JPRS ID: 9724 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400010020-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9724
11 f~ay 1981
,
- Sub-Saharan Af ri~a R~ ort
p
FOUa No. 71~9
Fg~~ FOREIGN BROADCAST lNFORMATION S~RVICE
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- other characteristics ret3ined. ~
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Unf~miliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
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JPRS L/9724
- 11 May 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 719
CON7ENTS
'L:~1TER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
[vest African Economic Cooperation neviewed
(Georges Meissonnier; MARCHES TitOPI~CAUX ET MEllITERRANEENS,
27 ~iar S1)......" 1
Development of France's Africa Poliey Reviewed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ~;T tiEDITERRANEENS, 13 Mar 81)
This article appears in JPRS L/9680, WEST EUROPE REPORT F'OUt~ 21/81
dated 22 Apr 8'l, pp 10-19.
= Briefs
_ Bids for Bukavu Dam 6
= Zaire-Angola Rail Traffic 6
Chadian Retu gees in Nigeria 6
Ahmat Attempts To Gain Support 7
Zairian Action Affects Zambia 7
Somalia-Ethiopia Moves 7
Senegal, The Gambia Considering Confederation 7
AIVGOLA
Comments on Strange Behavior of French Ambassador
- (AFRIQi1E-ASIE, 16-2y Mar 81j 8
~ Prospects for Significant 1'~85 Oil Production~ Increase
(MARCHLS TROPICAUX ET r4EDI'PERRANEENS, 17 Apr 81j 10
Brief s
P_gr~ements With Denmark, Italy i1
CENTRAL AFRICAN RF.PUBLIC
F.lection Shows Dacko Must Consider Nationalist Feelings
~ (Editorial; MARCHES TROPICAIJX ET MEDITERRAN:EENS, 2~7 Mar 81) 1'L
; - a - [III - NE & A - 120 FOUO]
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Elections Seen as Positive Experiment
(Trancois Soudan; JfsUNE AFItIQQE, 25 Mar 81).. 15
Data on israeli General's House Arrest
(JFUNE AFt2IQUE, 25 Mar 81) 19
CHAU
- France Acr_epts Possible Caexistenc e With Libya in Chad
(MAItCHES TROPIC.AUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 27 Mar 81) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
_ Brief s
North-South Tension 24
CONGO ~
Briefs
Cuban Deserters in Brazzaville, Pointe Noire z5
GHA13A
Nkrumahists Charge PNP Maintains `~.xploitative System`
(~iark August NyirPnda; NEW AFRICAN, Apr 81) 26
GUINEA
~riefs
ADF ~dater Loan ~9
ADF Rice-Growing Loan 24
GUINEA-BISSAU
Lr ief s
, WFP Emergency Food Do~r~ation 3U
~ MADAGASCAR
Ratsiraka's Secret: How To Stay in Power .
(Sennen Andriamirado; .TEUNE AFRIQUE, 25 Mar 81)..������~������� j1
MALI
Traore`s 'Renewal' Move May Uain Him New Allies
(JEUN~ AFItIQ~JE, 22 Apr 81) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Briefs
~lgreements With France 36
French Well-Drilling Assis tance , 36
Uranium Discovery 36
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"~IOZAMBIQUE
Plans Drawn for Yort, Ra.ilroad Expansion
~ (NIARCRES TROPICA~iJX r.T MEDITERKANF,ENS, 20 Mar 81) 37
NICER
President on Internal Security, External Threats
(Seyni Kountche Interview; J~EUNE AFRIQUE, 15 Apr 81)........... 39
SENEGAL
- Many Changes Noted Since Diouf's Accession To Power
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUN~ AFRIQUE, 18 Mar 81) 43
' Activities of PDS Leader
(JEUNE AFKIQUE, 18 Mar 8i) 47
Largest Industrial Project Has International Backing
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 25 Mar 81) 4y
ZAIRE
tsr ief s
Palm Oil Prices ~1
F'errosilicon Plant 51
Mining Activities 51
Budget Cuts ~ 5Z
'Jeans' Pl.ant 52
- Ivory Trade Ban 52
~
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INTER~-AFRT.CAN AFFAIRS
WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION REVIEWED
Paris MARCH~S TROPICAUX ET. MIDITERRANEENS 27 Mar 81, pp 834-35
[Article by Georges Meissonnier~
[Text] It seems proper to recall, as a preliminary remark, that to promote
their economic development, the member countries of tr~e West ~frican Economic
Community (CEAO: six countrie~: Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Mali, htger,
Mauritania, Senegal) signed a treaty which went into effect on 1 Janu~?-v 1974
and which provided fo r: establishment of a co~non custom tariff within a
= maximum period of 12 years; free circulation, exempt from any entry duties or
taxes, of products coming from the member countries; setting up special
' preferential condit3ons applying to ~~ember countries' importing products from
other member countries (regional cooperation tax, which went into effect on
1 January 1976).
_ At the same time, a Community Development Fund (FCD) was created, whoss purpose
was to compensate for the losses of customs revenues between member couztries,
and to finarice studies and actions within rhe framework of the CAEO. Furt~er-
more, the ob~ect of another fund, Fosidec, was to carry out studies and finance
economic projects.
Secondly, the treaty signed on 28 May 1975 by the 16 countries of the Economic
Community of the West African States (Cedeao, which includes besides the six
_ CEAO countries, the following: Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
= Guine--Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone and Togo) provides for the
following:
_ --The elimination of customs duties between member countries, any other
equivalent t~:xes and any quantitative commercial restrictions.
--The establishment of a common customs tariff after a period of 15 years starting
from 28 May 1979, with the following schedule:
--Zero to 2 years: retention of customs duties.
- --Ztao to 10 years: progressive elimination of customs duties tetween the
states.
_ ~
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--Ten to 15 years: adjustment o� a common external tariff ~,n the matter _
of customs duties. _
--Fin?~.1;~, after 15 years: existence of an A�rican common market appli~able
- to the 16 member States.
~
, --Discontinuin~ obstacles to the free circulation of persons, services and _
capital bztween member countries. -
--Agreement on the economic, indus*riai, agricultural, monetary policies, and ~
policies concerning the infrastructures, this harmony being marked by the
creatic~ of a fund for cooperation, compensation and development. The object
- of the latter wi11 be to compensate for the losses of custom's revenues between ~
member coti~~.tries, to finance projects and provide guarantees for foreign ~
investmenrs.
II. To be eligible for th~ privileg~d cc+nditioi~s, CedAao fixed some basic rules: ~
--Those relating to products: they concern the raw materials used and the added
value.
- --Those relating to the compar_y: they concern the share of nationals in the ,
companies, assets whereas thi~ condition is r~~t required in the CEAO treaty.
As regards the /basic r~ules relating to products/ [in boldface], one of the ~
rollowing four crit~ria should be satigfied:
--'the products must te obtained entir2ly in the member countries (by products we
= mean minerals extracted from the ground, the marine subsoi~, plant products,
_ living animals, products ~f hunting and fishing, goods and products manufactured
in Che memb~r countries from tYie 3bove elements, and materials containing
nothing imported from outside the member countries).
--The products containing community ma~.erials should have an added value
representing at least 40 percent of the total cost of the materials used.
~
--The product should contain at least 60 percent of community raw materials. -
~
---In the manufacturing process, the products should represent an added value of
at least 35 percent. ~
On the other hand, and this is something fundamental, Article I of the decision
A/DEC 15-5-80 dated 28 May 1980 in Lome, taken by the Conference ~f the Heads -
oc State and Government of the Cedeao) specifies th3t the nat;onals' of the
member countries may have up to the following percentages in the industrial
companies whose products are eligible for the benefits of the greferential
taxation deriving from their Co~nunity origin: 2R May 1981: 20 percent; -
28 May 1983: 35 percent; 28 May 1989: 51 percen:.
- The list of companies which satisfy these conditions will Y,e established and _
sent to the Executive Secretariat of Cedeao by the authorities in charge of -
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_ industrial affairs in each state on the basis of a f31e presented by the enter-
prises concerned. This file would include the following information: identity
of the industrial enterprise, legal regulations, name of the campany, head office;
nature of the activities; authorized capital and distribution of the latter;
percentage held by the member country, percentage held by nationals of the
member country, percentage held by nationals of other member countries,
percentage,held by foreigners.
Recourse tc front companies is not advisable because, in ar~y case, to determine
; the applicable rules with a view to definirig the real percentage of participation
by the nationals, one must consider at the source the effective holdings by
nationals (private parties b`longing to one cr several member countries of the
- Cedeao and/or State participation, which may involve the Sta~e itself or public
~rganizations). The economic criterion prevails therefore over the strictly
legal criterian. As an exampl~, if a compaay whose nationality, that is,
_ whos~ head office is that of one of the member states of the Cedeao, wishes to
have a 20 percent share, the capita]. distribution of this company would be
examined. If ~t is a company with 51 percent share in African hands (private
nationaJ.s or public organizations) and 49 percent foreign capital, an effective
share of the nationals of 51 percent x 20 percent = 10.20 percent wi11 be
estimated for the industxial company wishing to benefit by the preferential
- system.
,
We cannnt use therefore the system practicsd in Morocco which made it possible
to secure "moroccanization" through the intermediary of a Moroccan company
= without determining the national's real share.
� Meanwhile, as regard~ the liberalization of exchanges, the Conference of the Heads
of States of 28 May 1980 retained the principle of faster liberalization
for the following countries: Ivory Coast, Ghang, Nigeria, Senegal than for
- � the other Cedeao countries. This liberalization concerns exclusively the native
countries.
