JPRS ID: 9726 WORLDWIDE REPORT NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050022-8
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 22
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9972
9 September 198~
West Euro e ~Re ort
p p
CFOUO 45/81 }
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/9972
- 9 September 1981
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 45/81)
CONTENTS
ENERGY EOONOMLCS
ITALY
Industry Minister Submits National Er.ergy Plan
(Marco Bo'rsa; L,A STA1~A, 8 Aug 81) 1
ECONOMIC
I TALY
Confindu4tria Document on Propos als for Industrial Policy
(IL SOLE-T_4 ORE, 24 Jul 81) 3
_ UNITED KINGDOM
UK-USSR Trade Tted To Improved Relations
(David Tonge; FINANCIAL TIMES, 24 Aug 81) 17
P OLITI CAL
I TALY
Spadolini Aaiis ' So1id' Ties With Yugoslavia
(CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 9 Aug 81) 19
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MILITARY
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
'~iE TIMES' on Benefits of Spain's Joining NAmO
(Editorial; ~IE TIMES, 24 Aug 81) 20
= GENERAL
k`~AN CE
Solaris Unmanned Orbital Space Station t3nder 9tudy
- (Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSM06, 20 ~Jun 81) 22
I TALY
Parliamentarians Discuss Security Services
(IL MOND(S, 31 JuI 81).e .....................................e... 25
Franco Mazzola Speaks Out t Franco Mazzola Interview
Pennacchini Interviewed, Erm3nio Pennacchini Interview
Ricci on Corruption, Raimondo Ricci Interview
Carli Interviewed on Wage Indexation
(Guido Carli Interview; IL MONDO, 31 Jul 81) 31
Medical Care at Rome Policlinico Hospital Deplorable
(Silvana Bevione; PANORAMA, 20 Jul 81) 35
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~ENERGY ECONOMYCS ITALY
iINDUSTRY MINISTER SUBMITS NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN
'PM250803 Turin LA STAI~A in Italian 8 Aug 81 p 8
j[Report by Marco Borsa: "Nuclear, Coal Power Plants at Once to Prevent 'Energy
Bankrup t cy ]
[Excerpt] Milan--After years of discussions and pr~jects the national energy plan
'~bas~d on the need to construct several new coal- or nuclear-powered electricity
~generating plants over the next 10 years was at ~ast submitted yesterda,y for
~approval by the CIPE (Interministerial Economic Pianning Committee) by new
,Industry Minister Giovanni Marcora, which will make it binding for the public
,administration and set in motion a complex series of consultations ~arith all the
sides concerned (regional governments, trade unions, enterprises, and so forth).
The plan, which envisages investments in ti~e order of several dozen trillion lire,
~.is aimed at the construction nf several pow~er plants by 1990, in accordance with
a precise scale of priorities. First, by the end of 1981 both the nuclear plant
_ �at Caorso and the oil-fired plant at Porto Tolle must be working to avoid a serious
energy deficit as early as next winter, when the highest consumption occurs.
~Also by the end of the year locations will nave to be found for coal-fixed power
plants with a total output of 6 gigawatts (the standard unit output is 640 mega-
~-watts) and locations suggested for producing at least another 6 gigawatts of
nuclear powerx that is, for three power plants each housing two standard 1 giga-
�:watt units.
~Whereas coal-fired plallts are quicker to construct (3-4 years) nuclear plants take
longer, but according to the plan by the end of this year two sites must be found
for plants in northern Italy (with a total output of 4 gigawatts) and one in
southern Italy, for a third ?-gigawatt plant.
Apart from the power plants, the plan also envisages a substantial effort in the
infrastructures field, connected especially with the growing use of coal, which
demands adequate river ports where possible. In particular, the plan states,
"logistic and economic considerations suggest that it would be advisable to con-
-struct a first transshipment terminal on the Adriatic and a subsequent one on
the central southern Tyrrhenian coast. Trieste is a possibility for the former,
u*hile fer the latter, the choice, in accordance with the National Electric Power
Agency, could be among Milazzo, Gioia Tauro and Piombino.
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"Additionally, the port of Savona-Vado will have to be developed."
This ;~~dated and compiete version of the national energy plan could fare better
than previous plans since among the parties, especially on the left, and trade
~ unions there is now a widespread awareness that an energy plan is indispensable
for tackling the country's economic difficulties. At their latest congress the
Socials abandoned their reservations concerning the nuclear option, thus elimi-
nating one of the obstacles to the approval of the plan.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editrice LA STAI~A S.p.A.
CS~: 3104/362
~
~
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ECONOMIC ITALY
CONFINDUSTRIA DOCUMENT ON PROPOSALS FOR INDUSTRIAL P~DLICY
Milan IL aOLE-24 ORE in Italian 24 Jul 81 p 8
[Text] We publish herewith the full text of the closing portion
of a document entitled "Industry's Proposals for an In-
dustrial Policy,'~ which was debated yesterday by the
Council of the presidents of the 200 industry associa-
tions belonging to Confindustria. "Industry Minister
Giovanni Marcora was present at the discussion.
Don't Get Us Shut Out of the Advanced Nations' Club
"Italy, which now stands on the tl~reshold but has yet to cross it
of the exclusive club of advanced industrial nations, may find itself
irrevocably blackballed by the end of the decade, or even before then.~'
This was the pessimistic prophecy as to the outlook for this country
through the Eighties that triggered the drafting of Confindustria's
:industrial policy docu.nent, which embodies a suggested formulation of
~uidelines for a complicated fresh start aperation for Italian industry.
- Its basic assumption is th~at, in spite of everything, there are "fairly
good chances ior Italian industry's recovery," provided that adequate
structura]_ measures be taken in time.
After an initial portion devoted to "industry spokesmen~s frame of re-
f erence and their assumptions," the document goes on to analyze the cur-
rent and future scenario as laid down for Italian industry. In the
- decade from 1969 to 19~9, industry "managed., albeit with difficulty, to
cope with the ~ravest series of crises it had ever encountered." Once
~ the more critical phase of th~ first $ years was over, industry on the
whole showed a remarkable capacity for "spontaneous adaptation'~ to the
new internal and interliational constraints in the second half of the
decade: that capacity was manifest in a strong upsurge in exports (up
from 1~.8 percent of the GIP in 1973 to 20.2 percent in 1979), due pri-
mariZy to the more traditional sectors "which base their competitive
posture on the price factor."
That recovery, however, was built upon very f rail foundations, and left
substantially unchanged '~the permanent structural weakness of the Ita-
lian productive apparatus.~~ To deal with the challenge of the Eighties,
we need an overall industrial policy, which, without cov~ring the whole
sphere of economic policy, would nevertheless constitute "its central
core.p
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The conditions under which it can succeed are that the four great
nooses that are strangling industrial growth be untied: they are in-
_ flation, public finances, energy, and industrial relations.
The Confindustria proposal (addressed to all corporations, g^ivately
owned or partially state-owned) starts with identificatior. of a role
clearly articulated within the internationaT. division of labor (with
~ the main thrust left to the established sectors and heightened initia-
= tive in the mo~e advanced ones), and with a call for three-pronged in-
tervention (development, internationalization, and a stringent health
regimen).
From there, the document reviews the overall factors affecting business
activity in every sector. These factors or areas of intervention
essentially boil down to eight~: labor productivity, development and
~ technological innovation; energy availability; raw materials; reduc-
tion of the balance of payments deficit and development of services for
industry; internationalization of the economy; and siting of new in-
dustrial facilities, with special attention to the Mezzogiarr_o.
1. Cut Finance Capital Costs
Objectives: Reduce excessive costs and channel family savings
into productive businesses. At the same time, lay the
foundations for recapitalization of the industrial sys-
tem.
These particular ~hortcomings ha.~ both a short-term and a structural.
impact, and hence generate an increase in industry costs and a squeeze
on profit margins; they have a negative effect on capital accumulation,
whose growth is t~e~i to the level of interest rates.
Action: There must be some easing of regulations governing corporate
stock and bond issues and, more generally, those affecting all forms
of direct.raising of capital thraugh changes in current legislative and
administrative discipline, including changes to simplify the excessive
regulations imposed under existing corporate law.
Available tools for improving the conditions under which corporations�
must try to raise capital would seem to be these:
a. improve relations between the banks and corporations, both with re-
spect to general cooperation (exchange of information, joint lobbying
efforts on behalf of better legislation, and the like) and to specific
action (at ~oints of crisis); ~
b. approve a reassessment of the non-monetary assets of corporations
(Visentini-bis) to offset the effects of inflation on corporate budgets;
c. encourage patterns of financing that back up the traditional ones
(leasing, factoring, etc.), which are still woefully underdeveloped here
in Italy;
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d. pass a"reference law" for incentives, which would eliminate the
- contradictions and con�usion inherent in the present laws;
e. and,, on thE fiscal level:
introduce systems that woulc~ provide tax exempti~n for investments
in stock (along the lines of the Monory Act in France);
provide fair tax relief for savings deposits;
curtail the areas of discretion now enjoyed by government agencies.
