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JPRS ID: 9768 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USF. ONLY JPRS L/9768 3 June 1981 ~ - , USSR Re ort - p MILITARY AFFAIRS ~ CFOUO 6/81) ? ~ F~IS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATiON SERVICE - FOR OFFICIAL USE O1VL~' APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024407-8 NOTE JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from tiews agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, wiCh the original phrasing and other characteristics retained. Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets ~ are supplied by JPRS. Processing indica_~ors such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each it~~m, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the oY�iginal information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor- mation was summarized or extracted. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques- tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in cantext. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an - item originar.e with the source. Times within items are as _ given by source. The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli- cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government. - COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OW~IERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEi~tIi~ATION OF 1'HIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE O~iLY. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFICi 4L U~~ ONLY JPRS L/9768 3 June 1981 ~ USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS ~ (FOUO 6/81) - CONTENTS - MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSiJES Book Describes Soviet Views on Helsinki Accords - (KURSOM KIiEL'SINKSKIKH DOGOVORENNOSTEY, 198U,~ 1 ARMED FORCES ' Ideological Collection Offers Suggestions to Military Political - Workers (IDEYNAYA ZAKAIKA VOYENNYKH KADROV, 1979) 42 - a [ II I- USS~t - 4 FOUO] , _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFFCIAL USE ONLY - MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES BOOK DESCRIBES SOVIET VIEWS ON HELSINKI ACCORDS Moscow KLTRSOM KHEL'SINKSKIKH DOGOVORENNOSTEY in Russian 1980 pp 1, 2, 3-6, 63-112, 217-219, 224 [Table of Contents, Introduction, the Chapter on "Military Detente: An Urgent Task of the Present Time" and the Conclusion from the book by S, Vladimirav and L. Teplov, - editecl by V. I. Stepakov} [Fxcerpts] Title i'age: _ Title: KURSOM KHEL'SINKSKIKH DOGOVORENNUSTEY (On the Course of the Helsinki Accords) Publisher: Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya _ Place and year of pL~?~lication: Moscow, 1980 Signed to Press Date: S August 1980 ~ Number of Copies Published: 10,000 - Number of Pages: 224 Brief Description: ~ _ The book discloses the specif ic content of the peace-loving initiatives which have been undertaken by the Soviet Union along with the other countries of the socialist commonwealth for implementing the Final Act of the Conference on Security and ~ Cooperation in Europe, it unmasks the activities of NATO and the military indus- trial complexes of the Western powers, pri.marily the United States, which are act- L ing against the Helsinki Accords. The book is designed f or specialists in international affairs and readers who are interested in urgent problems of international life. ~ Tab1e of Contents = [ Introduction] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Final Act--A Code of Standards for Peaceful Coexistence 7 _ For Strengthening Peace in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 - 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 ~ ~ _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y Military Detente: An Urgent Task of the Present Time . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 The Mate-rialization of Detente in the Economic Sphere . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Subversive Activities by the Opponents of the flelsinki Accor.ds 160 = - 'i'he 1'rogressive Forces in the Struggle f or Security and Cooperation in Lurope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 [Introduction] - _ 1 August 1980 marks the 5th anniversary of the signing in the Finnish capital of Helsinki of the Final Act of the C~nference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The confc:rence was called upon the initiative of the socialist ~ountries. Signed by the leaders of 33 European states as well as by the United States and Canada, _ thi:, doc~aaent is of truly historical significance for the fates of the peoples of Europe and the entire world. In taking a long view of the Final Act, the General - Secretary of the CPSU Central Comimittee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, emphasized in his speech at the all- - ~uropean conference: "The document being signed by us is a broad but clear plat- ~ for.m for ttie action~ of states on a unilateral, bilateral and multilateral basis for years an3 possibly decades to come."1 r~ can be said that literally from the first day of signing the Final Act, the - Soviet Union, together with the fraternal socialist nations, have fought steadily - and consistently for the unswerving and strict fulfiliment of all provisions of ~ ' thls document, without exception, fully and in all areas--political, economic and - humanitar.�ian. The USSR has fought to extend political detente and complement it ~oi~h military detente. Precisely the policy of primarily the socialist countries can ser:~e and actually does serve as a model of an honest, conscientious and cre- ative app~oach to carrying out the Helsinki Accords. In a.~tin$ in accord witti the letter and spirit of the Final Act, the countries of tlle socialist commonwealth in recent years have made a whole series of important constructive proposals aimed at implementing and developing the provisions contained _ in this document. At meetings of the Political Consultative Committee [PCC], at sessions of the Foreign Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Pact Organization and at other joi.nt forums and ~^.eetings, the socialist countries by concrete deeds and ini- tiatives convincingly affirmed and today aff irm the signif icance which they give to tl?e ciuest~~~~i thae a treaty be concluded between all the signatory states on not being ri~:~t to employ either nuclear or conventional weapons against each other. ,oncl.udiiig o� such a treaty would fundamentally strengthen the political and .~~^al f oundation for observing the principle of the renunciation of force or the ~r;~at ot force in ~urope, it would raise its effectiveness and thereby create new - ,.,+~arantees ~.gainst the unleashing of military conflicts on the European contineat. ~i~~ same Cime the Warsaw Pact countries stated that they were ready: 1. i Tu a~;r~~e on preliminary notification of signifi~ant traop movements in Europe - ~ir.~:i on large-scalc air force and naval exercises conducted close to the territorial = - ~::,itE~r, c,f oth~~r Helsinki signatories; 'j 'fo ahrt~e on the nonextension of military-political groupings in Eurupe, on - - litni~i.ng the level of mil.itary exercises and on extending the confidence measures ro the region of Che Mediterranean. Parc~r._~tlar ,lttention amor~ the governments and public in the West was focused on the E~roposal of the Warsaw Pact countries to convene a conference on the political level wi~l~ tl~c ~articipation of a11 the European states, the United States and Canada for r~~v~c�i,~~; ~,necific steps for ttie purposes of lesseniug the military confrontation ~:~ncl . ancing military detente in Europe. Seemi~l~ly, having in front of them such an extensive range of proposals by the USSR a~id it5 Warsaw Pact allies, the Western Helsinki signatories would act as the Iic~l.sinlci Accords require and to which their signatures were affixed. Certainly no - ~ n~~ could disputc~ ttie fact that all the mentioned proposals conformed to the spirit 10 FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFiCIAI. USE ONLY of tiie Final Act wliich urged that everything necessary be done to ensure the cle- velopment of European international relations along a path of the consistent strengthening of peacef ul coexistence and the supplementing of political detente by military detente . - Unlortuna tely, by the end of 1979, the question of the further development of in- - ternational relations in Europe had not only not approached its solutian, but, on tlie contrary, had taken on particular acuteness. This was due to the plans to pro- duce and deploy on the territory of a number of the Western European vATO states qualitatively new American medium-range nuclear missiles aimed at the USSR and its - allies. The carry~ing ou.t of these militaristic plans would substantially alter the strategic situation in Europe, as this would shatter the equilibrium existing on the continent between the military forces of the two social systems, socialist and capitalist. Certainly the Warsaw Pact which would never permit NATO military superiority would - be forced. to take measures in response and a new increase in the arms race would - be inevitable. In order not to permit such a dar_gerous development of events for the cause of - European and universal peace, the USSR, together with its Warsaw Pact allies, showed true political boldness and set an examp~e of good will, having proposed, it can be - said, a program for strengthening peace in Europe. This, without exaggeration, his- toric initiative was contained in the speech given by L. I. Brezhnev on 6 October 1979, in Berlin during the days of celebrating the 30th anniversary of the GDR. _ The contents of the Program for the Strengthening`of Peace in Europe encompass all the basic