JPRS ID: 9927 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 39
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9927
21 Au~ust 1981
W~st Euro e Re ort
p p
(FOUO 40/81)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE .
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JPRS L/9927
21 August 1381
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 40/81)
CONTENTS
ENERGY EOONOMICS
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Energy Frogram To 5tress Conservation
(CAPITAL, Jul 81) ~
~ ECONOMIC
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Trade Difficulties With Saudi Arabia Viewed
(CAPITAL, Jul 81) 4
POLI Z'I CAL
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Wes t Berlin Youth S tree t Violence Persis ts
, (Wolfgang Metzner; STERN, 2 Jul 81) 7
I
FRANCE
PCF Revival Hopes: Iacal, Proportional Elections
(MicheJ. (hamard; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 27 Ju1-2 ~,ug 81)........... 10
Robrieux: Marchais Versus Two PCF Wings; Future Precarious
(Philippe Robrieux Interview; VALEURS ACTUELLES,
27 Jul-2 Aug 81) 14
- a - ' [III - WE - 150.FOUOJ .
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~ird World Cooperation Policy Outlined by Cot
(Jean Pierre Cot Interview; PARIS MATQi, 17 Jul 81)............ 16
Bangui Crisis Tests PS Ideals, Noninterference
(Jacques Esperandieu; L~EXPRESS, 31 Jul-6 Aug 81) 19
GENERAL
FRAN(~
Fraaco-Soviet Arcad-3 Magnetosphere Experiments
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMO~, 18 Jul 81) 21
- b -
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ENERGY ECONOMICS FEllERAL REPUBLIC OF ~GERMANY
ENERGY PROGRAM TQ STt~ES"S CONSERyATION
Hamburg CAPITAL in German Jul 81 pp 170-172
- /Text/ Next tal.l the Bonn Government intends to present its new
energy program: Conservation has absolute priority.
i ~
t
~ In the long run this strategy is bound to be costly for consumers,
I �.~hether domestic or commercial..
~
I
-i While Germans refresh themselves duri.ng the summer in the mountains and on the ~each-
i es, officials in the offices of the Bonn economic departmenta sweat over a difficult
; piece of homework: The "third forward projection of the energy program."
I When designing this "afterburner," the officials must take into account the differ-
I ent and often controversial demands of~the economy and the parti~s. Industry wants
~ cheap power for its machines and, with the.support of the CDU/CSU fraction, calls
i for the prompt construction of nuclear reactors. The government parties fear citi-
zens protests and therefore proclaim "social acceptance and social compatibility."
' They all are at one only in their d~mand for "getting away from oil."
~ As the Bonn Governments prefers not to be at odds with anyone, ministry officials
I seek the tried and trusted way out of the dilemma: They write something for everyone
into the program--with a special accent "in accordance with the political priority
j for energy conservation," as per department director Dr Ulrich Engelmann, head of
~ the energy department at the Federal Miniatry for Economics.
; The strategy adopCed is liable to be costly for household and industrial consumera
i as well as for the government: Lower consumption takes priority over economic effi-
! ciency. "Conservation is the greatest and most important source of energy" says
Erwin Stahl, parliamentary state secretary at the Federal Reaearch Ministry. That
could well be true; however--Stahl is prudently silent regarding the cost.
Federal and Laender finance ministers will note how expensive it is to tap these
sources once long-distance heat becomea the core o� the cons~ervation etrategy (as
per plan). Bonn intends long-distanc~e heat to displace oi1 as the No 1 heat supplier
for residential buildings in orc~er to relieve pressure on:the foreign exchange re-
aerves by better utilizing the energy produced by the ele~tricity plants. The tech-
nical jargon for such utilization is "power-heat coupling." While traditiongl power
plants use 1 kg of coal to generate 390 grama of electricity and the lion's share of
1
FnR ~~'~'TrTAT. TTSR (1NT,Y
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energy goes to heat the air and_rivere in the form,of waste, apecialized thermal
power plants cmvert600-700 grams into useful energy: They supply electricity and
heat at one and the same time, the heat flowing in the form of hot water to the
consumer by way of ita own pipeline system.
The Consequences of Bonn's Energy Program
Still, experts such as Dr Heinz Juergen Schuermann,~Energy Institute at Cologne
University, warn "of undue euphoria." Economic realities prevent the k~oped for
victorious advance. Long-distance heat req4ires large investments which cannot be
quickly amortized. Normally it is not possible simply to convert exis.ting power
plants (Prof Helmut Schaefer, Munich Technical University).
Particularly costly are the apecially insulated pipes. According to a atudy by the
Steag of Essen, DM8 billion for pipes would need to be invested in order to heat
half the 2.2 million residences between Duisburg and Dortmund by long-distance
heating. An additional DM4 billion would have to spe:~t on thermal power planta.
As the municipal electricity works are unable to afford sueh amounts, the Federal
Government and the Laender will have no choice but to step in with subsidies.
Moreover, energy suppliers shy away from investments because they are not certain
whether and when residential buildings will be linked to the network. Building
owners generally convert only when the existing heating equipment stops working.
Hansgeorg Winter, director of the Cologne city supply plant, reports thaC this
results in serious losses in the initial stages.
Moreover, in view of the large amount of capital needed.for the distribution net-
work, long-distance heat becomea profitable soonest in conurbations. There, how-
ever, many building owners have only recently converted to gas heating, and energy
suppliera inveated a lot of money in gas pipelinea. If long-distance heat were to
edge out natural gas thanks to government subsidies, these facili~ies could not be
amortized. The Esaen municipsl plant, for example, would have to write off
DM22 million in the Ruzttenscheid district aldne.
It is also disputed whether the promotion of long-distance heating will xeally pay
off for the national econom~r. According to the Steag study the expansion of the
long-distance heating network in the Ruhr district would conserve 8 liters of fuel
. oil per annum per DM100 investment. The insulation of.the basement in a one-family
home yields a conaervation effect of 32 liters, a thernial_waste gase valve 291 li-
ters and new fuel jets 1,165 litera. ~These figures are cited by Federal Construc-
tion Minister Dieter Haack in a letter to home owners.)
In future federal citizens will not receive aubsidies for such investments, al-
though they do get them as per the energy conserva~tion program now in force.
