JPRS ID: 10003 SOUTH AND EAST ASIA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050053-4
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• Sequence Number: 53
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/ 10003
22 September 1981
South and East Asia Re ort
p
- (FOUO 4/81)
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JPRS L/10003
22 Septembe~ 19$1
SOUTH A(VD EAST ASIA REPORT
(FOUO 4/81)
CONTENTS
K.~'.MPUCHEr1
Japanese Correspondent Visits DK-Controlled Areas
(Yoji Tar.i; HOSEKI, Jul 81) 1
- a - [III - ASIA - 107 FOUO]
F~?R nFF?r~a r i r.~F. nNi v
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KAMPUCHEA
Jt1PANi,SE CORRESPOND~Ni VISITS DK-CONTROLLID AREAS
. Tokyo HOSEY.I in Japanese Jul 81 pp 102-113
[Article by Yoji Tani "Account of a Penetration Into a Kampuchea Guerrilla Region"J
[ Te;ct 1 Ccmmentary
The Si+-uation in Kampuchea
"Kampuchean General Elections," (Heng Samrin govern.nent), "Democratic'Kampuchean
_ F~rces" (The former Pol Pot government, the present Kiu Sam Phan regime) "Pri.nce
Sihanouk" (Former head of state), "Former Prime riinister Son Saaln "(The Third
- Force-I~ampuchea People's Liberation Front)--Recently, words communicating the
situation i*~ Kampuchea have again become noticeable in the newspapers. At the
end of 1978 200,000 Vietnamese troops invaded the country, but in the more than
tc�:~ yea~s since then what has the situation been like in Kampuchea.?
(1) The Heng Samrin Regime: Pro-Vietnamese, Pro-Soviet. Supported by the 200,000
Vietnamese, it recently held a"general election." However, the area under Heng'~
clomi.nation is aoout one-fifth of the country(?)~ Recently the Soviet Union,
aiming at propping up this regime has announced economic aid. Heng Samrin's forces
number 30 to 50 thousand.
Democratic Cambodian Regime: Anti-Vietnamese forces originally under Pol
P~t, r~ow led by Prime P4inister Itiu Sam Phan. They have recently attacked areas
under Gietnamese control and have established many "Liberated Zones."
~15 ~ v~ (14 ) ~xx
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Key:
l. Map of the distribution of forces 4. Gulf of Siam
as of Feb. 1981 as reporied to 5. Koh Kong
the United Nations by Democratic 6. Pursat
Kampuchea 7. Battambang
a. Liberated areas 8. (Stung Chun Long Pat?)
- b. Guerrilla bases 9. Kratie
~ c. Areas under nesiocratic 10. Komgpong Thom
ICzmnucreean control 11. Zone under Vietnamese occupation
~ :~re~s under Vie~namese 12. Republic of Vietnam
' o;.
^.~..pation 13. Phnom Penh
- Sisophon 14. Angkor Wat
3. Laos 15. Thailand
(3) Prince Sihanouk and Former Prime Minister Son Sann. Sihanouk's former head
of Cambodia with Son Sann as his Prime Minister. In rfarch Sihanouk announced
the formation of the first "Unif ied Anti-Vietnam Line" with Prime Minister Khieu
Jamphan at a meeting in North Korea. China's Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping announced
mi_litary aid to the Prince and the activities of Son Sann are under attention as
Kampuchea's "Third Force" (Buddhists) by the ASF~1N countries.
_ The world press at ~resent is foci~sing its attention on Kampuchea. The reasons
for this are that the Democratic Kampuchea Army which had been preserved in the
mountair~ zones has begun to shake the areas occupied by the Vietnamese forces and
Uecause a movement towards forming a"Unified Anti-Vietnam Front" nas started among
the Democratic Kampuchean forces, Prince Sihanouk and former Prime Minister Son
Sann~ However, one also cannot overlook the fact that, as with the Afghanistan
iss~ie, the shadow of the Soviet Union has begun to flicker, and if the Third World
countries fight in quest of "independence," and are victorious, right afterwards
the Soviet Union will enter the picture...hence Kampuchea is becoming a"focal
point of modern history."
.
This report by the journal.ist Yoji Tani is a testimony to current conditions,
coming from Kampuchea....
[Author's report begins] The small truck that picked me up traveled south at high
speed down the national highway along the Thai-Kampuchea. border from the bordertown
Arany~Prathet. I was not informed where we would cross the border, nor was I told
where I~vas being ta.ken. I was living in uncertainty not knowing what the extent
of the war actually was in the forest zone, how safe it was, where we could stay.
At the same time, I was naturally exhilarated by the thought that aC long last I
would be ahle to come in contact with soldiers of the Democratic Kampuchea govern-
ment and the people of the liberated areas who shared their fate. ,
The itivasion and occupation by Vietnam that has continued for more than two years,
, and the Kampuchean forces that are resisting these,--these touch my own feelings,
since in the past I myself supported self-determination for the Vietn anese and had
spent my youth in anti-war demonstrations. To me, the concerns of Kampuchea were
my concerns.
