JPRS ID: 9805 USSR REPORT PHYSICS AND MATHEMATICS

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400060044-3
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• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 44
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/10067
22 October 19g 1
Sub-Sceharan Afriea Re ort
p
FOUO No. 744
FB~S FOREIGN BROADCAST iNFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/10067
22 October 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 744
CONTENTS
I?VTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Brief s
USSR-Africa Trade 1
ANGOLA
Precarious Financial Situation of Cement Plant
_ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 4 Sep 81) 2
Briefs
French Trade Mission 3
- Portuguese Electrical Equipment 3
BURUNDI
Economic Report to U.N. Conference on LDC's: 'Better Connections With
Outside World'
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER'ANEENS, 21 Aug $1) 4
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Possible U.S. Involvement in Anti-Dacko Coup
(JEJNF. AFRIQUE, 16 Sep 81) 9
Reasons for Anti-Dacko Coup Noted
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 Sep 81) 11
Regime's Attitude Toward IMF Program Uncertain
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 16 Sep 81) 15
COMORO ISLANDS
Economic Problems of Archipelago Surveyed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEUITERRANEENS, 2$ Aug 81) 17
_ _ a _ [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]
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GAMBIA
Cixcumstances Leading to Proposal of Senegambian Federation Examined
(Francois Soudan; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Sap 81) 23
Pros and Cons of Senegambian Union Discussed
(Sylviane Kamara; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 23 Sep 81) 2?
IVORY. COL~ST
Industrial Statistics Show Deciine in Most Sectors
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Sep 81) 29
MALAWI
Transportation, Tourism, Energy Fnci of Economic Plan
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Aug 81) 34
MOZAMBIQUE
Brief s
Radio Set Owner~hip 39
_ Electric Equipment Purch~ses , 39
- A:lrline Sale of Planes . 39
Bulgarian Banking Cooperafcion 39
USSR FACIM Pavillion 40
Increased French FAC IM Presence 40
NIGER.IA
Petroleum Production, Revenue Declines
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET.MEDITERRANEENS, 11 Sep 81) 41
Oil Price To Be Aligned With Saudi Arabia's ~
(MARCH~S TROPICAUX ET MEllITERRANEENS, 28 Aug 81) 42
Brief s
_ Insecurity in Lagos 43
tJew NNPC Head � . 43
- Oil Deposits Discovered 43
RWANDA
Economic Report to U.N. Conference on LDC's: Coming Qut of 'Splendid
Isolation'
~ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 21 Aug 81) �44
SENEGAL
- Briefs
Community Developmen t Budget 50
Diversification of Agricultural Prodection 50
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EEC Aid 51
UK Aid 51
_ Senegalese Refugees in Zambia 51
Iraqi Rural Development Credit 51
Argentine Aid 52
French Aid ~Z
TANZANIA
Briefs
Tanzania-Rwanda Textile Plant 53
Canadian Aid 53
Cooperatior. Accord With Angola S3
Expansion of Cement Production 54
- Tanzania-India Joint Pro~ects 54
Indian Aid Requested 54
ZAIRE
Brief s
Chinese, Zairian Cultural Agreement . 55
National Aid to Business 55
ZAMBIA
State Farm Program Delayed Despite Foreign Interest
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Aug 81) 56
Briefs
Industry Study 58
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
_ BRIEFS
- USSR-AFRICA TRADE--In 1980 trade betsaeen the USSF and African countries totaled
2 billion rubles ($2.6 million), a 40-percent rise over 5 years. In the first
6 months of the current year the largest increases occurred in trade with Hoz~m-
= bique (up 161 percent), Tanzania (up 109 percent), Guinea (up 54 percent) and Algeria
(up 50 percent). The USSR has economic dealings with 47 of Africa's 51 countries
- ar~d in the coming S years it intends "to foster mutually advantageous trade with
African countries and other fledgling nations." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
_ ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1872, 25 Sep 81 p 2423]
CSO: 4719/92
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ANGOLA
PRECARIOUS FINANCIAL SIT'JATION OF CEMENT PLANT
- Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 4 Sep 81 p 2291
[Text] The regort of the Empresa de Cimentos d~ Angola (CIMANGQLA) for the 1980
_ fisc~.~l year contributes some useful information on the activities of that firm.
CIMANGOLA, a joint publicly and privately owned Gompany, followed on the heels of
Secil do Ultramar, SARL, to c~nclude a process begun in 1978 with the nationalization
of that company and ended last year with the signing of the contract with Che
- associated Danish firtas.
The fiscal year reviewed was also marked by two contracts signed to overhaul the
cement plant and to build an access platform near the factory. Wor.k should begin be-
fore the end of the year and will make it possible for cement to be produced at
installed capacity level and to be quickly shipped out to the provinces or other
countries.
CIMANGOLA sales during the 19�~0 fiscal year totalled 243,000 tons or 32 percent of
the installed capacity, if the sales volume is regarded as the same as the production
- volume. This, however, was not the case, since there were stocks left over from the ,
previous fiscal year which were sold. With this correction, production is estimated
at about 31 percent of installed capacity.
The production plan was realized to the tune of 72 percent, and the sales plan to
76 percent. The sales plan showed different resulta, howQVer, depending on whether
it concerned sales on the domestic Angolan market (95 percent exe~cution) or sales
abroad (48 percent execution).
I Contrary to what its directors anticipated in 1979, CIMANGOLA continues to experience
a precarious financial situation. The company must cope with high financial costs,
particularly in the form of interest owed to banks for short-term f3nancing. It has
attempted to negotiate a contract with banks to obtain long-term financing and return
the company permanently to a sound position. A contract of this ~ort would give
greater operating flexibility and reduce the amount of interest owed. However, it
was unable to conclude the contract, an~d as of last 31 December, the day on which the
past fiscal year closed, CIMANGOLA eti11 owed banks interest amounting to 38.8 million
kwanzas.
With the reorganization of the cement plant, production should increase. But in the
best of circumstances, the favorable impact of thia recovery will not be felt before
1987_. It is only then at the earliest that the company can think about settlin~
its debts whi.ch now total more than 75 million kwanzas.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Mareux Et Cie Paris 1981.
9805
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
FRENCH TRADE MISSYON--The French Foreign Trade Center (CFCE) is orgainzing a multi-
sectoral trade mission to Angola November 18-26, 1381. It will focus on equipment
~ and supplies for agriculture, livestock raising and agro-industry, and will be
accompanied by Mr Calude Lecluse, head of the African Section of the CFCE. This mis-
sion, organized in con~unction with the Angolan embassy in Paris and in close
coaperation with the economic expansion poat in Luanda, will give the participants
an opportunity to meet officials from the Angolan agenc~.es and departments involved
in agriculture, livestock raising and the food indusCries. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1810,11 Sep 81 p 2348] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 9805
PORTIJGUESE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT--At the end of Auguat Angola signed two contracts
with a Portuguese company. The first is a$10 million contract to furnish and install
equipment to modernize the high voltage power line linking Cambambe dam to Luanda.
The second, in the amount of $5 million, involves construction of a thermal power
plant in the centier of the country. [Text] [Paria MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French No 1870,11 Sep 81 p 2348] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]-
9805
C~O: 4719/35
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BURUNDI
' ECONOMIC REPURT TO U.N. CONFERENCE ON LDC's: 'BETTER CONNECTIONS WITH OUTSiDE WORLD'
Paris MARCHFS TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS fn Frencii No. 1867, 21 Aug 81 pp 2147-2149
[Burundian Report to the U.N. Conference on Least Developed Countries: "Have
- Cor~nections with the Outside World."]
_ [Text] Except for a few details and nuancea, we find exactly the same charm,
attraction and weaknesses in Burundi as in Rwanda. The two countries are ~uxtaposed.
One seems to be tl:e carbon copy of the other: the same lush green hills, the same
rlispersed dwellings which intrigue geographers and socialogists so much, the same
soil good for many different crops, the same paradisiac climate, the same Congo-Nil
mountainous spine and, to cap it all, the same ethnic groups: a Hutu majority,
Tutsi minority. In Burundi, however, this is the main difference--the "giant" Tutsi
are in power.
Of course as far as the land is concerned, Rwanda is compared to Sicily and Burundi
- to Belgium; the countryside of one country brings to mind Switzerland, and the other
Savoy, but these are hardly distinctions that separate them. During the Belgian
administration, moreover, this region was only a single territory, Ruanda-Urundi,
with Bu~umbura as the main city. Now there are two sovereign states and, curiously,
_ this was when serious dissension began to appear between the Hutu and Tutsi commu-
nities.
We also find in Burundi the problems we discussed for Rwanda: distance from the
~ sea, strong population pressure, soil depletion, or in short a situation which gives
~ this country all the characteristics of an underdeveloped economy. The figures
change and so do the names of the cities, bt.t we are etill in a rugged country.
- A Landlocked Country with Population Problems
It is a long road to Dar-es-Salaam, Burundi's supply port. First there is a 180
km stretch on Tanganyika Lake from Bujumbura, the capital, to Kigoma in Tanzania.
Then 1,200 km by rail fro~ Kigoma to the port of shipment, Dar-es-Salaam. This is
the most frequently used itinerary (85 percent of foreign trade). Another possi-
bility is to pass through Uganda to reach Mombasa in Kenya, in other words the
Rwandan rou~te. You can also reach the Mozambique ports via Zambia and Mjulungu
_ (a lake port), or Lobito on the Atlantic through Zaire. But it is out of the
question for the time being to use this itinerary because of the disturbances
which have been afflicting Angola for years.
