JPRS ID: 9814 CHINA REPORT POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 53
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9814
25 June 1981
China Re ort
p
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 6/81)
FB~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
,'c
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400020053-7
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but als~ from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materi~ls from foreign-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text)
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the ori~inal information was
processed. W'here no processing indicator is ~iven, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source.
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JP RS L/9 814
25 June 1981
CHINA REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 6/81)
CONTENTS
PEOPLE~S ftEPUBLIC OF CHINA
MIZITARY AND PUBI~IC 5ECURITY
Role of Joint Operations in Modern Warfare I}iscussed
~ (Cai Buchi; JIEFANGJUN BAO, L~ Feb 81) 1
Major Refoi,n in Military Training Outlined
(Zin Jian; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 12 Sep 81) 5
Training Tests Reformed To Reflect Actual Combat Conditions
(Wang Gencheng; JIEFANGJUI`1 BAO, 5 Sep 81) 12
PARTY AND STATE
Ec?;_torial Calls on PLA To Obey Paxty Orders
(Editorial; JIEFANGJUN BAO, 2 Feb 81) 16
China Publishes English Language Daily
(ASIAWEEK, 12 Jun 81) 21
:
- a - [III - CC - 80 FOUO]
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONLY
MLLLTARY AND YUBLIC SECURITY
ROLE OE JOINT OPERATIONS IN MODERN WARFARE DISCUSSED ~
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 4 Feb 81 p 2
[Article by army commander Cai Buchi [2580 2975 1062]: "It Is Necessary To
Further Define the Purpose oE Basic Training'~]
[Text] The public unanimously recognizes that the basic training program is
important and that it is a aelf-evident fact. However, they have failed to pay
enough attenrion to the objective of basic training. The importance and objective
of basic training are two related but different~issuea. Practice shows that
- whether the basic training program has a well-defined objective spells a big
difference in the results of the training. In my opinion, uaing existing
equipment to extend the application of basic training to real wars and to shorten
the period between training and combat-readiness in order to meet the needs of the
joint ~perations of our armed forces ia the starting point ~nd ultimate objective
of our basic training program.
Does everyone clearly understand this objective? Not really. It must be said
that formalism atill exists to varying degrees in some of our army uc;its when they
undergo basic training. For example, they emphasize basic maneuvers and negle~ct
basic theories; they emphasize technical essentials and neglect tactical
essentials; they emphasize the essentials of daylight operations and neglect those
of night fighting; they emphasize the basic training of fighters instead of
cadres; they emphasize the so-called "rigid targets" clearly indicated by
numerals, meters and minutes instead of "nonrigid targets" which cannot be
represented by any figures. In sorth, they emphasize basic training under the
general (normal) conditinns and neglect basic training under the complicated
conditions ~simulating real wars). The consequence of this attitude toward basic
training is very bad. While undergoing shooting training, some units often score
~t~tstanding successes at the firing ranges. Their scores often drop markedly when
the sho~ting is pracCiced under c~nditions simulating the tactical scenes of real
war. The signal corps can maintain communications under general conditions but
w~uld fail in their duties in the event of interference. The artillery units can
hit their targets under well-prepared conditions but wQUld miss them in times of
an emergency callup. It seems necessary to overcome formalism and championship
mencality in order to achieve the well-defined objective of basic training.
Hok~ to treat achievements is really a problem. Should the training be treated as
a r~ission to fight wars or as part of ahow business? Do we want to score
successes under general conditione or under conditions simulating real wars?
1
FOR OFFICIAL USC ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL U~E ONLY
Either a correct or misleading guiding thought of training would result from the
answers to these questi~ns. The desire for some norms and conventions and for
achievements does not conflict with the purpose of real wars. But it should not
depart from the general objective of treating the training as a mission to fight
wars. tn recent years, the alogan "the t~sining ehould be regarded as a miasion
- to fight wars is no longer shouted as loudly as bef~re. Today it seema necessary
to renew this11slogan. The genuine realization of the concept of treating training
as a misaion to fight wars calls for a scientific training program. To meet the
needs of real wars, an overall evaluation of various basic training programa is
necessary sn that their execution can be arranged in the order of priorities or in
the arder of importance and urgency and treated in different waye. Specific
length of time and equipment should be allocated to guarantee the execution of
badly needed important basic training programs in timea of a real war, and high
standards sh~uld be set for each of them. Leadership of all levels should work
hard to meet these standards. Among them are the basic training of cadres in
organizing the command system, the baeic training of various arms and servicea in
joint operations, combat shoating practice as part of marksmanahip training, the
- antitank, the antiatomic bomb and antichemical defensive training under the
"three-anti and three defensive operations" program. On the other hand, standards
should not be aet too high for lesa important and not so urgently needed programs
as training in bayonet fighting and hand-grenade throwing. As long as we bear in
mind the necessity of treating training as a mission to fight wars and devote our.
limited time for training to carrying out the most urgen[, most difficult and most
useful programs, we can certainly produce solid resulta in basic training.
A further effor.t to define the objective of basic training calls for a vigorous
- study of and seeking of solutions for new problems reaulting from basic training
in fighting wars under modern conditions. Some comradea say that it ie dull and
prosaic to engage in the same old basic training program year after year. This
idea results from the following three facts: 1. Because the training is
organized in a"hodge-podge" way, its content is "universally applicable," the
basic training program has given the people the impression that "it is something
new for the lst year, overlapping for the 2d year and too old for the 3d year";
2. The content and demands of basic training have been assessed from an
unchanging point of view; 3. The mischievoua idea of aelf-complacency is
troublesome. The three facts originate from thia truth: a iack of purpose and
conviction in modern warfare.
The allegation that the basic training prog.ram is "nothing new" seemingly sounds
true. For example, par.ticipanta in the rifle and machinegun firing training
should reme?nbet the "three points--the target, miss point and bull's eye--and one
straight line" rule or the most rudimentary knowledge. If the structure of rifle
and machinegun r.emaine basically the same, thia "old rule" on ahooting training
w~uld not be changed. But we must see the constant changes that take place in
basic training--changes in the targeta to be fought, changes in the weapons and
equipment used by ~urselves and the enemy, the induction of new soldiers year
after year and the constant turnaround of cadrea. These developmenta and changes
are certain to add new elementa to the content and demands of basic training.