aspects of military detente. It contains an appeal: ~ a) To reduce the number of nuclear weapons on the European land. An effective way to this exists, and the Soviet Union has stated its readiness to do its part. More- over, as a gesture of good will, the Soviet Union expressed a readiness to unilater- ally reduce, in comparison with the present level, the number of inedium-range nuclear weapons deployed in the western regions of the USSR, but, of course, only in the event that Western Europe would not deploy additional mediur.i-range nuclear weapons. Slmultaneously the Soviet Unio;i proposed an immediate start to talks on reducing - - medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. It was also stipulated that the previously made proposals to pull out of the Mediterranean the Soviet and American - ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons wcauld remain in effect and that the USSR _ supported the plan proposed by the President of Finland U. Kekkonen to turn Northern Europe into nuclear-free zone. b) To renounce--for all states participating in the European conference--the use of both nuclear and nonnuclear weapons against one another. In this regard it was clearly stated that the Soviet Union would never begin to employ nuclear weapons against those states which refused the production or acquisition of such weapons and - did not have them on their territory. The Soviet Union was ready to draw up a cor- responding obligation with any interested state. c) To red uce the armed forces and weapons in Central Europe, an issue which had _ _ been under discussion in Vienna since 1973. In order to make headway in these talks 11 FOR ~FFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY aiid give them a new impetus, the Soviet Uniun took the decision--wikh the agreement of the GDR leadership and after consultation with the other Warsaw Pact members-- to snilaterall~ reduce the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe (specif ically it was a questi.on of pulling back up to 20,000 Soviet servicemen, 1,000 tanks as ~ - well as a definite quantity of other military equipmez~t from GDR territory onto Soviet territory within a period of 12 months).. d) To carry out measures aimed at strengthening trust, such as: to provide noti- fication on major troop exercises of ground forces not 21 days before, as had been . abreed upon in Helsinki, but a longer period before, and not on a level of 25,000 men but rather 20,000; not to conduct exercises involving more than 40,000-50,000 s~rvicemen; to provide notification on major air force exercises and naval maneuvers conducted close to the territorial waters of the other signatory states; to provide preliminary notificatian on movements of ground f orces numbering more than 20,000 F , men in the zone defined in the Helsinki Act. - Ttie Soviet Union considered a European-wide political conference on military detente and disarmament to be the most appropriate place for discussing the broad range of mcasures relating to r~lilitary detente and hence conf idence-building measures. The carrying out of the program for strengthening peace in Europe as proposed on e 6 October 1979 would not provide any unilateral advantages for the USSR or any other socialist country. All the nations of the continent would gain from its realiza- tion. The military threat in Europe would be reduced and a lessening~of tension - wo~il~~i he deepened and broadened. '1'i~e program for the strengthening of peace in Europe proposed on 6 October 1979 in Berlin was unanimausly supported by the fraternal socialist countries.6 A session o� tiie Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee held on 5-6 December in the capital o: tYie GDR noted that the new initiatives contained in the speech of L. I. Erezhnev c~f 6 October 1979 were a major contribution to solving the problems of military detente on the European continent. On I~et~alF of their states, the ministers participating in the session appealed to tl~~ governments of the NATO r_ations to reexamine the situation which existed in - Europe and not to undertake actions which would complicate the situation on the cuntinent. At the same time it was stated that the taking of the decision by the NATO Council to produce and deploy the new types of American medium-�range nuclear ~ missiles in Western Europe and the acting on such a decision would destroy the basis Eor talks. Tl~e iiiinisters had grounds for such a statement as the preliminary taking of a deci- sion for a"build-up" would mean an attempt by NATO to conduct the talks from a ~ "E~osition of strength." This was fully and frankly admitted by the Commander-in- Chi~_~~~ oE the Joint NATO Forces in Europe, Gen B. Rogers, who stated: "In order to be ons and tlieir destruction and requested that the Disarmament ~ommittee in Geneva be first concerned with working out an appropriate agreement considering all ttie existing proposals and future initiatives submitted for its review. I,~ t;,~~ course of the Vienna meeting in June 1979 between the Soviet and U.S. lead- er.;;, botti sides affirmed the importance of an universal, complete and supervisable b an on chemical weapons and agreed to increase their eff~rts to prepare a coordi- n a~ed joint proposal for submission to the Disarmament Committee. Soon after the V ienna meeting, the co~nittee was given a Soviet-American statement on the course of tt~e bilateral talkG from which it could be seen that definite, and in a number 34 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 l~OR UI~FICIAL IISE ONI.Y - of instances, significant progress had been made in the talks. At the same time, slow progress was being made on certain important points. - A majority of the cammittee members expressed satisfaction with the bilateral an- nouncement and participated in the discussion. The line of the more active in- - volvement of the com~?ittee in the work on the basic proposals of the future conven- - tion was fully and completely supported by the Soviet delegation which recalled that the Soviet state virtually from the first days of its existence had demanded a ban on chemical weapons. In particular, it was stated that the Soviet Union fully share the opinion of the broadest group of states on the urgent need for an imme- diate ban on chemical weapons as well as their concern over the absence of an in- ternational agreement on this matter. - The Disarmament Committee, proceeding fram the view that a ban on chemical weapons was one of the most immediate and vitally important problems in the disa~_menr _ area, decided to continue talks on this question in 1980 as well. The USSR was among those UN member s~ates which at the 34th UN General Assembly Ses- _ sion urged an immediate conclusion to an international convention~on banning nuclear weapons. In the opinion of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact members, a limitation on the so-called com*entional types of weapons could also serve well the cause of military detente. Their diversity and power and their lethal strength had risen man~fold in comparison with the period of World War II. As was shown by the example of Vietnam, bombing raids with modern so-called conventional bombs have such conse- quences that f or measuring their destructive force it would be possible almost to employ those criteria for assessing the destructive might of nuclear weapons. In the postwar years all acts of aggression have been carried out exclusively with the use of conventional weapons. And at present the peoples fighting against col- onial suppression are the victims of the use of precisely conventional weapons. . Israeli aggression against the Arab states and peoples was also carried out, as is - lcnown, using conventional weapons. "Certainly it is a fact," said A. A. Gromyko, "that 80 percent of the world expendi- tures on military needs go for conventional arms. How many people in the postwar period alone have become victims of the use of weapons which are termed convention- al but which now possess--due to the amazing accuracy as well as the complete de- struction of large areas--the most lethal power!"22 - For this reason the task of approving real measures to reduce aviation, artillery, tanks and other modern types of conventional arms, and likewise the armed forces - equipped with them, has in no way lost its urgency. The Warsaw Pact members were proceeding from this when they pointed out in the Bucharest Declaration (1976) that - they "gave great significance to concluding agreements on reducing armed forces and conventional arms.i23 The socialist countries, as is known, have repeatedly made specific proposals on this question. The Soviet Union is sincerely ready to conduct talks on reducing armed forces and - armaments. It has repeatedly stated this on various levels. The readiness for - 35 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY talks on this question was mentioned, in particular, in the memorand~n of the - Soviet Union on the questions of halting the arms race and disarmament submitted to the IIN General Assembly in September 1976.24 On 25 April 1978, L. I. Brezhnev came forward with a proposal to give up the en- larging of armies and increasing the conventional weapons of the states which were permanent members of the Security Council and the countries linked to them by mili- tary agreements. If there were a desire by all states possessing large armed forces to conduct talks on the conventional types of weapons, then positive results and constructive accords could be reached. The Soviet Union, in acting in the spirit of the Final Act, together with its allies has worked actively to eliminate all foreign military bases on foreign territories and ror the withdrawal