JPRS ID: 9742 USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9742
_ 19 May 1981 ~
U ~SR R -
eport .
. MILITARY AFFAIRS
CFOUO 5/81)
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JPRS L/9742
19 May ].9 81
USSR REPORT .
MILITARY AFFAIRS
(FOUO 5/81)
CONTENTS
� MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES
Book Discusses Problems, Prospects of Disarmament
(0 PROBLEMEIKH RAZORUZHENIYA, 1980) 1
GROUND FORCES
New Book Recounts WW II Experience of Infantry Division
(ROZfIDEIJNAYA NA ZEMLY~i ZAPOROZHSKIKH, 1980) 13
CIVIL DEFENSE
Book Discusses Role, Tasks of Civil Defense
(GRAZHDANSKAYA OBORONA, 1979) 16
DOSAAF AND MIZIT.ARY COP'IlKISSARIATS
Book Discusses Socialist Patriotism, Internationalism
(PATRIOTIZM I INTERNATSIONALYZM V DEYSTVII, 19~y). 21
- a - [ II I- USSR - 4 FOUO]
cnti i~rrti-r 1 f i i~~ nir: ~r
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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES ~
. )
BOOK DISCUSSES PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS OF DISARMAMENT
Moscow O PROBLEMAKH RAZORUZHENIYA in Russian 1980 (signed to press 19 Sep 80)
_ pp 1-2, 63-77, 270
[Annotation, table of contents, foreword, and chapter three from book "The Problems
of Disarmament" edited by G. M. Korniyenko,Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya",
10,000 copies, 272 pages] -
[Text) Prepared by a group of well-known Soviet diplomats and specialists in inter-
national affairs, this collection offers a deep analysis of the complex problem of
controlling the arms race. -
The authors persuasively demonstrate the tremendous harm done by the arms race
to each country of the world individually, and to the entire world community as a
whole. Th~y reveal the depth and scope of Soviet political initiatives aimed at
bridling the.arms race, at disarmament.
Contents Page
G. Korniyenko, "Foreword" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
V. yetrovskiy, "The Ultimate Question" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
' V. Yemel'yanov, "The Economic an3.Social Consequences of the Arms Race" 46
V. Karpov, D. Asatiani, "Problems and Prospects of Limiting
Strategic Arms" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
_ A. Petros'yants, "Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons--the Most
Important Element of Consolidating Peace and .International Security" 78
V. Shustov, "Negotiations on Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces
and Arms in Central Europe" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
~ R. Timerbayev, "Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
- A~ Vavilov, "Problems in Prohibitir.g the U'se of Scientific-Technical
Discoveries to Create Mass Destruction Weapons" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Yu. Tomilin, "Nonuse of F~~rce in International Relations. The
Guarantees for the Secux~ity of Nonnuclear States" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Ye. Fedorov, Yu. Fedorov, "The Global Problems of Mankind and Disarmament" 215
G. Stashevskiy, "Cessation af the Production of Nuclear Weapons and
- Liquidation of Their Stockpi2es--the Key Direction in the Struggle
= to Halt the Arms Race and Eliminate the Threat of World War" 244
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Foreword
It is sometimes said that the history of htunan society is the history of wars. If
there is some element of truth to such an assertion, it would be no less valid to
say that man has always dreamed of a tims in which wars would leave his life forever.
The biblical prophecy that a day will come when men will "beat their sabers into
- plo~shares" was a reflection of this dream.
Today this is no longer simply an allegorical.i:nage, sculptured in bronze by the
Soviet sculptor Ye. V. Vuchetich and standing before the United Nations building
in New York.
Since the time that the creator of the world's first socialist state, V. I. Lenin,
named disarmament the ideal of socialismP the task of implementing man's age-old
dream of re=org~ng death-dealing weapons into the implements of peacetul labor
became a matter of practical policy of the Soviet state ar?d, later on, of other
socialist countries as well.
Being the greatest pragmatist, V. I. Lenin, in distxnction from k~ourgeois pacifists
who are satisfied with si 1 talkin nostal icall about eace er tuall em hasized ~
mP Y 9 9 Y P . P Pe Y F
_ that only real disarmament efforts can narrow dow:z the material-technical base of ~
warfare, and that only total disarmament is a real guarantee of peace, and the most ~
dependable means of eradicating wars in gene~al. Having a perfect understanding of ~
history and being able to predict its development in many ways, V. I. Lenin warned
back in 1915--30 years before the first atomic bomb was exploded--that war based on
i.re latest mighty achievements of science and:technoloqy "may lead, and will in- ~
:~i.riably lead, to destruction of the conditions themselves of.h~an~society'~ ;
c~xistence."* +
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Lenin's warning is all the more valin todag, and it is no coincidence that many of ~
T. I. Brezhnev's speeches have it as one of their obvious themes. "Peace cannot be
strong," he said in one of them, "until we put az end to the arms race we are now ~
engaged in, to inflation of i?~litary budgets, and to creation of increasingly more ~
terrifying me~ss destruction weappns. It has now come to the point where if the
weapons now stockpiled were to be launched, mankind would be completely arnzihilated."** ~
Owing to the efforts of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and all peace-
loving forces, certain.results were a~hiev~ed%in'the effort to restrain the arms
race in the 1960's and 1970's. Had this not been so, there could be no doubt that
the.world situation would have been worse.today, and the danger of~war would have
_ been greater. ~
But at the same time it is entirely obvi~us that the rate of progress and the saale
of agreement on limitation of arms are still behind the rate and scale of the arms
race. Moreover at the turn of the present decade the most aggressive circles of the
USA and other imperialist powers assumed a course, in collaboration with Chinese
*Lenin,~.V. I., "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete.CaTlected Works], Vol 36, p 396.
**Brezhnev, L. I., "O.vneshney politike KPSS i Sovetskogo gosudarstva. Rechi i
stat'i" [On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. Speeches and ~
Articles~], Moscow, 1978, p 597.
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}iegemonists, toward further intensification of the anns race, in their desire to
disti:(rb the presently evolved military balance in the world in their favor and to
the c~etriment of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to the detriment
of international detente and the security of nations.
- But this has not discouraged the proponents of peace and disarmament. Rather.than
weakening, they are increasing their efforts to preserve and deepen detente, to
bridle the arms race, and to achieve a turning point toward rell disarmament. And
they look at the future with optimism because, as A. A. Gromyko noted, "now that
tt?e idea of disarmament has captured the imaginations of the masses, it is playing
an ii~creasingly greater role as a material force in world policy."*
The collection offered here describes what has been done to limit arms and achieve
disarmament, why more has noc. been achieved yet, and what specifically is being done
in this direct.ion today.
Problems and Prospects of Limiting Strategic Arms
Strategic arms limitation holds a special place in the effor.-t to halt the arms race,
reducc the military danger, and preserve international peace. This problem has
essentially become t17e key direction in Soviet-American relations. Being the two
mightiest powers of modern times, the USSR and the USA must not permit the strategic ~
a1:ms they possess to grow in quantity in the course of an uncontrollable arms race,
since tliis would increase the danger of nuclear war and undermine the prospects of
consolidating peace and security.
