JPRS ID: 9714 WORLDWIDE REPORT TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050010-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9960
4 September 1981
~
Worldwide Re ort
p
NUCLEAR DEVELOPlV1EIvT AND PROLIFERATION
~FG~UO 10/81)
,
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST IN~'ORIVIATIOI~ SERVICE
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NOTE .
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JPRS L/9960
4 September 1y81
WORLDWIDE REPORT ~
NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT AND PROLIFERATION
(FOUO 10/81)
CONTENTS
LATIN AMERICA
BRA,Z IL
U.S. Deciaion on Neutron Bomb Termed Logical
(Editorial; LATIN AMERICA DAILY POST, 13 Aug 81) 1
CUBA
Nuclear Power Plant Construction Continuea
(Ramon Lobaina Consuegra; BOHEMIA, 5 Jun 81) 2
WEST EUROPE '
FRANCE
French Analyais of Osirak Bomb Capabilitiea
(LE NOWEL OBSERVATEUR, 22-28 Jul 81) 6
Uranium Purchasea, Capacity, Agreement,
by Michel Bosquet .
Buis, AEC Contrary Opinion, by Georges Buia
- a [III - WW - 141 FOUO]
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BRAZIL
U.S. DECISIO~v ON NEUTRON BON~ TF~RMED LOGICAL
PY132230 Rio de Janeiro LATIN AMLRICA DAILY POST in English 13 Aug 81 p 4
[Editorial: "*:eutron Controver^y"] ~
[Text] The first thing to remember about neutron bombs is that they are neither
better nor worse th'an other atomic weapons. Or conventional weapone, for that mat-
ter. They kill ~ust as readily as other nuclear bombs. If you are against nuclear
weaponry, yo~ must be opposed to'neutron bo!nbs, as well.
The second thing to remember is that the neutron bomb controversy is a question
about strategic warfare, not a question about the morality of nuclear warfare. The
Soviet Union has attempted to place the neutron bomb issue on a moral plane but, in
fact, it doesn't really belang there. Chemical and biological weapons do.
Neutron Uombs are a strategic development ot nuclear weaponry which makes a great
deal of sense in the European theater where there is great popula~ion density and
highly built up industrial installations. The idea of the neutron bomb 3s to block
a massive conventional attack on Western Europe from the Warsaw Pact forces which
have gigantic advantages over NATO. The neutron bomb threatens the Soviet Union and
its allies because of the possibility to iise th2.weapon to neutralize this advantage
witheut destroying large tracts of Western European installations.
If you acc:ept,the nuclear deterrent defen~e posture that the supezpowers have de-
veloped over the past 3 decades, you can't really.condemn the development of the
neutron bomb any more thaxi you can condemn the cruise missile, the MX system, the
backfire bomber or SS-20's. T!ley are one more entry in the awesome ar.senal.
,
The U.S. decision to produce neutron bombs is ~logical, given ~he realities of the
Soviet nuclear threat an~' the aggressive develapment of their conventional forces
= whiGh threaten Western Europe. The attempt by the Russians to stir up emotional
arguments seems to us to be hypocritical since th~ Soviets undoubtedly have the
neutron bomb under development them~elves and they have shown littT+e enough concern
with the niceties such as the producCion and utilization of banned chemical agents,
- which are reliably reported being used in Afghanistan.
One of the arguments against the placing of neutron bonbs on European soil is that
their use would tend to escalat~ a conventional clash more rapidly into an all-out
nuclear exchange. For that reason, the i1.S. has decided not to stockpile the weapon
in Europe but rather to produce it and keep it in the states in order to have it
ready if it i~ needed. West Europe should have no quarr~l with that.
_ CSO: 5100/2307
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CUBA
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION CONTINUES
Havana BOHEMIA in SFanish 5 Jun 81 pp 28-31
[Article by Ramon Lobaina Consuegra: "The Project of the Century"]
[Text] When it is stated that the first nuclear power plant will be the most com-
plex project ever undertaken in the history of Cuba, in addition to the source of
pride that this might represent for the Cuban people, we are moved by the awareness
of the immense responsibility borne by the upper-level personnel and workers who in
one way or another will participate in the gigantic venture.