. 2
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The truck has apparently veered from the main nation al highway to a side road .
It runs along the bumpy road furiously kicking up clouds of sand and rocks. Even
tr,ough it is high noon there isn't a shadow of a person anywhere around. It was a
wi.erd feeling. Something lo~king like a person's shadow appeared in my f ield of
visio�i z.n the thicket up ahead. The truck slowed down. The shadow came gradually
c.loser. A man waved his hand, making some kind of signal. I guess it was a
soldier of the Kampuchean Army, .a black uniform caked with dirt, which is u~a~~ue
to .the Khmer people wound around his neck.
The truck stopped there. I was let off and according to his instructions, I was
order~~d to step through a thicket about a man's height. I don't know how many
minut~~s passed. I came to a river about ten meters wide. It was the Thai-Kampu-
chea border. I had finally made it to Kampuchea..
I hadn't noticed, but when we began to cross the river, about ten Democratic
Kampuchean Army troogs appeared on the side, carrying AK rifles on their backs.
I was relieved to see among them the smiling f ace of Lon -No ~.in (age 38), a
Foreign Affairs off icia.l of the Democratic Kampuchea Government. Last autumn he
had visited Japan and I knew his face. He is fluent in English and was to serve as
my host. ~
Again we entered the thickets, shrubbery are~s and thick forest and walked for
- about three hours. We finally arrived at a cleared space in the forest. There were
four relatively sturdy buildings thatched with grass, and in the opening in the
r_enter were l~ng hand-made tables.
"T'z.is is a government facility. We will ask them to let us stay here two or three
days," No Lin interpreted. This place, that he called "headquarters" is one of
the base areas of the Democratic Kampuchea. government and is reportedly used on
occasion for cabinet meetin~s by government leaders.
The ]liitf~lP. wa5 cleared for 50 meters in all four directions, with trenches dug in
p~.aces. Anti-aircraft machi~ne guns were also installed here, as if looking up at
ti~e ta11 trees growing next to each other. What I discovered the next morning on ~ ~
a k~alk, ~aas that many barracks were placed around this government base area, and I
was told ~hat they normally accommo3ate around 300 men who stay here on an alter-
nating basis.
The only seasons in Kampuchea are the rainy season (May through September) and the
dry season (October to April), and there is no "winter." There are about tw o weeks
wtiPn it i.s chilly in morning and evening, but it is hot the rest of the year, which
~--obabiy nakes this kind of jungle life possible.
J~Yom m}~ szcond day, I. walk:.~d to the neighboring "Liberated Zone" villages nearby,
starting out from the "headquarters" and while moving through the jungle came upon
se~~ral "liberated zones." Each village consisted of a row of houses on a river-
bank selected because there was water there. In particular there were villages
concentrated along the border, where.there is water ev~en in the dry season. These
places were probably naturally selected for the waGer and because it is possible
to �~scape by crossing the border in the event of a Vietinamese attack.
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Tlie iirst "liberated zone" that I observed was a spot 60 kilometers southeast of
,~ranyapr.i~h~c in thc jungle a few kilometers from the border. The setLtement was
reportedl~~ begun there when they escaped into the jungle during the first Vietnam-
ese invasion in 1979. At that time they felled trees, prepared the land and
bui.lt a vill.age, but many people died without food or medi.cine.
Even so, ther~ are three liberated zones (homestead villages) enclosing the
river, and the 'house in each are high-floored grass thatched homes beautifully
lined up. I heard that about 10,000 people live there, two thousand of whom
apparently had returned from a Thai refugee camp in June of last year, and some
cc>mplained "we want to go to our home village but cannot, since we f ear the Viet-
namese."
In this vicinity there apparently are a considerable number of "liberated zones."
However, for these liberated zones, a difference remains in the food supply situa-
tion, between the villages near the Thai border that receive international aid and
the villages from which it is necessary to make a 2-1/2 day round trip walk to
get sttch aid. Apparently representative members elected by their respective vil-
la~e ~c~o~le have been working very hard to eradicate the differences. The differ-
ence is particularly evident in medical facilities. It is common f.or there to be a
lack of inedicine everywhere, but there are some hospitals equipped with medical
equipment through the International Red Cross, and some which must rely on primi-
tive treatment.
In every village hospital there are always exhausted-looking patients stretched
across bamboo beds. A young doctor who says that he received medical schoolin~ in
Phnom Penh pointed out "lack of nutrition brings on disease and delays recovery";
while a doctor in another village related "In the places here that people have
esca ped to, there are no wards, so they have to sleep on the ground and every day
- tens of people die off." These words matcn the conditions that I heard about in
the Thai refugee camps, and I have no reason to doubt them,
I remember that Prime ttinister Samphan once told the world that this was a"battle
for continuation of the race against the starvation strategy of the Vietnamese
forces, but the jun~le was really a hell for them. The number of ill persons
reportedly increases threefold in the rainy season. Rven so, it appeared that
efforts were being made to build new wards and train nurses in each village.
