government who came to the
_ Spanish Embassy during the most difficult days in the relations between Spain and
Guinea and he publicly spoke out in favor of normalizing relations between our two
co unt r ies .
- C16: It is also being said that you are pro-Soviet.
D.O.: I have a Spanish education up to the pre-univers3;ty level. After that,;I
went to Milan to study law. I have a degree in :Cnternational Relations and Public
Administration. I have a European dducation and no liking whatsoever for communism
or tyranny.
C16: What 3o you think of the step taken by President Obiang to the effect of
banning the reading of three Spanish publications, including CAMBIO 16?
D.O.: It is one of the worst mistakes made by Ob iang who is under constant pressure
_ from the men who come from the Mongomo district. Thirty-two of the 35 members of
the Military Junta and government are from Mongomo.
C16: You were recently in Guinea. How did you find your country?
D.O.: Yes, this last August I entered the country clandestinely and we set up the
CCRCGS. Virtually, there has been no improvement. I could almost say tha.t things
are worse than they were under Macias. There is no specific political. program or
econo~nic system. The government is bogged down by incompetence and the Equa.t4rial
Guinean peogle are deep in poverty. Neither the president nor his team lmow the
meaning of democracy.
_ C16: And what happened to the Spanish aid of about 6 billion pesetas?
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D.O.: Nobody knows. It has disappeared into thin sir. It has gone into the pocl~ets
of som~: members of the Military Council and of some Spaniards who were in charge of
- channelling that aid to the people of Equatorial Guinea. The leading members of
the Military Council have accounts in foreign banics. President Obiang and Vice
President Florencio Maye are major shareholders in the country's main enterprises.
C16: Some o~ your compatriots and unofficial sources in the Spanish administration
claim that you do not have mu1~h popular support in Guinea and that you have lost
all your prestige there.
D.O.: In the interior. of the country, in Rio Muni (a region which President Teodoro
- Obiang has never visited and where there are tribes which are not aware of the fact
that Ma.cias ~aas overthrown and is now dead) there is no opposition worthy of the
name. But the leaders of the MONALIGE [National Movement for the Liberation of
Equatorial Guinea], the MUNGE [National Union Movement of Equatorial Guinea] and the
IGPE [Popular ldea of Equatorial Guinea]--parties created bEfore my country became
independent which merged into the Workers' National Single Party (PUNT) in 1973--
are now in exile and they enjoy great prestige in the interior of their own account
and because they can mobilize the country. Our CCRCGS is established in every dis-
trict of the country and en3oys credihility and respect among the various tribes
in the interior,
~I
_ C16: And inside the government as we11?
i D.O.: We know that part of the Military Council and half of the armed forces are
opposed to Obiang and in favor of setting up a provisiona.l governmen~ of national
~ union as a preliminary step ~o holding free and democratic elections. And.that is
; our goal.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Informacion y Renistas, S.A. ~
I 8796
' CSO: 4748/7
=i
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
REGIME SAID TO BE UNDERGOING PROFOUND DETERIORATION
_ Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish No 513, 28 Sep 81 pp 62, 63 '
[Article by Gonzalo San Segundo: "Spain to the Rescue"]
- [Text] Teodoro Ob iang Nguema, president of Equatorial Guinea and commander in chief
of the Armed Forces, has agreed to an aid program put forward by the Spanish Govem-
ment to ease its former colony out of the serious econamic and political sitt~ation
in which it finds its elf.
The plan, which will b e spelled out later, is a three-step process. The first step
is to safeguard the security of Equatoxial Guinea through increased cooperation be-
tween the two countries in the spheres of security and defense. When that phase is
concluded, a similar action will be undertaken fn the economic sphere with the help
of Spanish advisers. The final step of the plan involves action in the political
sphere and envisages setting up a constitutional system of state and government.
MeanwhilE, Daniel Oyono, a former minister of the Macias Government now living in
exile, has told a CAI~IO 16 special correspondent in Paris that the only way to bring
- democracy to his country was to s~t up a provisional government af na.tional union
- prior to holding f ree elections .
Spain does not want to lose its advantage, foothold and prominent role in Equatorial
Guinea. In recent weeks, and acting through its supporters 3n the Military Council,
the Sovet Union is reported to be trying to drive Teodoro Obiang into a corner and
force him to relegate Spain to a position of secondary importance.
But alerted by these schemes and animated by the spixit of representing the mother
country, the Madrid Government dispatched Jesus Martinez Puj~lte, director of the
_ Off ice for Cooperation with Equatorial Guinea, to Malabo (t~e capital of that coun-
tr;~) and on Monday, 12 September, he met with Colonel Obiang, the president. Nine
days later, on 21 September, General Saenz de Santamaria, inspector of the
National Pol.~.ce, went to Malabo carrying in his briefcase a plan to or~anize the
security of the former Spanish colony. Meanwhile, Spanish Foreign Minister Jose
Pedro Perez-Lorca, met in Madrid with his coimterpart, Florencio Maye.
The succession of visits to Malabo by Spanish Government officials will reach its
~eak when a group organized by the Ministry of Economy and headed by Undersecretary
of Commerce Agustin Hidalgo de Quintana, arrives there to attend the celehrations
to mark the date of 12 October, Hispanic Culture Day. A parliamentary mission is
also going to Malabo in the near future.
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,
Meanwhile, the situation in Equatorial Guinea is rapidly deteriorating. Toward the
~ middle of this month, some 20 people were arrested on charges of "plotting against
the state." All of them are considered to be pro-Soviet elements by the Equatorial
Guinean Government which has released them all with the exception of Luis Oyono,
Daniel's brother.
This development, which seems to be a reaction to the announcement made by Daniel
- Oyono on 18 September, in Paris, concerning the creation of a single poli~ical bloc
of the democratic Guinean forces inside the country, followed reports denocmeing
an "economic coup d'etat " which President Ob iang has used to reshuffle his govern-
ment hringing into it more pro-Sovfet elements;
Lt Carmelo Owono, an aeronautical engineer who is crnmmissioner of state for the
presidency, falls under that category. The same applies to Lt Isidoro E~i, commis-
sioner of state for information and tourism, and to Ricardo Elo, technical secre-
tary in that same department and former deputy chief of the Political Police under
Macias.
A few days before that, Presi.dent 4biang took what perhaps amounts to his most ser-
ious decision in the 2 years since he took over the leadership of his country by
banning Spanish newspapers from coming into the covntry and being read there. Later
on this ban was somewhat relaxed and only applied to three publications--CAMBIO 16,
DIARIO 16 and INTERVIU. Spanish diplomatic circles say that Obiang will lift the
ban on Hispanic Culture Day--a sort of prea.nnounced amnesty.
Day by day, Colonel Obiang Nguema--who has expressed the wish to meet the king of
Spain before the end of this year--finds himself increa~ingly isolated and under
growing pressure, to such a point that he is re~orting to methods similar to those
used by his predecessor, such as the "economic coup d'etat." r~ccording to Daniel
Oyono, this was "an attempt to obscure the real situation in the country." It
~ coincides with a profound deterioration of the regime.over which he presides.
