JPRS ID: 9892 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9892
4 August 1981
_ Ve/est E u ro e R e o rt
p p
(1=0U0 36/81)
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JPRS L/9892
4 August 19a1
WEST' E~IROPE REPORT
(FOUO 36/81)
CONTENTS
- POLITICAL
FRANCE
Favorable Attitudes on Electic~ns, Future Policies
(3acques Julliard; LE ~ZOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 4-10 Jul 81).......... 1
. ?~IILITARY
FRANCE
= Hernu Goals: Citizen Soldiers, Cost Reduction, Sanctuary
(Jerome Dumoulin, et al.; L'EXPRESS, 10-16 Jul 81) 9
Military Equipment Needs vs Co~st, Availability ~
(Jerome Dumovlin; L'EXP~'~ESS, 10-16 Jul 81)...~ 13
Citizens Pragmatic, Optimistic on Military Policies
(L'EXPRESS, 10-16 Jul 8'1) 15
PS Arms' Sales Theory vs Comme:rcial, EmplQyment Facts
(Christian d'Epenoux, r:t al.; L'EXPRESS, 10-16 Jul 81)......... 18
Transportation: Deployment Plan, Policy Subversion Potential
~Jer~me Dumoulin; L'F;XPRESS, 10-16 Jul 81) 24
G~NERAL
ITALY
Malrno Public Opinion Poll ora Effects of P2 Scandal
(Donato Speroni; IL MONDO, 'l6 Jun 81) 25
_ ' a- IIII - WE - 150 FOUO]
~no ncsrrr ~ r r ic~ n*r~ v
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POLITICAL FRANCE
FAVORABLE ATTITUDES ON ELECTIONS, FUTURE POLICIES
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 4-10 Jul 81 pp 41-44
[SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company] poll, 22-24 Jun 81; cammentary by JacqL~es
Julliard: "A Triumph Under the Microscope"]
,
- [Texr] The "heartbeat for the socialists that assured Francois Mitterrand's
victory in the presidential election became a wave.in the legislative
elections, a wave to which the right could not react and concerning ~
, which analysts ;aere left with no clear answers. Where did those new
battalions of socialist voters swarming a'l1 over the country come
from? For the first time, the poll which SOFRES made for LE NOUVEL
OBSERVATEUR cancerning the Frenc.h people's reasons for voting the
- way they did on 14 and 21 June along with Jacques Julliard's
comments gives a clearer idea of those who just launched the
country on a new political era.
_ For the more tY,an two months it had been swelling,.we thought we understood it well,
that famous socialist wave of spring 1981. And yet, in the latest postelection poll
that we asked SOFRES to make on the occasion of the recent legislative elections,
there are figures that take one's breath away, figures that astound us and lead us
to the brink of incr.edulity. The wave crossed the most well established borders,
flattened the oldest mountains, swept away the most characteristic features of our
election geography: At a stroke, our landscape was.wiped clean. When they try to
put the socialist results on their graphs, will the statisticians have to change
. their scales once and for all, or will they ~+e content to "iron down" the curve, as
thay customarily do for short-lived accidents? We sha11 only know later, wh~~n the
socialists are judged by their actions. For the time being, 1et us be content.to
' take the exact measure of the event.
First of all; one astounding observation: On 14 June, on the first ballot, the
socialists won in all the socioprofessional categories of the French population.
Farmers, merchants, artisans, manufacturers, upper- and intermediate-leve~ manage-
ment personnel, members of the liberal professions,l blue- and white-collar workers,
retired person~: All put the PS at the top. Beating Chirac with the farmers,
Giscard with retired persons and Marchais with the workers: That is the noteworthy
performance accomplished by Francois Mitterrand in these legislative elections on
the thrust of the presidential election. Subject to further resear.ch, one can state
that this is the first time that such an event has happened since deput~es have
been elected. in France. This provisionally closed a serious debate tha~t pitted
socialist theoreticians against one another. Should the expression "class front"
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- a formula which, in socialist jargon, designates the order of battle in the social
field be understood as "front of the classes"? At least with respect to elec-
tions, the matter has been decided, for no party has ever enjoyed such an"inter-
classist" electorate as the Socialist Party now does.
Such a change is not without ambiguities and it will be very dtfficult for the
Sociaiist Party to satisfy ali the strata of its voters, but so what! Cne has to
take a stand: In a democra~ic system, every gain in representativeness is made at
the expense of clarity or, if one prefers, of the purity of positions, whence the
- need, alongside interclassist graupings such as parties, for more specific organi~
zations of a class or social group, such as trade unioz~s.
B~.stion To Save

~
~ In the future, it will be difficult for the Communist Party ro present itself, when
competing with the Socialist Party, as the "working class party," ina~much as it now
attracts only 24 percent of the workers' votes, compared with 44 percent for the
~ Socialist Party (nearly double) and 30 percent for the UNM that ts, the coalition
of ri~htists. On the first ballot of the presidential election (see our poll in
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR of 1 June I981), Georges Marchais was almost equal with Fran-
cois ri~tterrand among the workers (30 percent compared with 33 percent). Since that
time, however, the hemorrhage has grawn worse: Fewer than one-fourth of all French
workers now vote com~unist! Behind this cruel figure is more than an election
setback, more than the end of a symbol: There ls a veritable theoretical rout. It
explains why, by the evening of the first ballot of the legislative elections, the
PCF felt that its very existence, was threatened and why, abandoning all pride and
coherence, it capitulated before the Socialist Party. In view of the coming munici-
pa~ eleciions, was it not a question of preserving, thanks to a hasty agreement, this
last great communist bastion: the mayors' offices in the Parisian suburbs and those
in a nt?mber of larger cities? The time of arrogance, when the PCF quibbled over
the subsidiaries of the nationalizable enterprises, when Georges Marchais, from the
capital oi the invaders, justified the invasion of Afghanistan, is long gone!
- Let us not leave our table showing the distribution of votes by sex, age and profes-
sion, without emphasizing the second ma,jor trend that came about between the presi-
dential election and the legislative elec.tions: the voting bel~avior of the young.
It will be re.r_alled that on the first ballot of the presidential election, voters
between the ages of 18 and 24, while massively choosing the Ieft over the right
(54 to 35 percent), distinguished themselves from their elders by preferring Marchais
- over Mitterrand (24 to 22 percent) and by giving the latter a percentage of votes
that was lower than his average. Then there was the hair trigger on the evening
- of 10 May, when the young people~appropriated a victory that was not particularly
theirs. And to gain pardon for tneir previous skepticism, they literally measured
the popularity of the Socialist Party by granting it, on.14 June, 44 percent of their
votes compaxed with 18 p~rcent for the Communist Party.
And yet another myth i.s deflated: In politics, at least, it is not always the young
people who are in the avant-garde.. The explanation seems to be the following: Until
recently, young people were profoundly skeptical about politics and that skepticism
was expressed, either hy a high rate of abstention (two times higher than for the
rest ~f the population) or by a vo~e in favor of the ecologists (11 percent for Brice
Lalonde on 26 April, compared with 4 percent for voters as a whole). Since that
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time, adolescents and young people have flocked to the winners camp, but they have
continued to abstain abaut~ twice the arnount of the rest of the voters and their
suppr~rt,, which is more massive than profound, will have to be tested by time.
One is tempted to say the same for women who, on the first ballot of the presidential
election, manifested a certai~ resQrve with resgect to Francois Mitterran3. Only
24 percent voted for him (29 percent for men). They also ~hanged because nearly ~
as many women as men voted socialist on the first ballot.of thz legislative elec-
tions (38 percent compared with 39). Workers, women, young people: There is in
these recent defections to the socialist banner a romantic, Lamartinian tone that
_ will not displease the new president of the republic.
1978 Intuition
On the first ballot of the presidential election, Francois Mitterrand obtained
26 percent of the votes cast, a fine success that opened the doors to victory. Seven
� weeks later, on the first ballot of the legisl,ative elections, the socialist candi-
dates improved the performance of their leader by nearly 12 points, a fantastic
surge that laid the way for the triumph on the following Sunday. That is why it was
interesting to ask whether, in the meantime, the motivations of the voters changed
or remained the same. The poll's answer is clear: By voting socialist, they f.irst
of all wanted to confirm the Mittexrand vote in favor of change. Neither the first
social measures which were actually modest taken by the Mauroy government nor
even the desire for institutional coherence seemed decisive. By an absolute major-
ity (51 percent), it was thought that it was "change" that was wanted: change, a
. vague, vast, all-encompassing, magic word. But it was a verdict also, for the old
majority, which never managed to get rid of the hair shirt of unemployment and infla-
tion or persu4de voters that it was capable of imagining anything else. Combined,
these two complaints explain 63 percent of the failure of the French r~.ght, which,
in order to be rejuvenated; needed the opposition cure just prescribed by the voters.
What does the future then ].ook like? Not wishing ta repeat what was said in the
commentary on the postpresidential poll, we shall not~dwell~on the exceptionally
high rate of satisfaction (59 percent) after the National Assembly election. Despite
(er because of?) the distortional nature of the majority voting system, which in-
creased the socialist victory by notewortHy proportions,' turning the relative major-
ity of votes into an absolute majority of seats, public opinion believes (75 per-
cent to 17) that the Assembly ~ust elected corresponds to the wishes of the French
people: triple approval with the presidential, majority and socialist victory.