There are schools in every villa~e in the "liberated zone" and it was apparent
that eEforts were being expanded on educatian of the childrer:. Since there were
no textbooks or stationery, they followed the method of learnin~ by raising their.
vo~ces according to the teacher's instruction, facing a hand-made black~~ard; Yrut
the faces of teachers and students alike were serious. The subjects taught are
- Kampucheail, arithmetic and music, but high school students are also taught politi-
cal ediicatlc~n that teaches the signif icance of the united front in order to over-
come the present adversities, and methods of preventing and treating malaria.
In spite of. such t~rrible conditions the expressions on the innocent looking ~hil-
dren running around barefoot are always cheerful, and one can constantly hear the
cries of newborn babies, all of which testifies to the robus*_ ouality of the
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strength for human survival. The villages in the liberated zones appear to have
returned to a peaceful state--at times they erect stages in each village, put on
dramas and folk dances using hand-made musicdl instruments.
A f e~a days later I observed a village meeting at which I was able to see clearly
the bond between the Democratic Kampuchea Government and its people. Scanning the
village square I could see 2000 people, who enthusiastically 2pplauded the speeches
of the government and villa~e representatives that were delivered over loud-
speakers. Their spirits were raised by shouting in chorus "The Democratic Kampu-
- chean Army and the People Forever" and "Down with the Vietnamese Invaders."
The meeting on that day was to celebrate victory in battle in the Phnum Malai
Mountains (an area in northwest Kampuchea). It communicated to the villagers the
state cf development and the significance of the unified front being promoted by
the government. The meetinfi stimulated people to cooperate in a spirit of democracy
and harmony, to improve and elevate life in the liberated villages.
Such meetings apparently are held from time to time in the "liberated areas." As
far aG I could see in Battamban Province, which I had penetrated, there was a con-
siderable number of people who shared their fate with the Pol Pot army and were
~~~aitin,c, out the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces. I don't have accurate figures,
but accordinp to estima.tes of the Thai military, the number of Kampucheans living
in the border areas is 430,000. The population in regions dominated by Democratic
, Kampuchea, according to its own figures, is 150,000.
The people in the "liberated " areas have planted vegetables and corn in the
fi.elds, and bananas and papayas around the f ields. The latter are apparently
consumed not as fruits but as veg~tables, and while they rely on rice supplied
through international aid, I was impressed with the vitality of their efforts to
be self-suf.ficient.
A f eature which distinguishes these people frAm those in the Thai refugee camps
is rheir. ~el.f-revitali.zation and their planned village construction. However,
to people driven out of the rice paddies into the "liberated" areas, the lat-
ter ar.e nothing other than refugee villages. Recently, apparently many people
ha~Te escaped to the "liberated areas" fram the flatlands, td avoid the terrorism
of tl~e Vi~tna^~~se soldiers and government oppression. However, the Democratic
Kampuchean Covc.~nment reportedly is advising people to move their dwelling places
rather tY~an increasing the population in the jungle, wherP food is in short supply,
and to remai.n in the flatlands and await the right moment.
- 'I'`.?erF Uas no Difference Between Men and Women among the Soldiers Fighting at the
i'~unt
There was considerable traffic along the roads connecting the viJ_lages in the
"liberated" areas, no matter where one went and sometimes one would even encounter
biryclists ringing their bells as they went along. In places there were small
huts, apparently r.elay posts with soldie?-s guarding them with rifles, but there
was not m~ich psycholo~ical tension.
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A feca days later I resolved to ascertain what Prim2 Minister Samphan calis the
dry season offensive and ta live with the Democratic Kampuchea forces 1n the
field, so I requested by all means to be allowed to travel to the f~ront. The
Foreign Office official, No Lin told me "It takes five days round trip to the
heavv fightin~, and there is no water along the way," but he apparentl} contacted
the front regimental comn:ander Nikho~r and brought me an "OK" to go to the front.
I was prepared for a rigorous march and was firmly resolved to face d~nger, since
if I hadn't done so, my trip all the way from Jap,sn would have been a~waste.
On the first morning, an elephant was prepared from the base area~. ?C was mounted
on one and I headed east into the jungle accompanied by abotit fifty soldiers.
The speed of the eleptiant making wide strides is equi.valent to that of. a person
walking fast. Even so, no matter how much we traUeled, there was no end to it
[�Iith a noon break sandwiched in between, the journey extended to nine hours and by
night fall we ar.rived at a supply base to the front lines.