Lambsdorff's senior energy official Engelmann says "we have provided enough incen-
tivea in this area." According to the planned new program Bonn will make available
funds only "if the measure can be shown to be uneconomic," for example heat pumps
or solar collectors.
Otherwise the Federal Government is gambling that higher prices will be enough to
create greater energy consciousnesa. When oil and gas get mc~re expenaive on the
world market, consumers wi.ll have to pay more for heat or handle energy more ration-
ally.
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In contrast to the proposals_made by the nuclear energy commission of inquiry and
former Research Minister Volcker I~auff, Bonn wi11 forego~~government o~dered con-
servation. Those who inaist on turning up the heat while keeping windows OpEri
will not have to expect a fine.
It is up to every federal citizen whether he wants to build an oil-heated swim-
ming pool or drive at 200 km speeds on the matorway. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
disarms citizens anxieties~ by saying "we are no~ energy tyrants and do not intend
- to spoil anyone's enjoyment of thei:r electric toothpick."
Indirectly however: Demand keeps rising despite diligent conservation efforts,
and energy producers.will be allowed to meet it to only a limited extent by nuclear
energy--although, according to the Iatest computations of Cologne Pro~ Hans Karl
Schneider, nuclear energy will be 4 pfennig cheaper than electricity generated in
power plants fueled by subaidized German coal. The consequence:~German ind~ietry
al.ready pays 25 percent more for el.ectricity than its French competitors. Nothing
much is likely to change with regard to these cost disadvantages, evex~ should
Bonn approve the 6-10 new nuclear power projects currently in preparation by the
Laender governments.
Coingne scientist Schuermann fears ~hat."energy policy is geared too unilaterally
to conservation." Bonn therefore neglects "to loak beyond the immediate future."
' According to Schuermann Bonn's energy program should enable domestic producers--
by financial aid, for example--to ens~re an appropriate share in world energy re-
serves for the FRG as a major economic power.
A run on the assumed deposits of coal, gas and oil has already begun. If nothing
happena, the Germans will onc~ again arrive too late. The future of energy sup-
plies for the German ec~nomy would then remain uncertain even after the end of
the oil age.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
~ 11698 .
CSO: 3103/363
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ECONOMIC FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY _
TRADE DIFFICULTIES WITH SAUDI ARABIA VIEWED
Hamburg CAPITAL in German Jul 81 pp 12-13
/Text/ The Saudis are paying, the Saudis are not paying; they
are paying, they are not paying-=German-Arab relatione are more
insecure than they have been for a long time. .Is the oil and
credit supplier of the Germans turning into a mirage?
The demonatration of sympathy had two main actors: Crown Prince Fahd, strong man of
Saudi Arabia, praised "on this happy day" the "good friend" from Germany and pro-
mised help in the struggle again3t the economic and financial recession: "As part
of the free worl~ we are glad to part~cipate in the efforts at stabilization."
Helmut Schmidt, the weakened chancellor o� the FRG, thanked him and, in particular,
lauded German-Saudi cooperation as "loyal and solid."
It is therefore all the more noteworthy how easily the soliditX of relations was
called in question at the next occasion. Only a month after the exchange of compli-
ments between the chiefs of government in Rhiyad some small talk at a Bonn reception
aroused alarm. The WELT AM SONNTAG ran the headline "Saudis Block Loans," and even
- the SPIEGEL, confidant of the government, noted "Rhiyad Dampers for the Germans."
And yet all that had happened was that departing Saudi Ambassador to Bonn Muhammad
Nouri Ibrahim told Guenther van Well, former state secretary at the Foreign Miniatry
and currently German ambassador to the United Nations, that "friendship is a two-way
street"--as a reminder of the Rhiyad Government's wish to acquire the Gernsan Le.opard
II tank.
The anxiety of the debtor Federal Government is understandable. This year it may
have to spend possibly DM10 billion more than.initially.planned and, moreover, have
to admit that the deficit in the 1981 German current account will not decline (as
was expected earlier) but achieve at least last year's amount of DM28 billion.
The Saudis could offer =elief for both woes. After all, they are currently earnin~
at Ieast $300 daily from the sale of their oil--more than $100 billion annually (in
terms of D-marks: 250 billion). Up to now the Saudi bank of is3ue Sama granCed a
credit line of DM11 billion to Federal Finance Minister Hans Matthoefer. DM8 billion
have already gone to Bonn. The ..~oney is paid directly in U.S.dollars-that is not
transferred by way of the Euro dollar market--and helps bridge Che gaps iri Germany's
foreign exchange balance and the federal budget. Whether this dollar aid from Rhiyad
may be further increased does not depend only upon the ~3audis (to employ the phrase
_ 4
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they like to use) "ability to perceive the traditional German-Arab, friendship," in
other worda obtain weapons made in~Germany.
At the same time the Germans ahould examine how far they aze willing to become de~
pendent upon the Saudis. The most aignificant data ~~f'German-Saudi economic coopera-
tion so far involve
~ Oil supplies: For 2 yeara the share of Saudi deliveries in. FRG oil imports--
cheap within tt~e OPEC context--has been rising. Currently it amounts to 27 percent,
soon it will be 30-35 percent.
- Exports: After the United States Saudi Arabia is the second largest export mar-
ket for the Germans outside Eurape. Last year we esrned DM4.5 billion for goods and
services, almost half of Saudi oil supplies to the FRG. Some 65,000 German jobs de-
pen~i on Arab busineas. Major conatruction firma such as Hochtief AG of Essen de-
rive a third of their turnover from Saudi Arabia.
Deficiency guarantees: The FRG's guarantees for loss of payments for German ex-
ports to Saudi Arabia amount to DM24 billion and are therefore much higher than for
any other customer country.
Finances: According to estimates by the Near and Middle East Union in Hamburg
Saudi financiers keep DMZO-25 billion in German bank accounts aild securities--and if
' such large funds were to be abruptly withdrawn, foreign exchange traders might suf-
fer coronaries, and the D-mark would be exposed to almost uncontrollable dtopa in
the eacchange rate. '
Government spokesman Kurt Becker, though, is convinced that the Mideast risk is
quite acceptable for the FRG: "We live within a totality of dependencies. We must
- simply diversify to the extent that one loss will not result in collapse. In the
individual case that depends on political stability, and you wi11 ~ee therefore how
highly we esteem Saudi Arabian stability."
