JPRS ID: 9957 CHINA REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9957
3 September 1981
Cl~ina ort
p
POLITICAL, SOCIOIOGICAI AND MILItARY AFFAIRS
CFOUO 14/81)
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JPRS L/9957
3 September 1981
CHINA REPQRT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 14/81) ~
CONTENTS
MILITAItY AND PL~LIC SECURITY
(hina'a Vietnam Veta Attend Nan~ing Advanced Infantry School
(Yang Genrong; JIEFANG.TIA~T BAO, 1 May 79) 1
Wuhan Tank Battalion Experiments in Multigrade Training
(Ruang 7ttao~ian, et al. ; JIEFANGTZAd BAO; 9 May 79) 2
Relationahip Between Comananders, Subordinates Discussed
(Pei Din$ean; JIEFANGTUN BAO, 25 May 79) 7
~.gitation, Propag~da Help Maintain Figh##ng Spirit
(7.hao Gengqun; JIEFANGJiAd BAO, 27 May 79)...0 .............o..... 10
Shenyang Arary Hoepital Ad~pte New Clinical Techno~ogy
(Guo Jindong, et al.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 27 May 79) 14
Bei~ing Un{ t Carries Out Combined-Arms Tratning
(Zhang Meimng, Huang Yuaheng; JIEFANGTUN BAiO, 27 May 79)....... 16
Study of New Weapon Technology, Combat Methoda Urged
(Bing Yan; JIEFANGTtiN BAO, 9 Apr 7Q) ......................r..... 17
Articles Extol Flight Heroee i.n Border Defense
(JIEFANG.T~T BAO, 9 Apr 79).....~ 22
Heroic Air Defenee Commander, by Pan Zongde
Mechanic Enaurea Flight Safety, by Jin Shi~un, Deng Xudong
. Patrol Aircraft Extra Alert, by Cai Shanwu, Liu Changdong
Cargo Plane Crew Al.ert
Saga af Yotmg Soldier's Sacrifice for Irbtherland
(Liu Liangkai, et a1.; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Apr 79} 25
- a - [III - CC - 80 FOUO]
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Youth Exhorted To Be Model Defenders of Motherland
(Wu Zhang; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 9 Apr 79) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Soldier Suggests Improvements in Tsctics, Equipment
(Lo; JIEFANGJiIl~1 BAO, 9 Apr 79) ..................................0 29
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SEC~ktITY
CI~LCNA' S VIETNAM VETS ATTEND NANJING ADVANCED INFANTRY SCHOOL
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chineae 1 May '79 p 1
[Article by Yang Genrong [2799 2704 2837]: "Nearly 100 Outstanding Cadres
Enter the Nan~ing Advanced Infantry School"]
[Text] Beginning on 15 April, 93 cadres from the Guangxi Border Troops
_ have arrived one after another at the Nan~ing Adva,nced Infantry School for
study. Among these out$tanding caamna,nders tempered in the self-defensive
counterattack are some military cadres who led "d~gger" companies in bravely
penetrating the ene~y lines and who directed one decisive victory after
another in the battles of Tong Deng [Chinese pronunci:ation: 0681 4098] and
Lang Son; some political cadres who always set a personal example in promptly
and forcefully carrying out political work during the battle; and same
leading logistics cadres who fear neither hardship nor death and who did an
outstanding ~ob of completing battle supply tasks. Amon~ the 93 students
are 50 who have been cited for battlefield service. The arrival of this
batch of students has given the school brave deeds and battle experience
for developing in-depth study of the self-defensive countera.ttack battles.
This has raiaed the quality of instruction and provided extremely beneficial
factor s .
The CCP comnnittee of the Nan~ing Advanced Infei.ntry School has attached great
importance to this batch of new students entering the school. .They drew up
a resolution cn atudying the brave deeds and experiences in the battle of
self-defense and counterattack, calling on the per�sonnel of the school to
study seriously the lofty patriotiam and revolutionaxy heroic spirit of
the troops who pexticipated in battle, study the valuable experience in
~ doin~ battle which was paid for with blood, to utilize this experience
thoroughly in reforming instruction, to strive to train outstanding command-
ers and to greatly advance all items of work with instruction at the core.
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NLILITARY AP1~i PUBLIC SECURITY
WUHAN TANK SATTALION EXPF~RIMENTS IN MULTIGRADE TRAIIVING
Rei~ing JIEFANGJIIN BAO in Chinese 9 May 79 p 1
[Article by Kuang Zhao~ian ~2568 0664 1.c].7], Liu Jinzhang [0~;91 6855 45451,
G~~o Chuangxing [6753 0482 5281] and Han Baoqing j7281 5508 7230J, "Ref'orm
the Educational System, Raise the Quality of Training"]
[Text] This newspaper received a great deal of response after
- we published the experiences of a regiment of units under the
' Nanjing Couanand with a"promotion grade system" of training
in our 26 February issue. Many units feel that this tr~ining
method is a ma~ar~ refo~m which solves the long-standing
problem of putting rookie and veteran soldiers in the same
pot and that it helps raise the quality of training. Some
comrades, however, ha.ve raised the question of how can we
solve the problems oF inadequate teaching personnel, equip-
" ment and space if we act like that regiment and train each
company in eepsrated cl~ss grades. The l~a 1 tank batt~lion
of a certain divieion of the units under the Wuhan Command
has experi~ented in ce,rxied out multigrade educ~tion taking
the batta)ion aa the educational un3t and solved these pro~~lems
relatively well. Here we introduce how they have done this.
The No 1 tank battalion is thia year's ~ioneer training test-point battalion
in a certain division of the armored force of the units under the Wuhan
= Comma,nd. Since the beginning of February, with the assistance of a divisional
work team, it ha~ adopted a new teaching system focusing on the battalion and
~oining the battalion and the compe~nies according to the "promotion grade
system" me~hod. The quelity of training has improved maxkedly.
The "Fromotion Gra.de Syatem" Training Method Carries With It a Reform in the
Fd~acational Systam
In Januaxy of this year when they were studying �~he training plan far the
training test-point battalion~ same comrades put forth the daring prop~sal to
carry out training on a specialized basis by sep~~ating higher and lower
c:Lasses. Of course this would be very good for solving the problem of putting
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P'OR OFFI Cl. AL U51. ~NLY
novice and veteran personnel in the same pot. But it also b~re witn it a new
problem. Everyane first counted things up: a tank company has fo~,r kinds of
personnel: tank commander, driver, first gunner and second gunner. If each
of these has a higher and lower class, that makes eight classes. Yet one
tank companv has nine cadres including the quartermaster and in ordinary
times at most two-thirds af these are available. The teaching capability is
- therefore insufficient to use the company as the teaching unit to carry out
multigrade training. In addition, some comrad~s pc~inted out that so many
training vehicles would be required for company-level training. In the past
when training was divided into four specialized squads there was a chronic
p~obl~m in practical operatiaz~s of contending for vehicles and waiting for
~hem. If they split tY~e four squads into eight classes the contradi~tions
of contending and waiting for vehicles would become more intense and there �
would definitely be insufficien~ training ~ounds and ma.terials as well.
What could be done? The division CCP co~ranittee considered the greater
interests and after numerous studi~s and deliberations resolved to search out
a way via reforming the educational system, changing from one in the past
with the company as its basic unit to a multigrade training system organized
in a unified way by the battalion. Moreover Assistant Division Commander
Chen and Vic~-Com~?~ssar Sheng led separate work teams to first go to the No 1
- battalion of a certain regiment for a trial run.
Methods of Implementing tha Organization of Teaching Using the Battalion as
the Basic Unit
How, concretely, can multigrade training be crganized in a unified manner by
the battalion?
One, the personnel of the en~ire battalicn are grouped into unified classes.
Using the method o~ mass appraisal, review by groups of teaching personnel
and examination and approval by the company CCP branch, they grouped the
- tank commanders, first gunners and drivers each into higher and lower classes
according to time of service, technical ~ade and ability to learn. The
second gunnera were groupe~ into one class, making ~ tot~l of seven classes.
- 7'hose whose professional techniques were relatively good went to the A
classes while thoee whose technic~l level was a little lower or who were
rc~ukies went to the B classea. The personnel of each company were ~.5ke
scY~oolmatee going to their own clasaes at unified training times to listen
t;o lectures or to drill. In the course of training personnel were pzomoted
and demoted in grade in keeping with the development of their professional
qualities.
Two, the teaching personnel of the entire battalion divided up their work in
a unified manner. The battalion organized and assigned the cadres and teach-
ing personnel of each company in a unified manner. Aiming at the technical
specialties of each cadre and his level of teaching responsibility and acting
in accordance with the principles of putting the capable in cotrmiand and
pairing up the strong and the weak, they put the specialized teAching person-
nel of the entire battalion into four instructor gxoups, including
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communications, gunnery and driving, and separately axranged c;~dres at the
levels of battalion and company to a~sume the responsibility of group leader
or assistant group leader. On ~ne eve of the training, the four instructor
groups divided up the work for the 85 oasic topics and operational topics
involved in this year's specialized training. This brought each subject down
to +he individual so that each ir~structor understood the topic, contents,
time and methods of his own teaching responsibility and there was a pr:~mary
teacher and a backup teacher for each topic in order to avoid the situation
where there is no one to teach when an instructor leaves. Battalion and
regiment cadre experts were invited to teach the nine theoretical topics
which w~re relatively difficult.