1. /System Applying ta the Following Countries: Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria,
Senegal/ [in boldface]. Three cases should he distinguished:
a. The products of the community enterprises will be exempt from trade
restriction~ as soon as they are produced and will have free access to the
= Commun;ty market.
b. The priority industrial products will benefit by expedited exemption from
tr3de restrictions. They wi11 be exempt over a period of 4 years at the following
rates: 25 percent; 50 percent; 75 percent and 100 percent applicable on
28 May 1981; 2.8 May 1982; 28 May 1983 and 28 May 1984 respectively.
c. The other products will be exempt from trade restrictions over a 6-year
period at the following rates: 15 percent, 30 percent; 50 percent; 70 percent;
90 percent and 100 percent, applicable on 28 May 1981; 28 May 1982; 28 May 1983;
28 May 1984; 28 May 19~5 and 28 May 1986.
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The definition of the community enterprise is being estab~ished. The list of
. nriority industrial products ~s being drawn up. -
2. /System Applying to the follow~ing Countries: Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana,
_ suinea, Guinea-Bissau, Upper Volta, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Sierra- _
Leone and Togo/ [in boldf3ce]. The same three cases.should be distinguished: ~
a. The products of the community enterprises, just as in formuJ_a 1, will be
exempt from trade restrictions as soon as they are produced and will have free
access to the Community market. -
b. The priority industrial products will enjoy a fast easing of trade
restrictions, but slower than in formula 1. These products will be exempt over a
6-year period at the following rates: 15 percent; 30 percent; 50 percent;
70 percent- 90 percent and 100 percent to apply on 28 May 1981; 28 Ma.y 1982, 28
May 1983, 28 May 1984; 28 May 1985 and 28 rlay 1986.
c. The other products will also be exempt from trade restrictions at a slower
~ rate than in form~l.a 1. They will be exempt over an 8-year period at the
rates of 10; 20; 30; 45; 60; 75; 90 and 100 percent on 28 May 1981; 28 May 1982;
28 May 1983; 28 May 1984; 28 May 1985; 28 May 1986; 28 May 1987 and 28 May ].9~38 ~
~ respectively.
III. ~ao important elements should te emphasized:
l. The A/DEC 16-5-80 decision has modified Paragraph 2 ~f Article 8 of the
protocol relating to the definition of the concept of products stemming from -
the member countries by considering that certain products (mixtures) may be
considered as originating from the member countries under the conditions which
the Council will specify on the basis of the Commission's recommendations. In
this case, the part used in the mixtures which are praven to originate in
the member countries will be taken into account. _
2. To eliminate the non-tariff barriers, all the member countries (above -
for.muiae 1 and 2) will be treated in the same manner, the method of exemption
being left to the judgement of the member countries, while the exemption will
be accomplished at a faster rate than for the tariff barriers, and over a
period of 4 years starting from May 1981 (Art. 2 of the 3ecision A/18-5-1980 of
28 r~ay 19~0) .
ZV. At the present time, the most important problem from a practical viewpoint,
anci certainly the most urgent one, concerns the nationals' share in the companies
whose head office is located in one of the 16 countries belonging to the Cedeao.
The benefit from the 20 percent share on 30 May 1981 only concerns ezcport
_ companies in one of the Cedeao member countries. At the group level, an
inventory shauld be made of the companies involved (export companies whose head
office is located in one of the member countries of ttie Cedeao and which do
not satisfy the condition of 20 percent participation). But this investigation
should also exist at the level of each company taken individually, independently
of the group to which they may or may not belong.
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In conclusion, it is apparent that the new rules of the Cedeao, as regards the
share of the nationals in the companies, assets, assume considerable practical
interest for industrial companies exporting within the Cedea~. Now, the
criterion of the natianal's share appears to have been occasionally, if not
forgotten, at least minimized in its consequences. Once again, the benefit
attached to the participation of nationals seems to be more limited for
non-industrial companies, but in all cases, all the export organizations which
do not satisty the legal conditions will not be eligible for the preferential
tariff system and will therefore have to face competition from companies which
are entitled to apply the share percentage fixed by the decision of 28 Ma.y 1980.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981
9G18
CSO: 4400/957
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BRIEFS
BIDS FOR BUKAVU DAM--For the energy needs of Great Lake countries, EGL [Electrifica-
tion of the Great Lakes Region] is issuing an invitation �or preselection of com-
panies to participate in the limited bidding which will subsequently be opened for
consL-ruction or the Ruzizi II dam and hydroelectric power plant with a 40-MW [mega-
watt] capacity. This power plant will be located south of the city of Bukavu on
the Kuzizi River, which at that point forms the border between Rwanda and Zaire.
Al1 operations and services are divided into six categories: No. 1--Civil engineer-
ing operations, excluding housing; No. 2--Supply and installation of hydromechanica 1
equipment; No. 3--Supply and installation of turbines and auxiliary machinery; No. 4--
Supply and installation of alternators and auxiliary equipment; No. S--Supply and
installation of electrical equipment; No. 6--Housing construction operations:
15 dwellings f or staff personnel, including the various systems (sewerage, water,
- electricity, etc.). Completion periods are: 38 months for category no. 1; 32 months
each for categories 2, 3, 4 and 5; 12 months for category no. 6. Construc*ion oper.a-
tions for the Ruzizi Ii hydroelectric plant will be open for limited bidding among
selected companies following the aforementioned preselaction. [Excerpt] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Mar 81 p 848] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
Moreiix et Cie Paris 1981] 11915
ZAIRF-ANGOLA RAIL TRAFFIC--Zairian television announced on 11 March that rail traff ic
between Zaire and Angola will resume soon, but its frequency will depend on Angola.
The Zairian National Railroad Company's representative in Kol~caezi, Mr Rose Marin,
sta'ted in this connection that 30 ::ars of manganese and zinc (which were blocked
at Kilunga) will promptly be using the Benguela railroad. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 793] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1981] 11915
CHADIAN REFUGEES IN NIGERIA--The UN High Commission for Refugees (HCR) granted emer-
gency aid of Y~ �:I.Ilion to Nigeria on 16 March for the approximately 12,000 Chadian
refugees in the state of Bornu. The HCR aid supplements the aid program established
by the Nigerian federal government, which already amounted to $9 million in late
Eebruary and which covers the refugees' short-term needs. It should be noted that
besides the aid supplied to the Chadian refugees, Nigeria is also supplying aid
to sev~ral hundred South African refugees, many of whom have received grants for
continuing their studies in countries accepting them. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
- ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Mar 81 p 842] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
1981] 11915
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~iMAT ATTEMPTS TO GAIN SUPPORT--Mali and Niger abstained. Algeria voted against
the draft resolution submitted by Acyl Ahmat at the conference of the foreign
ministers f~om six Saharan states meeting in Algiers (February 17-19; see JEUNE -
AFRIQUE No 1052). The chief of Ch.adian diplomacy asked his colleagues to support
Qadhdhafi's action in Chad. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar p 21]
[COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afri~que GRUPJIA 1981] 9719
ZAIKIAN A~TION AFFECTS ZAMBIA--Zambia lost all hope of improving its balance of
payments when Zaire reduced by 20 percent, in January, the selling price of its
cobalt, a metal of which it is the primary world producer. Cobalt represents 13
percent of Zambian income, the majur part of which is covered by copper, always at
a low price at the production level. [TextJ [Paris JEUNE AFR~~JE in French 25
Mar 81 p 21] '~~0'PYRIGHT: Jeur_e Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 9719 _
SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA MOVES--Are secret negotiations taking place between Somalia and
~thiopia? There are rumors to this effect in ~he diplomatic circles of Geneva,
where a numb er of contacts have reportedly taken place alreac~y. [~ext] [Paris
JEUNE AFRIQiTE in French 22 Apr 81 p 31] -
SEf1L~GAL, THE GAMBIA CONSID~,RING CONFEDERATION--Dakar and Ba.n jul are study-
ing the constitutional structure which could lead Senegal and The Gambia to
a certain type of' confede.ration. ~ean-Louis Buchet, Airique Confidantiel
column7 ~ext7 rParis JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Mar 81 p'I~ 6145 _
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i AN sOLA
COMMENTS ON STRANGE BEHAVIOR OF FRENCIi AMBASSADOR
.
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16-29 Mar 81 p 45
[Text] [Jill the French ambassador in Luanda remain at ha.s post much longer? At
any rate, the wish of Angolan official circles, as well as that of the international
diploma.tic community--including the Western one--in Luanda is that Jacques Foisier
should be rec~lled to Paris as soon as possible, or, lacking that, should at least
adopt a tone and behavior more compatible with his position.
- Indeed, an increaszng malaise seems to be developing in the Angolan capital with
respect to the activities and the personal behavior of the French ambassadar, whose
~ attitude, generally condescending and arrogant and freq~ently hosti.le toward the
- policy of social and economic development conducted by the People"'s Republic of
Angola, threatens to become a serious obstacle to the improvement of the French
- position in this country. This comes at precise?y the t ime when, following the
visir of ~rench Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet to Luanda and his meetings
in Paris with his Angolan counterpart, economic and trade relations seem to be
acquiring new impetus.
It is expected that the number of technicians and French resi3ents--which today
number about 200--would rise to 4,000 in the months to come, proot of the interest
and increasing interests of France in Angolan economic life. Sowever, dc~ not
Jacques Poisi~r's activities threaten to hinder the deJelopment of Franco-Angolan
relations and to hamper those French businessmen who are increasingly viewing ties
with Angola?
- Various diplomatic incidents illustrate the strange behavior of the ~rench ambassador.
For i.nstance, his colleagues noticed his absence at the reception offered by the
Angolan government ~o the delegation of French parliamentarian~--among whom all
- political tendencies were represented--which recently visited Angola. Moreover,
they deplored his various interferences in the contacts the parliamentarians
= mair~tained with their Angolan counterparts. They were also struck by the fact that
he lacked the most elementary courtesy in failirg to invite a single Angolan to the
reception he himself gave on the same occasion. They had already noted his very
brief. appearance at the public sessions of the last congress of the MPLA-Labor
Party, while th~e entire diplomatic community had faithfully attended all the
meetings . ,
More serious yet: Jacques Poisier's very colleagues at the French Embassy in
Luanda p;�ivately resent his ~ubj ectivity in most of his diplomatic relat~ons,
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which do not attempt in any way to mirror the political, economic and social
conditions of the country. The tendentious and frankly hostile "exposes" he often
p resents to Frenc~: diplomats, parliamentarians, businessmen and newsmen visiting
Angola should also be mentioned. A French businessman was overheard telling one
of his colleagues after a meeting with the ambassador in the latter's office:
" It is strange...I was under the impression that the role of ambassadors was rather
to work toward Che improvement of relations between their countries and those to
which they are accredited... This one..."
_ The Quai d'Orsay, which apparent].y is aware of the climate reigning in the French
- Embassy in Luanda, continues to turn a deaf ear to the situar.ion. But didn't
one of its former ambassadors to Luanda, Jsan-Jacques Feyronnet, enjfly the respect
- and f riendship of Angolan authorities, especially of President Neto, fox his frank,
direct and honest attitude? A victim of cancer, he had resigned before dying in
Paris last December.
COYYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie
CSO: 440t7/1085
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ANGOLA
FROSPECTS FOR SIGNIFICANT 1985 OIL PRODUCTION INCREASE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Fr.ench 17 Apr 81 p 1147
[Text] Production of oil in Angola should increase by 17 percent during 1981.
But, according to Jorge Morais, minister of oil, this increase will not be
very significant. Indeed, it will be much more important in 1982, placing
Angola, with 1.0 million tons, in fifth place among African producers, behind
Nigeria, Libya, Algeria and Egypt.
So far, discoveries give reason to believe that in 1985 Angolan production
will be more than 15 million tons annually, with a capacity f4r 20 million
v tons. In relation to exploration now under way, the disc~veries in bloc 2
(on--shore, south of the Congo River) have induced those oil companies wishing
to operate in Angola tc offer their services: 17 of them are in line for
bloc 1. The U.S. Cities Service Company should begin operations in bloc 9,
south of the mouth of the Kwanza River.
A contract was signed with a new type of company, the capital of which comes
from "neutral" countries (Canada, Sweden, Kuwait) and from the International
Energy Development C~mpany, whose obj ective is to fostex oil exploration
in developing countries.
The oil produced in the bay of the Kwanza is now beginning to bring in some
profits because of the increase in the prices of crude oil. This is the
~ oldest oil exploitation operation in Angola.
Jorge Morais recently stated that the recourse to U.S. companies has only
commercial motives. "We accept these companies because they have huge
_ financial and technological means, whose f irst beneficiary, after all, will
be the Angolan state. We are fully aware of our strength as oil producers,
- and we do not come in as beggars at the time of negotiation.s."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.
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i
ANGOLA
~
I_
i
BRIEFS
AGREII~NTS WITH DENMARK, iTALY--Angola and Denmark signed an agreement on
6 Apri.l for a 60-million Danish kroner loan (about 44 mil~ion French
francs) to b~.e uaed in the development of the CIMANGOLA cement plant. It
wa~; also announced in Luanda that Italy has decided to grant a$12 million ~
loan for the implementa tiofl of econom3c programs. [Excerpt] [Paris ~
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 p 1147] i
I
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
ELE~TIuPI SHOWS DACKO MUST' CONSIllER NATIONALIST FEELINGS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 27 Mar 81 p 815
[Unsigned editorial: "The Central Af;:ican Republic's Presidential Election--A -
Diff icult Task Af ter A Disputed Election"]
[Text] The announcement of the Central African Republic's
presidential election results has disclosed a good many surprises. -
Tfie first, and not the least, is the extremely narrow margin of
the ma~ority, 50.23 percent, wfiich allowed David Dacko (Central -
- Afr~can Democratic Union) to be declared president-elect af ter
the first ballot. The second one is the result achieved by Ange
Patasse (Central African People`s Liberation Movementl who
received 38.11 percent of the votes cast. However, Dacko
outd~stanced fiim by 90, 288 votes out of a total of 744, 688.
The last surprise was the poor results t~ie other candidates
managed to get: Francois Pehoua (Lndependent), 5.33 percen~,
Henri Maidou (Republican Party of Progress), 3.23 percent; and
Abel Goumba (Ubangi People's Patriotic Front), 1.42 percent.
Analysis of the voting reveals that Dacko derived his majority from the country's
interior except for the Sara region in the northwest, Patasse's traditiona.l
stronghold. In fact Patasse had an edge of 5000 vo tes in Bangui, where he is ~
very popular in the poor districts in the capital's outlying area and where he
definitely has a good reputation among high school students, university students,
teachers and civil servants.
Tiie announcement of the results was awaited in a feverish atmoaphere. Acts of
_ looting victimizing French people occurred in the suburbs of Bangui, and in
Bossangoa, the country's second largest city, and in the region controlled by
Patasse, as well as in several localities all over the country. The chief of
- state had to announce a curfew throughout the country as of 16 March, and then a
state of siege and the closing of the University of Bangui on 20 March.
As soon as Dacko's election to a 6-year terni was announced, it raised sharp
p~po tests on Behalf of his unsuccessful rivals. The turmoil calmed down fairly
- c~uickl.y because of tfie firmness sh.own by Dacko and the appeals for restraint made
by Patasse; tI~e latter does not want to risk seeing the legislative election which
is constitutiona.lly slated to take place during th~ month followirig the presidential
election postponed Because he feels convinced it will be favorabl~ to him.
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The ~onditions in which the voting took place (voter lists had not be~en dr4wn up
in alphabetical order, in Bangui more people voted than ~~aere registered, and it
took the Supreme Court 4 days to announce the results: they were issued on 19
Ma.rch, only a f_ew ~ZOUrs before the time limit set by the Constitution expired)
_ inevitably give rise to doubts abost whether the balloting was carried uut in a
completely regular fashion. Dacko~s opponents did not fail to condemn those
_ conditions even though they too must have benefieed somewhat from the sorx~y state
of preparations for the election process. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized
that the representatives of the opposition parties ~igned the Supreme Court's
statement, which announced the election results, signing it jointly along with the
representative of the winning party.
~ Backo should also, since his return to power, receive credit for having come out
in favor of the multiparty system and not having done anything to stand in the
way of parties beginning to flourish. In fact, aside from the five partie;: which _
xan candidates, there exist the Central African People`s Rally (RPC), chaired by
Gen Sylvestre Bangui, former ambassador in Paris; the Central African National
Union (UNCA), which along with tfie RPC supported President Dacko; and the Movement
for Democracy and Independence (1rIDI), led by Francois Gueret.
More significant are the motivations of the voters. For the peasant masses who
make up 80 percent of the population, Dacko is still the man who cielivered them
from thP yoke of Emperor Bokassa, in spite of the fact that Dacko was acting as
= Bokassa`s adviser up until just before Bokassa was deposed.
On tIie o ther hand, in the eyes of a good many of the capital's "intellectuals"
(university students, teachers, civil servants), Dacko has not been able to shake
off the 1abe1 of bineg a candidate imposed by France which ti?.e circumstances of
his return to power earned him. Therefore, President Dacko cloes not benefit from
tI~e kind of broad consensus whicl~ gives candidates designa.ted by a single party
tfi.e advantage. W'ithin such single parties different political *endencies can find
~xpression, except for single parties in countries governed in an authoritarian
manner deriving inspiration from Marxist ideology, and the broad consensus gets
translated into electoral r.esults which reach nea.r unanimity among the votes cast.
In a sense, the upcoming legislative election will constitute the second ballot
of tfie presidential election. Certain neighbors of the Central African Republic
seem to fear that an exaiaple like the CAR situation may be contagious and will
not make the task oF those who govern any easier.
However, it seems that President Dacko, showing greater determina tion than was -
generally expected of him, has started to score points at the ogposition's expense.
In accordance with the state of seige, the Central African Armed F~rces were
reestablishing order in Bangui wb.^re about 2000 young militants f rom I'atasse's
party had been attempting ever ~ince the election results were announced to get
the goverrnaent to s tep down. Confrontations lef t two dead and several dozen
wounded. The call for a general strike on 23 March, first sounded by the opposi-
tion, was heeded by few people in Bangui. Calm was restored throughout the country _
as of the evening of 22 March. However, the University of Bangui remains closed.
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After having hesitated abaut Frhat line to follow, thF opposition leaders, certain
of whom-Patasse and Goumba-have left Bangui and taken refuge in the country'~
interior, ended up choosing to stay withint the law and decided not to contest
the election's validity by other than legal means. Therefore, they are claiming
responsibility for the restoration of order, but they are also asking President
Dacko to postpone the legislative election for E mon.t,hs to allow them to prepare
for it under conditions wh;ch will put them on an eciual footing with the winning
party's candidates.
' President Dacko will have to rapidly make a decision and choose between strengt~-
~ning his authority by strong-arm methods or via tY?e collaboration promised by
- Patasse and off~ered to him by the opposition parties without any reservation if
tfie appeal by the four unsuccessful candidates before the Supreme Court shows
that the electians were fair.
' Elements of the French operational force called the "Barracuda" c~ere detached to
Bangui to protect the security of the Fren~h Embassy and the Bangui Airport which
was closed to tra�fic for several days, but there was no need for intervention
- on their part. However, they did carry out the evacuation from Bossangoa of
French people who had been subjected to demonstrations of hostility. The
opposition maintains that while the presence of French troops will have to be
sorted out in the more general context of agreements with France, it is prepared
_ to maintain a priveleged status for French cooperation, while seeing to it that
- the country~s independence is respected absolutely~ For his part, President Dacko,
wfio says there is no thing in the freindship shown him by France for hi.m to be
ash.amed of, FrTIl himself also definitely have to take into account nationalist
asp~rat~ons, particularly of young people, teachers, high school students, and
university students, aspirations which for the time being the opposition has
been able to monopolize for its own advantage.
C~PYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981
9631
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CEN"fRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
i-
ELECTIONS SEEN AS POSITIVE EXPERIMENT ~
!
P,aris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar 81 pp 18-20
[Article by Francois Soudan "The Heirs Bury the Fmpire"]
[Text] There were, of course, some irrsgularities. In spite
of everything the Central African Republic experienced a great
positive first with the presidential election of March 1~...
provided that the democratic experience is followed up.
Democracy exists. David Dacko has encountered it. In several polling places in -
the working-class suburbs of Bangui, with names like Kilometer Five, Fouh or Boy
Rabe, the number of ballots polled on Sunday, March 15 by his main opponent,
Ange Patasse, considerably exceeded the number of registered voters. ~
"If our adversary was able to cheat, this election was really free," those on ~
- the victor's side comment wi.th a malicious smile. The victor? David Dacko, of
course, elected president of the Central African Republic 18 months after the
French parachutists of Operation Barracuda deposited him with their cases of
ammunition on the airport runway in Bangui.
"it bothers me that I returned home in the l~aggage compartment of a Transall; I
must acquire legitimacy," a David Dacko obsessed with his public image as a
"parachuting president" seemed to repeat incessantlp. Today this legitimacy is
, acquired, or rather, won, in the course of an electoral debate which the country
_ had never before experienced, an open confrontation almost without precedent
in central Airica. -
It all started on December 8, 1980 with a"National Seminar of Reflection," _
_ organized in Bangui by Francois Pehoua, who was then David Dacko~s dashing right-
hand man. The opposition, having confronted the regime for several months and
- having often drawn excessively authoritarian responses, agreed to take part in
this seminar. The opposition ranged from the Marxist-leaning left, that of the
Ubangi People's Patriotic Front of Abel Goumba, to the Central African "Gaullist"
Sylti*e:,tre Bangui, founder of a"Rally" patterned after Jacques Chirac's.