In the meantime Federal Chancellor Schmidt has begun his advance. On the occasion
- of his visit to ~Riyad in late April last he called for far awre.extensive coopera-
~ tion between the two countries. After all, Saudi ~~rabia, the capital of which re-
~ sembles a giant canstruction site and the roads of which are lined by more wrecked
I cars than can be seen anywhere else, intenda from 1981-1985 to spend alm~ost
' DM500 billion on modernization. No less than DM175 billion are earmarked for new
industries, DM75 billion for housing and hoapitals, DM40 billion for electricity
supply and DM20 billion for telephone networks. The estimates of the~German eco-
nomy's potential annual share in Saudi Arabian ordera range from DM6 nillion
(Hochtief executive board mentber Harald Peipers) to DM20 billion (Near and Middle
East Union).
The Germans also consider desirable the.combinatio~i~of German technology and Saudi
money with regard to aid for the Islamic developing countries Turkey, Sudan and
Pakistan. Schmidt also invited the Saudis to acquire stock FRG companies and
had two of his traveling companions explore the potential for contacts between
scientists: Prof Eugen Seibold, president of the ~German 'Research Association, and
Prof Reimar Luest, president of the Max Planck Society.
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Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Faysal did accept the German proposaTs with the com-
ment: "We welcome extensive cooperation without any reservation." Decoded this
means: Even without reservation_in matters weapons. ~On the other hand the Saudia
are reluctant to forego the Leopard II tank for reaeons of security and prestige.
The Saudis appreciate that Chancellor Schmidt personally would not object to weapons
deliveries but that he is compelled--in the face of strong resistance by his own
party--to first amend the hitherto applicable and narrow principles governing Ger-
man weapona exports. However, nobody knowe how much time they are willing to allow
him.
Chancellery chief Manfred Lahnstein considers a"basic declaration on the redefini-
tion of export terms" possible by the fall. Prof I:arl Kaiser, director of the
Research Institute at the German Socie~y for Foreign Affairs in Bonn, on the other
hand, thinks it may Cake a year. "Nevertheless," he says, "appreciable progress
_ must be achieved by the fall. 'The Chancellor must tackle the internal debate."
The fall date has its reasons. The next conference.of the German-Saudi economic
commission is scheduled for the aecond week of November in Bonn. Whether acc:dent-
ally or otherwise--the first reading of the 1982 federal budget is scheduled in the
Bundestag for just that time. One topic of the debate: The finance miniater's need
for loans .
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co.
11698
CSO: 3103/363
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POLITICAL FIDERAL ~tEPUBLIC OF GERMANY
WEST BER'LIN YOUTH STREET VIOLENCE PERSISTS
' Hamburg STERN in German 2 Jul 81 p lla
[Ar.ticle by Wolfgang Metzner: "They Are After a Dead Body"]
,I
~ [Text] The confrontations between squatters, disruptive ele-
ments and the police in Berlin are becoming increasingly vi-
~ cious. ~ben the new CDU 5enat is at a loss for a solution.
"One, two, three--set the people free!" With this battlecry for their arrested
political comrades, masked de~onstrators advanced on the Schoeneberg city hall.
Stone throwers rushed forward in rows like spear throwers in ancient wars.
Policemen fled behind water cannon. Tear gas grenades were hurled back at them.
Burghard Seidel, who was standing between the lines with a transmitter truck
from Radio Free Berlin, said: "Sometimes the sky was dark with stones." Laugh-
~ ing punks opened the truck door and asked: "Well, are we on the air?"
Behind the lines there was looting and celebrating: At Bolle's pastry shop in
Schoeneberg, the store windows we~re ftrsC smaefied, then torte sfiells and bags
of candy from the store shelves were flung onto the street, champagne corks
I popped, an incendiary charge seC the aupermarket on f ire, which was advertising
with a large banner: "Everything for a great barbecue." 1~ao corners away, citi-
zens watched fram their balconies, beer glass in hand, as brightly painted figures
' smashed the windows at Kaiser's and dragged away cardboard boxes with food.
-i The bottom line of the worst street battle of this year in Berlin: 76 policemen
reported in3ured, dozens of damaged private cars, which were pushed across
streets as barricades, a devastated savings bank and looting even in a pharmacy.
The damage resulting from broken windows--from the Land criminal 3ustice build-
ing and the CONSTANZE editorial building to the NEUE flEIMAT--runs into the mil-
liona. "It has undoubtedly taken on a new quality", was the concerned commenC
of police spokesman Eberhard Schulz: Stones thrown at the windows of private
houses, incendiary attacks against policemen--we haven't had that before". His
boss, Berlin's new senator for internal affairs, Heinrich Lummer (CDU): "Brutal
- beyond all bounds."
Lummer, who was unable to control the "gutter rampage" (BERI~INER MORGENPOST) with
1,470 policemen on duty, was quick to assign the blame: The Al.ternative List had
"con~ured demons that no one wanted to exorcise". It was of no concern to Luimmer
. '
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that the Alternatiyes qn the ~ppt attempted to halt the excesses ("Stop that
crap; The senator ~s apQ~rentl,~r una~raxe that the "council" of the 150 houses
in $erlin occupied by squ~tters ~s at odds with the Alternative List and is abso~
lutely unw311ing to be guided b}r i:t.
"The Senat should pay for every eviction. The riot had been in the making for a
long time", was an opiaion to be Fieard after the battle among me~mbers of the
counterculture. The state attorney's office had worn down the squatters with
house searches. But it was the new CDIT Senat which had had a"symbol" of the
movement: the house at 45 Mittenwalder Strasse in Kreuzberg. Tt had been oc-
cupied since February 1981.
A writeoff company plans to "modernize it in luxury style" with DM 1.35 million
in public subsidies. The high rent--DM 21 per square meter--is to be "subsidized
down" to DM 4.75 with tas money. Even the new senator for construction, Ulrich
Rastenborski, thinks this idea is wrong. But, he says, the promises of his SPI?
predecessors are binding, and the pro~ect cannot be halted.