Great masses of soldiers were camped as if drawn ir~to the jungle on both sides
of the road, caith a considerable number of women amcyn,g the supp'ly unit. It was a
noisy spectacle, like a colony of sparrows.
tde ~.~ere to camp together with them. In the surroundin~; jungle, it is reported
that there are places where large quantities of weapo~5 and ammunition were buried
at the beginning of 1978 in anticipation of a Vietnamese ~ffensive. It is said
tha*_ these are dug up and used in attacks, but apparently there exist a lot of
weapons lost when those responsible for burying them died in battle. Mines have
been placed around them, so as long as there are no surviving members to serve as
guides to their location, they cannot easily be found.
The meal that had been prepared for us consisted of stir fried vegetables with
chicken, and soup. The rice was reportedly bought fro~ T~ai.].and with currency
provided by aid Fr~r,~ a Friendly country. The rice grains were dry and meal was
not delicious to me so I ate it by pourin~ the soup ove.r ik and drinking it. I
_ suddenly noticed d group of four or five people neckin,~ at the rice in their pot,
and was embarrassed to discover that the only thin,gs that they ate with it were
powdered f ish and salt.
The night soldiers were sleeping like insects, hanging in t~ieir ha~:unocks. Also,
some so?.3iers were si.tting around the campfire listening to folk music and news on
portable (Japanese made) radios reporting the r~sults of battles from each area,
since even in the jungle broadcasts of Democratic Kampuchea could be heard very ~
well.
It is rumored that the broadcasts origina'te from a transmitter placed in Yunnan
Province in China, but this is not ~onfirmed. In any case, as long as onP has a
radio, Den~~^ratic Kampuchean broadcasts can be heard anywhere in the country.
The ne:ct morning at 7:30 it was decided that I was to go on foot to the next relay
- post, and I joined about 300 soldiers heading towards t?~e front. After ~oing
beyond the supply base, I saw that large trees had been felled everywhere, laying
_ across the road. This was don~ reportedly to prevent the invasion by Vietnamese
tanks. I began to get some~hat tense. " large group of soldiers who were on
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their way to the front as replacements joined in, so suddenly the size of the
Kamp~ichean troops swelled considerably. For myself, who was born right after World
j~lar II, there was no way of knowing the feelings of these young soldiers who might
- di~ on the battlefields, but the appearance of these young troops silently march-
ing o.i, with AK rifles and anti-tank guns on their shoulders was truly majestic.
After coming this far, I reali;;ed that it was not only men who were fighting
against the Vietnamese troops. This is because I encountered even young women
car:ying ammunition or rice on their heads while gritting their teeth, w~lking
_ in f~_le on the long journey to the front. The women in the supply unit accompan-
ied tne soldiers, just as the combat nurses did, and supported the Bemocratic
Kamouchean forces in the rear.
k'e suddenly stopped while I was marching along lost in thought, and the command
came "We will camp here for the night." I was told that this place was about 15
lcilometers before reaching the village called Takon where 12~0 Vietnamese were
reoorted]y building a camp. When I settled into the spot indicated to me, at the
camping point, two or three soldiers who were on the side began suddenly to dig
holes. i,Then I stood up I was told soaething that meant "if a fire fight breaks
out please get in this hole." I spent a sleepless night laying next ~o that hole.
I reached the attack zone on the front the next day, which was the third day of the
marct~. It was five kilometers this side T'lkon. On this day, on the way, I
heard that we passed through a camp abandone�' by~the Vietnamesa in retreat and that
the F.ampuchean forces had been ma.king sporadic attacks twice a day for the.past
two caeeks in order to keep up the pressure.
The attack on this day was one of these. When radio c~ntact was made with units
on three sides who had sneaked up as closP as possible to Takon an all-out
attack began, coordinated with the signal from big guns. 107mm mortars spewed forth
fire and the enemy was attacked by these, and by 75mm mortars that boomed out. The
quick maneuverinQ of the F~ampuchean soldiers, the impact of the rockets...I dis-
covered that I was tense with fascination. Shortly, I was warned of the danger of
a counterattack by the Vietnamese and was ordered to retreat, but the mortar attack
contin~ied for about one hour.
Later I noticed that the radio broadcast that the "Vietnamese camp on National
Rcute 5 had b~en brought under control through a fierce attack by Kampuchean f.or-
ces," and aiso learned that the Kampucheans had retaken Takon.
Japanese Canned Goods were Scattered About the Fallen Vietnamese Camp
I aoain returned to "Headquarters," where z met Regimental Commander Nikhom who
I thought was at the front. When I asked him whPn he had returned from the front,
he said he walked back, marching through the ni~:.t. That eveninp, I had dinner with
Nikhom and told him that I would like to meet Pol Pot, and if this was difficult,
at le~st to know cahere he was operating. In reply the regimental commander ex-
plained with great self-confidence "I can't tell you, since his location is a mili-
tary s~cret. However, he se:r~ds us information and instructions by radio every
day. !�je I~r~ow ever.yching about the location of the Vietnamese forces, without
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~ which our attacks would bring no results. Of course, we also know in d~etail ~ahat
' is going on in Phn~m Penh." He also informed me that the Vietnam~ese c,amp at ~
la hon fell three days ago. He said that the freshness of battle st:ell rem~~~ned
at 0 la hon. The next day I set out for the field, dragging my c~rn-blist~~ed
feet.
