JPRS ID: 9739 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400010035-8
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• Sequence Number: 35
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9739
_ 18 May 1981
/ fri a Re or~
Near ~ast North A c
p _
- C~OUO 17/81) _
E
_ ~B~S F~REIGN ~ROADCAST INFORMATIO~J SERVICE
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NOTE ~
- JPRS publications cantain information primarily from foreign
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sources are transl.ated; th~se from English-language sources
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other characteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets
_ are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Textj -
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the
last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
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mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
- item originate with the ~ource. Times within items are as
given by source.
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JPR5 L/9?39
18 May 1981
~
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
- (FOUO 17/81)
CONTENTS
AFGHANISTAN
Baxbieri Claims Global Balance Must Be Combined With Local Balance
- (Frane Baxbieri; LA STAMPA, c^1 Apr 81) 1
IRAN
'ASAHI' Interviews Bani-Sadr on War, U.S. Re1..ations
(ASAHI SHIl~UN, 2 May 81) 3
Fifty Six Million Bollar I,oss ~n Arms Deal
(REUTER, 19 Apr 81) 5
IRAQ
_ Bri ef s
F`rench Nuclear Negotiations Suspended 7
- ISRAyL
Arab League Reports on Conditions in West Bank
(AL-WATAIC AI,-'ARABI, 13-19 Feb 81) 8
LIBYA
Briefs
F'ertilizer Plant 16
MAURITANIA
~ Algeria Aids Restoration of Order Following Coup Xttempt
(Samir Gharbi; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 8 Apr 81) 17
SYRIA
Various Currents Among Moslem Brothers Reviewed
(~'.I,-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 20-26 Max 31) 18
- a- [III - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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. AFGHANISTAN
BARBIERI CLAI*4S GLOBAL BALANCE MUST BE COMBINED WITH LOCAL BALANCE
LD241429 Turin LA STA1~A in Italian 21 Apr 81 p 1
[Article by Frane Barbieri: "Chain of Oblivion"] =
- [Text] It seems like a trick of history, but it could also be regarded as a
historical inevitability: the Soviet chiefs of staff aze examining the experi-
- ences of the U.S. Army in Vietnam with the aim of drawing up a new strategic plan
for Afghanistan since the blitzkrieg has proved a failure. It seems that two
alternatives are being studi~d. Following the "scala" adopted by the Americans,
if they wanted to carry out a total occupation (which would also mean total war)
the Soviets would have to send half a million troops into the Afghan mountains.
_ However, if they were content merely to control key points and routes in the
country, as the Americans hoped to do for a while, it would be enough f or the Red
- Army contingent to be increased from its present 85,000 to 110,000 men. At
present the second alternative i~ being pursued (22,000 Soviets have recently -
entered Kabul) but the former alternative is also being worked on since the -
iritensification of the war could endanger the str~tegic strongholcis themselves,
just as happened to the Americans in Vietnam.
The data reaching us from Afghanistan could be--and in fact undoubtedly are-- ~
exaggerated. Nevertheless, despite exaggerations and contradictions, both sides
- confirm that violent clashes are undErway at Kandahar, the country's second larg-
est city. The Muslim guer~illas claim to be defending the liberated city against
Soviet attacks, while the Karmal government maintains, on tlie contrary, that its
troops are defending the city against rebel attacks and that a Soviet division
- has rushed to the government forces' aid. However, these two half-tr~iths do
- r~veal one indisputable truth: Afghanistan is in the grips of an out-and-out war,
which exploded anew as spring melted the snows, just as in Vietnam the now
- legendary offensives were unleashed as the rains receded.
_ All the strange wars and semiwars (flf which there are now some 50) which are
unsettling the world reveal the foliowing rule: the sense of freedom and
national independence comes before and above any ideology or social system.
_ Just as Vietnam defeated the United States, Vietnam itself is becoming enmired
in the Kampuchean jun~;le, as the Americans did in the Mekong swamps, and so too
Afghanistan is becouiing a Vietnam in reverse, with the Russians in the Americans'
place. The chain of minor wars is growing at a frightening rate, often with
reversed and confusing fronts, while the world--so woiried by the prospects of a -
major war--seems inclined to bury them in an expedient chain of oblivion.
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Eritrea was forgotten for Kampuchea, then Afghanistan's fate obscured Kampuchea's
and now concern for Poland has caused Afghanistan's eclipse in the world's atten-
tion.
First they said: Hands off Kampuchea or no negotiations. When the Kampuchean
situation remained unchanged, there was a retreat to: Hands off Afghanistan or
no negotiations. Next they said: Hands off Poland or no negotiations. Now
. already they are saying: Mcscow has acquitted itself well with respect to
_ Poland, so negotiations can start. Without the chain of oblivion there would
probably never be the major negotiations still necessary to achieve the mythical
global balance. Basically world peace is worth an Afghanistan or a Kam~uchea
or maybe an E1 Salvador. But is this really so? Are we sure that the greater
peace is to be achieved by accepting and forgetting so many smaller wars?
The other day we heard a Soviet diplomat sa}� that the global balance already
exists: otheYwise the U.S. negotiators would never have signed SALT-II. Even
Haig has acknowledged it, he said. It must be true that planetary balance
exists inasmuch as both powers are in a position to destroy each other and the
entire world 15 times over. Nevertheless, under the umbrella of the self-
destructive balance there is an imbalance, inasmuch as one side (most recently
the United States) has a range of forces that enable it to intervene in several
gray, bordering or ill-defined areas of the world, counting on the nonreaction
' of the ~ther power, which could cause a total disaster but not carry out a local
counterinterven tion.
i^he famous Pershing missiles are part of this imbalance: right now the Soviet
SS-20S cou.ld destroy Europe or occupy it through blackmail, whereas Europe has
no means of destroying or blackmailing Eastern Europe. The only deterrent is the
- U.S. capacity to destroy everyone, including itself, assuming Washington decides
it is advisable to do so to avoid losing Europe.