The.Revolution has completed major industrial projects throughout the national
territory in recent years: ferCilizer factories, textile mills, different types of
food product plants and sugar mills, to mention but a few examples, and during the
past 5-year period, the Punta Gorda nickel plant in Moa and the Kar1 Marx cement
works in Cienfuegos are among the most important ones. Iiowever, in the opinion
of specialists, the Nuclear Power Plant (CEN) that will be built in the Juragua
area in the municipality of G:tenfuegos, bordering on Abreus, will surpass all of
them in size as well ~s complex-Lty of construction. The amount of cemegit and pre-
fabricated concretie, the steel used in reinforcemen~ and the excavations are far
greater than those of any of the projects previousTy undertaken.
For this year alone, eart'hwork costing 2 million pesos is planned. Civil construc-
tion will cost 2.18 million pesos and another 100y000 will go for assembly. When
it reaches its peak, the pro~ect will require the presence of some 7,000 construc~
tion workers and the assembly will cost over 30 million pesos annually.
Considered to be the country's priority.project, ~tartup of the CEN w~ill substan-
tially increase the nation's electric power with the incorporation of 880 megawatts
during the initial phase. At the same time it increases the country's energy capa-
- city, it will help save oil. Consequently, progress according to the schedule drawn
up is essential to the development of our economy.
Related Projects
Reynol Duarte, delegate from Industrial Projects Construction Enterprise No 6 at
the nuclear power plant, and engineer Nestor Fernandez, who heads work, explained
that in order to complete a pro~ect such as the CEN, a group of additional facili-
ties has to be built to provide the technical support to guarantee the construction
process.
2
�
T!~n - ~~nw n~w
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Among these are the construction yard, the heavy machinery dock, social facilities,
the CEN compound, a polytechnical school and road repair and construction, each of
_ which has various component parts on which work is underway.
' The construction yard, with an area of 50 hectares and costing approximately
20 million pesos, will provide the nuclear power plant with large automotive,
civil engineering, machine and welding shops. It will also have warehouses with ~
complete staffing, national and inflammable products and an 3ndustrial gas plant.
Near what will be the nuclear power plant, the construction yard is currently in
the earthwork phase for one of the sections. At the same time, work is staggered
on the other five, meaning that sometime this year, the remaining sections will
be opened.
The roar of the bulldozers, the ceaseless movement of the loaders and the coming
and going of the trucks, among them the magnificent Belaz, with a capacity of
15 cubic meters, show what progress is being made, thanks to ski11fu1 operators.
Equipment earmarked for this and other areas will be complemented by more trucks,
bulldozers and high-powered excavators supplied by the Soviet Union.
The loading dock (in the planning.stage) where supplies will arrive should be
completed by the end of 1983 and will require the construction of an accessway
1.5 kilometers long. Some 300,000 cubic meters of fill will be needed and will
come from the other excavations for the plant. '
With respect to the social facilities, the administrati.ve buildings of. the con-
stzuction and investment enterprise will have~to be bvilt and in the first phase,
a camp for 1,000 workers will be constructed, with its sociocultural facilities.
A tour of the areas shows how work is prbgressing. At the administrative base,
we met Julio Niebla, head of the project and an experie~ced builder with 36 years
in the field. Niebla proudly told us about work on the nuclear power plant and
s~ about the spirit among workers at the base, which now involves some 50 men. A:,
Niebla talked, he pointed out different areas where work is underway.
1 Organized into special teams and paid based on an agreement, the men at the admin-
istrative base are putting up the buildings using the Sandino system. The walls
- of some are already up; others are having the foundations laid.
Hou~ing for 1,000 Construction Workers . ~
Accompanied by Nestor Fernandez on a tour o~f several kilometezs, we arrived at
the area where the rest of the social facilities are going up. Situated on the
summit of a hill some 300 meters above sea level, loaking toward the Hotel Pasaca-
caballos, with Cienfuegos Bay on one side and the vast fields of henequen charac-
terizing the region on ~the other, the site where the construction workers will live
looks like a tiny city in the building.
First one sees the eight dorn?itories, cach with a capacity of 140 persons, built ac-
cording to the two-storey Sandino system. One is already finished. Alongside them
is the brightly colored building that includes the central kitchen, dining room
and cafeteria. The civil construction is completed and the building awaits the
modern equipment that will be installed.