As leader of the parliamentary opposition, Hans-Jochen Vogel was complaining that
the new Senat had "needlessly" expanded the confrontation. "He shouldn't shoot
off his mouth now and go over to the side of the squatters", says Thomas, who
lives in a squatter occupied house. The young squatters have not forgotten that
impressive police parades took place under Vogel, and that the Berlin SPD created
the housing shortage as a consequence of years of theoretical misplanning.
CDU member Lummer now wants to try "dialogue" after the battle. But the new Apo
(extraparliamentary opposition) in Berlin, which considers the Alternati~ve L~st
in the Aouse of Delegates only as its "playing foot", while it keeps ~ts
"weight-bearing foot" on the streets, sees even the namination of the law-and-
order man as a"declaration of war".
Major concern has long since moved on fram the scandal that 10,000 apartments
along the River Spree are standing e~pty., in spite of a housing shortage. It
is no longer just a hard core of 3,000 squatters that believes rocks are appar-
ently arguments, because violence is taken seriously. Frustxated 16-year olds
in leather 3ackets shout: "Germany, Germany, everything is finished", and
smash windows in banks and supermarl~ets and ransack them. Spray-painted on the
wall of a new building: "Pity concrete doesn't burn."
Last Thursday police heard the word ga out: "Burn the Kudamml" The Berlin
boulevard could have been destroyed at leisure on the Sunday before Easter,
because the police chiefs were meeting in useless discussions about ;ahat to do,
instead of giving the order to advance to rheir units in the side streeCs.
This time the Kurfuerstenda~ was adequately protected. But the young militants
- developed new tactics: They appear suc:denly in smal~. squads in different parts
of the city, vandalize shops and disappear again. So far, Lu~er has no plan to
counter this. Policemen, who have been on duty for 50 hours, are developing
their own tactics: "No arrests, club them." In the last deznosntrat~on, a
policeman sCruck a woman on the Iiead so hard witY? hts truncheon that tk~e weapon
broke.
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Considering the severity of the last street battle, it is almost a miracle that
theic were no deaths. "Yes, they are after a dead body, a new Ohnesorg", is
the opinion of police chief Guenther Freund concerning the militant demonstrators.
- In the meantime it is no longer certain that policemen are not stirring up the
flames. A journalist and several demonstrators claim to have seen policemen who
put on AL buttons and ~umped out of police cars as masked "riote~~s". Senator
Lummer has so far re~ected this asserti.on as "ridiculous".
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Gruner + Jahr AG & Co
9581
CSO: 31U3/365
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POLITICAL FRANCE
PCF REVIVAL HOPES: LO ,
- Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 27 Jul-2 Aug 81 pp 16-18
' [Article by Michel Chamard] '
i [Text] Debate between "Stalinista" and "Eurocommunists"
~ with~n the PCF [French Co~unist Party]. Mr Marchais
~ looks for a way out.
Mr Georges Marchais is caught in a crossfire. The two extremes of the PCF are
3oining together in the same accusation: the secretary general is destroying
i the party. For the "Eurocommunists," labelled "opportunists" by the leadership,
the rupture of the union of the left led to the present debacle. The prosoviet
-I hard core, on the other hand, blamea it on the lack of ideological steadfastnesa.
All dbservers see the PCF aecretary general as a leader living on borrowed time.
I
! Several months away from the 24th congress scheduled for early 1982, Mr Marchais
has achieved little of which to boast. In the last 3 years, the PCF has lost
~ one-fourth of its voters and hal� its deputies. The miZ~tants are distressed,
~ as shown by the smaller number of campaign posters put up during the presidential
~ and legislative campaigns. The communist press is showing a disturbing deficit.
Mr Marchais' personal authority comes out weakened. Mr Philippe Robrieux
~ explains why in the interview he gave to VALEURS ACTUELLES.
~
I
A 45-year-old professor tenured in history, and a research director at CNRS
i [National Center for Scientific Research], Mr Robrieux is an expert: a former
' communist student leader, a protege of Maurice Thorez, he belonged to the PCF
; until 1968, after having had a seat on the central committee. He has ~ust pub-
lished the second volume of his "Internal History of the Communist Party,"
(Fayard), which covers the period 1945-1972: an indispensable reference work in
a lively style. To the exegesis of archives Mr Robrieux has added personal
reminiscences or those of militants with whom he has remained in contact:
"The only way to understand a closed system, with its rites and its unwritten
laws," he says.
Mr Marchais performed his self-criticism before the central committee on 26 June,
but diluted his own responsibility with that of his predecessors. After all, he
explained, he was only the managing heir trying to carry out a policy to which the
party had too far committed itself before his arrival for dny possibility of
reconsideration.
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"The common program nourished illusions about the PSF by leading people to believe
that it had completely changed, to the point of eliminating the difference between
~ our two parties. That contributed to fostering among our voters the idea of a
m~~anin.Qful vote for a noncommunist candidate."
To whom was he alluding? Mr Waldeck Rochet, who launched the process of the union
of the left, agreed to Francois Mitterrand's lone [within the left] candidacy in
1965, then the withdrawal of several co~unist candidates who were frontrunners
on the left in 1967.
Even Maurice Thorez, who supported Mr Marchais' rise, is suspect. Analyzing the
period which followed the Khrushchev statement of 1956, Mr Marchais says:
"When one examines that period, one realizes that we were only able to deal with
these problems after a considerable delay. The party continued to come up with
old answers that were no longer well adapted to the needs of the struggle. Mr
Marchais announced that a'serious, wide, and profound' debate would be opened
this fall to define the political line to be submitted to the congress."
Meanwhile he added, "The debate within the party cannot be subject to outside
pressures."
Four days later, the federal committee of Paris excluded Mr Henri Fiszbin and 10
of his supporters. The com~ittee of Hauts-de-Seine did the same with respect
to the young mayor of Sevres, Mr Roger Fa~nzylberg, for organizing a faction
within the party.
Last May, several co~unist officials, among them Fiszbin and Fajnzylberg, set
up a study group, "Rencontres Communistes," endowed with a weekly bulletin which
very quickly had 3,000 subscribers..