2. ~oost Labor's Input into the Production Process
Objective: Bring the quantitative and qualitative contributio~a of
the labor fact~r up to the requirements of industrial growth
in the changing domestic and intermational context.
Acti.an: ~
It is possible to reach this goal if we have better performance, qua-
litatively and quantitatively, by labor on the job, perYiaps through some
mechanism for pegging paychecks:to performance, lowering al~sentee rates,
allowing flexibility in work assignments, making it possi~l~~ to adjust
personnel loads, and cutta.ng back on the non-productive labor load re-
sulting fxom laws designed to protect certain categories of workers.
Doing anything about the whole aspect of labor costs will require an
- examination in depth of the wage pattern and its indexing machinery,
and hence a reconsideration of the currently skew~ed ratio of direct and
indirect wages, and between direct wages and deferred wages.
Equally imperative will be steps toward structural modifications, such
as a move to remedy the heavy social burden placed on industry in this
country, which is far greater than the average in the Community. This
disparity in employer contributions is to a great extent the consequence
of the transfer of the burden of the costs of welfare intervention fin-
ancing tn corporate pension and benefit management, 3ahich ought by
- rights to be borne by the State.
As for labor productivity, it wi11 be necessary:
a. to restore direct job incentives, so as to peg take-home pay to the
auality and quantity of work done;
~i. to enable employerG, in response to market conditions, to reorganize
jab assignments on shifts whenever sa doing can allow a liigher ,Iev~1 of
utilization of plant at lower production costs;
c. to make in-house worker mobility a feasible option;
d. to increase the actual number of working hours per year, while keep-
- ing w.ithin the current cor.~tract limits or hours per diem, rnakira.g use
of adequate regulations to reduce the rate of excessive abse~teeism;
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- r~~ for labor-factor elasticity, though, what is needed is this:
~e-. regula~ions covering inter-company mobility so as to permit changes
i.~ work-force dimensions within each corporation, along with suitable
~provisions for placement of excess manpower elsewhere;
f. incentives for part-time work, eliminating additional costs and re-
gulatory uncertainties under welfare and benefit laws;
g. expan~ion of the areas in which term-contract labar is permitt~d;
, h. allowing the broadest possible scope for resort to overtime work,
coupled with elimination, in any case, of union recalcitrance toward
� application of existing contract rules;
- i. prod the Regions to action in the area of legislation on vocational
training through intervention designed to break such training down by
sector and by territory so as to take into accoun~ the f act that indus-
try but not only industry needs ever larger numbers of workers
- with skills adequate to modern production processes;
- 1. consequently to increase the funds available to the Regions for
vocational training, and to do so in such a way as to obtain broader
and more widespread support from the European Fund, but at the same
- time placin~; private enterprise on an equal footing with others, so
t?nat they can have access to these funds to finance vo~ational, tech-
nical, and managerial training courses for which the corporations now
foot the bill.
3. Expand Research and Technological Inn~vation
Objectives:
step up investments aimed at the areas of production which
- allow campanies to maintain and upgrade their positions
in international specialization.
Provide support out of existing public funds for highly innovative de-
velopment plans with a high potential for fallout.
Action:
We urgently need to get additional appropriations for the Applied Re-
search Fund at a level adequate to the requirements of swift recovery
on the part af Italian industry, also bearing in mind the f act that,
- unlike other countries, our public-sector input into research is mini-
mal.
We need to endow a fund for innovation, in line with the initial approach
which called for it to be earmarked predominantly for major programs
in a few clearly stipulated areas of production, so as to encourage a
prompt response to similar undertakings on behalf of our strongest inter-
national competitors.
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We need to set up a single poli~y-making center in the field of research
and development, endowed with institutional powers suitable to encourage,
coordinate, and orient the process of technological innovation and to
facil.itate its transfer into the productive system.
La6tly, we need ~ technology transfer policy designed to reach small
and medium industry, either through specific sector-wide policies or
througk~ a direct commitment from the public centers for specific re-
search, o:~ again through establishment and funding of specific initia-
tives for technical and org~nizational assistance to small companies.
_ Energy: Cut Cost and Improve Supplies
Ob j ect,:~ve : .
insure energy supplies adequate to the nation~s economic
growth, remedy the instability of energy supply costs,
and take steps to insure the requisite support for source
d~.versification.
Action :
We must push on with:
i. development of alternative and ancillary sources;
ii. our continuing active commitment to energy saving and conservation.
To this end, we must:
a. get started at once on the nuclear energy program already approved
by ParZiament, under conditions of complete safety to the population
and to workers engaged in the operation of such plants. The target
must be immediate startup of faur nuclear power plants;
b. hasten completion of ENEL's program for thermal and coal-fired in-
stallations (prompt approval of Bill ~02 of $ February 1980 and pos-
sible amendment of PL 339 of $ August 1975), as well as of an infra-
structure plan for more widespread use of coal as a replacement for oil
in some sectors of industry (cement, steel, plant-generated electricity,
- etc.
c. exploit uur domestic national reso~arces in the area of hydrocar-
bons and geothermal ~nergy, through a polic~ that will stimulate re-
search and exploitation and allow the broadest possible participation
- by applicants with the necessary qu~lifications;
d. pass Bill 2383 of 24 February 1981 on government intervention in~
the area of energy conservation and renewable energy sources;
- e. work out a development program for both research and applications
of renewable energy sources which identifie~ and coordinates the mis-
sions, agencies, and participa'~cing industries involved.
,7.
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Fu~t,l~ermore, we must :
~ f. expand in-plant generation of electric power, with particular em-
, pha,s~is on cogeneration of energy and heat, by removing all legislative,
j adrn~inistrative, and bureaucratic obstacles thereto;
g. provide incentives for expansion of hydroelectric installations run
b~ private companies and municipal utilities, through speedy approval
of Bill 2057 which encourages redesign of existing hydroelectric plants;
~
h. facilitate the gradual adjustment of industry structure so as to
~ tailor the weight of ~hose sectors which, although their contribution
to the GIP is relatively modest, are highly energy-intensive, more
suitably to the national ~�equirements.
- To achieve these objECtives it is vital to assure the most thorough
coordination at the administrative level through the establishment of
a special Interministerial Committee (or some similar structure) which
woL,.ld be responsible for the coordination and monitoring of the actual
implementation of the foregoing measures.
Improve Conditions for Raw Materials Supply
Objective:
Diversify sources to obtain more favorable supply terms.
In this context the supply problem must be approached
= fron. the three-fold aspect of quantities, prices, and
economies.
Action:
On the quantity count there should be little difficulty, since there is
a supply of non-renewable raw materials adequ~te ~o cover all predicted
requirements for many years to come.
The essential pr~oblem is that of maintainin~ conditions that wiil ensure
free access to supply sources.
~ To this end, we must devo~e the utmost attention to developments in the
now irreversible process of the international division of labor, so aa
to adapt our productive structure to the new demands of internati~nal
trade and to the current shifts in the context of world production.
As for prices, the problem takes on more immediacy under the impact of
price swings on our balance of payments, on our domestic price spstem,
and on the cost structures of the proc~ssing companies. The means we
have toward this end are these:
- a. work toward an efficacious regulation of markets ~through interna-
tional agreements on a product-by-product basis;
b. encourage, through adequate promotion and information on the part
- of the government as to conditions and outlook for the various markets,
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conclu~ion of long-term purchasing contracts at the corporate level,
or a start at joint ventures in the exploitation of profitable resour-
_ ces.
Along with such action which should be undertaken at the international
- level and which might do better in a Community context, we should set
~ about encouraging the likeliest ~fforts at the domestic level to reduce
- our dependence on foreign purrhases.
= Such initiatives can be broken down into two substantial approaches:
a. raw materials conservation (making more efficien~ use of raw mate-
rials in the production process; recycl.ing industrial by-products and
wastes);
b. more efficient exploitation of our domestic resources wherever it
is technically f easible and economically justified (mineral research,
reforestation, agricultural and livestock intensification and expan-
sion). This implies public intervention at the legislative and admi-
nistrative levels, through suitable incentive policies that will en-
courage adequate exploitation of al.l economically r~war3ing domestic
resources.
6. Rectify Our Forei,~n Trade Diseconomy
Objective:
Cut the penalties constituted by our handicap in
dealings with other countries, all of which weigh
- heavily on Italian industry.