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Close-by are other buildings that will, in the months ahead, become a medical dis-
pensary, communications center (postal and telegraph office), barber shop, beauty
shop, recreation room with different games, and an amphitheater. ~
The polytechnical.school where skilled workers and intermediate-level technicians
who will work at the n~iclear p.ower plant will be trained is being set up and com-
pleted at the end of the esplanade. It will have modern equipment and will be able
to receive 60 students. It should go into operation in September.
Also part of the whole is the first housing to be turned over to the Soviet special-
ists who will work on construction of th~ nuclear power plant. Some of this hous-
ing is near completion.
Among the related facilities is the nuclear power plant compound~, where earthwork
began in January. It is estimated that in this~5-year period, 1,800 housing units
will be completed with their accompanying so~iocultural facilities. Their com-
plete construction is~indispensable in order to be able to house the specialists,
builders and worke,rs who wiil operate the plant.
Censtruction work also involves the rebuilding of the section of highway from
,Abreus to the nuclear power plant area, about 30 kilometers. The constant motion
of equipment, graders, levelers and trucks results in new paved sections of road.
New road systems will also be built, as in the case of the roa~ from the loading
dock to the nuclear power plant and accessways leading to other facilities.
Fieldwork is now underway as part of the geological studies of the zone that wi]_1
be the location of the special building, the reactors and the machine room. Work
is proceeding according to schedule.
Another Gigantic IIndertaking
At the present time, some 400 construction workers are at the site, some of them
living there. Many participated in construction of the Karl Marx cement works and
they recall when Co~rander in Chief Fidel Castro summoned them.to the new project,
when he off icially apened the Guabairo industry. Responding to the challenge were
men like Juan Manuel Jauregui, Bernardo Iznaga, Hector Naranjo and Jose Florin,
who we learned are from different parts of the country.
Juan Manuel Jauregui is 60 years old. He is a carpenter and has been in construc-
tion for 22 years. "We finished up at Guabairo and are now here, as Fidel asked.
This is a source of pride for us because just look, there you have the cement
plant,which is a great project, but we know this will be even greater, but we r~re
not afraid."
During the break, Jauregui is sur=ounded by the younger workers, to whom he trans-
mits his experience. His jovial nature and discipline on the job earn him the re-
spect of those who attentively listen to his opinions. He tel,ls them of the ex-
tremely d~.fficult conditions under which construction workers toi~ed under capital-
ism and of the concern that now exists for the men. The young men listen to the
anecdotes and nod their heads in agreement, as if to corroborate every word of the
fluent language of the old builder and learn the lessons emanating from living
history, from this participant in another undertaking of giants.
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Construction of the nuclear power plant with the cooperation of the USSR will take
place through an intensive investment program representing a high pe:~centage of
the national plan for this 5-year period and double the amo~int undertaken by the
province in the 5 previous years.
~ The program scheduled for Cienfuegos includes other.economic objectives of.great
importance to the nation, such a~ the oil refinery and 31 other industrial projects,
119 agricultural programs, major water project for irrigation and industrial, and
social uses, ot~her projects devoted to~�health, education and recreation, and an
extraordinary housing construction plan providing for an ~lncrease four times greater
t-han what existed in the preceding 5-year period. .
In order to undertake this gigantic construction program, the Ministry of Construc-
tion has worked out a wide-ranging plan to prep~re the labor forces. The plan in-
cludes the retraining, in Cuba and abroad, of a large part o~ existing workers and
the admission to schools for training as assemblers or civil construction special-
ists another 4,000 new workers, a large share of whom will be from Cienfuegos.
Training in the USSR will be 326 workers from all over the country. In alternate ~
graups, they will receive suitable training for construction work on Cuba's first
nuclear power plant. ~ECOI [presumably Industrial Construction Enterprise] No 6 in~
Cienfuegos, the ~rain enterprise involved in current industrial pro~ects for the
nuclear power plant; has already chosen the first 45 engineers,.intermediate-level
technicians, foremen and skilled workers who will go~to the Soviet Union, wt~ich
represents 50 percent of the total of the first group. ~
Conscious of the volume of creative work pl.anned for the 5-year period and inde-
pendently of the help they will.receive from other provinces, the Cienfuego people
are getting ready to put their organizational and mobilizing abilities to th~ test
in order to successfully wage these new battles. ,
COPYh2IGHT: BOHEMIA 1981
11,464 ;
CSC): 3010/1598
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FRANCE
FREL~ICH ANALYSIS OF OSIRAK BOMB CAPABIL~TIES
Uranium Purchases, Capacity, Agreement
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 22-28 Jul 81 pp 31-32
[Article by Michel Bosquet: "Osirak: France's Secret File;" passages enclosed in
slantlines printed in italics]
[Text] Could the Iraqis really have used the react~rs supplied by France to make
themselves an atomic bomb? Many French and foreign experts think sa, and Michel
- Bosquet gives their arguments. Georges Buis, for his part, presents the other side,
the one espoused by the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission].