The route to 0 la hon was narrow and there were more mountain passes ~har~ 1
expected, added to which there was the danger of mines. I therefnr~ skarted the
trail and walked where there was no road, and finally arrived at ~the are.a totally
e:~hausted .
The Vietnamese base at 0 la hon was on a high point with a commanding view. The
jungle was cut away on all four sides for about 300 meters but the camp struc*Lres
themselves ~aere scattered abouey probably as preparatio~ aga~nst atta~ck. Deep
ditciles ~aere dug around each building, and there were many tr~ncfi~es deliberately
censtructed by ditches with logs and dirt piled on top, an~l I~4ould see why the
Vietnamese forces had been several times stronger than th~e Ka~~~c~~hean side.
Scattered about were ammunition, Vietnamese army cay~sn anu coo~Cing utensils testi-
fying to the horror of war, but what really surprised. m~ was the large number of
empty cans of Japanese goods scattered about, designed with th~e "Rising Sun" and
"P~ount Fuji."
To the best of my knowledge, the Japanese government sent to Phnom Penh as aid
canned goods worth 800 million yen through UN organizations. However, it is re-
~orted that some of ttiese ended up on the black mark~t in Vietnam, and here we have
confirmation that they were brought by the Vietnamese up to the front lines.
In a granary built by the Vietnamese about three b~gs of rice still remained.
Thinking it was precious booty, when I pointed it out to a soldier with whom I
had become friendly, he fro4med and shook his k?ead "No." It turned out that the
Vietr.amese may l:avc pcisoned it, so on no occasion Should it be eaten. Up to this
time, there had been cases of people dying fratn dri~iking water that they did not
know the retreating Vietnamese had poisoned, and cases of mass dysentery, so the
troops were very serious about such "booty."
(Hopu) (ag~ 27) the commander of the 0 la hon district, described the battle to
drive out the Vietnamese. "In the first week, we wore down the enemy by surprise
attacks, finally went around behind them, cut off their supplq route and maue a
concentrated attack from three sides in the jungle." He said they also concealed
themselves along the retreat route and fired at the retreating Vietizamese. He
added "It is an iron rule of diversionary warfare for a company to wine out a
regiment and r~~ute the enemy without making any sacrifices."
[Jalking along in pitch darkness, I was slated to return to "headquarters," but by ~
aecident ~ came across soldiers heading towards the front along with women carrying
supplies. '1'hey were to chase after the Vietnamese towards Pailin in the south."
Pr.ime ~linister Khieu Samphan Described Conditions at the Front This Way
I was to move from "headquarters" to the "liberated area" in the vicinity of Phnum
rlalai. I took leave of the soldiers, mounted an elephant, and t~~aded north. Phnum
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~
~talai i.s a major poir_t in northwest Kampuchea and since last year the Vietnainese
have repeatedly attacked it, but were repulsed each time. They say that tris ~aas
because the Vietnamese were unable to use tank.s in the fight~ng, since the bridge
near the supply base at 0-Chareu on the ~'ietnamese forces' side for the attack on
Phnu~ r1a].ai was detonated four times by ICampuchean ~uerrillas. At any rate the
fighting spirits of the Kampucheans i~ high. It is reported that the fierce
attack on the Vietnamese last December was especially terrible.
I hea;-d the following evidence about the situation at that time. "Tne Vietna.mese
forces poured soldiers drafted in the south into the fighting like human bullets.
The I:ampuchean forces made repea.t~3 surprise attacks on them from the jungle and
wiped them out.. The roa~i going from Q-Chareu to Phnt:m M:ilai wa~ covered with the
corpses of VietnaL~ese soldiers." The number of Vietnamese soldiers that died in
battle on that road, which is now nicknamed "Cemet~ry Road" reached 1,400 according
to Kampuchean reports.
I had an unexpected meeting in the liberated zone iiear Fhnum Malai. It was the son
of Prinr.e Sihanouk who has been in the public eye regarding the issue of an Anti-
Vietnamese Unified Front. Iiis son, Norodom Narindarapon (age 26), returneci from
France last December. I had dinner with him, and he related to me the following.
"I am a Buddhist, but feeling that I;aanted to fu~f:tll a political role to do some-
thing to solidify the people against Vietnam, I returned home to answer to the call
For a unified front. I have seen the bra~re posture of the soldiers on the battle-
field, and would like to under~o military training myself, if possible. I cannot
believe that my father could retire f'rom politics. Now, when it is necessary to
save our country from invasion, I hope that he will join us in the Ethnic Patriotic
Front that the government is calling for.