Three, the entire battalion drew up a unified concrete implementing training
plan. They organized the battalion's instructors to act in keeping with the
monthly plans of the regiment and collectively dre,w up a program for imple-
menting the training topics, collectively prepare lessons and examinatians.
In drawing up this program they treat groups A and B~eparately according to
ti;eir aptitudes. For example, they increased the number of relatively deep
topics for dryvers in claes A, including the extended utilization of tanks
and basic knowledge for technical appraisal and minor tank repairs.
Four, the battalion made unified arrangements for various kinds of training
equipment. While the instruction was being carried out, specialized training
equipment was all managed and repaired by the battalion and distributed to
each class in a unified manner for its use. This not only brought the exist-
ing equipment into full play, it also created conditions for ~oint specialized
training.
Five, the battalion and the companies ~oin with both divisian and joining.
Whi1e the bPttalion organizes specialized basic training and education in a
unified manner, the eompany cadres cooperate on their own initiative and
orp,anize the soldiera of their own campanies to go to class at the appropri-
a+.e t9.mea, to do their studiea well and to do good political and ideological
work in the course of training. The battalion makes unified stipulatione
- f'or the times which should be uaed for training, taking the company as the
basic orge.nizationel unit for conerete implementation. Training competitions
are slso carried out between companies. They also pay attention to ~oining
orga,nically separate training and ~oint training. That is, after a stretch
af separate specialized training they let the four kinds of personnel return
to their own tanka ar~d do a stretch of 3oint specialized training. They then
separate the training again in a repeated cycle. This allows the company
cadres to gresp promptly the specialized technical conditions of the soldiers
i.n their own companies end facilitates the personnel of each tank in prac-
ticing cooperative maneuvers.
Advantages of Reforming the Educational System
_ Although the No 1 tank battalion has not trial implemented the multigrade
instructional system organized in a unifiEd way by the battalion for a very
long period of time, its advantages have already begun to become evident.
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"With the new educational system, rookie and veteran personnel both have a
kee:n i.nterest in study." This is the general opinion of the soldiers. Rookie
and ~eteran personnel ha.ve separate drills and,lectures ~n keeping with their
cliff'erent natures and there is both promotion and demotion. The veteran
personnel do not study "the same old stuff," so they take an intense interest
~n study. The rooki.e personnel strive to be promoted to the higher grade ~and
- put out a bit more effort to study and drill. The enthusiasm of the ba.ttal-
ion's soldiers for training has been throroughly aroused.
- "With the new educational system we no longer worry about the instructor
problem." ~his is the impression of the company cadres. The No 3 company
is a prominent example. During the first half of last year, the commander
- entered a training unit and the vice-commander was not qualified. There were
no cadres to haiidle the two main specialties of gunnery and driving. The
company ran around in circles in haste and the best it could do ~Tas to pick
out four soldiers to act as instructors. This affected the quality of the
training. At the begi'hning of training this year, one technical cadre of the
No 3 company was in the hospital due to illness, two cadres were transferred
and there was no leader for one platoon. Yet because tre battalion organized
_ S.nstrcction in a unified manner, the training of the No 3 company not only
was as bustling with activity as before, its quality was better than in past
years.
"With the new educational system the utilization of vehicles, training grounds
and equipment has been raised." When the company was the unit of instruction,
vehicles and equipment were both guaranteed by the company. A large number
of vehicles were utilized and equipment was in short supply. With the
battalion as the unit of instruction and classes divided into higher and lower,
the battalion has alternated basic specialized and general topics and topics
involving basic theory and practical operations. Vehicl.es are transferred and
equipment is guaranteed in a unified way by the battalion, overcoming in an
effective way the above maladies, cutting down on the phenomena of idle
v~:hi.cl.es, ~~ontending for vehicles and waiting for vehicles and increasing the
train~ng t;ime of personnel in actual operations. ~
AS'ter more than two months the quality of training has improved markedly.
_ Goo~i results have been obtained in those classes which have already been held.
i'or example, the overall evaluation of the theory test for the specialized A
~ommunications graup was excellent while on basic drill No 1 the B~oup,
with eight participants, had seven reted excellent and one rated gocd, with
1UU per�cent passing. The overall daytime evaluation was excellent f'or
L-F~e ;3 participants in the A and B groups of drivers in basic driving, with
:100 percent passing. Basic drill No 3 was rated overall excellent
['or groups A and B of the firat gunners. In practicing initiating and terrni-
nrating the battle with anti~.ircr~ft machine guns, 13 ou~ of 14 second gunners
were excellent and one did not pasa.
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Re?nainin,r ~7�oblems
~ome new problems have appeared with the implementa+ion of the new educational
system. The main one is that once the rookie and veteran soldiers were
separated into different training classes it has not been easy to promote
movements for the veterans to lead the rookies. In addition, once the
battalion became t,he unit for instruction the cadres of the companies lacked
a very deep understanding of ~he soldiers of their own company. This has
brought witY: it some problems in company political and ideological work and
in company administration. But they feel that these problems mmr~..y be solved
b,y unc~vering new methods in the course of practice. Towards the end of
Ma,rch the division had already held an on-site conference in this battalion
and is promoting its experience throughout the division.
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MILITARY AND PIJgLIC SECURITY ~
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMANDERS, SUBORDINATES DISGUSSED
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 25 May 79 p 3
[ Article by Pei Dingsan ~5 952 1353 0005 On Horse' and ' On Foot ~
[Text] During a rapid march to pursue and destroy the enemy during the War
of Liberation, the troops marched day and night. The commander of one
regiment was anxioue to annihilat~ the enemy and was continually blaming the
troops for going too slow. Because he was on horsebaGk it was very difficult ~
for him to comprehend how much teaacioua willpowQr it took for the soldiers
who were already completely exhausted to march one etep forward. In con-
sequence some of the soldiers said, "Who doea not want to lay hold of the
enemy as quickly as possible? Those who are on horse must know the
difficulties of those on foot!"
"Those on horse must get to know the difficulties of those on foot" is
plain speech but there is truth in it which affcrdg food for thought. For
example, com~aring those "on horse" to the leaders and those "on foot" to
the maeses, this means thPt the leaders should attantively experience and
observe the hardships and diffi~ulties. Whea they hand over tasks to the
maesea or when they supervise and urge the masses to complete tasks, they
muat take into accotmt the difficulties which the masaes encotmter and,
with earnest solicitude~ handle nattere in a fair and reaso~able way.
Numerous facta from:?~?e.war ya~(~a~~prove that when those "on horse" can know
the difficultiea of those "on foot," the latter can follow the orders of
those "on horse." At present we must concentrate the thoughts ~nd energies
o� the broad masaes on socialist modernization and our "horaeback" lesders
must likewtee "know the difficultiee of those on ~oot." Bureaucratic
attitudes such as being unco*~cerned with the vital interests of the masses,
not taking the sufferinos of the massea to heart and being insensitive to
the practical difficulties of the maesea must all be reaolutely opposed and
rectified. If not, the maesea wil~ treat you ae badly as you treat them,
and it will be impor~eible to genuinely get eve ryone to concentrate their
thoughta and energiea on modernization.
There is another aide to the matter, however. Although that regimental
commander grumbled about the soldiere, he also had his difficulties.
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If they did not pursue and attack the enemy rapidly, they would not strike
them and migiit even affect the completion of the entire battle plan. From
this angle, that commander was also correct in saying, "Those who are on
foot must know the difficulties of those on horse!" So if we are to con-
sider the problem from all aragles, we must advocate "those on foot knowing
the difficulties of those on horse" at the same time that we should stress
"those on horse knowing the difficulties of tk~ose on foot." After the
disaster of Lin B iao and the "gang of four," there are some genuine practi-
cal difficulties at present among the masses. When the masses present their
own difficulties and demand that they be solved, this is understandable, and
they s hould be satisfied to the fulleat extent possible. However, those
"on horse" have difficulties ~ust in the same way that those "on foot" have
_ theirs. The fact that there are problems which should be solved is not
equivalent to having the wherewithal to solve them. We cannot simply look
at our own difficultiea and present demands to our hearts' content by ~ust
lookin g out for ourselves. We muat also consider the difficulties of the
state and show underetanding and aympathy for straits of th~ leadership in
not having the capability to fulfill all wishes.