Mr Fiszbin, 51, his expressive, bespectacled face, is the ringleader of these
"opportunists" that were denounced by the PCF leadership organizer, this the son
of a Polish Jewish hatter established at Belleville, joined the party at the age
of 15, becoming a permanent member 12 years later. Self-taught, devoted to
classical music, he carried the federation of Paris which he headed-into support
of the union of the left. Opposed to the break with the PSF, he was relieved of
his federal responsibilities in 1978. His friend and mentor, Mr Paul Laurent,
has not had a word to say in his defense, and he was replaced by his own cousin,
Mr Henri Malberg.
"Will one go so far as to class any critical opinions as outside pressure?" asks
Henri Fiszbin, who denounces the hardening of the leadership and challenges the
analysis in the Marchais report. He notes that the union of the left made it
possible for the PCF to win a number of mayoralties in 1977.
Mr Fiszbin remains isolated, but his sentiments are in fact widely shared.
Mr Marchais has had to take into account the aspirations for unity of a part of
his base, by accepting the entry of communists into the government and ministerial
solidarity, which obliges him to forego any opposition to the socialists.
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No one is fooled: it is a question of buying time. Until when?
Probably until the municipal elections of 1983. For the PCF, maintaining theit
position at the heart of a large number of municipalities is vital: it means
parallel circuits of financing and personnel recruitment. Now this battle for
the municipalities can only be fought in tandem with the PSF.
The communists could then xegain their freedom of action to try to recover their
former voters from the socialists, by taking an opposition stance. Mr Robrieux
appears skeptical a~ do the leaders of Rencontres Communistes. One of them told
me:
"The PCF has fought Mitterrand too much. It will have a hard time being believed
if it denounces the socialist errors again even if they are real ones."
Another hope for the PCF: the establishment of proportionality, which would free
it from its tactical alliance with the PSF. As long ago as 22 June, Rene Andrieu
mentioned on television this formal promise of Mr Mitterrand.
The policy of participation in the government has reawakened another faction ~
opposing Marchais, but one which up to now has remained in the background: the
"Stalinists."
Some officials [within the party] did not accept with good grace the in~unction
to support Mitterrand after 26 April. One ~ournalist who resigned from L'H[JMANITE,
Alain Leygnier, accuses several staff inembers of the daily of having given instruc-
tions to abstain or vote for Giscard d'Estaing on 10 May. Among them is mentioned
the head of the cultural service, who is today a member of Charles Fiterman's
cabinet staff.
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR of 11 July described a meeting in the Paris suburbs of some
40 PCF staff inembers, including two federal secretaries, who support a withdxawal
of the communist ministers and rapprochement with Moscow.
Judging the Marchais report too weak in its criticism of the union of the left,
they have reportedly decided to organize for the 24th congress. Among the means
being considered are a bulletin, and a"free" radio station at Argenteuil.
In its July edition, the bulletin "Le Communiste des Bouches-du-Rhone" bitterly
condemns "participation in a bourgeois government": "The communist party had its
justification in the struggle of the classes that were pushed to the limit."
The "Russian lobby" remains very influential, if not at the base, at least within
_ the party leadership. No one is unaware of the hostility shown by Georges Gosnat,
the party treasurer, or Maxime Gremetz towards the entry of communists into the
government, as no one is unaware of the hostility of Gaston Plissonnier, head of
the apparatus and "eye of Moscow" on Place du Colonel Fabien. They have a stan-
- dard-bearer among the old militants: Mrs Jeannette Vermeersc~, Thorez' widow.
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The party's press office four~3 it necessary to deny the existence of a pro-Soviet
faction hostile to the current line and resolved to restrain the leadership. Thus
the information was perceived to be an embarrassment.
Mr Marchais still has things in his favor: the network of the faithful that have
been put in place in key sectors of the apparatus, and also the prestige of his
position. Mr Robrieux nevertheless stresses their lim3ted value.
One man is patiently awaiting his hour: Roland Leroy, the editor of L'HUMANITE.
This 55-year-old former resistance partisan, touted as a"liberal," then as a
a "hardliner," was removed from the secretariat by Marchais in 1979. He announced
that he would personally deliver the ma~or speech on L'HUMANITE's anniversary on
13 September. That speech is often reserved for the secretary general.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs Actuelles"
9516
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POLITICAL ~ FRA~~E
- ROBRIEUX: MARCHAIS VERSUS TWO PCF WINGS; FUTURE PRECARIOUS
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 27 Jul-2 Aug 81 p 17
[Interview with Philippe Robrieux, a researcher in history at the National Center
for Scientific Research (CNRS), author of "Internal History of the Communist
Party," and former member of the PCFJ
[Text] [Question] What is your explanation of the failure of Georges Marchais'
strategy over the last 3 years? ~
[Answer] He has no political strategy: first he idles, then he races. Brezhnev
convinced him that capitalism was in its death agony. Thus he put the emphasis
on the revolutionary character of the PCF, which led to the rupture of the union
� of the left.
Up until last year, it was not unrealistic to bet on the triumph of the Soviet
Union: compare the map of the world in 1970 with that of 1980, and you see the
advance of the Soviet camp during the Carter-Giscard era. One can understa.nd how
Georges Marchais let himself be carried away: this explains his finger pointed
like a missile on television during his trip to Moscow after the invasion of
Afghanistan.
What remains of these hopes since the advent of Ronald Reagan and the departure
of Valery Giscard d'Estaing2 One might think that Soviet expansionism is going
to march in place, that oil blackmail will become problematic, at least for the
next 4 years.
Francois Mitterrand will be a less malleable interlocutor than Valery Giscard
d`Estaing: it seems most improbable to me that Jean-Baptiste Doumeng is hence-
- forth going to keep his access to the Elysee. So Georges Marchais remains at
the moment hanging in air.
[QuestionJ Is it not true that the PCF is counting on exploiting, at some point
in time, the dissatisfaction with the new regime?
[Answer] If Georges Marchais bets on the economic crisis, on the end of the PS's
honeymoon, that is an analysis by a nursery-school Marxist. F~-~n granting the
hypothesis, how can the reactions of the French be prejudged? Will they not make
sacrifices for Francois Mitterrand that they would have refused Valery Giscard
d'Estaing?
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Georges Marchaia has mentioned the strikes that marked the arrival of the left in
power in 1936. The situation is different: in 1936, the idea of the workers was
Co force to its knees an employer class that was more autocratic than the one of
todaq. Today, fear of crisis has made them aware that they cannot have things
exactly as they want them, that they must help Francois Mitterrand.