From this week of debates emerged an election timetable and a draft c~nstitution
- signed by all nine political formations. Adopted by the huge majority of
900,G00 Central Africans over the age of 18 on February 1 during a referendum,
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- thi:~ draft became a reality. Liberal ''in the French manner"--the advisers from
Paris who surround David Dacko were not unfamiliar with its drafting--it provides
for instituting a presidential-type republic and an unrestr:~cted mult~party
system. "Political parties or groups," as stipulated by Article 14 of the new
constitution for example, "are formed and carry on their activity fre:ely."
Thus the initial gong of this Central African democracy sounded on March 15 with
tY;e holding of the presidential election, after a pause for a campaign which was
sometimes extcemely viciaus. After the withdrawals of Sylvestre Bangui and -
~ Che teacher Tandalet Ozi Okito (f,ounder of a phantom Socialist Party and nicknamed
"the Central African Coluche" ever since he seriously proposed creating a national
Hollywood on the banks of the Ubangi) five candidates remained in competition.
Abe1 Goumba, to start with, was the last one to deposit the legal guarantee of
5 million CFA Fr. Representatine of the World Health Organization in Cotonou
(Benin), in axile for 19 years, and leader of the oldest of the opposition parties, _
he is the only politician of caliber who never compromised with the Bokassa -
dictatorship. But honesty is not necessarily synonymous with popularity, as -
Abel Goumba would quickly perceive this.
He himself and his party are completely unknown outside ;he radicalized circles
in the capital. Moreover, it was difficult to understand how this upright mon,
who posed the wichdrawal of the French troaps and the departure of David Dacko
as conditions for his return to the Central African Republic in November 1979, had -
returned without his demands having been met. The result: a very weak score,
far lower than he had hoped. .
- The second loser in the confrontation: Henri Maidou, Dacko's ex-vice president
but, above all, Bokassa's former prime minister at the time of the massacres of
the schoolchildren in Apri1 1979--an image which sticks to him and makes him
very unpopular with the youth of Bangui. His election emblem (a lion), his motto
("unity, liberty, progress"), and the constant reminder that he sig:~ed the
- request for military intervention against the emperor were not enough to draw
any significant support for him.
His campaign was directed especially against the public image of David Dacko,
(For example, as proof of the president's cowardice, he ha~' had distributed
several thousand copies of a tract reproducing the declaration of the transfer -
of powers from Dacko to Bokassa at the time of the coup d'etat of 31 December
1965.) Unsuccessful.
An independent candidate, high official at the headquarters of the Central Bank
of the West African States (BCEAO in Yaounde), Francois Pehoua had little better
succ.ess. Did he believe that David Dacko would leave the way clear for one who,
a short while ago, was still presented as the president's heir apparent? _
It seems thatthis br.illiant technocrat, supported by certain Parisian business
circles and close to the French minister for cooperation, was counting on a
withdrawal in his favor by the former counselor to Bokassa (whom he himself
had served briefly as minister of finance). At least that is what is being
whispered in Bangui to e~lain his surprising candidacy. But Dacko "hung on" at
the last minute, presumably on the advice of the Elysee, which was anxious
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about calm and stability ir the CAR in this peri~d before the French election. '
Too bad for Pehoua, who--with some justification--does not despair about the
future: the elect3on results put him in third place.
In fact, the ma.in part of the debate took piace between Ange Patasse and David '
- Dacko. A complex fi~ure with many twists and a vigorous orator--each of his ~
- speeches broadcast or televis~d during the campaign was followed with keen
i.nterest--Patasse ranks henceforth as the real leader of the Central African ,
opposi.t,ion. :
In Bangui (20 percenC of the national electorate), where the voting has been ~
really "political" he is hot on David Dacko's heels. EJ.sewhere he is nothing
to laugh at. Very popular with the intellectuals and the middle levels, much less -
so in rural circles, this iormer prime mi:~ister of Bokassa's (at Che time of the -
coronation) has centered his campaign around two sensitive points: the presence
- of a French contingent {raised to 1500 men since the events in Chad) which he
describes as "occupation troops"; and David Dacko's position as a businessman, a
"stockholder in foreign companies operating in the Central African Republic."
The problem is that many Central Africans are very sensitive to the Libyan
intervention in Chad and do not forgive Patasse for having momentarily taken
refuge in Tripoli in 1979, also, his total honesty, "businesswise," has yet to
be demonstrated. The fact remains that David Dacko will have to reckon with him
in the future fragile ~oalitions after the elections--even if the sharing of
tasks has already started with the cabinet reshuffle of November 1980, which saw
_ six "Patassist" ~nisters enter the government.
Faced with this force of nature, the very placid Dacko has played to perfection
his role of "president above the parties." His formation, the Central African
Democratic Union, which has been established for a long time in the rural
area where it took over from the MESAN [Movement for the Social Development of
Black Africa], Bokassa's single party, has benefited from all the services of the
state machinery, including, it seems, its financial advantages, which enabled
- it to hand out impressive supplies of election t-shirts bought in Paris and to
use the 504 brand-new covered trucks shipped from France for the ministry of health
_ for propaganda tours.
In addition to these few "unfortunate mistakes" was a big slip-up in the form of
amnesia: In other words, as~dQ fxom Abel Goumba, almost no one spoke of
Bokassa and the role played by the candidates from 1966 to 1979--and for good
reason in that except for the FPO leader, all of them have served the emperor
from Berengo at one time or another. Consequently, no one wanted this file
opened up. On this issue, at least, there has been a consensus--inglorious and
somewhat shameful.
However, despite these inadequacies and pending the legislative elections which
- are to take place in April, it is difficult not to consider the experience which
- the Central African Republic has just gone through as positive--provided, of
course, that it continues and that these elections are not a safety valve opened
before the "restoration of order," and provided also that the leaders recognized
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by the ballot boxes be~ome awa_re of the immense misery of the Centiral African
people wh~, ~c:.~rding to a recent United Nations re~ort, are living in "a
distr~ssful ~tate." A democracy is judged first of all by this yardst~ck.
_ Davtd Dacico, who has shown an unsuspected firnmess in this affair, seems .re~olute
on democracy, desp~.i:e pressures--discreet bLt real--from several of his neighbors
who are anxious about a~emocratic contagion, which they fear. Dacko, wha is
said to be fascinated ~y Senghor and obsessed *~ith the idea of atoning for his
former humiliations and compromises, has even surprised his French "protectors,"
~ certain of whom believe that the Central African Republic is not yet ready for
the multiparty system.
"He is an heir who wants to kill his f ather before going away," one of his French
advisers says of David Dacko. Bokassa's second death is perha.ps for tomorrow.
COPYRIGHT: J~une Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
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CENTRAL APRICAN REPUBLIC
DATA ON ISRAELI GENERAL'S HOUSE ARREST
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar 81 p 20
[Article by F. S. "From Suez to the Ubangi"]
[Te~ct] He was the sole topic of conversation, apart from the presidential
election: Shmu'e1 Gonen, about 50 years old, Israeli, a general and a diamond
cutter, is at the center of an "af�air" which has been agitating Bangui's little
political world for a mr~nth.
There is something unreal about Gonen's trajectory. A general in the Israeli
army at the time of the October 1973 war, commander-in-chief of the southern
i front, the Sinai front, and the Bar-Lev Line, this massive man, given to sudden
fits of rage, was accused by his deputies of being mainly responsible for the
defeat registered by his troops. He was then put in the reserve ranks.
He was linked momentarily with the Nicaraguan dictator, Anastasio Somoza, before
settling in Central Africa, where he trained Bokassa's imperial guard. In 1977,
Bokassa rewarded him by authorizing him to create a diamond research company,
Iligon. He obtained a license for prospecting in La Ngoere, between Berberati
and Carnot, but no capital. That same year he founded another company,
SICAMINES [Societe Industrielle Centrafricaine d'Exploitation Miniere], which
tapped new money (South African?). But he for~ot to dissolve Iligon.
September 1979 Bakassa falls, Gonen rema.ins. In 1980, in disagreement with his
- main Israeli partner, he creates a third company, SOROMINES [expansion unknown],
- after terminating SICAMINES according to the rules. At this point the current
minlster for economic affairs, Ma.thieu Gbakpoma, intervenes. The law, he explains,
requires everyone who creates a diamond company to pay the State 5 million CFA Fr
_ per square kilometer. The fact of the matter is, Gonen paid for SOROMINES and
S~CAMTNES, but not for Iligon. The minister demands it. Gonen recants: Iligon
never existed anywhere but on paper! The minister immediately has tiim arrested
~ and places him under house arrest. He is still there.
Why this .relentlessness? One thing is certain: Gonen's mine is the best
equipped an~ th~ most profitable in the country. It has a landing strip, a
~ modern infrastructuxe. Does this lend weight to the rum~ors to the effect that
Mathieu Gbakpoma himself and certain French interests reportedly have designs
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en this concession? To be quite truthful, anything is possible. Gonen may have
misappropriated public funds; he may have been one of the organizers of the leaks
concerning the relations between Giscard and Bokassa; and there may be a desire
to silence him. In any case, there is something to keep the gossip going in the
sidewalk interview broadcasts.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
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CHAD ~
FRANCE ACCEPTS PdSSIBLE COEXTSTENCE lnIITIi LIBYA IN CHAD
- Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MED'CTERRANEENS in French 27 Mar 81 p 820 -
jUnsigned art~cle: "France and Chad: An Ambassador in N'Djamena?"]
[Text] How has Chad gotten into its present state? The question was asked
recently by an article in LE MONDE which because of information rlrawn from
- reLiable sources contrasts favorably wit~. the customa.ry nonsense written and uttered _
on this su~ject, and this question is not only of historical interest. Indeed,
the question leads into tTie issue of ~rench responsibility in the conflict which
has batfi.ed Cfiad ~n blood for the past 16 year~, whether tfiat responsibility is
tfie result ef simple ~riendship or of unfor tunate choices made in 1910 at the
t~ae of the conquest of ~Tadai. For tfie Chadians themselves, the eff ectiveness -
of, the structures they are goiiig to have to put in place, in an Islami~ Chad
w~.tAou t any kiad of political or administrative activity these days even at the
lowest levels, wi7.1 depend on how genuine and penetrating their analysis of things
- is .