~ Actually, both thcse "on horse" and those "on foot" are good. Their overall
aims are the same and it is not difficult to unite them. At present the
fundamental interests of the people of the entire nation lie 3n carrying
out the four socialist modernizations. Thia is the big picture for the
entire nation and it is our common overall goal. In order to realize this
goal, both those "on horse" and those "on foot" must focus their thinking
and power on the four modernizations. Those problems of livelihood for the
masses which have accumulated over a long period ~f time must be grasped and
resolved in order to facilitate ~whipping up the enthusiasm of the masses.
At the same time we must look at the limitations of ob3ective conditions.
We cannot aolve everything in a short period of time nor can we act with
undue haste lest we block the four modernizations. At present, although the
course of eventa hae already made a turn for the better, it is only an
initial turn aa~ is far from a total turn. Much remains to be tidied up
and to be built and we must atill rely on leading cadres and the broad
masses to exert tremandous common efforts. As for thoae matters which we
do not have conditione to reaolve for the titne being, we must still promote
a spirit of arduoue atruggle and vanquiah th~ difficulties together. Only
if we fix all m~r hearta and eyes on the ~reat goal of the four moderni-
zations, ~oin present and long-run interests (that ie, taking present
interests into account while s~bmitting to long-r~ interests) and ~oin
partial intereats and thoge of the whole (that is, taking the�interests of
the part into account while sabmitting t4 those of the whole), then ~he
contradiction between those "on horse" and those "on foot" can entirely be
unified.
Tn order to better unify those "on horse" and those "on foot," both leaders
and the massea should ado~t a positive attitude, increase their sense of
responsibility and do their work with initiative. Leading cadres rnust have
a mass concept, that i.s they must be concerned about the masses and think of
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them in every regard. They must also report difficulties accurately to the
masses and publicize the Party's policies among them. In addition they must
discuss things with the masses and concentrate their wisdom. The masses
must have the thinking of protagonists and consider problems from the point
of view of the overall situation. They must not only show understanding and
sympathy for the difficulties of the leaders but also propose. ideas and
think of ways of dealing with them on behalf of the leadership so that they
may work together to overcome th~~e difficulties. If only those "on horse"
and those "on foot" work with one mind and one~hear�t and forge a burst of
energy, no difficulty can hinder the forward pace of our socialist moderni-
_ zation.
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MILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
AGITATION, PROPAGANDA HELP MAINTAIN FIGHTING SPIRIT
Bei~ing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chineae 27 May 79 p 1
[Article by Zhao Gengqun [6392 2577 5028] of the political work teaching and research
office of the political academy: "Whare Does the Fine Fighting Spirit Come From?"]
[Text] As far as the whole conduct of a war�is concerned, proper
orders, elogans and written addresaes to the troops are of the same
important aignificance as first-rate heavy guns or fir~t-rate fast
tanks. ~
--Stalin
After the victorious conclusion of the s~lf-defense counterattack against Vietnam,
we went to Yunnan and conducted a study among the frontier guards. We were particu-
larly impressed by the fact that in thie battle the work of propaganda and agitation
was well done, with clear-cut aime, strong militancy and broad mass support. The
simple but effective fighting slogane and propaganda and agitation of every descrip-
tion helped the army units to maintain their fine fighting spirit all along.
We have roughly suumiarized the contents'and featurea of the wartime propaganda and
agitation in a few pointa as a tentative outline for teaching.
1. Grasping well the education of "looking upon the enemy in.three ways," and arousing
the troops' fightiag apirit. The comradea nf army unita taking part in the war said
that thia is the foundation of propaganda and agitation. When.thia foundation is
laid, the fighting epirit will be ignited easily like dried firewood. Before the
battle etarted, all unite carried out education in looking upon the Vietnamese aggres-
sors with hatred, looking down upon them, and ehowing comtempt for them. The troops
were org,anized to read material on the crimes of the Vietnameae authorities in
throwing in their lot wi~th the Soviet revieioniats, in carrying out aggression against
Cambodia. and in purauing regional hegemonism. The comrades of local, foreign affairs
departments: were asked to explain to the troops the origin and development of fighting
in the border areas between China and Vietnam. Those overseas Chinese who had been
driven back to this country were aeked to expoae the crimes of the Vietnamese author-
_ ities in opposing and boycotting Chinese. The troops were taken to the sites where
the Vietnamese army of aggression murdered our frontier guards and.people, and
meetings were held to denounce the enemy. These live facts showed the cadres and
fighters clearly the reactionary features of the Vietnamese authorities. Shi
Yuannan [0670 2266 0589], a fighter in a certain regiment, said: "When I was born,
my father was helping Vietnam with reconstruction. To remember the friendship between
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the peoples of China and Vietnam, my :nother gave me the nawe of 'Yuannan' meaning
'Help Vietnam.' But now the Vietnames~: authorities have broken faith with us and
are v�ing guns to kill Chinese people wh,~ have selflessly helped them. We must give
these gangsters a heavy blow!"
- 2. Instilling heroic images in the minds of the fighters. The army units taking part
in the war compiled and published "honor ro11s" of theix own heroic insiividuals and
groups for circulation and study, and set the stiandards for the fighters to win honor
in time of war. All the fighters had these heroic images in their hearts, and became
determined to "learn from and emulate the heroes, to become a hero with honor," and
"learn from the heroes, translate into action, and make new contributions in defense
of the four modernizations." The 9th company party branch of a cerCain regiment
called upon the whole company to imitate Huang Jiguang [7806 4949 0342] and Dong
Cunrui [5516 1317 3843] in launching an attack, to imitate hero Wang Cheng [3769 2052]
in holding fast to one's position, to imitate Qiu Shaoyun [6726 1421 0061] in carrying
out orders a~id observing discipline, and to imitate Luo Guangxie [5012 0342 3610]
in opening up a passageway. The "Luoyang heroic company" of a certain Red Army
regiment was unable to advance while attacking Height 171. Political instructor Lan
Titang [5695 7555 1016] at once called out: "Carry on the tradition of the 'Luoyang
heroic company' and fight for ~the prestige of the 'Luoyang heroic company'!" All
the comrades of the company echoed loudly: "We are the steel-sworded Sth company
and we are determined to take Height 1711" Theq charged forward bravely and took the
height very quickly. Then, fighCing in coordination with otlter fraternal companies,
they took two more heights in succession, and won new honors for their "Luoyang heroic
company."
3. Doing a good job of agitation in the light of specific tasks. A certain regiment
was giver~ the task of taking Height 230 by secretly crossing the Red River. They
raised the cry: "Let's pull out the nai~., make a breakthrough, and open the gate for
the entire division!" The troops were inspired to plant the Red Flag on Height 230.
After the initial success, the higher couoanand again gave them the order to advance
toward Wei,jin and Gantang and, together with other fraternal units, to encircle and
annihilate the enemy 345th division. The regimenC party comanittee also called upon
them to "maintiain the atyle of continuous fighting, take Wei3in, cut right into
Cantang, annihil.ate the 345th division, and win a big victory." Under the stimulation
of this slogan, the comrades defied fatigue and fought continuously. During the
advance they ~ncouraged one another: "Let's brace up, wipe out the 345th division;
let's exert more effort, hiC hard the '315' enemy (the Vietnamese 316A division)."
Thus their fighting spirit wae high. The comradea of units taking part in the battle.
learned from practical experience that when pro~aganda and agitation work was inte-
grated with the concrete fighting task, it exerted a force which was quickly trans-
formed into fighting etrength.
4. Shouting war slogans at the right moment. .All the fighting units agreed that
shouting slogans aC the critical moment changed the siCuation entirely. They paid
great aCtention to every phase of the battle and conducted effective agitation at the
proper time. When the 8th company of a certain regiment had taken Height 154 and
built their defenses, the enemy carried out a surprise attack in the night and in-
flicted some casualties on the company. They im~ediately called out: "Turn our
grief into strength and resolutely avenge our comrades-in-arms!" When the enemy
artillery bombardment destroyed our heavy guns, they called upon all comrades: "Wipe
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out the enemy with our rifles and handgrenades, don't let the enemy advance a single
step!" When the enemy con~entrated forces in a mass attack and the fighting became
very fierce, they shouted slogans loudly: "Never give in, and vow to live or perish
at our posts." "Live up to the trust of the fatherland and the people's expectations,
and strike down the enemy even with a bayonet or a rock." Thus, six times they re-
pulsed the counterattack of the enemy. When the supply of ammunition dwin~lled on
ttie front, the 2d platoon of the 6th company sent over their own supply. More slogans
resounded along the front: "Learn from comrades of the 2d platoon, give the enemy
a hard blow, and swear to hold our positions." Prompt propaganda and agitation
inspired the fighters to become more and more courageous tn fighting sa that they
were able to hold the in position.