On Wednesday, 2 September, Obiang threatened to "throw the disturbing elements into
~ the trasr~ can" accusing them of being responsible for the disorder prevailing in the
I country. Meanwhile, the colony of Spanish nationals, amounting to some 700 people,
does not hide its fears and the voices of exiled opposition leaders can be heard
again after several months of silence.
For instance, at a press conference held in Madrid on Saturday, 5 September, Adolfo
Obiang, president of the FRII.IGE [Liberation Front of Equatorial Guin~ea], said ~,hat
"God knows what Teodoro and his people have done witih the m~ney wh3.hh they got
from the Spanish Government.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8796
CSO: 4748/7
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
SPANISH OFFICIAL DISCU3SES SPANISH AID TO REGIME
Madrid CANIBIO 16 in Spanish No 513, 28 Sep 81 p 64
[Text] :Iesus Martinez Pujalte, direc~tor of the Office for Cooperation with Equa-
torial Guinea, told CAMBIO 16: "The USSR has already had its chance in Guinea.
Now, it is 9pain's turn and we will not waste it." And he added: "Spain is not
going to engage in any kind of chancy and neocoloniali.st tmdertak.ing in its former
colony."
, Acknowleding that in Guinea "there.is no firmly established center of power,"
' Martinez Pujalte thinks that recent developments in that African country have
' spurred the Spanish plan of assistance. While it is true that the aid contributed
I by Spain over the last 2 years (around 6 billion pesetas, half of which is on a
; non-reimbursable basis and the rest in long-term loans) did not help to get the
~ country back on its feet, the Spanish Government does not want to miss this oppor-
; tunity which may be its last.
; "Spanish aid so far has not been very effective as a result of the huge domestic
I problems facing the country, the director of the Office for Cooperation with
Equatorial Guinea admits. And~.among those problems he mentioned the lack of an
administrative infrastructure, the lack of resolution when decisions need to b e
taken and the lack of clear ideas regarding the role of the Spanish advisers.
Including doctors and teachers, there are 356 Spanish advisers in Equa.torial Guinea
~ of which 32 are policemen, 19 come under the Ministry of Transport, 18 under the
; Mini~try of Defense and 12 under the Ministry of Labor.
! The Spanish attitude seems to be firm. "The Spanish Gavernment is prepared to get
Guinea back on its feet providing that it is given enough safeguards to effectively
carry out its undertaking," Martinez Pu~;~lte pointed out. "We are not going to
tolerate any further harassment against Spain and Spanish citiizens as happened with
Mac~as," he also said. ~
But not all aspec�:s are negative ones. Since Macias was ousted, in August 1979,
death as a result of ineasles has almost disappeared although the country's health
standard is far lower than it used to be in 1968 when Guinea became independent.
Schooling is proviced for 90 percent of the population and 500 million pesetas
- worth of canned meat, milk, sugar, wheat and fish have been distributed among the
population.
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There was a nPed to control this economic aid and in May 1980 the Co~ission for
Cooperation with Equatorial Guinea was created. Its purpose is to put to the best
possible use the 1.126 billion pesetas which the state budget h~s assigned this
year to the former Spanish colony on a non-reimbursable basis.
"The money is spent here in Spain and we send to Guinea goods and services which
are allocated by the ministries." Martinez Pujalte explained. This sum of aver
1 billion pesetas includes 300 xnillion for med;cal aid, 120 million for education,
80 million for public works, SO million for the te3:evision and a similar amount
_ for the Geographical Institute.
But there has been a drastic change in the criteria previously used by the Spanish
Government regarding the needs of Equatorial Guinea in the light of recent develop-
ments in its former colony. It is the general opinion ?:hat the two fulcrums on
which Guinea hinges are security and defense on the one hand, and economid develop-
- ment on the other.
This is why members of the Spanish police and military will be sent to Malabo to
act as advisers. About 100 Equatorial Guineans are currently attending courses at
military and police academies in Spain.
The iBUnediate purpose of our talks is to have Equatorial. Guineans, after being
trained in Spain, take over as President Obiang's personal guard under Spanish
commanders and officers to replace the Morocean troops now entrusted with that
detail.
In the ec~nomic sphere, efforts will be directed toward three essential objectives:
to make the bikuele a peseta convertible currency, to bring order into the fina.ncial
and budget machinery of the Guinean state and to equip the country with the m~ximum
- productive capacity.
President Obiang is preparing the ground. To start with, he has already announced
a sweeping ministerial ieshuffle in the coming�:~weeks, a reshuffle ~ah~bh could
- affect most of the departments.
CUPYRIGHT: 1981 Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8796
CS0 : 4 748/ 7
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GABON
BRIEFS
SUGGESTED BLUFF--How is he to face his deep feeling that he cannot count any
longer on the support of the French military forces in the case of a popular
revolt aimed at overthrowing him? This is the question provoking the night-
mares of the Gabonese chief of state. One of his advisors has hit upon the
answer: when Bokassa realized that Giscard was attempting to get rid o� him,
he thought of the stratagem of brandishing the threat of resorting to the.
Soviet Union. Why not act in the same vein? The Gabonese president--fearing
that such a maneuver could precipitate the fall of his regime and realizing ~
full well that the USSR leaders would never fall into such an obvious trap--
asked his advisor and confidant for time to think it over. ThiA3 may be why he
- launched a warning to France 2 weeks ago, accusing it of wishing to destabilize
his regime. "Bongo doubtlessly continues to think that the Giscardian regime,
which was able to "influence" a certain press, is still in power in Paris," an
influential member of the French Socialist Party co~ented. "It is time for
him to wake up...." [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 250, 12 Oct 81
p 28] COPYRIGHT: 1981 A.frique-Asie.
CSO: 4719/127 .
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IVORY COAST
BRIEFS
COFFEE, COCOA CAMPAIGNS--On 30 September the Ivorian council of ministers heard
an important announcement made by Aenis Bra Kanon, minister of agriculture, in
relation to the 1980-1981 and 1981-1982 coffee and cocoa campaigns. For the
i980-1981 campaign,.the minister noted a record production of 361,OOQ tons of
green coffee and the full operation of all of the 16 pulping machines. The cam-
~ paign is ending with a stock of 210,000 tons of coffee, a quantity never equaled
before. As for cocoa, once again the harvest exceeds 400,000 tons, confirming
the Ivory Coast's first place in the world cocoa economy. However, the two
maic. Ivorian products continue to face serious difficulties abroac'_ because of
the low prices on the international market on the one hand, and of insufficient
export quotas for coffee on the other, despite the government's efforts in this
respect. The council of ministers has set the first of October for the opening
of the ].98?-1982 campaign, and a presidential decree has determined the prices.
for producers at 150 francs CFA per kilo for coffee-berry (or 300 francs CFA for
green coffee) and at 300 francs CFA per kilo for cocoa. Buyers are forbidden
from purchasing below these prices. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDI-
TERRANEENS in French No 1874, 9 Oct 81 p 2565] COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie
Paris 1981.
