JPRS ID: 10114 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070029-9
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• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 29
• Content Type: REPORTS

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, JPRS L/ 101 14
_ 12 November 1981
West Euro e R~ ort
p p
- CFOUO 59/81)
- ~g~$ FOR~IGN BROADC~?ST INFCG~MATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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_ enclosed i.n parentheses. Wor3s or names preceded by a ques-
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JPRS L/10114
_ 12 November 1981
- WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 59/$1)
CONTENTS
THEATER. FORCES
UNITED KINGD~i
UK Journalist: West Must Maintain Balance of Forces
- (Arigo Levi; THE TIMES, 5 Nov 81) 1
ECONOMIC
FEDER,AL REPUBI,IC OF GERMANY ~
Matthoefer Optimistic on Effects of 1982 Financial Policy
(Hans Msth~efer; CAPITAL, Oct 81) ;
SPAIN ~
1982 Budget to Result in Higher Deficit, Inflation
(CAP'IDIO 16, 12 Oct 81) 7
~ POLITICA.L
f'~~DE�t11L ?~~PUBtTC t~F CEI~..ANY
Biedenkopf, Geissler Espouse New CDU Ostpolitik
(Werner P. D'hein, Uwe 'Li~rnner; STERN~ 15 Oct 81) 11
TTALY
Reactions in PSI Against Craxi's ~Dictatorial' Methods
(F.i:ligpo Ceccaxelli; PANORAMA, 1Q A~1~ 81) 13
`~PAIN
Gen~a1.~7 Siipparts Government Despite Differences
(F'elipe Gonzaie~.: Iz~t;.ivie. , , . , . ~ ~3~ ~ , . . . , ,F
_ ~ z r- ta~.~ - o rouo l
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' F`t1R t1F'F'1t'1.~11. 1'~h lfNl.~`
THEATER FORCES UNITID KINGDOM
UK JOURNALIST: WEST MUST MAINTAIN BALANCE OF FORCES
PM051257 Londan THE TIMES in English 5 Nov S1 p 10
[Report by Arigo Levi: "A Feraonal View"]
[Text] Europe's peace marches and supporters of nuelear disarmament would be
more crec~ible and convincing if they simult~,~eously preached the strengthening
of NATO's conventional forces.
General Rogers, the supreme allied commander in Europe, once def~.ned the present
NATO strategy as a"delayed tripwire strategy." Theoretically NA'~0 has had, for
a number of years, a strategy of "flexible response."
This would require NATO to be able (and to be seen to be able) to anewer a Soviet
attack at any level. But we actually lack that capability due to many weaknQSSes
in reserves, manpower, ammunition as well as to the fading of our former qualita~j_ve
superiority.
Today, NATO would hardly be able to resist a"second echelon" conventional attack
without having to employ some tactical nuclear weapon~.
At present the Soviet Union en~oys superiority in the field Qf theatre nuclear
weapons. That should, however, be taken care of either by the canstruction and
deployment of NATO's new TNF weapons, the cruiae and Perehing 2 missiles, or by
a successful negotiation redu~ing, pc-~;sihiy even to zQro level, Soviet and Western
weapons of that kind.
T ~eii.eve that, in spite of zhe effort.s ~F the p~~cr.~ marchers and unilateralists
(if tt-ieir views were to prevail, thcr =~.~~u:l.:r LE n~ char~: ~ of cancelling Soviet
superiority), the key countries in Europe-�~Tta~y~, Germany and Britain--will nct
abandon their plans to acquire thE new weapons. By so doing, they will create
ttie necessary pre~ondition fox a serious atte~np;: to bring under control these
t:errifying weapons.
B~it even if that happens, there would remain a c~angeroi;a imbalance, to the West's
disadvantage, on the central front. Indee~, r1A^'0's inferiority would become even
- mo.re glaring once the problem of TNF were out of the way.
J.
~oR u~ r tctn~, ~s~ urvL ~
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We know ~_verything about NATO'a "conventional" inferiArity. To compensate for
that we hav~e always counted~ upon our relat.~.~~ . superiority in tactical nuclear
weapons, as r~~ell as in the global strategic po~~er relatiQn. We have now 2oat that
super iority.
The new "Euromissiles" would have represented, as a matter of fact, "an additional '
American strategic option against the Soviet Union, on top of Ameriea's strategic
triad." I vuote from Gregory Trevertoa's recent ADELPflI paper o~ "Nuclear Weapons
in Europe." ~
It may still be worth doing without them, in nrder to eliminate or reduce the
_ number of Soviet SS20s; but America's possibly temporary relat~ive inferiority
in strategic weapons would *hen be more manifest to all. �
But even in the f ield of tactical nuclear w~apons, as shown by th~ abone quoted
paper, the modernization of Soviet shorter-range nuclear weapons (tactical
missiles, nuclear-capable fighters and medium bombers), has counterbalanced P1AT0's
former superiority.
In Gregory Treverton's conclusion9 this ne~ situation "may gine rise to the
possibility that NATO would eitner be deterred �ram using (tact3cal) auclear
weapons in a losing conventional conflict, or that NATO's exi~tin; nuclear delivery
systems would be destroyed before they could b~ used."
Another quite new ADELPHI paper by Desmond Ba11 (a pieca of superb research,
with the title: "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?"), shows comr3neingly that it
is not reasonable to expect that cantrol can be kept and that all-vut nuc].ear
war can be prevented, once strategic weapons are used (except, perhaps, for
"small, carefully conducted attacke" for demonstration purposes).
B~ut even the use of tactical weapons on Europe's central front, which would
produce fatalities ranging fr an two to one hundred million, would give rise to
an alanost uncontrollable and unthinkable situation.
In such circumstances, NATO's present "delayed tripwire strategy" may come to
lack the minimal necessary credibility.