By way of comparison, in April 1978 when, following the breakr~p of the Union of
the Left by the communists, the voters gave the right a reprieve in which it had
ceased believing a few months earlier only a one~paint ma~ority (46 percent com-
pared with 45) thought that the newly elected Assembly truly corresponded to the
desires of the French. Such an approval, mere lip service, would have caused one
to reflect.
Basically, nothing new happened between 1978 and 1981. The lack of unity in the
left, unemployment, were present 3 ycars ago. It is as if in their wisdom or their
intuitive understanding of the constitutional mechanisms of the Fifth Republic, the
voters in 1978 preferred putting off until the next presidential election a change
they already viewed as indispensable. The election rule derived from the current
institutions could therefore read as follows: on the presidential election, one
chooses; in the legislative elections, one prepares.
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Impeccable Carryover
_ Let us now turn to the vanquished and, first of all, to the Communist Party, which,
despite its entry intc~ the government, the ma~ority of the voters quite rightly re-
fus~ to place in the victory camp. Same 64 percent even believe that the Socialiet
- Party's victory was won, not only over the right, but over the Communist Party as
well. Naturally, only 26 percent of the comm!inist voters believe this, but that
26 percent in an already weakened electorate deserves consideration. It must be
brought together with the 21 percent of the communist voters who want G~eorges Mar-
chais replaced at the 'zEad of the Communist Party. In January 1976, Marchais was
deemed to be a good leader by 9~J Percemt of the co~unist followers, compared with ~
G percent who raere agai_nst him. In April 1979, on the eve of the 23d Congress, he
sr~ll had 81~ percent compared ~rith 9 against him. One can see how much ground he
- has los~.2 There is only one point.on which consnunist voters have not changed, un-
' like their leaders: their loqalty to the Union of the Left and republican disci-
pline. Once again, their voter carr;tover was impeccable (Tab_1_e 4), much better, as
one can see, than that of the s.ociali~t voters.3 At any.rate, we know that the .
defeat accentuates splits. Th~ coming debates within the PCF will be interesting
to observe, to the extent�that we shall have that opportunity.
The same is true on the right. Neither Raymand Barre, whose popularity for the time
being remai.ns homeopathics nor Valery G~scard d'Estaing, the big loser in this long
s~ries of ballots, has suc~eeded in rising fro~ the defeat, as massive as it was
sudden. Among foll~wers of the UDF, the former president of the republic scarcely
achieves an absolute majority (51 percent) when it is a matter of designating the
best future challenger of the new majority. It is Jacques Chirac who emerges the
winner on points of these snecial primar~es. 1~e now seems to have succeedeu
in the first phase of his program: eliminating all rivals wi;.hin his own camp. But
= on tize dawn of a socialist era, whose duration no one can measure, the most diffi-
cult tasks are ahead.
Sampling
This SOFRES poll was made for LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR from 22 to 24 June 1981, using
a national sampling of 1,000 persons representative of the entire population 18 and
over and a quota method (sex, age, profession of head of family) and employing a
stratification by region and type of population center.
' FOOTNOTES ~
- 1. It should be noted that for SOFRES as well as for INSEE [National Institute of
Statistics and Economic Studies], "upper-level mar~agement personnel, liberal
professions, manufacturers and large merchants" constitutP a single and scarcely
homogeneous socioprofessional category.
~ 2. SOFRES poll, LE NOWEL bBSERVATEUR, No 756 of 7-13 May 1979.
y 3. The small number or districts in which the duel of the second ballot pitted a
communist against a UTM did not make it possible, given the size of the sampling,
to figure the carryover rate of socialists over cammunists with a satisfactory
degree of reliability. ~
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For 51 percent, it was the desire for reform that explains the success of the so-
cialists.
1. In your opinion, what reason best explains the success of the Socialist Party?
Desire of voters to confirm their vdte in the presidential election for
Mitterrand and avoid an institutional ~risis 21
Desire to reduce influence of Communist Party in French political life 5
Desire to see reforms and changes promised by Mitterrand applied 51
First social measures taken by the Mauroy government 6
Wish to see socialist program to fight unemployment applied . 12
No opinion 5
100%
For 32 percent, the defeat of the outgoing majority is due to its economic and social
failure.
2. What reason best explains the defeat of the UDF [French Democratic Union] and the
RPR [Rally f or the RepublicJ? .
With the single candidacies of the old majority, many noters did not have
in their district a candidate who trul~� represented their ideas. 7
The UDF and the RPIt criticized the Socialist Party too much and did not
develop their program and proposals enough. 31
Giscard d'Estaing and Barre did not participate in the election campaign. 5
After its defeat in the presidential election, the old majority had no
chance'of winning the legislative elections. 15
_ The failure of the outgoing majority in the economic and social domain 32
No opinion 10
100%
It was yaung peoPle, women, blue- and white-collar workers...and a party of the rich
that ensured the victory of the Socialist Party. ~
3. Aistribution of Votes on 14 June Within Each Category of the Population
CP PSU PS, Rad.Left Ecolo- UDF RPR Misc. Misc.Rt.
_ Ext.Left Misc. Left gists ~ UNM Ext.Rt.
- Total 100% 16 1 39 1 19 21 1 2
Sex
Men 17 2 39 1 20 20 - 1 ~
Women 15 1 3~ 2 18 22 1 3
Age
18 to 24 18 2 44 2 14 17 - 3
25 to 34 17 2 46 3 16 15 1 -
35 ro 49 17 2 37 1 18 23 1 1
SO to 64 18 1 42 1 19 16 1 2
- 65 and over 10 1 27 - 27 30 - 5
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�
. (3. cont.)
CP PSU PS, Rad.Left Ecolo- UDF RPR Misc. Misc.Rt.
~ _ Ext.Left Misc. Left gists UNM Ext.Rt_�
- Socioprofessional
Category of Head of
Family
Farmer, f arm worker 6 2 32 - 28 32 - -
Small merchant,
artisan 10 - 35 - 19 31 - 5
Management, liberal
professions, manu- .
facturer, merchant 7 2 38 3 19 28 3 -
Intermediate-?evel
management, white-
collar workers 16 2 45 2 18 14 1 2
Blue-collar workers 24 1 44 1 15 14 1 -
Inactive, retired 16 1 29 - 23 26 1 4
On the second ballot, there were practically no "betrayals," except within the UDF.
4. Shifts of votes from first to second ballot, wherever there was a Socialist
Party-UNM duel.
Vote on First Ballot Vote on Second Ballot
PS UNM Abstention, No Response
Communist Party 100% 94 . 2 4
Socialist Party, ra~i~ai leftists, ~
misc. left ~ 100% 97 2 1
UDF-UNM 100% 5 84 11
RPR-UNM 100% - 96 4
Some 59 percent are rather satisfied with the result of the elections. ~
5. Are yo~~ n~~re satisfied or disappointed with the result of the elections?
. April May June
1978* 1981* 1981
; Rather satisfied 51 53 59
Rather disappointed 35 30 30
No opinion 14 17 11
iooy iooi iooi
* NOWEL OBSERVATEUR-SOFRES postelection poll.
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In the resu~ts of the 21 June election, 64 percent see a victory by the Socialist
Party over the Communist Party and the old ma~ority as well.
6. Do you believe that the legislative elections are:
A joint victory of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party over
the old majority (or) 29
A victory of the Socialist Party over the Communist Party and the old
majority? 64
No opinion 7
100%
For 75 percent, the New Assembly truly corresponds to the wishes of the French.
7. Do you believe that the Assembly that has just been elected corresponds to
what the French truly want?
FNSP-[exp. unknown]
SOFRES June
P~11 April 1978 1981
Yes, completely 11~46 29>75
Yes, fairly well 35 46
No, not very well 30~45 13~17
No, not at all 15 4
No opinion 9 8
100% 100%
The new power of the Socialist Party is not deemed."dangerous" by 54 percent.
8. Some say that the Socialist Party now has~all power (the presidency, the major-
ity in the Assembly, the support of the trade unions, and so on) and that this
might represent a danger for democracy. Do you agree completely, are you fairiy
much in agreement, do you not quite agree or not agree at all with this opinion?
Complete agreement 14~37
Fairly much in agreement 23
Not quite in agreement . 23~54
Not at all in agreement 31
No opinion 9
100~
Some 40 percent hope that the socialists will strictly carry out the reforms they
announced.
9. Do you hope that the Socialist Party:
Strictly carries out reforms and changes ~t.announced during the campaign? 40
Does not go as far and gives up certain reforms? 35
Goes farther and makes more reforms and changes? 19
No opinion 6
100%
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Some 21 percent of the followers of the Communist Party hopP that Georges Marchais
will be replaced.
10. Do you want Georges Marchais to remain as secretary general of the Co~nunist
Party or would you prefer that he be replaced :Cn the coming months at the head of
the Communist Party?
Overall Out of 100
CP Followers
Hope that Georges Marchais wi~l remain
as secretary general 27 71
Hcpe that Georges Marchais will be
replaced 31 21
No opinion 42 g
100% 100%
- Who would be the best candidate for the right in the case of a new presidential
election? Chirac is far ahead of Giscard.
11. If there were to be another presidential election �ln the next 2 or 3 years, in
your opinion, who would be the best candidate to face the left: Raymond Barre,
Jacques Chirac or Valery Giscard d'Estaing?
Overall Out of 100 Out of 100
- UDF Followers RPR Followers
Raymond Barre 8 12 4
Jacques Chirac 40 29 81
Valery Giscard d'Estaing 25 51 . 12
No opinion 27 g 3
100% 100% 100%
Some 44 percent believe that the 21 June results will have favorable effects on thei.r
lives.