Action:
To this end, intervention will be required in a number of specific
areas:
Telecommunications. In this field to whose strategic importance in
industrial policy we have already referred what is most urgently
_ needed is intervention in the public sector, specifically by orienting
the government toward mi~roelectronics and transmission of computer
data, and generally expanding data transmission and developr?~ent of data
banks. To this end, the following moves are required:
a. subject management of individual services to sound business crite-
ria, witl~ respect to corr~lation between costs and profits;
b. upgrade �the national Telex s3rstem by completing the changeover ~rom
mechanical to electronic exchanges;
c. speed up implementation of the overall telecoauaunications plan,
partly to put some order into the handling of public demand and to as-
sure industry in the sect or of some continuity in orders; meanwhile,
give prompt attention to t he management agencies~ investment plans;
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d. plan for phasing in new serv~.ces (dry copying, telex, videotex,
nationwide data transfer system, etc.);
devise a final solution for the crisis in the Italian Telephone Com-
pany [Sip Concessionaria);
f. take drastic measures to straighten out the postal service, enforc-
ing the approved steps toward s~reamlining its bureaucratic procedures .
and updating (automation) its distribution system. "
Transport. Any policy for this sector will call for carefully planned
- intervention at the overall level, as well as legislative action to
- bring Italy into line with the rest of the European nations in terms
of streamlining and simplifying regulations over individual modes of
travel.
To this end, we shall need to do the following:
a� hasten elaboration of the national transport plan, including orderly
provisions for providing se.rvices to the public and for ensuring a
steady flow of orders to the companies involved; at the_same time,
implement investment plans for the operating companies (supplementary
plan for the National Railroads, the National Road Board (ANAS), sub-
ways, and PL 483 on ports);
b. gradually get rid of bureaucratic red tape (customs and border ser-
vices; economic management of commercial railroad and port services);
consider permanent solutions to the crisis in the national railroad sys-
tem (Ff.Ss. reform bill);
c. start rail freight system rolling again altering the present
80/20 ratio between road and rail freight shipraents to 60/�0 includ-
ing upgrading of roadbeds, expansion of locomotive availability, with
special cars and one-cargo trains;
d. seek competitive patterns for intermodal transport among all modes
of transport, but concentrating on highway/rail and highway/maritime,
through establishment of an interport system and expansion of coastal
- shipping;
e. encourage operating autonomy for the ports (industrial ports and
small-scale specialized cargo handling f acilities).
Environment. Industry has every intention of mounting an all-out commit-
ment in planning, technology, and financing to action toward reducing
and controlling pollution. However, the environmental policy must be
integrated into the overall national economic and industrial policy, so
that priorities, objectives, resources, and institutional machinery can
- be ordered. More specifically, we need to do the following:
a. as soon as possible, fii.aiize the regulatory picture which is still
largely inadequate to provide firm legislative references for industry
and takes little or no account of industry's technological and economic
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b. provide public financing for corporate investments along the lines
of what is being done in the other EEC countries, and immediately phase
in the instruments for that purpose already approved (PL 675 and 650).
Government Regulation. Deregulatory measures should be adopted forth-
with, eliminating the arbitrary power of local and regional. bureaucra-
cies, abolishing aII procedures not strictly necessary to insure the
reliability of operations, simplifying procedures through extensive
use of computers, reducing the jurisdiction of price-setting agencies
to monopoly rates alone, and adopting technical standards in line with
standards currently used internationally.
At the regulatory level, it is clearly necessary to introduce the prin _
ciple which holds that government agencies, too, be subject to sanc-�
tions when they violate terms. For example, late payments must i*~clude
payraent of interest at current market rates; where control and audit
procedures are involved, the:e must be strict adherence to the prin-
ciple that silence imglies consent.
Distribution. In the distribution sector, which, like governmental re -
gulation, has a direct impact on industry's operations, we need:
a. to speed up the elimination of trade monopolies;
b. to amend PL 426/71 and its successors for planning of market dis-
tribution systems, which thus far have been only partially iraplemented
- and hence give rise to contradictory results;
c. to use legislation to encourage rnodern distribution practices (large-
scale distribution and associate distribution, supports for marketing
logistic s via central warehouses, refrigerator and freezer chains, etc.),
- centered around operating units endowed with adequate operating capital
and equipped with the logistical and operational machinery requisite
for present-day domestic and international marketing conditions.
'7. Stimulate the Process of
Internationalizing Italian Industry
_ Objective
The general problem is that of internationalizing the Italian economy,
in a context of supply-side policy which will reduce business uncertainty
and stiraulate and channel investment. In any casE, we must keep Italy's
exports strongly competitive and encourage the process of production
decentralization internationally. /The problem for Italian industry is,
in other words, to stay in the international marlcet and stay there un-
_ der sound competitive conditions./
Act ion
Support the process of internationalization, which can no longer be
viewed merely as a function of marketing products acquired within our
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boundaries an end which will in any event be pursued through upgrad-
in~ our sales structures abroad but also as expanding the acquisi-
tion by Italian companies of controlling interests in plants located
abroad, this latter as a function of:
a. acquiring technological know-how;
b. in the developing countries, providing the now indispensable ancil-
lary production f acilities in plants with low labor costs;
c. finding ways of getting around obstacles to direct penetration of
_ certain markets.
The Ossola Act (PL 22~) must be enforced down the line.
Our currency regulations must be updated and brought into line with EEC
legislation in the area of capital circulation into and out of Italy�
Equally necessary are the following:
a. step up the Fore~gn Trade Institute (ICE) activity and presence
abroad, on the assumption that I~E will be pulling out of the govern-
~ ment-controlled system;
b. encourage formation of specialized export units, such as voluntary
consortia, with particular attention to small and medium businesses;
c. mount closer guard over reciprocity conditions in international
trade for Italian products, implementing e~�fective quality control over
imported products, laying down more rigid domestic regulations and not
failing to apply countermeasures against trade partners who engage in
protectionist practices;
d. make the system of financial incentives for exports more aggressive
and competitive, and in particular extend the support already available
for medium- and long-term export operations to short-term operations as
well;
e. expand the ~~made in Italy" campaigns.
8. Siting Industrial Plants
in the Mezzogiorno
Objectives
The central objective is to get action under way to remedy or at least
offset our territorial imbalances. In contemplating the peculiar na-
ture of the Southern question as it relates to the Italian industrial
system, pursuit of this goal must be analyzed from two different angles:
one looking at /plant-siting programs in gen~ral, and the other at those
specifically keyed to the Mezzogiorno/.
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Insof ar as concerns /siting in general/, it is well to bear in mind the
fact that land management nowadays is increasingly coming under the jur-
isdic~ion of regional governments. National industrial policy must
therefore be confined in this respect primarily to matters of coordina-
tion and incentive.
Actian
As for the /political impact of land use/ on industry, the Regions should
channel their intervention primarily in these directions:
a. avoid allowing urban planning or land-use policy to take on a puni-
tive attitude toward industry, and go on f avoring residential building
or other aspects of land management, as has happened u~p to now;
b. speedily and clearly designate areas destined for industrial instal-
lations;
c. with all deliberate speed, come up with programs for the technical
infrastructures required in such areas, making use, wherever possible~
of consortia patterns which will take the place o~ current practices
under the extraordinary intervention act, and within which public owner-
ship and planning policy would be backed by managerial competence and
capabilities, and by active participation on the part of the user com-
_ panies.
As for the Mezzogiorno itself, the redefinition of the content and pro-
cedures for financial support for investments should be based upon se-
veral assumptions that would guarantee greater effectiveness:
a. Fi.nancial support should be aimed primarily at the company rather
than at the plant. The oonsequence of this would be that assistance
with interest payments wouldYiave:comparatively greater impact than would
sinking-fund contributions to corporate capital.
b. As a consequence, it would be best to launch practical programs of
real incentives, which should be based essentzally on the following:
financial and real estate leasing techniques;
intervention designed to expand and improve real services outside
the company (facilities for study, consultation, help with marketing
policies, insurance, etc.~, but stimulating the demand of Southern con-
cerns upon the specific sector, perhaps with suitable assistance;
preplanning and provision of servic~s~outside of the productive ac-
tivity proper, which involve a significant increase in investment costs
- (communication and transportation s~rvices, water and sewage plants,
social services); ,
encouragement of consortial init,iative, with the object of bringing
down the initial financial commitment for individual participants in
the enterprise, and bringing about a significant broadening of the po-
tential base for investment choices.
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c. The procedures and machinery for financial assistance must be sim-
plified and brought together in a single revised compendium just for
Mezzogiorno (but including all national legislation that may be rele-
vant), and which approaches the Mezzogiorno as a strategic variable.
d. The mac~iiner�y for application must be as autc~a~ic and camprehen-
sible as possible, reducing the scope of discretionary authority over
selection criteria and cutting down preliminary investigation time~.
Such investigation must be left to the lending institutions themsElves,
. with a check on legal compliance made a posteriori by the institute re-
sponsible fo~ extraordinary intervention.
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Table 1. Exports and Imports (as x of GIP)
Coimtries 1960 1970 1979
EXPOR~.'S .