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One need only remember the almost complete halt in supplies between October 1978
and .July 1979 to get an idea of how precarious Burundi's relations with the out-
side world are. At that time, a veritable air-lift had to be set up from May 26
to 17 July to avoid critical supply problems. One hundred forty-four flights were
m~de between Bu~umbura and Dar-es-Salaam and 5,000 tons of goods were shipped. The
- operation cost $6 million, and the net loss for ~he economy was $45 million. We
understand that the officials have prepared pro~ects in this area. We will examine
them further on.
Another concern, and not one of the least, is the population growth in a restricted
area. With one mill~on more people in the next 10 years, and 95 percent of the
_ population scattered in rural areas, intensively working land which is becoming
depleted, what will the situation be by 1990? The geographic and social character-
istics (hilly countryside and small land-holdings), deforestation, the result of
energy needs, overgrazing and farming habits are all such that the soil is becoming
_ depleted and the yield is declining.
One would have to change nearly the entire structure to put modern techniques into
practice which could asaure an adequate food eupply. There is still land to be
exploited, mainly in the Ruzizi plain, the area bordering Tanganyika Lake and in
the Mosso region to the east, but investment capital and resources are needed. Aside
from international aid, how can they obtain them, if not by foreign trade?
Coffee, the Only Real Wealth
Exports are virtually confined to coffee, and efforts made to diversify the so-called
cash crops have not had convincing results. It is true that there has been progress
made with cotton and tea, but not enough. Let's look at the figures: in 1981,
19,000 tons of coffee, 6,000 tons of cottonseed, 2,000 tons of tea and a little
quinquina. These four products account for 92 percent of the total value of exports.
Coffee alone accounts for 75 percent. In 1978, exports went up to 6,243 million
B~rundian francsl, with coffee accounting for 5,139 million, and imports amounted
to 8,842 million, or a 2,599 million deficit. The next year this rose to 3,978
million. The balance of payments followed the trend and was in disequilibrium. This
trend can only worsen. I~ ~s impossible to see how it could be otherwise in a
country that has to import capital goods at any price merely to be able to improve
exports in coming years.
Slow Progress
In 1970 and 1976, the annual growth of GDP averaged 2.7 percent, or just a little
above the population growth (2.2 percent). Beginning in 1977, the rate of increase
went up to 4.4 percent on average. This is explained by the increase in investment
_ which, in constant values, went from 15.5 billion Burundian francs between 1974 and
1976 to 29.4 billion during the next 3 yeara. The growth in recent years has been
particularly great in the industrial and service sectors, 12 percent a year, while
the increase has averaged only 1.9 percer.t for food crops, or a rate l~wer than the
rate of increase in the population, a disturbing fact. Investment for the 1978-81
~
1 90 Burundian francs = 1 U.S. dollar.
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~ period can be broken down as follows: 54.5 percent for the tertiary sector, 26.7
percent for the secondary sector an~ 18.8 perce~t for the primary sector.
It is important to note that only one-fifth of t'hese investments was financed out
of dome~tic savings, with the rest coming from f~reign aid. It can be estimated
at 12 percent uf GDP between 1974 and 1980.
As for the outstandir.g foreign public debt, it w~ent ~rom 629.6 million Burundian
francs in 1974 to 9,054 million in 1979. Deb~t servicing went from 88.4 million to
377.4 million during that same period. Howewer, the debt service as a percentage
of exp~rts has remained relatively stabl~--3 percent in 1974 as compared with 3.7
percent in 1979. This rate is expected te increase to 16 percent by 1985.
Fragile Economic Situation
Thus the economic and social development of burundi is hamper~.d by a rertain
_ number of factors representing real, bottl~enecks: low farming capacity, with food-
stuffs for the most part n~t ente~ing the ~onetary circuit; a.n industrial nucleus
concentrated mainly in Bu,jumbura; ov~rly weak infrastructuree; for an expanding
population; limited mineral resources; and, finally, an evid~^.t lack of trained
personnel. All of these facts place Burundi among the poorest countries. However,
the banks of Tanganyika Lake are ~ust as restful as those of Lake Geneva, the
mountains are not far away, the attraction is immediare. Livingstone, moreover,
fou�ad that it has a much better climate than Scotland. The era of ratings has
changed many things.
- 1981-90 Ter.-Year Program
You don't have to be a genius to imagine the unrelenting efforts that will have to
be made before the Burundi economy can come close to becoming a modern structure.
Invest, produce and export, this is economic orthodoxy. Burundi's leaders are
- perfectly well aware of this. First of all, here are the forecasts they made on
the growth of capital, i.e. of total resources (GDP glus imports): at market prices,
total resources should increase f rom 89 billion Burundian francs in 1980 to 109
billion in 1985, or at an annual rate of 4 percent. The GDP alone, valued at
74,252 million in 1980, will r~se to 107,603 million by 1990, or at an annual rate
of 4.3 percent. The various components of the GDP will inerease as follows:
agriculture 2.1 percent, industry 11 percent and exports also 11 percent. It is
immediately obvious that the problem of the food stortage cannot yet be solved and
that imports of grains and especially of fats will be needed for a long time to come.
How then do the different objectives outlined fo+r all the pro~ects link together,
sector by sector?
Rural Sector
Food crops will therefore increase by only 2.1 percent a year. The planners decided
to be modest, since agricultural structures are still too rigid to hope for any
noteble improvement in yields. Efforts will be cnncentrated in the Ruzizi valley
(rice) and in the Mosso valley (sugar cane and oil-palm).
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Export crops should register a considerat,le increase in production: coffee will
advance from 19,000 tons to 34,000 tons (1985), cotton f;:om 6,000 to 7,500 tons
and tea from 2,000 to 3,600 tons.
The rural sector has a total of 74 pro~ects, including the following:
_ - Integrated rural development (food crops and cash crops) at M�Panda, Kirimino
and N'Gozi;
, - Livestock improvement project in Mugamba/r;orth;
- Reforestation (Congo/Nil ridge and the south of the country);
- High-altitude cultivation of food crops in the tea-growing regions;
- Vegetable and fruit growing pro~ects (around Bu~umbura).
Industrial Sector ~
More than 30 pro~ects involve agro-industry, including a pro3ect to expand the
Bujumbura brewery (banana beer), conatruction of a sugar refinery, a coffee and
tea factory, a textil~ factory, etc. The pro~ects for a cement and a fertilizer
factory are linked to the extraction of carbonite phosphate in Matongo, near Kayanza.
In the mining sector, great h~pes have been placed in mining nicke~, with reserves
at 300 million tons. As for energy needs, they will increase and regional pro3ects
have been prepared, in cooperation with Zaire and Rwanda, within the compztent
committees of the CEPGL (Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes.
Transportation Infrastructure
- Three corridors, if onP can use that term, provide Burundi with communications with
- the outside world: road, air and lake corridors.
Roads. It is imperative to ensure links with neighboring countries, and from"there
the hitch to the port, in all seasons. The most important projects are th~
following:
- - Route to Rwanda: repair of the Bugarama/Kayanza asphalt stretch that goes to
Butare in Rwanda;
. - Continued construction of the Bu~umbura/Bukavu (Zaire) road;
~ - Con~truction of the shipping route to Tanzania, eastern section, i.e. toward
Isaka a:ld Mwanza (rail to Dar-es-Salaam); this roaci will aiso ~oin the one Rwanda
intends to build to Rusumo;
' - Construction of the stretch of road along Lake Tanganyika ending in Kigoma. For
= the time being it i.~ more a trail than a road that links that city to Nyanza.
These projects together represent 304 km of tarred roads.
Lake. It is absolutely essential to modernize the small fleet that connects
Bujumbura with Kigoma, an indispensable artery for Burundi. A container ship with
a deadweight of 400 tons and a capacity of 14 20-foot containers is to be delivered
very shortly. They are planning to o.rder two ferry-boats.
Air transport. The runway at Bu~umbura airport will be enlarged to 400 meters for
the B-747's. Work is in progress. In addition, the secondary runway will be tarred~
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Finally, modern facili*_ies are planned to make Bu~umbura airport an international
class airport. Moreover, six provincial airport will be developed. It is evident
Chat air travel has not been overlooked. This method of transportation will un-
doubtedly become much more than a secondary means in the years ta come.
We still have not referred to the large railway project. You could say that in
order to keep up with a number of African countries, and particularly its immediate
neighbor, Rwanda, a railroad has been planned by the Burundian authorities. It is
related to the future plans to mine nickel in the Musongati region. A first line
will link the mine to. the Tanzanian network, and a second line will service the
capital. This project fits perfectly into Burundi's development plans. Tt:e annual
production of ore for expo~t, 35,000 tons, and foreign trade estimated at 170,000
tons will ensure the profitability of these lines, claim the planners.
This picture would not be complete without mentioning tourism, which is the sub~ect
of 16 projects involving hotel facilities, and the social sector with health and
training. One doctor for 34,000 inhabitants, one nurse for 16,000 and one hospital
bed for 300 do no*_ provide sufficient health coverage, so 3 percent of the invest-
ments will go to this sector.
Finally, it has been observed in Burundi, as in France, for that matter, or in
California, that training given to "persons who have been promoted" could not be
immediately used for management personnel, to encourage those who do not have the
knowledge but who want to learn and understand. The training, in other words, is
not fitted to the jobs. During this 10-year period, officials will try to solve
this problem, which in many cases amounta to about the same thing as squaring the
circle.
Foreign Aid
To carry out this program, Burundi.needs aid estimated at $4.4 billion, That is a
given. The maney-lenders will study it. It is true in any case Chat Burundi, like
Rwandi, will find its true development within a regional community, whether it he
the Great Lakes or the Kagera River. A time will come when pointless rivalries will
have to give way to the needs o= a world doomed to evolve. It is a shame, but an
economy does not thrive on sentiment but on cold and harsh realism.
' COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
_ 9805
CSO: 4719/353
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
POSSIBLE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-DACKO COUP
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1080,16 Sep 81 p 22
[Article by M.K.N.: "Barracuda Made in U.S.A.?"]
[TextJ For awhile there had ceased to be talk in the corridors about the fine hand
of Uncle Sam in African coups. An~' then, suddenly, following General Kolingba's
putsch, our esteemed colleagues at E QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS and (to a lesser degree)
LE FIGARO and LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR were advancing the theory (which, with the former
publication, has the status of a near-certainty) of American involvement.
Indeed, if it is clear that Washington did not take any direct part in the army's
- seizure of power, it may seem premature to discount any possibility of direct knowledge,
as seems to be suggested by a number of signs and confidential information learned
in Par.is and Bangui.
Contacts
,
--Two American military advisers arrived in Bangui from Kinshasa (where the United
States maintains one of its biggest African embassies), several days before the coup.
~ A third was on the scene the very day of the putsch. This information has been con-
firmed by French military sources both in Bangui and Paris.
--One of the civilians who worked hardest in the background for Kolingba's seizure
of power, Bernard-Christian Ayandho (former prime minister under Dacko, dropped in
July 1980), has been to Washington several times this year. According to someone
very close to the former president, Ayandho was supposed to have made "an increasing
number of contacts" there, particularly through the Central African representative to
the United Nation, Kibanda (with whom he shares family ties).
Contratulations
--The secretary general of Dacko's party, the UDC (Central African Democratic Union),
Jean-Claude Ka2agui, was in Washington in late August, at the invitation of the State
Department. Officially on a mission to "sensitize" the U.S. administration to tY?e
necessity of economic assistance to the Central African Republic, he supposedly
undermined Dacko by claiming that the latter was not sufficiently "firm" with the
opposition.
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--Finally, American Ambassador Arthur H. Woodruff ~uas the first envoy accredited to
Bangui to pay his re:spects, Tuesday 1 September, to General Kolingba, and one of the
confidants of the new president, Military Attendant 3rd Class Alphonse Kongolo (who
- has been named minister of planning) recently returned from the United States (where
he has maintained numerous ties) after 4 years of military training.
These elements do not prove American involvement, either taken separately or all
- together. Al1 the same, they do amount to a collection of troubling pieces of
circumstantial evidence. Some in the Central African capital are convinced of the
reality of the American connection, and point out that the timers on the bombs which
_ did not explode that were discovered 14 July both in Douar and Bangui after the attack
against the Cinema Club, were of American manufacture. And it was ~ust in the wake
of 14 July that Dacko began to totter. However, all things considered, another theory
is perhaps more credible: the explosives and their timers might simply come from the
20 tons of C-4 plastique supplied to Libya in 1977 by former CIA agent Edwin P. Wilson,
now an advisor to Qadhdhafi.
Doubt
Reality or fiction? Covert operation by the Americans or a baseless concoction intended
to embarrass the new French authorities? One thing is certain: Washington is not
indifferent to the fate of a Central African Republic wedged between a"Libyanized"
Chad and the soft underbelly of Zaire. Especially since in the wake of 10 May
the White House has some doubts about Paris's firmness.
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
REASONS FOR ANTI-DACKO COUP NOTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1080 1~6 Sep 81 pp 18-22
[Article by Francois Soudan: "Who is Behind the Coup?"]
[Text] Comic-opera putsch, or military coup? Who were the real
players in General Andre Kolingba's overthrow of David Dacko?
Our special correspondent investigates.
Noti~ing has happened in Bangui, or aL� least very little. The potholded streets
bordered with mangrove trees, the gr~een hills which rise and fall on the Zairian
side of the Ubangi River, the white villas and the iron-roofed hovels in this city
built up in the midst of dense jungle, have seen nothing, heard nothing.
In the sections of Nord de Fouh, Boy Rabe and Miskirie, fiefdoms which have perennially
opposed--sometimes violently--the r.egimes of Jean Bedel Bokassa, and later David Dacko,
the "coffee mamas" and the "makala mamas`" (women who sell fritters) are carrying on
with business as usual at their smoking cooking pots. Only the three unpretentious
towers which grace this otherwise uniformly flat capital city--the Hotel Safari, the
Sodiam, and the Soviet Embassy (closed since 1979 and "placed under the protection
of the Romanian Embassy," as one reads on the iron grillwork) seem to contradict the
oversahelming impression of lethargy.
Nevertheless, there really was a coup in Bangui on the night of 31 August-1 September.
A"Benin-style�' putsch, without noise and furor, with only a few armored vehicles
- in the streets, a little like the one in Kerekou in October 1972 in Cotonou. It is
true that Andre Kolingba, 45, decked out in his five-star battle regalia which further
accentuates his cherubic demeanor, needed only to cross about 10 meters to inform
David Dacko that the time for his retirement had come. The distance which separates
the general staff headquarters from the presidential residence at Camp du Roux, on a
hill overlooking Bangui. The pretorian guard, the famous "Green Berets," composed of
Central Africans especially trained for this ~ob and of French paratroop commandos
(most of them blacks or mulattos), under orders from Col Mention, did not lift a
finger. "When the army demands that the president resign, that is a coup," said David
Dacko on the evening of 4 August at a very brief press conference. Doubtless. But
after all, Bangui is a small city where appearances can be deceptive and there are
always rumors: because of the fact that Dacko was free and smiling on that Friday,
people believe that the putsch was only a piece of theater, and that Dacko was himself
a willing accomplice. A comic-opera coup, in short. A coup staged for effect.
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Not so simple, however. General Kolingba's taking of power has someth~ng of the
nature of a triple revenge. Revenge by the army, first of all, against a chief of
state who ever since September 1979 has treated it like a poor relative: no training
and ridiculously low appropriations. "We were the orderlies of the French, we served
the Barracudas as their boys," one officer confided to us. Though relatively limited~
the prestige of this 1,~00-man army (which waF 7 generals and~ about 10 colonels) with
the populace increased the more it was discredited by the political class. Dacko was
unaware of this, and by means of the traditional little game of transfers, dismissals,
and promotions, as well as by his creation of the pretorian guard that was depriving
the soldiers of their monopoly of force, he tried up to the last to appease the hurt
feelings of General Andre Kolingba and his friends, who moreover did not try to
disguise their "concern" about the politicians' sterile games and the danger of
destabilization" of the country.
It was not until 14 July and the bloody attack against a Bangui movie-house,
responsibility for which was claimed by Iddi Lala's pro-Libyan group, that Kolingba
reportedly decided to play his own cards. Even befor~e then, however, reports which
the secretary general of the UDC [Central African Democratic Union] (Dacko's party),
Jean-Claude Kazagui, and prime minister Simon Bozanga (the "hard-liners" of the
president's entourage) sent regularly to Renaissance Palace, emphasized the necessity
of neutralizing Kolingba. The general knew this, just as he suspected that if Dacko
had tried several times (without success) in 1981 to bring him along on his official
trips to Libreville, Kinshasa and Nairobi (for the OAU [Organization of African Unity]
summit), it was because he was up to something.
Convinced of the need to "disconnect," a frequent sufferer from heart ailments, Dacko
believed he would be abandoned by Paris and in effect decided to orchestrate his own
succession: his friend, Monsignor N'Dayen, the Archbishop of Bangui, during one of
Kolingba's absences, was to take power with the support of another N'Dayen, his
brother, the commander in chief of the police. Cacko then would have been "overthrown,"
with his consent, by his own faithful supporters. But in the aftermath of 14 July,
David Dacko, who decreed a state of siege in the face of the increasingly ~threatening
opposition, was to call on the army. Three months previously, he could have asked ~
for the intervention of the French troops, but since the election of Francois Mitte~rand
on 10 May things had changed, and the Barracudas were strictly confined to their
barracks.
- Invested, therefore, with the authority to preserve order, Kolingba decided to see
what he could get for his support. He went to Dacko at the end of July, tendere~l
his resignation, and demanded the replacement of the head of the police. "Big David"
rejected Kolingba's first "suggestion" (see J.A. No 1079), but yielded on the second:
Lt Col Christopher Grelombe, a confidant of the general, took the place of N'Dayen
has head of the police.
From that point, the game was ready to be played out: on 31 August Kolingba, who had
cor~trol over both of the state's armed bodies, needed only to collect his forces.
But this general who has been called ambitious, an alumnus of the military schools
of Brazzaville (where he was a schoolfellow with former Congolese president Marien
N'Gouabi) and Frejus, ambassador to Canada and West Germany under Bokassa, and who
was the reputation of being a strong man, did not act alone.
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His victory was also revenge for several civilians who worked behind the scene for
his accesaion to power, linquestionably, the moat active among them was former prime
minister Bernard-Christian Ayandho, head of the first Dacko government, "dismissed"
in July 1980 (at the same time as ex-vice president Henri Maidou) following the
violent protest demonstrations in the schools in June. Ayandho had never forgiven
Dacko for having thus sacrificed him, and since then he had made himself the advocate--
both with the Gabonese, with whom he maintained excellent relations, and with the
Americans (see story below)--of a"Kolingba solution" to counter the risk of a
"Chadization" of Central Africa.
It was he, after all, who on the morrow of the Barracuda operation, brought Kolingba
back from Bonn to Bangui, and then insisted that he be named army chief of staff.
And his former military attache, Ma~or Evariste Konzale, was one of the principal
instigators of the putsch of 31 August....
- Another active individual in recent months: Jean-Marie Songomali, a high official in
- the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACCT), a member of the Bokassa
family (he married a niece of the deposed emperor) and at one time a confident of
the opposition figure, Francois Pehoua. A brilliant and affable person, Songomali
held several grudges against the Dacko team: after having accused him of being
implicated in a mercury-trafficking affair (see J.A. No 1078), wl:ic:: he vehemently
denied, maintaing that it was a"baseless concoction," aimed at discrediting him,
David Dacko in effect tried unsuccessfully to replace him on the ACCT by his chief
of staff, David Zokoe.
