JPRS ID: 9961 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050011-0
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• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9961
~ September 1981
Sub-Saharan Africa
Re ort
p
FOUO No. 739
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST IN~ORMATION SERVICE
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JF~RS L/9961
4 September 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 739
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Hfrican, Indian Ocean Countries' Economies Analyzed
(MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MIDITERRANLENS, 31 Jul 81)..........~... 1
CAPE VER~E
General Review of Needed, Planned Economic Improvements
(MARCAES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 31 Jul 81).~............ 5
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Days of Dacko Regime Said To Be Numbered
(Ginette Cot; AFR"tQUE-ASIE, 3-16 Aug 81) 8
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Regime's Survival Said To Depend on Moroccan Detachment
(Fode Amadou; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 3-16 Aug 81) 14
Frenctn ~'inancing of Pro~ects in 1981
(MARCHES TROPICAi1X ET MEDITERRANEENS, 7 Aug 81) 16
MAURITIUS
- Berenger Predicts I~4~I Vi.ctory in Elections
(Herve-Masson; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 3-16 Aug 81) 18
TANZANIA
Brief s
Compensation for Inventors 22
Transport Improvement Program 22
a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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r~R ~~rrrrni. irsr. ~Nt.~
UL Lc:L'u n3
Aid to Poland `
ZAr!3IA
Survival of Tazara Said To Be in Jeopardy
(Masautso Masau~so; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 3-~6 A~:g 81) 24
Briefs 27
Trade Union Leaders' Release R~quest
~
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
AFRICA,'J, INUTAN OCEAN COUNTRIES' ECONOMIES ANALYZID
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEUZTERRANEENS in Frenct~ 31 Ju1 81 pp 1980-1981
- [Text] At the conclusion of the first six months of Z981 Chere has been hardly any
impr~vement on the whole in the economic situation oi the countries of black Africa
and the Indian Ocean. Occasionally the situation has even worsened. The only ex-
ceptionG are the handful of oil-producing states.
A recent study by the FAO indicates that many countries of the African continent are
undergoing severe food shortages. Besides Saharan countries such as Upper Volta,
Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Chad, the international organization also lists
Cameroon, Madagascar, Togo, Angola, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique and Somalia.
In the Saharan countr3es the 1980-1981 harvest showed a decline in food production
made worse by the shortfall of the preceding harvest. Only Niger that was spared
, by the drought en3oys a grain surplus. The situati~m is especially worrisome in
Senegal which is short 400,000 tons of food.
Agricultural Output
A certain number of states were not able.to take advantage of the pri~e increase in
francs that dosetailed with the rising dollar rate either because their exportable
agricultural output declined or beeause of the collapse in world cocoa and coffee
markets. The lslst mentioned product shawed a surplus and was sub~ect to export
- qsotas established on the basis of the:market siCuation by the executive committee
of the International Coffee Orgaaization.
Production value of the leading farm products marketed afficially during the 1980-
1981 harvest was t,o show a slight increase in constant currency in CAR and maybe
in Togo too; stag~ate�in constant currency in the Ivory Coast, where the increase
in current francs may be partly attributable to black-market imports of Ghanan
- cocoa; ~emain stable in current currency in Cameroo:z, and noticeably plunge in Upper
Volta, Senegal, Chad, N3ger, Ghana and Burundi.
Forecasts of exportable quantities for the 1980-1981 farm crop output by French-
speaking black African countries run.as follows:
-~Cotton (ten producer countries): 596,000 tons (-35,000 tons as against 1979-1980)
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~ --Coffee (Ivory Coast and Cameroon): 330,000 tons (-26,000 tons)
' --Cocoa (Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Togo): 525,000 tons (+10,000 tons)
' --Peanuts (Senegal, Mali and Niger): 697,000 tons (-236,000 tons)
, Production value of the leading farm products marketed for the 1980-1'981 harvest is
therefore computed as follows in billions of CFA francs:
C~meroon (cocoa, coffee, cotton) 310 (+2 as against 1979-1980)
Ivory Coast (cocoa, coffee, cotton) 460 (+41)
Upper Volta (peanuts, cotton, shea) 330 (-64)
Mali (peanuts, cotton, corn, millet, sorghum, rice). 360 (-95)
Niger (peanuts, cotton, millet, beans, sorghum)..... 60 (-148)
CAR (coffee, cotton) 200 (+33)
Senegal (peanuts, cotton, millet, sorghum).......... 80 (-68)
Chad (cotton) 130 (-20)
Togo (cocoa, coffee, cotton, palm cabbage).......... 260 (+32)
In Benin, CAR, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal and Chad, production value of marketed pro-
ducts shows a decline as compared wit~ the start of the 1970's.
Timber output in the African countr~es in 1980 slightly declined in Gabon and in CAR
compared with 1979. It picked up somewhat in Cameroon because of new investments
and improved transportation, ar~d because of a noticeable increase in ivory Coast
shipments. Since the start of 1981 the market for tropical woods has been down. Iz~
the first quarter of 1981 French imports of undressed and sawn timber from Cameroon
dropped 20% in contrast to the first quarter of 1980. Ivory Coast reduction is about
40% for undressed timber and 22% for sawn timber. In the Congo purchases by the
lumber bureau rose at the start of 1981 for varieties other than gaboon mahogany, bui:
sales dropped 20y in volume and 16y ir~ value. Gabon had better luck, notably far
gaboon mahogany. The same applies to CAR for loadings of undressed timber in the
river ports.
Mining And Industrial Sector
In the mining sector the stagnation and even decline in developed-country industrial
activity made itself felt in the first quarter af 1981 in the voY~ne of output and
exports by affected African countries. The tempo of extraction and shipments slowed
down, sometimes considerably for iron ores from Mauritania, manganese ores from Gabon,
phosphates from Senegal, and uranium from Gabon and Niger. Togo's phosphate sales
~ held up until March and then noticeably turned down in April.
Government marketing of uncut diamonds in CAR (342,000 carats in 1980) continues
to be severely and adversely affected by stepped-up smuggling.
Cameroon's oil production should come to about 4 million tons in 1981 (as compared
with 2.8 million tons in 1980). In the Congo the 1980 level of 3.3 million tons
should be exceeded with 4 million tons being reached. Forecasts for the Ivory Coast
total 500,000 tons. Gabon's output has been waning for two years because of the
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I~c~R c?1'I~ic 7~1 ~'~t~ ~i~l 1
~ gradual exhaustion of the deposits being worked. It may come to 8 million tons (ver-
sus 8.9 million in 1980).