5. Raising appropriate slogans according to the nature of the work of each unit.
During the fighting period, all army units were guided by the general idea of doing
everything to win the war, and raised agitation slogans appropriate to the nature of
the work in their units. The artillery units raised the slogan: "Whereever artillery
is wanted, we will go to fight." They were not afraid of difficulty or danger,
placed their guns at various points in complex terrain, carefully aimed at every tar-
get, and made every shell fired explode in the midst of an enemy group. The motor
, transport corps comrades raised the slogan: "Wherever our troops are fighting, we
~ will deliver them ammunition and supplies." They endured the hardship of an arduous
journey, traveled day~ and night. Some drivers did not leave the driver's cab for
days and nights. The medicai personnel raised the slogan: "Our heroic comrades
win victories on the front; we will spare no effort to treat the wounded." They ex-
pressed their love for their class brothers by giving them meticulous medical care
- and surgery, worked hard day and night, and accomplished miracles in saving lives and
_ tending the wounded.
6. The outstanding commanders are also exemplary agitators. Among the cadres of
_ troops which took part in the fighting, we fould a common characteristic, that is,
they were both courageous in leading an attack and ~ood at agitation, and they put
agitation and command in perfect harmony. Commander Liu Jianrong [0491 1696 2837J
of the 4th company of a certain regiment led an attack to take a certain height.
In the fighting he commanded his company and did the work of agitation at the same
time. When he was hit twice, in the leg and in the abdomen, comrades tried to give
liim first aid. He told them: "Don't bother about Fne, charge forward quickly!"
Then, enduring severe pain, he led his fightere in continuing the attack. When they
reached a spot some 20 meters from the top of the hill, he was faCally wounded in the
head. He was still pointing at the enemy with his finger and with his last breath
urged his fighters to charge forward. Company commander Liu's words and gesture gave
ttie fighters tremendous strength. They shouted the slogan, "Avenge our company com-
_ mander," captured the hill quickly and wiped out the enemy.
7, Through a mass network of propaganda and agitation wi~h Communist Party members
as its core, field agitation could become everybody's activity. In the attack on
Height 148, communist Jiang Jinzhu [5592 6855 2691], a squad leader of the 2d company
of a certain regiment, was seriously wounded in the head. He said hoarsely to his
deputy: "We both are communists and must captu.re this hill to win glory for our
party and to avenge our dead comrades. If I die, you must lead the squad to
accomplish this task!" He endured severe pain in his wound, destroyed the enemy's
last firing point with a handgrenade, and set an example for his comrades-in-arms
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with his own exemplary action. Another comrade was wounded in both legs. When he
was carried down the hill on a stretcher, a reinrorcement unit was passing by. He
called to his comrades-in-arms optimistically: "I have some difficulty with my legs
and have to go down and take a rest now. I hope you will fight hard. I will return
soon!" Z'he fighters were moved by his words and said tearfully: "Rest assured that
_ we will certainly avenge you." Scenes like these were numerous in the battle. It
may be said that everywhere the cadres encouraged the fighters, the fighters en-
couraged the cadres, the infantry men commended the artillery men, the artillery men
praised the infantry men, the office workers encouraged the ~troops, and the w~unded
encouraged their comrades-in-arms. The situation was lively.
8. Not sticking to one pattern and using flexible methods. During our tour of study
we came to realize that the troops on the front used flexible methods of propaganda
and agitation. The brutality of the enemy, the people's support, the heroic deeds
- of the fighters iii the battle, the victorious reports from the battleground, and the
letters from families in the motherland were all good material for the work of
propaganda and agitation. Fighter Zhang Yuancheng [1728 6678 2052] of the 2d mechan-
ized company of a certa3.n regiment sprained his foot in field training, ~nd it
became very swollen. The aged leader of a local production team saw him, opened his
wound with a needle, and sucked the extravasated blood out bit by bit by mouth. When
the mechanized unit arrived at the front, the aged team leader again tramped over hill
and dale for scores of li and brought gifts to comfort Zhang Yuancheng and other
fighters. The officers used this event to teach tihe fighters: "The people give us
support to fight the enemy, we must win a victory for the people." The 8th company
of a certain unit was holding fast to Height 250 during a battle when the company
commander was wounded in the head. Deputy political i~structor Deng Gusnglu [6772
0342 4389] took the commander's service cap, which was smeared with blood, and wrote
_ the following words: "The hole was made by a bullet fired by the enemy and the blood
was shed by our co~ander. Comrades, we must avenge our commander!" This cap was
passed from one fighter to another along the entire position. It aroused the fighters'
concern for their commander and hatred against the enemy. They were filled with rage
and repulsed the enemy time after time in fighting back. The entire company held the
position firmly like a nail being driven into the ground.
The field work of propaganda and agitation is the essential substance of political
work in the time of war, and it ia a fine tradition of the political work of our army.
From the counterattack against Vi~tnam in self-defense we have again gained some new
experience and enriched its substance. Provided we can carefully learn Erom and
apply this valuable e~cperience, we will carry out our political work to better serve
the modernization of our army.
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SHENYANG ARMY HOSPITAL ADOPTS NEW CLINICAL TECHNOLOGY
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 May 79 p 1
[Article by correspondents Guo Jindong [6753 2516 2639] and Tang Wen~un [0781 2429
0193] and staff reporter Yang Xuequan [2799 1331 3123]: '�The Successful Use of New
Clinical Technology"]
[Text] How do army hospitals carry out modernization: by relying on foreign advanced
equipment or by depending on available equipment and using both native and foreign
methods? The Shenyang General Army Hospital has carried forward the fine tradition
of plain living and hard struggle, refrained from relying on others for help, and
c~rried on its work and achieved "modernization" at the same time. Under the guidance
- of this concept, it introduced 35 items of new technology in the first quarter of this
year, 9 of which reach the advanced level in our country, including the treatment
of congenital heart disease by repairing the closing tube of the tricuspid valve,
and the making of a portable capacity-discharge grid-controlled.x-ray machine.
In particular,.it has tackled the following three problems:
1. Correct handling of the relationehip between importing and copying, and trying
its best to copy whatever can be duplicated by relying on our socialist superiority
and collective wiadom and diaplaying a spirit of broad cooperation. In the past,
the members af the hospital's radiology department had tried to fill in the gaps in
the technology of diagnosing and locating~pathological changes in aoft tissues and
nonmetallic foreign bodies. After aeeing pictures of a patented molybdenum-target
x-ray machine in foreign medical ~ournals, they worked very hard Co design and build
their own soft x-ray machine, which won a special prize a.t the National Science
Sympoeium. Later, they visited a local hospital and saw an imported sample x-ray
machine which was more advanced in performance and could take pictures in any position
_ using a common power source in hospital wards. With the assistance of fraternal
iinits, they again worked hard for 7 months, and in January this year they succeeded
in turning out a replica of this maci~ine as China's first portable-discharge grid-
controlled X-ray machine of the advanced level of the 1970's. The machine has been
tested and used in clinical practice and found to perform well with satisfactory
results.
2. Trying by all means to save foreign exchange for the state by doing our own re-
pairs of imported equipment and making the necessary spare parts without waiting for
and relying on imports. Last July the hospital's number one internal medicine
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department imported a fiber endoscope, which was laid aside due to lack of a con-
ducting wire for a gastr~scope for high-frequency electric burning. Some comrades
trtended to wait for the importation of spare parts before using the instrument in
clinical practice. Later, they all realized that it would cost the state's foreign
exchange and take some time to import the needed conducting wire, so they decided
- to make one themselves. With the help of the hospital maintenance team, they suc-
cessfully made a replacement part and promptly used the e~doscope in clinical prac-
tice. In the first quarter of this year, by using this instrument in nine cases they
successfully carried out electric excision of gastric and colonic polyposis.
3. Setting high aims and lofty goals to catch up with and surpass the advanced level
when we have imported equipment and technology, as well as striving to create condi-
tions for catching up with and surpassing the advanced level when we do not have
imported equipment and technology. The hispital's number one sur~ical departm~nt
la~t year performed 147 operations involving direct observation inside the heart in
' external circulation, of which 82 casea were Fallot's tetrad disease, with a success-
ful operation rate of 97.5 percent, thus reaching an international advanced level.
To develop in depth and breadth the surgical treatment of cardiac angiopathy, members
~ of the department actively created the necessary conditions and took their own raad
of development. In the early period when they used valve tubes in the surgical
treatment of cardiac angiopathy, they encountered many difficulties. However, they
did not ask for assistanca from the state and did not wait, but took the initiative
to look for means to overcome the difficulties. To make their own valve-frame, they
approached a local factory to get some leftover bits and pieces of titanium alloy
steel, and ttcey did their own processing by ha~ering them little by little. They
had no biovalve, so every day they went to a slaughterhouse to pick out suitable
valves from hundreds, sometimes even nearly a thoueand, pig hearts for processing,
and then very carefully sewed them stitch by stitch onto the valve-frame. In
January this year, for the first time in our country, they suceessfully performed
an operation to repair the closing tube of the tricuspid valve in human bodies.