CSO: 4719/127 .
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~ SENEGAL
DIOUF DISCUSSES RECENT DEVELOPME~ITS IN POLITICAL SITUATION
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 249., 28 Sep-11 Oct 81 pp 8-I1
[Interview with Abdou Diouf, president of Senegal, by Ginette Cot; date and place
not specified]
[Excerpts] The situation which has developed since 1 January
requires a new approach and concrete and crddible propoboth
and responses to the existing problems in the country,
domestic and foreign. Ginette Cot, who met with the Senegalese
president, asked him all these questions.
I The establishment of an unlimited, multi-party system is unquestionably one of the
; most notable events of the last few months in Senegal. This is an event which was
I watched with attention, if not an astonishment at times not far from disquiet, in
! the other African capitals. By the end of AugusC, or about 5 months after the
i "democratic opening" had been put in concrete form by the revision of the constitu-
tion, l0 political parties (of which three c~aim to follow Marxism) were in the
_i Dakar political arena, and the list was certainly not closed. Didn't this rua the
risk of the country�s being swallowed up in a situation of anarchy and of para-
lyzing confusion, some people asked. Others asked themselves if Senegalese political
life was not giving the "staggers" to the observer wh o tried to find himself in his
this new labyrinth.
! However, first of all one fact stands out: the majority of the six political move-
~ ~nent~ ~ahich have just acquired legal status, alongaide the four parties previously
I existing,l in reality already had taken root, even if their activities were neces-
sarily on a reduced scale and their eventual growth if8theireemer encetnn thetof-
very fact of their semi-clandestine character. And g
ficial scene tends to overturn the assumpti~Lons of the political chess game to which
- people were accustc~med up to now, today it is practically the unanimous estimate
in Dakar that this explosion of politica.l tendencies and sensitivitl,es is a natural
phennmenon. In this view it is comparable to what you see when you lift the cover
from a boiling pot and constitutes an obligatory phase in the movement toward a
greater kind of political clarification. This is a clarification which the impact
of ideas, styles, an.d practices; a better and mutual acquaintanceship; and the con-
frontation with the daily realities and the imperious needs of the country should
inevitabl.y bQ charged with bringing.
.
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In this shifting scene, where rightly or wrongly reorganizations, remodelings, and
even tactical or strat~gic~�changes are generally expected, it would no doubt be
premature to foresee the possibility of the early establishment of a common action
frunt on the part of the progressive or radical opposition.
- Certainly, no one rejects--quite to the contrary--the idea of a need for regrouping
and alliances around a specific program, and certain problems may lead here and now
to the adoption of c~llective positions, as has b~~en seen in the time of the mili-
tary intervention in Gambia. However, for the new parties, it is now time for the
_ tasks of restructuring, establishing themselves, deploying their forces, and expres-
sing their personality. This is also a matter of discovering what brings together
and whar separates the diverse components of the new Senegalese political skein,
to determine their real objectives and concerns, both immediate and long term. Now,
like it or not, it is necessary to recognize that the advent of the former prime
- minister of Leopold Sedar Senghor to the posit3.cm of chief of state and head of the
Socialist Party, as well as the innovations which the new president has unquestion-
ably introduced, has tended to reshuffle the old cards and modify the situation.
No doubt it is too early to measure the real extent of the changes which have been
made or planned and even to appreciate the degree of sincerity of the intentions
that have been proclaimed. No doubt also the argument of the opposition, which is
fundamentally unanimous in estimating that only profound and radical reforms in
the gover~ent's structures and methods are likely to bring the coimtry out of the
economic, social, and cultural depression into which it has fallen, h~s not lost
- all its weight. And neither is it possible to refuse to hear those who persist in
doubting the capacity of the party in power- now for more than 20 years--to reform
itself in depth and to make a change of direction likely to contri.bute to leading
the nation along the path of salvation.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the situation which has developed since 1 January
requires a new approach, a deeper reflection on the situation and, more than ever,
concrete and credible proposals and responses to the problems which face the coun-
try. Lacking this, the democratic struggle which is developing on the foundations
, of the economic crisis would risk being nothing more than a s~erile debate which
would not take long to make the general public lose interest in it.
For the moment the new political edifi~e may etill seem to be quite fragile. This
should not be sur~rising whe~ we recall that democracy is a difficult and long-term
goal to achieve, if not a kind of apprenticeship without an end. Thus, one could
momentari].y fear for the survival of the democratic process at the time the Gambian
affair occurred, where the violent dispute with the opposition seemed to show that
the party in power, or at least its spokesmen, were hardly.prepared to hear or to
- allow to be heard divergent points of view.~ In the same way one of the first ques-
tions which comes to mind is to know if the establishment of the multi~party system
should be considered as an irreversible achievement or whether, on the contrary, it
is a momentary experiment linked to the prospect of elections in 1983, a date after
which this system could be altered.
To this question, as to other questions which will be asked of him during the inter-
view which he has kindly agreed to give us--and all of which try to reflect cer-
tain concerns of Dakar political circles--President Abdou Diouf answers, as you will
~ see, without wanderin~g off and without a shadow of complacency. Speaking like a
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chief af stat~ desirous of being "the president of all Senegalese," buC also as a
party man determined to take up successfully the challenge posed to the political
party he leads, the successor to Senghor excused himself at times for the spon-
taneity and the passionate tone of his conversation. Iie moves from indignation to
an amused smile, having a perfect working knowledge of the Senegalese political
game and the concerns which uaderlie+it.
[Answer.] Multi-party syste.~m? For us this is an irreversible phenomenon (he says
with conviction). Our determination is that the Senegalese people should be able
to express the*nselves, in the diversity of their sensitivities and of their opinions,
in the framework of parties legally established. That is the conclusion of a normal.
process, which has appeared af ter a long period of a de facto single party, followed
by a constitutional system with three or four parties.
I also believe that it is possible for p~rti~s to group themselves around common
but healthy objectives. In effect it woul.d be annoying for any kind of alliance at
all, an alliance against nature, to be establisred. By that I mean a group which
would be established on false and unhealthy bases for a purely electoral purpose,
with the single o~jective of defeating the Socialist Party. On the other hand I must
make clear that we are aware that the complete pluralism to which we have come, under
the specific conditions in Senegal, is our own particular experience. We do not,
, therefore, intend in any way to poae as an example and still less to seek to drag
; others along our path.
I [Question] If the opposition~~parties henceforth have access to legal existence
! on the same basis as the Socialist Party--on the sole condition that they comform
' to the restrictions set out by the constitution, which prohibits, for legitimate
and quit~ understandable reasons, any identification with a race, a religion, an
~
ethnic group, a sex, a language, or a religion--it is noted, nevertheless, that
i there is a disparity existing in terms of the means of expressing themselves and
of making themselves heard. We have~.the impression that the state controlled
media (radio and television and the da.ily go~�ernment newspaper) are not yet adapted
to the new situation. We have the impression, in addition, that the circular of
1977, regulating the use of state controlled media by legal political parties, is
above all applied to the opposition, which also complaina of the cens.orship to which
its co~nur.i~ues are su~ject. Woul.dn't monopolizaCion of the media by the party in
~ power risk reducing considerably the democratic process r~hich has begun?