Implementation of existing strategic arms limitation treaties and achievement of
' new ones may open new possibilities not only for halting the growth of nuclear _
missile arsenals and insuring their effective quantitative and qualitative limita-
tion, but also for success~vely traveling the road of their significant reduction,
having in mind full cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, and liquidation
of their stockpiles in the end. .
The Soviet Uion's consistent struggle to bridle the arms race is based upon a
meticulous analysis of the balance of power in the world, and on a full considera-
tion of the military-strategic situation, the trends and prospects of its develop-
ment, and the material-technical factors of armed forces development. In this
strL.ggle, the USS R bases itself on the need for both respecting the interests of
the security of each state in dividually, and consolidat.ion of international peace .
and security in general.
The ~~~rocess of limiting strategic arms began in November 1969 with initiation of
Soviet-1lmerican negotiations alternately in Helsinki and Vienna. Their chief result
was the signing, on 26 May 1972 during a Soviet-American summit conference in Moscow, -
of the permanent Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Systems,
and the five-year Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the
*"Sovremennaya dinlomatiya burzhuaznykh gosudarstv" [Nbdern Diplomacy of
Bouryeois States], Foreward, by A. A. Gromyko, Nbscow, 1980, p 15.
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~ Limitations of Strat~gic Offensive Anns.l Somewhat earlier, on 30 September 1971,
the permanent Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War
was signed betwEen the USSR and the USA; it can rightfuily be interpreted as part
- of the general complex of SALT~-ONE agreements.
$y signing the ABM limitation treaty, the USSR and the USA pledged to deploy not more
than two ABM complexes on the territory of either of the sides. 7.'he treaty
established ttie principle of the national technical means of verification in accord-
ance with the univ^rsally recognized rules of international law. The sides pledged
not to interfere with national technical means of verification, and.not to employ
intentional camouflage measures that would hinder verification. A joint Soviet-
Americai~ Permanent Consultative Commission was created to promote achiec~Ament of the
aims and satisfaction of the provisions of the treaty.
~ 2'he Ir~terim Agreement on Certain Measure~ ,7itn Respect to Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms
"froze" the number of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers
possessed by the sides at those levels which were in existence as of 1 July 1972, and
it set the limit on launchers for submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's).
These agreements were significant in that for the first time there was consent on
_ concrete measures that would in fact restrain the growth of the quantity of offen-
sive arms. Also of importance is the fact that i.iie USSR and the USA agreed to inter-
pret the signed SALT-ONE treaties~only as the first step in efforts to further limit I
strategic arms. In a joint communique dated 30 May 1972, both sides emphasized that ;
they "intended to continue active negotiations to limit strategic offensive arms, ~
an-i~:onduct them in the spirit of good will, respect of the legal interests of one
.nother, and compliance with the principle of equal security."~ ~
i
Z`he SALT-ONE documents signed in Moscow were m~t with great satisfaction on the part j
of the broad world public. But at the same time the enemies of disa~ament and ~
detente, botYi within the USA and in NATO, attempted to block enactment of the j
strategic arms limitation treaty. ~ j
A majo~ struggle began between ~he treaty's proponents and opponents in the U.S.
Senate and House af Representatives. In compliance with the USA's constitutional
procedure, at the end of September 1972 the Senate approved ratification of the
Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems, while the Senate and
Hause of Representatives confirmed the Interim Agreement. On 29 September 1972 the
Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems and Interim Agreement were. approved by the
Presidium of the USSR Suprema~ Soviet, and on 3 October 1972 USSR Minister of Foreign
Affairs A. A. Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State W. Rogers exchanged certificates
attesting to the treaty's ratification and adoption of the Interi.m Agreement at a
- Wh.ite House ceremony. The treaty and agreement became law.
For tl~e first timc, the Soviet-American SALT-ONE documents spelled out the solutions
to highly complex problems in national and international security, ones which
appeared insoluble just 5-10 years previously. Together with the important docu-
ment "Fur.damental Principles of Mutual Relations Between the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics and the United States of America," these agreements on limiting
strategic arms were an important step helping to weaken the threat of nuclear war
and restrain the arms race. ~
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In November 1972 the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Phase ~ao
, (SALT-ZWO) began in Geneva. The Soviet side consistently led the talks toward
agreement, and it submitted concrete proposals on new measures that would effective-
1y limit strategic arms, promote stabilization of the military-stra tegic situation
in mutual relations between the USSR and the USA, and strengthen the cause o~ peace
and international security.
In June 1973, during a Soviet-American simimit conference in Washington, a doctnnent
spElling out the fundamental principles of negotiations for further limitation of
strategic offensive arms was signed. It emphasized that the sides would follow the
pri~iciples of equal security, and with the recognition ~hat attempts to obtain uni-
lateral advantages would be incompatible with reinforcement of peaceful relations
between both states. The document asserted the need for introducing limitations
affecting not only quantitative indicators but also qualitative improvements in
strategic offensive a~ms. The sides confirmed the premise that the limits on
strategic offensive arms must be subjected to verification by national technical
resources.
The next step advancing the cause of limiting strategic arms was the signing of the
Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems, which
foresaw reducing the number of ABM deployment areas for each of the sides from
the two permitted by the treaty to one. '
As far as negotiations on a treaty to limit strategic offerisive arms were concerned,
they went on at a time of acute struggle between�the proponents of the SALT treaty
and reactionary militant circles in the USA which had formerly attempted to block
enactment of the SALT-ONE treaty and were now making an effort to force SALT-TWO
into a stalemate. Thus the talks proceeded irregularly, and periods of prolonged
stagnation were observed. In his memoirs, former President R. Nixon admitted for
example that in sumaner 1974 the Pentagon blocked the signing of the treaty by
sub:nitting the knowingly unacceptable demand of unilateral concessions on thP part ~
of the USSR.3
A certain shift occurred in SALT-?WO during a working conference between CPSU
Centra.l Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President G. Ford in
~ Vladivostok in November 1974. Z'he intent~on of the sides to sign a new long-term
agreement to limit strategic offensive arms effective until 31 December 1985 was
confirmed. It was proposed that this agreement, based on the principle of equality
and identical security of the sides, would include, besides the appropriate provi-
sicns of the In*_erim Agreement, the following limitations:
"a) Both sides will have the right to possess certain prearranged total quantities
of strategic weapon delivery systems;
"b) both sides will have the right to possess certain prearranged total quantities
of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
, with independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's)."4
Thus a ceiling for the total number of strategic weapon delivery systems was set,
to include strategic bombers, which were not included in the previous agreement.
Achievement of agreement to introduce a maximum limit upon strategic arms would
doubtlessly have been a major step forward in the effort to limit the most
destructive types of weapons.