. However, it must be acknowledged that another ~uore urgent question takes precedence -
over LE MONDE's: Where is Chad headed, and, in particular, what attitude can
France have regarding Chad's new orientation?
The recent visit to Paris of Mr Naimbaye, the GUNT (National Union Transition -
Gover~ent~ minister of agriculture, and the unofficial hi~: ?pvel contacts he ~ -
made there; the presence of second-rank Chadian politicians in France; the
testimony of Chadian bureaucrats in Garoua, Bangui and Niamey waiting to see what
will happen; the statements of Goukouni Weddeye himself; telephone calls made
from Germany to his Parisian relations by Achl Ahmat, the minister of foreign
affairs, who of ten goes there for health reasons; the small group of wounded _
Goukouni supporters being treated at the Percy de Clamart Hospital, who constitute
a sounding board for all this activity--all of this bears witness to Gi,'NT's -
desire to renew r~ormal relations, to w~ich an exchange of ambassadors would give
- concrete form. Tt would not be carrying this too far to connect it with the _
desire to provide for a counterbalance to the Libyan presence.
~ao events cast a special light on how we will be able to respond to this exgec-
tation. k'irst of all, there is the tour which Goukouni has just made for the
first time in the southern part of Chad, by way of Bongor, Moundou and Sahr.
This tour, by providing confirmation of the Chadians' determination to be united, -
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is in fact a prelude to political and administrative reconstruction, the faunda-
tions of which, in thc: north, will be decisive for the future. It is not enough,
� in fact, ~ust to express the desire for free elections. It is also necessary to
provide organization and define a framework for them; in short, to figure out for
what anri for whom candidates wi11 be running. 'Ifie other event is the resumption
' oP activity by Hissein 'rIabre, now based in ~udan, on the autskirts of Dar Guimr
~ and Dar Tama, in the mountainous Kapka region where Doud.mourah, the last sultan
of t�?a1a~, gave French troops a hard time in days past.
At such a critical stage in the rebuilding of Chad, the presence in N'Djamena
of. a well-informed ambassador from France would make it possible to keep Paris
informed, to prevent dangerous foreign influences from being the overriding ones
in tfiis reb~tilding, and to finally support a gradual return to normal in areas
- deprived of Y~uad, air and mail links and of basic public services. On the other
hand, in view of Hissein Habre's get~ing back in the ring, no t maintaining
_ diplomatic representation woudl appear to be planning for an opportunity to
overturn events. One may think what one likes about those events, but, after
so much suff ering has taken place, they are in tune with the obvious yearning
for peace on the part of the majority of those taking part in this tragedy and,
~n any case, of all of its victims. Off icial French statements opposing Qadhdhafi's
maneuvers in Chad lerd credence to this interpretation of the lack of diplomatic
- relations because they seem to line the French up according to a simplistic
- political equation alongside Egypt and Sudan, which have been "pro-Habrist" up
to now.
The question is f iguring out whether it is more effective to deter the Libyans
from settling in by providing Chad tb.e cooperation it wants rather than by
appearing to brea.the life back into the civil war. Besides, what we are talki.ng
about is no t effectiveness but emotional attachment. In spite of the ordea~s
~ of the last few years, we still have a solid fund of good will down there.
Nobody knows what would become of that if a share of the responsibility for the
resumption of hostilities were to b e laid a t our door.
_ It is true that the ambiguous stands of the Chadian leaders do not make it easy
to normalize our relations with them and that beFore doing so we might want to
~b~ain written guarantees with respect to the security of our diplomats.
- UnFortunately, a.mbiguity is not just a Chadian phenomenon. It is common among
African governments, and there are many exampZes of criticisms aimed at certain
French intiatives and publicly expressed by the same people who warmly approve
of them in private. In Chad more than elsewhere this ambiguity is in kesping with
- the local character. Try~.ng to clear it up would be an undertaking as vain as
_ getting the Toubous to lead a seder.tary way of life. It should be added that
GUNT` s members are afraid that this kind of guarantee might one day be used to
justify an "anti-Libyan" military intervention. Even if they do not harbor rhi~
- f ear deep down, there are ar...,,ng them no lack of advisers to make that sugges tion.
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In actual fact it is a simpler mattez than that. Obviously one might feel that
Chad's difficulties will be settled without us but in keeping with our interests
- and those of our allfes, and that therefore our return to N`Djamena is not an
urgent matter. This would be running a risk. Is that risk a lesser one than
the one involved tn recognizing a de facto state of affairs without having
' tfiat mean approval of the basis of a regime? Besides, the attitude of de Lacto
recognition is in keeping with a tradition of our foreign policy which we have
constantly made plain. This will no doubt lead us to coexist with the Libyans
in Chad. Tfzat is not such a dreadful prospect per se since we are already giving
technical assistance to Libya inside its own borders. Although there may be
some risk in this regard to the solidity of our African alliances (however, one
does not see why our allies would not see tha problem in the same terms we do),
- it does not seem to be any more awkward than the risk resulting from lying low
wh~cfi our adversaries could easily display as proof of aun c~sti.lity to the GUNT.
COPYRI~HT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris i98i
9631
- CSO: 4400/959
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CHAT)
BRIEF~
NORTH-SOUTH TENSION--Tensions increasingly keen between southerners and supporters -
of Goukouni Weddeye within the Chadian government. Colonel Wadal Abdelkader
Kamougue, vice pre~ident of GUNT [Transitional National Unionit~isrthenfla of _
protested against the fact Chat instead of the Chadian ~lag, g _
FROLINAT (Goukouni's political group) which floats over the public buildings
in N'Djamena, The southerners are also said to have set April 10 as the deadline
for the departure of several Libqan field officers which they requested of
President Goukouni. The president, for his part, has beparisSJEUNEnAFRIQUEvin a
- month a trip which he must make in the South. [Text] [
French 25 Mar 81 p 21] [~OPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981] 9719
CSO: 440C~952 -
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CONGO
BRIEFS
CUBAN DESERTERS IN BRAZZAVIIS,E, POINTE NOIRE--Dozens of Cuban deserters--
probably blacks--reportedly have been living for the past two years in the
workin~-class suburbs of Brazzaville and Pointe Noire, as well as in the
Angolan and Mozar~bican muceques of Luanda and Maputo. They subsist from
petty trafficking and trade secretl with surrouriding villagas. ~ean-Zouis
Buchet, Afrique Confidentiel column~ ~ex~ ~Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French
18 Mar 81 p 1~ 6145
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1981
- CSO : 4-400 /936
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GHANA
NKRUMAHISTS CHARGE PNP MAINTAINS ~EXPLOITATIVE SYSTEM'
London NEW AFRICAN in English Apr 81 pp 35-36 I
~Article by Ma.rk August Nyirenda~
~Text~ ~~.~NG elements of Ghana's rulin; The KNRG has diamiased the PNP's
People's National Party (PNP) have attempt to portray itself as a party
accused the party's Right of "hijacking" following Nkrumah's footstepa. It further
Kwame Nkrumah's socialist policies in chargea the PNP leadership with confus-
order to maintain their "capitalist and ing the people through thie distorted and ,
exploitative" system. The left allegea inaccurate claim. But to many, the PNP's
- that the PNP hierarchy, contrary to "socialiat policies" will, at best, amount
public claims of wanting ta bring about to calculated and peripheral flirtation
_ structural socialist changes, remains with the lesa radical aspects of
committed to capitalism and has only Nkrumah's type of socialism. The PNP's
spiced itspublicstatementswithsocialist claim, therefore, remains rhetorical.
jargon with hardly any chanQea. There is also a growing feeling among
This attack comes against the back- many Ghanaians that the PNP-led gov- -
ground of the simmering debate on the ernment has found it expedieat to be seen ~
role of Nkrumah's socialist remedial to embrace Nkrumaism becauae the
plans and the search for a solution to aseociation would lesaen public criticism
Ghana's complex aocio-economic prob- of ita manifestly right-wing socio- -
lems. economic policies. ~
.In his lecture, Mensah castigated those ~
Recent Lecture who called for a socialist programme as
being "ideological purists" who thought ,
The Left, which grouped itaelf into the that Nkrumaiam was u"sports jersey '
Kwame Nkrumah Revotutionary ~uard (that) they have designed land) which ~
(KNRG) was particularly incenaed by a can be donned by lother) people only with
_ recent lecture on the ideology issue given their approval". The PIYP ideologue also ~
by Dr Adae Mensah, acting General implied that the I.eft had among its ranks i
Secretary of the PNP. Mensah talked personalities who had denounced I_
about his party as well as the Convention Nkrumah during their :~arioue periods_of ,
People's Party (CPP) which was founded political persecution, a claim that has ;
by the late Nkrumah. since been hotly denied. The KNRG have
He implied that the PNP was the noted, and not without irony at Men-
natural heir of the CPP and even sah's claim, because it wae in tact a _
compared the PNP's commitment to group of PNP right wingera who bitterly ~
- restructuring Ghanaian society to eocial� opposed Nkrumah's aocialist prog-
ism with the CPP. The Left is concerned ramme. Moreover these were the very
that the PNP may have used its alleged men who obstructed Nltrumah's efforts to
alliance with the CPF to exploit public transform Ghana's economy along social-
sentiment because it was under the CPP ist lines.
that Nkrumah, its founder, had cam- The PNP has come under fire from
_ paigned to change the Ghanaian society another direction for its attempt to
in the early 1960s. equate sceialism and welfare state. Dr
Zb
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Mensah himself had alluded to the establiahment ofan egalitarian society in
question during his lecture when he which "exploitation of m~~n by man shall
auggested that Ghana could do with be prevented". Morever it is this same
either one of the two forms i� the other constitution that President Hilla Limann
could not be establiahed. But the two solemnly vowed to uphold.