of foreign troops from them. The urgency of this problem has been e~nphasized by the fact that by the aut~n of 1979, an enormous number of such bases existed throughout the world, including in Western Europe. The U.S. Presi- dent J. Carter stated: "We have created too many military bases overseas." Accord- _ ing to official data alone, the Pentagon had approximately 2,500 various military - installations located in more than 30 nations of the world, including in nations _ which signed the Final Act.25 Ln Western Europe the American military bases in 197y were uianned by 340,000 Ameri- can soldiers and officers, including around 240,000 in the FRG, more than 20,000 in - ~:n~la~id, more than 12,000 in Italy, 4,800 in Turkey and 3,700 in Greece. The U.S. "resident stated that ~h~ Pentagon was maintaining its troops on the territories of other countries as well and "some of them are very ciose to the frontiers of the Soviet Union." The Warsaw Pact has acted decidedly to solve this question both on a global scale and in term~ of the individual continents. But there has been no progress here, and tl~is cannot help but cause concern. The Soviet Union, together with the other Warsaw Pact nations, is ready to collaborate actively and constructively in settl- ing the given question. In November 1976, great attention was given to it again at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact PCC in Bucharest. ~ Two years later, in November 1978, the Warsaw Pact nations, in the Moscow Declara- tion of the PCC, reaffirmed their consistent position in favor of elimina~ing mili- tary bases on foreign territories and pulling foreign troops out of the territories ol other states, including European ones. ' Tt~e ensuring of security in the Mediterranean would be a major contribution to dcf~pening the process of military detente in Europe as well as beyond it as this - re~;ion encompasses more than 20 nations of Europe, Africa and Asia. The Soviet UI110[1 is a supporter of moving on to constructive talks and practical steps in a direction of e:{tending military detente into the Mediterranean. - "We want," said L. I. Brezhnev, "the Mediterranean Sea to become a sea of peace, good neighbors and cooperation."26 The Soviet Union and the other socialis t nations are ready to increase their contribution to the practical embodi.ment of this noble = task which meets the interests of all the Mediterranean peoples. _ 36 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 _ FOR OFFICIAL USF. ONLY - At tiie Buctiarest Session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee in May 1979, the USSR and the other socialist countries stated their readiness to extend all measures which would strengthen detente and confidence in Europe as well to the Mediterranean. The Soviet proposal remained in eff ect to withdraw from the Medi- terrancan the Soviet and American ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons; this had been proposed Uy L. I. Brezhnev in July 1974. The vital importance of the propos als of the USSR and its allies vis-a-vis the Mediterranean is obvious. It has been proposed that new types of nuclear missile weapons--Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles--be deployed in one of the nations of this region, Italy. And this in addition to the American forward based weapons which already exist there! Understandably, such actions could only be detrimental ~ to the security of the Mediterranean and to all the nations of Western Europe which _ signed the Final Act. To prevent such a development of events is the aim of the proposals of the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist commanwealth. In the opinion of the Soviet Union and all the Warsaw Pact members, an effective measure in the area of military detente would be a reduction in the military bud- - gets of the states which possess a great military and economic potential. The re- sources released in this instance could be channeled into the economic and social progress of peoples, at raising the economic growth rate, providing employment, developing new sources of energy, solving the food problem, combating diseases and building new schools and institutions of higher learning. A reduction of a milit~ry budget i s a most visible indicator of in what direction = one or another nation intends to work on the world scene, that is, toward war or toward peace. The share of military expenditures in tlie budget of the Soviet Union _ itself in recent years has systema tically declined. In 1976, expenditures were 17.4 billion rubles, or 7.8 percen t o~ all the expenditures of the budget, in 1977, 17.2 billion, or 7.2 percent, in 1978, 17.2 billion, or 7 percent, and in 1979, _ - 17.2 billion rubles were allocated for these purposes, or 6.8 percent.27 _ ~ The Warsaw Pact countries, starting in 1973, have repeatedly made proposals to re- d uce military budgets and by their actions have set an example in this regard. At thc 31st UN General Assembly Se ssion the Soviet Union reaffirmed its proposal to reduce military budgets and, in endeavoring to put this important matter on a = practical basis, stated that it wa s ready to assume a flexible position on the issue of the specific f igure from which the reduction in military budgets should start. It would Ue possible to agree both on a larger figure than 10 percent or on a smaller one as the first step. However, it was important to make this question _ more rapidly a matter of business-like talks between the concerned states. At the Bucharest Conference of the ~'~C in November 1976, the Warsaw Pact affirmed its sup- port for the idea of reducing the military budgets of states. - The socialist countries are convinced th~t it is possible and necessary to replace the current constant rise in the military expenditurPS of many states by their sys- tematic reduction. The Soviet Uni on favors having the nations which possess a - great economic and military potential, including the permanent members of the Security Council, agree on specif ic amounts for reducing their military budgets - either in a percentage or in absol ute terms. It insisted that such a reduction 37 - FOR OFFICIAL IJSE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02109: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Start in 1979 and cover a 3-year period. Some 10 percent of the funds freed from _ tlie reduction could be spent on increasing aid to the developing nations. It is not the fault of tt~e Soviet Union that this vitally important question continues to remain unsolved. A number of useful initiatives in the area of disarmament were proposed by the socialist nations which signed the Helsinki Accords in the course of the 34th UN General Assembl;~ Session, having demonstrated their leadi.ng role in the struggle to - halt the arms race. The General Assembly approved the declaration proposed by the Czechoslovak delegation on i.nternational cooperation for the purposes of disarma- ment. This declaration represents an unique code of standards for conducting dis- armament talks . The GDR played an active role in the drafting and adopting of a rasolution .on increasing efforts aimed at disarmament and checking the arms race. ' FOOTNOTES l. See PRAVDA, 2 August 1975. 2. Ibid. 3 . Ib id . 4. See PRAVDA, 22 Uctober 1977. r~ . ;~ee PREIVDA, 24 November 1978. 6. See PRAVDA, 7 October 1979. - 7. PRAVDA, 2 August 1975. 8. "~taterialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 24. _ 9, See PRAVDA, 23 Juty 1976. - 10. See MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I r1EZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 11, 1977, p 113. 11. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom," Vol 7, Moscow, 1979, pp 297-298. 12. Sec: PRAVDA, 29 June 1979. 13. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 5, pp 337-338. 14. Ibid., Vol 6, p 292. 15. "~iaterialy XXV S"yezda KPSS," p 38. 16. I,. I. Brezhnev, op, cit. , Vol 7, p 266. 17. "Radi Mira na Zemle: Sovetsko-Amerikanskaya Vstrecha na Vysshem UrovnE v Vene, 15-18 Iyunya 1979 Goda. Dokumenty, Rechi, Materialy" [For the Sake of Peace _ _ in the World: The Soviet-American Summit Meeting in Vienna, 15-18 June 1979. Documents, Speeches, Materials], Moscow, 1979, p 32. - 38 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024407-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 18. Ibid., pp 68-69. _ 19. PRAVDA, 2b June 1979. 20. L. I, Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 7, p 296. 21. Ibid., Vol 5, p 377. 22. A. A. Gromyko, "Vo Imya Torzhestva Leninskoy Vneshney Politiki. Izbrannyye Rechi i Stat'i" [In the Name of the Triumph of Leninist Foreign Policy. Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1977, p 540. _ 23. "Soveshchaniye Politicheskogo Konsul'tativnogo Komiteta Gosudarstv--Uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora. Bukharest, 25-26 Noyabrya 1976 Goda" [Meeting of the - _ Warsaw Pact PCC. Bucharest, 25-26 November 1976], p 14. _ 24. See PRAVDA, 30 September 1976. 25. See KR.ASNAYA ZVEZDA, 30 September 1979. 