12. Do you believe.that the results of the 21 June election will affect your
daily life, your standard of ].iving, in a way that will be:
May 1981* June 1981
Rather favorable 44 44
, Rather unfavorable 15 17
Almost unnotic~able 27 32
- No opinion 14 7
100% 100%
* NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR-SOFRES postelection poll.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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FRANCE
MILITARY
HERNU GOALS: CITIZEN SOLDIERS, C~ST REDUCTION, SANCTUARY
Paris L'EXpRESS in French 10-16 Jul 81 pp 55-57, 59
[Article by Jerome Duntioulin with Christian d'Epenoux and Jean-Francois Jacquier:
_ "The Army of the Year 1"]
[Text] Formerly pampered by Giscard, the military now have a minis-
ter who prefers gendarmes to paratroopers, infantrymen to tiankers,
GI's to generals. They are observing in silence.
The Army, liQtening in on the ministry [of Defense] on Rue Saint-Dominique, is watch-
' ing between the lines of a good-natured speech for some partial secrets on the coming
upheavals. When Charles Aernu presented his civil and military cabinet to the press,
he devoted the ma.in part of his statement to the gendarmerie. Several day later,
while one of his assistants refused to authorize L'EXPRESS to conduct an inquiry
among French Army units, he generously offered his assistance for an article de-
voted to the gendarmerie. As a good son, the new minister of Defense has not for-
- gotten that his father was a gendarme at Quimper.
But the tribute is more than filial. A high official stated ironically: "In Hernu's
opinion, the kepi and the red stripe are what counts. The gendarme is the Republic.
While the paratrooper always smells a little of a putsch." A malicious remark,
unfair perhaps, but one that contains its share of truth. Charles Hernu a~ccuses
General Jeannou Lacaze, Armed Forces chief of staff, former commander of the llth
paratrooper division and who will probably resign, ~rankly of being only "opera-
tional," one of those fighters that "Father" Bigeard l.iked.
"All the generals appointed by Giscard think only of war!" the minister of Defense
exclaimed in front o~ an amazed officer. "W~e need different types." "What does he
want? An army smelling of fried potatoes with boy scouts and campfires?" a captain
who suspected the minister's hand in the 14 July parade sighed: starred on the
Champs Elysees, foot troops and units of draftees. The Army of the Year l. The
chief of state, of whom Charles Hernu is a close friend, made it known that he
~ wanted "the military ceremonies of the national hol_iday to express defense based
on the people and to be aa opportunity for a meQting l~etween the ~eaple and their
army.
In spite of appearances, nothing iSo rea~sure an A~~my to which Giscard--a tanker
in his youth and nostalgi~ for the Army of [Marshal] Lattre [de Tassigny]--had re-
stored de facto priority, material comfort, and, almost unexpectedly, a"bit of
. , . . ,
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�
glory" at Kolwezi. The tribute paid to the troops on 14 July probably couid not
put professional Army pe~:sonnel at ease concerning the future ~~f the sacrosgnct
- military service, because they now know Charles Hernu's great ideas on 6-month
service or on extension of selective service to a civilian crientation, his cabi-
net's hostility to the "large battalions," regarded as inefficient and expensive,
- and, especially, the religion that Francois Mitterrand has created for himself on
the matter. A religion of peace and worldwide brotherhood: "Do you not believe
- that assistance to the peoples of the Thir?~ World might offer vast prospects to cur
~outh, in the form of expanded cooperation?" he stated to the newspaper LE MONDE....
"That can be conceived in various ways, especially in the framework c~f a renovated
military service. I have spoken about it to the minister of Defense and the
prime minister." That is the outline of a real Kennedy-style Peace Corps.
Another cause for concern for the Army~.generals, in that parade: in spite of Lheir
new weapons (the FAMA5 attack rifle, the AI~IX-10 "cannon wheels" or the front ar-
_ mored vehicle), the infantrymen and the GI's always evoke "papa's army," gaiter
buttons and kit. Hard, when there is a weakness for the tank regiments of the
eastern border and for that paratrooper division--the only one in Europe--that
is getting bored somewhat between Toulouse and the Pyrenees.
One of the most intluential socialist officers today within the government does not
beat around the bush: "The attitude of mind of the paratroopers is disastrous.
_ That is one thing. But the important thing is Chat the llth Paratrooper Division,
3,000 men, our best soldiers with the soldiers of the Alpine Division, does not
have enough aircraft to operate effectively overseas or enough weapons to fight
on the European theater." This critical attitude created by politcal-moral sus-
picion with regard to the Army "elite" and by skepticism on the operations capabili-
_ ty of the units, extending to the whole Army, is very revealing of the state of
mind ~revailing among socialists reaponsible~.for defezse. Socialist critics, to-
gether with some Gaullists, answer the generals' arguments--"there are no large
battalions; our five infantry divisions and our eight armored divisions are actually
large brigades, each with about 7,000 men; it is impossible to do with less"--as
follows: "Your army's total personnel amounts to 362,000 men, including 203,000
drattees. Your ratios are bad. The number of inen in relation to the number of
, tanks, for example, is 47 in the Soviet Union, 88 in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 176 in Great Britain and 396 in France. With regard to the mobilization
system and to the 14 reserve divisions, that is a joke and waste~"
According to the socialists around Charles Hernu, consistency would entail much
more equipment or much fewer men in every echelon of the Army. It is easy to
guess what solution will be imposed by the combination of the social expenditures--
the Defense appropriations, with 123 billion francs in 1981, represent the first
budget of the state--and the doctrinary inclinations of the PS.
When Francois Mitterrand, president of the Republic, appeared in his capacity as
~ commander in chief of tfie Armed Forces, his first miliCary inspection, on 11 June,
was for Taverny, the underground command post of the Strategic Nuclear Force. At
his side was the man whom he has appointed as chief of his personal staff, General
Jean Saulnier, up to then commander of the FAS, the Strategic Air Forces: the
18 missiles buried on the Albion Plateau and the 30 Mirage IV bombers. This double
De Gaullian tribute to the bomb and its servants expresses well the "urgent priority"
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given , rtght at the start of his 7-year term, to the strategic nuclear force, to
that "Striking Force" vilified for so Iong by the socialists and ;ahose code Valery
Giscard d'Estaing turned over to his succeesor during their ~1 May private conver-
setion in the Elysee Palace.
France Alone and Turned Into a Sanctuary
The entirely temporary suspension of nuclear tests:~n the Pacific also had only a
symbolic function. The Apocalypse was changing masters. In the footsCey~s of the
president, the prime minister, Pierre Mauroy, went on 2 July to Houilles, the
FOST [Strategic Naval Force] command post. Messages go from there to the five
missile-launching nuclear submarines (SNLE) or at least to the two that are on
permanent patrol. It is practically taken for granted that France will build two
more nuclear submarines in a period of time still to be specified.
Then there is the tactical nuclea: weapon: the bombs anboard Mirage III and Jaguar
aircraft and the Army's Pluton miasiles. In the minds of the socialists, its pos-
sible utilization is conceivable only within the framework of the employment doc-
trine dear to the Gaullists: the "warning blow," last warning before unleashing
the strategic nuclear force. No question for a Charles Hern~ to imagine France
participating in a limited nuclear conflict in Europe and thus to espouse the NATO
doctrine: the doctrine of "flexible counterthrust."
Colonel Marc Geneste, one of the best French specialists on the neutron bomb,'* that
weapon that Soviet propaganda has succeeded in making "diabolical," is very critical
of both doctrines. He has invited the Ministry of Defense to reopen the file with
imagination. In Geneste's opinion, the neutron bomb, which makes any tank concen-
tration very wlnerable, restores superiority to defense.
Its deployment would considerably reduce the risk of Soviet aggression by land in
Europe. "I cannot see," he says, "how the multiplication of our tactical forces
by 100 would harm our national independence. On the contrary. Our Armed Forces,
equipped with modern ammunition, would make Framce an entirely different military
animal and an entirely different political animal." And the way might perhaps be
swept for a future European defense.
For now, we are seeing, rather, a return to the old nuclear orthodox~ shaping up:
France alone and turned into a sanctuary. With regard to the idea of "popular de-
terrence," dear to Hernu---an idea with roots in thz glorious memory of the Resis-
tance but that also evokes the failure of nuclear deterrence, defeat and occupa-
tion--it would enable the socialist government to come back to something that may
resemble the defunct DOT, Operational Defense of the Territory, in the name of a
_ pure patriotism. Foot troops, precisely, not very expensive, because they are
lightly armed. A kind of militia based on local recruiting, athletic training
and great increase, in peace time, of BA, the~civilian "good deeds" of the Boy
Scout movement under the colors of France.
The number of persbnnel in the "battle corps" would be reduced and its heavy equip-
ment concentrated. Modernization of the Army, already lagging behind the provisions
* Marc Geneste, Samuel Cohen: "Echec a la guerre - la bombe a neutrons" [The Neutron
Bomb, A Check Against War], Editions Copernic, 19~30.
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of the law on 1976-1982 military programing, will probably be continued without
haste, because the prospects for participation in a,.c~onventional conflict in Europe
or in large-scale overseas operations are held in high suspicion.