Italy 14.1 17.7 28.1
Japan 11.1 10.7 11.8
U.S.A. 5.1 5.7 9.1
,~',e rmaay 19 . 0 21.1 25 . 5
France 15.0 16.3 22.0
Ikaited Ringdom 21.3 23.5 29.2
Spain 11.2 13.5 14.5
IMPORTS
Italy 14.3 17.2 26.7
Japan 10.6 9.5 12i6
U.S.A. 4.4 5.5 10.4
Germany 16.5 19.0 24.9
France 12.9 15.8 21.8
_ United Ringdom 22.6 22.5 29.0
Spain 8.2 14.4 14.6
Table 2. Financial Structure of Italian Industrial Corporations
. . ,
(in billicros of lire) 1968 1979
~ Ratio of aasets to to~~l indebtedness (a) 0.457 0.26X
New capital (theoretically) required to regain
0. 45 ratio ~.6, 400
Totaa. indebte~ness (a) 13,885 $7-;~88
Impact of fiuancial costs on grosa volume of
busineas (a) 3.97 5.7%
Total indebtedness of ItaJ.ian corporations (b) 32,664 154,094
SOUR(~S: (a) Mediobanca survey (b) Baak of Italy
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Table 3. Employment by Econoaic Areas (in
Countries 1960 1970 1979
A I S A I S A I S
Italy (Data unavailable) 18.5 39.4 42.1 13.4 36.9 49.7
Japan 30. 2 2 8. S 41. 3 1~. _4 35 . 7 46.9 11. 7 35.0 5 3. 3
U.S.A. 8.3 .33.6 58.1 4.5 34.4 61.1 3.7 31.2 65.1
cermany 14.0. 48.8 37.3 9.0 50.3 40.7 6,5 45.0 48.5
France 22. k 37. 8 39. 8 14.0 38. 8 47.2 9.1 37.1 53. 8
Uciited Ringdom 4.1 48.8 47.0 3.9 54.7 41.4 2.7 39.6 57.8
( 1980 figures, not 1979
A = Agriculture, forestry, fisheries
I = Indus try
S = Services
Table 4. Italy's Foreign Trade (in y)
Geographical Areas Imports Exports
1938 1960 1980 1938 1960 1980
Europe 62.7 54.7 59.1 51.7 62.3 66.5
_ EEC (the Nine) 38.6 34.4 43.8 31.1 37.4 47.5
Africa 7.7 6.8 11.0 27.4 6.7 10.3
North America u. d. 15.6 8.0 n. d. 11.6 5.9
U.S.A. 20.1 14.2 7.0 15.7 10.5 5.3
South America 11.9 6.0 4.3 7.5 7.6 3.7
Asia 7.2 13.4 16.9 4.1 8.7 11.4
Japan 0.3 0.7 1.3 0.2 0.4 0.9
- Oceania 1.9 3.0 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.7
Others 0.4 0.5 - 0.4 2.0 1.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
COPYRIC~iT: 1980 Editrice I1 Sole-24 Ore s.r.l.
6182
(50 : 310 4/ 336
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ECONOMIC UNITED KINGD~M .~~t
UK-USSR TRADE TIID TO IMPROVID RELATIONS
PM241455 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 24 Aug 81 p 1, 24
[Report by David Tonge: "Contracts May Depend On Improved UK-Soviet Relations"]
' [Text] The Soviet Union warned leading British companies tYiis weekend that major
contracts could depend on improved Anglo-Soviet relations.
_ Mr Vladimir Sushkov, the deputy minister of foreign trade, emphasised that the Soviet
Union was interested in long-term contracts with BP, British Steel Corporation and
Shell. He also held out the possibility of increased co-op~ratjon in power, light
industry, agriculture and the food industries.
But he linked econamic co-operation with "the problems of curbing the arms race,
disarmament and the strengthening of nations' security."
While favouring wider co-operation he added: "It is only natural that the Soviet
Union will promote more active economic relations... with the countries which are
its regular and reliable partners. ~
His statement was given by Novosti, the Soviet press agency, to the FINANCIAL TIMES�
in London.
- It is a mixture of carrot and stick. British officials suggest that Moscaw is keen
to underline thP commercial disadvantages for Britain of following the tough stance
which the Reag~an administration has adopted on both weapons and trade.
Mr Sushkov apparently wishes to discourage Britain from backing U.S. attempts to limit
the transfer of technology to the Soviet Union. The carrot in the Soviet approach to
the UK has been shown in a series of recent minor orders for ships repair.
He referred implicitly to the relatively strict British application of the Western
security e~mba:-go on technology transfer when he said the British market "has erected
- many ba~~riers" causing British companies often to lose large-scale contracts.
Equipment contracLS now under negotiation with the West totalled about roubles 2BN
(1,4BN pounds). He said British chances depended on the competitive abilities of
proposals, "on technological, commercial and other conditions."
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The companies mentioned by Mr Sushkov refused yesterday to comment on the political
side of his speech but confirmed their interest in Soviet business.
The deputy minister said that the Soviets were discussing a BSC proposal for a
long-term contract; BSC imports much of its iron ore from the Soviet Union and exports
its products such as strip for its South Wales works.
Mr Sushkov said: "It would be useful to form long-term economic relations with the
Shell Company.". Shell is involved in high-level talks with the Soviet Union on oil
technology, eacploration and production.
He also described as "important" the present negotiations with BP on oil exploration
in the Barents Sea and on possible British participation in the massive gas line
planned from West Siberia. He referred to a major agreement signed with ICI, and
contracts won by John Brown and Davy Corporation.
But he made clear Soviet anxieties about signing long-term contracts with countries
where there is a lack of common ground on international questions.
Three months ago, Mr Sushkov visited London for the first ministerial contacts between
the two countries since the Soviet invasion of Afghanis*_an.
Last year, British exports to the Soviet Union rose by 8 percent to 453M pounds while
imports fell by 5 percent to 786M pounds.
COPYRIGHT: The Financial Times Ltd, 1981
CSO: 3120/66
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POLITICAL ITALY
SPADOLINI HAILS 'SOLID' TIES WITH YUGOSLAVIA
PM251352 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 9 Aug 81 p 4
[Report on Prime Minister Giovanni Spadolini P August speech in Gorizia: "Italy
and Yugoslavia An Example for East and West"]
[Excerpt] Gorizia--Taking as his starting point the anniversary on which he was
speaking (it was on 8 August 1916 that the first Italian troops entered Gorfzia},
Spadolini discussed the problems of the area. He said that he believed 'tha~ "the
correct method is to include the completion of the Osimo agreement, tog~thex wit~i
other development initiatives, within the broader blueprint for inserting tlae
whole of the upper Adriatic area into the European economic integration process.
Among other things, this process implies the rational utilization of the ports af
Triest and Monfalcone."
Within this context Spadolini said that special emphasis must be given to improving
communicating routes (and the relative structure uf border crossings) between ~he
_ Adriatic cities and the neighboring countries.
"We are not unaware," he added, "that a great deal still remains to be done to
achieve the essential objective of the Osimo agreements: To make the border areas
the subject and instrument of increased exchanges and more intensive cooperation
between the two countries. The government is committed to continuing to act in
this direction, taking into account the expectations and suggestions of the popula-
tion of Gorizia and its province and acting in close consultation with the local
authorities."
Next Spadolini pointed out that "cooperation and friendship between Italy and
Yugoslavia, which are certainly open to increasingly varied forms of expression,
are regularly confirmed and put to good use in the fruitful exchanges of views
and consultations that are held between our countries, not only on bilateral
matters but also on subjects of general interest."
Having established this premise, the prime minister stated that "it is with sincere
satisfaction that the government again views the results achieved in terms of
strengthening mutual trust and extending mutual acquaintance with another state,
which constitute a worthy example on our continent of the possibility of countries
with differing political and social systems and differing international positions
building salid relations of cooperation based on mutual advantage and everyone's
benefit."
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.a.
CSO: 3104/362
19
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�
MILITARY INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
'THE T7MES' ON BENEFITS OF SPAIN'S JOINING NATO
PM 241454 London THE TIMES in English 24 Aug 81 p 9
[Editorial: "Spain Prepares To Join NATO"]
[Text] The Spanish government is carefully and deliberately going through the motions
of prPparing to join NATO. It announced over a year ago that it intended to apply,
with the aim of completing the process by 1983. Since then it has carried out sound-
ing with the 15 countries which now maice up the alliance; and this autumn it intends
to put the proposal to join before the Spanish P~rliament. A cabinet meeting last
week decided to ask for the opinion of the Council of State before submitting the
question to parliament. This deliberate approach is partly because of the importance
of the issue, both for Spain and for NATO, and partlq because of its great sensitivity.
Spanish entry to NATO is b eing opposed by the Spanish Co~mmunist Party, and by the
Socialists, the largest of the opposition parties. The Soviet Union is also strongly
opposed, and threats from Moscow are playing a part in the debate which is already
under way.
A number of reasons have prompted the Spanish government to decide to ~oin. The main
- one is the desire to return to the mainstream of Western and European diplomatic
activity after years of absence. Once democracy had been reestablished after Franco's
death, the first priority was membership of the European comm~nity; but that has been
temporarily stalled by ob3 ections from France. So now attention is being focused on
NATO. The hope, not necessarily well-founded, is that once Spain has proved its
Western credentials in that way, it will be harder to prevent it from.becoming a
member of the ca~mmunity. ~
Another, less publicized, reason is that me~mbership of NATO would keep the Spanish
armed forces busy and distract them from interference in Spanish internal a�fairs.