26. L. I. Brezhnev, op. cit., Vol 7, p 448. - - 27. See MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 2, 1979, p 102. - [Conclusion; pp 217-219] In May 1980, international life celebrated a maj or event, the meeting of the War saw Pact PCC. The conference was a new affirmation of the profound adherence and firm determination of the fraternal countries to continue the struggle to strengthen security and to develop cooperation in Europe, for universal peace, liberty and in- dependence of peoples, f or international detente, for halting the arms race and f or disarmament. - - The conference unanimously approved documents of enormous political significance. These were the Declaration and Statement which give a complete program for detente~ and they indicate the ways and means for strengthening European and world peace. The socialist countries reaffirmed their readiness for a constructive dialogue with all the interested states. They advanced an exceptionally important proposal to - agree that, beginning at a def inite, approved date, no state or no grouping of states in Europe would increase the size of their armed forces in the region de- - fined by the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Warsaw Pact members favored careful and intensive preparations for the Madrid Meeting set for the end of 1980 and fcar conducting it in a constructive and business-like spirit. The Declaration firmly and clearly stated that the concl u- sion of the Madrid Meeting by positive and concrete results would have a benef ic ial effect on the overall state of the international atmosphere. - The Warsaw Pact countries favored accelerated preparations for s conf erence on - military detente and disarmament in Europe and the holding of multilateral - 39 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 ~ FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY preliminary consultations by the representatives of the stat'es which would partici- ~ate in the proposed conference. They were in favor of the Madrid Meeting approv- ing practical decisions on the tasks of the conference, on the dates, place and procedure of its holding and on the agenda for its stage ha~ing concentrated the conference's work on confidence-building measures. As for the place of holding the _ conference, rhe conference participants supported the proposal to convene it in the capital of Poland, Warsaw. They also pointed to the necessity of increasing efforts for the purpose of rapidly achieving agreement on various areas of limiting and halting the arms race. The immediate tasks in this area, along with ratif ication of the Soviet-American - Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2), were the rapid t~ringing to a successful conclusion of the talks on: 1) Complete and universal banning of nuclear weapons testing; 2) Banning radiological weapons; 3) Banning chemical weapons and destroying their stocks; 4) The nonuse of nuclear waapons against nonnuclear states who do not have them - on tlieir territory and the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of _ states where they do not presently exist. The reaching of agreement on each of these measures, the Declaration emphasizes, ' would help to improve the international situation and the successful conclusion of the talks would be a major achievement for the good of mankind. The socialist countries proposed an immediate start to business-like talks on the ~ following urgent measures in the area of halting the arms race and reducing the . threat of war; 1) The concluding of a world treaty on the renunciation of force; 2~ `rlle halting of nuclear wea_pons production and a gradual Eeduction in their stockpiles until their complete elimination; 3) Banning the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruc- tion; = 4) Reducing military budgets, primarily of the large states; 5) Restricting and reducing the level of military presence and military activities _ in thc corresponding regions, be it the Atlantic, Indian or Pacific oceans, the ~teditcrranear~ Sea or Persian Gulf . - At tl~e meeting in Warsaw, in addition, a separate Statement was approved. The - liigher leadership of the countries r~presented at the conference proposed that in the immediate future a summit meeting be held for the leaders of states from all regions of the world. Such a meeting could focus attention on the key questions of 40 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL1l - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 ~~uk ut~~~tc't,~i. [~st~: c~u~.v - international life and outline the ways for eliminating centers of international ~ t~nsion. '1'h~ ciocum~nts of the Warsaw meeting were permeated with a profound belief that even the most confused and complicated problems, global or regional, could be settled I~y ~>c>li tical means. This applics also to the problems of a Ncar East settlement ~md tc~ tli~~ l1in~ r i.can-Irani.an conf licL. In -spcaking after the signing of the conference documents, L. I. Brezhnev said: "[n the present complex situation, when millions of people fear for the fate of detente and peace, ~rom Warsaw there rings a clear warning against a policy of military adventures and feverish arms race; there rings a voice of reason and peace and an aff irmation of will to cooperate in solving acute problems of the modern world."1 FOOTNOT~ 1. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom," Vol 5, p 339. COPYRIGHT : "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1980 10272 C5o : 1801 / 205 41 FOR OFFCCIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FQR OFFICIAL USE ONLY = ARMED FORCES IDEOLOGICAL COLLECTION OFFERS SUGGESTIONS TO MILI TARY POLITICAL WORKERS - Moscow IDEYNAYA ZAKALKA VOYENNYId3 KADROV in Russian 1979 (signed to press 26 Jun 79) pp 2, 63-93, 107-116, 128 [Annotation, table of contents, and selected articles from book "Tdeological Conditioning of Military Personnel", Soviet Army a::~? *?avy Main Political Directorate, - Voyenizdat, 100,000 copies, 128 pages] [Text] This collection of articles discusses the problems and experience of - commanders, political organs, and party organizations involved in the ideoloqical and theoretical conditioning of officers in light of decisions of the 25th CPSU ~ Congress and decrees subsequently adopted by the party Central Committee. - 'Pt:i:; book is intended for commanders, political workers, and elected party officials. Contents Page A. I. Sorokin, "Pressing Problems in Ideological-Theoretical Conditioning of Officers" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 N. I. Smorigo, "An Integrated Approach to Indoctrination" . . . . . . . . . . 19 - V. P. Lukin, "Ways for Improving Marxist-Leninist Training" . . . . . . . . . 34 P. Panzhinskiy, "In Close Association With the Tasks of Military Development" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 M. I. Yasyukov, "The Study of Methodological Problems of Mi.litary - Theory and Practice" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 D. A. Volkogonov, "T'he Ideological Struggle and Indoctrination of Troops" 75 B. A. Vasil'yev, "The Basic Method for Mastering Marxist-Leninist Theory" 94 ' I. N. Petrov, "Organization of Po3.itical Information forOfficers" 107 - N. V. Cherednichenko, "Active Propagandists of the Ideals of. Marxism-Leninsm" 117 "The Study of Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice", by Major General M. I. Yasyukov, Chief, Department of Marxism-Leninism, Militaxy Academy of - ' the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov The attention devoted by commanders and political personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy to the methodology of military theory and practice has risen noticeably in recent years. There are a number of reasons for this. 42 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE OAIY.Y I'irst, the missions facing axmy and navy personnel today have growii more complex. Together with fraternal armies of countries in the socialist fraternicy, ~i~e 5oviet Armed Forces are dependably protecting the revolutionary achievements and peaceful labor of their peoples against the aggressive transgressions of imperialism, and they are serving as the bulwark of peace in all the world. Army and navy personnel - spare no effort to maintain high combat readiness in the units and formations. The complex problems of military development require an integrated approach to their solution, and full consideration of the economic, politicai, and ideological factors of social life. One of the theoretical prerequisites for solving these problems is methodologically mature thinking by executive personn~l. - Second, development of military affai~s becoming increasingly more dynamic today. The influence of the scientific-technical revolution upon the army and navy is growing. The resources of warfare are being updated intensively, and qualitatively new forms of weapons and combat equipment are appearing with ever-greater frequency, - which makes updating the methods and forms of combat unavoidable. As a result there - is an increasing need for military personnel to maintain a creative approach to their work, and a convergence of their practical and scientific activities is occurring. Introduction of scientific methods into the style of their leadership is making their greater methodological sophistication necessary. Third, today's ideological battles are becoming more acute, making it necessary, as = was emphasized in the CPSU Central Co~ni.ttee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination", to decisively reveal the antipopular, antihumanitarian essence of modern capitalism, and expose the hegemonist, big-power course of Beijing rulers, their aggressive aspirations, and their alignment with the forces of reaction and war. All of these tasks demand constant attenti~n toward the philosophical and methodological aspects of the personnel's ideological- theoretical training. Responding to this trend, back in the mid-1960's the Soviet Armed Forces began creating special study plans and programs fer commanders and political leaders, - foreseeing the studying of a number o.f ineLhodological problems in military theory and practice. The broad methodological problems of armed forces develo~ment and the working style = of military personnel--scientific prediction, military creativity, and so on-- were examined concurrently. The scope of inethodological problems studied at a number of military academies and military institutes was expanded by the addition of the methodological aspects of the natural and technical sciences. Thus for many _ years the professors and instructors of the Military Air Engineering Academy imeni N. Ye. Zhukovskiy have been studying the subject "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy--the Methodology of the Natural, Technical, and Social Sciences, and the Theory and Practice of Military Affairs". In addition to the proceedings of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses and traditional methodological problems, they examine special issues, for example: "The Methodological Principles of Evaluating the Combat Effectiveness of Aviation Equipment", "Social, Class, and Gnoseological Principles of the Creative Activity of the Soviet Military Scientist and O~~1Cij. Another fact of great significance was that a number of training aids, including the book "Metologicheskiye problemy voyennoy teorii i praktiki" [Methodological Problems of Military Theory and Practice], which has b~=:a published in two editions, were prepared in conjunction with the initiation of the study of inethodological problems. 