Therefore in order for the balance to defend us better against wars, it must
be not only global but also specific, local, so to speak. Partly because not
all the bombs threatening the world are nuclear. It must not be assumeci that
all the peoples exposed to invasions or interventions (from Kampuchea tc
_ Afghanistan and from Poland to El Salvador) will be satisfied with a global peace
- based on a balance of power if the price of a greater peace mi~st be the abandon-
ment of their minor independences and freedom of choice. For the small countries
_ these are major values and as absolute as universal peace--and important enough
- to risk a major war. Europe will not become more peaceful by forgetting
- ' Afghanistan and will not deliver the Polish Catholics by sa~rificing the Afghan
Muslims.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
CSO: 4404/22
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IRAN
'ASAHI' INTERVIEWS BANI-SADR ON WAR, U.S. RII,ATIONS
OW041451 Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 2 May 81 Evening Edition p 2
- [Text] ASAHI SHIMBUN Tehran Bureau 1 Ma.y--President Bani-Sadr in an interview
granted this bureau on 1 May made the first specif3c disclosure about war
gains the Iran-Iraq war started, saying that Iran has "recaptured 40 percent
of the territory occupied by the Iraqi Army." Iranian troops, he said,
continue to overwhelm the enemy without arms aid by any for2ign country but
- the war is likely to be protracted. He also made it clear that Iran has
no plan to normalize its diplomatic relations with the United States.
- In the 50-minute interview held at the presidentia]. mansion, Bani-Sadr spoke
of various issues facing Iran, stating his views in a specific and detailed
manner. He has been busy inspecting frontlines and leading war efforts.
Furthermore, hg has of late refrained from co~nenting on a confrontation
in domestic politics. Accordingly, h:Ls remarks during this interview were
the frankest in the rece:~t period. -
- Regarding the Iran-Iraq wax, the president said that while Iraq has several
times more arms than Iran, the latter holds superiority in terms of training,
morale, the purpose of war and tactics. He disclosed for the first time
that Iran had recaptured 40 percent of territory from Iraqi occupation.
With foreign arms supply, if available, Iran could end the war at an early
date, he said. At present when such supply is not available, he added, Iran
must try to keep the equipment it now has, and, therefore, it is unable to
launch a large-scale offensive. This would naturally prolong the war, he said.
Speaking on the Irar.ian foreign policy after the hostage incident, he expressed
his hope for close relations with Japan and European nations, particularly
with Japan in Asia. Iran wants to establish independent, friendly ties with
them, f ree from the superpowers' dominatian. Turning to relations with the
- United States, however, Bani-Sadr made no effort to hide his anger at the
U.S. asthorities even demanding compensation for properties of the elements
of the old establishment who fled Iran. "The normalization of diplomatic
relations with tt~.e United States is impossible so long as it continues to ~
wield power," he declared. ~
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Asked about Iranian accomplishments in the 3 years since the revolution,
Bani-Sadr sa~d that the impact of the war and consequences of tne hostage
i.nci~lent and economic sanctions were tremendous. H~ admitted that Iran has
nut yet succeeded in ending its economic reliance on foreign countries.
He also noted that tha "lack af mutual confidence" among the people as a
national trait resulting from the prolonged oppressive rule has not yet
been corrected completely. The president warned that the curbs on freedoms,
imposed by the f;overnment authorities under the pretext of war efforts, have
proven to be a factor hampering the efforts to attain the goal of the
revolution.
' The Iranian economy has been sl~iggish because of the war, with one-third
of the working force (3.5 million to 4 million people) unemployed and the
inflation rate soaring 41 percent in 2 years. Referring to the capabilities '
of the Rajai Cabinet which bears the: responsibility for 3.mproving the
nation's economic plight, Bani-Sadr said that "It cannot win confidence of
_ the people so long as the rule by terror continues." Strongly.criticizing
the posture of the Rajai Cabinet based on the conservative, h ard-line
_ policy of the Islamic Republican Party, he lashed out at its hand-to-mouth
style economic management, saying that the cabinet has "no long-range plan
to prepare for the future."
" COPYRIGHT: [1931] Asahi Shimbun Tokyo Honsha
CSO: 4105/152 '
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~
IRAN
FIFTY SIX MILLION DOLLAR LOSS IN A'.ZMS DEAL
_ JN1916J4 London REUTER in English 1611 GMT 19 Apr 81
[Text] Tehran, 19 April (REUTER)--Iran admitted today it had lost
56 million dollars in an arms deal swindle in Europe while trying to
_ get badly needed supplies for its war against Iraq.
Asked at a press conference about iocal r~unours that 560 million rials
(7.5 million dollars) sent to France to buy arms had been stolen by
Iranisn representatives, chief government spokesman Behzad Nabavi said "It
_ is not 56 millior? tomans but 56 million dollars." One toman equals
10 rials.
~ This was the first officially reported bid by Iran to obtain arms outside
government channels in its seven-month-old war with Iraq.
Mr Nabavi, answering written questions, said the Iranian charge d'affaires
in Spain,. responsible for overseeing the purchase, had been recalled to
Tehran to explain the fiasco.
Iran's Bank Melli in Paris had paid 56 million dollars against shipping
documents which turned out to be incomplete, he said, but added "the
government has frozen the money and a court is investigating tne matter."
Journalists were unable immediately to question Mr Nabavi further on the
II:atter.
Mr Nabavi said later in a state radio interview the court was in Paris
"because the crime happened in Paris."