[Answer] My wish is that the democratic process be carried on loyally at all
~ levels, including the level of state controlled media. However, a~. the same time
we should not confuse the state with the political parties. Wteen the president or
cabinet ministers speak in the name of the ataCe, it is not the voice of the
Socialist Party which is heard. On the other nand, ~h~re is a c~3e cf conduct to
be observed. On the occasion of statements, communiques, or press conferences, you
can criticize as much as you want,.but there is a matter of respecting the rules
of propriety and courtesy. In the Socialist Party we avoid giving insult and we
ask the others to behave in the same way. That beiiig said, Che use of the official
media is subject to the same regulations for all political parties, whatever they
are. Finally, let us note that each political group has the right to hav~ its own
newspaper. However, there also it is a matter of avoiding certain defama.to.ry
statements, which only pollute the political atmoephere of the country and con-
tribute nothing to the strengthening of democracy.
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[Question] The 1978 ~lections (presidential and legislative) were very broadly a
matter of controversy, and their results were challenged. In the same way, more-
over, looking to the next elections in 1983 the opposition is calling for. a major
madification of the Electoral Code.and, in an overall way, for g�arantees with a
view to holding really free and democratic elections. Do you ttiink you can join
with the opposition in the preparation of the ne~a measures proposed?
fAr.swer] I do not consider that the 1978 elections were not free and democratic.
When the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) challenged the results, the Supreme
Court was charged with studying the matter and made its decision quite independently.
Having said that, I might add that one can always improve a system, and it is my
intention to propose an electoral code in the coieing months. I do not reject, of
course, any contribution. The PDS has already had the occasion of giving me its
opinion on tYds subject, and if other parties wish to make their contribution, I
am entirely at their disposition. The new code will be discussed by the National
Assembly--where .*.he PDS is represented, as well, moreover, as the Democratic and
Popular Movement (MDP) has been for some time. It has a deputy2 in the National
Assembly, and the Assembly will decide on the matter in f~i11 use of its sovereign
powers.
[Question] You have annaunced your intention and spoken of the need to democratize
and cleanse the Socialist Party. Such an evolution cannot go on without colliding
with ~trongly established privileges. Do you consider that the balance of forces
within the Socialist Party is favorable to the success of this project?
[Answer] Every political party has its unwiel dy aspects, its tendencies, its
factions. The Socialist Party, a mass party, is not immune from this rule. My
predecessor always fought for progress in terms of the methods and procedures
within the PS. I have taken up the torch and I intend to continue this work of
improvement, which, moreover, has become a necessity in the sense of a permanent
task. I will not allow myself to be stopped by any obstacle. My desire is to
make the PS the most "op2n" party, the cleanest, the mnst democratic party possible.
In the same way as I speak in favor of democracy within the country, I intend to
establish within the PS the kind of true, internal democracy which will permit the
_ free expression of the will of the members and respect for their choices at the
level of ideas and decisions.
[Question] The Socialist Party has succeeded the U~S [Senegalese Progressive Union]
under conditions which may seem to be rather informal. Further, it has been in
cha~-ge of the affairs of the country for more than 20 years. We know that, on
_ this basis alone, it risks having suffered some wea.r and tear to the credibility
of its power. Do you think that the reorganized Socialist Part.y will be in a posi-
tion to meet the challenge?
[Answer] For my part I am determined to meet the challenge. I will work in this .
direction and I will watch in particular to ensure that the Socialist Party does
not fall into the sin of self-satisfaction. It is by employing criticism and self-
criticism that we will avoid hardening of the arteries and that we will build a
healthy and vigorous party.
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[Question] In the same way a law against illicit enrichment has been promulgated,
which se:ems to go in the direction of the proclaimed desire to carry on the strug-
gle against corruption and inec~uality. However, questions are asked about the
real importance of this measure and about the possibility of implementing it.
[Answer) Before the adoption of this law, everyone had said: the president will
never d~re to approve it. Then, on the eve of the debate on the law before the
deputies in the National Asse~bly, people said: the National Assembly will never
vote for such a measure. These two stages have been passed. Then people have
whispered tha.t the establisl7ment of the special court charged with making inquiries
and ruling on matters of illicit enrichment will be a long time in coming. Toda~
the court has been established and the ~udges have been named. We are in a country
of law, and everyone w~ll do his work in complete independence. I could not do
better to express my politic~l wishes.
Having said that, and although there is no reason to fold our arms--far from it--
we might remark that Senegal is not amc~ng the countries most affected by corruption
and injustices .
[Question] We note a cascade of price increases (on gasoline, sugar)--and the
people seem to live in fear of new increases. For a growing number of people
"making both ends meet," as they say, is becoming an almost unsoluble problem.
Is it necessary to see in this deterioration in living conditions the consequ~.ces
i of the policy of austerity advocated by the II~' and which would come down to making
' the mass of the people bear the heaviest burden of the crisis?
~ [Answer] What government is in a position to halt the increase in prices? Even
the most powerful governments do not achieve this. A~ we have been able to ob-
serve, the real proletariat in our country is the mass of farmers. And the first
i social measure~ which were taken were in their favor, by wiping out the farmers'
debts and by reconsidering the prices paid to producers. That is to say that I
; am deeply aware of the situation in which my people live and that I will do every-
~ thing possible to ease their difficulties.
"j However, when the most developed countries do not succeed in halting inflation,
' how will we do it in Senegal? I am not an expert in the exchange rate of the
I dollar. And in order not to risk dragging the country into total bankruptcy, we
could not do otherwise than increase the price of gasoline. Regarding the increase
in the price of sugar--of which part is produced domestically and the rest imported--
the minister of commerce has explained the reason in detail.3 We could not continue
on the path of demagogic policy. There is a time when one is required to face up
to the situation. However, if we had not applied the policy of "price verity," we
would have seen more increases, and these higher prices would have been much broad-
er. If we didn't go more deeply into the process of prt,ce increases, it is be-
cause of the political process, based on a clear awareness of the aituation of wy
people, that I have committed myself to fight.
[QuestionJ Regarding the eventa in Gambia, a certain number of questions remain.
For example, the question is asked to wha~ exCent the proclamation by the leaders
of the coup d'etat in Ban~u1 of their adherence to Marxism was decisive in your
~ecisi4n to intervene militarily in Gambia.
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[Answer] The response stands by itself. I would never have permitted the Iegal
existence of several Marxist parties within my country if I were a declared enemy
of Marxism as such. The military intervention by Senegal in Gambia was decided on
at the request of ~he legal goverrnnent in Banjul and in conformity with the
defense agreemen~ts sign2d between the two countries.
[Question] Despite the specific aspects of the Gambian problem, but taking into
account several precedents (including the sending of a Senegalese force to Zaire
at the time of the Shaba war), aren't you afraid, after the intervention in Banjul,
- that here and there, particularly in certain neighboring countries, Senegal might
be suspected of nourishing expansionist or interventionist tendencies?