syatems are neither synonymous nor Mensah also r~~ferred to the contradic-
complimentary. The welfare state is tion which existed within the CPPduring
basical~y a capitalist society in which, the Nkrumah ruia and which the -
when capitalism develops a conscience Osagyefo (a Ghanaian reference to
and human face, tries to combat some of ~rumah meaning Redeemer) had tried
its own unacceptable features by taking to reaolve. Mensah, in trying to highlight
pqlliative measures. The United King- thesecontradicV;iona,helpedhimselfwith
dom has such a sceiety which has since generous, but conveniently chosen
come under severe criticism from the quotes, from Nkrumah's worka to
- ruling Tory government now actively emphasize his analyeis. _
seeking to change it. He quoted from Dark Days in Ghana
while leaving out those passages of the
same book which contradicted his find-
Experiment ings. Nor did he bother that the book
conclusively proved that Nkrumah had
The Left, nieanwhile, has questioned h~n stopped in his socialist reconstruc-
Mensah's assertion that a sceialist ex er- tion of Ghana only by the coup. Instead,
P Mensah uaed Nkrumah s admission that
_ iment in Ghana under Nkrumah bet- the CPP needed to be restructured as
ween 1962 and 196G had failed. Other proof that the Osagyejo had intended to
students of history have similarly dis- purge it of its radical elements.
missed Mensah's claim as an "inrnmpe-
tent and ill-thought-out analysis" of the
Nkrumah goee~~nme~ii. They point out Pzoblems
that Nkrumah's plans were not truly
implemented because ~.hey were Nkrumah's prescription for Ghana's
thwarted by his overthrow fr~~m power in pol itical and economic problema ia
1966, a coup achieved with support ofthe clearly stated in his later published
US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in books. In the circumstancee, the PNP is
concert with moves by European and tirying to hide behind the conatitution of
western economic organs a year earlier Ghana's Third Republic while it con-
when the world price of cocoa, Ghana's tinues along the path of neacolonialism.
major export crop, was deliberately The national constitution doea not pre-
reduced. The price drop effected an ~ent the implementation of a positive
' economic squeeze by western industrial- ideological programme. There are meny
ised countries ~n~ o~.`,c~ :.-�perialist Who have z.oued thwt a political part;; -
powers which eventually succeeded in must always have a clear-cut prog-
_ subverting Ghana's independence. ramme. Students ofthis school ofthought
But the PNP leadership have not run have further atresaed that, contrary to
out of excuses for not'turning to social- common practice in African po~itics,
ism. And while some left-wing members Pacties and their programmea ehould not
have suggested that Ghana has remained evolve around a personality. Rather, it `
committed to the capitalist system should be the party that must organise
because its leaders fear incurring the the messes around a programme based on -
wrath of their colonial masters in the a people-orientated ideology.
West, the PNP leadership now argues Politica] theorists, in explaining the
that it would not be possible to restruc- ?mPartance of a programme as it relatea
ture Ghanaian society because the con- to an ideology, have said that while
stitution is against the creation of a ~deology maps out the general route to be
socialist state. The PNP leadership evi- taken by the party, the programme sete
dently believes that the party's enemies out the immediate targets and taska. The
would seek action to restrain it from the struggle therefore ia immutahle aince the
socialiat course. However, Ghana's programme is constantly changing until
national constitution dces provide forthe the ultimate goal of a socialist society is
' � achieved.
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The controversy over the PNP's ~ ~
ideological dispute is not just academic. It
has significant political and socio- ~8
economic overtones as these affect the
country�s problems. Thia has since
assumed importance given that a grow- ~
ing number of people have ~ecome
convinced that the PNP leaderahip have ,
miscalculated Ghana's political mood. '
Many observers believe that this retlects
the height of naivete on the part of those h~
directing the nation's fortunes to assume
that the country has not learnt from its
troubled past�
~ I~
i
Atiantfc 0 :san
COPYRIGHT: 1981 IC Magazines Limited
CSO: 4420
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G'UINEA
BRIEFS
~ ADF WATER LOAN--The African Development Fund [ADF] recently awarded a loan of
1.5 million UCF (about 380.73 million CFA) to the People's Revolutionary Republic
of Guinea for financing [a determination of] parameters, in preparation for a
pre-investment study of water and electricity supplies. The loan is reimbursable
over a period of 10 y~ars and includes a 3-year grace period. The total cost of
- the study hors taxe (translation unknown] is estimated at 1.9 mi113.on UCF,
- ~ consisting of 1.5 million in hard currency and 0.4 million in local currency.
The hard-currency costs w311 be completely covered by the loan. The local
currency costs remain the responsibility of the Guinean Government. [Excerpts]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 783] 9516
ADF RICE-GROWING LOAN--The African Development Fund [ADF] recently awarded a
loan of 8 million UCF (about 2,030.58 million CFA Fr) to the Peoples
Revolutionary Republic of Guinea for financing a rice-growing project in Siguiri.
The loan is reimbursable over a period of 50 years with a 10-year grace period.
The Siguiri region's rural development plan is aimed at food self-sufficiency and r
the economic and social development of a region that is still isolated despite -
its enormous economic and human potential. The primary aims pursued in the
project are to increase and standardize the 6,820 hectares of rice production,
to satisfy the food needs of the populace better, and to improve living conditions.
The total cost of the project is estimated to be 27.84 million UCE. It includes
18.004 million UCF in hard-currency costs and 9.8 million in local currency.
The project will be financed by the ADF, the International Fund for Agricultural
Development [FAD], and the Guinean Government. The ADF loan wi11 be used to
finance a portion of the hard-currency costs, a portion amounting to 35 perce~nC
of the total cost of Che pro3ect, which is to be carried out over a 5-year
- per3od. [Excerp~s] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS ~n French 20 Mar
- 81 p 783] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9516
~ CSO: 4400/942 _
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I,
GUINEA-BISSAU ~
1~
BRIEFS
WFP EMERGENCY FOOD DONATION--The World Food Program jWFP] of the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO] is going to send Guinea-Bissau 5,000
- tons of corn as emergency a~sistance to satisfy in part the needs of the
drought-stricken population of the country. This gift, valued at $1,152,000 when
transport costs are figured in, was approved by Edouard Saouma, FAO director-
gen~ral. A shorter rainy season than usual and the absence of rain at the
critical time, as well as attacks by flocks of predatory birds, severely aff~cted
agricultural production in Guinea-Bissau this year, producing scarcity, according
to an FAO communique of 12 March. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 783] [COPYRIGHT:Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981~ _
9 516
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MADAGASCAR
- RATSIRAKA'S SECRET: HOW TO STAY IN YOWER
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar 81 pp 36-37
[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Divide Your Friends; Win Bacl: Your -
Enemies; Create a Political Police: You Will Be a Boss, My Son. How
To Stay in Power"]
[Text] President Didier Ratsiraka won over a formidable ally when he
ral.lied the old nationalist Mon3~ Jaona to the support of his regime on
10 March. Arrested on 30 November 1980 (thbs was not known till
January 198?), put under house arrest the very next day for an attempted
uprising, the man heading MONIMA [Nati~nal Movement for Madagascar
Independence] party--Madagascar for i:he 1~1al~gasy--and who, for a long
time now has been the incarnation of both a faction of the extreme Left,
and an intransigent nationalism, thus regained his freedom and legality. It
was not the first time, nor perhaps the last, either; for under every
regiu:: of the past 30 years Mo~nja Jaona has experienced prison after
rebellion.
Symbol of Resistance
- In colonial times, he defied repression, even after the bloodbath of
1947-48, in which the first armed revolt of colonial peoples was drowned. ~
Immediately after independence, under the regime of Prtilibert Tsiranana .
(1960-72), MONIMA crystallized into an increasingly tough subversive -
movement--culminating in the "bloody revolution" of April 1971, notorious -
for the massacre of thousands of unarmed part3sans. Since then Mon~a--
which is what all Malagasy call him--has stood out as the guilty conscience '
of those who, succeeding each other in power, have "~etrieued" the popular
revolution of May 1972. He tirelessly denounced the derailing of the
train of democracy and socialism. He did so with impunity till the evening -
of 30 November 1980, wlien the two baeses of the constabulary and the police
picked him up "to place him in safety, because there were people who sought
to assassinate him"; but really because Mo~?~a .Iaona was becoming a symbol of
resistancA to an increasingly less popular regime. However, this time,
Monja came out of prison to join Didier Ratsiraka against "a resurgent -
Right " which, it has been announced o~ficially, wanted to use his name
in order to "overthrow the revolutionary power."
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Masterstroke
ThE union of the Left thus seems to have been rebuilt around Didier Ratsiraka,
as in 1975, when the referendum of 21 December by a landslide vote adopted
b~th the Charter of the Socialist Revolution and the new Constitution, and
elected Didier Ratsiraka president of the repub lic. But the euphoria was not
to endure.
"Johnny-come-lately" to the revolution, the new president consolidated his
_ positi~~n, and achieved the masterstroke of dismantling all movements which
opposite him could have led to any sort of alternative: the political
parties (whether allies or adversaries), the armed forces divided into various
compartmentalized, if not rival bodies. In March 1976, Didier Ratsiraka
cr.eated his own party, Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA), whose
"vanguard" role was challenged by MONIMA. But Ratsiraka was more than a
- party head. He was president of the republic, and, as such, presid~d over
- the "Front" (National Front fo?: the Defense of the Revolution--FNDR), which
re~rouped all movements and parties which had supported the Charter of the
Revolution. Even then, however, the fire of dissension was smouldering.
On the extreme Left, MONIMA and MFM [Militants for the Establishment of a
Proletarian RegimE] (a proletarian party which attracts particularly
intellectuals and the second-class citizens of the big cities, uery highly
politicized) refused to sit together within th e Front, and enjoined
Didier Ratsiraka to choose between them. The president chose MONIMA. The
leaders of rL~M were put under house arrest shortly thereafter.
The formula paid off. Between March and June 1977, Didier Ratsiraka scored
more points against his Front partners who contended the village and legis-
laCive elections. AREMA came out on top, relegating all the other parties
to minor roles in the National Popular Assemb ly (ANP).
MONIMA accused AREMA of having rigged the elections by shamelessly making
use of the services of the state, and demanded a purge of the government
"stuffed with reactionaries a~1d Right-wing opportunists salvaged from the
ranks of the PSD"--Philibert Tsiranana's old Social Democratic Party, disbanded
in 1972. Didier Ratsiraka nevertheless had grown in strength, he had
appropriated the lion's share of the ANP and the village com~ittees. There
was no question of negotiating, still less of yielding to any kind of black-
mail, Since under the Constitution only those movements which had been
united in the Front could participate in politics, by mid-June 1977 MONIMA
had slammed the door, effectively outlawing itself.