He did not explain how the money paid by Bank Melli could be frozen, nor
what chance theie was of regaining it.
His revelations fo].lowed persistent r~ours in Tehran that funds�Pet
_ aside to buy arms had been embezzled by Iranian representatives abroad.
_ "The fight against Saddam [Iraqi President Saddam Husayn] needs a~unition
and military equipment which we have to get from sources that are not
' governments but companies," said Mr Nabavi, one of the most powerful figures
in the government of Prime Minister Moha~ad 'Ali Raja'i.
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_ Under the deal, the Iranian Embassy in Madrid was to have en.dorsed shipping
~ documents when the arms cargo was loaded, and then the money would be paid.
"All this was done in the wrong way," he declared. "The Iranian charge in
Spain endorsed the shipment without seeing the doctmments and the Bank Melli
paid the money even though the documents were incomplete."
Bank Melli is the biggest of Iran's nationalised coummercial banks and
handles most foreign trade.
Iranian leaders have previously spoken of obtaining arms abroad to make up
- for war losses and Iran is believed to be receiving small arms from North
Korea and Libya, as well as what it can get from non-governmental sources
in the European weapons market.
The small home arms ind4stry al~:o makes some a~un3tion.
A spoke.sman for the Spanish Embassy in Tehran said he had no infor~nation on
th e reported deal, adding that the Madrid government was pledged not to sell
arms to either of the warring nations.
CSO: 4~920/319
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I~Q -
BRIEFS
FRENCH NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS SUSPENDED--Iraq has suspended negotiations with
Framatome on construction of a nuclear ~lant. Reason: Baghdad is concentrating
its purchases on arms right now. (Text) [Paris LA LETTRt: DE L'EXPANSION in
French 20 Apr 81 p 5)
- CSO: 4800/52 ~
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~ ISRAEL
ARAB LEAGUE REPORTS ON CONDITIONS IN WEST BANK ~
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 Feb 81 pp 43-45
[Article: "Boycott of Israel Across Open Bridges: Least Harmful Form in Dealing
With Local Arabs"]
[Text] What are the positive and negative returns of the open bridges with the
- West Bank and Gaza in light of the principles of the Arab boycott of Israel? Is
there a better formula to strengthen the resistance the Arab population in the
occupied lands? The two questions have been ans~.ered by a study, a document pre-
pared by the General Secretariat of the Arab League and submitted to Arab off i-
- cials. AL-4lATAN AL-'ARABI stands alone in publishing iti with its statistics.
Immediately after the June 1967 War which placed the West Bank and the Gaza
Sector under Israeli occupation, a situation was created which unprecedented in
the Arab world, which had been subjected to Israeli aggression since 1948. On the
_ one hand, the occupation authorities worked systematically to subjugate the
occupied lands and their peoples to their authority. Their intention was to
drain off the resources available there and try to induce the natives to emigrate
by various pressures, not the least of which wa.s econamic pressure, and subse-
quently agpropriate the land. This is considered the final goal of Israeli
- policy. On the other hand, it was inevitable that Jordan should consider the
occupied lands as its own in spite of the Israeli occupation and consequently
would work to support the resistance of the natives by continually offering
material aid by paying the salaries of official employees and facilit,~ting the
muvement of the natives over the bridges so that they would keep their ties to
their homeland. As a complement to all of that, it was inevitable that the
bridges would be open to products from the West Bank and the Gaza Sector so that
the producers would not fall prey to the Israeli occupation which would impose
very low prices on them, spoil their efforts and induce them to refrain from work-
ing their land and consider emigration. Thus a situation was created which Israel
could exploit to penetrate the Arab markets by passing its goods over the bridges
as goods produced in the occupied lands, or at least by participating in the pro-
duction of goods in the occupied lands, either directly by setting up a partner-
- ship with the producers or by linking production to some Israeli components.
It was also inevitable that the other Arab g~vernments and the Arab League, espe-
- cially the main ~ffice of the boycott of Israel, should consider the question of
the open bridges from the standpoint of the principles of the boycott agreed upon
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by these governments. It has become the backbone of their laws and regulations,
- and some of the Arab governments have expresa~d reservations toward the polic.y of
open bridges, considering it a violation of the princip les of the boycott. In
their view, another form must be found to support the resistance of the population -
of the occupied lands.
It is clear that every opinion t~as justification, and it is not our purpose here
to put one opinion before another or to come out with a new opinion. The i:ztent
of this document is to outl~ne a brief picture of the economic situation in the
occupied lands and to dem~nstrate how much this situation is linked to the
Jordanian (and Arab) economy on the one hand and the Israeli economy on the other.
Then the compar~ison, in light of that, between keeping the bridges open and
closing them proceeds from the present and ~uture interests of the population of
the occupied lands. Accordingly, this study falls into three main parts. The
first deals with the economic situation in the occupied lands. The second reviews
the existing trade relations between the accupied lands and both Israel and
Jordan, and the third deals with t}?e economic and sociaY efforts, both positive -
= and negative. _
~ Economic Situation in the Occupied I.ands =
The major difficulties surrounding a study of the situation of the occupied lands
is the rarity of statistical information from Arab s;.urces, since the circum- ~
stances of the occupation do not permit the collection of such information. -
Consequently, all of the statistics in this study, unless otherwise noted, are
r_aken from the Quarterly Statistical Report for the Administered Lands published
by the Israeli Central Department of Statistics.