[Answer] On this subject we can provide the most formal assurances. Senegal must
deal with enough difficulties not to load on itself, in addition, intervening in
the affairs of other states. And, above all, we have in this regard principles on
which we will not compromise. It was to respond to the appeal of the international
cummunity that we sent troops to Lebanon in the fxamework of the UN International
- Force in Lebanon. And it is because we considered that there had been exCernal
intervention in the affairs of a friendly country that we sent a military contin-
gent to Shaba.
however, I can benefit from the opportunity you give me to provide full assurance,
through your publication, to all my neighbors with regard to the intentions of
Senegal as far as they are concerned.
[Qu~stion] A draft constitution for a confederation of Gambia and Senegal has b een
announced. Is it possible to know now how thi~ draft will be implemented, in con-
crete terms?
[Answer] We have agreed with President Diawara on the need, in present circum-
stances--and it is the minimum which can be done--to establish a confederation of
the two countries. The draft is being studied by experts in the ministries of the
two c~untries. It will then be studied by the chiefs of state and subsequently be
_ submitted to public opinion, either through the National Assembly or directly by
means of a referendum. It is still too early' to be more precise.
[Question] At the same time as changes have been m3de in the domestic arena, one
has the impression of a beginning of change in thF field of Senegalese foreign
policy. An outline of a rapprocnEment with Algeria has been noted. Can you te11
us what are the main orientations of Senegalese diplomacy today? And on the other
hand what is your position regardino the evolution of the problem of the Western
Sahara?
[Answer] From the beginning we reaffirmed our intention to strengthen our tradi-
tional friendships and to broaden the circle of our friends. We have nd quarrels
with any country. With Algeria we intend to develop a policy of close cooperation.
We are in agreement on all the ma~or problems. Between the two capitals (Algiers
and Dakar) there is only one point on which our views differ. It concerns the
problem of the Western Sahara--a problem we put aside at the time of our bilate.ral
_ meetings,
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- In a general way Senegal follows a policy of the outstretched hand and of real non-
alignment, a policy concerned with contributing to safeguarding peace and security
in Africa. We are a beneficiary of all the efforts which work and fight to re-
store peace rapidly in Northwest Africa aad we welcomed with relief the spe~ch~.~.of
the King of Morocco at the OAU summit meeting in Nairobi. We have been comforted
by the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the OaU, and we hope for a
rapid a~plication of the measures agr~ed upon there, in order to bring back peace
in thi~s region.
[Question] Anticipating our next question, President Abdou Diouf cut us off.
[Answer] As you have been able to note, we condemned vigorously the latest armed
attacks launched by South Africa against Angola, whose existence as a stat~ we
recognize. For nothing which involves an African coimtry can leave us indifferent.
[Question] Can one expect that Senegal will take one step more and recognize tlie
government in Luanda?
[Answer} There is a problem of princ~ple for us in that situation. As long as
Cuban troops are in Angola, we will have the feeling Chat there is a doubt as to
the real control of the Luanda gover~ent over Angolan territory. In our view
things would have been clea.rer if it had been possible to find a basis of agreement
, with the other political forces. OtheYwise, we have the impression that it is the
, Cuban presence which maintains the Luanda goverrnnent in power, keeping the other
forces at bay. It is true that there is a problem regarding the sequence of events.
! At the time of the Nairobi summit meeting, I had a conversation with an ~`sigolan
leader, the minister of interior, Alexandre Rodrigues. The latter gave me to under-
stand that it was South African: and Z~irian troaps which were the first to begin
, hostilities in 1975, when the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]
i was already in Luanda. Of course, the others, like UNITA [National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola] , state the contra~ty view~
i
-I
! [Question] However, . UNITA is supported by South Africa. And South Africa is
guilty of aggression against Angola. In these circv,mstances, how could Cuban
~ troops be withdrawn? Isn't this a true vicious circle?
~ [AnswerJ That is true. I think that it is necessary to turn toward the future.
~I The Angolan problem is closely linked to the problem of NamiUia. All parties should
' mobilize themselves to impose a solution of the Namibian question. And we are sure
; that, as from that moment, rhings wi11 be clearer and that the problem of the
iAbiri~~y .,f thp r.,Mar_~a o~~~A~,,,~nr ~~~1 ~ARP m,~~h ~f it~ ~m~~rt~nce.
[Question] Since the change of government tn France, how are relations between the
two countries?
[Answer] We place great hopes im~President Francois Mitt~rrand and his new team.
And we are sure that re~ations between the two countries, already excellentr are
going to develop even better. It is certain that there will be further develop-
ment .of cooperat3on and a broadening and deepening of relations in all fields.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Of course these are the Socialist Party; the Senegalese Democratic Party,
whose secretary general is Abdoulaye Wade; the African Party of Independence
(PAI), led by Majhemout Diop; and the Senegalese Republic Movement (MRS),
created by Boubacar Gueye. The six parties which have recently been recog-
nized, af~er having deposited their by-laws and received the acknowledgment
of th eir legalization are: the De~ocratic National.Assembly (RND), whose secre-
tary general is Sheikh Anta Liop; the Popular Democratic Movement (1~IDP), whose
national general coordinator is Mamadou Dia, former prime minister; And-Jef, ~
the Revolutionary Movement for the New Democracy (AJ - MRDN), led by Landing
Savane; the Union for the People's Democracy (UDP), led by Hamedine Racine
Guisse; the Independence and ~abor Party (PIT), formerly the PAI [African
Independence Party] - Senegal, which Seydou Cissoko and Amath Dansokho lead
and which held its first constituent~~congress lastAugust; the Democratic
= League - Movement for the Working Party (LD - MP'T), of which Landing Savane is
one of the principal leaders. Ztao other parties have deposited their by-laws
butare waiting for their eventual acknowledgements: the Assembly for National
Salvation; and the Senegalese People's Party (PPS), the latter having held its
- constituent congress last August before having received a response to its
request for legalization.
2. This refers to a deputy, Papa Demb a Diallo, who had resigned from the PDS.
3. The retai.l price of sugar on 9 August went from 260 francs CFA to 325 franes
CFA per kilogram.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.