So, even if it remains true, as "military balance" of the institute of strategic
- studies keeps on saying year after year, that "the ~verall East-West balance in
Europe i.s still such as ta make military aggression appear unattractive" since
"the consequences for an attacker would be incalculable" the awareness that a
relative imbalance exists could have dramatic peych~logical and political cox~se-
quences at the t~ne of a confrontation between East and k'est.
This could in~rease the ever-existing danger of a miscalculation leading to
nuclear war. In conclusion: If a ce.ritain degree of control must be kept on
nuclear weapons, so as not to foreclose the chanee for future generations to achieve
disarmament, we must maintain a clear, undeniable balance of forces in all fields,
starting with conventional forces. This is the only rational though costly anewer
to the present upsurge of nuclear fears in Western Europs.
COPYRIGHT: Times Newspapers Limited, 1981
CSO: 3120/12
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- MOR OF~ICIAI. USH: QNI.ti'
ECONOMIC FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMAN"~
MATTHOEFER OPTIMIST~IC ON EFFECTS OF 1982 FINANCIAL POLICY
Hamburg CAPITAL in German Oct 81 pp 12-13
[Interview with FRG Minister of Finarice Hans Matthoefer: "Change in Exchange Rate"]
[Text] In the opinion of Minister of Finance Matthoefer,
the German marlc is showing new strength thanks to increased
exports and future investments. It presents an opportunity
for the German Bundesbank to consider a reduction in interest
rates.
CAPITAL: Herr Matthoefer; your tanned face seems to be an indication that the
minister of finance survived the dispute about austerity ~neasures for ttte 1982
budget without any apparen~ wear and tear.
i
, Matthoefer: Nobody wanted to believe me when I predicted that in the end the coali-
j tion government would ~merge united from the discussion, although one interesting
round is sti11 to come when the Bundesrat will have its say.
! CAPITAL: A arentl there is little daz er that the Union states will force ou
~ PP Y S Y
! to accept an employment program in the Bundesrat, something which .you denied your
' own parCy.
i
~ Matthoefer: Tf~t is not qz~ite correct. Aft2r all, we not only saved money, but
we alsa creat~d tax incentives within a framework which permibs additional medium-
- term investm~nts that tray go as high as 2-billion digit figures.
' CAP?TAL: CLL ~L is r.oi: an ea,p~.uyrnet:.t ~~;~o~!':~m ~:ha~. ~vilZ be financed through tax
increases, sometliing that was als~ demanded by tilie cabinet.
� Matthoefer: A12 ny life I have taken pains to t~void word fetishism. Nevertheless,
it is irrefutable that the f.iscal policy of ;.h~. Federal Government will contain
employmer:i: i.nip~il sFS . They will be inherent ~Ln tr e 1982 budget and the laws which
accozapa~Yy {t.
CAPITAL: It is a conaervatiue fisGal policy, besrin~; the mark of the 6ocial
n~ms~~'I'dC'Tc N�~r, ''~ttt.oefer.
Matt'~oe~~:r: L~ ~nat; the way y~u want to put ~t, it ia all right with me. I am
continuously asking myself the yuestion: What~ver.you are doing, is it sensible?
_ 3
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CAPITAL: In your opinion, what is sensible?
Matthoefer: The current economic situation must be taken into consideration and ~
the realization that~employment c~nnot be guaranteed sole~.y and exclusively througit
fiscal and budgetary policies. Other elements, part~cularly in.terest rate policies,
play a mucr more decisive role than was the case even a few years ago. ;
CAPITAL: Ac:cording to one or ,your old an~ frequentlp repeated sayings, ~ reduction ~
in the interest rate is the best ecouomic program....
Ma.tthoefer: ...which makes sense. Investment decisions are certainly affected by
interest rates, and it makes a difference whether they are 14 or 6 percent.
CAPITAL: And at the present time you cannot offer a more favorable alternative to
the 14-percent rat~. '
Matthoefer: Right, the decisive disturbing factor is the deficit in our balance of
payments. We have to keep our inter~st rates high to prevent the outflow of capital
to foreign countries on top of foreign.-exchange payment~ for our balance~of~payments
deficit...e
CAPITAL: ...which happened in the past and contributed to the strong decline in the
value of the German mark....
Matthoefer: ...and we have to keep r~ur interest rates high tn attract foreign ~
capital to Germany to compensate for the outflow of foreign eacchange and remain
competitive with high American interest rates. It is working right now. If, more-
over, the balance-of-payments deficit decreases--either because of an increase in
exports or a decrease it? oil importa--the Bundesbank may consider a reduetion in
interest rates.
CAPITAL: But did you not forget something? Paul Volcker, the president of the
American Federal Reserve Bank, ,just announced that the phaae of high interest rates
in his country will have to continue for a while.
Matthoefer: I admit that the high level of American interest rates is a groblem
for us, but it is not the only one and not the most important one. There is a
slight indication that the German mark is beginning to regain strength; the German
mark is enjoying international confidence--the most recent influx of capital is
proof of it--which is occurring in spite of the fact that there is a difference of
apprnximately 5 percent in the interast rate, when compared to the United States.
CAPITAL: What are the reasons for this confidence?
_ Matthoefer: We all put in a ~ot of effort to put our house in order. The fact ~.hat
we are trying very hard to b~ing about price atability, although it is difficu3,t for
us to avoid certain inflationary pressures because we import 30 percent of our
commodities and their prices have risen 20 p~rcent, is one of the reasons.
CAPITAL: Another reason is the fact that the German mark is undervalued. As long
as the li.S. interest rates are h~.gh, the dollar will be at a premium.
4
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Matthoefer: It depends on many other imponderables, for instance, whether the
optimism will last about the economic policq of the Reagan administration, whether
the Americans will actually be able to bring down their high rate of inflation,
effectively rEduce unemployment and whether the United States will be able to main-
tain the surpluses in its ~alance of payments. .
CAPITaI.: And if this ia not the case?