The statistics show that the population of the West Bank and the Gaza Sector
at the end of 1978 was about 1,137,300 (60 percent in the West Bank and 40 percent
in the Gaza), compared to 1971 figures of about 1,007,400 (62 percent in the West
Bank and 38 percent in Gaza). T~ese statistics also indicate that the labor
force in the occupied lands in 1978 was about 33.4 percent of the population -
age 14 and older, or about 2i3,800 people. It is worth mentionin~ that the par- -
ticipation of inen in the labor force was double that of women, and the margin of
. women in tr,e labor force explains the low percentage of workers in relation to
the total popula*_ion. It is noted that the percentage of those working in Israel
was 32 percent of the total workers in the year men*_ioned above (that is, about
68,700). A report issued by the International Labor Organization mentions that
the number of those working in Israel in the occupied lands rose fram 20,000 to
70,Ot~0 between 1970 and 1978. The income of these accounted for.,about a thir.d of
- the increase in the gross national product for the occupied lands in that period.
However, most of this income was used to cover the value of the imports of the
occupied lands from Isr.ael, which constitute on the average about 90 percent of
tre total imports.
The aforementioned report says that there is constant emigration fram the occupied -
lands because of the low level of economic activity and the shortage of suitable
job opp artunities. It is estimated that about 20,000 emigrate each year, most
of them young people. The report notes that the level of investment is markedZy -
low as a result of the reluctance of owners of supplies to employ their capital .
bFCause of the occupation.
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T.n this framework, Israel is working to achieve two basic goals. The fi~st is
, an attempt to take i.n Arab workers with the intention of putting tl~:m to work at
- low wages in construction, agriculture and the textile industry in particular,
and the second { G to lower economic activity in the occupied lands in the ho~~e
_ that that will _..crease the emigration of skilled and ~ducated workers, especially
to the Arab oil countries.
A study of the economic and social conditions on the West Bank indicates that
Israel decreased the population of the West Bank between the years 1971 and 1977
by about 17.5 percent (or from 805,000 to 665,000 peop le). Israel is taking
- many punitive and coercive steps, including confiscation of land, annexation and
arrest, to achieve its goal of driving out the population. Among the results of
- the Israeli colonization policy was a decrease in the acreage of agricultural
land as a result of Israel~'s appropriation or confiscation of it to build sett?.e-
ments, which has led to lowering the agricultural sector's share of the gross
' national product from 35 percent before the ~ccupation to 26 percent. In 1976,
the number of w~rkers in the agricultural sector was reduced by 14 percent. The
same study of economic and social conditions on the West Bank indicates that the
emigration from the agricultural areas which accompani~d the occupation and the
control by its authorities cf some of the agricultural land has led t~ a reduction
_ in the number of farms on the West Bank by about 3,000 agricultural titles.
' Israeli statistics for 1967 indicated that there were 52,100 titles, while
= according to Jordanian f igures for 1965 there were then about 55,100 titles.
~ From anotner aspect, Israel has pursued a policy of conve:-ting Arab agriculture
in the occupied areas to production of crops used by Israeli industry. For
examp le, it seems that this policy has led to reducing West Bank pr oduction of
melons from 36,000 tons in the year 1967-68 to only 8,000 tons in 1971-72, a re-
duction of 78 percent. In return, some crops have recorded an increase in pro-
duction, including sesame, beans, cotton and sugar beets. Acreage planted in
sesame in the West Bank rose from 18,000 dunums in 1967-68 to 30,000 dunums in
1970-71. Acreage planted in tobacco rose from 4, S00 dunums in 1969 to 12, 000
dunums in 1970. It is also noted that production of vegetables (such as eggplant,
_ peppers, etc. ) rose while production of wheat and barley fell, which suggests that
= Israel intends ~o make the population of the occupied lands increasingly depenaent
on it for wheat, which is considered the basic element in nutrition. Israel has
_ tried to implement its desire by forming what it calls "a~ricultural councils" in
the occup ied regions.
Industry has no important role in economic activity in the occupied areas. The
occupation authorities have not opened up opportunities for industrial developmen~.
Iiz 1977, the total number of workers in the industrial sector in tYie West Bank was
9,061 workers, including 1,437 in the food, beverage and tobacco industries, 2,195
_ in the textile and clothing industries, 690 d~n the leather and leather products
industry, 1,160 in the lumber and ].umber products industry, 711 in the rubber and
plastic and chemical products industry, 663 in the nonprecious metals industry,
1,307 in the basic minerals and mineral products industries and 898 in other in-
dustries.
It is clear from this quick lobk that the economy of the occupied lands has a
limited base and relies basically on agricultural activity. Israel has been able
to control it, work to weaken it, limit the possibilit ies for its d evelopment,
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and subjugate it to ~he Israeli economy. Israel has also tried to make it im-
possible for agricultural production from the occupied lands to campete with
Israeli agricultural production, which enjoys great support in the furm of pro-
d~iction elements available at low prices, including water, equipment and agri- -
cultural machinery, and assistance in marketing the produce at home and abrcad.
Israel has tried to take advantage of this situation, which has led to obvious
and hidden unemployment. It has permitted only a liffiited number of unemployed
Arab workers to work inside Israel and in this event has even tried to d3:scriui-
inate again5t them by subjecting them to the same taxes imposed on Israeli workers
- without enabling t-hem to take advantage ef the various social services offered to ~
- Israeli workers, except marginally.
Commercial Exchar~ge, in Figures
The figures for commercial exchange for the occupied lands indicate that the
greater part of the imports and exports are from or destined f or Israel as a
result of Israel's policy of tightening the c~llar on the occupied land. In 1978
- the total imports of the Giest Bank amounted to about 4.35 billion Israeli pounds,
86 percent from Israel, 2 percent from Jordan and 12 percent from other countries.