The final influential personage, Michel Gallin-Douathe, a remarkably vivacious
sexagenarian, an alumnus of the French Overseas College who was a civilian administra-
tor in the French ministry of the interior (he holds dual citizenship), and one of
the ministers Dacko had sacked, was easily persuaded to come out of his Parisian
retirement to help the new authorities.
So it was revenge for the army, for Ayandho, and for several others, but--this too
must be said--it was also revenge for the Yakomas, for the more than 20 years during
which power went increasingly into the hands of the M'Bakas, the ethnic group to
which Boganda, Bokassa, and Dacko belonged. All the key inen in the new leadership
are in fact Yakomas: Kolingba and a substantial number of his ministers, as well as
Ayandho, Songomali, Callin-Douathe, all came from the same group. Is one monoethnism
to be replaced by another?
Bound together by links which are often familial, the military team that surrounds
_ President Koulingba is not, however, free of contradictions. The various political
currents which divide the country traverse the new leadersh3p too. There is grumbling
for example, about the fact that Major Allam, the secretary of state for the interior,
is a friend of Ange Patasse, that Lt Col Grelombe (secretary general of the goverrnnent)
and General Yangongo (the brother of Abel Goumba's right-hand man and minister of
labor) are rather "socialistic," that Ma~or-Domo Kogola (planning) was at one time
the bodyguard of Peho~ia, and that Kolingba himself trusts no one but himself.
'I'here is also the problem of inequalities in administrative authority within a
government which one can predict will at least be "muscular" regardless of its
effectiveness in other domains. While some ministers, such as the one for foreign
affairs, Jean-Louis Gervil Yambala (an honorably discharged lieutenant colonel), or
even Alphonse Kongolo, seem likely to be able to assume their responsibilities,
others--it would be cruel to cite them by name--will have much to learn.
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All the same, the first statements by the new reg3me agree on one point: firmness,
particularly with respect to opposition groups, all of whose activities have been
banned. No one in Bangui is ignorant of the fact that what in the final analysis
moved Kolingba to action was the monster demonstration organized Sunday 31 August at
M'poko airport to welcome Ange Patasse on his return from Brazzaville. The soldiers
could simply not accept this virtual second government which had been established
for several months in Central Africa.
No doubt they received encourageme:it from several neighboring countries for the
, realization of their abmitions and what they believed to be the carrying out of their
"mission," and particularly from Gabon and Zaire, whose presidents, after having
pressed Dacko to end his experiment with an infectious and "anarchic" multi-party~
system ("anarchic" was the term employed by one of the two heads of etate), subsequently
described themselves in private as "disappointed" by the indecisiveness of a man who
"approves motions but never executes them." And then, there is k'rance...an omini-
present and encumbering partner, whose interference was unceasing since the accession
to power of David Dacko, "Giscard's man," and whose vacillation following 10 Ma~y
certainly contributed to destabilizing somewhat more a president whose position was
already quite weak.
The French in Bangui, however, are happy: "The circus is over!" said one to me.
"The gobodes" (unemployed youths) "will no longer come to distribute their tracts on
the terrace of the Rock Hotel, now they are going to have to get to work!" There
is also smiling in the residential quarter of the "200 villas," where the French
officers say they are "relatively sure" that they are going to stay. There is a smile,
too, on the face of the blonde barmaid at a restaurant on David Dacko Avenue who
sports on her tee-shirt, in enormous letters, the words "I love the Barracudas."
"A soTdier in power in Bangui: that brings back memories around here, huh?"
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
REGIME'S ATTITUDE TOWAP.D IMF PROGRAM UNCERTAIN
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1080 16 Sep 81 p 21
[Article by S.G. "An Economy Adrift"]
[Text] Obtained only after a hard fight last June in Paris, will the moratorium on
Central African debt (Fr CFA 57 billion) be kept or will it be thrown into question
by the new regime?
- In Paris, those concerned say that it is too soon to attempt a diagnosis. But they
- are not expecting any change, especially since the accord concluded with the support
- of the International Monetary Fund [IMF] is relatively favorable to Bangui: it
includes a consolidation of arrears, a rescheduling of the debt over 9 years and a
grace period of 4 years.
Loans
But the implementation of that program should begin at the latest in mid-October,
after the signing of a confirmation agreement with each of the creditors. And
particularly with France (Fr CFA 14 billion), Yugoslavia (4.1 billion), Switzerland
(2.4 billion), and the United States (1.1 billion). Not to mention South Africa:
8.2 billion, including 7.8 billion in private loans and 0.4 billion in governmental
loans, all obtained by Bokassa for the construction of 500 villas and the Hotel
Intercontinental.
The results of these bilateral negotiations depend now on the new minister of
economic and financial affairs, military admiaistrator 'I'himothee Marloua, who,
c,ne ignores the remote possibility that payments will be stoppped--can only ratify
the Paris agreement. Should he do otherwise, he might alienate the investors, who
- expect to see financial reform, as doea the IMF, with which a program of economic
recover.y was concluded in March 1981.
Austerity
This 2-year program involves Fr CFA 40 billion in investments with top priority given
to agriculture and indispensable economic infrastructure. It also calls for wage
stabilization, gradual reduction in the rolls of public sector employees, and tax
increases. Its objective is to put an end to the economic and financial deterioration
whicti has continued since the fall of Bokasea: a decline in the real per capita
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income, an aggravation of budgetary deficits: Fr CFA 10 billion in 1980, compared
to 6 in 1977; a fall in export earnings (23.6 billion compared to 28.6) and growing
import costs (42.6 compared to 25.5); which has resulted in a trade deficit of 19
billion, compared to the 3 billion surplus in 1977; deterioration in the balance of
payments deficit: 13 billion in 1977, 43.4 billion in 1980; 49 billion forecast for
1981.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
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COMORO ISLANDS
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF ARCHIPELAGO SURVEYED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1868, 28 Aug 81 pp 2203-2205
[Text] A photograph of East Africa taken from a satellite shows an image of
Madagascar resembling a ship, the prow of which casts aside a cluster of amall islanda,
some in the midst of the Indian Oce~n, others at the northern mouth of the Mozambique
canal. The latter include the volcanic Comoro Islands archipelago, including Mayotte
(375 sq km, 46,000 inhabitants), Moheli (290 sq km, 15,SOO inhabitants), Anjouan
(425 sq km, 118,000 inhabi.tants, and Grande Comore (1,147 sq km, 163,000 inhabitants).
Like that of Karthala, a volcano which is ati11 active, the history of thia archi-
pelago has been and continues to be rather agitated. Without a doubt~this is because
of a population with very diverse origina, made up of Malays, Sakalava Malagasy,
Persians, Indians and Arabs, or perhaps also because of the foreigners who stop
there, for as long as their sh~p is in port or for a lifetime--Portuguese, Germans,
Englishmen, Frenchmen and even Chinese. To this very day, since the epoch of the
_ "battling sultans" in the 16th century, quarrels and local intrigues have never
ceased, prospering moreover in the midst of the fragrant scents of vanilla and
ilang-ilang, thanks to which this land became known as the "perfume islands."
To look no further than our own era, these last few years have been very agitated.
In 1975, the unilateral declaration of independence, in reaponse to "rude conduct"
on the part of France, was a surprise, but Mayotte, the separatist which did not want
to remain in the bosom of ita "three siaters," acted alone and returned to the French
fold--a move which annoyed the former aponsor and reduced the new state. A month
later, in a dramatic coup, the president was overthrown, the regime hardened "in the
Cambodian fashion" and France packed its bags and left, slamming the door, except on
Mayotte,* where the legionnaires established themselves to build...what else but
roads.
But on 13 May 1978, in a feat masterminded by Gilbert Bourgeaud, alias Bob Denard,
previously seen in action in Katanga and Biafra, the former president was put back
in power.
, And then, as if to bear out its reputation as the "shifting islands," the Comoros
annexed the Glorieuse Islands, little islets lost in the Indian Ocean~which it
*On 6 December 1979, the French National Assembly assigned Mayotte the status of a
"special territorial collective" for the next 5 years. In 1985, the population of
Mayotte will again be consulted.
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happened Madagascar coveted. Again a cause of friction with Tananarive, which had
brutally expell~d 16,000 citizens of the Comoros from Majunga in 1975.
All of this, a~ can be imagined, could hardly benefit an economic situation which,
to say the very least, had never been very flourishing.
Deteriorating Soil and Rapid Population Increase
The Comoros are among those countries which find themselves acutely faced with the
problem of survival in terms of food. With.a population increasing at a rate of 3.5
percent per year, and never having been able to eliminate the lag which developed
initially in the production of subsistence crops, one can hardly see what path might
lead to a happy solution. In any case, the soil is becoming exhausted and the extent
of the arable is limited by a small overall area. We encountered this problem pre-
viously in the study o� Rwanda and Burundi, but the situation is still more delicate
here. The Comoros have no neighbors, and if the sea vesaels which bring in 30,000
tons of rice and other basic foodstuffs evexy year were to cease to call at these
islands, the situation would become dramatic. No, to speak the truth, the future
days of the perfume islands do not seem very certain to be happy.