_ 5panish officers who met officers from other NATO countries would find a very differ-
ent attitude to public life. It can certainly not be guaranteed that membership would
deter the~m altogether from planning coup d'etat. It has not prevented coups in
Greece and Turkey in the past. But it would be a factor which would weigh in the
balance against futu~e military coups. In addition, membership would open the way to
NATO assistance in modernizing the Spanish armed forces, something that the army, in
particular, badlq needs. ~
For NATO, Spanish entry would bring definite advantages. ~Deriving largely from the
country's geographical situation, Spain is in a position to command mueh of the
Western Mediterranean and the Eastern Atlantic, by sea or by air. The Canary Islands
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lie on one of the West's main shipping lanes, by which some 65 percent of Western
Europe's oil arrives. For some years now, Madrid has had a treaty with the United
States which allaws the Americans ~o maintain certa3n important military bases in
Spain, and has provided a link with Western defence. The treaty is ~ust about to
expire, and negotiations are under way for its renewal, but membership of NATO would
estab lish a more comprehensive framework in which Spanish defence efforts could be
- coordinated with those of the rest of the alliance.
It is opposed by the Socialist Party because of a belief that Spain should follow
a more neutralist policy. Greater emphasis should be given, the Socialist believe, to
links with Latin America and the Arab world. They play on anti-Americanism, fostered
by the belief that the United States gave too much hacking to the Franco regime; and
- on the fear that memb ership of NATO would involve Spain in global conf licts which now
pass it by. This fear has been reinforced by statements from Moscow that ~oining ,
NATO would immediately put Spain ia the firing line--and also by recent actions of
the Reagan administration such as the decision to produce the neutron bomb and the
clash last week with Libya. In response the Spanish government has said that no
nuclear weapons would be allowed on Spanish soil.
For the Spanish right, there is another factor, the issue of Gibraltar. Most
- Spaniards consider that Gibraltar should be returned to Spain, but there are military
officers who feel that it would be impossible for them to sit down in Brussels with
representatives of Britain. Last year the previous Spanish government made an agree-
ment witta Britain in Lisbon by which the Spanish blockade would be lif ted and at the
same time negotiations begin between London and Madrid on Gibraltar's future. But
this was blocked by rightist pressure, and never put into effect. The need now is
to find some sort of formula--one, for instance, by which Gibraltar becomes a NATO,
rather than a British, base--which would satisfy the objections of the Spanish right
without infringing the principle that it is for the Gibraltarians to decide whether
- or not they want to j oin Spain.
For NATO as a whole, it is important not to put any pressure on Spain to join, or
~ even to seem to be doing do. It is a Spanish decision, and any attempt to interfere
could well produce a backlash that would be more damaging than a decision not to
join. NATO should simply make it clear that Spain will be very welcome if it does
deci.de to ~ oin.
COPYRIGHT: TIMES Newspapers Limited, 1981
~ CSO: 3120/66
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GENERAL FRANCE
SOLARIS UrII~lANNED ORBITAL SPACE STATION IINDEB STODY.
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 20 Jun 81 p 87
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Solaris, First French Orbital Space Station"]
[Text] At the recent Paris Air Show, Aeorspatiale_;unv~iled:,glaus.`far=the:Solaris
- orbital automated space station developed for the CNES [National Center for Space
- Studies].
The Solaris (Orbital Station and Autamated Laboratory for Space Rendezvous and Support
Activities) project is the end product of studies conducted these past few years by
the French industrial firms Aerospatiale and Matra, studies of an original French
orbital spac~ station concept that has produced the Minos and Trisat pro3ects.
This highlq comglex Solaris space system project is designed to demonstrate the
capability of conducting ambitious operational and industrial missions in space by
using the future Ariane 4(nonrecoverable) launch v~hicle and unmanned automated
spacecraft.
The goal of Aerospatiale's feasibility study is to permit CNES to offer this Solaris
project to its European partners as a major Community sgace program for the 1990-
2005 period. The pro3ect's magnitude is such that it cannot be conducted on a
strictly national level. The A~erospatiale study has also served to orient the CNES
research and development effort for the ne~at few years.
The Solaris pro~ ect is directed toward three missions of equal importance:
- a. Fabrication of materials at microgravity (less than 10-5G's), for the processing
- of a large amount of materials (up to 2 tons) in ari orbital station and returning the
finished products to earth;
b. Earth observation mission by fitting the station with a very high-performance
observation instrument (synthetic aperture radar);
_ c. Construction c~f large structures in orbit. This mission involves deploying and
assembling in space the sections of a large satellite that could not be placed in
orbit directly by a launch vehicle.
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~OR QFFICIAL I:SE UMi.~'
The Solaris system actually consi.:~t:r3 s,f
reveral associated satellites:
a. An orbital station ~n lov circular helio=aynchronous orbit as the central element
of the system, to hold and maintain payloads for each of the planned missions;
b. An automated mi.ni-shuttla fcrmed by the launch vehicle's orbital stage, to bring
supplies up to the statio~, return processed materials (or various pieces of
equipment) to earth and r~mcrv~ waste product~ from the station; ~
c. Tfao geostationary data-relay satellites to provide almost continuous data-relay
transmission ta the ground station and operations control center that would be
. located in Europ~.
However, these two satellites are nat specific to the Solaris system. They could
also serve as data rela~s for numerous other space missions, functioning like the
NASA TDRSS data-relay satwll~.C~s that are to replace tracking stations in the 1980's.
The orbital stat~on wi11 hav~e a design lifeticne of 15 years and be equipped with a
large high-powered (10 kilowatt) solar generator and a complex remote manipulator
system (a minimum of �our arma) car~trolled fr~m the ground. The station's
stabilization system ^Will limit residual acceleration to less than 10'SG's in the
oven during the entire materials pxocessing pnriod (4 months). The station will
also direct operation~ involving rendezvo;~~s w_-h the mini-shuttle as wEll as any
pos~ible loading and unloading of the spacecraft. For earth observation missions,
the station will also maintain accurate control of the orbit (with the capabi.lity of
_ limited excursio:~s in nearby orbirs). It will have a high-speed information
transmission capability--600 I~itg per aecond--for transmission of data from the
- SAR [synthetic aperture radar].
The automated mini-shuttle will be cap~ble of making two flights per year for a
period of 15 years. It will be used to deliver operational equipment, materials
for processing and obe~rvation instruments (radar, etc), as well as structures~to
be deployed in space. Ttie shuttle syatem will be designed to rendezvous with the
station at a very low docking apeed of 1 centimeter per second, and then return
recoverable materia.ls to earth by means of a reentry vehicle to be recovered at
sea in the territorial waters of French Guiana, South America, within an area of
about 300 kilometers by 360 kilometers :located in waters off the city of Cayenne.
ORBITE DE = SOLARIS y
1 ~
~ ~ 2
~ ~waq.~~.o.~~ ~ . lI,J ~I."$z~U ~f//OYII~OUF
. ~ . b - - ~ y,!,'f ~ ,
i~ . 4 . _ . "5..,~;~ , 7 -1
- ~ - ' _ ; ; ) ~,S
~ ',~_i _ _
, ~rV _ - I
i
. - r., . i -
� .H ,
~ _v--~ I / "
~ ._,~r-.'- _
' ~
- _ . ~ ; 4
, :.~~~~w
~
- 23
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Solaris Orbit
1. Helio=synchronous orbital space station
2. Automated spacecraft (VA) or mini-shuttle
3. 'Ifiao geosynchronous data-relay satellites: STAP. 1 and STAR 2
- 4. Geosynchronous [path]
5. Helio=synchronous
6. Equator
7. Ballistic reentry
STATION ORBITALE, CONFIGURATION DEPLOYEE
1
. =_.--_~t
~ 9
8 ~~~tanne la; ~
,u ~ 0 5~.,~-- .
11~' , ~ ~ �
2 - _ _ ;
~ , _ ; ,
~ r~ . - - - 1
' -~I,'~I'/~~ / ~i~~~,,~~~
~~Y
~_I ^I ~.i,_i_~_ i ~'G I 1 I
/1 . _ e-.la / _ ~
, I
~I v] .
3 LI~~ I~J ' f' ~ 1'~~J ~'~~I~I I
~,~6 ~~~`~'j; r;;; ~l i l' I , ~t -
~ : t:
~ , ~ � ~ 'I ~ ~ ~ g~ �
- ~ � - ~ - `~C~\ ~~`r ( .~-r. r~' ~ d
4 l. ~
/ , ' i ~ '�,I~
n-"",r._y ~ 1;`\\~ C~-'" I~/ Ii~ II %
~ yr I / ~i'' ~ \ j-~ �
~v~ ; f i(ii~'~ I i' : ~ /
i~
~ ~ ~ ~~~~'I ~I!i(II ~ 11 ~ 1~
/ ~ ~ ~I :iJ1Y011I~. ~~~fl~:v.~[ !~~(fa�Y~'~
/ ~ I ~ In`_~.'1.~a \ ':`~nie~t iJIJ:[e
I II Il]:.Jf. aJl
I I~~~IIit ~ ~ 'Ji~~~I!II .