This "liberated area" appears to be. a window for diplomacy opened by the Democratic
Ka.mpuchean Government towards Thailand, and visitors from foreign co~.~ntries are
apparently generally received here. Near here there is an advanced form of
liberated area vi~lage called a"new village,~' in which efforts have been expended
to improve ttie environment, and is being used as a model for other "homestead
villages." Ic is about three kilometers from this liberated area to Phnum Malai.
I could thus well understand why Kampuchea defended it "to the death."
I must report `hat here I also met with Prime Minister Khieu Samphan. The cabinet
that accompanied the Prime Minister included Secretary General Khet Chhon and
Social Welfare Minister Ieng Thirith. These important people appeared out of the
bl~~e, and when the interview.was over they again disappeared into the jungle. I
11~.~_= ~io :idea ;ahere the facilities for the high ranking cadre are located. They
are probably moved about ~onstantly in the jung7e.
However., in December 1979, I heard that when a delegation of Japanese newsmen met
with Pol Pot at a base area in Northern Kampuchea, they crossed the border under
cover of night and were led to the meeting place in blindfolds, but I could now
unuerstand the expression of their confidence in the "liberated areas" and the
_ change in the war situation from my interview with these officials.
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My interview with Khieu Samphan lasted from 4 pm to 9 pm with dinner in between.
The Prime ?~iinister, who served as Minister of Trade during Sihanoulc's regime is
known as the only person in the cabinet at that time who rode to w~rk on his
bicycle. Perhaps because of his present ord~al, he had much more white hair
than he did in his (earlier) photographs.
The dauntless f.ace of the Prime rtinister who, in his younger days studied Marxism
iil France, as had former Prime Minister Pol Pot, who now occupies the position of
highe~t military commander, appeared even to ~ef lect the mentality of. this country,
although I heard that he has a li~ht case of malaria. He answered each of my
questions crisply, to the point and with clarity. Here I will present only the
characteristics of the war situation as the Prime Minister related them to me..
Prime Minister Samphan and his party, filled with cotif idence explained: "In 1979
when the Vietnamese invaded, we were forced into a bitter struggle, with a dead-
- loclc state continuing into 1980, The two years up to now we were in a defensive
posture, but the war situation now has taken a dramatic and favorable turn and our
forces are no~a on the offensive in each area." Their analysis as to the cause
behind the change in conditions was ~1) lowering of f ighting spirit of Vietnamese
troops, (2) the military strength of the Vietnamese forces had reached its ceiling,
and (3) supply has become difficult owing to the economic collapse inside of Vietnam.
Dlext, in regard to how the people are accepting the war as a resistance to invasion,
they told me, showing con.siderable power, that "At the time, in '79, there were
people with various ideas, but those who were fighting against the invasion were
Kampuchean government forces, and support for them has spread widely through their
results in combat and through political knowledge." They also said that even
though the Prime Minister is in the jungle, he knows the situation throughout the
country in cons~derable detail.
~ "Those who support the Vietnamese troops amount to only one percent of the popula-
tioii (60,000, assuming a population of 6,000,000?). Even among the vigilante
groups that they established, there are some who will harbor political officials
and poor farmers will offer supplies to the guerrillas, so that in some fuxm they
can maintain relations with the people."
Later, when I asked a[~lestern correspondent in Bangkok how he perceived these facts,
I was able to hear an interesting explanation that was quite similar, "Heng
Samrin's regime is just a billboard for the Vietnamese, and his so-aalled arm~ has
practically no fighting men. It is not appropriate to think that they are fighting
- together, rather they serve as guides for the Vietnamese troops."
"~'ietnamese officials have been assigned even to the rural ~~illages, but the
vigilante groups have been organized actually in order to expose people opposed to
_ the Vietnu~-~ese, and sympathizers with the Democratic Kampuchean forces."
There are people who walk for several days from inside the cauntry to the Thai-
Kampuchea border to receive supplies from international aid. It is through the
mouths of such people that~one gets a vague pro�ile of what is going on inside of
- Kampuchea, one that is different f.rom that shown to foreigners.
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_ Frime Minister Samphan co~.tinued "Vietnam has sent 250,000 troops and 50,000
~overnment oificials into Kampuchea, but they have complete control of only one
area, and p,uerrilla warfare is continuing sporadically throughout the country."
Also, regarding the strength of the present Democratic Kampuchean Army, he ex~
plained "There are 6~,~OU regular troops (~he Thai Army estimate is 40,000). In
addit.ion, there are 70,000 guerrillas" and he reported "The scale is expanding even
_ more, since we have volunteers.