43 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONY.Y - The concept "methodological problems of theory and practice" underwent concurrent enrichment, and its scope was determined more clearly. It was emphasized that: this concept pertained to that range of problems of Marxist-Leninist doctrine which have a direct, dominant influence upor. the development of military science, and which aFfect cognitiori and practice in military aiiaiLs. Consequently by the time the study plans used in the Marxist-Leninist training of = officers, generals, and admirals today were developed and adopted, a certain amount of experience had already been accumulated in the study of inethodo- logical problems by executive personnel. - One riew aspect was that these plans examine@ the methodological problems of military theory and practice in light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. The con- gress proceedings contain a number of basic premises having great philosophical and metho~?~logical significance to the activities of militaxy personnel. T'hey - include the social role of Marxism-Leninism, the sources of military danger today, the just nature of the struggle of peoples for social and national liberation, the need for strengthening the military-political alliance of the socialist countries, - support of the popular struggle of liberation against imperialist aggression, ~he = need for high alertness arid constant combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, and others. Obviously, the new study plan called for studying the proceedings of the 25th CPSU _ Cor~c~ress fram a certain point of view, devoting special attention to the unity of thP ~nilosophical and methodological aspects of a number of the most important ~ ~ruvisions. - Also noteworthy is the fact that scientific conferences devoted to L. I. Brezhnev's books "Malaya zemlya" [The Little Land], "Vozrozhdeniye" [Resurrection], and "Tselina" [Virgin Soil] were held in the armed forces. These conferences had great ~.r~fiuence in terms of improving the methodological preparedness of military execu- _ tives. Efforts to organize study groups for commanders and political workers improved significantly since then. Commanders, political organs, and party committees and _ organizations carefully selected the composition of group's working on the third _ study plan. They considered not only the position occupied by a communist but also his experience as an executive, the level of his general and military training, and tiis ability to independently assimilate philosophical study material. PY~ominent military leaders and political workers, the chiefs of higher headquarters directorates, their deputies, and generals and admirals having considerable ex- perience in leadership and propaganda were appointed as qroup leaders. Lectures wer.e given by highly qualified specialists--professors and instructors from military ir~~titutions of higher education and scientific research institutes. Generals and officers representing the executive staff speak on a certain topic. ~ Party committees and persons directly responsible for organizing the lectures arrange interviews with the lecturers beforehand, orienting the latter as to the com~osition of the audience, its needs, and the need for tying the study material in closely with the practical tasks of the generals and officers. 44 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONY.Y - One of the main tasks facing both lecturers and seminar leaders and participants is to isolate the methodological aspect of problems under examination and demonstrate how the premises of Marxism-Leninism are to be used as the methodological tools for solving important theoretical and practical problems. Experienced executives keep this constantly in the center of their attention, explaining that assimilation of knowledge is only the first prerequisite of using it. Learning how to use this knowledge is a more complex problem. The range of problems associated with the essence of inethodology and its most im- portant principles was examined in the lecture "The 25th CPSU Congress on the Social _ Role of Marxist-Leninism. Marxist-Leninist Theory--the Philosophical and Methodo- logical Foundation of a Scientific Understanding of War" as well as in the seminar "War, Its Socioeconomic Rnots, Causes, and Essence. The 25th CPSU Congress on the Sources of Military Danger". Lecturers laid special emphasis on explaining the concept "methodology", emphasizing that any theory that is broader than the particular problems involved can serve methodoloqical functions. But only Marxism-Leninism in general, and especially its philosophical foundation--that is, the teaching on the most general laws governing development of nature, society, and thinking--can perform the role of a universal methodology. Using the methodology of Marxism-Leninism correctly means acquiring new kiiowledge and solving new practical problems with reliance upon Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Clarification of these problems has made it possible to correctly agproach - isolation of the complex of inethodological problems associated with the Marxist- Leninist teaching on war. Practice has shown that the mosr co~~ect approach to organizing seminars on this subject matter included, first of all, deep clarification of the essence of Lenin's _ definition of war as a continuation of state policy by the resources of armed violence. - A correct understanding of the essence and content of war was, to the participants of Marxist-Leninist training groups, the dependable methodological basis for discussing - a number of new problems typical of recent wars. Lenin's definition of war is pre- _ cisely what makes it necessary to meticulously analyze imperialism's modern policy and the world's military-political situation. Discussing these issues, the study group participants made broad use of the basic assessments of :he international situation made by the 25th CPSU Congress, and found in the works of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium _ of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnzv. What is very important is that the seminars thoroughly demonstrated the sources of military danger today. Seminar Narticipants exposed the attempts of the most reactionary circles of imperialism to interrupt the triawing of the international climate, to force the arms race, and to incite new centers of military conflict in differ.ent regions of the globe. Special attention was turned to the evaluations made by the 25th CPSU Congress of the provo- cative policy of the Beijing leadership, which in its anti-Sovietism essentially aligns itself with the policy of the most aggressive forces of the imperialist camp. Many groups participating in the seminar "The Social Nature, Types, and Forms of _ Modern Wars" made competent use of Lenin's premises to analyze local wars of the - postwar era, especially in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, and in Africa. In 45 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 ~ FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONY,Y addition to clarifying the social nature of these wars, some participants touched upon the military-technical aspects, forms, and methods of combat activities. This approach to discussing the issues contained within the seminar plan made it possible ~o use the methodology of Marxism-Leninism to successfully assimilate the combat experience of the postwar era and to arrive at conclusions important Lo improviny personnel training and indoctrination. It is important that many generals and officers associated the theoretical premises with their own practical efforts at raising the combat readiness of the army and navy units and formations. Interesting and instructive seminars were conducted on material s of the 25th CPSU - Congress associated with the ideological duel in war and peace. Both the lecturers and seminar leaders provided initial orientation to the group participants in Lenin's principles of criticizing bourgeois ideology. It was namely with examination of these fundamental issues that such lessons began. Only after clarifying all of - the ideological wealth of these principles did the participants go on to a criticism of concrete viewpoints of bourgeois ideologists, and their theoretical conceptions. Moreover much attention was devoted nat only to the strategic directions of bourgeois propaganda but also to exposing its tactical maneuvers and day-to-day practice. In - this connection the sociological, psychological, and biological conceptions of war contained in bourgeois literature were subjected to criticism, and the falseness of _ t}ie fabrications of an alledged "military threat" was revealed. 