Orbital Space Station in Deployed Configuration
- 1. Shroud of VA [automated spacecraft or mini-shuttle in raised position
2. Payload
3. Docking device
4. PCR [expansion unknown] ejection plate
- S. RSO [Rotating solar array] antenna
6. Docking approach sensor
7. Service.or utility modules
- 8. Opening into oven ~
9. Antenna for communications between orbital space station and STAR data-relay
satellites
10. High [low?]-temperature radiators
11. Communications with launch vehicle
_ 12. Antenna for communications with ground
- 13. Earth sensor
14. Sun sensor
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1981
80 41
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G~g~, ITALY
- PARLIAMENTARIANS DISCUSS SECURITY SERVICES
~
Franco Mazzola Speaks Out
Milan IL MONDO~in Italian 31 Jul 81 pp 12-14
[Interview with Franco Mazzola, Christian democrat from Cuneo, formerly in charge
~ of coordinating the security services, by Renzo Rosati]
[Text] Franco Mazzola, 45 years cld, a L'hristian democrat from
Cuneo, was under se:.retary in the prime minister's office respon-
sible for coordinating the security services. Therefore, under
Guilio Andreotti, Francesco Cossiga and Arnaldo Forlani, he served
as a political and operational supervisor of the security services.
Now Giovanni Spadolini has decided not to delegate authority.
According to many, this is a sign of criticism of past administra-
tions. Mazzola leaves the scene with some bitterness (he was
not even confirmed as under secretary), while controversial and
almost ~udicial discussions are woven around his office. Finally,
the accusations by the Rome Attorney's Office against Prefect
Walter Pelosi, head of CESIS [Executive Committee for Intelligence
and Security Services] and supposedly a member of P2, for having
requested the Finance Guard to spp on the minister of State Parti-
cipations, Gianni De Michelis and for having then forwarded the
- file to Licio Gelli.
Question: How could Pelosi take steps like that avoiding your supervision?
Answer: But I am not entirely convinced that Pelosi had De Michelis spied upon.
_ I am unaware that any CESIS document has been found in this connection.
- Question: Because a blackmail attempt is involved, it is plausible that letter-
head paper was avoided.
Answer: Of course, Pelosi may also have acted in an entirely personal way. How-
e~~er, I repeat, I am of the opinion that the truth is something else. I, and not
only I, had been aware of the De Michelis and the finance story for over 2 months.
Question: And what did you find out?
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Answer: Two months ago, precisely, the then Finance minister, Franco Reviglio,
informed me that De Michelis had learned that he was being sub~ected to an inves-
tigation by Office I of the Finance Guard. Office I, in turn., maintained that it
had received an order from Pelosi on behalf of CESIS. An oral order, and already
this seemed stra~gett~o me. Orders like that are not given or received orally. I
carried out an investigation in CESIS, a thorough investigation. I found nothing
proving that Pelosi had given that order to the Finance Guard, and, less so, I found
no copy of that file. At this point, it seems to me that it is a question of the
word of the Finance officers against Pelosi`s word. ~t any rate, I should like
to add a detail. Reviglio told me that Finance stated thattie had received the fa-
mous order in the middle of April 1980. At that time, I was temporarily out of
the government, because the under secretaries in the the second Cossiga government
were appointed on 5 April, while I was appointed a month later, on 6 May.
Question: Did Reviglio tell you from what source De Michelis had learned that he
was being spied on?
Answer: No. I believe that Reviglio did not even kncsw it.
Question: In any case,Finance~compil.ed that file. And then the file ended up with
Gelli. Does this Office`''I, then, operate as a separate secret service?
Answer: It is undoubtedly a question of departures. In order to prevent their
repetition, Law 801 on security services must be sppl,~d_' entirely to everyone.
This law specifies that intelligence tasks are limiCed to SISMI [Intelligence Ser-
vice for Military Security] and SISDE [Intelligence Service for Democratic Security].
Finace can concern itself solely with tax and currency fraud. If it has any other
kind of intelligence center, that center must be dismantled. I repeat, it suffices
to apply the law.
Question: But also top-level personnel in the regular secret services-c-SISMI, SISDE
and CESIS, appear on the P2 lists. And P2 has evaded political supervision.
- Answer: And how could we know who was on Gelli's lists? As far as I am aware,
the heads of the services were reliable and prepared from a technical and pseronal
point of view. Moreover, my position was strange. My sources of information, the
heads of the services, were, at the same time, also subjected to my investigations.
They have ohviously always denied belonging to P2. To whom should I turn for an
investigation? I repeat, however, that I have nothing with which to take exception
on Pelosi. He has always seemed to me very proper. It also seems to me that of
the prominent persons on the P2 list he wss one of the few who did not even have
a card number, a payment receipt, in short, not the slightest ob~ective evidence.
Question: Your personal secretary, Massimiliano Cencelli, is also on that list.
Did you not suspect that he was on it to spy on you? o.
Answer: No, Cencelli had no knowledge of the services. He was always concerned
with my constituency and with arranging my appointments.
Question: Falco Accame states that Cencelli appears on the CESIS payroll.
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Answer: I am not aware of that.
Question: Have qou ever become acquainted with Gelli?
Answer: Yes, I have met him. I met him once. And because I do not belong t0 atly
lodge, this is no crime.
Question: Under what circumstances did you meet Gel].i?
Answer: A qear and a half ago, in the buffet of the Grand Hotel.
~ Question: And do you remember why you went there?
Answer: It seems to me that it was a reception, a diplomatic cocktail party or
something like that. I was a guest among others. Gelli was also there precisely.
I gave so little importance to the thing, that I have no~ tha~g}it .about.it:.aga~tn unt:il
those lists came out.
Question: No one talked to you about the P2?
Answer: No, no one offered me membership. At any rate, I would have�refused it,
if for no other reason than that I am an individualist. I have not even joined
the Rotary Club or the Lions.
Question: Do you not feel a little left to one side?
Answer: No, I am content with not having reentered the government in that role.
A person should be in government rather long, but not too long. Otherwise one be-
comes ~ prisoner of being a prominent person. Moreover, ane.leads a harrowing life:
no privacy at all, escorted everywhere, armored automobiles. All these things "
finally weighed down on me a lot. And, then, I like active politics.
Question: Do you not have so~ sel~-criticism to make?
Answer: At any rate, I should criticize the law. The 1977 reform, which was good
on paper, turned out to be defective when actually put to a test. The services,
which were thus split into civilian and military fields of interest, make coordina-
tion very difficult, and it is almost impossibl~ to avoid internal conflicts. The
reform should be revised.. Certainly not to return to a single system, dangerous ~
without doubt, but rather to a differen.t division of sectors. That is to saq a
domestic service and an international intelligence service. After all, this is
the system preferred in almost every Western, democratic country in which there
is a consolidated tradition of security services.
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Pennacchini Interviewed
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 31 Jul 81 pp 12-13
[Interview with Erminio Pennacchini, Christian democrat, chairman of the parlia-
mentary rntelligence and Security Committee; time and place not given]
[Text] It is called the parliamentary Committee for Intel.ligence
and Security Services and for State Secrecy and it is responsible
for supervising the government so that the principles of the re-
form of the secret services are not violated. It consists of
eight members, between deputies and senators: four DC [Christian
Democratic Party, three PCI and one socialist. IL MONDO has in-
terviewed the committee chairman, Erminio Pennacchini, Christian
democrat, and Raimondo Ricci, communist, who is also one of the
authors of the reform.
"Let us make it clear immediately," Pennacchini said, "that we
have no power of decision on what the services do or undo. We
do not even have any"say in appointments. We can only summon
- the government representatives a posteriori or appeal to par-
liament."
Question: Are you aware that man~ candidates for top posts in the secret~s~rvices,
have withdrawn?
Answer: Yes, I am aware. And, unfortunately, they are not wrong. Abroad, these
are posts with enormous prestige. Here, they are either removed from office or end
up in prison at hard labor.
Question: Perhaps this would not happen, if the persons concerned did their duty.
Answer: As far as I know, up to now there have been no deviations. Not even by
tnose who appear on Lhe P2 lists. I have tound them to bc very compecec?t and pro-
per in their work.
Question: Even the former head of CESIS [Executive Co~ittee for Intelligence and
. Security Services]?
Answer: I still regard Walter Pelosi as an upright man. At any rate, we are going
to hear him in the next few days.
_ Question: The socialist Falca Accame also talks about padded payrolls, of hiring
of family members or of patronage hiring.