The military say that "it is necessary to wait and see." One thing is sure: the
infantrymen are down in the dumps. General Jean-Yves Delaunay, Army chief of staff
(the CEMAT, as they say on Boulevard Saint-Germain), assembled his top-level sub-
ordinates several times since 16 May and asked them urgently to say nothing and to
hold back their feelings. "I am going to try to save our budget," he told them sub-
stantially, "therefor~ keep calm." With regard to the CEMAT and to all the Army
officers, people fond of tradition and proud of it--"I am well aware that they
did not vote for us in a mass," a member of Charles Hernu's cabinet remarked
jc,kingly--the victory of the left and more so the admission of communists, whose
close ties with Moscow no one, not even the socialists, doubts,are a blow to th~
heart. A great shock, overcome at times by a collective irony reaction, like in
those regiments in which, on the evening of 10 May, everyone saluted with raised fist
in the name of "comrade."
At Toul, mail is flowing into the home of one of the great old men, General Marcel
Bigeard, hero of Dien Bien Phu. A former secretary of state for Defense under Gis-
card d'Estaing and a brilliant survivor of the former majority, he has just left
the chairmanship of the Defense Committee in the National Assembly. "No doubt
at all, we are entering another world," he says. "There is reason for the military
to be concerned. The tie with the Communist Party. Believe me, the officers are
more realistic, more open to world, than the socialist professors. The lads write
to me, questioningly. Believe me, if I said 'go,' many would be ready to marcr."
A jest. The republicanism and loyalism of an Army scalded by the events ir~ Hlgeria
are intact. "Why do you want the Army to move?" a colonel in the llth Paratrooper
Division asked. If things turn out bad, the French people are great enough to move
themselves. With regard to the officers, he added, "if they helieve that they can
no longer p~rform their mission,they will leave. Without making any noise." Gen-
_ eral Bigeard fears that the Defense budget may be progressively "cropped,~" "that
France's military power, respected in the world, will go into a decline." And
that the Army will the first to bear the cost.
Giscard was obsessed by the idea that the French Army should not suffer in compari-
son with the powerful Bundeswehr. He was promptly accused of not having really
accepted the Gaullist heritage: withdrawal from the NATO military organization and
possession of the atomic weapon. But as long as France does not want to offer its
strategic nuclear umbrella to its neighbors and as long as its neighbors do not want
to exchange it for the old American ~mbrellas, France's conventional forces and tac-
- tical nuclear forces are, in the eyes of its European partners, the true signs of
its solidarity.
Of course, it is possible to remake the Army. A colonel states that "it is the
only large body in the state that will let itself be reformed in depth, up to a
certain point, without one word of protest." But the patriotism of the citizen
- soldier cannot by itself frighten our enemies and reassure our friends. Preparing
for the Year 1 wars does not guarantee peace in the year 2000.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 s.a. Groupe Express
10,042
CSO: 3100/853
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MILITARY FRANCE
MILITARY EQUIPMENT NEEDS VS COST, AVAILABILITY
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 10-16 Jul 81 p 58
[Article by J[eromeJ D[umoulin]: "Brdad Scal.e~or Metropolitan France?"]
[Text] The aviators, who fear a decrease in Title V of the Budget--the one on equip-
ment--are looking fixedly ati France's sky. "We shall fight tooth and nail for our
450 operational combat aircraft," one of the "bosses" of the Air Force states.
The major fear is a staggering of the programs and, therefore, maintenance of obso--
lete aircraft in service. There is also concern over the number of pilots. ~Jith
a5 hours of flying time per pilot and per month, training is still excellent ("very
superior to the Soviets' training," an expert points out), but, with some 600 pilots
for 30 squadrons of 15 aircraft each, the French Air Force is cut ".a bit close."
- The socialists will have to make some decisions very soon. Especially, they have
to choose air surveillance and detection equipment. The Barre governm~nt was get-
ting ready to buy some Grumman Hawkeye aircraft in the United States, "small" flying :
radars, three times cheaper than the large Boeing AWACs. "We need Hawkeye aircraft
for our missions in France, Europe and Africa, for example, where we have made do, �
up to now, with the Navy's Breguet Atlantic aircraft," an Air Force general stated.
The Air Force is completing, at present, an evaluation operation of the Hawkeye. It
estimates its long-term needs at about 20 aircraft. The initial contract might in-
volve six aircraft. "We are well aware," the general continued, "that choice of
the Hawkeye will depend on the defense policy of the president of the Republic."
He added: "The same will apply to choice of a strategic transport aircraft that we
need desperately. We have asked the United States in vain for some C-141 aircraft.
The need is still there."
- A certain number of socialists are very much in favor of these developments. But
what about Charles Hernu? And Francois Mitterrand?
The good fortune or the bad fortune of the Navy will also depend on them. Because,
when Parliament reconvenes, they will have to confirm or invalidate the decision
made by Valery Giscard d'Estaing, in September 1980, to build two nuclear aircraft
carriers, in order to ensure replacement of the "Foch" and the "Clemenceau," at the
beginning of the 1990's. A decision that crowned a long debate: should small light
aircraft carriers, like the British qnes, be built to ensure ccntrol only of the
sea approaches, or, on the other hand, should tr.ue aircraft carriers, pz~ovided with
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attack capability toward land and a nuclear potential and with an ability to go to
the antipod~s on patrol or to operate to the benefit of friendly countries, often
by their mere presence? The Navy and~Giscard held out for aircraft carriers, "real"
ones. Names had already been found for them: "Provence" and "Normandie." "If the
socialist government should abandon them," an admiral remarked, "there would no
longer be any in Europe and we would be still somewhat more at the mercy of the
great powers." This is an argument that has something in it to seduce Charles Hernu,
that Breton minister [of Defense] who is frightening the Navy by asking for two more
strategic submarines. "We are in favor of huilding those additional submarines,"
an officer stated, "provided they are not demanded t'oo quickly. Otherwise, goodby
aircraft carriers."
I~aradoxically, the other great debate by the Navy pertains to an aircraft: the
ANG [New Generation ptlantic], the new sea patrol aircraft, rlesignated successor
to the famous Breguet Atlantic. "It is often overlooked, but it is a vital instru-
ment for us," an admiral remarked. "We have asked for 40 of them. That is an ir-
reducible figure, determined in accordance with the i.~ense expanses of sea over
which we have to conduct surveillance." But he sighed: the ANG displayed by
_ Dassault at Le Bourget is "horribly exp~ensive." Will nationalization make prices
come down?
Urgent decisions are to be made for the French Navy andthe Air Force that will in-
dicate choice of the broad scale and realistic ambition or choice of a fallback on
metropolitan France.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 s.a. Groupe Express
10,042
CSO: 3100/~53
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1
MILITAftY FRANCE
CITIZENS PRAGMATIC, OPTIMIS7'IC ON MILITARY POLICIES
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 1(~-16 Jul 81 p 65
[Public opinion poll by L'EXPRESS and Louis Harris on the French people and their
Army, conducted by Louis Harris-France from 22 to 24 June 1981j
[Text] Louis Harris-France public opinion poll, conducted for
L'EXPRESS from 22 to 24 June 1981, from a sampling of 1,000 per-
sons representative (by the quota method) of the French popula-
tion 18 years old and over.
[Question] ~Do you think that there a~e more dangers of war today~:than 10 years ago?
[Answer] Yes: 41 percent
_ No: 42 percent
No opinion: 7 percent
[Comment] While the USSR is still the main "theoretical enemy," little "alarmism"
among Communist Party voters (71 percent "no") and even in the Socialist Party
(63 percent "no").
[Question] Does the French Army seem to you to have the capability of defending
France effectively?
[Answer] Yes: 53 percent
No: 25 percent
No opinion: 22 percent
[Comment] Very definite confidence in the capability of the French military tool.
[Question) Do you think that the present 12-month military~selective service is
too long, too short or satisfactory?
[Answer] Too long: 23 percent
Too short: 3 percent
Satisfactory: 68 percent
No opinion: 6 percent
[CommentJ "Yes" strongly in the ma~ority for 12-month service. Except among per-
sons 18 to 24 years old.
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[Question] Do you favor or oppose establishment of soldiers unions?
(Answer] Favor: 28 percent
Oppose: 48 percent
No opinion: 24 percent
[Comment] Young draftees are in favor, 47 percent (compared with 32 percent op-
posed), and the Communist Party, 56 percent. The Socialist Party is divided
(35 to 38) and the right is strongly opposed.
[Question] Do you want obligatory military service to.be maintained or would you
prefer 2 professional army?
[Answer] Want maintenance of military service: 59 percent
Would prefer a professional army: 32 percent
No opinion: 9 percent
[Comment] Only young persons are rather in favor, 49 percent (compare.d with 42
percent opposed), of a solution that would exempt them from service.
[Question] In your opinion, should France continue to be a member of the Atlantic
Alliance?
[Answer] Yes: 74 percent
No: 4 percent
_ No opinion: 22 percent
[Couunent] Overwhelming ma~ority of "yes.'� Even among communist voters (only 12
percent "no").
[Question] Do you think that France should intervene militarily outside its borders
when its interests are at stake?
(Answer] Yes: 57 percent
No: 27 percent
No opinion: 16 percent
_ [Comment] Intervention forces are 90 percent professional. Hence, undoubtedly,
a majority "yes," especially among young persons.
[QuestionJ In your opinion, should France continue to have a nuclear deterrence
force?
[Answer] Yes: 72 percent
No: 15 percent
No opinion: 13 percent
[Comment] Agreement, even among those who vote communist (62 percent).
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[Question] With which of these two opinions are~~yon m~re~in agreement?