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A fundamerttally n~w elementin thc Vladivostok agreement was establishment of maximum
levels for TCBM's and SLBD1's outfitted with multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicles. For this purpose the Soviet Union insisted during the strategic
arms limitation talks that the production and deployment of missiles with indepen-
dently targetable reentry vehicles be prohibited,~thus averting an arms race in
this area. The importance of the Soviet proposal for real limitation of the stratec~ic
arms race can be seen at least from the fact that in the last 10 years the number.
of nuclear warheads in the USA increased by about 1,.000 units per year, while the
number of delivery systems remained almost constant.5 Therefore although it was
not a radical solution, practical implementation of an~agreement concerning the
numbers of MIR~~ed missiles would have set a certain limit on the unrestrained race
in this area. ~
In order to achieve practical implementation of the decisions made in Vladivostok,
at the beginning of 1975 the work of the Soviet and American delegations was resumed
in Geneva with the job of preparing the texts of the appropriate documents on the
basis of the Vladivostok agreement. Fundamental problems associated with limiting
strategic offensive arms were discussed in a meeting between CPSU CE~ntral Coznmittee
General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President G. Ford during ';he time of the
Helsinki Conf.erence in August 1975. Negotiation~ conducted in 1975-1976 between
L. I. Brezhnev, A. A. Gromyko, and H. Kissinger had~important significance to ~~ro-
yress in strategic arms limitations.
Throughout the entire time of SALT-TWO, the Soviet.Union persistently followed the
li.ne of achieving the greatest possible limitations of strategic axms. In the
a~countability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 25th CPSU Congress, .
L. I. Brezhr~ev noted: "Attaching extremely important significance to this entire
problem, we have persistently asked, and more than once, the United States not to
- close the matter with just limiting the existing forms of strategic weapons. We
ielt it possible to go further. Specifically, we suggested reaching ag~eement to
prohibit creation of new, even more-destructive'armament systems, particularly the
new Trident class submarines with ballistic missiles and the new B-1 strategic
. bombers in the USA, and similar systems in the USSR. Unfortunately these proposals
were not accepted by the American side."6
Following J. Carter's election to the U.S. presidency in fall 1976, the Soviet-
American SALT-Zw0 negotiations drew to a halt, and in some areas there was even a
digression from the approach agreed upon previously. Such was the case, for example,
in March 1977, when the American delegation came to~Moscow with an openly unilateral
prnposal which could in no way serve as the basis for a m~tually acceptable solution.
It is now becoming clear that the American administration, the U.S. Congress, and .
the American delegation in Geneva contained influential'individuals who worked
not to complete the effort of preparing the draft treaty, but essentially to block
it. r~lany months of purposeful, meticulous work were required to return the negotia-
tions to the mainstream of the Vladivostok agreement, and implement the directive
of the 25th CPSU Congress--to prepare a new treaty between the USSR and the USA on
li.uniting and reducing strategic arms.
CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR
Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev and U.S. President J. Carter met in Vienna on 15-18
- June 1979. On 18 June they signed the Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on
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Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation, the protocol to this treaty, and the Joint
Declaration on the Principles and Basic Directions of Subsequent Negotiations on
Limitation of Str.ategic Anns.
As is stated in a document of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the Presidium �
of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Minister on the results of the
Vienna Confere,ice, "agreement on these issues became possible as a result of the
long and hard work of the CPSU Central Corrunittee Politburo, the Presidium of the
US5R Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers, and L. I. Brezhnev's
personal contribution to preparing and conducting~the conferences, to consolidating
universal peace, to bridling the arms race, and to developing mutually advantageous
cooperation among states with different social structures."~
Full implementation of the documents signed in Vienna would have opened up new
possibilities not only for halting the build-up of strategic offensive arms and
achieving their effective quantitative and qualitative limitation, but also for
achieving a real reduction in these arms for the first time. -
As �ar as the basic cantent of the SALT-TWO agreement is concerned, in distinetion
from the Interim Agreement, which dealt only with two types of strategic offensive
axms (ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers), the new agreement foresaw maximum levels
for the aggregate nim~ber of ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-
surface ballistic missiles (ASM's). The treaty establishes equal maximum limits
for the nuclear weapon delivery systems of both sides; it foresees, as a start in
the reduction process, reduction of existing nuclear arms';~the treaty imposes, wit1~
the purposes of reducing the threat of the qualitative arms race, significant limi-
tations on modernizing strategic offensive systems and on creating new systems.
The aggregate levels set by the treaty cannot exceed 2,400 units initially, and
lai:er on they wi11 have to be reduced to 2,250 units. The established sublevels
of 1,320 units for the launchers of ICBM's and SLBM's outfitted with independ2ntly
ta~getable reentry vehicles and heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles having a
raiige greater than 600 km, and ~the sublevels of 1,200 units for the launchers of
ICI3M's and SLBM's with independently targetable reentry vehicles and 820 units for
the launchers of T:BM's with independently targetable reentry vehicles had the
objective of providing the fullest possi.ble guarantee of a balance in strategic
forces, without providing unilateral advantages to one side or the other.
Also serving the same purposes are limitations on the number of reentry vehicles
that may be installed in ICBM's and SLBM's and on the number of cruise missil~s
with a range greater than 600 km that could be carried by heavy bombers. Prahibi-
tior~ of the creation of new types of ICBM's (not counting one new type of light _
ICBM's) should limit the race in deployment of new, more-powerful types of ICBM's.
Permitting modernization of strategic arms within certain bounds, the treaty simul-
taneously prohibits rebuilding launchers for light ICBM's into launchers for heavy
missiles, and creating ICBM's with a launch or cold launch weight greater than -
that of heavy ICBM's possessed by each of the sides.
- Prohibition of a nwnber of new types of strategic offensive a~s, foreseen by the
treaty, is a serious step in restraining the arms race. Article IX foresees, for
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, r~xutnE~le, prohibitioi~ of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 600 km for
l~.unc:!~~~rs on floating platforms that are not submarines; prohibition of resources
for the launching of nuclear weapons or all other forms of mass destruction weapons
into near-earth orbit, to include fractional orbital bombardment systems; prohibi-
tion of mobile launchers for heavy ICBM's, and so on.
Establishment of the sublimit of 1,320 units and simultaneous limitation of the number -
of cruise missiles with which a bomber may be supplied is equivalent in principle
tc establishment of a limit on the aggregate number of aircraft-carried cruise
missiles with a range greater than 600 km. Installing multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles on cruise missiles is prohibited conc urrently.
The protocol to the treaty, which will remain in.force until 31 December 19$1,
scts the n umber of additional limits on cruise missiles with a range greatEr than
E~UO km, mainly prot~ibition of the deployment of sea- and�land-based cruise missiles
and ~~rohibition of the testing of such missiles with multiple independently target-
ak~le reen~ry vehicles. The protocol also prohibits deployment of mobile ICBM ~
laiil,c:hers, as well as flight tests of ICBM's with such launchers, and equally so,
the fliyht testing of ASM's or deployment of such missiles.
Z'he mutual pledge not to circumvent the provisions of the treaty through any other !