[Question] What then is Mr Marchais' future?
[Answer] Ultimately, he seems to be.losing. The hard core of the party, the
faction that followed the secret instructio~s to vote for Valery Giscard d'Estaing
on io r~y, has not really accepted the fact of seeing the secretary general implic-
itly betray it bq expressing his pleasure at the victory of the socialist candidate.
A part of this hard core is aligned with the "Eurocommunists" again in accusing
Georges Marchais of destroying the party.
The PCF finds itself in the position of a heart patient: the circumstances are
favorable for a violent seizure, buC no one knows when it will come. Certainly,
Georges Marchais has put his men in key positions. But Khrushchev had also done
this, and was no less easily overthrown.
The naming of communist ministers gave Georges Marchais a big boost, and put off
an immediate coup. If the leadership of the PCF had refused to participate in
the government, the apparatus would have concluded that he had chosen confrontation
with the socialists, which would have been a disaster at the municipal elections.
- Then, Georges Marchais would have been swept away, despite the almost preternatural
respect which makes of the secretary general an infallible figure.
Georges Marchais has himself struck the first blows at that myth: he has made it
into a caricature which does not correspond to the aspirations for dignity and
social ascension of the communist electorate. The man and his style are both
condemned. As it is one hopes he can still speak in the first person singular.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs Actuelles"
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POLITICAL FRANCE
THIRD WORLD COOPERATION POLICY OUTLINED BY COT
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 17 Jul 81 p 43
[Interview with Minister of Cooperation and Development Jean-Pierre Cot by Liliane
Gallifet; date and place not given]
[Text] [Question] You recently saids "We have inherited 23 years of detestable
practices." To whicli ones were you referring?
[Answer] This ministry has emerged from what was the Miaistry of Cooperation
that is, a postcolonial and neocolonial situation at one and the same time. The
custom was basically to establieh personal contacts betwee~i chiefs of state in
order to put together, piece by piece, a cooperation policy that did not fit into
the framework of a development strategy.
i
, [Question] What is the philosophy of the new cooperation?
i [Answer] Responding to the expectations of the African nations themselves. In
i Lagos last year, they defined their own strategy, a self-centered development more
in tune with their domestic needs. Our role 3s to support tha.t effort. This is
an important step compared with France's previous attitude. Another vital point
~ for me is the role of the nongover~ental organizations. These associations can
I do things that governments cannot do. I would like to translate this into budget
I terms by giving strong financial support to their action. I hope to rebalance the
, funds I have in their favor by reducing certain actions of my miniatry that are
~ too heavy-handed and poorly adapted to cooperation.
~
' [Question] The socialists have often denounced "the unhealthy relations" which
France had with Gabon, the Central African Republie or Zaire. What modifications
do you expect to make?
[Answer] We expect to establish relations between nations that is, depersonalize
them. There will be no more cohorts or rascals. France's role is to help its
partners take over their business themselves. For example, in the Central African
Republic, following Bokassa's fall, French officials exercised high-level respon--
sibilities in the Central African administration, which is an unhealthy situation,
not to mention the fact that it is in fact a recolonizat~on. It is indispensable
that in the months ro come for this cannot be done suddenly we reach a
re-Africanization of all administrative and political personnel in that country,
withdrawing our own.
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[QuestionJ But how? Is the regime in the Central African Republic not propped up
by the technical assistants?
[Answer] The regi.me in the Central African Republic is not propped up. On the
contrary, it is made more fragile by the excessive responsibility assumed by the
French in the administrative and political structures of government.
[Question] Do you not believe.that announcing the withdrawal of the French offi-
cials risks being perceived as abandonment?
[Answer] Not at all. I have spoken of this with the prime minister of the Central
African Republic. He agrees with me. He himself perceives the presence of these
French officials as a form of neocolonialism that is poorly tolerated.
[QuestionJ Will you do the same thing elsewhere,, in the Ivory Coast, for example,
where the French also play an imgortant role?
[Answer] We hope that cooperation will be what it should never have ceased being:
technical aid. The vocation of cooperation is for our engineers to pro~vide the
apprenticeship for the African technicians. On the other hand, we should not be
directly involved in administration. We must not subsidize budgets endlessly,
which we are forced to do in catastrophic situations. This is actually an admis-
sion of failure. We must put an end to these mistakes. This cannot be done
overnight, but we must reinvent a policy that will permit the African countries to
gradually stand on their own two feet. ~
[Question] Do you intend to change the status of the technical assistan:s, who
have to date been paid by the Africans? .
[Answer] It is normal for the Africans to pay the technical assistants. A ser-
vice rendered must be paid for. Having said that much, we shall take measures to
reconcile the disparities between the situation of technical assistants from Quai
d'Orsay and those from the Ministry of Cooperation.
[Question] The technical assistants ha.ve often been criticized for favoring the
French enterprises that invest in Africa. Are you among those who find this wrong?
[Answer] Not at all. I think it is very important to link the Third World coop-
eration and aid effort with France's economic interest. If we cannot demonstrate
that it is very important for our economy to embark upon a policy of cooperation
and development, we shall not have the support of French opinion, especially in
- the current crisis. The Third World ia perceived as a competitor, an often dis-
loyal one, an economic burden, even an obstacle in times of crisis. Now then, I
am convinced that it is through a policy of cooperation, through the intensifica-
tion of our trade with the Third World that we can create ~obs in France. A
well-understood generosity can go hand in hand with our country's interest.
[Question] Africa~s:medical development has been 1eft~to the United States. Do
you deplore this fact?
[Answer] We have not abandoned our medical action. If this were the interpreta-
tion of the agreement made, we would do away with it. Actually, a certain type of
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coordination i~ needed between the ditferent health policies in the African coun-
tries and in concertation with them. I have met with Africaa health officials.
They have told me of their astonishment at not being consulted. There can be no
qtiestion of leaving everything up to the Americans in the field, first of all,
� because we believe that as far as Africa is concerned, our health policy is the
best one our doctors are better acquainted with African problems and next,
because that it not what the Africans want and it is up to them to dec~de.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse S. A.