5170
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TANZANIA
UJAMAA SAID TO BE BACKED BY VAST N1P~JbRITY
London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169,Oct 81 pp 22, 23
~Article by Omar A1-Amoody; "Myerere Still Believes 'Ujamaa' Is the Greatest
~Excerpts~
Today, the effects of Nyerere's social- -
; ism are beginning to be felt in the coun- Adverse effect
I try. Attitudes have changed. So have
; lifestyles. For example, it is now nation- Nevertheless, Tanzania has its prob-
I ally accepted that it is morally wrong for lems. In part, the government maintains,
some pe~ple to live in luxury while others these are due to outside influences. For
! are destitute. People are no longer im- i~stance, a few years ago the Interna-
~ tional Monetary Fund and the Tanzania
_ ~ pressed by limousines and skyscrapera. GovernmEnt a eed on financial aid
i They are far more impresaed by the
~ development of social services like ~~lling US$40-million to support Tan-
i schools, health centres, water supplies, zania's balance of payments. Subse-
electricity and transport in the rural Quently, o~icial sources claim, pressure
areas where 90 per cent of the 18-million from the IMF and the World Bank contri-
Tanzanians live. No longer does the Tan- buted to a 10 per cent devalutation of the
~
I zanian peasant have to walk more than Tanzanian shilling.
four kilometres in search of his water, Tanzanie's liberalisation of foreign
I ~t~a.,o.,eo*., ~r a_h~~t uo t~.,oo* exchange control also had an adverse '
i r~ ' ~ ~~�v~ effect. It resulted in a 45 er cent increase
I exhaust himself to get his produce to in the countr 's im ort bill, with a cor-
i market. Villages now own larries and y p
' buses. Today the peasant detertriines responding deficit in the balance of pay-
what he wants and what he dces not menta to the tune of T Shg 1,768-million.
! want. He has, to an extent, become a In 1977, Tanzania hed a balance of pey-
' 3~zis:~n-m~ksr. 'Lhis he s~~~s L~:iQL'eh ments surplus of 1,233-million ahillings.
village committees. L.ack of foreign exchange has led to the
Seventy per cent of school-age children present under-utilisation of factories,
in Tanzania today attend primary disruption of the tranaport ayatem and a
schools. Forty per cent of the villagea eHortage of consumer goods ~n shops.
have clear running water. Thirty-five per Breakdowns in basic aervices such as
cent have dispensaries and over 74 per electricity and water, coupled with finan-
cent have their own shops. cial indiacipline within parastatal organ-
isations, has resulted in a drop in the
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~ standard of living for most Tanzanians. pretends that ~`anzania is a completeTy
To add to the country's problems, there ~ialiet state. But S,hat is the aim.
have been incidents of corruption, rack- It was with this in mind that Tanzania
eteering and profiteering. recently staged maesive countrywide
This, the people say, is a reflection on demonstrations to reitsrate their com-
human nature and the ways of the world, ~tment to socialism. Ujamaa, the peo-
not the system. So Ujamaa maintains its ple say, is the vehicle by whi~h they can
popularity as a way of life for the vast attain their social, cultural and material
majority of Tanzanians� n~
AFTER ALMOST 15 years of talking �
hard to his people about the importance $g ~/ag ~g~1t
to them all of his brand of socialiam
succeeding in Tanzania, Julius Nyerere In 1961 Nyerere had in fact promised
is more conf`ident than ever that Ujumaa. that hia people would do more to develop
is the answer to the problems inherited Tanzania than that done by the colonial-
from colonialism. ists during their 40-year rule. True to his
Part of his ssccess, perhaps, is his p~miae, Tanzania raise'd ita social,
honest approach to those he rules. He has ~nomic and political atandards.
never tried to cover up the probleme faced Nyerere believed that hie people would
by Tanzania. Rather he has presented be prepared to work harder when they
those problems as a challenge. And his ]~ewr that the fruits of their labour would
people have taken up the challenge. benefit their own country instead of a
Nobody, least of all President N~erere, "foreign" government. He was right.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited
CSO: 4700/194
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ZAIRE
WESTERN COUNTRIES CONTINUE SUPPORT; OPPOSITION LIQUIDATED ~
Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French No 3278, 24 Sep 81 pp 29-31
[Article by Jacques Wiame]
[Text] For more than 10 years now we have been told Mobutu's
' regime was on the verge of foundering. All the same, it is still
afloat, despite economic and financial insolvency, despite the
systematic exploitation of the national wealth by the president's
clique, despite the poverty of the people and the ruinous condi-
~ tion of the country, despite the rebellions and the opposition.
i
; An unsinkable dictatorship? The incomparable skill of "Kinshasa's
i great helmsman" in avoiding the reefs? The durability of Mobutuism
~ is basically underwritten by the Western countries who obligingly
~ come to the rescue--militarily and financially--whenever the regime
is threatened. And that support is not about to be reconsidered.
i Mr. ~Tguza Karl I Bond found this out when he made his recent trip
to the United States.
~
Before the House Fore:Lgn Affairs Sub-Ca~ittee, the former Zairian
prime minister made terrible accusations against Mobutu, his family
I and his entourage. He spoke of the corruption, the diversion
of funds, the violations of huma.n rights, the torture. But only
_I a few hours after he made his charges, the United States Government
~ reaffirmed its "full support" fc?r the Zairian regime. Following
~ Paris and Brussels, therefore, Washington thus renewed Mobutu's
life insurance policy.
Chancelleries, like religions, secrete doctrine. On the subject of Zaire, the United
States, along with the Belgian and:French governments, clings to the following
analysis: Mobutu is the strong.figure in Zaire, the only one capable of maintain-
ing national cohesion. It is in the interest of the West to provide him the eco-
nomic and military aid he demands, because the country occupies a strategic posi-
tion in the heart of the African continent and has fabulous mineral wealth (uranium,
cobalt, copper, diamonds, etc.) which is so necessary to Western industry. The
fact that the general-president and h3s entourage extract a heavy commission from
the nation's resources is a necessary evil. The choice is Mobutu or chaos.
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As a result of that doctrine, the Western camp has always come to Mobutu's rescue.
It has sent expeditionary forces there several different times to support the shaky
strongman. It has provided numerous f inancial transfusions t~~ keep this ultra-
wealthy but ruined country alive. Since he fled Kinshasa, Mr. Nguza Karl I Bond
_ has been trying to show the West the "error in its calculations."
In Washington, before the House foreign affairs subcommittee, he repeated what he
had said many times in Europe:
"Far from being a factor for stability, thE Mobutu regime is a destabilizing element.
Zaire and the Zairian people are getting poorer anci poorer, while the fort.unes of
the president and his entourage continue to swell. The patience of Zairians is
riot unlimited, and the limits ha~%e been reached. Remember the so-called invincible
shah of Iran and the so-called dc,cile people of Iran. If they want to avoid an
explosion--a Shaba III or a Kinshasa I--the Western powers must press Mobutu to
step down peacefully and support the establishment of a democracy.
A modern-day Cassandra, the former Zairian prime minister's words have been ignored.
Enigma~ic
The "realpolitik" being carried out by the United States, French znd Belgian admini-
strations is sustained by "bread and butter" considerations, not just fine senti-
ments. Who stands outlined behind the democratic alternative proposed with such
fanfare by Nguza Karl I Bond? Zaire's former number two man is presented to us
as a savior, heaven sent. The man himself, however, remains an enigma. A nephew
of Moise Tshombe, a jurist educated at Louvain, a Dutch-speaker--which softens the ~
hearts of our northern neighbors--he gets good press. His career in public life,
however, has not left an imperishable trace on Zairians. His fame i~~ conf ined to
what was formerly Katanga [provinceJ, where his image is not that of a charismatic
leader but an honest administrator. In Zaire and in foreign capitals people are
surprised that after having been condemned to die and then pardoned he agreed to
accpet the positions of foreign minister and prime minister. It is found still
_ more surprising that, after having been tortured in Kotakoli prison, he denied
- the accusations made by Amnesty International and came to the defense of his tormen-
_..L__ w.._a ;,,,~o..i~i.~a in hiG nolitical actions, prone to change
LOLS. VIl L[lC Vl.uCl uatiu~ uc ~.o .i.�~..---~-----
directions abruptly.