It is true that the authorities are attempting to "plan" family develcpment, but the
results will be long in coming in a population in the grip of tradition, and thus
ill-suited for the application of modern concepts. Also, the government is placing
its hope for the time being in corn, which seems to provide better yields than rice,
and in better yields for other food crops, such as cassava, sweet potato, etc, which
grow up to 400 meters above sea level in the shade of the coconut palm. Without any
doubt, the prevailing temperate tropical climate and soil of volcanic origin lend
themselves well to a number of agricultural crops, but for years the forest has been
deteriorating thanks to cutting at regular intervals. The soil has thus deteriorated
and the rivers, flowing now on permeable soils, are draining away and their sources
are tainted. For this reason rainwater had to be collected in tanks, leading to sub-
stantial proliferation of microbes. In the Comoros, 80 percent of the population is
affected by malaria, and infant mortality (malnutrition and illness) is 20 percent.
One would think the scenario describea a nightmare univerae. This is, however, not
quite true, because in tropics, and in the Comoro Islands in particular, the sun and
the sea temper and ameliorate the harsh reality. But the Comoro Islands do not remain
turned in upon themselves and their difficult problems, but also engage in exchange
with the world. What then is the situation with foreign trade?
Trade Out Of Balance
Food crops, sorghum, cornr rice, sweet potatoes and the few livestock products are
consumed on the spot and are involved in practically no commercial transactions.
Volumes hardly vary and remain quite stable:
rice: 3,350 tons in 1966, and 3,661 tons in 1978
corn: 1,155 tons in 1966, and 1,545 tons in 1978
cassava: 23,000 tons in 1966, and 24,460 tons in 1978
The only advance is seen for coconut (some of the copra is exported): 29,400 tons in
1966, and 48,700 tons in 1978.
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Income crops, on the contrary, are playing an ever more preponderant role in the
- economy: Grande Comore is the vanilla island (second largest world producer),
Anjouan produces mainly cloves and ilang-ilang* (leading world producer), and
Moheli produces copra (a byproduct of the coconut). Here, then, is the contribution .
- of each of these products to the total export value in percentages:
1974 1977 1979
Ilang-ilang 36.7 26.7 14.1
Vanilla 22.1 49.2 69.1
Copra 23.2 6.1 5.3
Cloves 11.3 13.4 10.0
Vanilla and ilang-ilang thus account for the lion's share, being trailed at some
distance by copra and cloves. The four together, in any case, account for 98.6 per-
cent of the exports.
Imports are mainly made up of food suppliea and heavily outweigh exports. Rice alone
accounts for 20 percent of the import value. In 1975, imports totaled 4.968 billion
CFA francs as conpared to exports worth 2.037 CFA francs, leaving a deficit of 2.931
billion, the rate of coverage being only 41 percent. More recently, in 1979, there
was a deficit of 2.369 billion, but the rate of coverage was 60 percent. There are
no minerals of value justifying exploitation in view, nor any prospects for oil.
Thus it is hard to see how the deficit trend can be reversQd. Perhaps at a future
date tourism could make a substantial contribution to foreign trade, but we are far
from that point now.
Finances of an Undeveloped Country
The Comoro Islands are not lacking in resources and it ca~nnot be said that the coun~ry
is poor. However, its economy is not yet developed enough for its financial situation
to show a positive balance.
Commercial trade which is out of balance inevitably leads to a deficit in the current
payments balance. Only contributions from abroad in the form of loans or gifts can
reestablish the balance. There is, however, one striking point when one studies this
balance carefully, and that is the freight and insurance category. They accounted
in fact for debits to the account totaling 1.298 billion CFA francs in 1978 and 1.820
billion in 1979. In other words, 65 percent of the export income! It is costly to
be an island, above all when it is di.stant from the major production and consumer
- markets.
As to the foreign debt, it came to 21.3 CFA francs in 1980. The debt service came
to 461 million CFA francs, or in other words the equivalent of 27 percent of the
domestic federal budget income. This represents a burden which it is difficult for
public finances to bear.
A poor infrastructure, with few roads, no real ports, an airport with limited capacity,
infrequent communications among the islands and intermittent service to the African
*The flower of the ilang-ilang is used in making perfume.
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r'UK urr'1~1a1. u~r: ULVLY
continent and the rest of the world complete the economic picture in the Comoro
Islands. Overall, matters do not appear in a very favorable light. A gross
national product estimated at 1980 at $70 million, representing $200 per capita,
gives some idea of the underdevelopment of the country. The plan of action which has
been drafted for the 1980's should be able, if implemented methodically, to correct
the situation.
A Detailed and Consistent Plan
First let us specify the main options selected: to guarantee independence in
foodstuffs on a priority basis, to improve ~.nternal and external communications and
to resolve health problems rapidly. Let us then examine the main projects which
have been developed in terms of these goals.
Self-Sufficiency in Food
Some 95 percent of the population lives in the rural sector, which contributes 40
percent to the gross national product. Agriculture is far from the main economic
activity. The soil of volcanic origin, although porous, is rather rich, but in view
of the demographic pressure, the limited arable land poses difficult choices between
the use of land for food crops or income crops. The balance will never be easy to
strike. The fact remains that a number of proposals have been studied. However, let
us first examine the activities in progress:
The coconut palm project ($5.2 million, financed by the World Bank) is designed to
increase the production of coconuts, and thus that of copra;
_ the corn project ($3.1 million, financed by the EDF [European Development Fund]) has
led to the planting of 221 hectares of corn on Grande Comore for the 1981-82 sea~on.
Zf the expected yields are obtained, corn will be extended to Anjouan and Moheli;
and
improvement of the growing of vanilla, cloves and bananas ($7.6 million, financed by
the African Development Fund), and finally, the poultry breeding projecC ($2.3 million,
EDF and UNDP [United Nations Development Program]), which should result in the
annual production of 4 million egga and 325 tons of poultry meat. Thia will be com-
bined wir.h the development of sheep bree.ding, which ahould lead to the production
of 250 tons of ineat annually. Currently, the residenta of the Comoros must be satis-
- fied with S kg of ineat per year. This supplemenCary contribution will truly be
welcome.
According to experts, the potential for reaching an acceptable food production level
would require the development of 51,000 hectares of available land. This would
suffice to feed the 55,000 families in the Comoro Islands. In addition, these
conditions favor the raising of goats and sheep above all, and also favor fishing,
although the coastal waters are not especially rich in fish. If the fishing zone
were extended to a radius of 50 km from the archipelago, a catch of 20,000 tons could
be expected (present figure, 6,000 tone).
Let us stress the following, among the 17 projects making up the structure of the
rural plan:
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The development and exploitation of the forests: planned reforestation of 300 to
400 hectares per year to pratect the soil and providc wood for carpentry and heating
fuel; and
the intensification of soil protection and restoration. This project calls for a
pilot operation in 3 years covering 150 hectares (Nioumakele Basin, on Anjouan)
which will subsequently be extended to other areas.
Plans call for the creation of Rural Development Support Centers (CADER) so that
the projects can be carried out under the best possible conditions. Planned to
play a motivating and advisory role, but also to provide fertilizer and other
supplies at cost, these CADER will be set up gradually. Five bodies of this sort
are already in operation, and 10 others will be established in the coming months.
Internal and External Communications
Despite the excellent location of the archipelago on the Mozambique channel, which
made it a port of call in the past, the modern world seems to have ignored this
_ privileged location. Without a doubt the British took note of it during the last
war and established a base there, but once Vichyist Madagascar came under its in-
fluence, the Comoros lost their strategic interest. Also, there is no port worthy
of the name. Only coastal vessels drawing little water can tie up along the ancient
wharves of Moroni, the capital, or Fomboni (on the island of Moheli). Therefore,
the few oceangoing vessels which stop in the Comoros drop anchor in the roadstead,
and small harbor vessels ply back and forth to the loading docks.
The major project in this sector is the development of a deepwater port at Mutsawudu*
on the island of Anjouan. This site is preferable to that at Moroni, where the
rocky bottom makes dredging impossible. The planned facilities will include a
250-meter quay (with an 8- to 9-meter draft) and a warehouse store. Handling equip-
ment for the wharf operations has also been planned (traveling cranes, forklifts,
hoists, etc). The total cost will come to about $27 million.
_ Si...uitaneously, the ports at Moroni and Fomboni will be improved so that MLtsamudu
can truly play the role of a dispersal port for the region. These two operations
are expected to cost $22 million.
Once the por.t infrastructur~ has been built, external communications will be sub-
stantially improved, but communications.amon,g the islands remain infreque~t due to
the lack of facilities. Three vessels ply these routes but they are ancient and of
limited capacity. Thus the purchase of a 350-ton coastal vessel and a 2,000-ton
cargo ship is planned.
It is clear that in the case of the Comoro Islands, air service is much more than
an auxiliary facility. It has become a sometimes vital necessity.
The Moroni-Hahaya airport commissioned in 1975 has not yet been completed. The
work must be continued in order to make of it an international class airport (cost,
$7 million). As to the Anjouan and Moheli airports, they need extensive updating.
*Total traffic in 1977 was as follows: imports, 60,000 tons, including 10,000 tons
of oil products; exports, 3,000 to 4,000 tons.
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_ Air Comores operates a Fokker 27 (44 seats~. ~he purchase of an additional aircraft
appears obviously ar~er,t. It should be noted, however, khat Air France provides a
weekly flight between Paris and Moroni via Dar-es-Salaam.
~

~ However, there are also interior islands where the roads are often nothing but bate
~ tracks impassable in the rainy season. Plans for this sector call for peripheral
roads and some service roads to the interior.
~ One might say honor to whom hanor is due, for the Morani-Hahaya airport road (lE~ km)
will be rebuilt on a priority basis.
By the end of 1983, if the projects are carried out, there will be 450 km of paved
roadway. But the whole of a maintenance service, also incorporated by the planners,
~ will remain to be impleme~ited.
The plan includes, of course, sustained campaigns for health improvement (80 per-
cent affected by malaria) ..~ncl rhe training of cadres and team leaders.