P.ecent.ly, it became evident that increasing numbers of Vietnamese who were sent
into the invasion of Kampuchea fear dying in the jungles of a strange land and have
been deserting into Thai territory. It seemed perfectly natural to me that the
_ ~~ietnamese soldiers, constantly harrassed by surprise attacks, would lose their
wiil to fi~ht in a senseless war that is being protracted. Even in Battamban ~
Pro~~ince that I had infiltrated into the jungles cover a vast area and ones range
of vision at best is ten meters. No matter how strong the Vietnamese may be, it is
next ta impossible to stamp out the guerrillas who know how to survive the jungle
labyrinth, just as the U.S. forces were unable to deal with the Vi~at Cong. As for
the recent strategy of the Vietnamese, it appears that they have already given up
on advancing into mountain re$ions, perhaps because they have realized they have
had more victims than successes, or because they lure the enemy ir.to the f latlands
and wipe them out there. At the same time, it is saf e to say that one f eature of
the Kampuchean situation these days is that the Kampuchean forces are waging fierce
attacl:s on the Vietnamese bases that have been stretched out across the flatlands.
The Young Fen+a.le Democratic Kampuchean Soldier Smiled and Looked Down When She
Fa~~ed the Camera
Noca let mc~ discuss the sober aspects of the soldiers of the Democratic Kampuchean
P.rmy, the former soldiers of Pol Pot. This may be a sub~ective opinion, but the
impression I got from dir~ct contact with them was not the "cruel, unjust gang"
reported in the meuia i;~ Japan. Rather they are a group of simple young people with
surprisingly high moral standards.
iia1F oP the soldier.s are 18 to 25 years old, and many come from poor farmer house-
hul~ls, l,izat is striking about such young soldiers is that they become separated
fro:~ the real f.ighting men wh2n they get married, and that in Kampuchea, where the
avera~e life span has been about 45 years, at the same time, in Third World coun-
tries that ar~ on the road of pro~ress the size of the population under age fif-
teen is 45 percent (UN data), which testifies to the reality of the situation.
Ttt~ yoi:n; soldier.s who were raised in a place having no connectzon with materialis=
' tic civiliza~-ion are filled with the earthy innocence that still remains in the
'I'ohoku region of Japan. I was impressed by the beauty of their clear eyes shining
iii tne dar.kness of their sunburnt faces. This is not only true of the men. Even
the women in the supply units were innocent young girls who would reply confidently
they are serving "for our country's independence" and would smile and look down
when in front of the camera.
An independence was evident among them. That did not match their youthfulness.
Duv-in~ m~r.ches, if someone stood up, everyone would follow suit, people would
prepar.e their two meals a day as they liked in groups of four or five, and when the
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Givovac site was selected people would sleep where and when they liked, and all
life was carried on at the squad level. There were no orders or commands, and
perhaps because they had been tempered in the many diversionary actions where they
had to act according to their own jur',gment, it was unusual to see how disciplined
they actua lly were.
There caere fixed military rules among the soldiers. For example, "one must not
deprive the people of even one grain of rice," in order to prevent soldiers armed
with rifles from shooting, "There must be no arguments among the troops," and
to guard against moral degeneration there was a rule between men and women "women
must not be teased."
Such discipline in the Kampuchean forces was a legacy from the time of the fi;ht
against tre Americans and apparently it now permeates them in the war against the
Vietnamese. As far as I could see in their living and in their marches, conversation
betcaeen the sexes was modest, and at night no one ever approached the women's
camp. I was repeatedly struck by the kindness among people: lending one of one's
sandals to a barefoot person, showing care to those with malaria, and the like.
As I discovered when I learned that an older man dressed in simple farmers' clothes
and straw sandals was Regimental Commander Nikhom later assigned to defend
]3attambang Province, my honest impression was that the Democratic Kampuchean Army
in a country where 90 percent of the population are farmers was none oth~er than an
_ "army of farmers," and the commanding officers in each area were "good natured
peasants."
_ The Cambodian Conflict rtust Be Reported from the Standpoint of the Side Being
Invaded
To the Japanese, the term "Cambodian Army" raises a dark.image. This is because
it inevitably re~niiids them of the "atrocity problem." Therefore in Japanese public
opinion, there are many who say "Of course, the Vietnamese were wrong to invade
(Cambodia), but the Cambodians themselves (Pol Pot's army) were also cruel." But
if. we take the position "The invaders are wrong and so are the invaded," what can
- the people of the small country of Kampuchea hold on to in order to survive?
Isn't the current Kampuchean problem one of resistance to the independence of a
small country being swallowed up by the military might of a large one (Vietnam)?
After the Americans left Indochina, the Soviet Union is supporting Vietnam in order
to encroach upon Southeast Asia, and didn't this same Vietnam invade the small
country of Kampuchea in order to swallow it up?