By bombing the Franco-Iraqu reactor at Tamuz, Israel committed an act that was
criminal in legall, moral; and political terms. Al1 the same, this crime could have
been foreseen. It was so foreseeable, i.n fact, that even among those who have
denour.ced it many are uncomfortable, while others are even frankly relieved that
the abscess has been lanced. If they ~ould speak candidly, they would speak of a
crime with broadly mitigating circumstances. If they could be totally honest,
they would add that, if Israel committed a crime, France was at fault for provoking
it.
, These matters are being discussed discreetly ~ust now in Paris, particularly within
the scien*ific community. People still r~ecall an issue of FRANCE-SOIR dated 5
Aug 80 which had the 8-column headline: "Warning of French Atomic Scientist."
The scientist in question was Francis Perrin, former high commissioner in Atomic
Energy. He said, among other things: /"This atomic reactor (supplied by France
_ �o Iraq1 could be used to create plutonium by irradiating uranium. In principle,
Iraq has committed itself not to use such plutonium for military ends. But the Non-
= Proliferation Treaty (which prohibits any military utilization) could always be
. denounced. Consequently, it is possible ~:hat a few years from now Iraq, having
prepared its plutonium with the French reactor which is not designed for that but
~ which c3n be used for it, would say: "Now I am breaking my comdnitments in order
~ to make atomic bombs." This is what India did...It is a question of prestige for
_ that P.rab country .
"Caramel" Rejected
That was in August 1980. Three manths later, Iraq, which had just invaded Iran,
~ienied AIEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspectors access to it nuclear
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installations, even though by terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty it was obliged
to accept them. For the second time in a month, Paul_ Quiles, the PS parltHmc~ntr~ry
spokesman for nuclear issues formally queried the government about /"the danger
of proliferat.ion of nuclear weapons which results from the export of nuclear
materials for civilian purposes, a danger which appears especially worrisome in case
of Iraq."/
That was in November 1980. Quite persuasive pieces of evidence continued to
accumulate, leading to speculation that the Iraqi Government was involved in nuclear
technology for basically military ends: First, when Jacques Chirac, in 1975,
negotiated a major commercial agreement in Baghdad, the Iraqis placed an order with
him for a big natural uranium reactor. It was this kind of reactor, provided by
Canada, wh~.ch enabled India to explode an atomic device. With a power output of
1,500 thermal megawatts, the reactor desired by Iraq would be difficult to monitor
by the AIEA, because its fuel could be emptied out while it is in operation, without
leavi~zg a trace. More than a hundred kilos of plutonium per year could be extracted
in this way.
Only six are needed to make a bomb. Chirac and the Iraqis, however, were unaware of
one detail: France was unable now to supply this kind of reactor, for it had quit
constructing them `in 1969 and disposed of the equipment.
This agreement had to be renegotiated.
Second, Iraq then picked the Osiris reactor (renamed Osirak), whose mate is the Isis
- reactor. One interesting feature: the fuel for these reactors is almost completely
pure (93 percent) TJ-235, which can be used without further processing to make a bor~b.
The cores of Osirj.s and Isis together contain 25.8 kilos of U-235. This is clearly
more than enough to build an atomic weapon. Iraq tried, but in vain, to obtiain
delivery of several fuel elements at the same time. The AEC pretended that it had
to procure these fuel elements from the United States. In fact, it could take
them from French military stocks.