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~
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BEIJING UNIT CARRIES OUT COMBINED-ARMS TRAINING
Bei3ing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 27 May 79 p 1 '
[Article by Zhang Meirong [1728 2734 2837] and Huang Yusheng (7806 3768 3yj2]:
"Bei~ing Unit Carriea Out Combined-Arms Training for Better Joint Command"]
[Text] One of the Beijing PLA units has carried out combined-arms training at a
preselected operations area to help its commanders at all levels become familiar with
the various armed service branches and improve their ability for ~oint command.
Before this combined exercise, the arary unit uaed collective training as a means to
have all armed service branches learn from one another, to have the infantry learn
tYOw to get into tanks and armored carriers, and so that the commanders at all levels
could learn systematically about other armed service branches and the principles of
combat. During the exercises at various levels, the infantry was reinforced as much
as possible by armed service branches with tanks, artillery, signal corps, engineers
and antichemical warfare corps, so that all armed service branches could get prac-
- tical training. When the regiments carried out exerciaes, the higher echelon set up
~ a field situation based on the enemy's formation, equipment, firepower distribution
and tactics to help comcnanders at all levels, in conditions close to actual fightin~,
to atudy ways of using their troope, disposing of firepower and setting up command
posta, to etudy ways of ad~usting the cooperation of varioua armed service branches
at different times, and to become familiar with the organized command at their own
levels. The soldiers learned the order of battle, changes in combat formations under
different conditions, ways of using topographical and surface features, alternative
covering fire. and the advantage of la+.:nching an assault after a barrage of artillery
fire. They said that they learned a great~deal from this practical exercise and
greatly improved their technological and tactical level.
At present, in the light of the weakness of ita cadres in combat coordination, this
army unit organized eight training groups of cadres from among its divisions, regi-
ments, battalions, companies and staff officers, intensified study and training in
the organization of command, and made the determination to achieve better results
from the training of cadres this year.
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STUDY OF NEW WEAPON TECHNOLOGY, COMBAT METHODS URGED
Bei~ing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 3
[Article by Bing Yan [0393 1484]: "It Is Necessary To Study Seriously New Combat
- Methods"]
[Text] As China's Arcny modernizes, the commanders of the army face an urgent
question: to strive to study and research advanced combat methods.
As a historical process, the rifle defeated the aword, and new advanced combat
methods will ultimately replace out-of-date and backward combat methods. This is
an ob~ective law of warfare development and must be the ob~ect of the consciousness
and generals of any class who must conform to this law and not try to change it.
In the~history of warf are, battle by mounted troops negated battle by chariots;
' line formations of musketeers and lancers negated mounted armored troops; skirmish
formations under cover of artillery negated line formations; and after the appearance
of the tank, armored units took the place of skirmish tactics on the battlefield,
etc. These changes in combat methode and means prove the truth that "Soldiers do
not have a constant situation and water does not have a constant form." (SUNZI
BINGFA, XUSHIPIAN) The thinking of combat commanders must not get into a rut and
take steps without regard to the circumstances.
Some comrades ask, "Aren't our proletarian arnry's combat methods the most complete .
and most advanced?" No. There are two thinga wrong with this. The first is to
ascribe the "class" label to combat methods. This does not conform to Marxist
materialism and can only block our f ield of vision and bind us hand and foot. The
second ie uaing the advance nature of clasa rather than the advanced nature of
combat methods which departs from seeking truth from facts and becomes one of the
theoretical basea of parochial arrogance.
Does combat method have a class nature? To anawer this question it is necessary
first to analyze its ob~ective properties and clarify the fundamental factors
which determine combat method.
In proving that combat method has a class nature, many comrades cite Engels as
proof: "The entire organization and combat methods of an army and the victory or
defeat related to it dependa on material, i.e., economic, conditions; it depends
on the human and weapon materials, that is, it depends on the quality and quantity
of the inhabitants and on the technique." ['~Selected Works ot Marx and Engels,"
Vol III, p 210.] Well in "Anti-Duhring" and other essays on military affairs
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Engels expressed this same idea. Under the conditions prevailing at the time,
Engels felt that the method of combat was determined by the two factors of inen and
weapons. However, later, new warfare partice proved that this conclusion had to be
corrected. For example, to explain the fact that changes in the soldiers in the
army determined the changes in combat methods, Engels used the American War of
Independence as an example. He pointed out that the reasons the combat method
changed from line tactics to skirmish tactics *~as partly because the Americans had
the rifle which was faster and more accurate than the musket, and partly because
the insurrectionists lacked strict infantry training and it was diff icult for them
to master the line tactic. The insurrectionists fought for their personal in-
- terests and unlike the mercenaries who deserted in critical situations, did not need
strict line formations to keep them in check. At the same time, the Americans were
hunters and marksmanship is suited to skirmish tactics. Thus, Engels came to the
conclusion that skirmish tactics were "a new combat technique produced by
changes in the soldiers." ["Selected Works of Marx and Engels," Vol III, p 208]
But based on this conclusion: it is difficult to explain why later on mercenaries
who were fully trained to serve the ruling classes and were neither hunters nor
insurrectionists all used ski~rmiah tactics. In fact, after Napaleon, all the armies
in the world, including proletarian armies, used skirmish tactics. It is clear
that changes in the soldiers were not the main reason why combat methods change.
Here, the ultimate reason is the deadliness of the rifle. In the face of its shower
of bullets, all dense combat formations must disperse, otherwise it would be
impossible to achieve the aim of self-defense and to destroy the enemy. During the
Franco-Prussion War, the armies on both sides used breech-loading rifles in the
f irst engagement, but because the commanders followed the old ways and still used
column formations, suited to the time of the rifled musket, a brief transitional
step in the evolution from line formation to skirmish formation, the Prussians
attempted to stop at this stage and make it the combat method suited to the new
weapon. As a result, they suffered great losses. In less than 2 hours of battle,
they lost over one-third of their guard army. From then on the.column formation, ,
like the line formation, was completely discarded. Therefore, the idea which Engels
emphasized repeatedly that "once tec?~nological advances can be used and have been
used for military purposes. they immediately become dominant and frequently go
against the will of the commandera and give riae to changea and even revolutions in
combat method." ["Selected Worka of Marx and Engels, Vol 3, p 211] But Lenin
summed up Engels' idea more accurately and euccinctly: "Tactics are determined by
an arnry's technological level." ["Selected Worka of Lenin, Vol l, p 669]. That is,
the basic factor which determines combat method is the development of weapons ansi
equipment which accompanies the increase in productive forces, and all other factors,
including the influence of brilliant commandere and changes in the soldiers, simply
provide the external conditions for changes in combat method so that sooner or later
the different armiea of other countries will master the new combat methods. (This
is a general law of combat method change including even the selection and applica-
tion of tactical techniques in apecific battles, based, of course, on the flexible
changes in the ob~ective conditions of weather, terrain and intelligence, and the
two cannot ever be combined.)
Since the fundamental factor which determines change in combat method is the
- development of weapons technology and not man's subjective will or changes in the
soldiers, we can say atraightforwardly that combat method itself has no class
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character and even less can the class properties of an army be used as a norm to
, measure whether or not combat methods are advanced. Armies made up of different
. classes but at the same stage.of weapons development may use the same combat methods.
Armies of all classes may learn from each other in combat methods. Of course we
should acknowledge that whether or not combat methods are advanced is determined
first of all by whether or not the weapons and equipment are advanced. At the same
time, we also should acknowledge that at the�same stage of weap~ns de~elopment,
those who discover new combat methods are not necessarily tl-.oae who have created
the new weapons technology. Having advanced weapons and equipment is a precon-
dition for having mastery of advanced combat methods but there is also the question
of whether or not those with advanced equipment are good at f i~nding the combat
methods most suited to the new weapons technology. There is also � question of
smashing conservative thinking, getting rid of the force of habit, not rigidly
adhering to outdated experience and an obsolete military science outloek, but
upholding the practice of proceeding from reality, and seeking truth from facts so
that one's thinking will constantly adapt to the ob~ective laws of the develapment
of warfare. It ie worth mentioning that when we discuss the fact that weapons
determine combat metho~ and that the technological level determines tactics, we
are not answering the question of what determines victory and defeat in warfare.
Therefore, acknowledging th ob~ective law that changes in combat method are
determined by the development of weapons we definitely cannot equate the issue of
what determines the outcome of a war with the doctrine th~t only weapons are
important. If one studies the advanced combat methods of foreign countries, even
less can one talk of any "bourgeois classification". Today we want to accelerate
the modernization of national defenae, and not only must we vigorously develop new
advanced weapons and equipment, we also must make an effort to study and master
advanced combat methods.
Our proletarian army of course has iCs own unique principles of tactics and strategy.