The extremely cruel nature of modern warfare and the constant changea in the
situation on battlefields will also place new demands on the joint operationa of
the armed forces, the content of basic trainin~, the political, technical and
physical qualiCies of army units. Great progresa has been made by the enemy in
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY �
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400020053-7
F'OR OFF'~CIAL USE ONLY
areas nf firepower, m~bility, ability to m~unt surprise attacks, battlefield
observatinn, eguipmen~ used i,n the command system in modern warfare. This has
alsn placed new demands on markamanship training, and training in mobility,
c~~~emunications, command art, security arrangements, and joint operations. To use
inferinr equipment to defea?. an enemy armed with superior equipment, we must
understand ma~.y strange problems and overcome many difficultiea. For example, if
cadres in command positiona have ne rich professional knowledge, no strategy t~
win, victory by aurprise attacks, no superlative command art, and no strong will to
fight under complicated conditions, our armed forces will find it impossible to
' coordinate with each oCher in attacking the enemy. Mare and more comrades have
come to realize that the factor of time is crucial in modern warfare, and war
preparations should be calculated by minutes and seconds rather than by days and
liours. Any delay in terms of a few minutes may cause tremendous changes in the
' situatinn on battlefields. In a confrontation with the enemy mechanical and
arm~red crops, the enemy artillery fire would quickly overcome us and the enemy
tanks and armored cara would soon storm our positions if our first firing missed
the targets. If one of the services participating in a joint ~peration lacks
s~lid basic training, it will find it impossible to coordinate with other
services. The cruelties of war may take a heavier toll than expected on
battlefields. If we lack versatile basic training, we will find it difficult to
cope with the modern wa.rfare and will find ourselves unable to use a variety of
deployed weapons to the best advantag;r. All of theae demand that we overcome the
"old concept" of basic training, and change the "universally applicable" content
nf training, and the "hodge-podge" approach to the organization of training. We
must do everything possible to avoid the unnecessary and overlapping practices in
training. Vigorous efforts must be made to develop the training program in a
scientific way and to stimulate the enthusiasm of commanders and fightera for
military training. We must help them explore new methods of basic training
through the di;~cussion of new topics of modern warfare. ~
Some comrades are cnncerned that emphasizing joint training thia way may lead to
the toning d~wn of basic training. This concern is unnecessary. Why couldn't a
joint training program materialize as a result of so many years of basic training
wtiich is supposed to help army units improve their. basic skills in fighting?
Although the reasons are manifold, the root cause of this problem is a lack of a
clear declaration that the objective of basic training is to serve the joint
operation of the armed forces. In the final analysis, the basic training program
is the basis of trainino in joint operations. The purpose of this training is to
make joint operations possible. For this reason, the basic training program
~�annnt depart from the guidelines of joint operations. Just as in the case of
laying a fnundation for a multistory building, the construction of this project
cannnt get underway.if the foundation is not laid firmly. It muat be noted,
hnwever, that the f~undation for a two-story building differs in requirements from
the foundation for a six-story building. Our desire to use the concept of joint
~~perations t~ guide and enhance the basic training program has the objective of
testing the basic training program in the tactical joint training and joint
op~rati~ns oi the armed Forces, and improving coordination between the basic
tr:iining program and joint exercises. Advocating the use of the concept of joint
~~p~~rati~n t~ guide basic training absolutely does not stem from a desire to
pr~;n~te any "leapfrog-type" joint training during the period of basic training.
What we really want is a training program still to be carried out in accordance
with related regulations. Last year when we selected a reinfor.ced infantry
3
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
regiment to participate in a joint training program, we began with the
proclamation of a requirement for "layir~g a solid foundation and doing everything
possible t~ aeY�ve the joint operationa." We devoted two-thirds or more.of the
time all~tted tc+ this joint operation to the basic training. The training was
organized in a way that proceeded from an elementary course to an advanced course,
Er~m a simple cour'se to a complex program, from Che training in basic skiils to
their application, and from the tr~aining for individuals to joint training. In
additic~n to conscientiously grasping the basic training of army units, we
c~ncer?trated attention on training cadres in basic akills. As soon as the
groun3work was laid for various professional detachments of a specific army uait,
training in improving basic skills in coorda.nating infantry with artillery units,
infantry units with tanks, and ground forces with air force units was added to the
entire program. As soon as the guidelines of joint operations were atrengthened,
we placed the basic training program under the guidance of an overall joint
training program. The resulC was great success in basic training. Our
achievements in maj~r performances proved to be better than in previous years,
thus laying a firm f~undation for the subsequent joint tactical training program.
Practice sh~ws that the emphasis of laying groundwork for joint operations will
result in strengthening rathet than weakening the basic training program. We
should not pit hasic training against joint training, and should not separate the
former from the latter. Only by integrating the two into a single effort in an
organic way can we lend substance to the objective of basic training and provide a
reliable guarantee for fulfil~ing the joint training program. It is wrong to
assume that advocating the use of the concept of a joint operation to guide the
basic training program as an attempt to diacard the basic training program or
circumvent it to carry out the joint training program. The application of the
c~ncept of a joint operation to guide the basic training program calls for a
scientific training plan. Our armed forces have different arma, services and
professional detachments. What they should do firat, what should come next, how
they can proceed with their basic training programs, how theae programs should be
arranged, and what standards should be set for theae programs are tasks that
should be speci.fically planned and carried out in accordance with related
requirements. These programs should be scheduled in an orderly manner and in
sequences which advance from the low level to the high level and from the
individual training to the joint training. We should emphasize training in basic
skills on the one hand and training in their application on the other. While
pr~moting pr.ofessi~nal training for individuals, we must attach importance to
laying gr.oundwork for joint training. In addition to grasping the joint training
of a single service, we must pay attention to the joint training of various
- servicea. Only in this way, can we leave a mark every step of the way, and raiae
ehe basic training program to a new level during our march to the goal of a joint
~peration.
9574
C5U: 4005/2073
4
FOR OFFIC[A~. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- r1ILITARY AND PUBLIC SECURITY
MAJOR REFORM IN MILITARY TRAINING OUTI.T_NED
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 12 Sep 79 pp 1-2
~Article by Lin Jian [2651 0494] et al.: "A Ma~or Change Is Needed in Our Military
Training"]
[Text] Drill must become a"bloodless battle" and battle must become a"bloody
drill." In the lst century A.D., Josephus made this statement when discussing the
Roman training method, and it concisely and comprehensively lays bare the relation-
ship between traiuing and war. The wdr of self-defense counterattack against Viet-
nam that we waged at the end of the 70's decade of the 20th century proved again
the truth that training and war are interdependent, mutually permeating, and mutually
changeable.
The sound of rifles and cannon in the lofty mountains and jungle of Asia's tropics
echoes throughout the whole army. Having passed through a"bloody drill," the great
number of officers and men are thinking deeply about a"blQOdless battle." How can
they L-ruly change the experience bought with blood in the war into wealth that
g�ides training? Does the training content and methods practiced for many years need
- a major change? What is the way, in the final analysis, to achieve greater, faster,
better, and more economical results in training for combat preparedness? Should
our training stick to old ways? Should these old ways be slowly replaced or should
they be vigorously eliminated and new ways be fostered so as to speedily get on the
~ track of modernization?
How are we to change our military tr.aining? Introducing the discussion of the
criterion for truth into the military realm (isn't this to talk~about "making up a
missed lesson"? This is a good subject relating to reality.), to look at training
from the angle of actual combat, the following several questions directly enter our
inquiry.
We. Should Make "Armed Defense of the Four Modernizations" the Standpoint of Training
Tlie war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam smashed the argument that
we "prepared again and again against a war that would never come," and deepened our
c:onc?pt of "armecl defense of the four moder.nizations. Hegemonism will not readily
resign itself to our country's carrying out the four modernizations but will cer-
tuinl.y seek an opportunity to destroy them, and the biggest destruction is effected
by instigating a war. It is hard to imagine that our country's four modernizations
will be peacefully carried out in an international environment free from the threat
` war. This view was confirmed by this war that we fought. From harsh reality we
only draw the conclusion: the four modernizations must be defended by armed
ggle.