= It should be noted that more than half of the imports from Israel were of agri- -
cultural products, while most of the imports from Jordan and other countries were
industrial commodities. As for exports, the total in 1978 amounted to 2.5~5 -
: billion Israeli pounds, of which 57 percent were exported to Israel, 42 percent -
to Jordan and 1 percent to other countries. As a consequence of that, the West -
Bank shows a balance of trade deficit of 1.785 billion pounds. The balance of
t.~ade with Jordan shows a surplus of 997 million Israeli pounds and a deficit -
~a~~li other countries of 4$2 million Israeli pounds.
Statistics show that in 1978 the total imports of the Gaza Secter were 3.395
_ billion Israeli pounds, of which 9Q ,~ercent came from Israel and 9.5 percent fram
- other countries (other than Jordan). E::r ~rts totaled 2.176 b illion Israeli
- pounds, 66.6 percent to Israel, 26.4 per~~.~t to Jordan and 7 percent to other
- countries. As a result, there is a i.otal trade deficit of 1.219 billion Israeli
pounds in the }ear in question. As is the case with the West Bank, the balance
~ of trade recorded a deficit with Israel of 1.624 billion Israeli pounds, while
there was a surplus of 575 million Israeli pounds with Jordan and a deficit of -
170 million Israeli pounds with other countries.
Economic Effects of Policy of Open Bridges .
A. Having the bridges remain open means that the farmers of the West Bank and the
Gaza Sector can market their surplu:; products in Jordanian and Arab markets at
- prices higher than the prices they would obtain if they marketed those products
, in Israel, since there th~se commodities compete with similar, lower-priced _
- Israeli commodities. As a result, this will maintain reasonable sources of income
- for the workers in this sector which will enable them to stay on their land and
- not consider emigration. The number of workers in this sector in 1978 amounted to
, about 46,300 w~rkers forming about 32 percent of the labor force in the West Bank -
- and the Gaza Sector. The value of the agricultural co~odities exported from the
West Bank and Gaza to Jordan in 1978 amounted to 1,016,985 Israeli pounds.
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B. The matter is not limited ta the marketing of agricultural comcr,odities. There
are industrial goods which are being exported to Jordan and some of the Arab coun-
- tries, such as olive oil, soap and prec~ous stones. These exp~rts to the East -
Bank were worth about 644,000 Israeli pounds for 1978, and there were about 21,000
workers in this sector making up less than 12 percent of the labor force in the
West Bank and Gaza.
C. There is an indirect benefit as a result of the mouement of products from Gaza
to the Ea.st Bank. That is related to the traffic created within the West Bank and
over the two bridges, which has generated other sources of income.
D. The raw materials necessary for industry in the West Bank are being impor.ted
by way of the East Bank, which keeps them from being subjected to the stringent
- Israeli import restrictions ar.d makes these imports available at a lower price.
- Jordan benef its from this if those commodities are exported to it in their final
f orm.
E. Visitors coming from Arab states to the West Bank and the Gaza Sector and also
residents of the West Bank when they return from the East Bank can bring in a num-
ber of commodities in the form of gifts or for use in the West Bank, reducing the -
natives' dependence on Israeli products and helping to distribute co~nercial move-
ment on the East Bank to a certain extent.
Social Effects
In addition to the economic effects, there are positive social effects of the
opening of the bridges.
A. There are many families in the West Bank who rely for their livelihood on
personal remittance of money from their sons working in the Arab states or the East
Bank. If the bridges remain open, those transfers can be made in the form of cash
which continues to pass over the bridges. Its owners may protect it by depositing
it in the banks of the East Bank. If the bridges were closed, those families would
be forced to emigrate to join their sons at the source of subsistence, or else
- t~:eir cash and deposits would be transferred to Israeli banks, benefiting those
banks and harming those families. Drafts from sons to their families in the West
Bank were estimated at about 1.231 billion Israeli pounds for 1975.
B. Tiiere are a number of persons living in the West Bank who have interests and -
investments either in the East Bank or in the Arab states. These peopae leave
the West Bank temporarily to supervise and manage their interests and then return
tc? their permanent homes in the West Bank, while the bridges remain open. If the
- bridges were closed, most of them would leave the Bank to look aFter their
interests, since it would be less advantageous remain than to leave. -
C. The Jordanian go~~ernment has adopted a policy of supporting th~ resistance
of families of the West Bank by paying the salaries and wages of a number of
social groups, such as teachers, lawyers and doctors, on the West Bank. It is
believed that this policy will change if the bridges are closed.
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v
li. It was decided at the Ninth Summit Conference held in Baghdad to suppcrt the
resistanre of the people of the West Bank with the sum of 100 million dollars. -
The importance of having the bridges open lies in the ability to tran~fer those ,
eums to the West Bank directly by way of the bridge (taking into consideration the
impor.tance of those sums in supportirig the resistance of the people in the faCe,~o~ _
the Israeli occupation's coercion, preventing their emigration). If the bridges -
were closed, two things might follow. The first would be ending support and con-
sequently shaking the resistance of the people. The second is the transfer of
those sum~ of their deposit in Israeli banks, which is unlikely.
,
In summary, these positive effects have made it possible for the people of the
47est Bank and Gaza Sector to maintain an acceptable standard of living and "have
stopped them from considering emigration and leaving the West Bank. Some of them
believe that the opening of the bridges was the main reason making life tolerable -
in the West Bank and the Gaza Sector.
What About the East Bank? -
I
- As for the East Bank, the policy of keeping the bridges open bas had a part in
achieving the following: _
A. Continued supply of the East Bank with a major portion of its requirements for
agricultural products. Agricultural exports from the West Bank and the Gaza -
_ Sector form a part of the total agricultural products offered in the central
market of Amman which cannot be ignored, in addition to the fact that some of
those products fill the need of some Arab markets.
