JPRS ID: 9847 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030028-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 28
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030028-4
FOR OFFIC'IAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9847 ~
15 July 1981
� ~
~
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 731
Fg~$ ~OREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030028-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030028-4
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, ~eriodicals and books, but also from news agency .
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and ,
- other characteristics retained.
_ Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [ExcerptJ in the first line of each item, or following the
_ last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically ox transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
- Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
c ies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030028-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/49: CIA-RDP82-00850R440400030028-4
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9847
15 July 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 731
CONTENTS
_ INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Soviet Penetration in Africa Reviewed
(Jacques Latremoliere; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS, 29 May 81) 1
A Look at Mitterrand's African Advisers
_ (Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 2 Jun 81) 11
Miterrand's African Advisers Profiled
African Experts in Socialist Party
GABON
Reported Corruption, Poverty, Despotism Blamed on Bon~o Rule
(Alam Sibom; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 22 Jun-5 Jul 81) 17
UGANDA
'GUARDIAN' Correspondent Meets Idi Amin
(John Hooper, Jonathan Steele; THE GUARDIAN, 2 Jun 81) 19
ZAIRE
Corruption, Financial Situation Analyzed
(Monty Cerf; NEW AFRICAN, Jun 81) 21
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030028-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400034428-4
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
SOVIET PENETRATION IN AFRICA REVIEWED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 29 May 81 pp 1459-1462
_ [Article by Jacques Latremoliere: "The Soviet Bloc Penetration~in AfricaJ
[Text] At the beginning of World War II, only two Soviet dlplomatic missions and
half a dozen consulates or consular agencies, dealing almost exclusively w!.th
maritime disputes, existed in Africa. Now, in 1981, the USSR is represent~c: in
that continent by 32 embassies staffed by 6,500 civil servants and agents who
enjoy diplomatic status. The Addis Ababa embassy alone has a staff of 600
persons.
There is no possible comparison between all this manpower and the personnel
lined up by big nations of the West such as Great Britain, France, the United
- States, Canada or the Federal Republic of Germany, although these countries are
the major suppliers and clients of the African nations, even of those to which
the sociallst label is attached. The growth of commercial relations between
the USSR and Af rica can only partly justify all this personnel since the bulk
of the activities of the Soviet embassies focusses on intelligence, dissemination
- of cultural information and political action, both among the governments and the
populations themselves. Their efforts in these spheres are complemented by the
presence of technical collaborators who are there in relativey large numbers
considering the narrow scope of Soviet cooperation programs, from the standpoint
_ of cooperation as we understand it, i.e., financial aid given as a donation or
as a loan, allocated to productive projects and implemented by helping to design,
study, execute and run these projects. This help can be given free of charge or
_ be repaid in various ways. As a matter of fact, Soviet technical collaborators
are working mostly in the local branches of the public services, preferably in
the radio, press, audio-visual media, police and security, not to mention the
services which control air, maritime and railroad communications.
. For the entire continent, the number of these technical collaborators is estimated
to be 28,000, to which must be added another 12,000 technical experts from East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Cuba, Poland and Bulgaria. There are fewer
Poles and Bulgarians, the former because they are inclined to try to establish
contact with Westerners working in cooperation programs and the latter because
their level of expe.rr.ise remains mediocre. This figure of 40,000 technical
1
FOR ~FFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400030028-4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400030028-4
FOR OFF(CIAL USE ONLY
collaborators from the socialist countries (not counting China and North Korea)
: includes citizens of the USSR and satellite republics who are working for .
international organizations. There are almost as many of them as Western
cooperation agents but their investments which, in our view, should be the basis
for their presence, only amounts to 11.3 percent of the investments from the
western countries.
In addition to civilian personnel, we have military personnel and in this category
a distinction must be made between advisers, officers and NCOs in charge of
teacliing, training and sometimes officering the national armies on the one hand,
and the operational established units on the other hand. Soviet personnel is
predominant in the first group which consists of approximately 10,000 people and
amounts to 80 percent of the nonsocialist foreign military men stationed in t'ia
continent and engaged in similar tasks. The total strength of the operational
units is 60,000 men, of whicti 10,000 are Soviets, 1.5,000 ~ast Germans and 35,000
Cuhans. I'rom this last group, 52.8 percent, that is, two divisions, are in Angola
for the time being.
The armament oL- these units is more or less the same as the armament which is
either given or sold to the African nations. It consists of strong equipment,
not very sopllisricated and already old, since it was manufactured in the sixties.
Soviet military assistance strictly controls the use of weapons supplied to the
national armies, particularly with regard to fuels and ammunitions; under the
best circumstances, the organic reserves of these armies would only lasr them
2 or 3 days of fighting. This strict control is what would have made it
possible, in 1977, to turn almost overnight the artillery and tanks of the
Somali Army into a heap of scrap but for the stocks of ammunition and spare parts
which the Soviets left behind when they were expelled from ~gypt and which
enabled President Sadat to "bail out" Mogadishu until 1979.
It is nonetheless a fact that one of the USSR's main concerns is to ensure,
whenever the need arises, a rapid logistic support both for the operational
units brougllt in from outside and for the national armies's operations which it
- wants to s~ipport. This is done by means of a large fleet of transport aircraft
and tlie correspondin~; ground installations. This is huw, in 1975, the Operation
Car.Iottz succeedecl in transporting 8,000 troops from Cuba to Angola in the space
oE 48 hours, Eormin}; a totally autonomous unit while, accor.ding to official
~stimates, in th~se days the PenCagon would have required a mini~~am of 10 days
. to