, state or states, or by any other means, has independent and, moreover; extremely
important significance. This closes a dangerous loophole of possible erosion or
weakening of the set li.mits and provides a strong guarantee of their stability and
~ffectiveness.
'i'he pract~ce of notification concerning the launchings of ICBM's beyond the limits ~
of national territory was introduced by the previously signed Soviet-American
Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War dated 30 ~
September 1971 and the Agreement to Prevent Incidents on the High Seas and in the ~
Airspace Above Them dated 25 May 1972. The SALT-~,10 treaty foresees ~a general ~
and farther-reaching pledge on this account, foreseeing prompt notification as:to i
the performance of all planned test launchings of ICBM's, witY, the exception of
just single ICBM launchings pla$ned withi.n the limits of national territory. This ;
pledge is an important measure aimed at increasing the trust between the sides. '
'1"he fundamental principle of Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks is
the principle of equality and identical security. The new~treaty was structured
mainly on the basis of this principle, and it expresses a just balance between the
interests of the USSR and the USA. It is the result of many years of effort. Each
~:~rovision of the treaty and of other documents associated with it was carefully -
thought out, and no deviations from the achieved agreement can be ccnsidered per- ~ -
missible. At the Vienna talks L. .I. Brezhnev.pointe~ out that "any attempts at
shaking this intricate edifice, which was erected with such great difficulty, to ~
change any details in it, or to tilt it in one's favor would be an unpromising
effort. The entire structure might collapse--with serious and even dangerous
consequences to our relations and to the situation in the world as a whole."8
Formation of the principle of equality and identical security began long prior to
tlle opening of Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation as a result of ~
Soviet disarmament initiatives in the early 1960's. Thus the text of the Joint
8
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Declaration of the Govc~rtunents of the USSR and the USA on Prearranged Principles
for Negotiations ori n.i ~..-~rmament, which were approved by the UN General Assembly
on `l0 December 1961 coi~tains the following provision: All measures of universal
and total disarmament must be balanced such that in no11phase of enactment of a
treaty would one statE or a group of states be able to receive a military adV~ntage~
and that security would be guaranteed equally to all."9 Later this principle was
embodied in the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems and the
Interim Agreement, and it was documented in the Fundamental Principles of Mutual
Relationships Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States _
of America dated 29 May 1972, which confirmed the impermissibility of attempts "to
obtain unilateral advantages, c'~rectly or indirectly, at the expense of the other
side";10 it is also docuanented in the Fundamentai Princ~.ples of Negotiations on
Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms dated 21 June 1973.
The preamble of the new treaty and the Joint Declaration on the Principles and Basic
Directions of Subsequent Negotiations on Limitation of Strategic Arms, signed in
Vienna by L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter, devote a special place to this principle. _
Section One of the Joir.t Declaration states in particular: "Tne sides will continue
to negotiate, in i:ompliance with the principle of equality and identical security,
on m~asures to further limit an d reduce the quantities of strategic arms, and to
further limit them in qualitative respects.'~I1
In terms of limiting strategic arms, the principle of equality and identical
security is essentially an expression of the recognition by both sides that parity
is needed in their strategic arms, and that a ba?.ance in strategic nuclear missile
power must be maintained, be it peculiar and, at times; dynamic. The principle
of equality and identical security, the sole possible foundation for agreement on
strategic arms limitation, is organically associated with the very nature of
_ modern weapons and the objectively existing balance of strategic forces between
the USSR and the LT~:~. ~
Curing the Vienna talks in June 1979 between L. I. Brezhnev and J. Carter, Fach
siae declared that it did not aspire and would not aspire to military supremacy,
inasmuch as this might lead only to dangerous instability, generating a higher 1eve1
~f arms and not promoting the security of either side.12
Uiscussing provisians worked out in the course of the strategic arms limitation
talks and making up the basis of Soviet-American interaction in this area, ~ae
should note the importan~ significance of combining quantitative and qualitative
limitations. In this case the role of qualitative limitations grows significantly
- when equal maximum levels of strategic arms are established for the sides, and
especially when these limits are reduced. '~he need for combining quantitative and
qualitative limitations is dictated by the principle of equality and identical
security, inasmuch as when quantitative limitations exist, it becomes even.more
important, than in their absence, to establish qualitative limitations that would
exclude the possibility either side might have for shooting ahead through improve-
ments in armament and obtaining unilateral advantages, even if the quantitative;
limits remain the same. In other words there is a constant possibility of so-
called "technological breakthrough"--creation of new forms of weapons which, when ~
placed in the hands of one of the parties to the strategic arms limitation talks,
- could provide the latter a unilateral advantage.
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= 'I'h~ provision of combining quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic
arms was documeilted in the SALT documents as one of the fundamental principles of
the negotiations.l3
In addition to establishing quantitative limits, in ordPr to reduce the threat
posed by the qualitative arms race the SALT-TWO treaty imposes significant limi-
tations on modernizing existing strategic offensive systems and creating new
systems. These limitations pertain, in particular, to the launch and cold launch
weight of missiles, the number of reentry vehxcles~per-MIRV missile, and other
parameters.
One important factor of the viability of SALT agreements is organizing verification
of compliance by the sides. In application to SALT, the principle of verification
effectiveness assumes the form of national technical means of verification. ~
Article XII of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems dated 26 May 1972 and '
Article V of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the ?,imita- ~
tions of Strategic Offensive Arms state that "each of the sides uses the national !
technical means at their disposal in such a way as to comply with the universally ;
recognized principles of international law." This same principle, which had now '
demonstrated its viability, was also included in Article XV of the SALT-~'WO Treaty.l4 ~
J
The SALT-~]U agreements signed in Vienna in June 1979 are typified not only by the ~
fact t_hat they establish a system of mutually associated and balanced limitations ~
on strategic offensive arms, but also in that they clearly define the future tasks ~
associated with strategic arms limitations. These tasks are spelled out both in ~
the text of the treaty itself and in a special document--Joint Declaration on the '
Principles and Basic Directions of Subsequent Negotiations on Limitation of (
Strategic Azms.ls Discussing this aspect of the Vienna aqreement, USSR Minister
of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko noted the following at a press conference on 25 ~
June 1979: "...the present treaty creates a brid e leadin ~to the next treat ~
9 g y. .
It is our intention to not stop with what has been achiev~d, to go farther, to `
spare no efforts in order to achieve a further reduction of nuclear missiles.~~16 j
Here specifically are the goals set in the joint declaration cited above: Meaning-
ful and significant reductions of the numbers of strategic offensive arms; qualita-
tive limitations on strategic offensive arms, to include limitations on the creation
- of new types of such arms and on modernization of e xisting arms; limitation of ~
strategic offensive arms that destabilize the strategic balance to the greatest
degree; measures to reduce and avert the danger of a surprise'attack; resolution
of issues contained within the protocol to the treaty--that is, concerning mobile
- ICBM launchers, sea- .and land-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km, -
and on on. ~
As is spelled out in Article XIV of the SALT-ZWO Treaty, active negotiations on ;
strategic arms limitation were to be resumed immediately after the SALT-TWO Treaty
entered into force. Thus the next step is to ratify the SALT-ZinTO Treaty, which
would open the road for progress toward SALT-THREE. ~
However, in th e time since the signing of SALT-TWO, serious obstacles have arisen
to limitation of strategic arms, and new dif:iculties have arisen due to the in-
consistency and hypocrisy of the policy of the USA and its allies, which are in
I
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turn associated with negative trends in the growth of military expenditures and
intensification of the arms race, trends which arose and developed back before the
signing of SALT-~n10.