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400020053-7
~
~ FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
I
Makir?g the armed defense of the four modernizations the standpoint of training is
the embodient of defending the motherland and defending socialist construction,
and is the demand raised by the general task of this new era with regard to training.
For our training to make the defense of the four modernization its standpoint, we
mt~st have a clearcut guiding ideology so that we can maintain a correct orientation
~nd arouse even more the enthusiasm for training. "The trair.~ing received in 1 month
~f combat action is superior to the training received in 1 year of peacetime."
Why? The principle is this. If we take the training in this combat action to be
that of a"small-scale action," then, no matter whether its distance in time from
the outbreak of the next war is long or short, we might as well, during this period
ol time, look upon it as a big-scale action." Our training will change with every
passing day and thE changes"will be considerable. The kind of peacetime training
idea that "day after day we go to the training ground but we are not preparing to
go to the battlefield," that kind of work style "only thunder but no rain," i.e.,
much said but little done and shouting strategic slogans as if they were tactical
slogans, that kind of "cups and medals mania" tendency that the purpose of trai.ning
is comparison and competition, that kind of bureaucratic practice that draws a
circle about something i.st refuses to have the final say about it, and for a long
time remains at the stage of "research"--in 8 or 9 cases out of 10 is a fault in
training standpoint.
Wr Must l~ake Education and Training Central
The 3d Plenary Session of the llth CCP Central Committee unequivocally proclaimed:
The focus of th e entire party's work is to be shifted to the construction of
socialist modernization. In line with this historical shift, education and training
should be made central in armed forces' work and the pace of the construction of
modernization .quickened. If one is not clear about this point, the strategic
position of training can only sink to the level of empty talk. In the past, owing
to the damage inflicted by Lin Biao and the "gang of four," there was created a
situation in which only civil affairs were carried out and military affairs were
ignored, and there was "military blindness" on the part of armed groups. The units
clid not all receiva training, those in principal charge of military administration
withdrew to the second line, and many of those handling training were "back-
benchers." This situation was hard to reverse. ~
In accordance with the theory concerning the pri,ncipal contradiction i.n our country
at ~he present stage put forward by the communique of the 3d Plenary Session and
Comrade Hua Guofeng's "Report on the Work of the Government," and analyzing the
c~urrent state of affairs in our armed forces, we can clearly see: the degree of
mudernization in our armed forces is still very low and is far from meeting the
demands of modern warfare. To change all the rules and regulations, establishments
and systems, leaders' work styles, work methods, and force of habit that do not
suit the construction of modernization, and t~ rapidly raise the level of moderni-
zation in strategy and tactics, is the principal contradiction that needs to be
resolved by our armed forces at the present stage and is also the central task of
our armed forces in this stage. In order to resolve this contradiction, under con-
ditions when we are not at war, we must mainly rely on education and training.
Political work must be strength~ned, and it must center on serve this central
task. We must not and should not again take class struggle as the key link or make
political movements central. In order to strengthen the construction of the armed
6
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R004400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
f.~~rce5, the Military Commission [of the CCP Central Committee] convoked three con-
fc�renc~s was to have the entire armed forces make preparations against war. In
~t~ls process, a great amount of the daily work went into education and training.
P'acts in this war of self-defensive counterattack against Vietnam proved: it makes
great difference whether training is carried out or not, it makes a great differ-
ence wliether training is good or otherwise, and it makes a great difference whether
the cadres have been trained in military academies or school~ or not. Thus, it was
natural and logical to shift the focus of the entire armed forces' work to the
strengthening of modernization with education and training at the core.
To judge whether education and training are truly at the core, we can study some
items, e.g., whether the majority of unit~ are being given and are truly being
given all-round training; whether the principal persons in charge of military admin-
- istration in units being given all-~~ound.training devote their principal energy and
time to grasping training; whether the personnel, time, content, and quality of the
training are ascertained in advance; whether the situation has changed in cadre
~raining so that key points are discussed, difficult points are grasped, and weak
points are inspected; and whether, in transmitting missions to the lower levels, the
headquarters, political and logistical organizations work as one to grasp this core,
and create by all means conditions for good training. This last item is a very
Icey item, and it must be resolved well.
Prevent and Overcome the Practice in Training Guidance of "Cutting With One Stroke
of the Knife"
Our armed forces are garrisoned in the vast territory of the motheriand. In each
darrison area, the terrain is different, there is a great disparity in heat and cold,
the. enemy's situation is diFferent, and the mission is different. Thus, in trai.n-
ing guidance, we must prevent and overcome simplification, i.e., "cutting with one
_ stroke of the knife." For example: acting as if the northern and southern parts
of the country were alike, as if the defense of the interior and the defense of the
borders were alike, as if the strategy for first-line forces and the strategy for
reserve forces were alike, as if field armies and regional forces were alike, and
as if veteran soldiers and new soldiers were alike. In the distribution of specific
topic.s and time for company training, to unify this distribution too rigidly is
- very detrimental to arousing the enthusiasm of the cadres and fighters. For example,
on an island where communications are handled by electric cable, to still demand
that telephone soldiers erect telephone poles for pole-climbing training; in digging
an antitank network, to dem~nd that mountainous areas and plains be treated alike,
so that the troops are forced to 1Fve1 a hilltop before digging the ditches. The
great number of officers and men sum up these phenomena by calling this training
guidance "cutting with one stroke of the knife."
"Curting with one stroke of the knife"--this product of subjectivism and bureaucrat-
ism--has become more and more unworkable. It replaces the specific with the general,
uses the generality to obliterate the individual, "cutting" down the training
focus," cutting down the initiative of the officers and men, and seriously divorcing
training from actual combat. If one is not trainec. in the requirements of war, one
cannot acr vigorously. If a unit in mountains and jungles are not trained in map
L-ecogn:ition and reading, then during a maneuver it cannot move according to the
azimuth and it will go back and forth and finally return to where it originally
7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
started from, with the result that the unit will have procf that "the earth is
round."
Do you want, by seeki~g truth from facts and by proceeding from reality, to change
this state of affairs of "cutting with one stroke of the knife"? Then you will be
f;oing against the training outline; if you want to stick to the outline, then you
will be separating yourself from reality. Because the outline was promulgated by
the upper level, the result will only be to do things in a Procrustean manner,
making reality submit to the outline, the ob~ective submit to the subjective.
The bloody experiences and lessons of this war of self-defensive counterattack made
people feel most sorrowfully that "cutting with one stroke of the knife" brings
great trouble to others and that we cannot let it continue. Many units that took
part in the war have suggeste~: Either there should be a fairly large revision of
the training outline or it should not be followed. This outline was formulated on
the unchanging foundation of an annual training period (90 to 120 days), with the
result that there are many contradictions in it. Whether it is possible or not to
have tt?e outline, for every year the headquarters of the General Staff issues a
training directive containing the policy, principles, content, and demands for
training, which provides the basis for education and training in the entire armed
forces. Each military man, each service arm, and each unit integrates its combat
mission, paying attention to its own combat objective and its own terrain and cli-
matic features, and drafts its training plan, which is then reported to the head-
quarters of the General Staff. Thus, our training guidance is unified but not
rigidly so, is concentrated but not excessively so, and it possesses both general-
~ ity and particularity. What is displayed.is not the enthusiasm of one but of many,
and the training moves along like a gain of chess.