Monja Jaona paid no attention to that. He organized demonstrati.ons and protest
marches, and continued to publish tracts and communiques. Ra.tsiraka res~rted
to his tactics, convinced a"moderate" ~oing--in eontrast to Monja'~s
intransigence--to remain in the FronC.
Schism and Cracks
Schism followed. MONIMA 'hard-liners" followed Monja Jaona. A VSM-MONIMA
(MONIMA Socialist Organization) rallied to Ratsiraka. From then on, the
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president who meanwhile had recon~iled the extreme Left, the MFM rival of
Monja's MONIMA--controlled everything, since he was not faced with any
s ufficiently strong or organized force. But, behind this facade of
omnipotence, a new split was opening up, this time within Didier Ratsiraka's
owt? party. Rivalries were gradually underm3ng ARII~fA.
Climate of Suspicion ~
Publicly--on the radio, at meetings--the president�s trusted followers con-
tradicted each other, and accused one ano ther of sabotaging the revolutio n.
Some, calling themselves the "AREMA of the Left," dubbed the others an
"AREMA of the Right." In the front ranks of the former stood the president's
~iife, Celine Ratsiraka, as well as certain ministers coIImmanding a flamboyant
~_hetoric, such as Georges Ruphin (Information), Bruno Rakotamovo (Equipment)
or Simon Pierre (Rural Development and Agrarian R~form). On the other side,
- those noted for their economic realism, personified by the man second in
command in the State, Lucien-Xavier Adrianarahinjaka, president of ANP;
- the dean of the "Front," Charles Ravoa~anahary, or yet the minister of
planning and finance, Rakotavao Razakaboana; and also, some say, various
close collaborators of the presideut.
Anathemas were exchanged, as well as accusations. In each camp, secret
weapons ~aere being forged: files on the corruption of the adversaries,
on the sudden dizzying leap to wealth of some member of the "AREMA of the
= Left," or bribery by one of "AREMA of the Right." Didier Ratsiraka did not
take sides, but his Mach iavellism soon became a balancing set.
Resentment grew as the president was blamed for not taking a stand. But,
despite rumblings of discontent on both sides, no one raised a hand for
permission to speak. Ratsiraka has kept his followers divided by an oath of
unconditional loyalty to himself, exacted in 1975; as well as by the notorious
"files" on each of them which he keeps up-to-date, by means of his intelli-
gence service.
It is in this climate of suspicion at the top, that broods, at the base, anger.
The economic crisis and th e irresponsibility of those in charge--busy
quarreling with each other--fostered the spread of poverty.
Police Apparatus
In 1979 the inhabitants of Fianarantsoa (south central) took to the streets.
In 1980, it was the turn of M~naka.ra (southeast), then of Toliary (south),
at the instigation of Monja Jaona's MONINIA. At the beginning of I981, the
capital, Antananarivo--~where the university has been on strike since the
- beginning of the academic year--~aas caught up in the same surfeit of violence,
looting, demonstrations and merciless repression. There were 17 dead in
February, not 6, as had been claimed; and there were 86 wounded, not 44;
not to mention the arrests and atiductions. The cha3rman of the educators'
strike comm.ittee, Professor Randriamampandry, was picked up and then
incarcerated no one knows where. ~ao otfier strike leaders were abducted right
in town; the blood-stained car of one of them was found on 10 February.
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- Physicians in the capital have demanded explanations. Early in March, the ;
- Council of Churches (Catholic and Reformed) issued an appeal to national
officials, which was read in all churches~ Among the armed forces, tracts
- were circulated inciting the off icers to rebe113on. There were no demon-
strations in support of the regime. It was then generally believed that -
Didier Ratsiraka would fall f rom power. '
But he did not fall; because he has no adversary, no organized movement
of any kind, no challenging personality, and particularly because, even
though he no longer has any political support, he controls a formidable
police apparatus, whose strike-force is the sir:ister DGID (Directorate-General
of Information~and Documentation). -
Absolute Legal Arm
This "political police" operates under the iron hand af Ra~~iraka's brother-
~ in-law, Colonel Bienaime Raveloson-Mahasampo, who is married to the sister
of the president's wife. The DGID has complete powar in Madagascar, with the
mission of smoking out all "plotters" (f~lse or real), traffickers in _
currency, those sabotaging the regime, mercenaries o~ imperial ism and
reaction." It strikes whom, when and where it wishes with a completely
legal weapon--15 days' custody....
To sum up, the recipe of the political pol3.ce works very well with a regime
that keeps alive, to stay in power, an atmosphere of "pern~anent plot."
The formula worked w~ll f~r a certain Stalin, who inspired a certain
Kim I1-song, Didier Ratsiraka.'s model.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
9347 -
CSO: 4400/946
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_ MALI
TRAORE'S 'RENEWAL' MOVE MAY GAIN HIM NEW ALLIES
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 22 Apr 81 p 39
� [Text] 7.tao months after promising "fundamental changes," is Gen t~foussa Traore
going i.nt~ actian? At any rate, on 11 April he launched the campaign to achieve
~ "the renewal of all grassroots organs of the party," as had been decided on
- 12 February at the extraordinary congress of the UDPM [Democratic Union of the
Malian People]. A misunderstanding had cropped up at the time between President
Traore--also the party's secretary general--and the members of the congress. The
former affirmed that he had received a mandate "to proceed to the renewal of all
components," including the BEC (Central Executive Bureau), while the congress
had only requested of him the renewal of the "grassroots organs," that is, of
local and regional sections, without attempting to change the national direc-
_ torate. But by upsetting the base, Traore is actually gaining a weapon for the
_ future: the new officials in charge of sections wi11 demand in his stead the
heads of certain BEC members who have become unpopular. In order to do so, _
Traore involuntarily acquired unexpected allies. In many distr icts, former
officials from the US-RDA (Sudanese Union-RDA, Modibo Keita's p arty which was
overthrown in 1968) have decided to present their candidacy to head the UDPM -
= sections, the objec tive being to get hold of the new party internally, "since it
is out of the question to overthrow Mouss a Traore by a coup d'etat or through
street demonstrations." They would also like to take President Traore at his
~ word, after he declared in February that no longer would the UDPM "exclude any-
_ ' one." This is one way of ending the ostracism directed against Modibo Keita's .
former companions.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981 .
CSO: 4400/1Z11 ~
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MALI
BRIEFS
AGREEMENTS WI'~H FRANCE--~ao credit agreements between France and Ma.li were
_ signed on 30 l~.~arch by Minister of Foreign Affairs Alioune Bondin Beye and
Fiiilippe Renard, director of the Malian branch of the Central Fund for
~conomic Cooperation. The first agreement pertains to the financing of the
study for a sugar project in Banko~ana, in. the Bamako area, where produc-
tion will amount to 30,000 to 50,000 tons. This agreeme~t is for
' S00 million Malian francs, 170 rnillion of which comes from the Fund for Aid
- and Cooperation, and the remaining 330 million from the Central Fund. Once
implemented, this project will save Mali 6 to 7 billion Mal.ian francs, now
used to import sugar. The second agreement, for a total of 320 million
Malian francs, to which are added a 330 million contribution by the FAC,
- will partially finance the opening of the Costes-Ongoiba canal. It must
be noted that the Office du Niger ~s contributing 2.8 billion Malian francs
to this project, as well as appreciable manpower. This secend credit, reim-
bursable in 30 years, has been granted a~ an interest rate of 1.5 percenC,
[Excerpt] [Paris I~lARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Apr 81 p 1129]
FRENCH WELL-DRILLING ASSISTANCE--The Paris Rotary ~Club has decided to give
financial support to the Eau Vive firm to assist it in developing well-drillin~
operations in the Sahel, and particularly, in the early phases, in Mali, where
_ one opcration (Mali Aqua Viva) is a"ready under way. This rontribution of new
capital should make it possible to dri11 150 new wells between now and 1982 in
the San reg~on, 451 km east of Bamako, where 650 watering spots have already been
created to make 30 liters of water available to each of 100,000 int~abitants every
day. High officials responsible for the operatie~n will be in charge of a technical
caravan with instructions to begin drilling to depths from 20 to 100 meters. The
wells wi.ll subsequently be equipped with a hand or foot pump that will be
~ maintained by local technicians. Officials of the Paris "Retary" said that this
first involvement, which basically consists of supPlying capital to an operation
already in progress, could be followed by new initiatives. On the one hand, they
are ready to extend "Operation Eau Vive" to other countries in the Sahel,
particularly Senegal. On the other hand, they want to improve techniques and
provide the wells with solar pumps, which at present are much more costly than
manual pumps. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20
Mar 81 p 783 ] 9516
URANIUM DISCOVERY--Mali's minister of industrial development and tourism, Robert
Tieble N'Day, recently announced in Bamako that the Japanese company PNC had
di~covered uranium reserves in the northzrn part of the country, near Gao.
Mr N'Day also said that in the wake of his recent trip to France, he was thinking
of signing oil exploration permits for French and American companies. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 783] 9516
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MOZAMBIQUE
PLANS DRAWN FOR PORT, RAILROAD EXPANSION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 801
[Excerpts; During talks held between officials of the commercial services section -
of the French embassy in Maputo with Mr Bhatt, national director for Mozambican
ports and railroads, the following information about the planned infrastructure
extension came out. -
With regard to ports, various projects are under examination, including
research concerning the viability of a coal terminal in the port of Maputo, which ~
Soras Associates, a New York firm long associated with the ports and railroads -
directorate, has been asked to build.
The second study covers construction of a sulphur terminal (for transport to
South Africa~. Mozambique would like to begin work with the least possible delay;
a request for bids will probabiy soon be issued, and in all probability only
certain countries will be allowed to bid.
These :pecial projects should not cause one to forget the overall plan for the
development of the port of Maputo, which will be completed over a 20-year period
in two stages, the first stage comprising the laying of piers and alignment of ~
access routes to accommodate 100,000-ton ships, and the second stage comprising
the designing of channels and, in accordance with the growth of the traffic,
the possible construction of an offshore terminal at Ponta Dobela.