[Answerj France should stop selling arms abroad for ethical reasons: 32 percent
It is normal for France to continue selling arms, for foreign
trade and for employment of French workers in the armament
industry: 56 percent
No opinion: 12 percent
[Comment] Amazing consensus: first of all, employment, then ethics. With the ex-
ception of the Communist Party: only 41 percent of the coIImmunist voters believe
that employment aady~fozeign trad~ ~ie-.more:impo~~ant.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 s.a. Groupe Express
10,042
CSO: 3100/853
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MILITARY FRANCE
PS ARMS' SALES THEORY VS CO1rIlKERCIAL, II~LOYMENT FACTS
- Paris L'EXPRESS in French 10-16 Jul 8~ pp 62-66
[Article by Christian d'Epenoux with Jerome Dumoulin and Jean-Francois Jacquier:
"Arms Sales, the Price of Virtue"]
[Text] A test for the socialists: France has become the number
three arms dealer in the world. With ii~ortant consequences, es-
pecially on employment. The government is hesitating between
ethics and realism.
"Track down the bomb." In the afternoon of 4 June, the MATRA [Aeronautical Equip-
ment and Production] executives,were passing around the presidential watchword,
half-jokingly, at the Le Bourget Exhibition. The chief of state had ordered the~.
military aircraft to be presented to him unarmed. He refuses to be photographed on
a background of attack aircraft loaded with rockets. General quarters: mc~re es-
_ pecially because the president's em~.ssaries have more zeal than asked of them. And
because the exhibitors, affected by.the grousing, did "a little too much" ~n their
part, as the Elysee Palace insinuated, in order to minimize the incident. Never-
theless, ber_ause orders are orders, some facetious persons declaimed on the
stands: "Hide those missiles for me that I cannot see," but they moved un.til night-
~fall everything that mi.ght offend the presidential eyes, "with the help of GI's
and Army trucks.
On the next day, S June, Francois Mitterrand walked, fast and imperial, in front of
the stark naked Piirage aircraft, displaying little interest in their performance and
cutting the in-flight presentations short. No incident, but, on the stands, faces
were glum and the silence was heavy. The press set aside an extensive news item
for the symbolic gesture. Armament industrialists, upset, are already preparing to
go into mourning for the end of an epoch.
France is third largest arms dealer in the world with 24 billion francs in exports
in 1980. Still far behind the two great powers, but with a regular potential in-
crease ensuring it, at present, of almost 10 percent of the world market. In 1980,
in spite of several failures, sales were at their zenith, little annoyed by prohi-
- bitions for the last 15 years. After the 6-Day War, De Gaulle cut off Israel, in
order to win over the Arab world. In 1970, Pompidou cut off Portugal whose colonial
wars he condemned. In 1977, Giscard stopped selling to South Africa and became more
particular with Chile. But, on the whole, the preceding Fifth Republic governments
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~ paid more attention to performance than to selection. The result was that the
buyer, everywhere, had a feeling of confidence. The places won by sheer force
praisedthe quality of the products and the faithfulness of the French commitments.
France, the "third thief," spiked the guns of its competitors. Between 1974 and
1980, it almost quadrupled its sales. And it got a foothold in 61 countries, in-
cluding 33 in the Third World. Some, like Uganda, were starving with hunger but
~ bought guns. With regard to the Arabs, they became henceforth its best customers,
since De Gaulle's veto against Israel. Between the Soviets and the Americans, who
"mark" their protege too much, France became the ideal partner.
A "Turnkey" Navy
Starting in 1974, there was a real gold mine: the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Iraq.
Between 1978 and 1980, King Khalid absorbed 20 percent of the exports. Last Oc-
tober, France signed a wonderful contract with him, the "Sawari contract," 14 and
and half billion francs for a"turnkey" navy. In a threatening environment, Arabia
intends to enclose its sea frontiers with a"wall of fire." The seventh year of
Giscard's term ended in a blaze of glory, on the arms market.
"France has become a nation of grocers," Giscard's disparagers deplored. "One
single ethics: oil." It 3ustifies the Mirage aircraft, the tanks, the missiles.
By introducing itself in the heart of OPEC, France has a fantastic lever in ex-
change. In the more critical periods, it wi1:1 never be short of anything.
War may indeed break out, as it did last autumn, between Iraq and Iran. Baghdad,
France's second oil supplier, immediately reassured Paris on the word given.
Without great merit or virtue, it is true. Iraq needs France. For its nuclear
program, for its ambiguous aims. And also for its war. With regard to military
deliveries, Paris has become a privileged partner in that Soviet game preserve. In
Marseilles, therefore, freighters continued tol:D.ad'.helicnpters, spare parts, mis-
siles, radar equipment. Last October, a French general assured us that "they
will lack nothing." Better: thanks to France the Iraqi military machine was pro-
gressively filling its most glaring shortages. MATRA's Magic missiles, adapted .
under the Mig aircraft by Frznch technicians, "do wonders" in aerial combat. The
Super 530, used in the same way, will replace them. Qn 1 February, the first four
Mirage F-1 aircraft of an order for 60 landed close to the front. The radar cover-
age "sieve," strengthened by the French, was contracting. A Thomson engineer pointed
out tnat raids by Iranian fighter aircraft are becoming rarer and more costly."
But, on 7 June, when the Israeli F~.5 and F 16 aircraft attacked Tamuz, the Roland
missiles deployed around the :Ir.aq1 atomic complex did not have time to be used.
The radars did not detect, or detected too late, the Israeli raid. On 19 June,
at the Satory Exhibition,an expert made this diagnosis: Lack of experience and
poor low-altitude detection. Oh, if they had listened to us." This deficiency
should be made up shortly.
_ Is it possible that France might have taken part in the conflict through this exem-
plary case? At the end of June, three missile-launching patrol boats, ordered for-
merly by the Shah, were preparing at Cherbourg to go to Iranian waters. In Sep-
- tember, at th~ outbreak of hostilities, Raymond Barre stated that "in matters of
arms sale, we take lessons from no one. The Iraqi example illustrates perfectly
the fragility of the doctrine, once it has run up against the obstinacy of reality.
In Iraq, France continues to deliver arms openly to a country on the "battlefield."
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Difficult years, but prosperous years. In 10 years, exports of military equipment
progressed twice as fast as French foreign trade. With the help, of course, of
a few failures to keep faith, a few scruples sacrificed without too much difficulty
on the altar of busir~ess turnover, a few selections of customers without being too
particular. An attitude whose ~ynicism was denounced by the opposition whenever it
_ could. Ready with ethical indignation, less imaginative on reasonable substitution~.
At the time, Georges Marchais denounced "this mercantile policy." Mitterrand, Ro-
card and others took South Africa, Chile, Argentina as targets, i:~ the name of hu-
man rights and freedoms. Curiously, Iraq and Libya seem to be less "shameful"
customers. In 1978, Garles Hernu and Jean-Pierre Cot, at present minister of De-
fense and minister of Cooperation, respectively, proposed a new charter. It was
a question of "counterbalancing the pressure of the military-industrial lobby."
Ar,ns sales would, theref~re, be controlled by Parliament. Fascist and racist coun-
tries and countries at war wculd no longer be supplied.
"The vicious circle of arms sales may be broken by a socialist government," Jean-
Francois Dubos (now in Charles Hernu's cabinet) confided, last April, to the news-
paper L'UNITE. Some of his friends showed more prudence. Or more realism. "We
must not conceal from ourselves the fact that an autonomous defense entails a
policy on foreign arms trading," Didier Motchane, a member of the PS executive
committee, wrote a month later. "We must remember the Popular Front and noninter-
vention in Spain."
On 10 May, nevertheless, the second rouiid of the presidential election tolled the
knell for the arms dealers. With the socialists, ethics came into office. Nothing,
in principle, will any longer be "as it was befo~e." "Not one weapon, not one bolt,
not one military screwdriver to South Africa," Claude Cheysson, minister of Foreign
Relations, proclaimed on 18 June. Selection, new style, was beginning. On 20 June,
the Satory "arms fair" closed its doors in an atmosphere of a failed marriage.
The atmosphere was grumbling, but the stands were gay. Sweet music and wall-to-wall
carpet, hortensia flowerbeds, charming hostesses and attentive salesmen, every-
thing invited to a dreamy stroll in that surrealist exhibition, where devices of
death were displayed as innocently as dishwashers. Instead of housewives, the cus-
tomers were expert gentlemen who settle down at tl:e controls of a tank ~ust as in
a commonpl~ce four-door sedan or who handle ultrasophisticated radars with a deli-
cate finger. At the Ruggieri exhibit, the type 241 blinding grenade, "used advan-
tageously during commando-type operations," attracted a group of enlightened ama-
teurs. In the hands of elite gendarmes, sent by France,.it seems that the device
did wonders in the final assault on the Grarad Mosque in Mecca, in December 1979.
MATRA exhibited its latest creation, the SATCP (very short range surface-to-air),
a modern missile launcher easily transportable by two average vigorous infantrymen.
At GIAT (Land Armament Industries Group), a wide range of armor-piercing antitank
shells caught the attention of Saudi Arabian visitors. "No possible defense," the
salesman stated. "At 5,000 meters, you pierce 300 millimeters of armor. The shock.
wave breaks the tank and neutralizes the crew." At Satory, an elegant modesty
banished blunt words from the language. Death seems sweeter when it called "neu-
tralization, secondary or primary effects, performance, effectiveness.
That, therefore, is arms sale: comparative merits of devices in technical, muf-
- fled terms, among congenial experts. This year, with an additional concern.