But its "advancement" and "uniqueness" is only in the righteousness and popula~ity
of the wars we fight, i.e., in the human-sea tactics of the people's war, it relies
on the support of the masses and on flexible application. Al1 hegemonic armies are
divorced from the people and have little eupport. They can copy thE tactical and
strategic principlee of people's war from our military specialir~ts, but they cannot
really learn to apply them. But on the other hand, we can study completely the
tactical methoda of all the armies iit the world from an understanding of the guiding
principles of warfare in general, and with modif ications use them to enrich and
perfect the strategy and tactics of the people's war. In the past, under the
influence of the "leftist" line promated by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," combat
methAd and tactics were branded with a clase character and the incorrect styles
~
of parochial arrogance and the notion tht they were the only true revolutionaries
were developed. Furthermore, the carrying on of our army's traditional combat
method and experience was also cut off at will according to the political needs of
periodic "line struggles." Even today some co~amanders do not dare to use "point
formation" and "V formation" in troop training, saying that this is a tactical
principle of Lin Biao, so it's better to return to the pre-Napoleonic era and use
close-line formation to stop the hail of bullets from enemy machineguns. This sort
of old fashioned idea is unsuited to the situation as we modernize our army.
That the development of weapons technology determines the changes in combat methods,
should be said to be a basic understanding of Marxist military affairs theory. No
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matter whether we stu~3y modern warfare or draw on foreign experiences, cr even
study battles from our own past, ai~d study the strategy and tactics summari.zed by
Comrade Mao Zedong, it is always necessary to adopt this viewpoint. Otherwise, it
is turr_ing things upside down and pursuing the trivial rather than the essential.
A few years ago, when Lin Biao and the "gang of four" were pecldling their reaczionary
willfullness, this point of view was overlooked by people and many comrades studying
military affairs and researching warfare were satisfied just to memorize everything
uncritically a:~d to copy down existing conclusions, and indiscriminately to accept
intact the r..ombat means and methods of the past. They did not know that military
~ affairs specialists should not be copiers but should be creators; the study of
military tlieory is not "archaeology" but it is a field which should open up paths
to the development of truth. Are not many of our older comrades paying serious
attention to helping out and setting a good example for young cadres? This is a
commendable spirit. But helping out and setting a good example is not simply
mechanically imitating the past, you cannot paint a modern day "ladle" according to
the "bottle gourd" of the past, but must proceed from the new historical conditions
and combine what is to be passed on and what is created. Therefore, we propose that
the basic Marxist idea that the 1eve1 of technology determines the tactics and the
weapons determine the combat method be restudied, with the aim of making our com-

- rades able to ove~haul completely their thinking and understand how to explore new
laws for direct~ng war according t~ the cognitive line of ma.terialism.
In studytng and re5earching new combat methods in accordance with the objective law
that the development of weapons technology determines changes in combat method, we
must start from the beginning--that is, we must study new military science knowledge,
- understand the capabilities, characteristics and uses of new weapons technologies,
get a firm technological foundation and then tactical means can be used flexibly.
A far-sighted military scientist also shauld note the world developmental trends in
modernized weapons and equipment and see in them the direction new combat methods
and means will take. Those commanders who neglect to study military science and
simply copy the exiating combat methode of others are not smart commanders. Many
combined unit commanders lack the ability to "combine," and an important reason for
~his is their severe lack of acientific and technical knowledge.
Our commanders also should look at another side of the questiori--changes in combat
means and method also influence the development of weapons and equipment. This not
only appeara in the proper use af tactica which can fully employ the existing
_ technology and equipment, but even make up for inadequacies in the techology.
Moreover, as soon as new advanced combat means and methods appear and are used,
it is necessary urgently to demand improvementa in obsolete weapons and equipment
and point the way for new technological development. For example, under the con-
ditions of modern warfare, a clear characteristic of combat method is the dispersed
arrangement of manpower and the concentrated use and camouflaged movement of fire-
power, which demands in terms of technique, an increase in the range and accuracy
- of field axtillery and at the same time also presents newer and greater demands
with regard to the combat performance of aircraft and varying range antiaircraft
weapons, and an imprc~~ement in existing communications, reconnaissance and
engineering technologies and machinery, pointing out a general direction for the
_ improvement of our weapons and equipment, to increase our self-consciousness and
reduce our recklessness. The negative attitude that existing equipment is adequate
and that there is no point in studying new combat methods or that limits study of
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combat methods to those suited to existing equipment is the "myopia" of military
science research. The dialectical method is such that backward technological
level~? can lead to backwsrd tactical thinking and backward tactical thinking must
limit and constrict technological deve.lopment.
Studying and researching advanced combat methods also must promo;:e change in our
organizational and command methods. Just as technology determines tactics, new
combat methods d~mand new organizational and command methoc; suited to them. This
point we can see clearly in the staff planning in present military command agencies.
Tn ancient warfare weapons and equipment ~aere ~imple, combat methods were basically
close co~nbat and organ~.zation and com~nand also were simple. By 1$09 when Napoleon
- met the Austiran Arury at Wagram, his command post was only 3 or 4 kilometers from
the frontlines and he could still issue verbal orders personally to his troops (his
orders co~uld be sent directly to regimental commanders). Later on, with advances
in firearms, ~n~reases in the kind a.: soldiers and the use of skirmish tactics, the
battlefield expanded and Napoleon could no lor_ger issue verbal orders to command
his troops, sc a new type af staff officer appeared, i.e., Napoleon's chief of
staff, Field *~Iarsha3 Berth:Ler. And by the Franco-Prussian War, Berthier also
created the gener~l staff, then all armies in the world imitated ~he Frencn Army
- in the creatlon of the organizational command. Modern warfare is m~ch more
complicated than in the time of the Franco-Prussian War and the use of new military
- tech~niques on the battlefiel3 and the production of new combat methods makes it no
longer a bssic premise to rely on increasing the staff personnel. What is urgently
demanded is to develop command tools, improve command methods, reform command
organization, bor�-ow from advanc~d experience abroad and gradually automate
organization and co~and.
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ARTICLES EXTOL FLIGHT HEROES IN BORDER DEFENSE
Heroic Air Defense Commander
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 2
[Article by Pan Zongde [3382 1350 1795]J
[Text] "FO11ow me, charge!" This is the code of action of Li Zhonglin [2621 1813
2651], the commander of an air defense regiment on the Yunnan border and it is a ;
true portrait of his revolutionary spirit and soldierly life. ~
On 17 February, Li Zhonglin's regiment was responsible for security p~trol duty j
in the battle zone in con~unction with a protective counterattack and defensive i
border battle by the armry. When Li Zhonglin laid out the order of battle at the ~
regimental party committee meeting, he bravely put himself in the first echelon
and demanded that the higher authorities give him the most arduous mission. At
7:15, four green signal flares rose into the sky and immediately there was the '
~ roar of engines on the airfield. "Follow me, charge!" Regimental Co~nander Li
led the f irst echelon and flew ma~estically toward the battle zone, ever vigilantly ~
patrolling the skies aver the motherland's border.
One time, in coordination with the surface units which were punishing the Vietnamese
invaders, Che upper echelons ordered Regimental Commander Li's regiment to help spot
where our artillery's.ahells were landing in the battle zone. "Follow me, charge!"
Again, Regimental Commander Li took the lead aircraft in the first echelon, and in
close coordination with his wingmen vigilantly and nimbly circled and spotted.
Suddenl~, the radio in their aircraft malfunctioned in the microphone. He
quick-wittedly waggled his wings to signal to his wingmen. Wingman number 3
understood immediat~ly and quickly moved ~o the front to continue spotting and
successfully completed the mission.
Patrol missions often set out and return before dawn and at twilight. At such
times the fog is very dense and visibility is ~ow. Flying under such conditions
is very difficult. So that everything would be perfectly safa, each time they had
to fly under auch weather conditiona, Regimental Com~ander Li always shouted
"Fo11ow me, chargel" and led everyone to battle through the difficulty. Early
, one morning, Regimental Comtnander Li was in the first echelon returning from a
patrol when unexpectedly the fog began to get thicker and they couldn't see the
runways clearly. Relying on mastery gained through many years of training, shortly
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before they reached the airfield, he alerted everyone to use their compass precisely
and pay attention to getting a fix on the verCical ground markers on the field so
as to determine their position. Under his precise example and careful directions the
entire unit landed safely and the pilots all respected Regimental Commander Li for
- being bold but cautious and commanding well.
Mechanic Ensures Flight Safety
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 2
[Article by Jin Shi~un [7246 0013 6511] and Deng Xudong [6772 4872 2639]
[Text] On the morning of 20 February, as the fighting eagles returned from patrol
one by one, the ground crew of the 20 Squadron carefully carried out a post-flight
inspection. The mechanic Liu Shahong [2692 3097 3163] nimbly finished inspecting
aircraft number 73's intake and then inspected the ~et. At the time the jet was
still over 63� C, so the acting master mechanic had little Liu inspect it again
early the next morning. Liu Shahong thought that the f ighting eagles had to go into
combat at any time and if when he inspected it the next morning he discovered some
obstruction th~tcouldn't be eliminated promptly.it would keep the aircraft from going
into battle. He decided that he definitely could not have a chance for combat
bungled because he did not do his ~ob well and so insisted on completing his task.