'I'~: methodological problems of Soviet military development were studied in the second year. Attention was centered on problems such as the army and its place in the ~olitical system of Soviet society, its development in an environment of mature socialism, the laws governing the functions of the USSR Armed Forces, and the ways for strengthening their fighting power. - 'I'he methods employed in the lessons became more diverse. In the group led by Comrade G. P. Skorikov, for example, seminars begin as a rule with discussion of a repor~. After such a report is given, the material is reorganized in final form, and th~n used as the material in a lecture given to the personnel by the officer _ or general who had prepared the report. Thus a semr.r_ar on the topic "Economic, Sociopolitical, and Ideological Foundations ~f Soviet Military Development in the Conditions of Developed Socialism" was preceded by a report on the problem "2'he _ Party's Economic Strategy and Development of the Material Basis for Further Reinforce- mc~nt of the Defense Capability of the Country and the Armed Forces". It was compe- tently demonstrated in the course of the report that the economic achievements of the USSR are having a favorable influence, strengthening its defense capabilities. Moreover the listeners expressed interest in a special section of the report con- c~rning economic integration of the Warsaw Pacz countries, and the significance of such integration to strengthening the fighting power of the allied armies. After the report was given, the seminar leader encouraged the group participants to discuss the key problems of the topic. In riis statement, he pointed out that the participants of the discussion should make broader and fuller use of the pror.eedings of the 25th CPSU Congress and subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee, and of the speech given at a meeting of active party members of the Ministry of Defense 46 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONY.Y by CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the _ Sovict Union D. F. Ustinov, laying special emphasis on the essence and influence of the party's economic strategy upon the country's defense capabilities. Those attending the seminar participated quite actively. They significantly supple- mented the report, illuminating a number of the most important problems of the topic. The viewpoints of Engels and Lenin on the dependence of the army and navy on economic conditions were thorougfi,ly analyzed, and the methodological significance of the works of Marxist-Leninist classicists on these issues to Soviet military development was demonstrated. _ Special emphasis should be laid on the fact that the participants tried to tie the _ subject matter of the seminar in with their practical missions. Much attention was devoted to economic integration of countries in the socialist fraternity, and to the significance of such integration to their defense capabilities. An interesting and instructive discussion evolved on the most important methodologi- cal premises associated with the topic. Discussing the theoretical problems, the seminar participants considered the practical activities of generals and officers. - This is precisely the typical feature of the seminar which its leader, Comrade _ G. P. Skorikov noted in his concluding remarks. He encouraged the report's author to rewrite it with a consideration for the statements of the seminar participants, and to publish it in the form of a pamphlet. Sununarizing the statements made in the seminar, G. P. Skorikov gave a detailed description of the basic ways economic integration of the socialist countries is influencing their defensive power. _ Noting the merits of this seminar, we must also venture a number of suggestions on _ improving its conduct. In my opinion some of the speakers did not reveal the - - methodological aspect of the problems under examination with sufficient clearness, as a result of which the specific applications of the seminar were lost to some extent. Certain comrades, particularly the author o~ the report, relied too much on the written text, making it difficult for the participants to perceive the _ material. What is needed is lively, creative discussion in keeping with the position and training level of the participants. In addition to the seminar method examined above--that is, listening to and dis- cussing a report, another proven method is that of beginning discussion of the problems contained in the seminar plan immediately after the leader's introductory remarks. An example of this is a seminar conducted by Communist P. Ya. Samokhodskiy. The lesson was organized in such a way that many of the participants were able to take the floor several times in the course of the animated discussion, supplementing - and developing the thoughts of their comrades. One such person revealed the role of science in strengthening the USSR's defense capability, offered broad generaliza- tions on the theory associated with this issue, and revealed how methodological - _ principles could be utilized to solve the concrete problems associated with developing the military-technical base of the Soviet Armed Forces. Another participant devoted his talk to the principal trends in the economy and their influence on the fighting power of the army and navy; he brought up much interesting material which itself _ became the object of a lively discussion. 47 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONi.Y Communist P. Ya. Samokhodskiy actively led the work of the seminar, competently guiding the discussion with additional questions, brief commentaries, and substan- tial generalizations of each problem in the study plan. When itseemed to him that the participants were becoming d~stracted by purely military-technical issues, he turned their attention to one of the fundamental premises of the Marxist-Lenii~ist teaching on war and t ie ur:;:1~--the thesis of the decisive role of man in war. It should be noted that the participants of the group responded well to the guiding influence of the group leader. They thoroughly discussed the "man-machine" problem and examined the ways to raise the effectiveness of indoctrination in the army and navy and amplify the role of the military collective. An extremely important contribution was made to the discussion of the seminar's subject matter by Communist Ye. A. Kovalev, who examined the problem of managing indc~trination. W'hat was valuable about his talk was that it contained a number of practical recommendations on milit~xy-patriotic indoctrination of the young. Such an intimate relationship between broad theoretical relationships and methodo- logical principles on one hand and the practical issues and day-to-day activities of the participants on the other imparted a certain degree of relevancy to the seminar, eliciting great interest in the participants and predetermining the creative nature of the discussion. It should be noted that the high ideological-theoretical and ~ethodological level of seminars conducted in these and othe~ groups is the result of the great organiza- tio~~al efforts of party committees and party organizations and the product of the sui~si.antial effort of the students to study the recommended literature. Another factor which had a positive influence on the quality of the lessons is that some units and directorates now write up seminar plans and lists of recommended literature for the entire training year. Collective and individual consultation and _ exchanges of work experience are organized. Problems associated with Marxist-Leninist training are regularly discussed at party meetings and by the party bureau. Reports by communists on their independent effo.rts at studying the works of Marxist-Leninist classicists and the recommended literature are now being given more frequently. In the course of discussion of such reports, communists receive additional advice on improving their personal system of independent study. I~arty committees are now exercising more active control over the course of the hlarXist-Leninist training afforded to the group participants. Attending the lessons, party committee members frequently engage actively in discussion of pro- blems in the study plan, making proposals on ways to improve the seminar techniques. Sem~nars are regularly held for seminar leaders in a number of places. In one of them,for example, Colonel General M. A. Garayev gave an instructive report to the generals and officers of General Headquarters directorates. Complex problems in the study plans are clarified, the methods to be used in forthcominq lessons are worked out, and positive experience is exchanged at seminars of this level. 48 - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 - FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY Party committees devoted special attention to the concluding period of the training year. The plan of the final lesson is prepared meticulously. It includes four or five of the most important problems studied during the year, and the list of liter- ature is written up with a consideratio;i for recently published party and government - documents. One acceptable plan for such a concluding lesson was that used in a number of methodological seminars sponsored by the central administration of the Ministry of Defense. The lesson topic was "The CPSU's Leadership--the Fundamental Principle of Soviet Military Development. Basic Laws Governing Development of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Role of Science in Strengthening the Soviet Azmy and Navy". . - The plan for the seminar included the report "The CPSU's Leadership of the Armed Forces--the Basic Law of Their Development". _ Disc~zssion of the following basic issues was recomanended. 