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It is true, that at the MATRA exhibit, the Army chief of staff, who was escorting .
the Prime Minister, on 16 June, confirmed great interest in the SATCP program and
the discussion with Pierre Mauroy was "excellent." It is true that the remarks by
the head of the government on respect for contracts in hand seemed to reassuring~
It was also found that Mauroy made a real effort to inform himself and that his visit
was "serious." But there are too many uncertainties in these aftermaths of 10 May.
One of the 3irectors of MATRA (where a house variety of chauvinism is readily prac-
ticed) said that "ordinarily, foreign chiefs of staff are seez. This year, the
deputies were seen primarily." Circumspect deputies, more inclined to contacts
than to decisions. And then the staff of the chairman of the board, Jean-Luc
Lagardere, is afraid to bear the costs of the new policy. MATRA is private, apt
to be nationalized, well managed, in full expansion, in short, all the defects.
"We are accused of keeping dancing girls," one executive complained. There already
are some portending signs: the government has withdrawn manufacture of the FAMAS
automatic rifle from its Manurhin subsidiary. To turn it over to Saint-Etienne,
"where the machines were no longer running."
"We had made every arrangement for accelerated manufacture," a house engineer said.
"The aim was a high rate of production. Therefore, equipment for the French Army.
And, finally, export, where demand is strong. Now,tfiey prefer to make welfare."
Responsibility and competitiveness are the key words put forth at MATRA and at
Thomson, in contrast with the hazards of public service. "With our 14 activity
branches," Emile Durand, head of the military sector, stated, "we attract to us
the cream of the professional schools. Armament was the firm's top level. What
will become of it tomorrow?"
Real concern or honest blackmail? It is a theme song heard a lot, it is true, at
present. "The arms industry is a leading sector, ultrasensitive," a general arma-
ment engineer said. "Introduce a factor of instabil.ity, like a decline vf exports,
and everything risks toppling over." Here, there is alarm over the demands of the
CGT [General Confederation of Labor], which is calling for "a rapid, compleCe na-
tionalization of the armament industries." Moreover, "all that time lost with
verbosity, exchanges of views, Theodule committees" is often feared. A director
of the Dassau~t research department, already disgusted, has preferred to go back
to company headquarters.
~
In the General Delegation for Armament (DGA), it is pointed out that it is, of
course necessar to differentiate between real threats.and the "verbal exaggera-
tion" of electi n argument. But, this time, the threat "must be taken seriously."
"Because it will be difficult to displease the Socialist Party doctrinarians and
the ultrasensitive fringe of voters, inflexible on problems like Chile or South
Africa."
"You Are Dear, but You Have Quality"
Difficult times, according to the specialists, are probably expected for the French
arms industry, if sales undergo "an appreciable shift."
In order to vie with international competition, this sector is compelled to retain
a high degree of technology. It devotes 22 percent of its resources to research
and development, or five to six times more than the average in civilian industry:
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Disenchantment would rapidly affect young engineers and employers who:.would desert
for civilian industry.
American "headhunters" are beginning to approach the best qualified dynamic persons.
Too many uncertainties on the future would cause a brain drain.
"You are dear," the South African Pik Botha confided on day to a French salesman,
"but you have quality." That gun traveling-salesman says today that "this quality
represents years of battles." One single example: before landing the Sawari con-
tract with Riyadh, tt-i~ French "missionaries" must ~a~xe mrade ~no~ l.eas t~an 22 tr~~s.
"The trouble is," their customers like to repeat, ""that the ~icabs detest~~ctl~ng~~.1t
No:a, in 1980, 55 percent of French arms sales went to North Africa and to Persian
Gulf countries.
The socialist victory and the pro-Israel positions of the new president made them
- frown. The admission of communists in the government made them scowl outright.
Some investors in the Gulf withdrew their assets from French banks, but, so far,
the contracts do not seem to be in jeopardy. It is feared that "they will at least
drag on everything that is not signed."
There probably will not fail to be a pretender to succession. Neither the new
ones--Brazil, Italy, the FRG--which have long teeth. Or Israel, outside the Arab
markets. Neither the old ones, like the United States, which is watching, with
the gigantic means and their "horror of a vacuum." The restriction imposed in 1976
by the virtuous Jimmy Cartei is now only a memory. They had enabled'France and
others to occupy lost markets. Washington intends to work twice as fast as usual
to rewin them. "There will no longer be any obstacles to arms exports," the under
secretary of state, James Buckley, said recently. The Americans have already pro-
mised to increase appreciably their military credits to Africa and the Near East.
"We must count on them to exploit the sl.ightest faltering," a Thomson-CSF engineer
said. They are already saying everywhere that Dassault is going to be nationalized."
That is not all. A suspicion also weighs on French engines manufactured by SNECMA
[Natior.al Corporation for Aircraft Engine Design and Construction] in cooperation
with General Electric. "Can the United States Air Force count without risk on the
collaboration of a less reliable France?" the Pentagon wonders.
Less reliable? "France and its industrialists are and will always be reliable,
faithful partners," Pierre Mauroy stated strongly, on 13 June, at Le Bourget, in
_ order to try to dissipate skepticism and "false rumors." The cabinet of Charles
Hernu is also doing its best to reassure. "The problem of arms sales will be
examined on an overall basis," a high official said. "Overall," that is to say
by taking all the consequences into account. And he added, for a deputy who is �
worried about unemployment in his region of Tarbes, when the shipyard is one of
the centers of employment: "You can fu11y reassure your friends."
300,000 Jobs
The armament industry employs 300,000 wage earners, including 130,000 state em-
ployees.
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Some 6,000 enterprises are working with National Defense directly or as subcon-
tractors.
One wage earner out of three in the armament industry works for export.
Arms sales represent about 5 percent of France's exports.
The fair play of Jean Martre, general delegate for armament, h2s, moreover, been
especially appreciated. "He has played the game, opened the files completely and
has completely informed." The result is that Jean Martre, a privileged contact of
the industrialists, remains (for the present) in the DGA. But Gerard Hibon, di-
rector of International Affairs, leaves.
And what about the "Regis Debray effect" on the Latin American ~ustomers? "Men-
tion to me one single decision made by Regis Debray," a person close to Claude
Cheysson stated offended. Noted officially.
There are other positive signs. Jacques Mitterrand, president of SNIAS [National
Industrial Aerospace CompanyJ, believes that "Le Bourget was a good exhibition all
the same." Although he a3ded, skeptical on the so~mdness of nationalizations:
"In the 15th century, the Ottomans invaded the east. But there was discussion on
the sex of the angels."
The Arab reactions, especially, are less bad than feared. Of course, the French
have gone all out: convincing emissaries, including the president's own brother,
were sent in a mad rush, after the 10 May election. King Khalid even has a per-
sonal letter from Mitterrand reassuring him on his intentions. And it is also
said that, on occasion of the king`s trip to Paris, the sovereign and the pre-
- sident, in addition to Prince Sultan, minister of Defense, and his French counter-
part, Char3.es Hernu, "hit it off very well."
The result is there, which does not entirely commit the future, but at least spares
- the present. At the end of June, the Saudi were "amazed at Taluk in the Arabian
desert, by the performance of the Shahine (Desert Wind) surface-to-air system, fi-
nanced by their capital. They are at least reassured from the technical point of
view.
Formerly, arms dealers were honored. The Greek Bazil Zaharoff, the greatest sup-
plier in the Edwardian era, was raised to the peerage by the king of England and
was decorated by Clemenceau. Although the stakes are still large, those times now
seem to be far off.
But, as Mao said, quoted by Pierre Francois, one of the directors of Dassault:
"Things are never as serious or as good as we think." The new government would need
much virtue, in order for them to become bad. And virtue, in these difficult ttmes,
would be almost heroic.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 s.a. Groupe Express
10,042
CSO: 3100/853
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MILITARY FRANCE
TRANSPORTATION: DEPLOYMENT PLAN, POLICY SUBVERSION POTENTIAL
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 10-16 Jul 81 p 57
[Article by J[erome]_D[umoulin]: "Transportation: A Sensitive Ministry"]
(Text] On 25 June, Claude Cheysson, minister of Foreign Relations, stated that "the
Ministry of Transportation is not going to be concerned with Defense." Noted offi-
cially. Charles Fiterman, minister of Transportation, was ready to be taken in.
But not his sword. On 2 July, "calm force" compelled. The mi.nister appointed
Pierre Begault, a 36-year-old high civil servant, to his cabinet for Defense and
Security Affairs. Affairs that are neith~r insignifcant, nor subaltern. The fol-
lowing are a few examples among others:
Constant updating of an ultrasecret document, the Initial Deployment Plan in France
in the FRG, which gives detailed particulars on means of transportation and communi-
cation lines available in r_ase of conflict.
Full authority over possible requisition of the air fleet of national companies.
Supervision of the French components of the Central European network of NATO oil
pipelines.
De Facto collaboration by the ministry in Fr.ench or interallied land and air maneu-
vers. For example, in Volt-Air confidential training exercises.
Participation in the operation of certain military organizations involved in the
daily use of French land and air spaces, like the German Logistic Delegation in
France (Fontainebleau).
Probable access, if not participation in, to the deployment plans for the future
mobile nuclear missile that will probably replace the rockets on the Albion Plateau.