Answer: What Accame says is not always pure gold. At any rate, we have to be
_ clear. We cannot go look into the internal mechanisms of the services. Much less
in the payrolls. That would be ~~`_~imit.
Question: There also are some who say that~H.~~ Office I is actually a tha.fd
secret service, autonomous and illegal.
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[Answer] Then I shall add that there are a fourth, a fifth and a sixth service:
Carabinieri, police, other public and private organizations have intelligence cen-
ters. We must make up our minds to apply the law. Espionage, always for legiti-
mate purposes, must be permitted only to SISMI [Intelligence Service for Military
Security] and SISDE [Intelligence Service for Bemocratic Security].
Questiont And why is this law not applied?
Answer: There is a problem of ill will and also of incompetence. I should say,
however, that the spotlights cannot always be aimed at the services. I understand
criticisms, but not unsound insinuations.
Question: Are insinuations to blame?
Answer: I say that the secret services are the only state sector that cannot be
a glass housee There are people here who are risking their life.
Question: What about the P2 affair? Were you not warned of anything?
Answer: How could we be? I read in the newspapers that this P2 existed, but the
newspapers talk about so many things, also about pygmies in East Africa.
Question: Is it true that your relations with Under Secretary Francesco Mazzola
were not of the best?
Answer: I do not say that they were bad. We might have wanted more courtesy, how-
ever.
Question: Giovanni Spadolini has decided to concern himself personally with the
services. What do you think of that?
Answer: He is merely applying the letter of the law. We have to see if he will
be successi.l. Guilio Andreotti also tried it at first and then had to appoint
an under secrhtary.
Ricci on Corruption
Milan IL MONDO .Ln Italian 31 Jul 81 p 13
[Interview with ?taimondo Ricci, communist, member of the parliamentary Intelligence
and Security Comn~ittee; time and place not given]
[Text] Ac:.ording to Raimondo I~icci, Spadolini's decision, on
the other hand, is positive. "The prime minister seems to have
realized two things: that tlies~.~must_u,or be shadow areas in the
state apparatus and that the ~'fii~~e deserves political atten~
tion at the highest level."
Question: Is P2 an alarm signal?
Answer: Corruption has been considerable. Not only at the top, but precisely in
the operational departments, among intermediate level officials. I do not believe
that personal acts can be spoken of. The problem is institutional.
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Question: What observations are suggested by the Pelosi--De Michelis-Finance affair?
Answer: At first sight, it makes one think a lot of the old SIFAR [Armed Forces
Intelligence Service] systems. Yet Finance should concern itself only with fiscal
and currency matters. If it has a secret service, it must dismantle it.
Question: How are things going in SISMI [Intelligence Service for Mi.litary SecurityJ
and SISDE [Intelligence Service for Democratic SecuriCy]?
Answer: We have found much difficulty in the organization of SISDE. It has grown
too slowly. For SISMI, there was the problem of getting rid of the deadweight of
the old services. It cannot be said yet that the revamping is complete.
Then from the technical point of ~v~t;, the Bologna massacre, for example, revealed
rather scant intelligence on rightist subversion. But, on the whole, the services
- have functioned. There have also been some important successful achievements.
Question: Then, the reform has finally proven to be truly effective?
Answer: The reform is correct and should be supported, if not developed. Its prin-
ciples are thoroughly innovative. Formerly, the services were under the Defense
Staff. Regulations were issued time after time with secret circular letters. There
was no political responsibility whatsoever. A situation in which the law nf;is~tLght
makes right could easily find favor.
Question: You said, however,t'112t P2 has revealed an institutional corruption.
Answer: This is a very critical phase. Temptations to turn back might develop.
On the other hand, the individuals in the services are for the most part good and
valid with a desire to act. The important thing is for the clean forces to pre-
vail. The example of the neads, the climate that they will create will count much.
Question: What should be done politically?
Answer: The law necessarily has loopholes. Therefore, choice of the men is funda-
mental. It must be made with criteria of completence, honesty and loyalty to the
constitution. I believe that the government can b~ asked to motivate the choices
made, although without participating in the responsibility for appointments.
Question: Has Spadolini done well in proceeding so rapidly in revamping posts,
even though the matter of SISMI is still open?
Answer: I cannot evaluate the individual selections. But Spadolini has done well
in acting fast. Risks of unlawful acts are multiplied precisely in the interregnum
phase. SIFAR and SID [Defense Intelligence Service] files disappeared, while an
attempt was being made to prepare the new services and there was no political and
operational supervision and responsibility.
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981
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G~gg~, ITALY
CARLI INTERVIEWED ON WAGE INDEXATION
Milan IL MONDO in Italian 31 Jul 81 pp 16-17
[Interview with Guido Carli, president of the European Community Industrial Union,
. former governor of the Bank of Italy, former president of t'he~.Gener~i.Cnnfede~atiion
af Italian Industry; time and place not given] .
[Text] With the start of ineetings in the prime minister's o~fice
between government and labor unions, on Friday 17 July, the nego~:....~.:~....
t3.atton for the anti-inflation pact, proposed by Giovanni Spado-
lini to the social parties on the evening of 28 June, entered
an active stage. Wage indexation, on which controversial discus-
sions had been put on the back burner only momentarily, is once
more on the table, among the floating mines that may explode from
one minute to the next. IL MONDO talked, on this issue, which
was also indirectly the cause of splits between the employers,
with the former governor of the Bank of Italy and former presi-
dent of the General Confederation of Italian Industry, Guido
Carli, who agreed to answer questions, although he admitted
'Zt~Sh embarrassment, because I am convinced that the argument is
beginning to become oppressive." Carli is still president of
UNICE, the European Cnmmunity Industrial Union. �
Question: Cancellation of the agreement on wage indexation by the CONFINDUSTRIA
[General Conferation of Italian Industiy] was avoided at the last minute, owing
primarily to intervention.by the prime minister, According to the labor unions�
it would, in fact, have been a kind of declaration of war. According to the in-
dustrialists, who were pushing for this solution (the first to move was the pre-
sident of FIAT, Giovanni Agnelli), ft was only a way of discussing the cost of la-
bor again. Who was right?
Answer: In an interpretation of the attitudes of CONFINDUSTRIA it is necessary
to differentiate between objective and instruments. Conce=ning.:ohjectives, I~be-
lieve that there is agreement.of .opinions on the need for modifying the present
arrangement of wage indexation. This means that it is urgent to renegotiate the
agreements. The Xabox.uu~oa& have constantly refused to agree to negotiate on this
matter. Confirmation of this had led to singling-out in the denunciation.:of the
February 1975 agreement an~:instr-u~ent with which the labor unions would be com-
pelled ta negotiate. But the truth is distorted, when intentions of humiliating
the labor unions ar~ atrributed to the supporters of cancellation.
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Question: The employer front proved to be divided in the whole wage indexation
affair, not only on whether or not it is advisable to cancel the 1975 agreement,
but also on opinions on the relation between wage indexation and inflation. What
is your opinion on the subject?
Answer: Every triggering of wage iredexation causes a partial or total adjustment
in the workers' income depending on inflation. If companies can do so, they trans-
fer the increased costs stemming from this to prices. This process gives rise to
~ a sequence of actions and reactions that stops at a price level far higher than
the origi.nal one at which it was intended to adjust income. Wage indexation is
a cause of an increase in inflation. The use of mathematics makes it possible to
measure the multiplying effects of inflation caused by the present mechanism based
on a quarterly automatic increase. But recourse to mathematics entails..agxe~~.at
to use logical arguments. I am aware of the difficulty of introducing these argu-
ments in mass discussions. If monetary restriction prevents companies from trans-
ferring increased costs to prices, the process stops before reaching the maximum,
but the companies' profit and loss statements suffer from it and their capability
for investing and maintaining employment is decreased.
If the cost-income-price spiral is not broken, the monetary po~icy does not and
_ cannot attain the ob~ective of putting :an~ end to the inflationary process. It
is necessary to be resigned to the resultant loss of competitiveness and to entrust
correction to an exchange devaluation, but this rekindles the inflationary process.
Question: Are there al~o other criticisms to be made of the wage indexation sys-
tera?
Answer: Yes. Wage indexation decreases earnings, restricts the bargaining margin,
takes away bargaining power. The more this power is taken away from the labor
unions, the more they try to strengthen it, occupying new areas and thus strengthen-
ing the bonds that restrict the companies' capability of running their plants. Labor
productivity suffers from it.
An attempt to restore instantaneously the buying power eaten away by price increases
produces the effect of accelerating inflation, cancelling the effectiveness of the
monetary policy and pushing it toward excesses.
It is not important that the present wage indexation mechanism protects only 66
lire of every 100 lire of wages against inflation. This proportion would remain
constant, even if the nominal wage should increase 300 percent. In this case, wage
indexation would cover 198 lire of 300 lire nominal wage. Prices push income up-
wards and income pushes prices upwards and the proportions between these amounts
do not change, but rather are expressed in constantly higher nominal values.