In the absence of'fresh statistics it is not easy to trace the growth of industrial
' activity since the start of 1981. Using high-tension electric power.consumption as
a basis for evaluation, Alucam's output showe3 some increase. The same sort of
~ power consumption rose in the first quarter moderately in Senegal and Upper Volta
and more pronouncedly in Togo. In CAR some stagnation was noted.
I Refined crude oil tonnages for the First quarter of 1981 rose a little in Abidjan,
while they decreased slightly in Gabon and quite perceptibly in Dakax.
; Commodities Markets
_ For some months now world market prices in francs for most products exported by
black African and Indian Ocean countries have been heavily inf luenced by the rising
, dollar rate. This means that there were better prices for oil, ores, leathers,
bananas, cotton, oil ~eeds, rice, sisal, cloves, rubber and gum arabic. Prices
were relatively stable for uranium, lumber, coffee (sub~ect at the time to a decline
in price quotes), and vanilla. On the other hand sugar, cocoa (for which the market
was really depressed), pineapples and diamonds took a dive.
On the whole for most states there was a posit3ve growth in the market prices of
commodities exported between February and May 1981. The situation in Benin, Mada-
gascar and Niger underwent no great change. But (:ameroon, Ivory Coast and, somewhat
less, CAR were affected by the recent development in market prices for their exported
commodities.
! In contr.ast to the situation that prevailed for a number of years, it is now count~ies
that produce cocoa and coffee ;and that have no mineral resources) that are in an
unfavorabl~ situation. Countries that harvest oil seeds, however, are unable to take
full advantage of an international climate that presently favors them, because of the
~ eff ects of the dr.ought on their exportable production.
Financial Situation
Owing to a variation in the level of net foreign holdings during the period April
~ 1980 to the end ~~f March 1981, the balance of foreign settlements was negative not
only in ivory Coast, Mali, Ni~er and Senegal, but even in Cameroon. Conversely, it
was positive in Benin, CAR, Congo, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Togo, and Gabon most of
all. Ghana, Lib eria, Rwanda, ~ierra Leone and Somalia too suffered either losses
of foreign currency assets or an increase in their debt burden.
- In the same period, April 1980-March 1981, Ivory Coast, Senegal and Madagascar
benefited from sizable assistance from the International Monetary Fund. So did, to
a lesser extent, Benin, CAR, Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Chad and, in particular, Togo.
Chana, Lib eria, Mauritius and Somalia too, among others, got significant aid from the
- IMF. Contrariwise, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and even Mauritania put more into the IMF
than they withdrew fi�om it.
Only in five states did the treasury on the local level occupy the position of
~ creditor vis-a-vis the banking system. Those countries were: Benin, Cameroon, ~
~ Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Niger.
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Over the past 12-month period total currency in circulation contracted slightly in
the Ivory Coast. It expanded only very little in Upper Volta, Mali, Niger, Senegal
and Togo. In Gabon and Mauritania, the expansion was between 20 ar.d 30y. It was
more pronounced in CAR and Congo (between 30 and 40%) and even more so in Madagascar
(40~6), Benin (45%), and Cameroon (45Y).
Credits for the economy rose moderately in ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Senegal and Togo. The rise was slightly more noticeable in ~enin, Congo, Gabon,
Madagascar. In contrast, the 30% rate was exceeded in CAR and Cameroon. Other states
registered large expans3ons of credits placed at.the disposal of their economies:
Gambia (55~'), Ghana (23~), Sierra Leone (26%), Somalia (26y) and Zaire (31%).
Latest consumer retail price indexes reveal over the past twelve months a quite
moderate rise (less than 10%) in Cameroon, Gabon, and Senegal; more of a rise in
Ivory Coast and Upper Volta. The annual inflation rate was even higher in CAR,
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania and Togo.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
CSO: 4719/328
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CAPE VERDE
GENERAL REVIEW OF NEIDID, PLANNID ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENTS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French No 1864, 31 Jul 81 pp 1978-1979
[Excerpts] Two poorly equipped ports--one of them i:i Praia, the capital--an airport
which should be modernized, a deficient agriculture, a non-existant industry....
Indeed, Cape Verde was not the most precious jewel in the Portuguese colonial crown.
That this rather inhospitable land- which, however, has a certain charm--became in-
dependent in 1975 can be truly thought of as a wager. But at least, independence
will bring the advantag~ of increased assistance to this country, that used to
receive few subsidies from a metropolis itself little developed.
If one loo}cs at the total picture of Cape Verde's economy, all mean3,ngful indicators
are in the red and figures are alarmingly negative. In the agricultural sec~or,
for instance, production during the last~l0 years only reached 40 percent of the
level of the si~ties, which was deficient even at that time.... In 1978, agricultur-
al production was 20,Q00 tons, covering only 3 percent of actual needs. Despite
foreign assistance, 34 percent Qf the total population is suffering from malnutrition.
Fishing activities, still in the artisanal stage, only bring in an average of 9,000
tons oF fish and crustaceans. If qne is to add to this an embryonic--not to say non-
existant-industrial structure, the 50 percent differential between the GNP and total
outlays is not surprising, with the rest being made up by remittances from abroa3
and international aid. Per capita income amounts to less than 200 dollars (170
according to World Bank figures).
As for foreign t;:ade, exports only~cover imports at the rate of 4 to 6 percent. This
is where the fashionable expression of "the deterioration of the terms of exchange"
acquires its full meaning. With the recent increases in the cost of fuel, the average
value of an exported ton is about one-fourth that of the average imported ton, a
factor aggravating still further an already chronic deficit. The Cape Verde Republic
receives significant aid that permits it to survive. This foreign assistance comes
as food assistance, aid to various programs and projects and, finally, technical
assistance.
Between 1975 and 1979, foreign aid reached 4 billion escudos, or 100 million dollars.
At the end of 1980, the total amounCed to.138 million dollars (in 1979 the GNP was
2,251 million escudos). In relation to food aid, authorities have decided to apply
a new method: instead of simply distributing donations, a practice that has nefarious
economic consequences, part of them (75 percent) are marketed and the rest distributed.
Sale proceeds go to the national development fund whose resources are used to finance
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vari~~u~ pru~Je~tS, ~u~h a~ th~ ~S[ahil5h:u~uC ut t~n ~iitlrt u4tw.~rk ul w~ralwu~es !ur a
3-month reserve supply af wheat and corn.
On the bss~s of what we have just reported, one couid weil ask if it is really
necessary to plan for a future that seems hopeless. Ilevertheless, one must anaw~r
affirn~atively, not because of simple conventional replies, but because some hope
, does sppear on the horizon. A rapid survey seems to confirm this.