11,464
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POLITICAL FRANCE
BANGUI CRISIS TESTS PS IDEALS, NONINTERFERENCE
Paris L`EXPRESS in French 31 Jul-6 Aug 81 p 49
[Article by Jacques Esperandieu]
[Text] Central African Republic again! The threats of a crisis
in Bangui put the Elysee in an awkward situation.
The French Government is rather embarrassed. The state of siege decreed in the
Central African Republic by President David Dacko plunges it into a dile~ma: to
continue to support a regime which is now openly violating democratic norms, or to
contribute to its fall at the risk of seeing itself accused of interference.
Bangui, 14 July: three dead (including a French technician) and about 30 wounded,
in a bomb attack whicl~ destroyed Le Club, a downtown cinema. "The kick-off of a
series of actions which will onlq end with the departure of the las~ French soldier,"
claims the Central African National Liberation Movement (MCLN), which cla~ms credit
for the attack. The MCLN? A minuscule group founded last December in Lagos
(Nigeria), by Idi Lalla, who was once a sociology student at Nanterre. In a word,
hardly substantial enough to make the authorities tremtile, one would think.
Wrong. Their reaction was brutal. On 18 July, David Dacko lays the blame on the
opposition parties. The MCLN, but also the Uliangt People's Patri~tic Front [FPO~
of Dr Abel Goumba--whom Idi Lalla once served in the capacity of spolcesman--are
banned. Ange Patasse's Movement for the Liberation of Central Africa [I~LC]- which
came in second in the March preaidential election- was suspended: On 21 July, a
state of siege was estaBlished over the sntire country. On 22 July, finally, after
the discovery ~f some uneapped explosiv~s at Bouar (in the westem part of the
country), where~800 French soldiers are garrisoned, the army was called in. With a
concrete warning: "The us~ of force includes the uae of weapons."
Ttao months after the banning of the lone labor confederation, which was threatening
a strike, the other shoe has dropped. The democratic veneer conferred on the regime
- by a constitution, a presidential election, and the recognition of the opposition, is
brutally shattered. Wliy this folly? "Only one explanation: Franeois Mitterrand's
victory," says one French expert. In Bangui, on the night of 10 May, they were
dancing in the streets. But not at the presidential palace. Would not the coming
to power of the left result ia an end to the massive aid Parts was giving to the
Dacko regime? And, of course~ the first measures taken ~iy the new French authorities
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were not at all reassuring. There was the recall of the (FrenciiJ Recrerxirv gtan~ral
fro~ the presideacy of the Centra~ African Republic. And the threats to recall
' President Dacko's (F`rench) personal guard.
Things went so far, it is said in Bangui, that Dacko reportedly made contact with
Moroccan mer~enaries. There was, above all, the rather "cool" welcome given in early
July to the Central African prime minister in Paris. He was not received by Francois
Mitterrand--which is understandable--nor by his counterpart, Pierre Mauroy--which is
somewhat more surprising. Simon Narcisse Bozanga found in Jean-Pierre Got, the
minister for cooperation, an unyielding interlocutor. On the particulars: yes to
the continuation of French aid (Fr 450 million per year), but on condition that it
no longer be used exclusively for making up budgetary deficits, particularly for the
wages of the 23,000 civil service employees. This threat was all the more serious
because Central African authorities are confronted with a catastrophic economic situ-
ation: public debt amounting to nearly Fr 1.5 billion (twice thy size of the budget),
foundering agricultural production (coffee, cotton), which has been hit by the poor
prices paid to tfie peasants and deterioration in the marketing system, imports
which--because the country is landlocked--are costing more and more.
David Dacko, however, still has a major strength: the lack of credibility of the
declared candidates to succeed him. Ange Patasse, of cour~e, received close~to 40
percent of the votes in the March presidential election. But his lengthy collabora-
tion with the Bokassa regime (fie was a minister 11 times) destroys a large part of
his appeal. It is the same with Henri Maidou, the former prime min~ster for the
~ fallen emperor, whosE denials in the affair of the massacred schoolchildren earned
him the niclrname of "Mr Denial" in Bangui. As for Francois Pehoua, he is torn be-
j tween the business affairs which sustain him and his resolve not to cut off his base
of support, which led him squarely to accuse the French soldiers of complicity in
, the 14 July attack.
; There remains Abel Goumba, 56, a tenured professor of ined3,cine. On the plus side;
his integrity aclrnowledged by all, his competence-T20 qears ago he was the m3nister
of economy and finance for the Central African government, before being thrown into
, prison by...David Dacko, and sentenced to exile--and above all, his constant opposi-
' tion to the Bokassa reg3me. But, on the negative side, that 20-year exile was it-
self largely responsible for his defeat in the presidential election: 1.42 pe~cent
~ of the votes. From Paris, where he can count on the active support of the PS,
' Abel Goumba is trying to bring together all of the opposition around a moderate
program: continued presence of the French troops, a plan of economic recovery. A
pro~ect that w~11 take much time and Iabor...So much ttiat a high P'rench official,
disillusioned, concludes: "I~,' is difficult, in the present state of affaiis, to
let Dacko fall. For without" fiim the CAR [Central African Repulilic] would 1ie Uganda.
Or Chad."
COPYRIGHT: 1981 s.a. Groupe Express
9516
CSO: 3100/889 ~
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GE NE RAL FRANCE
FRANCO-SOVIET ARCAD-3 MAGNET_OSPAERE E~PERLMEIrTS:DISCUSSED ~
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French No 86~ 18 JUL 81 pp 53-54
_ [Article by Pierre Langereux]
[Text] 1':~e Soviet Arcad-3 satellite, which is to be laanched on or after 20 August,
by the USSR, is, up to now, the most ambitious production of Franco-Soviet coopera-
tion. This satellite, constructed and operated ~ointly by CNES [National Center
for Space StudiesJ and INTERCOSMQS, is intended for the 'r'ranco-Soviet ARCAD [Arctic
Auroral Density] program for studying the physical phenomena of the polar magneto-
sphere at high latitude (60�) and especially the relationships between the atmos-
phere and the magnetosphere.