If we follow the thesis of the Shoichi Honda school of journalism that taught us
that ''the issues must be examined from the side of those being invaded" during the
Vietnam co~:flict, two prerequisite conditions are missing in reports on Kampuchea
up to the present time. One is that the Democratic Government of Kampuchea, which
was founded in 1975 by evading the struggle for ethnic liberation, was under con-
ditions of economic hardship that were more severe than those of Vietnam. The
scale of the bombing raids by American forces was not the same ratio as in Vietnam
for example the all-out bombing of the entire country for 200 days in succession
brought destruction unprecedented in the history of this small nation.
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. One other factor was that the Kampucheans were also fated to deal with ethnic
liberation, i.e, at the same time as they were liberated, they rad to deal with
Vietnam's policy of incorporation (the plan for an "Indochina Federation").
Japanese think that the invasion of Kampuchea was a sudden blitzkrieg, but this
is n~~t so. Until the large-scale invasion by the Vietnamese at the end of 1978,
various schemes were carried out to overthrow the regime of Pol Pot, who would
- not agree to the "Indochina Federation" being advocated by Vietnam. The idea was
~ similar to the Soviet principle of limitation and was intended to bring the mili-
tary forces of Laos and Cambodia under the d~:rection of the Vietnamese.
The Kampucheans chose to advocate non-alliar.ce and neutrality, and follow a course
of independ~nce separate from Laos not because of~an ethnic confrontation, but be-
cause there was an undercurrent of. self-reliance, a desire not to entrust again
the liberation gained by the flow of blood, to the dominati~n of a neighboring
country. The border confl~ict that broke out soon after liberation was not an issue
as to who was the aggressor. It was nothing than a political confrontation and
political discord over whether to be subordinated to Vietnamese control or follow
the pa~h o~ independence, taking th~ form of a border conflict.
Insicie Kampuchea, as the Vietnam facticns were purged and operations designed to
overthrow the government ended in failure, it was decided to throw the Vietnamese
Tank Corps into an all-onr offensive as a means of last resort. The Heng Samrin
regime was set up one month prior to the offensive, It was a mere "decoration"
desi~ned to hide the Vietnamese aggression from the eyes of the world. ~
At the center of the Cambodian "atrocity issue" are punishment of the Vietnam
faction cluring the turmoil and unrest right after independence, and instances of
bloodshed that took place as retributions against members of the old regime and the
Vietnam faction at *_he loc:31 level. Of course, there were many deaths from
starvation and disease, but they do not exceed the number of deaths in societies
after revolutions that have occurred up to the present--a fact which is gradually
becoming apparznt.
I thir~lc it is necessary to focus attention on the fact that the source of the "mass
. atrocitv iss~~e" is Ji.etnam, the country that was the ag,gressor at the time. Just
bec.~~~se piles of bones were shown in the environs of Phnom Penh that was under
Vietnamese control at the time does not a11ow us to ~ud~e whether these resulted
from atroci.tie~, illness, or starvation. Burial of the dead after liberation
changed Erom individual to mass graves, and if they were disinterred, any number
ot human bones could be dug up.
Ts ~.t t~:,o far-fetr_hed to think that it was only na.tural for them to set these up
as ''places of atrocity" and show them to foreign newsmen? (Even if these were
"gr:~a* at;-ocities," this xs for the Kampucheans, not the Vietnamese, to judge.)
These words keenly represent the anger of the Kampucheans on this issue.
Another Kampuchean has said that Vietnam, which has tens of thousands of boat
_ pecple abandoning their homeland, is not qualified to judge Kampuchea. It is more
anpropriate for them to be concerned with finding means to supply food to the
starvin~, people in tf~e~r oom country, than to send their armies into �oreign lands.
~ I~inn't t~~ink that any solution can be found by complaining about an unconf irmable
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"mass atrocity" unless attention is paid at the same time to the problem as to why
hardships and tragedies continue to plague the many refugees and people in the
- "liberated areas."
Regarding the "mass atrocity issue," Prime Piinister Samphan openly acknowled~;ed
that there were cases of persons who were put to death without warrant due to
misunderstandings in the process of uncocering Vietnamese spies and disruptive
elements bought by them, and to excess alarm, but at the same time he stated "if
ti~e atrocity reports were true, we and the people probably could not continue this
- bitter struggle," and expressed self-reproach and regrets, saying "our being too
late in opening a diplor,iatic window was a decisive failure for Kampuchea and made
_ the Vietnamese sZander possible."
~ I cannot forget the words of ris Ieng Thirith "It is the Vietnamese who are commit-
ting the atrocities. I cannot understand why we, who are the victims of aggression,
are being criticized .
The UN resolution demanding tti~at all foreign troops be withdrawn from Kampuchea is
sti11 being ignored by the Vietnamese aggressors. Reverting to the principle of
se'lf.-decermination of. peoples, isn't observance of this resolution itself tt~e first
step towards solving the K.ampuchean issue?
CO:PYRI~HT: Kobunsha 1981
60~a3
CSC): 4105/208 END
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