To begin with, let us specify that a plan for 1982-1985 has been prepared and that 3t
is integrated into the planning for the 1981-1990 decade. Sector by sector, a number
of projzcts have been studied: some of them are 3mbitious aad all of them aim at the
"lang-term impl~mentation of an independent national economy in which everyone's
basic needs will be satisfied." To carry out this objective, it is necessary *o
achieve an annual growth rate of the GNP of 7.8 percent during the next 10 years.
= Let us briefly examine the principal projects in the various sectors of the economy.
Agricultural and livestock. These two activities represent 23 percent of the GNP and
the government has assigned (for 1982-1985) priority to investments in this sector.
As early as 1980, they represented already on~-third of public investments, and they
are estimated at 90 million dollars for the next period.
Despite the deterioration of the soil, there are, incontestab ly, a nun?ber of possi-
bilitiies in this field, where only 3 percent of arable land is under irrigation. To
increase t:~e irrigated acreage (8 to 10,000 hectares) by improved water retention, to
' reconvert the non-irrigated surface by establishing new crops, concentrate the twa
ba~ic crops-~-corn and beans--on more appro~riate terrain, these are the pro~ects
under study in the field of a~riculture.
Among the 30 or so projects, let us mention: preparing the Santa Catarina plateau
- an~. th~ Barca Valley (island of Santiago) for cultivation; the reforestatian of the
valley's high areas; the reconstitution of the plant cover of the hydrographic basins;
- the improvement of 3,000 hectares of pluvial crops; the creation of 3,000 hectares
of pasture land. As for the Brava-Fogo projects, it includes: 400 hectares of
afforestation, 800 hectares of reforestation, 400 hectares of coffe~: cultivation,
1,000 hectares of fruit cultivation and 1,000 hectares of ma.rket--gardening land.
Special credits will be devoted to the anti-desertification fight through the con-
struction of nearly 900 small dams.
Fishing. This activity constitutes one of the main resuurces of the country. Effarts
to date have been significant. Artisanal fishing (3,000 fishermen, 1,000 boats, 200
- of which are motor-equipped) will be given assistance and *he industrial fishing
fleet (only 3 boaCs thus far) ~ill be increased. Refrigeration and freezing instal~
lation5 will be modernized. These measures will foster increased export possibilities
and will better serve domestic needs. A total of 31 miliion dollars in investments
is envisage~ only for the period 19$2-1985.
I:ndustry. Industry only~represents 10 percent of the GNP, indeed a small part of the
cocntry's economy. Some small cann~ng factories, a clothing plant, a shoe factory,
a mill and a small repair yard constitute most of the industrial activities. The
shipyard planned for Maio represents, by itself, almost one-third of the investments
in this se~tor.
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According to planners, industrial production should progress at the average rate of 10
� percent per year during the next decade, and create 1,500 jobs.
Transports and co~mmunications (7 percent of the GNP). With 10 islands scattered over
the ocean, one can easily perceive the urgency of the problems coiicerning transports
and co~iunications .
For the next 10 years, total investments in this sector amount to.131 million dollars:
they include the strengthening of the commei~cial fleet, which only numbers 30 small
~ boats at present, the improvement of the only two real port facilities, Praia and Sao
Vicente, as well as the modernization of the Amilcar Cabral international airport. If
these infrastructure projects are carried out, the Cape Verde islands will again
possess tt?e maritime strength that was thwarted for so long.
Commerce and tourism (21 percent of the GNP). At the en~ of the year, the construc-
tion of a new hotel in Praia will boost available beds to 750. Sites are picturesque,
~the enviromnent calm and refr.eshing, the people hospitable: tourism has a future,
but how many infrastructures are needed before this comes to pass....
As for commercial activities, objectives are the following: improvement of the dis-
t~.bution network, the establishment of new warehouses, the creation of a"compensa-
~tion fund" for the stabilization of prices of imported produces and the establishment
of an international trade department.
Obviously, these projects should go hand in hand with the accelerated training of
cadres. This is a difficult problem in all developing countries, indeed a bottle-
~neck which often prevents the implementation of programs otherwise well planned.
That investments envisaged for the next decade reach 600, even 700 million dollars,
to which should be added `he financing of reoccurring expenses, really has no great
~ significance for Cape Verde at this point. What is important is to deve~op a nation,
as long as it exisCs, and make it viable. This is an arduous task fraught with
obstacles, which presupposes, on the part of donors, a sustained effort and a great
deal of patience, and on the part of the recipients, a reasonable degree of ardor
and understanding. ~'his perhaps runs counter to the economic situation at present,
but undoubtedly expresses an increased sense of international solidarity.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
- CSO: 4719/326
~
~
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
DAYS OF DAC~O REGIl~ SAID TO BE NUMBERED
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 245, 3-16 Aug 81 pp 18-20
' [Article by Ginette Cot: "Dacko's Downfall"]
[Text) Less than 3 months after leftist torces gained power in France, the
situation in the CAR [Central African Republic] continues to deteriarate at
a more rapid rate. One basic reason is that nothing or almost nothing has
changed the system set up in Bangui by Giscard's government; this system is
truly a time bomb. If Mitterrand's victory of 10 May 1981 raised great hope
among the Central African people, it also created a real panic in government
circles in Bangui and among those holding the ultimate power in this capital.
As everyone knows, panic is a poor adviser an~ can lead to terrible excesses.
This is all the more so says the opposition because David Dacko, who returned
to power in Bangui ia September 1979 in the luggage com,partment of a French
Transall, has neither learned nor forgotten anything. Thus he is tempted to
- revive past scenarios, one of which in 1960 enabled him to usurp power by
muzzling a11 opposition while another allowed him to leave the political
scene without difficulty or injury by turning the power secretly over to
Jean-Bedel Bokassa.
The situation is even more dangerous because an unwholesome crowd is at work
in 3angui. People have not forgotten that 150 members of the French colony,
long-time residents of the CAR, signed a statement supporting Bokassa after
the massacre of primary and secondary students in April 1979. PeopLe also
know that we~1-established economic and financial groups in the CAR
represented by men like Dematos and Plantevin are very nostalgic about
Giscard's era and work feverishly with the strongmen in Dacko~s government.
Furthermore, the latter is spurred on by zealous personael sent by Giscard
d'Estai~~g--technicians, secret agents and former colonialists--and that thus
far, only one, a close adviser of the president, a Mr Serre, has left the area,
officially for a vacation. Finally, llacko, who integrated into his
increasingly unreliable army former members of the notorious imperial
guard of Berengo, turned to Moroccan mercenaries to strengthen his persqnal
guard. He could, i.f necessary, to create disorders, obtain support from
some heads of nearby nations, like Mobutu aad Bongo who are also fearful �
~ about the changes in Paris.