~ An example: On 16 Anril, h? wrote in his 1?rt?x of resignation to Mr. Mobutu:
~ ''iiy mo5t atueat d=sire thut m~ ~*_a~ in F�r~Pe, which I h~pe will be as unevent-
ful as possible, shall not be exploited in any way for any kind of political adven-
turism."
Two months later, he announced his candidacy for the presidency of the republic
(1984) . '
He has also changed his attitude toward Zairian opposition figures in exile in
Belgium. His tactics for coming to supreme power have also varied.
"I want neither a derlaration of war nor blood on my hands," he said in an inter-
view with a Belgian journalist. But in the African newspaper CONTINENT he announced:
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"If my words are the trigger, I will take fu31 responsibility."
Finally, and this is not the least disquieting fact, behind Nguza Karl I~ond are
the movements of a not very tempting potpourri of people. Despite all these dark
- spots, however, the alternative Nguza offers to the Mobutu reAime renains attrac-
tive. But is it credible? One democrat is not enough to create a democracy. From
what breeding-ground can more be drawn?
The Internal Oppasition
At first glance, even within Zaire itself, there is no opposition to Mobutuism.
And the regime tri~s to portray the Zairi~r? people as spellbound and docile. In
reality, opposition movements do become active from time to time, and rebellions
and strikes break out. But these incidents do not easily escape the official cen-
sors. The r~evolt of the peasants ~f Idiofa--and the massacre which followed--
the guerrilla operations carried out in the Fizi Baraka region by Laurent Kabila`s
PRP [Peoples Revolution Party] and the strikes unleaahed by the teachers and students
at the university, by the rank and file of unionists--all this has been brought to
Iight by Zairian opponents in exile who have never hesitated to spread tall tales
or mix togethertruth and falsehood. Their claims thus lack credibility.
, During the "Kinshasa spring," when the andithereoliticalsbureauaofathesMPR [Popular
Western pressure, members of parliament P
i Movement of the Revolution] (Zaire's sole political party) began to criticize the
i regime, demand an accounting, set up commissions of inquiry. This alternate center
i of power was nipped in the bud. Kasai's 13 deputies, and also representatives
of Kwilu and Shaba, were incarcerated and depxived of their civil righCs. The
~ union leaders who dared criticize government institutions, who denounced the special
, privileges of the oligarchy, were imprisoned. Dissident students were sent to
I the fields and put into uniform. The army--so often and so savagely purged--has
~ lost the taste for plotting. Messianic rebellions--such as that of Nzambi Mpungu--
- have been violently suppressed. Nevertheless, if one can believe the Zaire Commit-
tee, Mobutu's first is weakening. His authority is disputed. For example, a member
' of the MPR political bureau, a former senator from Maniema dismissed by the supreme
~ guide, has reportedly been restored to his position by his peers.
' imL_ T__r .~l n~~/'~oit'tnT
~ 1I1C 1+1C6Ciitat vYYvv+..+~�� .
I
Finally, Zaire's dissidents can only express themaelve~ by going into exile. It
is the only way they can draw attention to their thoughts and organize. In Western
, capitals, prarticularly in Brussels, movements opposed to the regime have pro-
iifEiQ~~d. ~~n~te~ fr~nt~ have taker. the place of disuni.ted fronts. The Congo
Liberat.ion Organization founded by Mbeka Makosso, Zaire's former ambassacior to
Iran, has been eclipsed by the Congo Liberation Council Zed by Mr. Mungul Diaka,
one of Mobutu's ex-ministers. Alcngside the FLNC [Congolese National Liberation
Front] which was responsible for r.::a two Shaba offensives and was excessively Marxist
has appeared a moderate FLNC. In place of the Katangan gendarmes of Mbumba operating
from Angola we have Major Mfumu's Ka.tangans based in Zambia. Zairian exiles and
dissidents come and go between the various political parties and liberaeion move-
ments, change camps, and wander aimlessly.
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It is a liquified opposition, one which in the last analysis poses little danger
to a regime enjoying the "full support" of the Western countries. Because of this
_ re8lpolitik under the equatorial sun, Zaire will thus remain an ultra-wealthy country
with an impoverished and starving people. But until for how long?
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Pourquoi Pas?
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7.AMB IA
AUSTRIAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT DESCRIBED AS SUCCESSFUL
London NEW AFRICAN in English I~io 169,Oct 81 pp 26, 27
~Article by Monika Brenner and Reinhardt Engel: "Zambia: A Couple Who Gave
Back a Village its Values"~
~Text~
i MTOWE is a little village in eastem The task of Johannes Rauch and his
Zambia. Several hundred farmets grow wife Gertrude was to install an educa-
their crops on poor soil. They suffer from tional eyetem for the young girls and boye
hunger, sickness and alcoholism. Young of Mtowe to improve their lot by simple
men and women leave their village look- means. ~ � ~
ing for work in urban industries and in "ln the beginning the young people
the large rnpper mines. Reasons for this were dieappointed with us," said Johan-
rural exodus are the relatively high nes Rauch. 'They had another picture of
wages paid there, and a feeling of resig- Europeana. They thought a Eu.ropean
nation in the village, the knowledge of could solve every problem, that he had
being left behind by the technical machinery and money. We did not even
development outside Mtowe. The unity of have a car."
~�illage life is increasingly falling apart. Soon the two Austrians succeeded in
The education of the young people gaining the confidence of Mtowe's young
plays its role too. 15raditional culture is inhabitants. The most important task
regarded as beckward and primitive. The was the improvement of the soil. They
agricultural policy ot the Zambian gov- dunged the fielda biologically; they har-
ernment concentrates on "modern farm� nessed the kn~wledge of old people:
ing". Students in agricultural achools are which water holea could be used and
being taught how to use fertilizers, trac- which were ciangerous; wnicn iree~ weie
tors and harvesting machines. A little homes of harmful monkeye and which of
village like Mtowe could not af'!'ord any of useful birds.
these resourcea. .
, Besides, schools teach other social val- S~ICLple maehanery
i ues. lnstead of cooperation within the
famiiy students iearn individualism and They built aimple macninery -
competition. Having acquired this tech� ploughs, harrowa, and other machines.
nical and aocial knowledge even those � Everything was drawn by oxen; a tractor
young people who intended to stay wouldhaveinevitablymeantdependence
become resigned and move into the more on expensive fuel and central mainte-
de~�eloped areas. nance ahops. The village people could
; This was the starting point ~ for an repair or even improve the t~ools them-
Austrian development project. The Insti- selves.
tute for International Cooperation, (I1C), Gertrude Rauch taught the girls to
a catholic organisation, which educates weave, using self-apun wool, and to sew
and sends development aides to countries their own clothes. Becoming independent
all over the w~urid, sont an Austrian from outside was the leading principle
couple tu Mt.uwe. here as well. The strict division of labour
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between male and female taske remained
unchanged during the project.