The Single Service Arm Mentality Is Very Harmful ~
There is this example of a battle: The lst Company of a certain unit was attacking
a certain hill. The company commander had put the weapons attached to his unit to
one side, and let the infantry make 11 attacks in succession. They fought for 9
hours 44 minutes without success. The company commander then thought of the heavy
machineguns, flamethrowers, the engineer squad, and the recoilless rifles that had
not yet been used. By organizing their coordinated use; the battle was decided in
only 20 minutes. This battle example shows that it is truly inadequate for a com-
pany commander;.as he did in the past, to brandish his Mauser pistol and shout
"Char~e!"; that in peacetime if one is accustomed to think in terms of one service
arm, then in fighting a war one will have artillery pieces but not use them, and
the slogan "cannon cannot prevail over bayonets, so infantry decides the outcome of
a battle," which is like~a satchel charge in the mind, is ouit-of-date and should
be changed to "cannon can prevail over bayonets and the outcome of a battle is
decided by coordination of the service arms."
The problems revealed by this kind of battle example are representative of those
among commanders at all levels. They regard the special arms attached to their
units as millstones around �their necks," fiddle with them and do not think of using
them, forget about them when organizing a battle, and by attending to one thing
lose sight of another; they unconditionally let tanks charge ahead without opening
a route for them; they want the flamethrower soldiers to rHrow flames but do not
8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400020053-7
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ have command authority, and those who have comm~nd�authority do not understand the
- special arms; and they unscientifically issue blir_d orders to technical service
arms that exceed the capacity of these arms. All these things invariably show that
the single service arm mentality has gravely endangered combat operations and
hi~idered training, and is harming out combat effectiveness.
't'he single service arm mentality has become a kind of ideology. It took shape for
many reasons: historical and current, ideological and organizational, and theoret-
ical and practical. It is deep-rooteii and quite hard to change. In the 1920's,
the old Red Army carried knapsacks wherever it went and threw wooden-handled harid
grenades; in the 1970's, the youths still carry knapsacks everywhere and the wooden
handle of the hand grenade has not been cast aside. The battle career over several
decades of "millet plus rifles" deeply imprinted the single service arm mentality
on the minds of many of our comrades. The slogan "battles are decided by infantry"
has become an unalterable theory for them. In peacetime, very little training in
combined arms operations is done, and some soldiers of the special arms become pro-
duction soldiers and noncombatant soldiers, while many leading cadres frequently
concern themselves only with the infantry. Our army has already changed from being
a single service arm to being a combined arms force, and the number of special arms
companies exceeds that of infantry companies, but these leading cadres still always
consider infantry the "big boss." In the military establishment and system in effect
and the weaponry and equipment on hand, there remain many single service arm mal-
practices, which are detrimental to carrying out combined arms operations. There
are now few materials on foreign armies provided, no organizing of visits to observe
the advanced weaponry and equipment of units. Irrational restrictions and f etters
arid security measures close people's minds so that they are ignorant and ill-informed.
The outmoded, backward single service arm mentality departs far from the trend
toward modernization of the armed forces. To overcome it, to eliminate it, and to
- replace it with combined arms training and coordinated operations has become a task
of top priority in fundamentally changing the features ~of trianing in our armed
Forces.
Some tentative measures have already been found for preventing or overcoming the
5i.ngle service arm mentality:
1. The higher military academies and schools are to offer training courses for
tiigh-ranking cadres in which they will study modern~warfare, study the performance
and function of modernized weaponry and equipment,�and study the organizational
command of coordinated operations involving all service arms. All ordinary cadres
must enter, in turn, the academies and schools to pursue advanced studies. The
units must run well groups~for training cadres in rotation.
2. In deploying infantry and special arms cadres, "combined arms" groups are to be
set up, thereby changing the state of affairs in which the membership of leadership
gruups are homogenous.
3. Every army is to organize and set up a combined arms regiment (battalion) con-
sisting of infantry, artillery, tank and other serv~ce arms, first planting "ex-
E~~~riment~l plots," gaining experience, and then gradually popularizing them.
4. There will be more live tactical combined training in which all service arms
will participate.
9
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Persons will, in a planned way, be sent out of the country for on-the spot investi-
gations in order to learn about the experienc,e of foreign armies in combined arms
training and coordinated military operations.
13reak Away From the Dogmatic Attitude Toward Mao Zedong's Military Thought
What is the basis for bringing up these questions? Please look at the facts:
- In writing and compiling teaching materials, some people do not use the fund~amental
principles of, and the standpoint, viewpoint, and method for studying warfare in,
Mao Zedong's military thought, but simply load their materials with the quotatiions .
[of Mao Zedong]. They do not think about forging ahead in the study of military
theory, and thus strategic and tactical thought follows old regulations and living
military principles are changed into dead articles.
Study and research an military theory are insufficiently integrated with reality.
The principles of fighting a battle of annihilation--concentration of military force
being the condition, thrusting deep and outflanking being the method, and complete
encirclement being the plan--can be thoroughly memorized but when applied can still
be only~a gleam on the horizon.
They take principles to be the starting point for studying problems. In summing up
training and combat experiences, they do not want to investigate and study, do not
want to make a concrete analysis, and simplistically reach triumphant conclusions.
With regard to whatever Chairman Mao had said, no matter how the situation had
changed, the conclusions did not change. ~~t the end.of 1945, Chairman Mao said,
"With regard to training items, raising the technical level of firing, bayonet
charges, and throwing hand grenades are still primary and raising the tactical level
is supplementary." Today, several decades later, they still take this statement to
be the basis for life-risking bayonet charges and hand grenade throwing. Some of
the 10 major military principles that Chairman Mao talked about must be developed,
and some of them must be revised, and specific ones have already become unsuitable.
Some comrades still insist: The 10 major military principles are completely suitable,
suitable in the past, at present, and in the future. �
With regard to Mao Zedong's military thought, we can only discuss its application
and dare not diseuss its development. Chairman Mao did not discuss many questions
of modern warfare (e.g., concentrating military force, engaging in close combat and
night combat, and attacking massed tanks), and so we dare not air his opinions.about
them. If one stubbornly wants to discuss them a little, then one will be using
indiscriminate applications of realymade principles and formulas as a substitute for
an earnest inquiry into academic military protS.lems.
From the abovementioned facts we see the shadow of the."pinnac~e theory" anii the
vestiges of the two "whatevers" in the realm of military thought. In short, they
both make a mystery of and a formula of Mao Zedong's military thought. If we take
~ this dogmatic attitude, then we will not be able to understand completely and
accurately Mao Zedong's military thought or grasp it in line with seeking truth
from facts, and Mao Zedong's military thought cannot truly become a compass for
our army's training and combat operations.
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Training requires for its correct guidance advanced, scientific military theory.
Looking at this thought from the angle of modern features and developments, laying
stress on studying the application of Mao Zedong's military thought under ttie
conditions of modern warfare, and, by integrating theory with practice, answ~~riii~;
and solving ~raining and operational problems--this is the Marxist attitude toward
military theory. We can predict that, after this dogmatic attitude is thoroughly
eradicated, our arm}~'s education and training will rapidly get on the right track
- and be able to pass the severe test of war.