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Blackmail
Given these conditions where it seems as if the CAR were in some way
pregaring to be a testing ground where those nostalgic for Giscard's
government and the openly neocolonialist regime could very well seek to
_ trap and trip the new French government, a21 provocations--and thus the
- terrorist bla�t of 14 July 1981 was the first warni~ng--and all forms of black-
mail are possible.
Although he sent his prime minister, Simon Narcisse Bozanga, to Paris to try
to sweet talk the new French leaders, Dacko, in an interview with a Parisian
weekly made threatening noises: "Either the French are our friends and they
will have no difficulties about military facilities or they are not and we
will go our separate ways. In o~her words, either you accede to our requests
and continue with Giscard d'Estaing's ways or we will look elsewhere for a
protective umbrella to keep us in office or, at least, preserve our privileges.
While Dacko sounded out the possibilities in certain capitals, mainly Cairo
and throuoh an intermediary, Washington, Bangui greeted a new American
ambassador, Arthur H. Woodruff, an experienced diplomat and specialist in
' African and European affairs, who affirmed the support of the United States
~ for the objectives of the Central African government as well as the Reagan
administration's intention to "renew cooperation" between the two countries.
Blackmail about foreign protection and blackmail about domestic disorders--
these are the two weapons used by the Dacko government and its accomplices to
try to intimidate Mitterrand's government.
~ For a long time, the day-to-day realities of the CAR have shown the futility
of the promises Prime Minister Bozanga made in Paris about the democratic
- process. Since his trumped-up election last March as head of state, Dacko
has shown his true colors. Not only has he indefinitely postponed legislative
elections called for in the new constitution, but he has heaped disgrace on,
and launched a real witch hunt.~ag3inst the opposition. At the same time, he has
followed a hateful policy of tribal division. The UGCT [General Union of
Central African Workers] was disbanded on the pretext that the trade union
was politicized and thus anticonstitutional and the opposition was not
allowed to use the radio, the only way to reach the ].argely illiterate
population. Militants and sympathizers of the opposition parties were
removed from the civil service. There were illegal arrests. Weapons were
distributed to members of the UDC, the government's party, to set up
militias. The very lives of opposition party leaders, especially Dr Abel
Goumba, president of the FPO-PT [Ubangi Patriotic Front-Labor Party] were
specifically threatened.
While the tension became ever more unbearable, various sources agreed that
preparations were being made for a coup d'etat. In order to withdraw with the
government in power and to maintain hi.s privileges and future tranquility,
Dacko reportedly approved a plan to assassinate Ceneral Kolingba, Central
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African aYmy chief of staff and bring to power his adviser and member of his
ethnic group, Monsignor Ndayen, archbishop of Bangui. Several high officials,
among them Gen Sylvestr~ Bangui, almast all from Dacko's tribe, were
suppo~edly responsible for carrying out this plan, a simple transfer of
power disguised as a coup d'etat. In the confusion, the opposition leaders
were to be assassinated.
Whatever the case, the terrorist explosion of 14 July 1981 occurred in this
climate of extreme tension and confusion; it was zhe first of its kind in
_ the Central African Republic.
The facts are known. On the evening of 14 July at 2145 local time, a bomb
exploded in the Le Club movie house in the heart of the capital; it was
frequented both by Europeans and Africans. The ceiling of the theater
~ completely collapsed. Three people including a French aid died and 32 were
injured, 5 French citizens. The MCLN [Central African Movement for National
_ Lit~eration], a tiny group formed on 30 December 1980 by Dr lddi Lala,
expelled, after several warnings, on 5 September 1980 from the FPO-PT by
Dr ~oumba because of his opportunism, lack of discipline and greed, claimed
responsibility for the explosion; it apparently was not supposed to be an
isolated incident (two unexploded bombs were found thefollowing @ay at the
Central African National EZectric Company and the National Diamond Office;
3 third was found several days later at Bouar Base where most French military
forces are stationed.)
Panic
This was only the first of many activities, stated a M~CLN spokesman, "until
the last French soldier leaves the CAR." From the evidence, however, it
appears that the goal was just the opposite of the stated objective; the
interests of those responsible for the blast are identical to Dacko
goverument interests. First we note that true opposition to the neocolonial.
~overnments which have succeeded one another since independence in the CAR
have never resorted, even at the most terrible momeats of the Bokassa
dictatorship, to such methods. The fact that this explosion occurred when
leaders of tY:~ French left who have continually criticized Giscard d'Estaing's
policy in the CAR have just ~come to power makes it more questionable.
Someone supposedly wanted to create panic in the CAR European co~unity, make
the French troops stationed in the country act and force the Elysee Palace
t~ take some impr.oper action that would not be taken otherwise.
In other words, this explosion only adds to the horrible suspicions about the
Lala group which, am~ng oeh~r things according to reliable sources,
reportedly paid for its participation in the Dacko government by assassinating--
which the MCLN supposedly was ready to do--opposition leaders.
If tr~~re we.re any illusions left, Iddi I~ala's movement was totally discredited
in the eyes of the people who were deeply shocked by the 14 July 1981 blast.
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The FPO-PT--whose president, Abel Goumba, was in Europe then to arrange
personal matters before settling permanently in the CAR--was the first
opposition movement to r~act. In a cammunique to the press in Bangui, the
- FPO-PT held r'the reactionary forces wcrking in the CAR responsible for the
explosion" and stated: "Despite the change of government in France, the
system of secret agents set up by Giscard d'Estaing is still intact in the
CAR under Dacko's protection to preveret, by criminal maneuvers...any dialogue
between the socialists in power in France and Central African progressives."
Terming the explosion "a disturbing precedent," the FPO-PT stressed that
rrblind terr.orism would not solve the Central African problem."
In their turn, on 1? July 1981, former Qresidential candidates united in a
temporary political council, condemned "this unprecedented crime in the
,
country s history in a joint communi.que. "In fact, who could profit from
this act of terrorism?" they asked. 1�Would it be the opposition? Armed
with the most formidable, effective weapon, the constitution, and strengthened
by its great popularity, tite opposition would not get involved in blind
terrorism which could only weaken it. Would the government and its henchmen
pro�it?" asked the communique a little later. "This theory should not be
rejected....Indeed, did this government through its prime minister not ask
French authorities, among other favors, to leave French troops in the CAR?
The terrorist act of 14 July 1981 ti~ould by its nature justify this continued
presence, if only to provide for the security of the 3,800 French citizens
living in tY~e CAR. Moreover, was this not a fine pretext to eliminate
the bothersome opposition and restore the dictatorship? A similar scenario
allowed Dacko in 1960 to get rid of MEDAC*, jail its leaders and set up
MESAN [Movement for the Social Development of Black Africa] as the only party.