Third, after the 1979 attack at La Seyne against Osirak's reactor vessel, Raymond
Barre tried to renegotiate the agreement with Iraq: he proposed to fuel Osirak
with a combustible stripped of any military value ("caramel") but which would neither
= diminish the pawer of the reactor not its capacity to produce plutonium. Intransigent,
the Iraqis told Barre they might denounce the entire agreement, which also provided
for France to be supplied with 10 million tons of Iraqi oil per year.
Fourth, Osirak is not really a research reactor: it is more powerful than that.
By way of ex~unple, the Israeli research reactor at Dimona has a power output of
5 MW; that of~ the Laue-Langevin Institute at Grenobls is 57 MW: it is the mc+st
powerful university research reactor in the world. But Osirak is 70 MW, and is
, unmatched in any country. It was intended to be used for testing materials used
- in the nuclear industry by means of irradiation. Well, Iraq does not have an atomic
indus~rial program: it is hardly about to run out of oil. Osirak.could,~~n t~he
other hand, be used to irradiate natural or impoverished uranium in order to generate
plutonium.
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Fifth, Iraq in fact went right ahead with massive purchases of uranium: 100 tons
bought from Niger, 130 tons from Portugal, still unknown quantities from Italy
and from Brazil. Last year Iraq even tried to buy 11 tons of impoverished uranium
from Canada in order to have them processed into [fuelJ rods by the Nukem
corporation in Hanau, Germany. Now impoverished uranium can only be used for one
tr~ing: it is easy to turn into plutonlum.
A Game of Hide and Seek
Sixth, the extraction of plutonium is all the same a delicate operation. Though
~t produces radioactivity levels 10 to 100 times lower than the reprcessing
_ operations at La Hague, it requires a"hot cell" so it can be manipulated from a
distance. Now in fact Iraq did buy a hot cell from Italy, withou~ having the
slighest need for it in terms of its civilian program. For the irradiated fuel
from Osirak, by terms of the contract, had to be sent back to France.
Seventh, the possibility of using Osirak to generate plutonium is denied by no
one. The only controversy is over how much could be produced from it. According
to the conservative estimates of three high-ranking physicists who at the end of
May finished a very well-documented mem4randum for Francois Mitterrand, Osirak
- would be able to produce 5 to 10 kilos of plutonium per year. One would need 6 to
make a bomb. The AEC put the figure at 3.3 kilos maximum. The director general
of the AIEA has put out the figure of $ kilos. The inspector general of AIEA
opened himself up wide to ridicule when he spoke of /"only a few grams. The reactor
would have to be in operation for centuries to put together enough to make a
plutonium bomb."/ The CIA, finally, estimated that Iraq would h;ive it~ bomb by
about 1985.
The Chirac and Barre governments, def.ending themselves against their critics,
always invoked the total legality of Franco-Iraqi cooperation, as also the legality
of the 1976 sale to Pakistan (which did not disguise its determination to build
a bomb) of a plutonium extraction facility. The former government always acted ~s
if the AIEA inspections alone were sufficient to prevent the diversion of fissionable
materials far military purposes. It is widely recognized, however, that these
inspections are no real safeguard. This is even admitted privately at least by
the officials of the AEC themselves. Was not a French inspe~tor assassinated in
Taiwan after having discovered there the disappearance of 500 grams of plutonium?
No sanctions, no protests, followed.
The AEC has also widely publicized some 5afeguards of a quite different nature:
those provided by the presence of its own technicians at Tamuz, by the terms of an
accord which up to now had been aecret. But if the AEC has always been determined
- to prevent the Iraqis from building a bomb, it is equally certain that the Iraqis
- have always been just as determined to acquire the means to build one. A vast
game of hide and seek was played in which each player pretended to be unaware of
the real intentions of the other. This is why the questions posed by the
exportation of ~.uclear technology go far beyond fhe problem of technical safeg~ards.
Are peace and detente being well served by s~pporting willy-nilly the nuclear
ambitions of bellicose and unstable states? Is it a course of ::.tion worthy of
a civilized country to exploit the rivalry between nations engaged in the race for
the bomb by selling both sides materials which could be the detonators of an atomic
war?
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These questians have been openly asked since the Israeli raicl. Plai.nly, it was
necessary to condemn Israel; but to go from that to conclude that we should also
continue the Giscardian policy of nuclear exports is a step which the AEC will not
' force a lEftist government to take.