- B. Continuing ro supply the East Ba.nk with its requirements for some necessary
manufactured goods, such as olive oil, vegetable oils and soap. These commodities
and others fill the needs of some Arab markets.
C. Stimulating the Jordanian banking system, since a considerable part of the
deposits of the commercial banks may be attributed to natives of the West Bank.
The percentage of those deposits is Pstimated at about 10 to 15 percent of th~
total deposits of the commercial banks.
D. Stimulating the movement of savings and investment of the Ea,st Bank by invest- -
ment in industrial companies or participating in building factories. .
- E. There is an indirect reason, which is that the ~losing of the bridges would
_ lead to the emigration of a large number of people from the West Bank to the East -
Bank, creating crises in housing and causing inflation and a recession in economic
activity in the absence of the ability to handle this emigration.
The open bridges have helped Israel to get rid of the problem of surplus agricul- _
tural production in the West Bank, since their prices are lower than the prices
of Israeli products. However, Israel has been intending to change the structure
of the agricultural sector, since it has encouraged products which Israeli industry
- uses, such as sesame, sugar beets, etc. Israel also benefits_from taxes on those
exports which are paid in foreign currency, and the amount of these taxes is paid
in turn i~n Israeli currency.
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The following steps co>>ld put a stop to the infiltration of Israeli products:
~ A. For agricultural commodities exported from the West Bank to the East, a
cettificate of origin must be obtained from West Bank authorities in the Ministry
of Agriculture or any other agency attesting that the exported commodities come
from the West Bank and Gaza. If a violation or smuggling is detected, then that
- source must be forbidden to export to the Ea.st Bank.
- B. Manufactured goods such as olive oil, stones, soap, etc., must have a certi-
f icate of origd~n f rom the chamber of commerce, cooperative societies or other
reliable Arab authorities.
C. Control must be tightened in the area of the bridges, and any traveller coming
from the West Bank must be forbidden to bring in any commodity or product of
Israeli origin, or these goods must be destroyed immediately in front c~ their
owner as a warning to others. Here the importance of alerting the citizens to
the dangers of smuggling should be e~hasized.
- D. Supervision must be tightened in the al-'Aqabah region, since most smuggling.
operations take place through that area.
- In light of all of this, one can summarize the f ollowing:
1. Israel has a clear policy aimed at containing economic activity in the occu-
_ pied lands and working to suppress their activity to discourage investment. For
example, it will be noted that only 47 percent of the total acreage of the West
Bank is being used for agricultural purposes (that is, 261,420 hectares). In
1974 this acreage dropped to 202,000 hectares. It is worth mentioning that the
Israeli settlements on the West Bank were established on about 35,000 hectares. .
Also, other agricultural land cannot be utilized for security reasons. Reliance
on rain makes agricultural activity in the West Bank more difficulz, since irri-
gated lands comprise no more than 4 percent of the total farmed land. All of that
is followed by a decrease i� the number of workers in the agricultural sector from
44,000 in 1968-69 to ?1,000 in 1975-76. Consequently, the percentage of these
workers in the total work force dropped from 42.5 percent in 1970 to 3~.9 percent
in 1976. In the Gaza Sector this percentage dropped from 31.6 percent in 1970 t~
26.3 percent in 1975. Israel took advantage of this situation and tried to
attract unemployed workers by giving them higher wages than they had been receiv-
ing. There is no doubt that that is equivalent to a first step toward detaching
- the people from their land and causing them to emigrate.
2~ In return, there was no expansion in the industrial sector. This sector's
share of the gross national product of the West Bank and Gaza Sector fell from
7 percent in 1968 to 5 percent in 1973.
3. Tourism and related services formed an important source of revenue from the
West Bank before the occupation. In 1~66, income from this source was between
6 and 7 million Jordanian dinars, Most of it came from tourism in Jerusalem.
Israel tried to direct tourism to Israeli hotels,which lowered the rate of
occupancy of Arab hotels from SO percent in 1967 to 31 percent in 1973 and later.
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4. (?ne cannot s~ay on the basis of the Israeli or international (UN) informatian
whether there is infiltration of Israeli goods across the open bridges. It is
to be assumed that Arab importing countiies are taking the steps necessary to
prevent that and uphold the boycott. Howev~r, some indirect infiltration is
_ inevitable, by incorporation of Israeli production into final Arab production.
The question raised is: Must such infiltration be permitted ~f it is certain
that it can happen?
In summary, in light of the situation from which the people of the occupied lands
are suffering, closing the bridges means ~permitting the occupation authorities
to isolate ttiem and impose their power entirely on them. In this e'~ent, the occu-
pation authorities will try to decrease economic activity and direct it towa.rd a
form which serves their economic and political interests and their ambitions for
the land. Through economic pressure, Israel can limit the horizons and aspirations
of the people and impel them to emigrate and abandon their land. Israel may re-
sort to laws which it invented to confiscate these lands on the pretext of the
absence of the owners, It is certain that in this e~~ent Israel will also move
~ to tighten its grip on the farmers in the occupied lands by not permitting them
to market their products~at home. It was mentioned earlier that Israel is
attempting to change the shape of agricultural production in the occupied lands
and make it conform more closely to demand in its markets.
Closing the bridges means abandoning the West Bank and the Gaza Sector and creat-
ing conditions similar to those which prevailed after 1947, with Israeli economic
and political control over conditions in the West Bank and Gaza, giving rise to
ttie emigration of a majority of the population.