X X X X X X{~as published] .
People cannot completely recognize truth at one stroke. Tru th~ must be continually
tested by g~actice. Whether the various points we have expounded in this article
are really true depends on the test of practice, and we are ready to study them
together with everybody.
- 9727
CSO: 4005/2459
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-04850R000400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MILITAHY AND P'UBI,IC SECURITY
TRAINING TESTS REFORMED TO REFLECT ACTUAL COMBAT CONDITIONS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 5 Sep 79 p 2
[Article by deputy army commander Wang Gencheng [3769 2704 2052]: "Preliminary
Trials and Ideas About Training Examination Reform"]
[Text] Not long ago we organized a comprehensive tactical examination under field
conditions and with soldiers using live ammunition in which 11 companies of infantry,
artillery, and tanks took part, and conducted preliminary trials on how to make com-
bat operations, training, and examinations consistent. From the practice of this
examination we saw that the followin~ three aspects of examination reform need to
be resolved.
The Content of Examinations Must Fmbody Changes in the Key Points of Training
At present, the unit's training has already shifted from the past when attacks on
infantry were primary to making attacks on tanks primary, from training a single
service arm to training in coordinating all service arms, and from stressing tech-
niques to paying full attention to tactics. This suits the demands of actual com-
bat, and the examination content should embody the changes in the key points of
training, so as to impel the unit to pay full attention to the training topics that
= are required by combat operations.
Add to the proportion of the "three attacks and three defenses" in training exam-
inations. Everybody knows the importance of the "three attacks and three defenses,"
but at present the proportion of this aspect ir. the content of examinations is still
fairly small and needs to be bigger. For this examination, we arranged for 10 out
of the 19 training topics to include the "three attacks and three defenses" in the
examination content. For the firing at fixed and moving targets of the 85mm cannon,
the 82mm recoilless rifle, and the 40mm rocket launcher--all against a background of
actual combat�-there were examined three different missions under different condi-
tions and over different terrain. In order to make this key point more prominent,
we also increased the score proportion so that "three attacks and three defenses"
topics counted for 65 percent of the total score.
Strengthen the examination of tactical training. Practice in the war of self-
defensive counterattack on the China-Vietnam border showed us that it is extremely
important to raise the tactical level of units. However, owing to the fact that
there exists among us, from top to bottom, the idea of attaching more importance to
techniques than to tactics, there was little tactical content in examinations and
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400420053-7
FOR OFF[C[AL USE ONLY
the methods of this content were stereotyped, and the tactical training of units was
done perfunctorily. In order to change this state of affairs, the army, the divi-
sion, and the regiment need to organize their strength and carry out research to
find out the content, standards, and ways to carrying out examinations on tactics,
so that there will truly be good training in tactics and the training in this re-
spect will be lively. To this end, we organized an enhanced examination for in-
_ fantry company tactics based on the demands of actual combat, on unfamiliar terrain
and under complex conditions, which tested combat operations arranged by higher
levels and tested the organizational command and movement of detachments in carrying
out a single combat mission, thereby comprehending tempering and improving the
operational skills of the companies in marching, attacking, eating, bivouvacing, and
concealing themselves and tentatively garnering for some experience in examining the
unit's tactics.
Examine well the training in coardinating all service arms. Formerly this aspect
was not examined, and there are still r~o clear-cut standards. This situation re-
quires great efforts both at the top and the bottom to find out in practice methods
of examining this aspect. Based on our preliminary practice, with regard to its
content, there are three principal links in coordination training: the degree of
mastery by the co~nanders of a combined'arms force in applying the principles and
the organizational procedural methods with regard to tihe service arms; the handling
of all sorts of situations; and the coordination of infantry-artillery, infantry-
tank movements as well as the coordination of the movements of specialized detach-
ments. By centering on these three links we can fix standards and methods for the
specific examination of commanders at all levels as well as the fighters. At a
trail point in the examination this.time, we attached technical arms under the
regiment to infantry detachments. The seven infantry companies that took part in
this examination were each ~ugmented with a platoon which had a 82mm recoilless
rifle, a 82mm mortar and a heavy~machinegun and with a team that had three flame-
throwers. For opposing airborne forces, the companies were also strengthened with
two howitzer companies, one 85mm cannon company, and consistently put into effect
in the train~ng examination. The following points were examined according to the
development of the battle: First, the preparatory fire by long-range artillery and
the organizational command of each unit from the time of its advance to the time of
its launching of an assault on the enemy. The coordinated operations of the directly
aimed artillery's destruction of its target, the enemy armor, and the wiping out by
all the infantry weapons firing at one time on the landed airborne enemy at a dis-
tance of 250 to 500 meters. Second, the coordinated operation of the tanks over-
taking the infantry battle formation and.leading the infantry assault, and also,
when advancing, stopping for a short time and firing, violently breaking through
and cutting the enemy line and then compressing the enemy into a narrow space. Third,
the organizational command over the tanks in their original positions supporting
the infantry assault, the short period of preparatory fire by mortars, and the
simultaneous encircling and destruction of the enemy by 11 infantry, tank, and
artillery detachments. Through this kind of live soldier and Zive ammunition train-
ing examination of the service arms, whicY? tested the company-level commanders of
the 11 companies that took part in the examination, an understanding was reached of
their actual capacity to command combined arms operations. This preliminary test
was a way for us to find out how to strengthen future training examinations with
regard to coordinating the service arms.
With Regard to Examination Methods, We Must Be Adept at Creating Complex Conditions
That Approximate the Battlefield, Designing Our Tests Based on War
~rder to train military units, some countries in the West have set up special
~.iining centers" and "testing grounds." Before the outbreak of the fourth Middle
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00854R004400020053-7
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
East war, the Egyptian army, in.order to break through the Bar-Lev defense line,
picked out a river that had the same veloeity flow as The 3uez Canal and conducted
over 300 training tests on it. The creation by foreign armies of conditions that
approximate actual combat is v very�significant lesson foz us. Based on the know-
ledge we gained from this traini~g examination, o� all the methods of reforming
training, the most fundam~ntal one is to provide testing conditions that approximate
as closely as possible actual combat, designing our tests based on war.
1. Choose the site well so as to conduct the tests in an environment approximating
actual combat. In military operations great attention must be paid to terrain, and
in peacetime training terrain should also be given full attention. This time we
chose a site that approximated the battlefield of a future war; it had the typical
features of northern terrain. Based on different terrain features, a different
content for the examination u~as arranged. With the units far from the barracks and
� drillground, they were tested in the field where the terrain and roads were unfam-
iliar and complex so that the environment approximated actual combat and they had
- to analyze and deal with problems. This was much different from past examinations,
and with regard to where to move and position even the simplest piece of artillery
or single horse, terrain had to be taken into account and given earnest thought.
2, The form of the situation must, as far as possible, embody the complexity of a
- future war. There are.good terrain conditions and tl~ere are also good situations.