He made his way into the jet and got soaking wet from sweat in t:~e hot interior.
Holding a light he conducted a careful inspection of the fuel ring and the flow
regulator and discovered a carbon buildup about the size of a fingernail in the
precombustion chamber. He determined that this was the damaged part and promptly
reported this to the leader. Then along with the rest of the comradss in the crew
he worked through the night until 5:20 changing the afterburner. Because they
promptly got rid of this serious obetruction, they guaranteed the fighting prepared-
ness of this young eagle. For this reason, the upper echelons awarded Liu Shahong,
Merit Citation Class III.
Patrol Aircraft Extra Alert
Bei,jing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 2
[Article by Cai Shanwu [5591 0810 2976] and Liu Changdong [0491 2490 2639]]
[Text] In the air 10,000 meters above China's southern border, from time to time
comes a deafening roar: It is a flight from the high-speed fighter group of the
Yunnan Front Line Air Force on patrol.
Aft~r the self-defense counterattack and defensive border war broke out, each day
this group was on the spot for 19 hours. Although the drain on the comrades'
strength was great, everyone maintained high fighting morale and continued to
fight without fear of fatigue. Deputy Regimental Commander Xia Youcai [1115 0645
2088] and group cadres Hu Da'an [5170 6671 1344] and Tang Qizhong [0781 0120 1813]
who flew missions with the group, fought bravely in the vanguard, vied for the
diff icult tasks and set an example for everyone else.
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One day they were on orders to patrol on China's side of the China-Vietnam border.
Their flight suits were soaked with sweat but no one complained. At 13,000 meters
Deputy Group Commander Wu Chunfa [0702 2504 4099] and pilot Chen Xiaodong [71.15
2556 2639] suddenly discovered something ~uspicious. Wu Chunfa immediately alerted
Chen Xiaodong to keep an eye out. They k~pt careful watch, ready to fight at any
time, until the suspected target disappeared and they victoriously returned. At
the same time that they were frequently going into combat, this group also took on
training missions with other units. In leading they came up with an idea and
sent experienced pilots to four airfields to coordinate training and study tactical
techniques for destroying enemy aircraft. Through this training the air combat level
of this and the other units was raised a great deal.
In 20-odd days' time they completed all combat missions assigned by the upper
echelons and received the praise of the leadership and comrades of the Yunnan Front
Line Air Force units.
Cargo Plane Crew Alert
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 2
[Text] Female pilot Wang Shuran's [3769 3219 5333] air crew of a regiment of the
air force's air arm was cited for meritorious service 3rd class in carrying out an
urgent airlift mission in the self-defense counterattack and border defense.
During the 9 days that they were executing the mission, they flew over 6 hours each
day and the longest they were on the gr.ound was 20 hours. Sometimes before a mission
was completed, and the aircraft was still in the air, orders for another were
received over the radio. Sometimes, just as a mission was completed and the air
crew comrades had gone to bed to zest they were immediately recalled for a new
mission. However complex and difficult the mission, however short the time, how-
Pver difficult the conditions, they were always filled with pride and enthusiasm,
Eearlessly, they thought single-mindedly of the needs of the'front and did everything
to insure victory in combat. One time, they had loaded their cargo at an airfield
and were ~uet ready to take off when auddenly they discovered that the braking
parachur~ a fighter had uaed when landing had not yet been retrieved and at the
same time a rear fighter flight was ready to take off for combat. If they took
off as usual on time, the braking chute might get wound around the propellor blades
but if the plane did not take off promptly it would have an effect on the rear
fighter flight taking off. It was a critical situation and there could not be any
delay. The air crew comrades bravely, reaourcefully and in close coordination
took off along the side of the runway in between the fighter takeoffs. They coped
with this complex situation successfully and their cargo got to its destination on
time. ~
The good cooperative spirit and strong battle style of Wang Shufeng's air crew is
inseparable from their highly developed sense of "liangzhang yiyuan" [0357 7022 0001
0765J. Air crew leader Wang Shufeng, party group leader Feng Gai3in 7458 2395 0603]
and safetyman Yang Qinglong [2799 7230 7893], were true to the great trust of the
party organization and the confidence of their comrades. They conscientiously did
their duty, made atrict demands on themselves and served as a model in everything
they did. Thus they spurred on all personnel in the air crew to stand fast at their
posts, help each other, not fear diff icultiea, unite and fight, and relying on their
callective wisdom and thua strengthen completely their mission in an outstanding way.
24
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SAGA OF YOUNG SOLDIER'S SACRIFICE FOR MOTHERLAND
Beijing JIEEANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 1
[Article by Liu Liangkai [0491 5328 0418], Wu Shunxiang [0702 7311 4382], Liu Bo
[0491 3134] and Wang Jianguo [3769 1696 0948]: "Charges Ahead to Heroic Sacrifice
for the Motherland and for the People; Cadre's Son Zhen Ping [3914 1627] A Fearless
New Generation Hero; Zhen Wenlin [3914 2429 2651] Martyr's Father and Deputy
Director of Political Section Says Zh.en Ping Lived up to the Fostering of the Party
and Peo,ple and Died a Glorious Death"]
[Text] At 1643 on 27 February, two white signal flarea rose over the peak of Kouma
Mountain reporting that the gate to Liang Mountain was open. Zhen Wenlin, deputy
director of a political section who was just then at the command post in the rear,
received a message relayed from the frontlines: His son Zhen Ping h~d led the first
charge of the First Platoon, Company Eight on Kouma Mountain and herocially sacri-
ficed his life. Deputy Director Zhen thought for a moment then said calmly to the
comrade beside him: A price must always be paid for revolution, and that's what his
death was. ,
To commend Zhen Ping's meritorious deeds in battle, the league and party committees
have petitioned the higher authorities to bestow on him the title of Combat Hero.
During his lifetime, Comrade Zhen Ping's behavior was commendable. In 1974, after
graduation from senior middle school at the age of 17, with the encouragement of
and support of hie parenta he went to a rural area for labor training and in 1977
he was recruited into the arary from the hydroelectric power station where he was
working. In the army he was modeat and prudent and atudied hard to get ahead. He
was on good terms with soldiers from worker and peasant backgrounds. In all things
he took the lead and served as a model. He was evaluated as a model member, a
pacesetter who studied Lei Feng_and a training pacesetter. A year after 3oining
the army he entered the party and was called a superior student. In March 1978
he was promoted to squad leader and this January he was made platoon leader.
Zhen Ping was filled with righteous indignation over constant encroachments of
Chinese border regions by the Vietnamese reactionary authorities. He wrote many
statements of determination to the party branch requesting that he be allowed to
participate in the battle to punish severely the Vietnamese invaders. In a letter
he wrote to his elder brother he said: "I will charge ahead for the motherland and
the people even if it is to my death!" He said to his father, "Please don't worry.
I won't embarrass the party and the people. You will hear news of victory."
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On 26 February, Company Eight took on the mission of the main attack on Kouma
Mountain. At the branch committee meeting at the front, three infantry platoon
leaders vied for the mission to be the assault platoon. Zhen Ping repeatedly
requested the mission and finally was given the task of being the assault platoon.
Zhen Ping was very much aware that his responsibility was a heavy one: Kouma
Mountain is 800 meters high, the slopes are densely wooded and the terrain is
irregular. It is the sort of poaition that is easy to defend but difficult to
attack: It is very strategically located but with difficult access. It is the
gateway to Liang Mountain. Whether or not Kouma Mountain could be taken on schedule
would affect the general situation of the battle for Liang Mountain. That night, he
called the squad leaders and squad cadres together and engaging in military democracy,
they studied the various mPthods of attack and drew up a battle plan.
On 27 February, under cover of our artillery, Company Eight launched an attack on
Kouma Mountain which was held by the enemy. At 1535, Company Eight launched the
final attack on the Kouma Mountain peak and Zhen Ping led the entire platoon
throughout the attack right at the very front of the company. Each time they made a
breakthrough he fired off a signal flare to report to the command post that the
assault platoon had reached its position. Our aupport fire crept up toward the top
of the mountain and Zhen Ping bravely attacked at a distance of only about 20 meters
behind the point where our shells were landing. Sometimes he would crawl forward,
other times he would bound, organizing the platoon's fire as they wiped out three
enemy gun poaitions in succession, right up to the peak. Our cannons had barely
stopped when Zhen Ping charged to a point only 25 meters from the enemy entrenchment
on the mountain top. The enemy hiding in the gun emplacement had not expected that
our infantry detachment could move this fast and without looking threw handgrenades.
One by one the handgrenades flew smoking over the heads of the plafioon comrades.
Zhen Ping shouted: "Wipe out the enemy gun position!" The entire platoon opened
fire together. Just as Zhen Ping had climbed over the entrenchment and raised the
signal gun to fire a flare reporting victory a surviving enemy soldier hidden in
the bunker fired a shot and Zhen Ping fell.