In view of that, although keeping the b~.idges open has led to some indirect
economic benefit to Israel, it will be in the present and future interests of the
people of the occupied lands and will help them to remain on their land and streng-
then their resistance to the unlawful Israeli occupation. In other words, keeping
the bridges open in light of current conditions gives hope to the people of the
occupied lands and helps them in their resistanee and aef iance.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI
7587
CSO: 4802/504
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LIBYA
BRIEFS _
FERTILIZER PLANT--Libya has signed a contract with a group of Germsn and Italian -
- companies (consortium) headed by the West German (Uhdi) Company to build a
fertilizer plant in Marsa al-Burayjah. The amount of the contract is 200 million
West German marks. The plant will begin production in 1984 with a capacity of
1750 tons a day. [TextJ [Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 Feb 81 p 48] _
7587 COPYRIGHT: 1979 ~-WATAIJ AL-sARABI
CSO: 4802/504
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~ MAURI.TANIA
- ALGERIA AIDS RESTORATION OF ORDER FOLLOWING COUP ATTEMPT
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 8 Apr 81 p 42
[Article by Samir Gharbi]
` Order Reigns
[Text] At daybreak on Thursday 26 March, on the rif le range of the Jdiria barracks,
30 kilometers from Nouakchott, Lt Cols Mohamed Ould Bah Ould Abdel Kader and Ahmed
Salem Ould Side, and Lts Moustafa Niang and Doudou Seck were executed. The first act -
following the attempted coup of 16 March (JEUNE AFRIQUE No. 1056) had come to an end.
The four death penalties had been pronounced on 24 March by a special military court
which at the same time had sentenced five other "putschists" to hard labor for life.
This was done in private and with the greatest secrecy in proceedings which opened
on Saturday 21 March.
As soon as the verdict was known many important persons requested or recommended cle-
mency for Lt Col Khouna Ould Haidalla. Among them were some members of the Military
Committee of National Safety and the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein. Dispatched
with all possible speed, Vice President Tarek Aziz arrived 3 hours after the execu-
- tion at the Nouakchott airport which had been especially kept open for him. On that
same Thursday 26 March, while Nouakchott was broadcasting gestures of support and -
sympathy telegrams addressed to the government, it was denounc~ng "Moroccan hegemon-
ism." The Jdiria executions were mentioned only once in Arabic--the press remained
silent. On th~ other hand, a supporting march organized between ,3 stadium in the
- capital and the esplanade of the presidency (3 kilometers) was widely publicized, in-
cluding by Radio Algiers.
However, on 31 March, the importance of the complicity which the authors of the coup ~
could find within the army, was far from being authenticated. At any rate the A11i-
ance for a Democratic Mauritania denounced a violent repre~sion which seems to have
crashed down on about 1000 people. Other sources mentioned the arrest of about 30
- officers. And a curfew was still in force in Nouakchott (from 1900 to 0600 in the
morning). The airport, as well as the one in Nouadhibou, remained closed to inter-
national traffic, even though both welcomed several flights of large Algerian Anton-
ovs carrying military materiel and military security "civilian" personnel. Order
reigned in Nouakchott, but less and less Mauritanian order.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1981
7993
CSO: 4400/1066 M~~~
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SYRIA
VARIOUS CURRENTS AMONG MOSLEM BROTHERS REVIEWED
_ Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 20-26 Mar 81 pp 30, 31
LArticle: "Syria: Story of the Disputes in the Ranks of the Moslem Brothers"/
LText/ What is going on in the ranks of the Moslem grothers in Syr~a? ~Ihat is the
real nature of the disputes within the leadership? Available information indicates
that the brothers' movement is currently holding an exceptional conference to deal
- with this subject.
These days, the "communiques" are numerous and multifarious, but they all play the
one note of disputes in the circles of the movement of the Moslem Brothers.
One of these commur~iques bearing the name of Mr "Isam al-'Attar, severely attacks
- Mr 'Adnan Sa'd-al-Din and accuses him of "pushing the young people of Syria into
an unequal struggle with the ruling regime in Damascus."
Another communique, also bearing al-'Attar's name, objects to the "appointment"
of Mr Sa'd-al-Din as general overseer of the brothers, on the claim that he does
not represent a force worth mentioning and has offered nothing to the taovement or
to I~lamic action.
A ~hird communique attacks the communique of the "islamic revolution in Syria and
its platform" and the persons signing it, Messrs Sa'id Hawi, 'Ali al-Bayanuni and
'Adn~n Sa'd-al-Din.
The war of communiques goes on, but a simple process of investigation has subse-
quently proved that these communiques were forged, that there was no validity to
tham, and that they were "fabrications" by the Syrian intelligence agencies, which
"took charge" of the pracess of distributi~g the communiques - without al-'Attar's
knowledge, of course.
But does that mean that everything is as it should be in the ranks of the movement's
leadership in Damascus? �
Two Contradict~ry Views
The fact is that there are two contradictory views in this regard.
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_ The first view, whose source is circles in the wing of Sa'd-al-Din, Hawi and al-
- Bayanuni, holds ~that the rifts have been brought under control an~1 that everyone,
including al-'Attar himself, has rallied around the new command, following Sa'd-
al-Din's election as gener~l overseer and the ~;^anting of priority to the militery
activity commanded by the "Fighting Vanguard" ('Adnan 'Aqlah) within the country.
Various tendencies have agreed to support this organization in various ways, con-
, sidering that "the current stage requires escalation of the armed military confront-
- ation against the regime in Damascus."
_ Thus 'Adnan 'Aqlah "left" Syria for the outer world, and agreement was reached on
a new str~ategy for the brothers' movement, under Sa'd-al-Din's command.
~ One can easily deduce another different view from a statement made this week by a
prominent leader of the Moslem brothers to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI; he said the fo~lowing,
in these words:
1. As of the publication of the latest issue of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, no agreer,~ent
had beer~ rnade among the various parties of the Moslem Brothers and consequent7y no
new general overseer had been elected in Syria, unan~mously or otherwise.