Excess
Indeed, we know how Dacko hurriedly seized the pretext of the 14 July blast
to implement a plan he had in mind for a long time. Deliberately grouping
together, as if he did not know better, the tiny group of Iddi Lala and
Abel Gaumba's movement, and making them responsible, he not only banned the
MCLN and the F~0-PT but also suspended "because of sympathy" with those
responsible for the blast, the MLPC [Central African People's Liberation
Mo~vement~of Ange Patasse. An international arrest warrant was issued for
La1a and Goumba. Zeaders and militants of the FPO-PT and the MLPC (Patasse
escaped the dragnet) were arrested immediately. A special court was set up
and orders were given to prevent "suspicious individuals and well-known
agitators" from leaving the country.
Several days later, on 21 3uly 1981, a state of siege was decreed throughout
the country and the Central African army was ordered to shnot on any
gathering.
~'{MEDAC was established by Abel Goumba after the nationalist policy of MESAN,
movement founded by Boganda, had been betrayed.
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Did Dacko in his panicky fear with his desire to set up a bloodthirsty
dictatorship go too far and thus put the rope around his neck" It is too soon
to tell, but it is highly unlikely that socialist France will give him any
help with this policy. No doubt it was not a coincidence that the usurper
oE Bangui stated, 3 days later on 24 July 1981, against all evidence, that
"this was not a threat to the process of democratization" and he tried hard
tc. show that "the CAR is one of the fP.w countries in Africa where human
rights are completely respected, where there are no political prisoners."
For his part, indulging in an excess of cynicism and arrogance, Prime Minister
Bozanga condemned "any interference in the domestic affairs of tlne country.
There would be time," he stated, "for the French socialist government to
send emissaries to learn about the situation and obtain all appropriate
information...."
If the Dacko government seems to act like a fish stranded on the beach it is
because French officials reac~ed circumspectly and firmly. Thus, at the
announcement on the state of siege, FrQnch minister of defense, Charles
Hernu, confirmed that French troops stationed in the CAR were confined to
barracks and would only intervene if the security of Fren~ch citizens were
threatened. Prior to that, official circles in Paris expressed amazement
about ihe repressive measures taken by the Dacko government. "We wonder,"
stated these circles, "about the scope of these measures and we point out at
- this time that, during his visit to Paris, the CAR prime m~.nister stressed
the democratic nature of the current government in the CAR and its desire to
continue the multiparty experiment."
Perhaps the disapproval was more clearly and plainly expressed. In any
event, many signs indicate that the new French government has "all the facts"
not only on the true nature and competence of the Dacko regime but also on
- the degree of support and credibility of the various oppositian groups which
currently rally around the upright o1d timers on the return of the Central
_ African neocclonial policy. The newspaper LE MONDE hinted in its foreign
bu~lletin of 24 July 1981 that Che sympaChies of the E lysee were with
Dr Abel Goumba who did not at just the right moment claim to be a socialist
and whose rea~~:.on to the 14 July 1981 blast showed "the serenity of a
leader who was not seeking merely to replace Dacko."
No doubt, the French government intends, as it has continually implied, to
a~�oid any initiative which could be termed an interventionist policy, even
undoi_rig the imbroglio created by the Giscardian regime. Those blackmailers
shocild be well aware thar socialist France cannot act as if it were still the
mother country and the CAR a colony. However, if the Central African people
and their most important, true representatives must have the final say;
Paris, nevertheless, is partly responsible for a solution to the burdensome
ii~heritance from the recent neocolonial past; the new French authorities cannot
expect to go on indefinitely without sinking in turn into the inextricable
mire. As Dr Goumba told us, "France has a certain moral responsibility, if
unly because for 20 years, the CAR has truly been the exclusive, even
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personal work of various French leaders i.n the Elysee. This reached its
height when Giscaru d'Estaing entered the Elysee; he acquired a property
af 2 million hectares in the CAR, has interests in almost every ?~usiness
venture and truly put his stamp on the country. We cannot forget that the
system set up by Giscard d'Estaing remains intact. In Bangui, secret a~ents
come and go without authorization, uncontrolled. T'his situation is dangerous
even for the French socialist government. Today any provocation is possible.
It is vitai to remove the personnel sent by Giscard's government.
Downfall
"I hope that the orders to French troops to act only in the event of a
foreign danger or to protect the French coc~nunity will be scrupulously
ob2ye3. Who would. deny that a trifle could ignite the powderkeg?
"The French government cannot say 'solve this yourself' and wait, knowing that
with the Dacko regime, the basic conditions for democratic political life are
impossible."
Certainly recent event3 in Bangui show the danger of maintaining the Dacko
regime and his henchmen, r.ot only for the CAR's future and the long--range
objectives of France in this region of the continent but also for the very
objectives of the new policy which the Mitterand government plans to implement
in Africa. There is no doubt that if all financial and logistical support
to the puppet government in Bangui ceased, this would cause its dQwnfall
because it is rejected by a vast majority of the country's vital forces. In
other words, the days of the regime of Bokassa's successor are henceforth
numbered.
COPYRTGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.
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E~UATORIAL GUINEA
REGIME'S SURVIVAL SAID TO DEPEND ON MOROCCAN DETACHMENT
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 245, 3-16 Aug 81 p 24
[Article by Fode Amadou: "Malabo Under Nguema II"]
[TextJ The deteriorating political, economic and social situation ir~
Equat~rial Guinea deeply worries western neocolonialist circles. After 2 years
as head of state, President Obiang has not been able to improve minutely
the people's standard of living, much less their security.
Foreign c?iplomats in Malabo almost unanimously agree that if Morocco withdrew
its military con~tingent, rivalry within the Mongomo clan for control of
power would inevitably result in the overthrow of the head of state. .
After removing a bloodthirsty dictator, Macias Nguema, on 3 August 1979,
this nation of 280,000 inhabitants hoped that an era of stability, security
and relative democracy would finally begin. Has the situation changed very
much? It ha~s not.
The capital, Malabo, with 30,000 inhabitants, is divided in two. On one side
there is the presidential palace, the cathedral, security and police
buildings, tc+rture chambers and the shady gardens where the new president,
Col Teodoro Obiang Nguema, nephew and former deputy minister ot detense of the
late president,is protected night and day by well-armed Moroccan guards.
On the other there is the people whose elite, the intellectuals were cut
down, massacred by the hundreds by Macias Nguema; the people are not more
confident about the new petty dictator of Malabo.
Ha~ve the people of Equatorial Guinea been liberated? "It is 'liberation'
by Moroccan bayonets," say Guinean intellectuals openly. In fact,
apgroximately 200 Moroccan officers and soldiers are responsible for the
false stability of ~ government torn by two rival ethnic groups which have
long fought for power. There is the Mongomo clan (mame of Macias Nguema's
village in the far east of continental Equatorial Guinea) whose inhabitants
belong to the Fang tribe, by far the majority. The Fangs~have refused to
share government responsibilities with the country's other tribe, the Bubis--
settled on the island of Bioko where Malabo is-.-vho daily. must endure the
th~eats, provocations and extortion of the national police.