Uranium and Plutonit;m
An atomic bomb can be constructed out of two substances: 1) Uranium-235 [U-235].
Natural uranium consists of 0.7 percent U-235, the remainder being U-238; to separate
them, sophisticated installations for "isotopic separation" and "enrichment" are
needed; 2) Plutonium. It is formed by subjecting U-238 to radiation in a reactor.
In order to separate it, one needs only a ch~,mical laboratory, equipped if possible
with a"hot cell" and equipment for remote controlled manipulation.
~ Buis, AEC Contrary Opinion
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 22-28 Jul 81 p 33
[Article by Georges Buis: "Fear For I~aught"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed
in italics]
- [Text] /"Slander us if you will, there will alway oe some pretext.:/ Such was the
bottom line of the campaign launched by Israel to justify its terrorist raid on the
Tamuz I and II nuclear research reactors being built in Iraq some 20 km south of
Baghdad by Franch technicians. And so many decent people are letting themselves
be taken in by this propaganda tRat it is necessary to set the record straight.
In 1975, Iraq asked France Lo train its atomic scientists and to supply it in the
same connection with the research tool appropriate to this very high-level
technology involving physics and chemistry. France responded favorably to the request
and proposed a research tool which was not intrinsically dangerous, namely a
reactor ot the Osiris family--it would be called Osirak--the same kind of reactor
used at Saclay for pure basic research. In doing so, France supplied Iraq with a
tool for scientific training. 'Lo say that it provided a bomb factory is--to speak
euphemistically--a mistake. T1�_..t is, in reality--and this is not ~ntioned--at
the same time that France was supplying the Osirak reactor, not only with the
concurrence of the AIEA, but putting it under the AIEA's control~ it signed in 1978
a 10-year agreement with Iraq for /"joint programs and research."J That is to say,
- for a 10-year period nothing could be done to or with the products oi the reactor
without our knowledge. A reactor is not a bicycle from which one could surreptitiously
remove a wheel Thursday night and replace it no less surreptitiously on Saturday
morning--Friday being the "Sunday" of the Islamic world.
Ttao other safeguards of great importance have also not been discussed in this affair:
1) France has committed itself not to supply the en~iched uranium necessary to
the functioning of the reactor in quantities more than the bare minimum required,
in order to make it impossible to produce en~ugh plutonium to make a bomb. 2) The
_ reactor itself is joined to a"critical model," in which the rods are tested, which
ma~.~s them radioactive and prevents them from being re-used without reprocessing.
A whole set of operations, requiring the utilization fo considerable resources,
would have to be effectuated behind the backs of the French engineers [to divert the
fissionable material]. Certainly one can conceive the possibility of someone
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putting in or around the reactor's core a sheath of natural uranium in order to create
_ plutonium. But from the top of the pool in which the reactor is bathed, one can
see the core, and the operation would tht~s be impossible to carry out without
thase working in the area knowing it.
Eight Meters by Forty
Of course, a day might come seven years from now when the Iraqis could say to the
other researchers that they wanted henceforth to work alone. In order to da that,
they would have to procure enriched uranium, whieh is very tightly controlled.
There are, however, two sources: Pakistan and China. But then, there would be no
more need for Osirak: the Iraqis could much more simply just make uranium bombs
~ without plutonium.
In conlusion, it is their own affair if the Iraqis wanted to train good nuclear
technicians, and in so doirig they are on the same path as other semi-developed
countries. To say that they were trying to prepare themselves to /rapidly/ produce
nuclear warheads is ludicrous.
Finally, among the untruths Menahem Begin has broadcast whoesale one might mention:
1) that 9unday is not a day of rest for the French in Iraq for the good reason that
it is not one for the Arabs. As luck would have it the bombing took place at 1837
hours, while the technicians had left the factory at 1830. That is a small margin
in terms of such long-distance raid and thus one might w~ll call it a~ucky chance.
One lone French technician was killed, doubtless from the effect of the blast and
explosion and lung daxeage. Six Iraqis were also killed; 2) the fact that the Israeli
prime minister spoke of the destruciton of a secret installation 40 meters deep.
In fact, it was an ordinary laboratory, buried not 40 but only 8 meters deep, and
that was for "structural" rather that atomic reasons.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Le Nouvel Observateur"
9516 ~ ~
CSO: 5100/2297 END
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