Matthoefer: I would have an immediate effect on the exchange rate of the German
_ mark. Because the consequence might be a reversal in the flow of cagital.
CAPITAL: In other words, it would flow back to Germany.
Matthoefer: Under certain conditions it would occur very rapidly, because a cur-
rency that is suspected of being revalued attracts the interest of international
investors.
CAPITAL: If that should be the case, the German mark would rise as quickly as
it fell.
Matthoefer: Nevertheless, we wili have to make sure that the Ger~an mark does not
_ rise too fast. The Americdns, who are still leading in tPChnology, have lower
wages and social expenditures. If the exchange rat~ of the dollar should drop
, sharply, the combination--leading technology, low wages and an undervalued cUrrency--
would under certain circumstances have disastrous effects on our exports.
CAPITAL: Is that not an exaggerated interpretation?
Matthoefer: Nobody is able to predict the future, but one must be prepared for
all eventualities.
CAPITAL: W~ have seen in the past that substantial dollar fluetuations within a
~ short period of time have disadvantageoue effects on the world economy. In your
' opinion, is there a possibility tha.t the German mark can be made independent from a
volatile dollar.
;
, Matthoefer: We are using the opportunities that are available to us. The key word
is: Elimination of the balance-iof-payments dpficit. '3'here is only one component
oThi.~~F, we will not be able to infl.u~~s:e- ~-*~s~ -7n-�~~3r_y and economic policy.,
WP ~~ve to leave fluctuations in ~yc~.:~r.~e Yn..!-~4 *_he tsa+-kets. Furthezmo.r.e; t2,~
note-issuing banks are in agreement that the~~ must prevent wild ~umps in exchange
_ rates through intervention, and they are doing it~ Nevertheless, we all a~e not
strong enough to apply the means of intervention against any change in the exchangc~
rate. I do not evez think that i.t is desirab:ie, becauge it must be regulated by
the market.
~CAPI?'AL: Looking at the matter rr_alisti.cally, whe,.e atll the German mark be in
1982_ .r.onsidering the conditions }ou menttonF:d~
:F�_ ~~fer: A preliminary ramar~c: .ias o:zN te~r peuple who pr2c3ieted a
reva~luatioti of the d~llar dur3ng the 1979 Wor'1(.i Cucren~y Conference in Belgrade.
Because at that time the doliar was undervalued.
J
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ir~~ ~~t~t~1~ 1 ~1 ! ~eF~ r1N1 1
CAPITAL: Now it is overvalued.
Matthoefer: Yes. But it cannot be permanent that a currency can rise so high of a
coimtry that~is experiencing an inflation rate which is up to $ perceat higher when
compar.ed to the FRG. The for~ign and the domestic value of the dollar are no ~
_ longer in agreemen~t. I predict a change ia 1982.
CApITAL: The G~rman mark will rise again. �
Matthoefer: I believe so.
CAPITI~L: Interest ratea will decline. '
Matthoefer: I hope so.
COPYRIGHT: 1481 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
~
8991
CSO: 3103/39
_ ,
!
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ECONOMIC SPAIN
- 1982 BUDGET TO RESULT IN HIGHER DEFICIT, INFLATION
Madrid CANIBIO 16 in Spanish 12 Oct 81 p 67
[Article: "Stopgap Budgets"]
[Text] The government has now introduced to Parliament ita propo5al. for public
revenue and expenditures for 1982: a state budget whi~h amounts to a.5 billion
pesetas, and another 2.4 billian pesetas for social security. In all, the expen-
diture amounts to nearly 6 billion pesetas, which cannot be covered by taxes and
other revenue anticip~ted by the public treasury. Hence the 1982 b-udget has come
into existence with a def icit of 698 milbion pesetas, although many experts agree
that the "red figures" may actually reach a billion pesetas.
~ In submitting these voluminous accounts, the minister of finance, Jaime Garcia
' Anoveros, stated: "These budgets are a reflection of the crisis being experienced
' by the c~untry ~n the one hand, and the government's economic policy and the agree-
' ments reached with the social and political forces in the areas of employment,
, autonomies, local corporations and industrial restructuring, on the other."
; To seal gaps caused by the serious ec~nomic crisis and to respond to the labor,
; autonomous and municipal consensus are the bases for this 6 billion pesetas that
i will come out of the taxpayers' pockets next year, and the ,justification for a
high deficit, which is of particular concern to busineas owners and to the govern~-
' ment itself.. "~~e would have liked to submit a lower deficit, but in order to do so
it would have been necessary to increase the tax pressure further, which does not
seem re~sonable, or to f.ail to meet urgent needs caused ty the crisis, which dces
~ m r 1_P ~ ther."
not ~E~e oss~b i
On the revenue side, the Finance Ministry has taken care not to increase the tax
pressure greatly (0.6 percent), indicating that Spaniards will pay only about 40
million nesetas more in 1982 than this year, in taxes, and that the greatest reve-
- r_ue will ~~me f.rom an improvement in tax administration. To encourage the taxpayer,
next ye~r. the exemptions for f3milies will incz~2ase (2,OG0 pesetas more for wive:
~nd ~:hildr�en), an.d Gavin gs wi11 be given an impetu9.
= The cYt4iG he~~rs a laYge share in. the item of Nxpenses. To improve the coverage of
�~.;.~;ye~, w_~ p?e~?~P~ i.n the Na.r.toral Acc~~7d or. Employment (AN~) entails
184 *~i_? :i'~o7: pes~t:a:: for the TtiEM (/5 perceuc a~~ie il~at~ ~~~is year) . Anotizer 358
million pesetas wi11 go to social security, to ease the burden of business firms
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and workers in their finances. The public enterprises will receive 184 million,
while 32.7 million will have to be allocated for the reconversion of sectors in
a etate of crisis. The territorial entities wil'1 receive 194 million, and an
additional 161 mil?_ion pesetas will be shared bet~reen town councils and chamber9
o� deputyes. ~
The black area of the budget is still, for another year, t'he deficit, and its
financing in ~articular. That 698 million will be finaa~ced with a long-term public
debt: (127 million), a foreign debt (100 million), a sHort-term public debt (120
million) and a mere appeal to the Bank of Spain, which will give it the "little
money machine" to make up the remaining 350 million. Thi.s cculd increase inflation,
while at the same time the public debt ia a risk for the procurement of aufficient
financing on the part of business firms.