Throughout the entire time President J. Carter has been occup~ying the White House,
Washington has continued to encourage further growth in military prepar.ations. The
USA's five-year military program calls for further expansion and qL aliCative improve-
ment of~ the arsenal of strategic arms. Production of cruise missiles began in 1980.
~ Efforts are under way to create the new mobile. MX ballistic missile, which is to be
deployed in the latter part of the 1980's, and the new Trident submarine system is
- being developed and introduced. Conventional armed forces are beginning to ex-~
perience their largest growth in t.he postwar history of the USA. The ruling circles
of the United States, resurrecting the infamous policy of dealing "from a position
of strength" , have assumed the road of directly subverting the efforts toward detente.
To piease business interests, U.S. Congress and the administration tabled ratifica-
tion of the SALT-ZTn10 Treaty indefinitely. -
At the same time the leaders of the USA continue to proclaim that the SALT-TWO Treaty
is still on the agecida of the U.S. Senate, and that the administration intends to
see to its ratification in the future. ,
U.S. Secretary of State E. Muskie said the following in a speech on 7 May 1980 to tht
Senate Committee for Foreign Affairs: "I belieue that signing the agreement for
balanced arms limitation would strengthen our security. The SAI~T-~T(7 Treaty cannot
be interpreted as our gift to our rivals. By limiting the threat hanging over us,
it satisfies our own interests."
- U.S. Presidential National Security Advisor Z. Brzezinski. follows the same line.
Spealting for example on 11 October 1979 in Savannah (Georgia), he declared that the
SALT-TWO Treaty strengthens the security of the USA, reduces the threat of war, and
provides the basis for reducing nuclear arms, and that this treaty has vitally im- _
portant significance to the future of the USA as a national entity.
Thus despite all of the zig-zags in practical policy, the ruling circles of the
U5A admit that limitation of strategic arms is in keeping with the 'fundamental
national interests of the USA. Public opinion surveys show that most Americans
are in favor of limiting or completely prohibiting strategic offensive arms.
According to a survey conducted by NEWSWEEK in February 1980, 60 percent of the
AmEricans have this opinion.
In turn the Sov~.et Union, true to its consistent policy of peaceful coexistence and
reducing the risk of the outbreak of war, will do e~verything it must to keep intact
all of the positive things that have been achieved so far in limiting strategic arms
- and restraining the arms race in general. The 1980's can and must become a time of
significant movement forward toward real disarmament, including :in relation to
strategic arms. The SALT-ZWO agreement creates the necessary prerequisites for
this. Whether or not the favorable prerequisites are satisfied will naturally
depend not only on the Soviet Union but also primarily on the United States. Pro-
gressive mankind hopes that the proponents of halting the uncontrollable arms race
and achieving new agreement, on the basis of SAL~TWO, on further measures to limit
and reduce strategic arms will prevail in the USA.
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FOOTNOTES
1. "Sbornik deystvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglasheniy i konventsi,y, zaklyuchennykh
SSSR i inostrannymi gosud~rstvami" [Collection of Existing Treaties, Agreements,
and Conventions Signed Between the USSR and Foreign States] (referred to ~er~~
inaf ter as "Collection of the Existing Treaties..."), Issue XXVIII, Moscow,
1974, pp 31-32.
2.. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya.
Sbornik dokumentov. 1972:' [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and Inter-
national, Relations. Collection of Documents. 19�72], Nbscow, 1973, p 79.
3. See PRAVDA, 24 June 1979.
4. "Vneshnyaya �poli~ika Sovetskogo Soyuza i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya. Sb ornik
dokumentov. 1974" [The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union and International ~
Relations. Collection of Documents. 1974], Moscow, 1975, pp 171-172. ,
5. "Department of Defense Annual Report," Wash., 1980, p 77.
6. "Material~r XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 23. ~
7. PRAVDA, 22 June 1979. ,
f3. PRAVDA, 18 June 1979. ,
9. "Mezhdunarodnoye pravo v dokumentakh" [International Law in Documents], Moscow,
1969, p 385.
10. "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye. Sbornik dokumentov" [The Soviet
Union in the Struggle for Disarmament. Collection of Documents], Nbscow, 1977, -
p 121. -
11. PRAVDA, 19 June 1979. ~
12. Ibid. . ~
13. See "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye. Sbornik dokumentov," p 127;
_ PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.
14. See "Sovetskiy Soyuz v bor'be za razoruzheniye. Sbornik dokumentov," pp 115, -
119; PRAVDA, 19 June 1979. , ~
15. See PRAVDA, 19 June 1979.
16. PRAVDA, 26 June 1979. ~
COPYRIGHT: "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1980 .
11004 -
CSO: 1807/95
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` ,
GROUND FORCE S
NEW BOOK RE COUNTS WW II EXPERIENCE OF INFANTRY DIVISION
_ Kiev ROZHDENNAYA NA ZEMLYAKH ZAPOROZHSKIKH in Russian 1980 (signed to press 14 Feb
80) title page, pp 2, 5-7
CTitle page, annotation and foreword from book "Born on Zaporozh'ye Lands", by
Guards Maj Gen (ret) A. I. Oleynikov, Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury Ukra-
iny, 115,000 copies, 178 pages]
[Text7 A. I. Oleynikov
Guards Major General (ret)
BORN ON ZAPOROZH'YE LANDS
(Second Supplemental Editian)
Signed to press: 14 Feb 80 '
Copies: 115,000
Pages: 178
Kiev
Political Literature of the Ukraine
Publishing House
1980
Th is book traces the combat experience of the 226th (later the
95 th Guards) Infantry Division from the date of its formation
_ in July 1941 in Zaporozhskaya Oblast up until the end of the
Great Patriotic War. The division participated in the defense
of Poltava, Khar'kov and Stalingrad, in the battle of the Kursk
Sa lient (Prokhorovka region), in the liberation of Poltava,
Kr emenchug and Kirovograd, in the assault crossings of the
Dnepr, Yuzhnyy Bug and Dnestr Rivers, in the liberation of Ro-
mania, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in battles on German ter-
ri tory. It was awarded the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red
Banner, Order of Suvorov, Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy, and
re ceived the designation "Poltavskaya." The author has concen-
Cr ated his attention on the heroism of the division's fighting
men, and on the patriotism and proletarian internationalism of
_ Soviet people in the struggle against fascism.
Li terary annotation by M. M. Gilelakh.