The Arcad-3 program, off iciallq decided on in October 1974 at Kiev (USSR), was es-
tablished in Marseilles (France). It is a continuation of the French Arcad-1 and
2 experiments onboard Soviet Aureole-1 and 2 satellites, launched on 27 December
1971 and 26 December 1~7~, respectively, by the USSR. Arcad-3 was to be launched
originally in mid-1979, within the framework of the International Magnetosphere
Study (IMS), which took place from 1g76 to 1979 with the launching of several sa-
tellites (GEOS-1 and 2, ISEE-1, 2 and 3), rocke~ probes (Subtorm, Ipoca~p-3, Porcu-
pine programs) and stratospheric balloons (Sambo-2 program).
Arcad-3 is the first satellite actuallq produced ~ointly by the USSR and France,
which devoted 26 million francs ta the operation. .
It ts asatall~ite ,in?the~"Scv3ettun~~~tersa+l automatic stations" (AUOS) series developed
in two versions depending oa the missions: the AUOS-T oriented toward the earth
and the AUOS-S oriented toward the sun.
The AUOS-T satellite in the Arcad-3 program is a satellite stabilized on the three
axes by gravity gradient and magnetic anchoring, with two inertia wheels in addi-
tion. It weighs close to 1 ton, including 150 kilograms of scientific payload,
consisting for the most gart (around 100 kilograms) of French equipment. This
equipment includes the scfentific experiments, as well as important service equip-
ment: an infrared horizon seasor (SODERN) for altitude control, a CN2B onboard
computer (Crouzet) for controlling the satellite and a 136-megahertz telemetering
system (EEE) for direct transmission of data from the French experiments to France.
It ts the first tin+~ that a Soviet satellite carries that kind of French equipment.
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Arcad-3 is to conducC about 10 ~cientific experiments determined by three French
laboratories--the Center for Study of Radiation in Space (CESR) in Toulouse, the
Environment Physical Research Center (CRPE) in Orleans and the External Geophysics
Laboratory (LGE) in Saint-Maur--in addition to two Soviet laboratories: the Re-
search Institute (IKZ) in Moscow and the Magnetism and Atmosphere Institute
(IZMIRAN) in Moscow.
Certain experiments are devoted to a study of charged particles (Spectro of CESR,
FON, Kukuchka and Pietschanka of the IKI) and in particular of electrons (isoprobe
of the CRPE), ions and therm,al plasma (Dyction of LGE). Others concern a study
of the magnetic and electrical f ields of very low frequencies (TBF of CRPE, LGE
and IZMIRAN) and fluctuations of the magnetic field (TRAC of LGE and IKI), as well
as a photometric analysis of the aurora borea~~is (ALTAIR of the IKI).
This is the first time that the payload of a Soviet satellite has been assembled
jointly and the integration of the complete satellite has been conducted jointly
, by French and Soviet specialists, in France and in the USSR.
i
-I The Soviet satellite underwent space environment and electromagnetic compatibility
' tests in 1979 and 1980 in the facilities of SOPEMEA in the Toulouse space center.
I' The acceptanGe tests of the satellite were conducted primarily at Toulouse and Mos-
j ~ow. Finally, the whole payload underwent detai.led tests, in May 1981, in the IKI
before being incorporated in the satellite by the Kapustin-Yar ~pace-launching site
near Volgograd by French and Soviet specialists. Next, Arcad-3 was sent to the
_I top secret north launching field, located near Plesetsk, at about 200 kilometers
~ from Arkhangelsk, where the launching will take place, because Arcad-3 is to be
i placed in a 400-2,000-kilometer circular solar orbit, inclined 82.5� with a period
! of 109 minutes. Then, the French teams will. return to Moscow where they will re-
ceive magnetic tape re~ordings of the latest tests conducted at Plesetsk where the
French are not admitted.
i
! The satellite's life is nominally 6 months, including 1 month for acceptance and
~ 5 months for operation, which will be conducted jointly by France and the USSR for
~ the first time. The r~mote-coztrol programs will be prepared both in France on
i a Cyber 170-750 computer (CDC) and in the USSR on a French Solar 1604 computer
(CIMSA) and on a Soviet computer. Telemetry signal reception will also be handled
jointly by a network of eight stations distributed around the world. On this oc-
casion, the CNES is using the Toulouse (France) and the Kourou (French Guiana) sta-
tions, in addition to two stations in the French Southern and Antarctic Lands
(TAAF) in Adelie Land (Antarctica) and on the Kerguelen Islands (Indian Ocean},
and a station of the Norwegian Scientific and Industrial Research Council (i~1TNF)
at Tromsoe. The USSR is furnishing three stations, respectively at Moscow
(IZMIRAN), Apatity (Kola Peninsula) and Norilsk and the foot of the Pontorana Moun-
tains (central Siberia). An agreement was also concluded between CNES and
INTERCOSMOS, in March 1979, to handle jointly operaCional processing of the scien-
tific data at Toulouse (CNES) and at Moscow (IKI and IZMIRAN).
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040039-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040039-1
FOR OE'FICIAL USE ONLY
:
1i ~~~~~?r~M:~
~
+.r,�.. , r .
.`-'y,'~,v..
.
%
a~
"Arcad 3~~ satellite being tested
in the CNES simulator in
~ ' Toulouse.
~ 4a
d'
i'..
X,S~ ~~~i '
~ ~
i:l:~, f j'~o~.
r ..~Y: ~ ~y.~,' ~ If
~~5 : (
'x
; .
� w~ r i;
e~ u~.,~' da' ~d a, ~ : ~
~ ~ } r ~qv�~t ~k~ ~ ' . ~ ~j � ~:F : ~ i1~
E, > ~ - -~ia' ~rpw .
~K i~ ! ~i ~ <
~;?"~.ti
, .
I S.. ~
i
" French telemetering unit (xith ~
_ . . �
` - ~ ~ ' ante nna ) of the "Arcad 3'�
satellite.
23
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040039-1

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040039-1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
If ~ . _ _
- . MAT DE STAlILISATION
MAGNfTIGUF
T8B Ot
ROSE �
i
! ISO?ROBE 1 4
~ i ION 02
~ ~ ION Ot
/
~ ~?ANNEAUX
SOLAINES
TBE 02 ,
/O
OVCTION~
TMf
\ iS0 � F2 ISOrROBE I
~
~ IEO � f1
~ ' .
~ Orbital configuration of the "Arcad 3~~ satellite
and layout of French test equipment.
COPYRIGHTs A.& C. 1980. ~
10, 042 END
CSO: 1853/10
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400040039-1