The Distribution of the Budgetary Pie (millions of pesetas)
Sections Personnel Investments Other Expenses Total
_ Salaries
Household of His
Majesty the King - - 255 255
General Cortes 2,312 - 1,583 3,895
Office of the
' Controller of
Currency 209 5 25 239
Cor~stitutional Court 283 37 124 444
Council of State 175 5 32 212
Public Debt - - 132,496 132,496
Retirees 224,844 - 48,692 273,536
Judicial Branch 366
General Council 232 - 134
Presidency of the
Government 53,094 992 17,814 71,400
Foreign Affairs 7,224 774 9,700 17,698
Justice 30,506 10,783 17,959 59,248
Defense 207,520 123,911 77,$51 409,282
_ Finance 23,393 688 14,030 38,111
Interior 135,433 19,886 11,363 156,682
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Sections Personnel Investments Other Expenses Total
Salaries
~ Public Works and Urban
Development 25,442 53,88Q 90,552 169,874
Education 303,075 316 181,974 485,365
t,abor, Health and
Social Security 30,437 2,210 626,384 659,U31
_ Industry and Energy 3,120 1,137 138,052 142,309
Agriculture and Fishir.g 10,219 3,010 116,600 129,829
Economy and Commerce 6,234 4,761 6,736 17,731
Transportation, Tourism 228,013
and Commtinications 63,265 21,151 143,597
Culture 9,460 6,h99 Z4,127 30q306
Territorial Administration 697 11 741 1,449
Ministerial Foreign Exchange 89,251
Expenses ~ 45,818 3,038 40,395
Territorial Entities - - 194,098 194,098
~ Interterritarial Compensation
Fund - 89,616 90,384 180,000
' Industrial Reconversion - - 32,700 32,700
Total 1,183,012 342,910 2,007,898 3,533,820
' How th? St?t.e ~~er.ds Ovx Money
Iten~ l~1t~2 R~+~~;et. ~.981 Rudget Increase
Personnel saYaries 1,203,846 1,062,672 13.28
Assets 980,200 863,166 13.55
~ Lia'.~;.1?.t Ie~= 223.646 ]_99,506 12.09
135,494 112,409 20.53
Goods anci ~Pr~r~l.CC�s
DeEense b1,~s51 47,217 30.99
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- Item 1982 Budget 1981 Budget Increase
Others ~ 73,643 65,192 12.96
Interest 83,891 57,267 46.49
Current transfers 1,247,756 877,240 42.23
Social security 358,499 216,870 65.30
Unemployment 174,400 100,000 74.40
Territorial entities 167,353 135,760 23.27
Civil War pensions 48,693 24,382 99.70
Enterprises and OAC 184,913 136,902 35.06
_ Free education 72,454 57,299 26.44 ~
FORPPA [Fund to Regulate Farm .
Products and Prices] 34,174 22,982 48.69
Others 207,270 183,045 9.39
Total current operations 2,670,987 2,109,588 26.61
Real investments 342,987 271,806 26.18 ~
Capital transfers 486,652 392,689 21:24
Total capital opprations 829,639 664,495 24.85
Various financial assets 19,288 38,594 3.73
Various financial liabilities 58,086 30,523 90.30
Total financial ope.rations 77,374 49,117 57.52
~ Grand total * 3,578,00~ 2,823,200 26.73
- * The 1982 Budget has increased in the estimate of expenses that had to be met owing
to the transfers of authority to the Basque Country.
COPYRI~HT: 1981, Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
. 2909
CSO: 3110/24
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POLITICAL FEDE~i.AL REPUBLIC QF GERMAAIY
- BI~Dr'~.'~OPF, GEISSLI~~i. ESPOUSE NEW CDU OSTPOLITIR
Hamburg STERN in G erman 15 o ct 81 p 256
~Article by Werner P. D~hein and Uwe Zimmer: "Fond Greetings to Moacow]
' ~ext~ Biede;nkopf and Geissler are espousing a new CDU ostpolitik~
but party chief Kohl is still hesiteint.
Genertjl Secretary Heiner Geissler and his predecessor behind the party tcanager~ s
desk, Kurt Biedenkopf, have climbed aboard the same boat. The two prominent IInion
' politicians, who once were rivals~ have been putting their heads together and con-
; spiring behind the bacls of opposition leader Helmut gohl to get the CDII moving
, instead of waiting around for the SPD/FDP alliance to collapse.
i
, Geissler and Biedenkopf want to kindle a discussion of a~ib~ ects that have thus far
been taboo. Kohl~ s riv~l. as the next candidate for the chancellorship~ Kiel~ s
' Minister-President Gerhard Stoltenberg, i.ntends to support the party's internal con-
frontation course; he gave assurances to thia effect in a confidential meeting a
- ueek ago Sunday. Berlin Governa.ng Mayar Richard von Weizsaeclcer is also in on it.
Startled by the great response engendered by the new peaGe movem~nt in the FRG~ this
self-proclaimed philosophical vanguard~ a first resolve ia to lead the Union to a new
� o stpolitik.