There are situations on tTie battlefield in which the enemy collapses a~t our first
assault and~in which the enemy is routed at our first attack, but they have no
actual value in peacetime training examinations. Therefore, the situation must be
changed from that of the wishful thinking of the past so as to embody, as far.as
possible, actual combat situations. In the examination this time, in accordance with
the enemy's tactical characteristics and the combat methods that could be adopted,
as we11 as the missions that the various companies cot~ld shoulder in a future com-
bat, we set up three training topics, viz, penetrating and cutting up the enemy,
engaging the enemy, and attacking enemy airborne forces, with 19 training problems
and 76 training contents. There were many complex changes in the situaLion: some-
times one kind of situation would appear suddenly, and at other times many kinds of
situations from many directions wou3.d appear at one time. In a future war, all the
possible situations we would encounter and all the possible methods and measures
we could adopt with regard to the enemy were embodied in the craining examination.
This was beneficial for tempering and improving the~unit's capabilities in actual
combat.
3, Through strict examinations, set standards for actual combat. Practice proves
that with the "nursemaid" method of training and examinations the genuine skills
and knowledge required by actual combat cannot be learned. Formerly all types of
firing were done on the shooting range and there were many conditions that assisted
the firing. But when it comes to application, this type of training does not com-
pletely meEt the demands~of actual combat. This time for the live-ammunition firing
examination, all sorts of targets~continually appeared at the front or on the flanks,
on the top of hills, at different heights, ~n big and small groups, and the targets
were extremely irregular. Many targets were also concealed in thick growths of
grass, making them hard to distinguish. The gunners had to make calcualtions for
whatever terrain they occupied. The targets of f ire were sometimes set at an angle
of depression and sometimes at an angle of elevation, and for all of them the
gunners had to estimate the distance themselves, set the rear sight themselves, and
choose the point to aim at themselves. All of this greatly increased the difficulty
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
in firing, and althuugh the number of successful hits, as compared with those on
the drillground, fell slightly, it was a useful firing exercise that approximatc~d
the conditions of actual combat and was by comparison solid and down-to-eurtli.
The Key to &eforming Examinations Is io Change the Leading Cadres' Ideas About
Training
How a given unit's training i~ grasped and fiow the examination of its training is
done always has a close connection with the ideas of the unit's leadership, espec-
ially the leading cadres in charge of training. Therefore, if we want to make the
content and methods of examinations meet the demands of actual combat, the key is
for the leading cadres' ideas about guiding training to be correct, and this requires
that the following ideological barriers be done away with:
First is the idea of fearing a drop in examination scores. Some comrades worry that
examining the units according to the standards of actual combat will lower scores.
If we look at this question purely from the standpoint of examination marks, then
the scores of examinations conducted in the field under conditions approximating
actual combat will be somewhat lower than the scores of examinations conducted on
the drillground. But the former scores actually reflect the unit's training level,
and the unit learns true skills that it can use. If the unit were to only pursue
so-called good scores on graphs, then when war breaks out it would suffer and even
not be able to fulfill its mission.
Second is the negative idea of accident prevention. Some comrades fear that, by
taking a unit in the field with all its vehicles, artillery pieces, supplies and
gear, and engaging in exercises with live soldiers using live anm?unition, if the
exercise is not done well accidents will occur and there will be complaints from
top to bottom. There should be a correct attitude toward this problem, and these
comrades should recognize that in an examination conducted under conditions that
approximate actual combat there is a greater possibility of accidents occuring than
there is in a barracks, but one cannot, because of the fear of accidents occurring,
bind one's own hands and feet. In the past, our army organized and carried out
between 10 and 20 live-ammunition, night-and-day tactical exercises, from the com-
pany to divisional scale, without one accident that caused casualties. Practice
proves that if the exercise is well organized and positive measures are taken,
accidents can be avoided. We also see that only a unit that dares to temper itself
in peacetime can reduce its casualties in wartime, paying a small price for a big
victory.
Third is the idea of seeking an easy life and fearing trouble. To organize a train-
ing examination based on tRe standards of actual combat, one must beforehand go into
the f ield and survey the terrain, choose a site, scale mountains and ford streams,
formulate a plan and concretely carry out a program, and ,judge standards. The work
is complex, the organization of the examination is difficult, and it requires arduous
labor. It will not do to seek an easy life and fear troulile. We only need to know
that whether a unit's training can be carried out in peacetime has a direct bearing
on whether it can be led to victory in wartime, on whether it can complete the com-
Uat mission given to it by the party and the people. By keeping the overall
situation in mind, hardship and fatigue will not be things to fuss about.
9727
CSO: 4005/2459
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007142/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PARTY ANll STATE
EDITORIAL CALLS ON PLA TO OBEY PARTY ORDERS
Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO in Chinese 2 Feb 81 pp 1-2
[Editorial: "Unify the Thinking and Actions of Army Units with the Party's Line,
Principles and Policies"]
[Text] The PLA General Political Department is holding an all-army political work
conference with the study and implementation of the guidelines of the central work
conference as its central theme, calling for a thorough study of how to greatly
strengthen army political work under the new situation, how to uphold the four
basic principlea and how to urge the army units to think and act in a way
conaistent with the party's line, principles and policies. This is a very
significant guarantee for cadres and fightera to take a step forward in the
achievement of political unity with the party Central Committee, to fulfill
successfully all missions assigned to our army by the party Central Committee and
ita Military Commission and to accelerate the building of a modern revolutionary
am?y.
Our army is a revolutionary armed group devoted to implementing the party's
political task under the abaolute leadership of the party. How to make our army
units think and act in a way consiatent with the party's line, principles and
policies is the basic objective of our army's political work and a reflection of
our arnay's excellent tradition. Since the day our army founded and developed this
- political work for the revolution, it has consistently emphasized the need to
educate our army units in the party's program, principles and policies so that
they will pledge their loyalty to the absolute leadership of the party. This.
point has been profoundly emphasized and set forth unequivocally in works by
Comrade Mao Zedong and other revolutionaries of the older generation and in the
regulations governing the political work of our army. During the long period of
struggle waged by our army, which spans over a half century, it has always thought
and acted in a way pointed ouC by the party Central Committee and has never failed
to obey its correct orders in action. For this reason, it has become a powerful
revoluti.onary army of total devotion to the people's cause such as has never
before appeared in Chinese hiatory.
Today when we reach a new turning point in hiatory, it is particularly significant
to emphasize the necessity of making all our army unita think and act in a way
consistent with the party's line, principles and policies and to take a step
forward in achieving political unity with the party Central Committee. Since the
30 Plenary Session of the llth party Central Committee, the party Central
16
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R004400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
C~mmittee has reaffirmed and set forth its ideological, pulitical and
organizational line, and promulgated a seriea of new policies in the political,
ecc?nomic and cultural fields. Through practice, thia line and principles and
policies have been proven to be effective and completely correct, and therefore,
have wan the broadest support of our people and our army commanders and fighters.
The major policy adopted by the central work conference last December with the aim
of further readjusting the economy and bringing about greater political atability
has also proved to be the only correct political and economical policy for our
country at present. In order to meet the new challenges, to keep ourselves
abreast of the constant development of the new situation, to strengthen
effectively political work, to use the line, principles and policies adopted since
the Third Plenum to arm the minds of cadres and fighters, and to help our army
units raise their consciousness to the need to implement the guidelines of the
central work conference, we must consider it absolutely necessary and urgent to
improve our army work. We must consider organizing the study of ~he line,
principles and policies adopted since the Third Plenum and their implementation,
as well as the study and implementation of the guidelines of the central work
conference to be the primary duty of party committeea at all levels and leading
cadres, and the central theme of our current political work and political
education.