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the basic laws governing sociopolitical and mili.tary-technical development of the Soviet Armed Forces. 2. The main directions for further improvement of the army and navy in light of decisions of the 25th CPSU CongrQss. 3. The 25th CPSU Congress on the role of science in communist development, in - strengthening the ccuntry's defenses, and in raising the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. For practical purposes the plan for the seminar embraces the basic content of _ methodological problems associated with Soviet military development, examined in the pr_evious training year, and it concentrates attention on the basic laws governing development of the Soviet Armed Forces. The list of recommended literature contains-- - in addition to the works of Marxist-Leninist classicisi~s~ the most important deci- - sions of the party on the issues under examination, and the USSR Constitution--works by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev devoted to military development, his speeches given at the - 18th Komsomol Congress, during his tour of Siberian and Far East regions, and upon - presentation of the Order of Lenin and the "Gold Star" medal to the city of Minsk, - and the editorial "On the Present Policy of the U.S. Government", published in PRAVDA in June 1978. The ~rovisions of these documents were deeply studied by the communists and broadly - utilized in the concluding lessons as methodological reference points for evaluating _ the present era o� international relations and Soviet military development, and in the course of discussion of the important problems associated with strengthening - the Soviet state's defensive power. The practice of holding summary conferences on the methodological problems of - military theory and practice deserves attention. Several study groups are brought together for this purpose, and one of the most important and broadest topics is brought up for discussion. A typical feature of the past training year was the conduct of inethodological seminars and scientific-practical conferences devoted to Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's _ books "The Little Land" and "Resurrection" for generals and officers. Special atten- - tion was devoted to discussing problems such as troop indoctrination in the spirit - 49 _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 ruK uh~r'tc:tAL USE ONY.Y of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, improvement of the work style of executives and troop command and control, and raising the effectiveness of party-political work. Consequently a number of new significant factors have recently been introduced ihto the study of the methodological problems of military theory and practice by execu- _ tive personnel. The leading methodological problems posed by the 25th CPSU Congress - and by practical social and military development are now being discussed more ob- jectively in lectures and seminars. Seminar participants have successfully mastered the art of applying the basic methodological principles to analysis of military practice and to solution of complex theoretical and practical problems associated with raising the combat readiness of the army and navy. - In the course of the lessons, the forms arid methods of the training ma~erial's assimilation were enriche d, the scientific philosophy and creative thinking of executives were developed, and their co~t�nunist conviction was deepened. The forms of training control were made more flexible and comprehensive. Such are some of the res ults of the work of inethodological seminars conducted for executives within the system of Marxist-Leninist training for generals and officers. _ = * * ~ "The Ideological Struggle and Indoctrination of Troups", by Major General D. A. Volkogonov, Chief, Propaganda and Agitation Division and Deputy Chief, Propaganda arid Agitation Administration, Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. ~)ne of the mos t acute forms of the class struggle, the struggle of ideas~is a - reflection of the duel between two social systems in the spiritual sphere. It represents a permanent front, the "forward edge" of which passes through the minds and hearts of millions of people, influencing their world outlook, id� als, view- _ i~oints, coiivictions, and feelings. There never are any lulls or breathers in the ~ ideological struggle. Erecting barricades in the pa}..h of socialism's peace offensive, world reaction ne ver misses a chance to assume a counteroffensive in individual se~;tors of the struggle, employing anticommunism, nationalism, racism, and neo- facism for this purpose. The tendency toward detente has not done away with the principal contradiction of the era--the contradiction between socialism and capitalism. As before, we witness mi litary opposition, a political struggle, and economic compe- tition. But the duel in the spiritual area is becoming especially acu~te and, as was emphasized at the 25th CPSU Congress, the problems of the ideological struggle are assuming the forefront more and more. 1. The 25th CPSU Congress on the Unique Features of the Ideological Struggle Today Tli~ ~tuel with bourgeois and opportunist ideology is an important part of our party's _ ideological work. In his speeches, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized many times that increasingly higher requirements .-~re being imposed on our political work today. Our propaganda--both within the country and abroad--must react sensitively to changes occurring in the world; it must be resourceful and persuasive, and it must fully expose all of the enemy's ideological sabotage. If we are to ef fectively and aggressively oppose the influence of i,moerialist propaganda, we would need to con- sider a number of features inherent to the present staye of the struggle between communist and bo urgeois ideology. 50 ' _ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY � APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY _ The first feature: It is a reflection of the indisputable fact that the certain - relaxation occurring in international relations is not at all weakening the ideological struggle; on the contrary it is deepening and expanding its front, _ imparting to it a more acute, stressful nature. This is a manifestation of the uniqusness of peaceful coexistence as a special form of c:lass struggle. Peaceful - coexistence is not some sort of unprincipled cohabitation with the capitalist world, as various ultra-leftists say today; on the contrary it creates new, additional possibilities for intensifying the class struggle with imperialism. Peaceful co- - existence does not extend to relations between antagonistic classes within a - capitalist state, and it does not at all signify recognition of the permanence of the exploiting structure, together with its countless social faults. It was noted _ back at the IntF:rnational Conference of Communists and Workers Parties (1969) that peaceful coexistence satisfies the general interests of the revolutionary struggle against all forms of oppression and exploitation. Promoting a deepening in the 4 class conflicts in capitalist countries, detente is imparting something new to _ the duel between the two social systems. Growth in various forms of international exchange and developznent of economic, - commerci~l, scientific-technical, and cultural~ cooperation with countries in the other social structure are leading to a noticeable increase in immediate human contact, and to a direct collision between different ways of life, ideals, and philosophies. Bourgeois ideological centers are trying to capitalize on this feature as a means for intensifying their subversive acts, sabotage, and sophisticated _ _ attempts at infusing alien ideals, viewpoints, aiid conceptions into the socialist social consciousness. All of this means that all military personnel must exhibit - higher political alertness, ideological vigilance, and class intolerance of all hostile influences. The second feature: Its essence is that the preser.,t ideological duel is proceeding in highly diverse forms. The object of influence is defined very precisely in ~ efforts to influence the consciousness of the people. Bourgeois propaganda does not conceal the fact that th~a principal objects of its ideological ~nfluence are the intelligentsia and the ycung. Such a choice is no accident. It is associated with the fact that the organ~zers of bourgeois ideological sabotage want to exert . pressure upon the philosophy and political positions of the intelligentsia--an im- ~ E~ortant "Yroducer" of spiritual and cultural values. Considering the important role of the Soviet intelligentsia in ~ur people's cultural and spiritua~ development, bourgeois propaganda continues in its ~.':.tempt to influence, at least to some degree, the positions of persons doing intellectual labor, their "production", and their moral coun'tenance. One of the numerous known subversive ideas which bourgeois ideologists would like to introduce, to "plant" in the con- sciousness of our intelligentsia,is the idea that intellectuals play a"special role" in the modern world. This is 4 new version of a bcurgeois elitist conception. It _ "proves" that the entire scientific and engineering elite, which is supposedly be- coming more and more responsible for society's development, is riding the crest of _ the wave of scientific-technical progress. Consequently, these theorists conclude, the intelligentsia can no longer satisfy itself with "secondary" roles, and that it mu~t decisively display its "independence" of government institutions. 