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Author's Foreword '
On 22 June 1941, fascist Germany suddenly attacked the Soviet Union without a decla-
ration of war. The peaceful labor of Soviet people was interrupted. The Soviet na-
- tion engaged mankind's most wicked enemy, German fascism, in mortal combat. A new
period ensued in the li.fe of the Soviet state and the Communist Party--the period of
the Great Patriotic War,l
On the fields of battle Soviet fighting men, inspired by communist ideals, showed
their immeasurable superiority over the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, who had become a
tool in the hands of the Nazis, straining to achieve world domination.
But it is precisely this obvious truth that many authors of war memoirs published in
the west are reluctant to admit. Hitler's former military lead~rs and participants
in the "Eastern Campaign" accuse Hitler in the first place af all the failures, hav-
ing declined to take into consideration the opinion of his highly experienced gener-
als, as well as the "impassable Russian roads," "devastating climate," "poor supply
system," etc.
'rhe question automatically arises--could the pedantic members of the German general
staff fail to take into account the road conditions or the capacity for troop sup-
pl.y? OF course not. Today it is universally known that the attack on the USSR was
thoroughly planned and prepared by the military command of Hitler's army. But this
plan began to fall apart from the minute that the first Wehrmacht subunits crossed
the Savi~t border. Triumphal reports of successes by Hitler's troops flew to Ber-
!~n, but in actuality events were not at all taking shape as the German staff envis-
,ge~i. Soviet border guards and Red Army troops were standing up along the enemy
{~rith, able to counter his numerical and technical superiority with an invincible
sCubbornness, an unbending will to attain victory. By their courage and heroism
they showed once again that "victory in any war depends in the final analysis on the
c�ourage of the masses who are shedding their blood on the field of battle. A con-
viction as to the justness of a war, consciousness of the necessity to sacrifice
one's life for the good of his brothers enhances the courage of the soldiers and in-
duces them to bear unprecedented difficulties."2
T~~ose who would advocate revising the results of the war all paint the same picture
of the "Wehrmacht's valor." It goes without saying that many German army units
Csoy~dineniye7 were not ill-prepared for waging predatory wars. But how often were
they smashed by Soviet regiments and divisions formed in the heat of battle out of
reserve soldiers and officers--units that acquired their military experience during
the cour.se of the battle:
Tl~c~ 226th Infantry (later the 95th Guards) Division was just such a unit. It had to
wage battles with the "Death Hea~l" SS Tank Division--not without reputation--and
witll such units as the "Viking," "Reich," "Mighty Germany," and "The Fuhrer's Body-
guard," bur not once did its fighting men leave the battlefield in defeat.
In July 1~941 the newly-formed division consisted only of about 200 regular soldiers.
But with the passage of a little t~ime, men of entirely peaceful professions became
nasters of the military art, because in every one of them dwelt a high consciousness
~f patriotic duty.
1. See "Istoriya Kommunistecheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History ~f the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet UnionJ, Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, p 476.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 41, p 121.
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,
I
~
In 1945, after the liberation of Prague, streamers gleamed on the colors of the 95th
- Guards Poltavskaya In~antry Division--the Order of Lenin, Order of the Red Banner,
Order of Suvorov (Second Degree), and the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy. Such was
the Motherland's evaluation of the courage of her sons.
This book recounts the trials that befell them, relates how these soldiers and offi-
cers perfected their combat skills in savage battles.
My own recoll?ctions are not the book's sole foundation.
I became commander of the 95th Division back during the course of the offensive bat-
tles, and stayed with it from the village of Zybkoye in Kirovogradskaya Oblast until
Prague. But to discourse on this period alone would be to sidestep the beginning of
its combat journey--an aspect of no small interest, to be sure.
I decided to relate the most significant events, including those which took place
prior to my arrival in the division. Letters and memoirs of veterans of the 95th
proved invaluable in this regard--from G. Ye. Dzhig, P. V. Boyko, P. P. Biletskiy,
P. A. Podsiorin, F. M. Zayarnyy, S. N. Yerzhikovskiy, I. P. Zima, V. P. Poviychuk,
P. V. Mitrofanov, N. D. Sebezhko, G. A. Kobernik, S. G. Kobernika, F. P. Bazekin,
M. M. Rokhlinaya, Ye. V. Meshkovaya, A. A. Tyutyayevaya, S. V. Andreyev, V. P. Arna-
utov, M. N. Golubev, V. A. Kudelich, B. A. Zbarzh, and from many other officers and
soldiers to whom I express my sincere gratitude.
' This work uses excerpts from books by Soviet military leaders, documents of various
types and materials from the archives. Views of foreign authors are cited.
COPYRIGHT: Politizdat Ukrainy, 1980
97G8
CSU: 1801/195
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CIVIL DEFENSE ~
BOOK DISCUSSES ROLE, TASKS OF CIVIL DEFENSE
Moscow GRAZHDANSKAYA OBORONA in Russian 1979 (signed to press 17 Sep 79) title page,
pp 2, 3-4, 5-6, 174-176
CTitle page, annotation, table of contents, foreword and chapter I from book "Civil ~
Defense", edited by N. P. Olovyanishnikov, Izdat el'stvo "Vysshaya Shkola", 330,000 I
copies, 176 pages]
~
[Text] CIVIL DEFENSE � ~
I
Ed.: N. P. Olovyanishn ikov ;
i
i
A Textbook for Students of Specialized S econdary-Level Educational ~
Educational Institutioas Authorized by the USSR Ministry of Higher ~
and Secondary-Level Specialized Education ~
i
Second Edition, rev ised 1
Signed to press: 17 Sep 79 ~
- Copies: 33Q, 000 ~
Pages: 176 ~
i
rioscow "Vysshaya Shkola" 1979
This textbook examines the means and methods of defense against ~
weapons of mass destruction, and deals with organization for civ-
il defense administration and communicat ions, the conduct of re-
connaissance, rescue operations and urgent emergency recovery
measures in the centers of damage.