Wlth a cry of "Avenge platoon leader Zl~en!" the comrades of Company Eight thoroughly
destroyed the surviving enemy soldiers and took firm control of the main peak of
Kouma Mountain. At this time our infantry, artillery and armored units were
- struggling up along the winding trail of the lower part of Kouma Mountain.
On 28 February, Deputy Director Zhen came from the command post to Youyiguan to bid
farewell to the son who had lost his life for the motherland. Beside his son's
body he said resolutely, "You fought for the motherland and the people, you have
lived up to the fostering of the party and the people. Your death is a glorious
one." Deputy Director Zhen requested that his son's body be buried on a hill
beside Youyiguan where the border of the motherland could be seen, together with
the other martyra who had sacrificed for the motherland. He took the uniform which
had the hole of the enemy bullet and his son's bloodstains to give to his sma.ll
grandson.
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YOUTH EXHORTED TO BE MODEL DEFENDERS DF I~THERLAND
Bei~ing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 1
[Article by Wu Zhang [0702 1757]: "Two Generations of Heroes"]
[TExt] In the def ensive counterattack, an army cadre went to the China-Vietnam
border where he ran into his son who was a soldier in a border def ense unit. He
spoke to his son in a sincere manner, "It is fitting that I should see you now.There
is only one goal, and I hope that in battle you will not prove to be an unworthy
son. The boy replied with determination, "I'm wocried about that too, and I've
made"a plan for winning honor." The cadre then said, "The most important thing is
~ to stick to your plan on the battlefield. I,just hope that in ~the battle charge
you will be courageous and tenacious." One of the leadership cadres from a forward
unit learned of the son's brave sacrif ice and said proudly, "The kid did the right
thing. He was not untrue to the training of the party." In this self-defense
counterattack, such leadership cadres have encouraged their children to win honor
for the motherland and there are a great many children of cadres who have bravely
killed the enemy.
Hearing these heart-wrenching stories ia like hearing a clear and majestic song:
"Hark, the mother is calling the eon to fight in the East...." One cannot help
recalling the lines written by Chen Yi exhorting sons and daughters: "The people
reared you, repay them by winning honor. If the motherland ia in trouble, you
should be in the vanguard." In this def ensive border war, the glorious tradition
of our party and army has burst forth with daazling brilliance, too.
What parent doea not love his child, and what parent does not look forward to his
ciiild's future? Yet there are different ideas on the kind of future and how it can
be achieved. In the view of a Communist Party member, children are not one's
private property. Only by educating children to make a contribution to the people's
enterprise do parents feel they have fulfilled their responsibility. They detest
and re~ect seeking a way out for their children, proceeding from selfish motives,
to spoil their children and even to use improper means to curry favor on their
behalf. Ordinarily, they demand that their children study and work hard to do their
little bit to help build socialism. Once it becomes necessary they generously send .
their children to the front, with the same lofty sentiments and aspirations they
had when they joined the revolution in their youth. They ~lrgP ~heir children
courageously to kill the enemy and not hesitate to lay down their lives for their
country. In particular they scorn the individualistic and mean behavior of those
who hold back their children at the critical moment.
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Such parents are farsighted and know how to love and rear their sons and daughters.
They def initely do not keep their sons and daughters under their wings but let then?
go and do battle with the wind and rain. They understand that "A good sword comes
from hardening; the fragrance..afplum flowers comes from the bitter cold." If they
want their children to make something of themselves, they should not begrudge letting
them go into the furnace of revolution and be smelted in the fierce flames. Of
course, they hope that their children will become scientists, engineers and
brilliant military commanders and make an even greater contribution to the four
modernizations. They also know very well that relying on a comfortable home, lots
of money and high class furnishings cannot pave the way for seizing the "jewel in
the mathematical crown." Thus they encourage their sons and daughters to go to the
difficult places.required for the four modernizations and to the battlefields to
protect the four modernizations and be tempered in the flames.
We extol the heroic older generation for being broadminded and farsighted; we also
extol the heroic younger generation for its soaring aspirations and heroic vigor.
Our promising younger generation understands that like father, like son does not
necessarily mean that they are good people; one who relies on a"good daddy, good
mama and good patron" in order to loaf about, can only turn into a good-for-nothing
and be detrimental to the moetherland, the people and oneself. The early realization
of the four modernizations brings ~oy to working under~hard conditions--making their
home wherever they are and bravely shouldering heavy burdens. When it is necessary ~
to use their youth and ardor to protect the four modernizations, they step forward
bravely and are honor-bound not to turn back. A long time ago Gork3. said "Because
of their intense yearning for a happy life, one frequently sees among young people,
those who do not treasure the things that others have won for them; one can also
see some impetuous hawks who fancy too early that they have a comfortable roost.
They are in too much of a hurry to enjoy the achievements of the present without a
care for the fut~ire and they no longer strive to consolidate and strengthen this
glorious thing which is beautiful but which atill faces difficult times." This
message is doubly touching when read now. At a time when these cadres' sons and
daughters must be models among the soldiers in the border defense, have not many
young peopte, including cadrAR~ Q~r_s and daughters, gi,~ta;~ rid o~ the d~fect vi
"too early fancying tney have a comfortable xoost"?
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SOLDIER SUGGESTS IMPROVEMENTS IN TA(;TICS, EQUIPMENT
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 9 Apr 79 p 3
[Article by Lo [7482] [given name unreadable]: "Suggestions on Improving Tactics,
Equipment"]
[Text] Comrade editor
I am a soldier in the China-Vietnam border self-defense counterattack. All of our
officers and men are brave and tenacious in battle and have won great victories
against the Vietnamese aggressors. Through battle experience we have proposed a
number of issues in strategy and tactics which should get some serious attention
and should be improved in the future. On the basis of my own experience I would
like to discuss several suggestions here.
1. When fighting in hilly and forested areas against an enemy who has taken
defensive precautions and can operate in a dispersed fashion, we should not use
, conventional daytime attack methods with large units. In battle the Vietnamese
soldiers holding hilltops were frequently few in number, but our armies attacked with
concentrated units of company or even batallion strength, which is like hitting a
flea with a fist: It wastes manpower and increases casualties.. In a strategic
_ campaign, "using an ox cleaver to kill a chicken" is undoubtedly correct, specifically
each battle move ehould be applied flexibly on the baeis of such ob~ective factors
as intelligence on the enemy, terrain and weather. The reason our army fought
better and better in the last stage of the aelf-defense counterattack is that we
understood the enemy and had flexible command and tactica.
2. The most threatening thing to an attack in mountainous areas is an established
enemy firing point. It is difficult to wipe out an entire unit with patterned
artillery fire; field artillery are numerically few and inconvenient to move;
bazookas are not very effective against established firing points. Frequently,
demolition teams use satchel charges, torpedoes and hand grenades to destroy them,
but this greatly delays the speed of attack. If the explosive performance of
bazookas were modified, it would greatly reduce casualties and speed up the attack.
3. The semiautomatic rifle's rate of fire is too slow and they are becoming less
and less suited to modern warfare. In terms of accurate firing, within 400 meters
there is hardly any difference from the submachine gun (in single shots). Due~to
the extensive use of cannons, light weapons are mostly used between 200 and several
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tens of ineters and at such times, the submachine gun is the most useful and its
power can be fully employed. I propose that the semiautomatic rifle be re~Jaced
as soon as possible by the submachine gun or small-caliber high-speed, fuJ.ly
automatic rifle.
4. The present equipment for the individual soldier is of no advantage in combat
and not just because it is heavy. The crisscrossing of equipment straps and belts
is very inconvenient. Hand grenades, cartridge pouch, canteen, satchel, gas mask
and submachine gun (or semiautomatic rifle), etc. brings to 6 or 7 the number of
straps around the neck. When on the march in the moutains, there is also a back
pack and every so of ten they all have to be read~usted, otherwise the straps get
so tight you can't breathe. When we engage the enemy and 3ump forward under enemy
fire, these equipment straps are.extremely inconvenient. Soldiers hope that this
can be changed very soon.
5. Physically strong soldiers should be chosen to be frontline medics. Those
wounded at the frontlines cannot be sent to the rear promptly mainly because the
medics are physically weak, so the soldiera have to help each other to the rear
areas and this creates a group of temporary noncombatants and weakens the unit's
fighting strength.
6. The steel helmut is a necessary piece of equipment for the soldier and should
be provided. Under enemy sniper f ire, hand grenades and artillery attacks, some
- soldiers have suffered head in3uries and some have even died of head in3uries from
stray bullets a thousand meters distant frum the enemy. If they had a steel helmut,
many would have avoided such an in3ury.
I believe that those who fought in this self-defense counterattack could recount
more and better experiences. So that our arnry can rapidly modernize to suit the
demands of modernized warfare, we urgently hope that the higher leadership and
revelant departments will pay heed to the experience of this war and rapidly take
effective steps so that our army's tactical thinking and weaponry will be greatly
improved.
8226
CSO: 4005/2097 END
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050007-5