While studying the central documents and trying to grasp their spirit and essence,
we must concentrate special attention on grasping the general guiding thought of
the Third Plenum, and deepen our understanding of the guidelines of the central
work conference in light of the developing and changing situation. The guiding
thought of the Third Plenum embodies the principles of "emancipating the mind,
starting up the c~achinery, seeking truth from facts, uniting and looking forward,
studying the new situation and seeking solutions for new problems." The guiding
principle of economic construction set forth by the Third Plenum actually resulted
~ from an accurate review of experiences and lessons our country has accumulated in
economic work during the past 31 years, and a full-scale assessment of the current
- aituation of our country which takes into account such essential conditions as
large population, a backward economy, and low-level science, technology, education
and culture. This guiding principle represents a step forward in implementing the
guiding thought of the Third Plenum which calls for seeking truth from facts and
correcting leftist errors, and is therefore entirely consistent with the series of
policies adopted since the Third Plenum. Practice shows that as long as we grasp
the guiding thought of the Third Plenum, we will be able to correctly assess the
domestic econ~mic and political situation, and accurately comprehend the policies
adopted by the party Central Committee. Only thus can we truly think in a way
consistent with the party's line, principles and policies.
It must be emphasized that the four basic principles--the socialist road, the
people's democratic dictatorship or the dictatorship of the proletariat, party
leadership and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought--are principles that have long
been consistently upheld by our party. Whether the four basic principles can be
upheld will have a bearing on the future and destiny of our party and state.
Since the Third Plenum, our party has put into effect an ideological line, a
pnlitical line and an organizational line and a series of principles and policies,
all of which have been formulated in coordination with the new aituation and under
17
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the guidance of the four basic principlea and all of which are designed to better
implement the four basic principles under the new situation. Only by correctly
assessing and firmly grasping the four basic principles and acknowledging
consistency between the four basic principlea on the one hand and the line,
principles and policies ad~pted since the Third Plenum on the other can we
thoroughly understand and better implement the party's line, principlea and
policies and convert them into a weapon to recognize, criticize and overcome all
forms of erroneous ideology. In this connection, our assertion that we muat
maintain political unity with the party Central Committee means firmly upholding
the four basic principles, and acting in a way consistent with the line,
principles and policies adopted since the Third Plenum. For the time being, it
means resolutely implementing policies approved by the central work conference.
This i.s the aim and objective of our political work. The current all-army
political work conference has listed the study of how to publicize and implement
the four basic principles as its basic guiding th~ught and main content of
discussion. This is indeed a very timely and necessary action.
The key to success in making our army units think and act in a way consistent with
the party's line, principles and policies rests with a conscientious effort to
study and profoundly understand the spirit and essence of the party Central
Co?nmittee documents, to wield these ideological weapons well, and to use them as a
basis for maintaining rapport with realiky, for carrying out work with a well-
defined objective in mind, for solving problems effectively, and for strengthening
the militant character of our ideological and political work. The objective of
thinking and acting in a united way cannot be achieved if we juat echo what the .
books say, if we discuss mattera of common intereat in general terma, if we
present our views in a purely philosophical way, if we do everything as a raatter
of formality, and if we fail to keep in touch with reality. Our discussion on
maintaining contact with reality means maintaining contact with spec.ific unita and~
departments, and especially with what one really has in mind with regard to work.
How far we have gone in understanding the line, principles and policiea adopted
since the Third Plenum, what results we have produced from their implementation,
what experiences and lessons we have drawn from t:?is endeavor, and what
shortcomings, misunderstandings and miscomprehensiona, misgivings or even
conflicts of interest we still have--all these muat be reviewed and examined. We
must focus attention on eliminating the "leftist" influence, and overcoming other
erroneous tendencies. We must consider it necessry to launch criticiam and
self-criticism, so that we can think everything over clearly, and get everything
d~ne spontaneously. We must give thoae comrades who do not underatand well the .
party's principles and policies an opportunity to raise their political
consciousness and permit them to reflect some of their opinions and suggestions to
. higher authoritiea. In the course of study, we must keep our minds open, and
improve our ways of thinking in a united way through the discussion and study of
different opinions. The principle that "the individual is subordinate to the
organizati~n, Che minority is subordinate to the majority, the lower level is
subordinate to the higher level, and the entire membership is subordinate to the
Central Committee should be strictly observed at all times. No ene ahould be
. permitted to criticize any decisions once they are made by the party Central
Committee; nor should anyane be allowed to make critical apeeches and apread
antaganistic statements inside and outside the party. We muat clearly understand
the effect that vari~us social trends of thought may have on our army units. We
muat actively take action to educate, criticize and wage the necessary ideological
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/42/09: CIA-RDP82-40854R040400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
struggle against those who speak and act in violation of the party's line,
principlea and policies and the four basic principlea. These are violations that
cannot be tolerated.
Ir_ studying the central documents and in conducting education in the party's line,
principles and policies, it is extremely important to educate r,adres, eapecially
leading cadres at the regiment and higher levela in this field. Leading cadres
are urged to study well and clarify their thinking. Only in this way can they
lead army units to study wel~, help them solve problems in connection with
' reality, and act as models in guiding them to firmly implement the party's line,
principles and policies. Education must be conducted on a level-by-level basis
until cadres at all levels can take turns in receiving training. Leading cadres
must first atudy well before beginning a lecture tour of the army units explaining
to them the party's principles and policies and answering queations raised by
them. We must teach cadres to firmly believe that the leadership provided by the
party Central Committee and the party's line, principles and policies adopted
since the Third Plenum are corrected. It is neceasary to resolutely implement the
major policies approved by the central work conference to do everything, consider
problems and carry out work from the standpoint of the overall intereat of further
readjusting the economy and bringing about greater political stability. It is
necessary to take into account this overall interest, subordinate local interests
to it, and atrive to meat and benefit thia overall interest rather than impair it
in the slightest way, no matter what we do. Yielding local interests to
revolutionary interests, putting the overall interest of the revolution above all
. else, and consciously implementing the party's line, principlea and policies have
become an excellent tradition of our party. But following the 10 years of
catastrophe, thia tradition has been trampled underfoot. Today, the moment has
come for us to reeducate our army units, especially cadrea, in this excellent ~
tradition in conjunction with the new situation.
To make the party's line, principles and policies truly take root in the army,
party committees at all levels must peraist in seeking truth from facts, and in
upholding the mass line, and muat abandon the general method of work. Isn't it
true that since Che 30 Plenary Session of the llth party Central C~mmittee,
repeated efforts have been made to promote the study of the new situation and seek
solutions for new problems? How much has been actually done by party committees
at all levels ahould be conscientiously examined through the atudy of the
documents on the central work conference. Further efforts must also be made to
study ways to thoroughly implement such documents. The series of new policies
adopted by the party Central Committee reflect a law and a remarkable spirit in
this new period of history. If we still think and act in the same old way, we
will be unable to keep abreast of the developing new aituation, nor will we be
able t~ meet the needs of the party Central Committee's policy decisions. Party
committees and leading cadres at all levels must continue to emancipate their
minds, stimulate their revolutionary spirit, carry forward the work style of hard
struggle, maintain rapport with reality, keep in close touch with the masses,
conduct investigations and study, underatand and control the trende of thought
among the army unita, size up the new situation, seek aolutions for new problems,
and suggeat effective measures for examination and implementation by army units.