If the 10-year effort bPars fruit, then, there can be no doubt that small industry,
other than craft operations, will begin to see the light, and that tourism, prac-
tically noz.c~xistent now, can develop seriously.
_ Are the Sevchelles, ~arther to the north, with their 100,000 visitors every year,
not alreacly a considerable encouragement?
Assessment uf the Plan
, The cost of the complex of projects can be estimated at $450 million. Apart from
the assumpti.on of operational expenditures by the lenders for 5 years, and the total
or partiaZ repayment of the foreign debt, the government of the Comoro Islands hopes
to obtain favorable prices from certain suppliers, in particular the producers of
oil. It is probable that the Comoro Islands leaders are too hopeful on this latter
- point, because the OPEC countries, as a general rule, will give no special discount
to Third-World countries, preferring for various reasone, one of which at least is
_ a cost-accountirig consideration; to grant them advantageous loans, or indeed gifts.
'I'his being the case, the Comoro Islands hope that the international ~ottanunity will
- examine their plan with interest and that their requests for aid will produce
- results. In this connection, it will be recalled that French aid to the Comoros,
suspendc.d at one time, was resumed, and the relations between the two countries
were normalized despite the delicate problem of Mayotte, which still remains un-
resolved.
Where the Comoro Islands are concerned, one might believe that, from the strictly
developmental point of view, it would have been better for them to remain in the
French orbit, contrary, moreover, to what we had to say about Cape Verde in relation
to Portugal. It is better in fact to negotiate the labyrinths and the convolutions
of the administration in Paris than the complicated and often uncertain mazes of
the IMF [International Monetary Fund], the World Bank, or some other international
organism. This was the price of independence. This is without a doubt one of the
expl.anations for the attitude of the Mayotte leaders.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
5157
CSO: 4719/381
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GAMBIA
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO PROPOSAL OF SENEGAI~IAN FEDERATION EX~'IINED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1078, 2 Sep 81 pp 36-39
[Article by Francois Soudan: "The Price of Security"]
[Text] Having learned from the tragic events in Ban~ul,
presidents Jawara and Diouf haae.decLared themaelves in
favor of a Senegambian federation.
With much guttural clamor and the ample movements of their blue boubous pushing herds
of dirty goats in f ront of them onto the mouldy planks of the ferry, the Mauritanians
were the first to return. Small shopkeepers and breeders, seen throughout Ban3u1,
they cautiously took refuge on the other side of the Gambia river during the first
hours of Kukoy's putsch. For four days, they watched their stalls burning in the
distance, before getting back onto the first "ferry" which was leaving from Barra.
Today, they are feverishly counting their losses which Dawda Jawara promised to
compensate. However, fcr them, it will no longer be qu~!te the same as before: the
huge contraband traffic from which they also made thei�r living as sma11-time
smugglers or occasional retailers has, in effect, a strong chance of becoming nothing
more than a memory.
Contraband
The Senegalese are there and it is not a hidden fact in Dakar that one of the missions
- of the expeditionary force, which is present from Ban~ul to Garowal along the entire
_ stretch of Gambian territory, is to clean up this huge "duty free" supermarket which
the country of Dawda Jawara has become.
One would find everything in Ban~ul: whisky and hemp, cameras and trucks...Weapons
as well: poachers who operate in the Senegalese national parks came here to stock
up on kalachnikovs, whereas the gamekeepers are only equipped with old Mas 36 rifles.
It is estimated that nearly 70 percent of the products imported by Gambia were
smuggled out of the country. An extremely lucrative market from which the very rich
bourgeoisie of Banjul profited including the family of Dawda Jawara itself. Further-
more, contraband and also tourism are two closely related activities; an aggressive,
polluting, hugh tourist trade (a dozen or so luxury hotels between Ban~ul, Sere Kunda
and Bakau whose total population does not exceed 60,000 inhabitants) that is
beginning to spread along the banks of the Gambia river since the transformation of
Juffure, the ancestral village of the American writer Alex Haley (author of "Roots"),
into a place of pilgramages for Black Awerican tourists.
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Although the putschists did not attack the Westerners (very strict orders were
given in this regard by Kukoy), certain hotels like the Bungalow Beach, frequented
primarily by Swedes, were occupied by young rehels.
During a matter of serveral hours, they tied about 20 tourists to trees before
forcing them to lie down under beds...
Hardly surprising, in view of the extent of frustration experienced by an urban
population (whoae annual income per inhabitant hardly surpaeses 1,500 French francs
or 75,000 CFA francs wh;ch the opposition to Jawara's regime was able to swell
during recent years to the point of becoming a permanent threat. A many-sided
opposition, rallying the Akou (bourgeois of Banjul) who are hostile to a president
who always depended on the rural masses, as well as leftist functionaries barred
by the Constitution from all political positions, and 3oined by unemployed workers
and the uprooted. Three principal groups: the National Convention Party (NCP), of
former vice-president Cherif Diba (excluded from the Progressive~People's Party--
PPP--in 1968 following a tinancial scandal), supported by the Akou; the Gambian
Socialist Revolutionary Party (GSRP), rather pro-Soviet and the Movement for Justice
in Africa (Mo~a) .
Opposition
All three, in varying degrees, participated in Kukoy's putsch (who furthermore, is
a member of GSRP). But the last of the three is, by far, the most original: basi-
cally Pan-African with roots in various English-speaking countriea such as, Nigeria,
Sierra Leone and above all, Liberia (where it played a decisive role in the over-
throw of William Tolbert), Moja extols "social and African ~ustice" according to
the directives of its principal inspirer: Tipoteh Natogba, economic minister of
Liberia.
In Banjul, the Moja was directed by two extraordinary personages: Koro Sall, an
old associate of N'Krumah, professor forever wearing a beret in "Che" fashion,and,
particularly, Samuel Sylla. Sylla is the "Black Falcon", an odd mercenary trained
at the British military academy of Sandhurst, officer in the Nigerian army during
the Biafra war ("effective, fierce, dangerous", as Yakubu Gowon described him one
day). Having returned to Banul in 1969, he was gLven a position by Jawara, who
feared him, at Radio-Gambia (with a minister's salary). These three opposing forces,
which nothing outside of a common hatred of the "Jawara clan" brought~together were,
thus, united on Thursday 30 July, behind Kikoy Samba Sanyang and the rebel elements
of the Field Force. Today, they no longer exist or almost d~ not. Beheaded.
Cherif Diba: arrested; Pingou Georges (leader of GSRP): shot and killed; Koro
Sall: shot and killed; Kukoy and Sylla: vanished. Dawda Jawara, therefore
apparently has a free hand, as never before, for better or for worse. Undeniably,
the worse would be to retain the structures, the systems and the style which pre-
vailed until noTv, not leaving him any other choice of surviving other than insta-
- bility and permanent repression. Will thie weary taan, who declared the day after
the putsch: "if it were only up to me, I would h~~.~e resigned from power", have
the will to start very profound reforms? The creation of a prime minister's post,
the opening up of political careers to functionaries, reform of the ma~ority party,
the PPP, permit hope for a possible commitment in this direction.
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Dissolution
However, it remains that the freedom en3oyed by Jawara is now little more than one
strictly supervised, almost ullusionary. The Senegalese army which gave him back
his position, lost at least 30 men in this action and a non-negligible part of its
operational budget. A gap, which the million dollars promised by Jawara as compensa-
tion for families of victims, will certainly not be able to fill. Moreover, the
officers who surrounded Lietenant-Colonel Abdourahmane ("Abel") N'gom, commandant
of the Senegalese contingent in Gambia, have understood better than others the state
of dissolution into which this country had plunged, half of which had been declared
"a disaster area" the day after the putsch. Perhaps, they would be reluctant to
intervene a third time if nothing were done to remedy the causes of the "Gambian
malady": nepotism, disorganization, corruption. Especially since strict orders,
which obliged them to use only very reatrained fire power d~ring "Operation Fode
Kaba II", were not well accepted by some.
Integration
The sight of President Jawara giving his press conferences at the State House in
Ban~ul, surrounded by Sene.galese military, permits one to guess how little freedom
the Chief of State will have from now on. And the concordant declarations, on 19
August in Dakar, of Jawara and Abdou Dioud in favor of a"Senegambian federation"
Combining the security and defense services of the two countries, only confirm what
must be called a defacto integration. Like Zanzibar allowing itself be absorbed,
15 years ago by Tanganyika into a"Tanzanian federation", Banjul does not, in effect,
have either an army or security service to integrate.
From before 1965, independence date of Gambia, the formation of a"Senegambia" was
already anticipated in Dakar. It took shape in the following years by the creation
of an interministerial commission and the signing of a treaty of association includ-
ing agreements of mutual defense. "Operation Fode Kaba II" gave this union physical
shape.
From a simple historical point of view, the creation of a Senegambian federation
may pass, after all, for the correction of multiple colanial aberrations: on each
side of the borders (but Senegal and Gambia are not the only ones in this case),
they are in effect, the same people, the same culture, the same heroes whose names
are: Yaba Diakhou, Lat Dior Diop, Mamadou Lamine or...Fode Kaba.
Nationalism
- From the aspect of political ethics, the proposal can defend itself as well: the
most ferocious adversary of an integration was always, in effect, the most corrupt
group of the Ban~ul bourgeoisie, who feared--and rightly so--that a Senegambian
federation would make it lose the substantial gains which it drew from contraband.
It can finally be said that independence is under way and deservedly so: in 15
years, the political class in power in Banjul did little (or almost nothing) in
this regard than transform its country into a travel folder and a supermarket for
traffickers.
However, there exists, undeniably, a certain Zambian national feeling due, above
all, to a century and a half of British colonization. A feeling which the
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- Senegalese military intervention, understandable as it was, did not conduce to
change--far from it. E~erything depends now on the way in which the men of
Dakar will concern themselves with Gambia, without for all that occupying it...