51 , FOIt OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONY.Y There is, of c~>>r~e, nothing new in this. In his time, V. I. Lenin himself referred to such a line of reasoning as "a vulgarization of Marxism". The e5sence behind it - is still the same--it is an attempt tc, weaken the moral-political unity of socialist ~ - society, to generate soci~l "dissatisfaction" in workers doing mental labor, and to encourage their nihilistic attitude toward our spiritual values. The organizErs _ of such diversions would benefit by learning that the Soviet intelligentsia is in- separable from the people, that it shares their interests and aspirations, and that it makes a great contribution to communist development. Only socialism has been : able to create all of the conditions for the intelligentsia's truly creative, free . activity, as can be seen from the tremendous cultural achievements enjoyed by the Soviet people. ' Anuther large social group upon whic:h bourgeois propagandists would want to exert - their undermining influence is the young. We should always keep this in mind when - we evaluate the nature of s~ociern bourgeois ideological subversion. The CPSU Central - Committee decree "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination" emphasizes that hostile propaganda is constantly conducting a savage offensive ayainst the minds of thP Soviet people, attempting to debase socialism and exaggerate the benefits of capita 1 ism. Young people up to 30 years old make up more than half of our country' s population. _ Tl~rough their deeds, study, and thoughts, the Soviet young are constantly demon- stratir:g their unwavering faithfulness to the cause of their fathers, a faithfulness to communist ideals. At the same time, analyzing the problems associated with in- aoc;trination of the young generation in light of the ideological struggle, we cannot rail to see that it has not experienced the class struggle wh;c:~. befell the fate of senior generations, that it has not participated in wars to defend the socialist ~atherland, and it has not experienced many of the difficulties which lay on the st~oulders of their predecessors. It takes a certain amount of time for every young man and woman and for e ve ry young soldier to test their ideological soundness, ~ independence, and citi zenship. Social and class experience do not come about right away. This is what our ideological enemies count on in particular, attempting to _ torpedo the ideals of collectivism, and impart a predisposition toward private ownership, and the elements of consumer psychology and political indifference. - The:refore when we display the concern that even individual soldiers would not yield _ to alien influence, we express not only a natural desire to protect the individual's ~ cor~sciousness from hostile ideals, but we also recognize this to be a unique school for achieving class maturity. When it is asserted that today's young people have ~ic~t tindergone the school of the class struggle--a valid thesis in general, we would n~,v~ to make one qualification. The class struggle, which in tne eyes of the Soviet _ ~eoule h~s iiow eiitered the international arena as an expression of a duel between two systems, has a dire ct bearing upon every individual: He must consider it when - t;e makes ar~ accurate political evaluation of events, when he must compare works of - 1i.tt~rature and art accurately; on the basis of the class criterion, and when the - tima comes to oppose alien morals. It is methodologically important for perception of communist ideals by our army young to be accompanied by an ability to persuasively ~ _ criticize alien viewpoints and understand their social reactionary nature and danger. The third Feature: We are activPly fighting today not only against bourgeois ideology bu~ also against the ideology of modern opportunism, Maoism, and Zionism, which nave noticeably intensified their anti-Marxist activities in recent years. 52 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY d APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02149: CIA-RDP82-44850R000400024407-8 FOR OFFICIAL USIE ONLY Tlie rising activity of opportunism today can be explained by a large number of causes. First of all it is associated with growth in the world revolutionary process, which is introducing new masses of people into the arena of the political and class struggle, people who are often s~cially immature, and wh~ ~arry the ele- ments of petty bourgaois revolutionary thought and spontaneity i~~~o the mov~ment. To go on, bourgeois ideological centers have intensified the~r attempts to influence not only the social consciousness of peoples in socialist states, but also various groups representing the workers and communist movements in their own countries, being vitally interested in introducing a revisionist "Trojan horse" into their consciousness. Finally, it should be recognized that the major social changes _ occurring in the worZd and the consequences of scientific-technical progress are not being reflected adequately in the minds of the people in view of differences ' in their philosophical predispositions. It is no accident that many opportunist conceptions and theories are associated with the progress of science and technology, ones which make the significance of such progress absolute and speculate on the con- ' seq;~ences of scientific-technical progress in the struggle between classes. All of this presupposes a need for combining the struggle against bourqeois ideology = with more-resolute exposure and persuasive criticism of its faithful ally--the ideology of opportunism, which is attempting to revise the nost fundamental premises of Marxism-Leninism, and which is encouraging a retreat from proletarian inter- nationalism toward nationalism and anticommunism. A tendency of accelerating convergence of openly bourgeois ideological conceptions and ~hose which are still being masked by slogans stolen from Marxism can be seen today. An especially large number of revisionist attarks have recently been made against - proletarian internationalism. At the same time, the rich experience of the revolu- tioriary struggle of rhe masses shows that the goals of society's social transforma- tion cannot be reached apart from class solidarity and the unity of laborers, without a consideration for the general laws governing the transition from capitalism to socialism. "A deep understanding of these general laws, and reliance upon them in combination with a creative approach and consideration of the concrete conditions in each given country," notes the CPSU Central Committee's accountability report to the 25th CPSU Congress, "have been and continue to be an inalienable feature of - Marxist-Leninists. An3 we can confidently say that while concessions to opportunism ' may provide some sort of temporary advantage, in the final analysis they would be harmful to the party."* _ Waging a struggle against opportunism, we consider the fact that while it does maintain a general antisocialist, anti-Marxist orientation, depending on its form it bears certain ur.ique traits. Thus right-wing opportunism, which manifests itself most often in countries thaL are developed in economic respects, usually makes its ideological attacks under the excuse of "improving socialism". Right-wing oppor- tunists preach "peace among the classes", ignoring the military danger on the part of imperialism and attempting to emasculate the revolutionary orientation of Marxism. But the historical exgerience shows that right-wing opportunist ideology invariably surrenders its revolutionary cause in the face of reaction. *"Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress), p 31. 53 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/09: CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020007-8 FUR UFFICIAL USE ONLY "Left-wing" opportunism, in its various forms, actively resorts to extremely revolu- tionary terminology and ultra-revolutionary slooans, inciting laborers and young ~~eol.~le to thoughtless, adventuristic actions which u~uall.y end in defeat. Thus th ~ struqgle against both right-wing and "left-wing" opportunism, which objectively is an ally of bourgeois idcology, is important today. These features of the ideological struggle, as well as some others (its global scope, change in the concrete forms and methods of its conduct, intensification of _ the psychological accent in the ideological diversions ~f bourgeois propaganda), _ emphasize with even greater clarity the indisputability of the fact that detente is not weakening the manifestations of the principal contradiction of this era-- - the contradiction between socialism and capitalism. As before, we are opposed by - the imperialist world, and although its aggressive possibilities have been reduced, , as was noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, its nature continues to be the same.* Its basic ideological-political weapon--anticommunism--has remained the same as well, though some new factors have appeared in the tactics and forms of struggle and in organizational activities. 2. Anticommunism--the Main Ideological-Poli~ical Weapon of Imperialism Modern bourgeois ideology has a clearly expressed anticommunist nature. Imperialism i.s still able t~ unite all reactionary forGes beneath the black banner of anti- - communism in the hope of defending the interests of the bourgeoisie. Given the f~iqhly acute contradictions in the "free" world, anticommunism is today the sole E~l
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