2. The communique to which AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI referred in its previous issue (p 12)
is false and slanders Mr al-'Attar in every sense.
~ al-'Attar has led the Moslem Brothers and still is leading the overwhelming
_ ,ajority of them, and the majority of the people in Syria, on the road to freedom,
cii~nity and the desired Islamic future.
4. al-'Attar has not ventured to stop the struggle, especially since he did not
cease it for one day, in previous or current times. He never asked for respor~si-
bilities; rather, it is his brothers who unanimously elected him general overseer
in 1961 and have always wanted him to continue to lead the society, in spite of
his repeated attempts to excuse himself and his constant desire to be exempted from
- all responsibility, in order to be at the service of all the Syrian people withc,ut
distinction. He still insists although his brothers insist on the opposite.
Sa'd-al-Din's Circles Reply
Doesn't that statement mean continued disputes in the leadership of the movement,
which would of necessity have an impact on the escalating domestic operations
against the Syrian regime?
flere Sa'd-al-Din's circles reply, "The movement is a single rank. There is no truth
to the various rumors which speak of rifts, which the agencies of Damascus themselves
are propagating. The election was held in a democratic fashion and the various cur-
- rents supported it." ~
Numerous items of evidence for this are presented, among �hem the fact that military
operations have not stopped; "At the beginning of this month, a gr�oup of mujanids
in the al-Harifah section of Oamascus skirmished with armed elements, and the shir-
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mish continued for a whole hour. As a result of it, 42 of the authorities; personnel
were killed and 25 were wounded, above and beyond the martyrdom of one brother and
- ~he wounding of another."
' In addition, a group of mujahids recently made an al:tack on the Revolutionary Youth
Federation headquarters in the center of Hamah (across from the bookstores in al-
Dabbaghah). This area is not more than 60 meters away from the party headquarters
and the main police center.
The group burst into the center while a party meeting was und erway in it. It fought
_ with guard personnel, then raided the auditorium, killing fiv e party members, wound-
_ ing others and setting off bombs in other rooms. It then withdrew rapid1y and the
- special units located in the party's nearby building and the citadel were not able
to intervene until it was too late.
The injuries in the ranks of the youtt~ were not precisely spelled out, either. One
should bear in mind that the brothers returned safely to their bases.
As a result of the oepration, security in the city broke down. The special units
occupied the streets and started firing here and there. The city went on strike and
the shops closed down, without exception, for 3 days.
As a result of the operations the authorities arrested all the owners of the book-
stores and shops near the Youth Center and subjected them to interrogation in a
desperate attempt to learn the identity of the attackers.
An attempt was made to assassinate an official while he was visiting a village. He
is now in the al-Salam hospital in Hamah for treatment, having received a wound which
was not fatal.
A special unit patrol was hit at the Shaykh Muhammad al-Hamid Mosque and three o~ the
. men in it were killed. As a result the authorities' personnel went over the area
with a fine tooth comb and killed a number of isolated citizens, including two chil-
dren, the son of 'Abd-al-Karim al-Baydah and the son of Amina h and Ibrahim Junayd.
= Tw~~ armed Youth of the Revolution personnel were killed in the Hamah movie theater.
One of the Youth of the Revolution personnel Fah Qandaqji, disappeared and as a
result the special units and intelligence searched the al-Sa buniyah section in Hamah
and subjected the people to humil~ation after gathering them together, men and women,
in the schools, in the cold and rain. Six hundred citizens were then arrested.
Official persor~ne'I arrested 16 people from the Electricity Organization in Hamah
~n the charge of distributing publications opposed to the regime and exposing the
corruption of the regime. Concerning these arrested persons, the following was
1 earned :
1. Rashi Najjar, an employee and clerk in the bureau, was su bjected to the most
severe forms of torture.
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2. 'Azzam Misri: a technical superv3sor.
- 3. 'Abd-al-Qadir 'Abbud Musalli, a technical supervisor.
~ 4. 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Nayik, head of the organization bureau.
5. Muhammad 'Irwani.
_ The same circles co ntinue to present examples of the brothers' escalating activity
in Damascus, Hums, Latakia, Jisr al-Shughur and other Syrian tokm s in the midst of
a complete official media blackou~t whose goal is to stress the "rumors" being bruited
~ about concerning the rifts which are of necessity reflected in the brothers' armed
_ militar~ activity.
. An official in the Sa'd-al-Din wing (who asked that his name not be disclosed~ for
secur�ity considerations) told AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI that the Syrian authorities are now
propagatirig news of rifts and at the same time imposing a"blackout" on the brothers'
internal activities.
A General Conferenc e
There remains this question:
What is the c~use of these "rifts?"
~he answer here varies as the viewpoints vary. There are people who say that the
:nain reason lies in the q~estion of the electian of a general guide. While one
current of the brott-~ers demands that the historic leadership (al-'Attar) continue
to bear resp~nsi~bility, others call for a change and support Sa'd-al-Din.
While a large group of brothers considers that al-'Attar has authorization from the
Fighting Vanguard to speak in its name, and it supports him, others object to this,
pointing out that S~'d-al�Din has been elected general overseer of the movement and
that 'Adnan 'Aqlah has "pledged fealty" to him.
Among the o~~her cau ses of dispute are the style of action and extent of independence
of the movement.
There are people in the "international organization" who criticize Sa'd-al-Din's
wing for his ties with certain organizations and demand total freedom.
Whatever the case may be there, the fact remains ~hat the Moslem Brothers' movement
is holding a secret exceptional conference abroad to study the new developments and
create a common denominator for the various trends which will restore their unity
- and coherence.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
11887
CSO: Lt802 END
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