The success of the programme was
convincing. The few dozen young people
who took part harvested more than a
third of the crops all the other farmers of
~itowe did. In their carpentry shop they
built their own furniture too.
Shortly before the two Austrians left,
t.he young people of Mtowe started to
construct more daring projects. They
built a windmill to water a vegetable
field and improved the supply of
vitamin-rich food to the village.
Equally important was the improve-
:..ent in self confidence of the young
people in Mtowe. They now~ know that ~
they do not have to leave their social
~urroundings and culture in order to live
reasonably wel1. They do not risk having
to live in the slums of the industrial
tow~ns.
The educetional system which the
Rauchs had instulled is continuing to
w~ork without Lheir help and is still
- ~expunding. Young people fcom Mtowe
nu~~� teach their colleagues in neighbour-
in~; villagea~
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited
CSO: 4700/194 .
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ZAMBIA
BUMPER MP~IZE CROP POLITICALLY HELPFUL FOR KAUND~P~
London NEW AFRICAN in English No 169,Oct 81 pp 27, 28
~Article by Guy Arnold: "Zimbabwe's Legacy for K.K."~
~Text~ .
I 1981 HAS NOT, so far, been an ensy year part Kaunda and Zambia had played iri
for Zambia. It began with strikes on the the Zimbabwe independence atruggle.
Copperbelt and = almost - a major con- One of Salisbury's main roads was
frontation between the powerful union renamed after Zambia's president. Yn the
movement and the government. Thia final years af the guenilla war in
resulted from union opposition to a new Rhodesia, Kaunda had been the close
UNIP controlled system of local govern- backer of Joshua Nkomo and hia ZAPU- ~
ment. In February, President Kaunda PF rather than of TVlugabe and his
made the second reshuf(le of two montha ZANU-PF which from 1975 was based in
when he replaced the number two and Mozambique.
three men in the state hierarchy: Mainza ~~p~~ tOIIi'
Chona, long close to Kaunda, gave way to
Humphrey Mulemba as UNIP
' Secretary-General (effectively deputy Following Zimbabwe independence, ,
head of state); while the Prime Minister, both Machel of Mozambique and Nyerere
Daniel Lisulo, was replaced by a long of Tanzania were soon invited to Zim-
time politician, Nalumino Mundia. babwe on etate visits; the invitation to
In June came new rumours of an Kaunda was, therefore, somewhat
attempted coup after Zambia had expel- belated. Nonetheless he er~joyed a
i!_L
led two American diplomats who, accord- triumphai tour of ~imoaowe w~~,c,~ ~
ing to the Miniatry of Foreign Affairs, appeared to heal the woundg resulting
- ' had been engaged in activities inir: ~~nl to from the earlier coolness. Speaking in
the country's security. Certain names Bulawayo, Kaunda called upon Zinlbab-
N~ere then advanced as being implicated weane to unite behind Mugabe and said:
~ in the "pic~t" and included the chairman "You atand a test from South Africa. If
of the Zambian Loniederation oi 'i'rade you sre aiviucu t;e sae,:.y u':~: Fc^at: st�
- Unions, Frederick Chiluba. The uae of his your ranks and one day South Africa will
name was seen as a preliminary move be able to bring you to your knees." The
towards another government-union con- two countries concluded an agreement
~ frontation. for preferential trade and increased ca
In July, however, President Kaunda operation.
went on a state visit to Zimbabwe. This On his return home, however, Kaunda
, was regarded as a special tribute to the faced further conflict in the form of
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rcnewcd slrik~nK un the Copperbelt. As ec;onomicandpoli~.icalproblemsbyusing
t~e mineworkers' lcader, David Mwila, the ZCTU as a ecaFeBoat.
said: 'Theae strikes ere symptoms of the Since independence many of Zambia's
people's growing disenchantment with trouble~s have beE:n ascribed, rightly, to
this government's economic policies:' UDI in Rhodesie and, for example, Zam-
Part of the discontent stems trom the bia often sufferec: ~~re from the effects of
huge differentials between Zambian and sanctione tha~r. did Rhodesia against
expatriate mineworkers for i.he same job. whom they wore aimed. Zambia's
But as Chiluba said: "I admit the uniona exporta, pa:'ticularly of its vital product
are to the right of the party. We are copper, were severely afiected by the
dem~nding that the government put an cutting off of the Mozambique ports and
ersd to socialisation and spend ita revenue the closing of the Benguela railwey, and
improving the lives of ordinary people." its imports of vital fcx~d and equipment
Such a statementperhaps inevitably was were likewise severely hampered.
seen as a direct political challenge to the hi8 p~p~ paid dearly for hfls s e dfast
government.
A week later Chilube and three other ness.
top trade union off'icials were detained by Ironically, the end of the Smith regime
Kaunda and the ZCTU met in emergency and the emergence of an independent
session to consider what action to take. Zimbabwe have in a sense exacerbated
The crisis on the Copperbelt was suffi- Zambia's problems. A aharp divide
ciently disturbing to perauade Kaunda to appears to have developed between
cancel hia plans to attend the Royal Kaunda and a number of hia close advis�
wedding of Prince Charles in London. ere about the direction of his economic
In the event the unions backed away policies. And certainly there are far too
from a direct confrontation with the gov- many of the most able men in Zambia
ernment-.there had been suggeations ef who have long since departed from poli-
a general atrike - and appealed to work- tica into private business or ather occupa-
crs to remain calm. The 7.CTU did, how- tions; they are men whose skills the
ever, call for a public commisaion of countrydearlyneedsatthepoliticalhelm
inquiry with representatives of the OAU rather than some of the old political
and ILO to investigute the strain which hacks of the Central Committee.
has developed between the labour move- Kaunda, however, remains one of the
ment and the government. most astute politicians in Africa and will
Politieal tool no doubt weather this ~turm as he has
survived many others. He will be helped
by what appears to be a coming bumper
ln announcing the arresta of Chiluba crop - an estimated llm bags ot' maize
- and his colleagues, Kaunda said they had which is the highest output ever - and if
instigated strikes and planned to take Lhe new agricultural policiea really are
ovcr the leadership of the country. This beginning to pay dividenda then one of
- was reiected in a statement by the ZCTU the most difficult and consietent prob-
o.,...~
which said the workers were not being lems - the inatiitity oi ~aniu,n w+cw
used as a political tool by the labour itself - will have been solved at least for ,
movement and wrnt on: "The Govern- this year and ~t a time most helpful to an
ment must not sh:� the blame for ita own embattled President Kaunda�
CUPYttlGtil: I9Si iC 'riag~zities Limit~d
- CSO: 4700/Z94 E~
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