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Neither massive arrests by government officials, repression, torture nor the
unexplained disappearances of many opponents whose only crime sometimes was
to criticize the Fangs' hold on administrative controls has silenced the
anger swelling throughout the country. This anger is exacerbated by the ecnnomic
slump and acute social problems of the Guineans.
Cocao exports, the country's main resource with lumber, dropped from 40,000
tons at independence in 1968 to 8,000 tons today. Since farming has been
gradually abandoned, the networks to move and market agricultural products
have seriously deteriorated.
With the notice to terminate fishing agreements between ~l~e former Macias
regise and the Soviet Union, Malabo has turned to the West, particularly
Spain, the for:ner colonial power. Although 400 Spanish technicians have been
sent, fear which the government arouses in the people and political instability
dominate the situation. The only miracle which could revive the country's
economy comes from the strong smell of petroleum from the Gulf of Guinea
bordering on Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon. Wi~hout this s~.ill-undiscovered
manna, the UDEAC [Customs and Economlc Union of Central Africa] does not
intend to approve the integration of Equatorial Guinea into its raaks.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.
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- EQUATORIAL GUINEA
FRENCH FINANGiNG OF PROJECTS IN 1981
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81 p 2058
[Text] At its 15 January 1981 meeting, the 'aoarci of directors ~f th~ Aid and Coop-
- eration Fund (k'AC) decided to pro~tde financial aid to Equatorial Guinea from the
Ministry of Cooperation. The aid will be used for five operations or projects.
totaling 16.2 million French francs, or 8?0 million CFA francs.
The first operation, amounting to 3 million French francs (150 million CFA francs),
involves assistance to the National Energy Campany. The second, for 2 million
francs (100 million CFA francs), will permit continuation of a geological and mining
research program throughout the country. The third operation, totaling 4.5 million
francs (225 million CFA francs), involves construction of a cultural institute in
Malabo. The fourth action totals 4.2 million francs (210 million CFA�francs) and
will permit completion of the second installment of 'repair work on the Malabo Port.
The fifth, amounting to 2.5 million francs (125 million CFA francs), will be used
to finance a programming mission with Equatorial Guinean authorities in order to
make prefeasibility studies for pro~ects.
This prograu~ was completed, at the 3 April 1981 session, by an action totaling
1.2 million francs (60 million CFA francs), whose purpose is to set up an office
to design rural development pro3ects. ~
The details on the projects are as follows: ~
- Assistance to the National Energy Company: In March 1980, a team of experts with
the task of exploring the hydroelectric potential of Bioko Island and the Rio Muni
region deter~ined the main guidelines of the project: completion of a diagnostic
misston in order to bring the equipment and services of the National Energy Company
up to specifications; the choice of a hydroelectric site and the completion of a
feasibility study for a dam; and the equipping of a hydrological department on
Bioko Island. �
Systematic prospecting: The first'installment of geological prospecting was done in'
Rio Muni Province throughout 1980 and the first quarter of 1981. The results of
this research made it possible to determine the form to be given to the rest of .
the pro~ect. The new program will take 2 years and cover the entire country (about
28,000 square kilometers). Work will include: a documentary and ptiotog~eological
study; geological survey sections; and mining prospecting tests.
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Malabo G~ltural Institute: At the rtquest of the Equatorial Guinean authorities,
at the time of the signing ~~f the cooperation agreements in Nogrember 1979 in Paris,
the Ministry of Cooperation ~ecided to finance construction of a~rench cultural
institute in Malabo and to ret?abilitate the Bata Cultural Center. The institut,e
' will be built on a~,000-meter-square site granted by the govemment and located
in the center of the capital.
Malabo Port repair: The first phase of work, costing 8 million francs, involved
repair of the main port ber~hing pier. The work included: repair of the under-
water joints on the pier wall; recon$truction of the filter placed behind the pier
wall; repair of tYie pier platforni head. 3'he second phase of work will include ,
rehabilitation of storage hangars, construction of a port personnel building and
~ completion of a pier lighting system.
Development officec This subsidy is for the purpose of financing a programming
missicn to enable Equatorial Guinean authorities to iuentify and make prefeasibil-
ity ~taidies for projects that might find financing. ~
P�ural develflpment project design office: Prepared by a team of expert~ in January
1981, this project Will be in two phases: During thE first, the main ob~ective
will be to define the homogeneous agricultural areas, determine..their physical
and agricultural characteristics and make an inventory of agricuitural potential.
During the second phase, pro3ects will be designed based on the inventory and
worked out further on the technical, econnmic and financial le~~rels.
~ COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
- 11,464
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MAURITIUS
BERENG$R PREDICTS Mr~i VICTORY IN ELECTIONS
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE No 245, 3-16 Aug 81 pp 26-27
[Interview by Herve-Masson: "We Will Win the Election"]
[Text] Francois Mitterrand's election as president of the republic and the
victor;~ of leftist forces in Erance is considered, as AFRIQUE-ASIE has reported
and repeated, a significant event by Third World public opinion and political
circl.es..
In the southwest area of- the Indian Ocean, especially in Mauritius, this
change has aroused great hope among working people and leftists. The
progressive MI~I~and the PSM [Mauritian Socialist Party], which are preparing
to collaborate during the legislative elections of next December-January,
have been strengthened.
Given this state of affairs, MMN~ Secretary General Paul Berenger recently
visited Paris. He met with officials of the French left and granted several
interviews to the Parisian press. During a rambling talk with Parisi~n
supporters of the Ml~i.and representatives of Mauritian emigrants in France,
Berenger explait~ed some.of his party.'s positions and the primary purpose of
his short stay in Paris to AFRIQUE-ASiE.
We know that, contrary to international law as established by the United
Nations, the :hagos Archipelago was taken from Mauritius by the British in
1965, set up:as a,British colony ~British Indian Oceaa Territory-BIOT)
and loaned by London~authorities to the United States which then set up a
large military and nuclear base in Diego Garcia, the largest island.
The people of Chagos, the islanders, approximately 500 to 600 families of
Mauritian or.igin, were sent to Maurit~ius where the labor government has done
nothing to welcome and resettle them. These islanders are at present the
poorest, most underprivileged people in Mauritius.
Mauritian public opinion was greatly aroused by a hunger strike by several
islanders, followed by the arrest of eight women who dared show their
solidarity (they are liable to prison sentences with their trials scheduled
to open in late July). Opinion was sufficiently aroused for the government
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to agree to send an official delegation to London for talks with British
authorities on just financial compensation for the forcibly transplanted
�amilies.