' ^eiss? er~ s longer-range perspective is tku.s: "We have a real chance with the voter
~ only if we c~n sell pec~ple on two things: The CDU can get along with the trade
unions and with the Russians." He and Biedenlcopf Warked together on a main motion
I ior the upcoming CDU Party Congress in Hamburg expresaing the CDU~ s readiness ~~for
' ~ cor~tin?ious exchange of ideas and iniormatien w3th i:~e Soviet leadership~" TY:e
documentf approved in the meantime by the perty's executive committee~ is not con~
tent with the Union~s previous �o~mula of ~'observance of existing treaties"; in-
_ stead, it subscribes to "further concrete steps designed to impmve and expand co-
operation in econom~:c~ scientific~ techriical and cultural spheres" with tY~~; Warsaw
F~act states. Says Biedenkopf: The Soviet Union must not r~nain "a black hole~~ to
.-he Union.
The~e new accents come at an inconveniemt time i:or Kohl now on a trip to the
tlnited States becauae he want s to repreaent himself and the Union to President
~,~n~c.;~ as the only solidly loyal par'tnex ~n the al7.iazir.e. Koh1~ a entourage be-
lie:ves that advances made to Mosco;a just ai ~his t~;~e wo:u.d have "to be percei~ed
by our kmerican friends as s sl.ap in the ~ce."
.
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_ Although Kohl does meet regularly with Eastern diplomats from East Berlin~ s
resident minister~ Moldt~ to Moscow's Ambassador Semyonov~ with whom Kohl spemt
3~ hours over dinner last week he leaves ~'no doubt~ even with these gentl~nen,
that a government headed by him~~ would stand ttunswervingly at the side of the IInited
States," according to a clo se Kohl associate.
President Reagan noted Kohl~s voW of loyalty with satiafaction and appreciation, but
~ America~s leaders inten~ to avoid any impression of encouraging a change of govern-
ments in Bonn~ let alone a Chancellor Rohl� xhe CDU chief is en unlmown quantity
for the Reagan administration. The Republicans in the White House are far more fam-
~ iliar with leading CDU politicians experienced in the ways af the United States
people like Walther Leisler Kisp~ Manfred Woerner~ Burt Biedenkopf and Ric~.ard von.
Weizsaecker.
- ~ week ago Monday~ wheri SPD Chairman Willy Brandt had to wait for some time in II. S.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig~s anteroom~ Reagan adviser Lawre~ce Eagleburger
had the guest from Bonn brief him on the situation in the Union. Eagleburger aeid
that people know "absolutely nothing here~~ about whether the CDU has as much of a
proble~~n ~,rith its young people as the SPD~ and uhere the younger Union gerieration
stands on issues like peace and armament. The American gave sober consideration to
Brandt~ s report to the effect that the young people are d$aerting the Union
chiefly because the Uni.on is making light of the peace movement in the FRG~ is in-
- deed largely ignorin~ it.
The Americans would have to be even more sober in assessing the r esults of an opin-
ioii poll circulating s ecretly in Bonn. According to the ~udy~ only one out of three
CDU/CSU voters thinks it is better for the United Statea to have a greater defense
capability than the Soviets; 61 percent of Union voters favor immediate diearmament
negotiations trith no attendant arms modernization. One out of every three CDU sup-
~ porters would even forgo the modernization if negotiations should come to a stand-
sti11~ since ~~the West is strong enough as it is." And 50 percent favor depending
on the United States militarily but not socially.
Numbers like these support Geissler and Biedenkopf in their opinion that a more
critical d.istance with respect to the policies of the United States as an alliance
partner could do no harm. They intend to direct the Union~ s attention to the fact
that ~~wc definitely also have interests in common with the Soviet Union and the
other r~ast ~uropean countries" (Bieder~kopf). Says Geissler: "It i~~t enough ~ust
to keep on counting missiles and bombs."
COPYR.IGHT: 19~1 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
745g
Cso: 3103/55
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POLITICAL I~Y
REACTIONS IN PSI AGAINST CRAXI'S 'DICTATORIAI.' METHODS
~ ~tilan PANORAMA In Italiaa 10 ?~ug 81 pp 32-34
[Article by Filippo Ceccarelli: "Autocraxi"]
[Text] He decides, he does aad wzdoes without listening to anyone, ~ust like an
absolute boss. But the despotic aiethods of the PSI secretarq, Bettino Craxi, are
beginning to provoke reactions. Q~nd not oaly within a small minority of the party.
~"And I still represent it." For tha fifth time in a row in less thaa 2 months. �
Despite four failures.
For Bettino Craxi, for exactly 5 years the head of the PSI, the socialist ~urist
Federico Mancini is the best possible candidate for the constitutional court. But
above all he is "his" c3ndidate ax~d therefore he cannot lose. He must not lose.
The treacherous allies of the government who promise their support and then do not
keep their word, they do not scare him. Still, he is wonied about the snipers
harbored by the PSI.
No socialist, none at all, at any level, caa interfere in the matter. If the PSI,
now, were to change its mind aad present another professor instead a~ Maacini, it
" would simply be because Bettino has changed his. He alone.
These are Bettino Craxi's rules for the PSI. "Autocraxi," as someone has already
called it.
Oa the very same daq, Thursday the 30th, a few hours before the 42 members of the
, socialist leadership met, a raised eqebrow oa the part of the secretary was eaough

= to cause the failure of a project whica theq had been talking about within the PSI
for years: the creation of an euecutive committee, a more flexible and smaller
executive body (at most 7 to 9 members) inteaded as the first step of the organiza-
tional restructuring of the party.of tihe carnation. Theq waated it to be 15. Too
many. And ever~thing was blocked. So strong is Craxi: ~e has governed alone up
to now, he can continue very well this wa.y.
That the leader of the Italian Socialists has a rough and authoritarian way of making
policies is certainly not a revelation. But the fact is that for some time his
political stqle has become even more radical. And within the PSI there are quite
a few, not only among the adversaries af the lef t, but also among the friends of
the inner majoritq (72 percent), who consider with some concern the current record
of the secretariat and who are stirxing up grumbling and intolerance with the PSI,
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~ at the center as wel? as on the periphery. Up to now, the Cragi style had only
brought advantages to the party. First of all, in the area of soeialist leadership,
it had prattically solved one of th~ most delicate problems of the PSI: political
- indecisioa and slow progress. "There is no doubt," maintains Gennaro Acquaviva,
the head of Craxi's political secretariat, "today, the PSI is the party with the
greatest capacity for decisian." More manageable than any other, with dissension
reduced to the minimum.