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
- 9853
CSO: 4719/384
~
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GAMBIA
PROS AND CANS OF SE[JEGAMBIAN UNION DISCUSSID
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French No 1081 23 Sep 81 pp 33-34
~rticle by Sylviane Kamara: "It is Urgent to Wait"
rTex~ Though it appears natural, the Senegambian con-
federation project gives rise to varied reactions.
A frog in the throat, a burr under the saddle~ a suppository in the behind
of Sene~al: metaphors for Gambia are not lacking and are in no way flatter-
ing. Gambia is a small bit of something irritating, whi~h is a nuisance and
which can hurt. So it goes without saying that the Senegalese greeted with
relief and enthusiasm the announcement by their president on 7 September
that confederation of the two countries will take effect 1 January '1982�
"I think that in the immediate future Sene$ambia will impose a few sacri-
fices on Sene~al," explained Abdou Diouf, ~'but in the medium and long term
this union will benefit both Gambia and Senegal." A confederation, then~
there will be, with each state, for the time being, retaining its sovereign-
ty.
- ~ c ~ in mid-august~ circles closa to the liaicar government :�rere ta:..~:~ of a
federation to come into being within 6 months, with President Abdou Diouf
as head of the Senegambian state, and Sir Dawda Jawara as vice president.
The latter would accept at the outset, in the euphoria of his ~ratitude to
the Senegalese, but would later withdraw. In any case, it is not certain
trat this formula would win the support of all Senegalese. "Jawara as vice
president?" asked a Dakar youth with surprise and earcasm "Senegalese inter-
ventions at 6-month intervals have proven his weakness. He should settle
for the post of governor of Gambia!"
Contraband
It is true that the rebellion at the end of July did nothing to restore his
standing. Perhaps a federation could more easily be set up with the suces-
sor of the present Gambian president. But the last word has not yet been
spoken. "Confederations have always evolved towaxds federation," considers
- Sene~alese Prime Minister Habib Thiam, ~'and we wish for the closest coopera-
tion with Gambia."
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In the economic and political fields it is not denied in Dakar that the
problem of contraband will have to be examined on a priority basis. Im-
ports by Gambia in fact largely exceed its needs. The state thereby col-
lects considerable customs duties, and fraudulently disposes of its sur-
pluses across the river. It is consequantly urgent and indispensable for
Senegal that the tax structure be;harmonized between the two countries.
What of the reactions of other states, particularly Guinea-Bissau? Its
shadow was thought to lurk behind the rebels who proposed the establishment
of a federation to join Gambia, Bissa.u, and the "liberated" Casamancei
That is why the head of state, Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira, declared on 9
August, while visiting Sene~al~ that "we are in Dak.ar to lend once again
the support of my government and people to the action taken by the Senegal-
- ese Government, so that peace and security may reign in our subregion."
- At the same t'ime Col Manuel Saturnino, minister of interior, pointed out to
Dr. Daouda Sow, Senegalese defense minister~ that the authorities of his
country were well aware that a Senegalese reconnaissance aircraft had flown
over their border, but had been content to strengthen their military ~ispo-
sitions. "We did not reaot," Col. Saturnino said in substance, "but next
time, we will fire!"
The people of Guinea-Bissau are neverthe~.ess disturbed, for Kukoi Samba
Sanyang, leader of the Gambian putschists, has taken refuge in their coun-
try. Though his arrest was not made public until 26 August, the Gambian
and Senegalese governments knew as early as the 8th that the brains of the
coup d'etat was under lock and key.
Security
If Bissau wavered that lon~, it was because the Council of the Revolution
was divided as to his fate. President "Nino'~ favors his extradition. But
others maintain that Kukoi Samba Sanyang--who enjoys full freedom of move-
ment ~s publishe~--after all represented himself as a Marxist-Leninist.
How could he be handed over without abjuring the faith, or antagonizing
Angola, Mozambique, and the USSR? For pro-Soviet communists take a very
_ dim view of the way events have turned, and this Seriegambian confederation
� looks to them like an annexation.
They are not alone in their frowning. Britain took offense at the Senegal-
- ese intervention of October 1980, and it is probable that it will make
great efforts to wreck or delay the confederation, which would cause the
loss of a part of its influence over Gambia.
But whatever Bissau or London may think, Senegal could hardly permit the
development in Gambia of a regime far too different from its own, mo mat-
ter what its nature. Would a Maoist government in Dakar accept a pro-Soviet
team at Banjul? One can get along with any neighbor, but can one, without
risking his own safety, admit just anyone into his house?
COPYRIGHT; Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
6~ 45
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IVORY COAST
INDUSTRIAL STATISTICS SHOW DECLINE IN MOST SECTORS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1870, 11 Sep 81 pp 2330-2331
[Text] Even before the fiscal year ends next 30 September and before the companies'
accounts are published several months after that date, Ivory Coast industrialists
are not hiding either their distress over the results of the 1908-81 business year
or their concern over the difficulties to come.
It is true that oil production prospects--the magnitude of which nobody in Abdijan
knows, except for certain members of the Oil Committeel give reason to hope for
a better future. However, as Mr Lambert Konan said last June in the opening address
of the general assembly of the Chamber of Industry he presides over, "the path that
leads to this future will be fatal for many co~anies that will find they do not
- have the resources needed to cope with the decline in economic activity between now
and 1981-83, the slowdown in government investment, the sudden and massive increase
in interest rates, inflation, problems in collecting their debts and corresponding
cash problems."
In order to place this s tatement in the context of the Ivory Coast, a balance sheet
of the activities of the secondary sector in 1980 and 1981 should be drawn up, on the
basis of the statistics available for last year and the few data an the current fiscal
year. Then in conclusion, we will review the main plans that Mr Maurice Seri Gnoleba,
- minister of industry, has for his country's industry. He is already speaking proudly
of the projects as not b eing easy, but ae full of hope.
A Balance Sheet That Varies by Sectors .
Ivory Coast industry showed a growth rate of 22 percent in 1980, as compared to 18
percent in 1979 and 20 percent in 1978. Although the increase in volume was only
10 percent, against 12 percent in 1979 and 15 percent in 1978, the results for the
1980 fiscal year are very close to the annual average for the decade of the 1970's,
i.e., a 23 percent increase in value and a 12 percent increase in volume.
Exports, valued at 282 b illion CFA francs in 1980, grew more rapidly (+38 percent)
than sales on ths domestic market (+15 percent), and th~y account for 35 percent of
the total turnover of industries (795 billion) and 48 percent of total Ivory Coast
expurts (590 billion).
This committee includes the secretary general of the government, the mining minister,
the finance minister, the director of PETROCI and the director-general of the
Autonomous Sinking Fund. Oil production in 1981 will amount to about 480,000 tons
of crude oil extracted from the Belier deposits.
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At tfie same time, the number of persons employed by Ivory Coast industry (71,373)
i.ncreased by 6 percent and total wages (94.6 billion CFA francs) by 26 percent. The
1981 economic decline, zxpressed in terms of volume, should range between -15 and
_ -20 percent.
Ivory Coast industry came closer to some structural objectives it had set in 1980 and
- thus is increasingly in the hands of the Ivorians every year. The "ivorization" of
capital is progressing and amounts to 64 percent, 53 percent of which, however, is
government-owned and only 11 percent in the hands of private investors. Ivorians
account for 75 percent of the work force, other Africans 22 percent, and non-Africans
3 percent.
The supply of factories with Ivory Coast raw materials is developing and now accounts
for 60 percent of total turnover, DecEntralization is being pursued: Abidjan now
accounts for only 60 percent of production, as compared with 70 percent 2 years ago.
An analysis of the figures for industry and public works by branches is needed to get
an idea of e xactly how the secondary sector has developed. (Most of the statistics
have been extracted from studies conducted by the Ivory Coast Chamber of Industry.)
The structure of Ivory Coast industry has changed very little in the past 3 years:
the agro-food sector is stillthe predominant one, refining has gained nearly 2.5 points
as a result of the increase in oil prices, and mechanical and electrical industries
such as wood processing industries have declined by 1.5 points. Qverall, industry
accounts for 71 percent of the secondary sector in 1980, as compared with 65 percent
in 1979 and 64 percent in 1978.
- A. Construction and Public Works
'.~his sector has developed prodigiously in 20 years (with a turnover multiplied by 36)
and, what is more, went through an exceptional period in 1976, 1977 and 1978, when
growth rates in terms of value ranged around 40 to 60 percent. However, the massive
reduction of government investment caused a slowdown in activity which gradually took
the form of stagnation in 1979 (+13 percent in value), of a considerable setback in
1980 (-6 percent in value or -20 percent in volume) and is very li~cely to take the
form of a sharp drop in 1981 (-40 percent in volume).
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Turnover for the Secondary Sector
(In billions of CFA francs)
81-80
79-78 80-79 estimate
Indus try . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549 650 795 755
Construction and Public Works 309 349 327 245
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 858 999 1122 1000
Change in Turnover
(Percentage)
81-80
79-80 80-79 estimate
Indus try . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +18X +22% -5%
Construction and public works . . . . . +13% -7y -25%
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +16.3% +12% ~12%
Structure of Ivory Coast Induatry
(Percentage of turnover)
1978 1979 1980
Agro-food (branches 6 to 10) 37.2y 37.2y 37.3 ,
Textiles (11) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.8y 12.9% 12.5
Timber (13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3% 6.8% 6.0
Oil refining (14) . . . . . . . . . . 9.9y 10.5% 12.3
Chemical industry (15) . . . . . . . . . 7.7y 7�8~ 7�1
Mechanical and electrical industries .