It is intended for students of specializ ed secondary-level edu-
- cational institutions. '
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Table of Contents p$ge
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 -
Chapter I. Role and Tasks of Civil Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Chapter II, Nature of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Employed by the Armies ~
of the Imperialist Nations. . . . . . . . . . . , , . , . , . 7
1. Nuclear weapons of the armies of the imperialist nations 7
2. Chemical weapons of the armies of the imperialist nations 16
3. Bacteriological (biological) weap~ns of th e armies of the imperialist
nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Chapter III. Defense of the Population Against Weapons of Mass Destruction 21
4. Methods of defending the population against weapons of mass destruction 21
5. Protective structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6. Means of individual defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7. Population dispersal and evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8. Rules of conduct and actions to be taken by personnel in areas of radio-
active, chemical and bacteriological contamination . . . . . . . . . 49
9. Personal decontamination; nuclear, chemical, biological decontaminaCion
and disinfection of clothing, footgear, means of protection, weapons
and equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Chapter IV. Instruments Used in Radiac and Chemical Defense Reconnaissance. . 56
10. Radiac reconnaissance instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
11. Chemical defense reconnaissance instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Chapter V. Administration and Communications for Civil Defense 70
12. Organization for administration, communications and notification in civil
defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
13. Men and equipment employed in administration, communications and notifi-
cation in civil defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Chapter VI. Reconnaissance of the Damage Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
14. Organization and conduct of reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
15. Actions of scouts manning the radiac and chemical defense lookout
position . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
16. Actions of the reconnaissance section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
17. Peculiarities in conducting site reconnaissance for individual sectors
of the national economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . 92
18. Organization and conduct of air reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Chapter VII. Rescue Operations and Urgent F,mergency Recovery Measures in Damage ~ `
- Centers and Areas of Natural Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
19. Rescue operations at the center of nuclear damage 97
20. Urgent emergency recovery measures at the center of nuclear damage 104
21. Rescue operations in locations contaminated by radioactivity and toxic
agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
22. Peculiarities in conducting site rescue operations and urgent emergency
recovery measures for individual sectors of the national economy 112
23. Actions to be taken by the population in areas of natural disaster 122
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Chapter VIII. Protection of Agricultural Production from Weapons of Mass
Destruction . . 126
24. Measures to enhance stability of�agricultural production.during wartime 126
25. Protecti~n of farm animals. . . . . . . . . 126
26. Protection of agricultural plants . . . . . . . . ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
27. Production of agricultural produce in storage and shipmenC.and�in field 130
cond i t ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Chapter IX. Use of Transport in Accomplishing Civil Defense Tasks . 134
28. Functions of transport in the civil defense system. 134
29. Railroad transport. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
30. Motor vehicle transport . . . . , , , , , . , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 137
31. Water transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ , ~ ~ ~ � ~ � ~ ~ . ~ ~ 139
32. Air transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
. Chapter X. Technical Support of Civil Defense Measures. 141
33. Nature and tasks of technical support . . . . . . . . . � � . 141
. . .
3 . Organization for technical support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Chapter XI, Protection and Disinfection of Foodstuffs and Manufactured Goods. 146
35. Effect of weapons of mass destruction on foodstuffs, nutritional prod- ~
ucts and manufactured goods . 146
36. Protection and disinfection of provisions,.water,and�manufactured goods 147
37. Organization and operation of special supply subunits and subunits that ~
provide food and individual clothing and equipment. . 153
. . . '
Chapter XII. Medical Provisions for the Population and Civil Defense Forma-
tions. . . . . 156 ~
38. Organization and functions.of the medical service in.civil�defense. 156 ~
39. Organization of inedical assistance in the damage centers. 159 `
40. Organization of special medical assistance for stricken individuals 165 ~
Chapter XIII. Organization for Civil Defense Training of the Population . 168
41. Organization and methods of training the population in civil defense. . 168
42. instructor preparation for the conduct of civil defense drills. . 171
43. Civil defense measures in the pioneer camp. . . , . , . , . , ~ ~ . 171
44. Organization, forms and methods of conducting civil defense propaganda�
among the populace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1~2
Foreword
Significant, positive changes in the development of international relations have
been brought about as a result of the wise and purposeful activities of the Leni.n
Central Committee of the CPSU, the CC Politburo, and the CC CPSU General Secretary
and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev,
directed towards consolidating the peace and security of nations.
At the same time, the forces of imperialism and reaction are striving to hamper de-
tente. They are embarking on a new stage in the arms race and expanding the pro-
duction of weapons of mass destruction.
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Under these conditions the ~PSU and the Soviet government are taking the necessary
measuxes to insure that our.~country is safe from any surprises. They are maintain-
ing the country's defensive capacity at the required level, and strengthening our
- armed forces and civil defense in every possible way.
Through thorough preparation of the population and the national economy, civil de-
fense must achi.eve a maximum reduction in the destructive effect of modern weapons,
and in case of an enemy attack, must conduct rescue operations and urgent emergency
recovery measures at the damage centers.
One of the mos t important tasks of civil defen~e is training the population in pro-
tecting themse lves from the weapons of mass destruction. Students are undergoing
such training in educational institutions.
In secondary-level specialized educational institutions, civil defense is an inte-
gral part of s tudents' initial military training.
The major tasks of this training comprise the following: conducting a close study
of the destructive properties of the modern weapons employed by the armies of the
imperialist na tions, and studying methods of protection from these weapons; training
- students in the practical use of ineans of protection, teaching them how to equip the
simplest shelters, conduct personal decontamination and disinfection and use instru-
ments in radiac and chemical defense reconnaissance; acquainting students with the
basics in conducting rescue operations and urgent emergency recovery measures, with
methods of conducting reconnaissance, and also with the peculiarities of conducting
civil defense measures at sites of that sector of the national economy for which the
specialists are being trained.
This textbook was written in accordance with the program of initial military train-
ing, and covers subject areas in both the program's general section (Chapters I-IV;
para. 20-22, Chap. VII; para. 25-27 and 29, Chap. VIII) as well as the "Individual
Section Trairiing" (Chapters V, VI; para 23 and 24, Chap. VII; para 28, Chap.VIII;
Chap~ers IX-XIV).
- Chapter I. Ro le and Tasks of Civil Defense
Ci~~il defense (CD) is part of the system of national defensive measures conducted in
time of peace and war for protection of the population and the national economy from
weapons of mass destruction and other means of enemy attack, and also for the con-
duct of rescue operations and urgent emergency recovery measures in the damage cen-
ters and zones of contamination.
The Communist Party and the Soviet government attach a great deal of significance
to civil defense and are constantly concerned with strengthening it. The improve-
ment and development of civil defense is a nationwide matter and the duty of each
citizen of the USSR.
The role of civil defense is determined by the nature of the complex and varied
tasks it will have to accomplish during a nuclear missile war. These tasks may be
divided conditionally into three groups. ~
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The first group comprises tasks related to providing protection for the popuZation
against the weapons of mass destruction: advance preparation of protective struc- -
tures; providing the population with means of individual protection; training the
population in methods and means of defense; organizing the notification procese for -
threat of enemy attack; organizing and conducting population dispersal and evdCUa-
tion.
The second group includes tasks related to enhancing the stability of operation in
national economy projects during wartime and under conditions of enemy attack.
The third group comprises tasks related to eliminating the aftereffects of enemy use
of weapons of mass destruction--the organization and conduct of reacue operations
and urgent emergency recovery measures in the damage centers.