Furthermore, it is Craxi who decides the electoral line, supervises the lists of
candidates, resolves the delicate local-situations. It is Crasi who writes and has
others write in AVANTI, who decides whether to respond and how to respond to the
other parties. It is Craxi who chooses the dates, preparas the Palermo congress
~ aad who officiates. Furthermore, it is Craxi who alone sees to international
- contacts, Cr:sxi who intends to chaage for the nth time the symbol of the PSI (the
hammer aad sickle, which are already hidden, would completely disappear).
After the Palermo plebicite, with his direct investiture as secretary by almost
three fourths of the delegates, and especiallq after having led the PSI to success
_ in the recent administrative elections, Craxi has had some justification for making
his own pawer even more absolute within the party and protecting that style of
_ governing which Michele Achilli, the leader of the extreme internal left, is one
- of the few to have th~ courage within the PSI to define publicly as despotic. But
the autocratic model does not always benefit the party's owa image. Especiallq,
when Craxi's broadsides serve to confirm Silvano Labriola (in the lists of the P2
of Licio Gelli) as head of the socialist group in Montecitorio; to cause to fall
on his f~et th~ former minister Enrico Manca (another suspicious P2) procuring for
him the office of president of the Chamber's Industry Committee; to torpedo Franco
Rev~glio as minister of Finance (an old grudge); to forca on the groups, without
even dreaming o~ consulting them, the caadida~y of Federico Mancini.
~en the lack of interest which he demonstrates toward the traditional structures
of the party enters into the laws of autocraxi. In April 1980, when the socialists
returned to the government, the sections on economq, organization, problems of
state, health and women's rights have been without leadership. The old PSI
' apparatus, of "morandian~".origin, is fall.ing.to.pieces,and._nothing specific seems
destined to substitute for it.
"The result is that the PSI intervenes onlq on the questions c~hich interest the
secretary. There is no gosition, for instance, on the current government-union
confrontation," accuses Achilli. Luigi Cavatta adds thoughtfully from the Ief t:
"The almost [translation unkaown] zeal for lack of organization is certainly a
function of the Craxi phflosophq. The trouble is that it has negative cansequences
- in the internal life. It discourages political debate, certaialy damages the
selection and the formation of new leadership.
It is a fact, for instance, that in the last government, to place a capable and
_ aggressive man as minister of Finance, Craxi had to select Rino Formica who had
already been chosen by the deputy secretariat of the party, preciselq with the task
of watching over reorganization and the education of new cadres.
Authoritariansim, self-confidence, a touch of arrogaace. In a party governed
accnrding to these principles, it is natural then that every slip, every old style
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~ agreement should c:lash and stand out much more than in the past. That is the
- embarrassing situation in which the Central Commirtee of the PSI finds itself.
In Palermo, on the last night of the coagress, in the climate of a brawl, which ie
alwr~ys present on these occasions, a glaring mistake was made: the delegates
approved a list of candidates in which had been forgotten six suthoritative leaders,
among them the minister of Transport, Vincenzo Balzamo.
Nor~r the six ~xGluded ~:andidat~s are tryin$ desperately to ha~~e the mistake corrected.
Bur. the trouble has not been sesolved. Bettino Craxi has not yet found time to
chink about it.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Arnoldc~ Mondadori Editore S.p.A. Milano
8956
C50: 3104/~50
_ 1,
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x~
POLITICAL SPAIN
GONZALEZ SUPPORTS GOVERNMENT DESPITE DIFFERENCES
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 21 Sep 81 pp 34-37
[Interview with Felipe Gonzalez, secretary general of the Socialist Party, on
Calvo Sotelo's government, by correspondent Jose Manuel Ari~a; date and place
_ not given]
[Text] Whether the government governs or not creates fictitious problems for
the citizens, according to Felipe Gonzalez in his interview with CAMBIO 16.
The sociatist leader cannot understand how, after a few months--irom March to
- July--of negotiations and agreements to resolve the state's problems, at the
return of su~ner politics are again fraught with tensions among the parties
! and a crisis in the centrist party and its government.
The NATO discussion, the letter from the Soviet Embassy, the statements made by
Ferrer Salat and the next PSOE [Spanish Socialist Worker~ Party] congress are
! other subjects on which the secretary general of the Socialist Party will com-
I ment. 1982, which in the opinion of Felipe Gonzalez could be a year of calm
dedicated to the solution of problems and the routing of coup attempts and ter-
I~, rorism, is now obscured by groundless confrontations.
I; Two letters are on the socialist leader's table: that of President Calvo
Sotelo's response to the centrist accusation that the PSOE was maintaining
secret agreements with the USSR and the astonishing note from the Soviets on
Spain's entrance into NATO. Also the recent speech given by Ferrer Salat,
' president of the employers' association. "I would say that Mr Brezhnev and
Ferrer Salat_ are a~j.ke in their intentions to damage the socialists," and a
relaxQd Felipe Gonza~_ez laugY~s 3t h~t.~ joke w~Ith h;s morning cigar in one hand
and a cup of corfee in ~he oth~r.
Felipe Gonzalez [FG]: President Calvo Sotelo's letter of response is respect-
able and respectful and a denial of any poisoning of that type. However, in
the lsst analysis, the slandering has been done and the affair is in the hands
of our atL~~tne~~s. Now with more reason than everT after Soviet interference
in Sn~in's ~~xternal affairs, which, it seems, was not expressly intended to
favor the ir.*_eres ~s of the Rigk~t.
,-~~~z?~y ; h! . Pt .,~�,t �^t ~?.~llt~ '~~trer. wi th Cal.va Sotelo than, previously,
with Suartsz? .