Only in this way can we implement the guidelines of the central work conference in
coordination with the actual needs of our. army units, and help them greatly
improve their ways of thinking and rectify their work style. SinCe the third
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2407/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400420053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Plenum, great changes have taken place and great progress has been made ~n the
political and economic fronts throughout the country. Both the economic situation
and the situation of political stability have been faring better and better year
after year. To us, an overall and correct understanding of this situation seems
necessary. Only by assessing it in the same way as the party Central Committee
does, can we think and act in a way consistent with the party's line, principles
and policies. The PLA is a revolutionary army led by the CCP, a strong pillar of
the people's demecratic dictatorship or the dictatorship of the proletariat, which
must assume the historical mission to defend the motherland and protect the fnur
modernizations programs. We must think and act in a way consistent with the
party's line, principles and policies, obey orders of the party Central Committee
in all our actions, and act as models in implementing the party's line, principles
and policies, and in enhancing stability and unity. Only in this way can we make
a greater contribution to the party and people.
9574
CSO: 4005/2073
20
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R004400020053-7
FOR OF~'ICIAL USE ONLY
PAR~Y AND STATE
CHINA PUBLISHES ENGLISH LANGUAGE DAILY
Hong Kong ASIAWEEK in English 12 Jun 81 p 35
CT~t]
l.ast week, China marked a milestone The China IMily had been on the
in its press history: the first English- ~ drawing board for.years. Last year, the
language daily newspaper since the Peop/e's Dai/y's managing dircctor, Jiang
founding of the People's Republic in 1949 Muyue. and general manager. An Wenyi~
was launched on June 1. The China Daily, headed an executive team which visited
an eight�page broadsheet, is being dis- the headquarters of Australian publishers
tributed outside as well as in China; ii will David Syme & Company~ owners of the
serve as the Peking government's official influential Melboume Age newspaper.
organ in communications with the rest of where they prepared and printed a pilot
the world. Primarily aimed at foreign "dummy?" af the China Daily. In May,
residents and tourists in China. the paper trial cop?es baud on that original dummy
will strive to avoid the heavy-handed were distributed m major Chinese cities.
ideological writing that dominates its While in MeTboume. the Chinese also
sister publication, the People's Daily. worked out a deal with Syme to
The edi~ors are determined to produce a "borrow" John Lawrence of the Age as
first-rate, readable journal. Published five thc Chinese paper's editorial adviser.
times a wcek, from Tuesday to Saturday, l.awrena, a former director of the
the China Dnily gives prominence to Nigerian lnstitute of Journalism~ ex-
international news, devoting the front and plained that initially~ the Chinese would
back pages to co~erage of major domatic be relying on foreign expertise in Iayout
and foreign events. The second page is and production matters:"Obviously~ the
given to finance and economics, w~th Chinae lean on us. No one on the stai'f
special columns on such capitalist has experience of Western newspaper
phenomena as stock and commodities practice or methods." Syme repro-
markets. Opposite that is a page of sentatives have stressed. however. that
domestic news, with a focus on'Peking, the editorial decision-making is entirely in
while the fourth page is reserved for Chinae hands. Syme's top mar?, Ranald
editorial commintary and readers' cor- Macdonald, emphasised: "We will have
respondence. The Arts, reads the no say - and would not want any - in
banner across page five, and the last few the editorial policy of the paper."
paga are filled with features entertain- Until editor . Feng has built up thc
ment ~sangs and sports news ~Yom China pa~r�s reporting strcngth, he will be
and abrc~ad. relying mostly on d~spatches from China's
Overseeing the entire endeavour is Feng offici~l Xinhua News Agency. Chen
Xiliang, a former editor of the English- �Long, Xinhua's director in charge of
language PeAing Review. Feng's staff is external news services, told Asiaweek:
large.fby non-Chmese standards: more ~~W~~re doing as much as we can, but of
than ~ 120 people, of whom SO ar~ couru~ we are short of hands, and our
journalists~ and 22 correspondents dis-
tributcd around the globe. (The Peop/e's emphasis on brief domestic stories for an
Daily, by comparison~ has some 1,800 ~~~ernational service isn t entirely suitable
staffers, 600 of whom are involved in for the new daily." Admits Chen: "For
many years during that long catastrophe
editorial work.)
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R040400020053-7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
[the Culturai Revolution]. we fed boasted that the "biggest problem"
untruths to the~ maases at home and for adverasers in that pu',lication is
abroad." But since the fall of the Gang of "coping with the flood of replies grner-
Four in 1976~ claims Chen, Xinhua has ated by every issue. The Chmese have
"stopped feeding lia. We recognise it is a tremendous thirst for knowledge,
important for our credibility that we especially about technical matters."
uphold the truth." Itself not a step behind the times in
A glance through the China Daily's things technical~ the China Daily has a
trial issues reveals that the editors are production system that utilises some of
clearly striving to keep the paper from the most up-to-date equipment, such as
becoming a propaganda sheet. Yet they U.S.-made Compugraphic photo tyFe-
will encounter some problems. For ex- setting machines. lt ~s pnnted on the
ample. a front-page article from t6e Peop/e's Daily's four double-width
Apr. lU issue. "Lashin8 Out at Kuomin- Metroliner web-offsst presses, which are
cang," says: "lt is shar day-dreaming for reputedly Capable of rolling off 400,000
the Taiwan suthorities to try to impose copies an hour. As its circulation' in- .
their reactionary rule u~on the p~oplc on creases, the English daily may also make
the mainland, local obtirrvers said." use of iu sister outfit's impressive

- Despite these perhaps inevitable dif� disuibution network, which has 6-7m~
ficulties, the Chrna Dvily is exprcted to copies of the Peoplt's Daify delivered
- aitain a circulation of 50,000 by year's each day to cadres and commoners from
end from an initial run of 20,OOU� As Shangt?~i to Xinjiang.
Syme Media 'Enterprises (HK) Ltd. has The China Daily is an ambitious
concluded~ it may prove a signifcant project, but one .unlikely'to fail. For the
products forum; the subsidiary of estimated AO.OUO foreigners living in
Australia's Age group has secured rights China and the 200,000 tourisu who visit it
to market up to 8S% of the total annually. it it a welcome - and unique -
advertising space availabie. (The rest will opportwfity'W catch up with the outside
go to domestic producers.) The advertise- world. ~Md for the 25 million Chinese
ments, selling for USS6.50 per column who ue'atudying English, it not only
centimetre, will appear in fixed spaces offers a good chance to prastise reading
over six pages of the newspaper; neither skills, but is an exCiting symbol of their �
the front nor opinion pages wil) carry nation's new outward-looking approaG
ads. Syme already distributes in China a to the world.
- maQazine on technology. Onc executive
CSO: 4020/375 END
22
, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020053-7