Even more than the sharing of certain secrets, what seems to be causing concern is
the capability of acting against the vital interests of the country or of the al-
liance, in case of crisis or conflict. Before the forma.tion of the second Mauroy
government, Clause Cheysson had stated, before the Diplomatic Press Association,
that he would have no objection to entrusting the Ministry of War Veterans and the
Ministry of Youth and Sports to the Communist Party. For the communists, that would
have been a way to touch on military mattsrs. From a distance and without frighten-
ing.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 s.a. Groupe Express
- 10,042 24
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- GENERAL ITALY
MAKNO PUSLIC OPINION POLL ON EFFECTS OF P2 SCANDAL
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 26 Jun 81 pp 18-21
~Article by Donato Speroni~
~Text~ The P2 Masonic Lodge scandal has left its scar. Almost 1 out of every
10 voters intends to change his or her votinq habits as a result of this event.
In particular, it hag damaged the image o~ the PSI ~Italian Socialist Party~, the
number of whose supportera had been steadily growing until 1 month ago. This has
- been the most striking result of the most recent IL MONDO-Makno Osservatorio, the
periodic public opinion poll (see the preceding Qne in IL MONDO No. 5), based on
a sampling of 3,000 pereons representative of the Italian sociademographic make-
up. The poll's findings include other important indications, ranging from the
confirmed faith of the Italians in the president o~ the Republic, Sandro Pertini
(although less certainty as to the possibilities for the continued effectiveness
of his administration), to the growing aoncern over intlation, which is now ap-
proaching terrorism in order oE p=iority in the minds of the people.
P2 and the Parties
Makno had already completed a part of its survey when the P2 scandal exploded in
all its fury. A comparison ot its ~indings with those o� previous polls shows a
shattering of the ~trends that had been setting in among the voters prior to the
P2 "earthquake."
The graph titled "W:~ich Party Do You Consider Closest to Your ldeas?" shows a
growing uncertainty (almost 36 percent blank responses versus 24 percent in the
tw~o preceding polls). But the poll showed a gradual, slow erosion o� the commun-
ist PCI ~Italian Communist Party vote (24.1 percent versus 26.9 percent Cas pub-
lished~ 1 year ago), a stable DC~Christian Democratic Party~ (31.6 percent with
less than a one-point change in 1 year), a rapidly growing PSI at 19.7 percent
with almost a 3-percent gain in 6 months. Among the smaller parties, the most
notable change is the PR'S ~Radical Party~ drop trom 5.1 percent to 3.8 percent,
with a probable shift of voters to the DP ~Proletarian Democratic Party~ and the
PDUP ~Prolerarian Unity Party~ (totaling together 5.8 percent versus 2.3 percent
6 months ago). The PRI CItalian Republican Party~shows moderate growth (5.6 per
cent, with a gain ot almost 1 point in 6 months), as does the PSDI ~Its].ian Social
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Which Party Do You Consider�Closest To Your Views?
. ~
DC
PSI 19,7
16,7
PCI 24'~ ~
~ 24,9
PR! 5-s . Key:
4,7
~pi g,q 1. June 1981.
2'~ 2. January 1981.
PL) 2'~
6,6 3. Other slates.
MSI 346 4. Blank or void.
PDUP j,3 .
PR 3'8
5,1
pP 4,5 giugno 1981
1,0 pennaio 1981 2)
Alt e liste j;5 35,62
)hianche
e/o nulle 24,1
% 0 10 20 30
Will the P2 Scandal Change Your Vote?
) no, non mi ha fatto 2) no, perch~ non ho~ Key:
mutare parere seguito la questione
/ 1. No, it has not
:
~ " changed my views.
. , ~l y
F =
~ r.:~,;~
~ ~ 3)si,lomodificher~ 6) votevano 2. No, because I have
� ~ ~.r~ . ; o not followed the
. : s,t;~ 13,1 ~
, DC 2,5% matter .
. ' - - .1 PCI 1,296
` PSI 1,696 3. Yes, I will change
~ . . P R I 0,496
,i:
PL10,396 it.
. F% I'!~ . MSI 0,196
10,096 , PDUP 0,196 4. I do not know.
, ,
-s,�'�., non risponde
~,,,-u, 5. No, because I have
,�;;r~...fy;';``, B 7% 2'2~ not understood what
{ j t,.N,..: ~ non so 4)
i4~-�''` ~ ~ ~ it is about.
no, perch~ non ho 5) 6. Were voting :
capito di cosa si tratte
7. No response.
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Democratic Party~ (from 2.1 percent to 3.4 percent) and the PLI ~Italian Liberal
Party~ a aherp drop (from 6.6 petcent to 2.7 percent), the latter showing vir-
tually a total lack of support among the younger age gzoup (actually 0 percent
in age brackets below 20 years).
During the first week in June, .n the heels ot the P2 scandal, Makno again polled
the Osservatorio sampling. Th~ ~:indings are summarized in the graph titled "Wi11
the P2 Soandal Change Your Vote?": Of those polled, 59.8 percent stated they had
not changed their views as a result of the scandal, but 8.4 percent responded
that their voting intentions have been changed. Considering further that almost
one-third of those polled did not respond either because they had not followed the
matter or because they had not tully understood it, it is reasonable to assum~
that as the scandal develops the percentage o~ voters changing parties will con-
tinue to grow. To whose detriment? The graph shows the parties abandoned by the
_ voters who have changed. If the percentage figures shown are converted to a 100-
percent-scale base, 30 percent of the changed voters have left the DC, 14.4 per-
cent the PCi, 19.2 percent the PSI, 4.8 percent the PRI, and 3.6 percent the PLI.
An interesting point is that none of the voters intending to change party among
those polled were members of the PSDI, which is actually the only party whose
secretary, Pietro Longo, appears on the P2 lists.
The net effect of the voter migrations emong the parties will to some extent be
self-compensating. The probability, however, is that any net gain resulting from
such migrations will accrue to the parties least in the limelight with respect to
Licio Gelli's lists, hence the PCI (which in fact showa a rather low percentage of
- voter abandonments) and the extraparliamentary left. Among those hardest hit, on
the other hand, is the PSI, which, based on these �igures, shQUld lose fram 1 to
2 percentage points with reapect to the levels it had attained in the immediately
preceding months.
The distinction according to age groups is very significant. Voter preferences
in the 15-19 age group show some similarities with those in the over-55 group,
with the DC and the MSI ~Italian Social Movement~ above the national average.
Characteristic ot the very young, however, ia a strong l.eaning toward the PR,
which is preferred by 13 percent of those polled. But Marco Pannella's following
drops sharply in the next age group, the 20-24 bracket, where the DP leads--17~2
percent--together with the PCI. In the next 10-year age sector (ages 25-34), the
PSI holds the absolute lead with 26.9 percent veraus the PCI's 25.4 percent and
the DC's 24.6 percent. Disappointment toward Bettino Craxi's party, on the other
hand, is shown by middle-aged men, 45-55. In this sector, the intermediate
parties attain their greatest auccess, led by the PRI with 10.1 percent.
What has the P2 matter changed as regards age-group leanings? The most signifi-
cant variation �rom the mean is found in tk~e 20-24 year bracket, where the per-
centage of those intending to change party has actually doubled (16.7 percent).
The Government
In the opinion o� the Italians, Arnaldo Forlani's government was in any case
doomed even before it resigned. Whereas in the two ~receding ~olls more than 18
percent of those polled stated they �avored the government in office, positive
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1~ Qual o la (ormulo d(
yov~~no piu odatta?
Governo d~ tecnici 20,0
Governo senze le Dc ~ ~g,~
Dc�Pcl e eltn panit{ ~ 16,3
Dc-leic~ appoppiaio del Pcl 5~ 10,6
Monocolore Dc b ) 6,6
Dc�lelcl (oen~e Pcl) con Paf 7) 6,3
Dc�Psl-P~I> ) 3.7
Non so y 20,0
Key:
1. What is the most suitable governing formula?
2. Government of technicians. 6. DC single-party government.
3. Government without the DC. 7. DC and ~one or more~ "laic
4. DC-PCI and other parties. parties" (without PCI involve-
ment) but includin~ the PSI.
5. DC and ~one or more~ "laic g. DC-PSI-PRI.
parties ~PLI, PSI, PSDI, PRI~,"
with PCI backing. 9. Do not know.
, What Public Figure Is Best Suited to be President of the Nation?
Cossiga ~o,o
,0
Fanfani ~'s ~
5,7
Andreotti 10,6 v
Craxi 15,8
2~,3
Saragat 34 Z . - Ke
Y~
Berlinguer 122------22.1
.
~ 1. June 1981.
Zaccegnini 5.8 ~
- - 3;0 - 2. January 1981.
Spadolini 5 Z
. 3. Others.
Forlani 5 6
- ~ ~'3 -
Zanone ~~8
- - 3'8
Almirante Z'S
6,3
Pannella ~1~ olupno 1881
_ 5,2 pmn~io 1981
Visentini 2�4
; 4. -
Longo �
_ -
Altri 3~ 154 .21,4
0 5 10 15 20 25
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50 percent of the 35-55 age group judge him very �avorably), but runs into dislike
by some of his own age group (8.5 percent of the elderly over 55 years of age are
against him). He is more liked in the North and the South than in Central Italy,
where very favorable opinions toward him are only 28.6 percent and unfavorable
opinions reach 10.7 percent. On the whole, the poll confirms the outstanding
popularity of the head of state.
Obviously, however, while public opinion judges Pertini �avorably as a person, it
shows little faith that many favorable tesults for the well-being of the nation
can be expected from the Quirinale.