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- FG: I have had important conversations with Ca].vo Sotelo for our mutual knowl-
edge and, I believe, in the country's interest. The talks were not devoid of
difficulties, both in substance and style, and even relative to negotiation,
for, on one occasion, it was plain to s~e how the interests of the UCD [Demo-
cratic Center Union] were put on the table.
In any case, the level of communication and understanding was reasonable. Not
m~xch better than with Suarez. With Suarez relations deteriorated for various
reasons; one of these was that the agreements reached were not kept. Fiowever,
he is quick to judge peopl~ and interested in knowing if the agreements on em-
ployment and self-employment will be carried out.
C16: What are the best and worst features of the preaident of the government
and his cabinet?
FG: I should like to describe what has happened in the past few months. I am
astonished and concerned about our present situation, for September is a month
in which we are again speaking of a government crisis; ~ust as the school year
is now scheduled to begin, so is the government now scheduled to take off, and
talk reverts to crisis, simply because it is September.
C16: What is at the root af your astonishment and concern?
FG: After the vote of investiture and the events of 23 February, the logical
description of the political process is simple: First, there is a socialist
government offer of a broad ma~ority to protect the executive branch from
attacks of violence and involvement and endow it with the strength necessary to
defend the democratic institutions. That offer by the PSOE is refused.
- To continue, the government offers a negotiating policy on state matters which
the PSOE accepts and supports in its entirety, not only participating but also
~ frequently offering a wark method, program and time span for carrying out pro-
3ects. Therefore, my party is playing a role in the strengthening of our insti-
tutions which no one can deny and which gives me the right to say what follows.
Fr~m February to July, the govemment has had: an economic policy partially
carried out through an agreement with the social forces--namel.y, the National
Agreement on Employment--where there are no attacks by leftist forces against
the government, and agreements on the sub3ect of self-employment which will
enable the government to adopt a politicgl program to confront what has right-
fully been called the ma,jor problem of the democratic state.
' In addition, in ~he struggle against violence, the government has the explicit
and implicj* support of all the country's democratic forces. This means that
the government can concentrate all its forces on combating coup attempts and
~errorism.
I believe that with the program I have ~uet outlined, which affects 36 million
Spaniards, governing properly means being able to govern Spain by successfully
f acing up to its major problems. With that political capital acPumgident Calvo
the government and--I am not betraying a trust in saying so--by
Sotelo, the month of July ends.
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And September opens with an absolutely forced and fictitious confrontation with
subjects such as NATO, or private television, when there is an Executive branch
with a possibility of stabilizing his regime by the end of 1982? Let them come
and explain that to me. Fox I am able, through my behavior and that of my par-
ty, to demand.that the government govern. Let them concern themselves with th~
resolution of Spain's problems, the real ones, and ler them take us on.to 1983
or until the next elections which must be--and I believe they should be in 1983--
held in peace and tranquillity. May nu false problems be invented.
C16: But NATU and private television are also important problems.
- FG: I do not say that those problems are not important, but they are also im-
portant for 1983. They can wait a year and a half; they do riot need to occupy
the attention of the social forces at a time when the country needs stability
and concentration c~f its efforts. However, I c~ntinue to have grave doubts as
to why elements of discord keep cropping up when our efforts should be devoted
to overcoming all divisiveness and trying to unite all our wills to the maximum
to help our country progress.
C16: What explanation do you have for this?
FG: I have none, to be truthful. There is a sophisticated answer and one which
is less sophisticated; I accept~ neither. The sophisticated answer says that
the poiicy of socialist r.esponsibility is auch that the PSOE has more cre3ibil-
ity in public opinion and, therefore, it was necessary to shatter that image of
- understanding to overcome the major problems, and we are covering up the ob~ec-
' tive weakness of our government team for which we are respon~ible. Then, there
is another less sophisticated explanation: That the governmznt cannot stand
~ the pressure being put upon it from abroad.
C16: Is there not a third explanation? That they cannot gavern with their own
party divided and with opposition from within?
FG: That would place a lot of responsibility on the UCD. For many months I
have been saying that the UCD should straighten out its affairs. That it is
important for Spain that it do so. Ho~.~ will t:h~.s be done? That is not my prob-
lem, but it is obvious that the UCD cannot hide its responsibilities by provok-
ing groundiess confrontations. With Nt~TO, private television and the sub~ect
of r~~pe~eed, it mig'rie ha~~e a.uopt:_d a pusitln~i wh~.ch would pacify the country
unti~. ?~ne end of 1982.
C16: But could not UCD's internal problems begin to affect everyone?
FG: Certainly, but democracy has certain rules which must be respected. One
o� those ~5 ne~ to play pim-pam-pum in texmir.atir.g one government to promote
another wi:hout respecting the people's will. Bir a ma~ority of ~~otes the peo-
~le hava ct~o;.~en s UCD regime witich is ro govern ftcia elect~on to election.
When it is ~iu~e for the next elections, the peopl.e will be able to evaluate the
r~~:~lts ob:~a:C.~~d '~y those in .~hom they place~ tneir cunf.idence. I must not act
ot::erwis4. for 1 cannot me~idle {.r *.he internal probiens of another party.
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~ rr~i~ t?F ti~ ! te 1~~k ~~'~i ~
C16: In your opinion, what is at the root of Calvo Sotelo's haste to enter f
N.ATO?
- FG: I find no explanation. It is an obscure discussion in the eyes of the
cit~.zenry, in which they are hearing the strangest things. For example, when
it is said that no country submitted to a referendum. But that was in 1949.
Spain's present situation is different, and the people are divided. That is
_ why we are requesting a popular opinion. For a referendum can be held, no mat-
ter what they say. And perhaps the safest thing is to hold it. The UCD will
then be in the minority, but the Spanish citi2ens will say whether or r?ot they
want to be in NATO.