Satisfactory accomplishment of these tasks depends to a great degree on the prepar-
edness of command personnel and non-military formations, as well as on the prepared-
ness of the entire population for defense against the weapons of mass destruction. ~
Therefore, one of the fundamental tasks of civil defense in peacetime is universal, ~
mandatory training of the population in the methods and means of protection. '
I
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "yysshaya skkola", 1979 ~
9768 ~
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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS
BOOK DISCUSSES SOCIALIST PATRIOTISM, INTERNATIONALISM
Moscow PATRIOTiZM I INTERNATSIONALIZM V DEYSTVII in Russian 1979 (signed to press
21 May 79) title page, pp 2, 3-4, 119
CTitle page, annotation, table of contents and introduction from book "Patriotism
and Internationalism in Action", by V. I. Nechipurenko, Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF USSR,
40,000 copies, 119 pages]
CText] V. I. Nechipurenko
PATRIOTISM AND INTEkNATIONALISM'IN ACTION
Signe d to press: 21 May 79
Copies: 40,000
Pages : 119
Moscow
Order of the "Mark of Esteem"
DOSAAF USSR Publishing House
1919
Professor V. I. Nechipurenko, doctor of historical sciences, dis-
cusses the nature of socialist patriotism and internationalism,
and covers in detail the means of educating youth in the glorious
traditions of the Soviet people srid its armed forces. -
This book is intended for DOSAAF propagandists and a wide circle
of readers.
Table of Contents Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter I. Marxism-Leninism on Socialist Patriotism and Internationalism 5
~ne Fatherland, given birth by the GreaC October . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
International nature of the socialist Fatherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Unity of Soviet patriotism and internationalism--the source of strength and
power of the sucialist Fatherland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
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Chapter II. Soviet People--Patriots and Internationalists 45
Solidarity of the Soviet people with the workers of the entire world--social-
ist patriotism and internationalism in action. . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Building socialism in its developed stage in the USSR--embodiment of patriot-
ism and internationalism in Soviet people. . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Defense of the socialist~Fatherland--the highest patriotic and international
duty of the Soviet people . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Chapter III. Patriotic and International Upbringing Under Conditions of
Socialism in its Developed Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $j
Patriotic and international upbringing--an inalienable part of the formation
_ of the new man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Basic forms and means of patriotic and international upbringing. 94
Role of DOSAAF organizations in the patriotic and international upbringing of
youth. . . . . . . . . 104
_ The book~ of L. I. Brezhnev--"Malaya zemlya",."Rebirth", "Virgin Lands"--the
_ i
anna.ls of Soviet patriotism and internationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 ~
!
Introduction ;
We live _n an era of radical social changes. The postures of socialism continue to �
consolidate and expand. Victories in the national liberation movement are opening j
up new horizons for countries that have won their independence. The class struggle ,
of the workers against the oppression of monopolies, against exploiting orslers is
mounting. The revolutionary-democratic, anti-imperialist movement is assuming
ceater and greater proportions. All of this taken together, the 25th CPSU Congress '
stressed, signifies development of the worldw=de revolutionary process. I
I
In the vanguard of builders of the new world, of fighters for socialism and national j
].iberation stand communist. and workers' parties. Leading the historical, creative ~
work of hundreds of millions of people, they are being guided by Marxism-Leninism, ;
anc3 are carrying on high the banner of revolutionary worker solidarity, Proletarian ~
internationalism permeates the entire substance of the theory and practice of scien-
tific cemmunism. It is the inexhaustible source of strength_and cohesion for the ~
revolutionary liberation movement, the pledge of its victories.
Proletarian internationalism has acquired a special significance in our time. On the
one hand this has come ahout through growth in the potential of the basic revolution-
ary forces, which, i.n rallying together, are capable of handing imperialism a deci-
sive defeat. On the other hand, this rallying together is necessitated by the tac-
eics of our class enemy, who is intensely coordinating his anti-communist activities
on an international scale, striving to split communist ranks apart and attempting to ~
_ pit various detachments of the workers' national liberation movement against each
other.
As [he 25th CPSU Congress pointed out, a movement of the problems of internationalism
to the fore of ideological conflict in the international arena has been brought about
' by the peculiarities of the current period. It is precisely at this time that the
question of the fat~~ of mankind, the future of civilization, has arises with special !
acuteness. Internationalism and the brotherhood of nations have become the solid ex- i
-ression and criterion for the moral development of mankind, one of the deciding fac- ~
tors in social progress. :
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The enemies of communism, right and "left" revisionists and Maoists, are distorting
in every conceivable way the essence of proletarianism, and are attempting to pit it
against patriotism. They engage in profiteering on peoples' national feelings, im- _
plant and cultivate chauvinistic attitudes. In this regard, nationalists of every
stripe are lining up more and more frequently in "marxist" clothing. Adopting Cer-
tain views of Marx, Engels and Leczin and' tmr?dz~~c~i-xiingly ir~terpreti~ttg them, they at-
- tempt to emasculate socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism by ex-
tracting their Marxist-Leninist class essence. This demands a high degree of polit-
ical vigilance on the part of Soviet people--an intense, uncompromising struggle
against inimical ideology, a strong rebuff to nationalistic views and dispositions
alien to our society. ~ -
Pointing out the necessity for a strict, class-oriented, concrete and historical ap-
proach to the definition of internationalism and patriotism, V. I. Lenin noted that
it is not he who vows and swears to be an internationalist that is one, but rather
he who really wages a struggle in the internationalist manner. "Internationalism in �
fact," Vladimir I1'ich stressed, "is one and only one thing--selfless work in devel-
oping the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one's own coun-
try, supporting (with propaganda and one's sympathies, as well as materially) /that
very same struggle/, that very same line, and /only that line/, in /all/ countries
without exception." [in boldface7 According to Lenin, patriotism blends integrally
with revolutionary internationalism--for the struggle of the workers in pursuit of
their national interests is at the same time the struggle to realize the interna-
tional interests of the proletariat.
_ V. I. Lenin thoroughly revealed the inseparability of national and international
tasks in the struggle for liberation, of national and international responsibility
of the participants in this struggle. He thoroughly revealed the dialectical unity
of patriotism and proletarian internationalism. The correctness of Leninist ideas
~ ha~ been confirmed by the entire course of historical development, by the great -
acl-.ievements of true socialism, of the international workers' movement and the na-
tianal liberation muvement.
"Ir. the distant October of 1917, workers and peasants of Russia emerged as one
ag~inst the old world, the world of greediness, indignity and violence," stated Com-
racie L. I. Brezhnev in his speech "The Great October and Progress for Mankind."
"They built socialism in a country surrounded by the hostile forces of imperialism.
They built it, and they defended it. Today we are not alone. Our country has be- .
come part of a large family of socialist states. So could we--Soviet communists and
- al? the Soviet people--be anything more tightly knit in the world that surrounds us
_ than this socialist family? To see it flourish, to promote our general welfare, we
are doing everything in our power:"
These words vividly express the essence of the new socialist patriotism and inter-
_ nationalism that permeate the policies of the CPSU and the Soviet state, and that
characterize the vital orientation of the Soviet man, who unites within himself
boundless devotion to the Mothe~land, readiness, the will and ability to build com-
munism, detend the peaceful labor of his own people and the peoples of the fraternal
countries of the socialist community as well.
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This book will deal with the essence and specific character of patriotism and inter-
nationalism, their interrelationship, their role in the upbringing of the new man,
in the building and defense of communist society. It is intended for DO SAAF propa-
gandists and a wider cir;:~2 of readers.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo DOSAAF SSSR 1979
9768
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