(18,19,20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.6X 11.0% 9.5
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.5X ].3.8% 14.7
' These sudden changes in volume of activity are of course characteristic of the con-
struction and public works sector, but that doesn't make them any less dangerous.
Employment has been seriously affected: 45 percent of the 57,000 workers have been
laid off in 2 years, and the financial situation of most of the companies is more than
strained because of payment arrears, bad debts, and the climb in interest rates and
inflation.
~ 1979 1980 1981
Turnover (billions of CFA francs) 349 327 245
Number of companies . . . . . . . . . . 329 298 250
Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57,000 43,900 32,000
including:
Ivorians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33,000 25,000 17,000
other Africans . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,000 16,800 1].,800
non-Africans . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,450 2,044 1,300
Total wages (billions of CFA francs) . 73.6 68.8 50
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B. Industry
1. Agro-food. At the very heart of Ivory Coast's economy, this sector has a turnover
_ of nearly 300 billion CFA francs. It has grown in step with Ivory Coast industry as
a whole, at a rate of 22 percent in value between the 1979 and 1980 fiscal years.
However, divergent results are noted in the different branches.
Branch 6: Processing of grain and flour (CA (turnover] 1980: 113 billion)
This branch is increasing its turnover very rapidly (+73 percent in 1979, +63 percent
on 1980), thanks to the flour mills (the Grands Moulins of Abidjan is the 14th
largest firm in ivory Coast). The rice husking factories, however, have operated
below their capacity in 1980-81, because delivery from the OCPA paddy has been in-
adequate.
Branch 7: Canning industry (CA 1980: 70 billion) This export-oriented branch (85 per-
- cent of sales) has shown a decline in its turnover since 1978 (-8 percent in 1979,
-7 percent in 1980). Pineapple canning firms are unable to compete against the Asian
market and must sell their goods on the world market at a price below production
cost. In 1981, the three main companies in this sector, and especially Salci, a
subsidiary of SCOA [West African Trading Company], are on the verge of bankruptcy.
Branch 8: Beverages and ice (CA 1980: 31 billion) The rate of increase in the value
of this branch, which has exceeded +35 percent a year since 1975, suddenly fell to
+7 percent in 1980. In 1981, the most recent figures show a decline in the volume
of activity of about 14 percent for "this sector. The major companies are Solibra
and Bracodi, the llth and 13th largest Ivory Coast firms, respectively.
.3ranch 9: Comestible fats (CA 1980: 44 billion) In 1980, this branch recovered
~`slightly in comparison wiCh 1979--a 19 percent increase in value, as against a 4
percent increase. But the difficulties which the cocoa butter companies encountered
in obtaining supplies of the basic raw material, i.e., cocoa, seem more than para-
doxical in a country ranked among the foremost world producers.
In 1981, the cocoa processing plants ha~te fared better without a doubt, while the
Palmindustrie production apparatus was disorganized because of that firm's financial
problems. The Blohorn group, the largest private firm in the country which is showing
good growth for this year as a result of constantly expanding its line of popular
consumer products, even had problems obtaining supplies of oil because of the shortage
of Palmindustrie.
2. Textile industry, branch 11 (CA 1980: 99 billion CFA francs) The building of
a strong and competitive textile industry appears as one of the successes of Ivory
Coast's industrial policy. Downstream from the CIDT, the agency in charge of cotton
production, six spinning, weaving and printing companies (Gonfreville, Icodi, Uniwax,
Sotexi, Cotivo and Utexi) are part of the 37 Ivory Coast firms recording a turnover
of more than S billion CFA francs in 1980.
The textile industry, which exports 30 percent of its output, grew by 19 percent in
1979 and 18 percent in 1980. However, the financial difficulties of the CIDT, to
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which the Agricultural Stabilization and Price Support Fund (CDDPPA) and the Ivory
Coast government have loaned substantial amounts, might lead to the abolishment of
the preferential prices for cotton granted to cotton mills.
Moreover, illegal imports undermine the market whenever controls are relaxed. The
1981 and 1982 fiscal years may therefore turn out to be less favorable for the textile
industry.
3. Timber industry, branch 13 (CA 1980: 48 billion CFA francs) The timber industry,
which was flourishing just a short time ago (+25 percent increase in value between
1975 and 1978) slowed down in 1979 (+10 percent). There has also been a persistent
drop in the percentage of rough timber processed in local factories (42 percent
in 1978, 41 percent in 1979, 37 percent in 1980).
Finally, since May 1980, the world timber market has fallen into a deep slump and a
number of timber processin~ comvanies which traditionally were also in the rough timber
business are going through a very difficult period and,'if not forced tb file for
barikruptc~,.are at least in a dormant state. ' : ' "
4. Oil refining, branch 14 (CA 1980: 98 billion CFA francs) Oil refining has
tripled its turnover in 5 years. After a slight decline in production in 1978, the
turnover of this branch increased in value by 47 percent in 1979 and by 35 percent
in 1980, because of the increase in oil prices.
An expansion of the production capacity (2 to 4 million tons a year) of the Ivory
Coast Refinery (SIR), the Ivory Coast firm with the highest turnover, should maintain
this upward trend in 1981, if the general slackening of the economy and the increase
in consumer prices of oil products do not cause a sharp reduction in domestic de-
mand. Whatever the case may be, the Ivory Coast refining industry is increasingly
export-oriented: exports totalled 57 percent of turnover in 1980, as compared with
47 percent in 1979 and 41 percent in 1978.
5. Chemi.cal industry, branch 15 (CA 1980: 62 billion) The turnover of the chemical
industry almost doubled in 4 years and its increase in value seems to have levelled
off slightly at over 20 percent a year. However, SIVENG, the main company in this
_ branch and the country's primary producer of fertilizer (60,000 tons), is no longer
able in 1981 to play the role of "financial institution" that the fertilizer subsidy
and prefinancing policy of the Ivory Coast government implicitly assigned it.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
9805
CSO: 4719/407
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MALAWI
- TRANSPORTATICN, TOURISM, ENERGY FOCI OF EC~aCMIC PLAN
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1868, 28 Aug 81 pp 2201-2203
LFialawian Report to the United Nations Conference an the Least Developed Countries
(Paris, 1-14 September 1981): "The Revival of Growth"7
- ~ext7 One might almost say that Malawi follows its lake, that it follows the exact
shape of it equally as much as it blends with it. A strip of land, barely more than
100 km wide, the country is, in effect, squeezed between the western shore of Lake
Malawi, formerly Nyassa, and the Zambian frontier, and becanes even wider, slightly,
towards the south in the direction of the valley of the Zambezi. If you add that
Livingston discovered this enormous body of water in 1859, that specialists are very
interested in the almost unexplainable variation of its water level, and that, lastly,
the region is located in the extreme south of the great geologic fault of eastern
Africa, you will have said all there is to say about this state, born in 1964, with
limited resources. Basically a country which, a priori, calls up no particular
commentary, as historians say when they lack anything more interesting to say.
Nevertheless, upon taking a closer look, in Africa Malawi is a case which is unique
in its genre. Its president (for life), Dr Hastings Banda, has dared establish
close relations with the "white bastion" of apartheid. Haviny become, at that time,
champions of anticommunism, the Malawian chief of state took the side of South
Vietnam and the United State s in the Indochinese war. Soon after he played the part
of privileged speaker for Pretoria within the framework of the South African policy
of openness with the independent black states. Banda, not hesitating to "ally himself
with the Devil," har3 the ambition to "kill apartheid by contact." "Dialogue is the
best method to hasten its end," he said...
In 1971, he was received in South Africa in spectacular fashion--pushing Tanzania and
Zambia, intransigent on the principle of apartheid, even farther from the "renegade."
- Afterwards, everything was not clear between Pretoria and Lilcngwe which recalled its
immigrant workers, but, even so, relations between the two countries remained rather
close. On the other hand, Zambia was obliged to "talk econamy" with South Africa and
reestablished a good relationship with its neighbor, an instance which stands alone.
Thus, everything seems apparently to have calmdd down again between the "socialist"
countries and Malawi; the economy has prevailed aver politics, but what a lot of
agitation provoked Malawi's attitude. This must be remembered.
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- Economic necessities prevailed and this was preferable, especially when it is a matter
of ~::ensitive point or global hot spot. Then Malawi, with its six million inhabitants,
' marchiny ~gainst the current of history, had benefitted, in that way, from the favors
of a powerf~~l South AErica; permitting it to get off to a good start in the economiC
spizere (financing of railroads and the transfer of the capital to Lilongwe notably).
- This does not deny that Malawi finds itself anyway, in 1981, in the "LDC club" (least
developed countries)...The PMA (pays les moins avances--least developed countries);
wt~ich pleases its adversaries who see in that a just sanction against a type of conduct
they consider, at the very least, debatable.
Perceptible Progress Over a Period of Years ~
Everythiny ~eemed constrained to contxnue along the mo:nentum of ~he years following
independ~~nce, that i~ along the path of a constant and substantial progression in the
~~IB--~_~rsc~ it was necessary to borrow, and not always under favorable terms. A few
figures will show th~_~ituation even better.
F'oreign ~lebt by 31 December 1978 rose to 508 million kwacha (1 kwacha =$1.25; $L.00
= O.E3 kw) ~nd the trade deficit rose to 130.6 ~r~illion kw in 1980; the tendency for
the iuti.ice i~ to inccease further.
- F.~cec~ w i tt~ ti~ i; i tuat ion , the gc~ve rnment adopted the auster ity measures that one
adc~pts in sim~l.jr cc,~_~es: increase gasoline taxes, budget e~ts in operations and
F~.~ui~-n~f~nt , limits on imports, and a lowering of credit ceilings. Cyclical measures,
thc :-.pc~, c-~~usin