The Alliance has a historic logic which I would like to see changed, so that
military blocs would disappear and true detente and an atmosphere of peace
would follow. However, in the meantime, NATO and the Warsaw Pact are with us.
PSOE's position is clear: we are not against it, but we do not want to enter
NATO. Therefore, our car:paign is not based exclusively on a negative approach
but, rather, on the possibility of informing and consulting the peopl~.
- C16: What is the significance of the lettex from the Soviet Embassy?
FG: To me the USSR's interference in Spain's internal affairs is intolerable.
And in addition, the same style is always repeated: the domineering style
which the So~iet Union and Americans use. For in that domineering style there
_ is always a certain underlying threat which makes it more intolerable.
Moreover, the Soviet Union has never agreed that Western Europe should try
alternative models of leftist government which might put their own model in
jeopardy, the model they ~all soc:ialism but which I call com~unism. It is
more than clear that throughout the political struggle of the past 20 years
in France the USSR has supported De Gaulle, Pompidou and, later, Giscard
against the candidates of the Left and, in the last three elections, Mitt~rrand.
Is such evidence to be found in Spain? I h~ve not seen it that cl~~rly, for
all in all, we have had only 4 years of democracy. But what is clearly s~een
is that the USSR's interference in Spain's internal affairs is damaging th~
position of the parties which do not want Spain's entry into NATO. It is a
ploy which appears intended to make a campaign gift to those who want to enter
NATO, using a negative argument: as the Russians do not want us to do so, it
will be good to enter NATO.
C16: The PSOE congress is to begin within a month. Will a govertmnent program
~ be prepared there as though the socialiate wil~ win the next elections?
FG: That congress will deal with the broad lines of a political, social, eco-
nomic and cultural strategy, which is what an ordinary party congress should do;
and n~t, in my opinion, succumb to the temptation of discuasing all the problems
which would be incorporated in a program of government action. Later, through
representative conventions and meetings of the organization, it will be neces-
~ sary to deal with each of the aspects programmed for possible government action
in addition to what has been accumul.ated throughout the years.
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_ I am reluctant to speak of the next congress, for, as I am now secretary general,
I do not want to condition the delegatea in their options or thinking. However,
= by definition., there is no doubt that there will be no other ordix~ary cangress
before the general elections. Thus, we shall consider the hypothesis that the
party r~ight take over the reins of government. And that, more than anything
else, should mark the sense of responsibility the delegates feel toward the
citizenry. It should be such that when it is said that a certain thing should
~ be done, there is no doubt ttiat it can be done; so that we do not indulge in
theory until the end of the century.
C16: Will the congress mark the passage from Mazxism to social democracy within
- the PSOE?
FG: I do not think so, because, among other things, such polemics are rather
groundless and are not the polemics of the true citizens...
C16: Will the congres5 tone down the difference in opinion held by radical mem-
bers and a maderate leadership, as sometimes mention.ed?
FG: There are two or three co~ents frequently heard: that the bases are more
radical than the leadership,~that the party has no skill.~d personnel, how will
they govern, and the like. The people--and the socialist bases are people, in-
dustrious people--have many times demonstrated their strength and patience with-
out, at the same time, failing to expresa their desire for change and their
I denunciation of the inequ~lities and in~uatices of this society.
; It appeara to me difficult to have valuable opinions of that nature when part of
the bases of the Socialist Party are repreaented in union activity within the
labor movement, basically in the UGT [General Union of Workers], but also in the
I CC00 [Workers Co~issions~, and outside both union organizations. And when
I those bases are capable of making a wage agreement in so~lidarity with an em-
ployment policy, what morE can be asked of that capacity for sacrifice?
~ C16: Socialization can be asked, as Ferrer Salat has said. .
FG: Hpre ch~ c~:'y element in rhe country whtch is hard and intransigent is a
sector of the Right which wants to go on maintaining the inequalities. There
are personages who utter do~~atic opinion regarding these evils, like Ferrer
Salat, wha :;u~~~ tnat the governmetit ia doing badly because it does not lean
�ar er.oug~ tr~ the Riglit; and ti?iat the bocia,.'_tzr. '~~~rty, desnite its moderation,
would S.iE:e to so~ialize society. Obviously.
If we had to wait for soci~l changes by pez'sons of that nature, children would
- still be worktng in the mines and we would no~~ have an 8-hour work day but
_ rather ~-~i11 u::Q c~~ 16, ~or it is never the righ~ time to decrease llours, have
~ore vu:.ac'_cn ~irne, cope with soLia_l welf~re ana sY~are the nation~31 wealth.
That is preclsely why there is a siruggle 1.n society, What is happening in
Spa~n t~iat tl,~s ~ocial str~iggle no~,- has a greater snare af civil.ization, of
respect, L~,rou:t~ say o:.' t:~u1y admiral,le hl~toric p+.~ience.
- 2G
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C16: How do you think 1982 will be?
FG: According tio the analysis made at the beginning, I see 1982 as a rather posi-
tive year. First, we have made an effort to strengthen *_he government by
broadening its parliamentary and social aupport; second, we have urged that
government to take the necessary action to resolve its problems and to come up ;
with a program of action which will solve problems of state; third, we think
the goverriment should concentrate its efforta on crushing coup attempts and
deterring violence.
I think of 1982--and I say this in all sincerity--as a year of tranquillity in
which the Spanish people will devote their efforts to resolving their problems.
The question asked now, in September, truthfully does not have the same answer; ;
but there is still time, for the government has a program which has been agreed
upon in all important areas.
But let it govern. If its party has problems, let it resolve them; let it still ~
have political capital for that. We can pay a price: that of having aided a gov-
ernment whose overall policy is not the same as ours. But we are willing to pay ~
that price for stability. For it is the gover.nment which pays the price for be-
ing firm and conducting the country's policy with steadfastness.
COPYRIGHT: 1981, Informacion y Revistas, S.A. i
8568
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400070029-9