Question: But if that is the way things are, why, finally, did the industrialists
reverse course? Only to please Spadolini and his new government?
Answer: The great ma~ority of the rank-and-file of CONFINDUSTRIA had invoked can-
cellation of the 1975 agreement. Because cancellation would have occurred while
the prime minister designate was trying to form the government, CONFINDUSTRIA
leaders decided to assume a prudent wait-and-see attitude. The prime minister had
stated that he was inclined to promote a meeting between the social parties and
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he was right in deciding after learning the results. The cautious behavior of
CONFINDUSTRIA helped convince public opinion that it intended to attain an objec-
tive--opening up negotiation--and that, in order to overcome the obstacles in its
way, it could not fail to propose cancellation of the agreement. It was acting
out of necessity. Spadolini's intervention achieved the result of inducing the
I.abor unions to agree to overall negotiation on wage stru~ture without ruling out
wage indexation. In spite of the fact that I have no direct information, I doubt
that this calmed the concerns of the confederation rank-and-file, because exper-
ience leads to misturst.
Question: Concretely, what might be an alternative to the present wage indexation
system? Are you aware if the industrialists have a proposal of their own to put
forward?
Answer: I do not believe that when the rank-and-file demanded cancellation of the
agreement, it was clearly aware of the features of what might replace it, but it
perceived that there was an urgent need for a change and it wanted a change and
it was confident that it would bring about a different order, more consistent with
the interests of production. A series of proposals for replacing the present sys-
tem emerged with the help of some of the best economists. Some industrial countries
have already shown that it is possible to ad~ust wage indexation to the need for
holding back inflation. In our case, in spite of signs of an easing off that showed
up in June, the current inflation makes it necessary today, no less than yesterday,
for protection of the real wage not to give rise of itself to effects of diffusion
of inflationary stimuli. But correction would be impossible, if a broader margin
should not be restored to collective bargaining by limiting the area occupied by
- automatic increases.
Question: There have been many controversial discussions on the form of the nego-
tiations between the government, the employers and the labor unions. Are you or ~
are you not in favor of three-way negotiations?
Answer: I do not believe that trilateral meetings are indispensable. The parties
can learn the government's objectives separately and can comply with them by con-
ducting bilateral negotiations.
Question: In spite of the reported distortions of wage indexation, especially with
regard to labor cost, many companies have made and still are making substantial
prof.its in recent years. How do qou explain that? .
Answer: To the objection that, in spite of the distortion caused by wage indexa-
tion, small businesses, a large number of inedium-sized companies and some large
companies have obtained profits, I reply that this shows that the amount of money
in~ected in the economy has kept demand up to a level at which companies have mar-
keted their products by raising prices to an extent sufficient for covering costs
and for acquiring abundant profits. That confirms the fact that the ad3ustment
~ was made in an atmosphere of inflationary expectations.
Question: In your opinion, how much did these inflationary expectations contribute
also to causing the recent stbck market shakeup?
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Answer: Inflat5~mwa:ry expectations led the public to buy shares at rising prices
without paying any or very little attention to yields. The monetary restriction
- seemed not to have been heeded. It seems that recently it has been heeded and that
does not seem to me to be a negative sign. The authorities reacted faultlessly
by giving priority to the need for disciplining the stock market operation in ways
suitable for giving the public the maximum amount of information and by refusing
to turn it into a subsidized institution. The more behaviors distorting the formation
of quotations are limited and the more this reflects expectations of earnings by
companies, the more the employment of savings in shares will protect against the
consequences of inflation. Therefore, the decision not to exceed in granting tax
relief to investors who have the actual advantage of indexation of their investment
seems wise to me. If relief judged to be excessive were granted, the demand for
= protecting dependent labor income by relieving it from the consequences of the tax
drain would have better grounds.
Question: In short, would it not be fair to make two weights and two measures?
Answer: It would seem to me unfair to facilitate indexation of profits and to reject
indexation of wages.
COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981
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G~gg~ ITAL,Y
MEDICAL CARE AT ROME POLIG'LINICO HOSPITAL DEPLORABLE
Milan PANORAMA in I~alian 20 Jul 81 p 59
[Article by Silvana Bevione: "That Hospital Is Ready to Be Condemned."]
[TextJ By night the police preside and sometimes even search it. By day it is a
constant scene of thefts, purse-snatchings and assaults. From one~s first gllm~se
it pr~esents a spectacle of neglect, filth, povertq and misery. .
It is not a slum in Naples or a red-light distrtct. It is the Rome Pollclinico,
the city's largest and most important hospital, the symbol of all the evils
afflicting Italian hospitals.
A study of the Policlinico done recently by Axel (an information a~gency founded a
few mAnths ago by a group of young people who have declared thems~lves resolved to
"finally take the lid off the pot of Italian decadence") has broul;ht to light a
dismaying and disgraceful situation. ~'The emergency room is like the plague
house described by Manzoni, only Brother Cr3.stoforo isn~t even thexe," Francesco
Santoro, director of Axel, says bitterly and ironically.
"Beds piled up, patients even put two to a bed." '
~tao nurses must care for at least 60 patients without gauze, hypodermics or
medic3nes. Their dressing room is near the garbage room. Their lanatory (two+
toilets for everyone) is also used by the patients. The doctors ~ust run back
- and forth sorting out the patients, who stream in onlq to wait for up to a week
in the corridors on mattresses lacking even sheets.
Axel decries one fact above all: a year after the introduction of the health
reform thp only noticeable change in the Policlinico is its name. The hosp3.ta1,
formerly named after Umberto I, is now called Usl Rm3, for Unita sanitaria locale
Roma 3(Local health unit Rome 3). Everything else has remained unchanged.
In 1973 the Policlinico staff complained: ~'The elevators don~t work and the
patients are transported at the risk of the orderlies. The ch3mney flue fills
~ the hospital with dirt. Babies in the pediatric ward miss meals because of the
lack of staff. Dead newborn babies are stacked up in the refrigerators because
there is no one to record their deaths. Ants and cockroaches infest even the
incubators."
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In 1980, 7 years later, a patienr was literally attacked by ants in his bed, and
one m~rning ~n April a dumbfounded or.derly found an enormous dead rat reposing
on the kitchen dumbwaiter in place of the dinner to be distributed to the patients.
Reports coming fz~vm the t~ospital irom day to day now are anything but reassuring~
Antonio Fara, a 70-y~ar-L:d man living on a pension, died of perforation of the
- intestines and peritoni[is without the doctors even noticing it, while the
medical director, klario ,Zeoni, was indicted for felony. The ward heads of fourteen
divisions, in a letter addressed to the administration of the hospital, "Declined
all responsibility for pdtient care and sanitary conditions in their divisions."
But it is above all the stark data, in their dramatic simplicity, which show how
far down the drain th~e Rome Polic2infco hras gone. Four thousand beds in a
building built at the beginning of the century for one thousand at the most.
Fifty or sixty parientsf usualZy, in wards designed for thirty and having no
showers and only ~l~ree bathroom.g. Six bedpans must make do for everyone, and
there are only i:rau or three hypodermir_s. The staff is very small and is obliged to
do killin~ sh~zfts, often undertaking duties fer which it is neither competent
nor prepared. Whenever possible, pati~s~t~ pay a private nurse (called a"badante")
_ costing up to ~~~,~00 lire per night,.~~d it is customary by now to send for
hypodermic~, sheets and food from home.
Violence is the rule rather thar. t~e exception at the Policlinico, and is both
cause and effect nf a situati.on which 3s ~etting more explosive every day. Savage
~trikes en~anger the patients' livea. Juvenile delinquents raid the wards and
attack the medical dfrectors and dactors. There are daily fights among opposing
political facti.ons, drug addicts, enraged relatives and nurses. To top it all off
the hospital is deluged witrr communiques purported to be from the Red Brigades
threatening blood~ retaliations.
"It's heart-brea.king to see all this vileness and filth here,~' says Guido
Chidichimo, a heart surgeon wh~ .res~gned fram Rome`s Sar Camillo Hospital on the
fifth of May in protest. "It~~ lncredible k~ow far the deteriorat3on of Rome's
hospitals has gone. In my opinion the medical directors are to blame. It isn~t
enough to ask for help and cc~~pl~~n verbally. It is thei.r precise job, as
defined by law, to guarante2 thc~ sani*_ary facilities of the hospital. If they
can't do it, let them follow m~,r example and resign en masse.~'
Axel feels that the blame lies higher up, with the politicians. Others feel it is
more di�fuse, rooted in soci.ety itself. Francesco Marabotto, national secretary
of the Tribunal for the Rights of the Patient, feels that people's apathy is to
blame. "We have to learn to protest, to check up on things, to re~ect illegal
- acts which have become habitual," he says. "Things that have been taken for
granted so far must become a source of indignation and scandal tomorrow.~'
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Arnoldo Mondadori Editore S.p.A. Milano
9855 END
CSO: 3104/346
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400050022-8