Meanwhile in early July, Prime Minister Seewoosagur Ramgoolam flew to London
and Paris (where no doubt he hoped to beg some sous).
Shopping?
Headed by Minister Purryag (named by Ramgoolam) and made up of James Burty-
David, president of the incumbent Labnr Party; Paul Berenger, representing
the parliamentary opposition (33 deputies against 34 in the Labor Party and
3 who resigned from the PS1rID [Mauritian Social Democratic Party]) and
representatives of the islanders, the Mauritian official delegation was
greeted in London with the news that the British considered the matter
closed because the Mauritian prime minister had signed a so-called final
agreement. The islanders who demanded 8 million pounds will be granted in
all and for all 1 1/2 million. In addition, they would be obliged to sign an
agreement individually renouncing any future return to their country.
Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, on a private visit to London, bluntly refused to
meet his awn delegation saying he was only in London "to buy some clothes:"
Berenger wanted to point out this amazing situation to the Parisian press,
politicans and the solidariCy committee set up in France itself.* It should
be added that in Mauritius the British government's refusal to me~et (and the
Mauritian prime minister's complicity) were regarded as a great insult.
Mr R. ~eerpaisi.ngh, PSM chairman, stated that "in the end, the British
attitude is not worthy of a civilized country and should be criticized as it
deserves." "The free world must be proud of this," said ironically the
president of the GWF [General Workers Federation], the powerful trade union.
Alain Laridon, another trade un.ion member, felt "the English are declaring
war on us...."
Berenger stated that the 1~I, now in the opposition and no doubt in power in
the future, would continue to work for the return of the Chagos to Mauritius
and the dismantling of the Diego Garcia base. "We plan," he said, "to promote
a true policy of nonalignment toward the blocs and we will n~t tolerate a base
by any great power on land belonging to Mauritius.
Diego Garcia and the islanders were not the only concerns of the 1~Il~IM secretary
general. We asked him what he thought of the left's accession to power in
France and what its consequences would be for his own party.
- The MNIl~I, explained Berenger, is neither a communist nor a traditional
socialist party. Basically, we are a progressive front with our marxists
and non-marxists. Having said this, the 1~A~M considers the PCF
*Diego Garcia lnternational Solidarity Committee (France), 20 rue de Rochechouart,
75 009 Paris. .
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[French Communist Party] and the PSF [French Socialist Party] brother parties.
We have had ties with the PCF for a long time and we feel a solidarity for
Che PSF which is not a social-democratic party like many of ita westei:~
counterparts. In this context, we plan to strengthen our ties with theae
twa brother parties."
[Question] Could you be more specific about political activity?
[~l.nswer] No doubt general elections in Mauritiue will be held in late 1981
or exrly 1982 at the latest. I do not think I am being overly optimistic in
stating that the MI~4i-PSM coalition will win. Thus we will havr_ a~andate to
govern. Now we will inherit a crisis-ridden Mauritius--10 to 15 percent
unemployment, a huge foreign debt, a wide-spread housing crisis, etc.. In
short, we will inherit a catastrophic economic and social situation. We
would like to count on emergency aid from socialist France to deal with this.
I discussed this with PCF comrades aa~d they promised their support.
I~a ac?dition, perhaps first of all, there are the problems of our sugar
imports, protected thus far by the Lome agreements. We want the French
_ government's help to maintain these agreements and protect our exports to
EEC countries from the caasequences of a protectionist policy which we think
is looming on the European horizoa. Finally, we are especially concerned
about the militarization of the Indian Ocean. We feel France can play a
moderating role there.
[Question] Is there anything else?
[Answer] There are-thousands of problems. One of the most important is
our economic relation with the Republic of South Africa. Mauritius depends
heAVily on the apartheid for food and tourist businesa. We want to put some
distance between us. The French government can help us.
[Que~tion] How is the NIl~i doing?
[Aaswer] Very well, thank you. The time of the turncoats, those of our
members who fnr personal interest joined the Labor Party, is over. Our
30 remaining deputies are reliable. Our alliance with the PSM brings an
equal number and we contemplate the future with justified optimism. We
will win the next election.
Thus we met in Paris with Paul Berenger who is sure of himself and his party's
upcomi.ng victory.
Complete Seizure of Diego Garcia
On 15 July 1981, several days after negotiations between the Mauritian
delegation and Great Britain on indemnity for the families deported from the
Chagos Archipelago in 1965 broke off, the American navy released ~300.million
to fi.nanr_e large-scale projects to develop the Diego Garcia military base. ~
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H~eavy material, to equip 12,000 sailors, has been unloaded on the island.
Tha landing strips will be enlarged to accommodate giant C-5 transpurt planes
and B-52 stratgic bombers. There will be work on port installations and
military buildings; it is scheduled for completion in 3 to 5 years.
Later, the base will permanently house 2,150 American soldiers. Diego
Garcia is thus destined to become one of the largest U.S. military bases
in the Indian Ocean and increasingly becomes a strategically indispensable
site for the imperialist gendarme in the event of a crisis in the Gulf
nations.
Mauritian opposition is fighting to reverse this situation, demilitarize
this area completely and restore the Chagos Archipelago to Mauri~ius. This
is an explosive matt~r.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie
9479
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TANZANIA
BRIEFS
C~I~ENSATION FO$ INVENTORS--Oa 27 July, the Tanzanian Parliament passed a bill
making it possible to grant medals and a sum of money.to any person in Tanzania who
makes a discovery or designs aa invention accelerating the "country's socioeconomic
development." The law was adopted in the form of an amendment to .the 1968 law on
scientific research and was proposed by Minister of Planning and Econamic Affairs
Basil Mranba. Mranba stated that .5 million Tanzanian.shillings had been reserved
by the government for 1981-1982 to give compensation to inventors. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81 p 2062] 11,464
TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM--In presenting his ministry's budget to the National
Assembly in Dar-es-Salaam recentl.y, Tanzariian Minister of Communications and Trans-
port Ibrahim Kaduma indic~ted that TAZARA (Tanzania Zambia Railway Authority) was
going to import 14 diesel-electric locomotives and 16 motors made in the Federal .