The other significant indication that emerges from the query on institutions has
to do with labor unions. Only 2.2 percent of those polled (compared with 14 per-
� cent of those polled in January) rate the unions among the nation's usetul insti-
tutions. Even the RAI ~Italian Radio and Television Company~ rates higher, even
though only slightly. The drop is a resounding one and is confirmed also by the
results tabulated under the specific question on the function performed by the
various labor organizations. Only 8.3 percent credits trade unionism with a
positive function (16.8 percent 1 year ago and 11.8 percent in January), while
31.8 percent judges it negatively (18.2 percent 1 year aga, 25.8 percent in Jan-
uary). In sum, in 12 months the balance between positive and negative opinions
has deteriorated in a ratio of 1 to 4 in �avor of negative opinions. Broken out
geographically, opinion in the industrial 23arthwest tends more toward moderation:
a few positive responses (4.2 percent), a relatively few negative responses (25
percent),and almost 58 percent "don't know" and indefinite responses. In the
South and the islands, however, opinions on the labor movement are sharply
- delineated. Here, positive opinions registered a record 10.9 percent, but nega-
tive opinions also did so (40 percent), conEirming it as an area where the effects
of the recent industrialization ot some zones ase contraposed to the attitudes of
protest in the other zones abounding in un~nployed and unprotected workers.
Important Issues
The gl~emp in the imaae of the union movement can also be linked to the ~ncreased
sensitivity of the Italians toward the problems of inflation. Thoae polled were
asked to indicate up to four priority problems the government must address
immediately. After terrorism, up from 63.9 percent to 67.0 percent, came price
increases with an upward jump of all of 20 points. But also showing a strong ~
uptrend were concerns over pensions (+7.2 percent), housing (+5.8 percent), unem-
ployment (+7.5 percent) and drugs (+2 percent). The increased concern over these
problems pushed all other issues into the background. Public health reform, for
_ example, lost ground (-5.7 percent) as did reorganization of the school system
(-2.8 percent). The attitude toward reconstruction of the South after the earth-
quake also lost ground, only 17.1 percent having considered it a priority matter
and an even lower percentage (16.4 percent) having done so in Southern Italy.
Wide priority divergences emesge trom a break-out ot the figures according to
age groups and geographical areas. Cl.early, the elderly (over age 55) rank pen-
sions ~irst in the order o� priority problems, with a 68.8-percent response in
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1 ~Corn� y~iudica !'ope~oto
di p~rtinlT
Molto fevorevole 2 ) 45,6
Abbestenza levprevole 3 ) 39,9
Stavo~evole 4 ) 6,7
Non so 5) ~ B I
Key:
1. How do you judge Pertini's performance?
2. Very favorable.
3. Rather favorable.
4. Unfavorable.
5. Do not lcnow.
What Tnstitution Contri.butes to the Nation's Well-Being?
(up to two responses)
Chiesa 1) 2, Key:
- - - - - 1. Church.
Partiti 2) 6,6
~-8 2. Political parties.
Presidenze 3~ 13~8 . 3. Presidenc of the Re ublic.
Repubblica t4;6 Y P
Magistratura 4) 4. The courts.
t 1,2
t4,3 5. Carabinieri.
Carabinieri 5) ~s~g
6. Police.
Polizie 6 ) 5,8 ~ . ~I �
9,0
Rai 7~ 2,3 ~~iuqw ~9g~ 11 8. Independent press.
4,3 ~nmio 1881 ],2)
9. Trade unions.
Stampe 1~.~
indipendente 8) 10. Do not know.
2'2 11. June 1981.
Sindacato g ~ ~ 14,4
Non so ~~A . 12. January 1981.
10 ) bA
�6 0 10 20 3Q
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opinions of the last Forlani government in this poll dropped to 17.6 percent,
while an absolute majority (51 percent) considered the now defunct government in-
capable of resolving the country's problems. The drop in popularity is concen-
trated in the areas carrying the qreatest political weight throughout the countiry.
In the industrial northwest, the drop is extremely sharp (from 16.8 percent to
11.3 percent) and becomes a crash among the younger and productive classes; among
those polled between the agea of 25 and 34, the consensus drops from 20.1 percent
in January to 7.7 percent today.
But what alternatives are preterred by the Italians? Responses are broadly
divided, with a relative majority (20 percent) respondinq "I do not know" anc3 a
"government of technicians." A"government without the DC" follows closely (18.7
percent); and a strong prefexence continues for historic compromise formulas
directly or indirectly involving the PCI in a government with the DC (26.8 percent
overall). Preference for a government with a socialist presidency shows a slight
decline as compared with the previoua poll, while preference for a DC single-party
government shows a slight gain.
These indications also tally with those as to relative popularity of political
figures the Italians would like to see eleated to the presider~cy. PSI Secretary
Bettino Craxi still holds the lead he captured in January but loses 3.5 ~as
published~ points. Enrico Berlinguer, in a sharp drop, loses all of 10 points.
On the other hand, the Christian Democrats outside the government have gained:
Giulio Andreotti (+2.9 percent), Amintore Fanfani (+1.9 percent) and Francesco
Cossiga (+3 percent). Benigno Zaccagnini's popularity, hawever, has suffered
~-5.5 percent~ the etfects o~ his long withdrawal from political activity.
In this classification, President-designate Giovanni Spadolini ranks a mere sev-
- enth and is down from 5.2 percent to 3.3 percent. It is probable, however, that
a portion of PRI preferences have been diverted to Bruno Visentini, who with his
proposed government of technicians has entered this classification �or the first
time, with 2.4 percent.
The Institutions
' The Church, the Carabinieri and the Presidency of the Republic continue to be the
nation's most respected and credible triad (see graph titled "What Institution
Contributes to the Nation's Well-Being?"). Thia fact had already begun to P.merge
from the fiz~t survey 1 year ago but was drastically changed by the second survey,
to make way for the independent press. The latter has now taken a plunge,however,
from 29 percent to 12.9 percent, in the wake of all the events of the past several
months.
The popularity of the Church has been growing, while that of the Presidency ot the
Republic has suffered a continuous erosion, having ahrunk between June 1980 and
January 1981 (-13 percent) and dropped further (-1.1 percent) in the last 6
months. These figures appear to contrast sharply with those in the accompanying
table measuring the popularity of Sandro Pertini. All of 45.6 percent of those
polled view his performance vesy favorably, and only 6.7 percent are against him.
Pertini is popular mostly among women (46.5 percent), middle-aged persons (over
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Key :
~ 1. What function has the CGIL-CISL-UIL per-
Qual i la funsion~ s~oifo negli Eormed during the past few montha?
1~Itimi rnosi do Cgil.Cist-Yil? June 1981.
2 ) piupno 3 )p.nnalo
1��~ 3. January 1981.
Positive 4~ 8,3 ~ 1.8 4. pO83.t1V2.
Negativa 5 ~ 31,8 25,9
Positiva e 6 5. Negative.
negativa ~ 33,0 33.0
- Irrilevante 13,6 I 10.4
Non so 8) ~s,a ~9, ~ 6. Positive and negative.
7. Irrelevant.
8. Do not know.
What Problems Must the Government Act Upon Immediately?
(up to four sesponses)
Terrorismo 1) Key:
33A l. Terrorism.
Pensioni 2) 25,8
2. Pensions.
Case 3 ) 41,3
33,5 3. Housing.
Prezzi 4~ 4. Prices.
M,6.
Assinenza t7,s 5. Public health assistance.
sanitaria 5 ~ 23,3
~A 6. Unemployment.
Disoccupazione 6
41,6 7. Drugs.
Oroga 32~~ S. Schools.
30,0
Scuola 8) ~~~4 9. Public morality.
t 7,2
Moralizzazione t6,9 piupno 1981 10. Reconstruction o� earthquake-
pubblica 9 z3,s ~ p~nnaio 1881 12} stricken zones.
t7,1 "
Ricostruzione l~ 23,9 11. June 1981.
zone terremotate ,
12. January 1981.
96 . 0 10 20 30 40 50 80 70
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this sense. What is rather surprising, however, is that terrorism is o~ marked
concern to the very young and to persona over age 45, with indications in this
sense among them totaling close to 75 percent, whereas it is of less concern to
the intermediate categories, aged 20-44, where the problem is accorded priority
by only 56 percent of the responses. Concern tor prices increases with age
levels, confirming the fact that inflation hurts above all those who are able to
impart to their inco;nes only a minor dynamic. The housing shortage is felt fore-
most in the Northwest (48.2 percent) and in the 25-34 age group (51 percent). The
very young are more concerned than the others over the drug problem (33.8 percent),
schools (29.2 percent) and above all job openings (all of 75.4 percent).
Notable is the scant favor registered by the proposal to reintroduce the death
penalty: only 6.1 percent of those polled includes it among their priorities, with
a drop of 1 point in the last 6 months and wide geographical diEferences: from
9.2 percent in the South and the islands to 1 percent in the Northeast.
The Danger Factors .
What are Italy's major danger �actors? In responding to this question, those
polled behaved in a manner substantially different from that of 6 months ago. At
that time, corruption occupied first place with 70 percent of the responses, but
numerous other responses had attained notable levels: terrorism, scant capability
of the political class, waywardness of youth, aontinuation of the DC in govern-
ment. This time, however, the responses were more drastic. Corruption remains in
first place (50.5) percent, while all other issues gleaned less that 8 percent of
the rssponses. It is reasonable to conclude from this that if only the political
class could succeed in rooting out the poisonous weed of corruption, public opin-
ion might even be induced to view the future with optimism.
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981
9399
CSO: 3104/317 END
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