Republic of Germany for locomotives of the DFH-2 ~t.ype. The problem o� transport#ng
21ie funiis for TAZAxA between ~ambia and Tanzania will also be solved. The Tanzania
Railway Corporation (TRC) will also import a machine in 1981-1982~to lay new.track
an certain sections of the central line of the Tanzanian railroad system. The com-
pany will also buy trucks and buses for road transport. During the fiscal year,
it will launch a 2U-year development program costing a total of 6.4 billion Tanzan-
ian shillings, with the financial aid of Canada. The minister engaged the National
Transport Corporation (NTC) to put more buses on routes for Dar-es-Salaam users. ,
The urban transport company,.UDA [expansiun unknown], will have 600.buses by 1986 and
75 percent should be permaaeatly operational. The Kamata Company (National Bus Ser-
vice) will have 120 buses by June 1985. It will soon open a line to Lindi and
Mtwara. Three re~lonal transport companies are being expanded in Dodoma, Ruvuma and
Mtwara and two others will be set up in Mwanza and Tabora. The minister also asked
the NTC to examiue operatioas of TAGOSHILI (~anzania Coastal~Shipping Line) and to
set up a 5-year plan to get the company off to a new start. The "Mwenge," one of
its vessels now idle and which was originally to carry livestock to Saudi Arabia,
should be used profitably. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR~iEENS in
French No 1865, 7 Aug 87. p 2062] 11,464
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
CSO: 4719/288
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ZAIRE
b1tIEFS
AID TO POLAND--The Zairian Executive Council decided at its weekly meeting on
7 August to send the Polish people 20 tons of coffee and 20 tons of tea. [Text)
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET 1~DITERRANEENS in French No 1866, 14 Aug 81 p 2115)
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.]
CSO: 4719/294
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ZAMBIA "
SURVIUAL OF TAZARA SAID TO BE IN JSOPARDY
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French No 245, 3-16 Aug 81 p 25
[Ar.ticle by Masautso Masautso: "Tazara's Illness"]
[Text] The Chinese-built Tanzanian-Zambian r.silroad (Tazara), 1,860 km
long which was initially ba,ptized Great Ra~ilroad of Independence (Great
Uhuru Railway) seems to be dying quietly a mere 6 years after the first
train ride.
Initially considered a symbol of close cooperation between the Third World
countries, the Tazara, which cost several million dollars, is today a source
of disappointment affecting the governments of Zambia and Tanzania as well
_ as that of China.
After several months of serious operational problems, passenger service was
suspended for 3 weeks in April.
A short statement from the Zambian general manager in Dar es Salaam, Maj Gen
Charles Nyirenda, only said that "due to circumstances beyond the company's
control, passenger service has been suspended until further notice." No
other information was given. Passenger service was suspended for almost a
month. Only merchandise was shipped which meant a loss of several thousand
dollars for the Tanzanian-Zambian organization.
Although the railroad has never came so close to complete closing since its
- opening during ceremonies for the llth ann�iversary of independence,
24 October 1975, the Tazara has been operating at a loes. Last year, China
had to come to its assistance with a loan of $10 million to purchase spare
parts for locomotives and rolling stock. Chinese aid came after a seven-
- point plan was drawn up and presented by the tripartite council of ministers
which met in Lusaka lagt 5eptember; it worked to put the company back on
track after thie threat of bankruptcy.
The propo~ed measures included a 10 percent increase in contributions and the
assignment of a team of Chinese experts to the Tazara to solve the problems.
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Zambia and Tanzania agreed to allocate $4 million to repair the railroad. The
two countries also signed an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany on
the delivery of 14 locomotives. It is hoped that these measures would help
to restore the problem-ridden railroad whose monopoly was already threatened
by the reopening, in Zambia, of the southern route which had been closed by
the former racist leader of Rhodesia, Ian Smith.
Ian Smith and his puppet successor, Abel Muzorewa, also added to Tazara's
misfortunes when, 2 years earlier at the height of the war for the liberation
of Zimbabwe, they sent Rhodesian commandos into Zambia to blow up railroad
bridges.
For Zambia, the Tazara was to help transport the country's essential exports
and the imports vital to its future industrial development. The railway
opened new prospects for agricuitural and industrial development and for
populating the provinces of the Center and North.
- A Vital Road
On the other side of the border, in Tanzania, the railway passes through a
vast mineral-rich (cflal and iron) area and the most fertile lands not yet
under cultivation. This was the only large-scale project which could be
taken over by Zambia and Tanzania and was the only sizable Chinese aid
program in Africa.
China aided the two countries after the lukewarm responses of the traditional
western financial powers, including the World Bank. Reimbursement of the
loan--long term and interest free--was $200 million, divided equally between
the 2 countries for a period of 30 years beginning in 1983. Now that the
railroad is having difficulties, can it provide Zambia and Tanzania with the
financial means for reimbursement?
In addition to the problems about locomotives and rolling stock, other
difficulties have arisen--high rates for Zambia and congestion at the port
of Dar es Salaam which has caused a considerable delay for Zambian merchandise.
However, new wharfs are under construction and additional docks are slated
to try to handle this considerable traffic.
Today, when traveling the 1,860 km of the railroad, we see that the two
countries have not yet fully exploited the developmental prospects created
by the railroad.
Tanzania has either failed or spPnt too much time exploiting its mineral
resources. Zambia's population seems to emigrate quickly from the villages
to the cities, leaving the land along the railroad uninhabited and
uncultivated. Full utilization of the line should have definitely improved
regional cooperation beyond the borders of Zambia and Tanzania--Zaire,
Burundi and Rwanda all use the port of Dar es Salaam. The railroad should
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have contributed substantially to the liberation of southern African
countries still using South African ports.
If the Tazara stopped operating, the governments of Zambia and Tanzania would
be responsible. China has done everything possible to give them remarkable
technical aid when no one else wanted to.
The two countries then must make the railroad viable so it will truly live
up to its name, Great Railroad of Independence.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afxique-Asie.
9479
CSO: 4719/262 ~
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ZAMBIA
BRIEFS
- TRADE UNION LEADERS` RELEASE REQUEST--Meeting for 2 days in Ndola at the~end of
July,, the ZCTU (Zambia Council of Trade Unions), asked President Kaunda to release
four trade union leaders arrested by Zambian authorities (MARCHES TROPICAUX, 31 July
81, p 2007). After examining the situation of the workers in the copper production
area, the general Council of the ZCTU, which includes 60 percent of the active pop-
ulation of Zambia, also asked the government to appoint an independent investiga-
tive commission to study relations between the government and workers and to exam-
ine the causes of the recent mining strikes. The commission will also have to
determine whether the four trade union leaders arrested tried to overthrow the gov-
ernment, as Pre~ident Kaunda stated. Herbert Bweupe, general vice president of the
ZCTU, suggested that the commission include merabers of organizations from outside
of Zambia, such as the OAU, the International Labor Organization (ILO) or other
UN organizations. He also stated that the government should not hold Zambian unions
responsible for the country's economic difficulties and political instability.
[Text] (Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French No 1865, 7 Aug 81
p 2062] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11,464
~ CSO: 4719/288 END
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