At Beira, the new port can currently receive, depending on the tides, ships with
a ma.ximum capacity of 25,000 tons. A pre-viability study of plans to deepen
the routes of access to the port has been completed by the Britisn company
Bertlin and Partner. Completion of this project would enable the port to take
ships of up to 40,000 to 70,000 tons capacity; completton would include two parts
(deepening the access route~ and constructing a deep-water pier); The Netherlands,
Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries are interested in the pro~ect. The
Netherlands has sent a team of technicians Co the site. But divergent views _
between the Dutch consultants and the Mozambican authorities seem to have
appeared. The latter apparently want a small-scale model of the port improvement _
works to be built in the Lisbon Engineering La.boratary, while the Dutch consultant
believes such a model would not be useful. -
- The Netherlands is supposed to present a proposal at the end of April. Before
then, Belgium will probably have presented its proposals. It is currenCly
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providing technical assistance for improving the efficiency oi the port of Beira,
and Mozambique expects to ask for the dispatch of Belgian technicians.
_ Regarding rai.lroads, Mozambican plans cover the purchase of equipment and the
impr.ovement of rail lines.
Mozambique needs 300 coal cars and has sent requests for them to Portugal, Brazil,
and Zimbabwe, though up to now no response has been received. It also needs 150 _
ballast cars for the upkeep of the rail lines and has made requesCs to Romania,
Zimbabwe, and Brazil, and should also have asked Portugal. In both cases, for both
coal cars and ballast cars, Mozambique is asking for 100 percent financing, to be
_ secured by the proceeds of port and transport taxes.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981 ~
9516
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NIGER -
PRESIDENT ON IN?'ERNAL SECURITY, EXTERNAL THREATS
LD161625 Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 15 Apr 81 pp 46-50
[Interview with Seyni Kountche, president of Niger by Siradiou Diallo: "I Have
- Learned a Great Aeal in 7 Years"--date and place not given]
[Excerpt] JEUNE AFRIQUE: You recently arrested members of the former regime.
~y ?
Seyni Kountche: When Niger citizens compromise themselves with foreign powers _
_ we cannot sit back and do nothing.
_ JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are you sure that the people who have been arrested are really
linked with foreign powers and are not sometimes victims of conf.~~~~^_ and the
settlement of old scores?
Seyni Kountche: Never: Never, do you hear, never is an arrest made without
- proof bein~ duly obtained.
,TEUNE AFRIQUE: A citizen can usually cross his country's borders without being
a fureign agent. Is this not especially true in a country in which the nomadic
life is important?
Seyni Kountche: Of course we know that as well if not better than you do. But
although the cizizen has rights which we recognize and respect, the national
- community has rights too, especially the r.ight to defend itself against foreign
designs. In this connection any Niger citizen found guilty of treason toward
_ his people will be severeZy punished. Moreover l do not see why you are trying _
to defend such people.
,TEUNE AFRIQUE: I am not defending anybody, I am just trying to understand.
Seyni K~untche: There is nothing to understand. When Niger's security and
independence, not to mention its integrity, are threatened we are forced to defend
them. Therefore we will strike the enemy agents mercilessly.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are you not afraid that by hitting out at an increasing number
of Nigerois you are likely to tarnish your image as a statesman primarily con-
cerned with development problems?
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- Seynl. Kountche: It is true that my image is judged chief ly on development. I
woul.: be worried if you had told me that you had noticed a caange in my attitude
~ in that sphere. I do not think there has been any change. But with regard to
- my firm line toward citizens who have compromised t:hemselves with foreign
countries...just look at Niger's geographical position and you will understand.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: This geographical position is well known. But are you not afraid
of being carried away on the tide of repression and resis t ance which has weakened
, so many African regimas?
Seyni Kountche: You see, a politician has to be in contro 1 of events. He is
carried away as you describe if he allows himself to be overtaken or led.by
events. I am not doing that.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: As far as repression is concerned, it is e asier to know where
- and when to start than where and when to stop.
Seyni Kountche: Don't worry. You and the Nigerois know that I am not prone to
_ injustice and abuse of power. I will not arrest anybody arbitrarily. Consequently
this means that I know p~~ecisely where to start and where to stop.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Colonel al-Qadhdhafi seems to want to sp e ak to some of your
fellow citizens over your head; I am thinking of the Tuar egs. Does that worry
you?
Seyni Kountche: Colonel al-Qadhdhafi has been caught up in a dangerous course
which he no longer controls. It is a course which extend s beyond Niger. The
Tuareg problem also concerns Mali, Muritania and Algeria. In other words
al-Qadhdhafi has bitten off more than he can chew. For our part we will not
- tolerate this subversive action in our country.
,TEUNE AFRIQJE: Do you think that Niger's Tuaregs are suf ficiently tied to the
rest of the national community?
Seyni Kountche: In Niger they are perfectly aware of the ir membership of the
- national com~unity. Especially since they enjoy medical care and state-financed
supplies and equipment on an ~;~al footing with the othe r ethnic groups.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Nonetheless do they not tend to be on the fringes of society?
Seyni kountche: Certainly not. All the ethnic groups ar e treated equally.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Are you not afraid that they will some d ay give into subve.rsion?
Seyni Kountche: We have no fears. I will even say that if the Tuaregs haa ~o
choose a promised land one day it would certainly not be Libya. You must realize
" that the Arabs in general and the Libyar.s in particular have no more respect for
the Tuaregs than they have for blacks. They regard them a11 as slaves.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Nonetheless al-Qadhdhafi has tY~e means and he is persistent.
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Seyni Ko untcl:e: He certainly has considerable means. But I am still convinced
that the Nigerois will not a11ow themselves to be colonized bv money. Wh.atever
the discontent inside the country, people unite as soon as there is an outside
danger. The experience of the Sawaba attacks in the sixties confirms that.
- Al-Qadhdhafi's hegemonist designs will simply contribute to the Niger people's
unity. If there is a Libyan intervention we will fight with all our strength,
with bows and arrows if need be.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: In what way are the Libyan designs a threat to Niger?
Seyni Ko un tche: There is not actually an imminent threat. We do not believe
that al-Qadhdhafi could attack us openly. He can only indulge in subversion.
Furthermore he would have to find a suitable medium--traitors--through which to
act.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Why then are you speaking out against al-Qadhdhafi?
Seyni Ko untche: Although there is no real threat, there is a real dispute which
boils down to two points: First, we know that al-Qadhdhafi is recruiting Nigerois
_ whom he is training to carry out subversive acts in our country; second, he has
appointed a Mauritanian national who formerly lived in Niamey to organize and
lead an artificial opposition. This Mauritanian (Liman Chaffi) is a well-known
' trader in Niamey where he still owes the Development Bank of the Republic of
Niger a great deal of money. He was one of the main architects of the abortive
putsch in March 1976. We found some of the weapons sent to the insurgents by
al-Qadhdhafi in his house.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: When I asked you after the abortive putsch in March 1976 whether
al-Qadhdhali had inspired it, you said no.
Sevni Kountche: Of course I was well aware of the ins and outs of this affair.
I was quick to assembly the evidence officially establishing al-Qadhdhafi's
guilt. I simply discussed the matter with the late President Boumediene, avoiding
- any pointless polemics with al-Qadhdhafi and now wishing to be distracted from
_ my development policies.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: Is there a danger of part of Niger's territory being occupied
_ by Libya, a situation which would be like an extpnsion of the famous Aouzou
strip?
- S~yni Ko untche: There is no such threat at present. If al-Qadhdhafi were to
indulge in such an adventure we would defend ourselves.
JEUIr'E AFRIQUE: Some people have spokpn of al-Qadhdhafi's army occupying the
- Tummo well on the Algerian-Libyan [as published] border.
Seyni Ko untche: That is not true. Tummo is not occupied by the Libyans. That
well is some 100 km from our furthest military post in the region. The nearest
T,ibyan p ost is at a. respectable distance from that watering hole.
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,fEUNE AFRtQUE: You asked the Libyan Embassy staff to leave Niamey. Then the
embassy was closed. Why? ;
Seyni Kountche: Because we do not accept any so-called people's bureau here. ;
A minimum of courtesy is necessary in internatior~al relations.
TEUNE AFRIQUE: On what conditions could diplomatic relations between the two
countries be reestablished?
Seyni Kountche: They have not been broken off. Relations have been frozen.
They will be reopened when the two points I mentioned have been clarified. Mean-
while we feel no hatred toward the fraternal Libyan people, who are linked to us
by geography, history, religion and culture.
_ JEUNE AFRIQUE: How do you judge France's attitude in what is commonly known as
the Chadian affair?
Seyni Kountche: France is big enough to know what it wants and what it is doing. '
It is not for me to judge its leaders' behavior.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: You give the impression of having moved much closed to Nigpria
- and Cameroon since the even~.s in Chad.
Seyni Kountche: That is natural. We are in clos e consultation with those
countries with a view to hastening the rest~ration of peace in Chad. We are
making every effort to ensure the restoratinn of an atmosphere favorable to free
elections under OAU auspices. Peace throughout the region depends on that.
JEUNE AFRIQUE: When does the Nigerois arnry plan to hand power back to the
civilians?
Seyni Kountche: I do not know. First we must f inish establishing the National
Development Company. That structure wi11 necess arily lead to something new.
~ JEUNE AFRIQUE: What form will that innovation take?
Seyni Kountche: You are too cu:~ious. Wait and s ee.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
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SENEGAL
i~IANY CHANGES NOTED SINCE DIOUF'S ACCESSION TO POWER
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Mar 81 pp 10~ 11, 1Z
iArticle by Abdelaziz Dahmani~
~ ~ex~ The political climate is relaxing, and two rr.onths
after the accession of Abdou Diouf to power man~~ thinp;s
have already changed.
Uakar, in mid riarch 1981, has come a long way from the atmosphere of febrile
i:ension which marked the end of December 1980--the eve of Px�esident Leopold
- Sedar Senghor's departure. Today's political climate is clearly one of re-
?axation. The thaw is readily acknowledged by certain leaders of many op-
position groups.
- This "prospective" relaxation--as it is discreetly called by opposition mem-
bers who reflect on the new realities--has left its mark on daily life. Des-
pite severe criticism businessmen, French assistance personnel, and Syrian-
Lebanese merchants seem less worried than in December. Yet, in the cafes on
i;he Avenue Pont;,~, ;;oung intellectuals sell the latest taxaw of Sheik Anta
Diop, entitled: "Democracy by Government in a Foreign Language is a Decep-
tion!" Revival of Wolof and other national lan~uages is widespread.
Automobile trat'fic is still dense..--despite an oil bill of some 50 billion
CFA Fr in 1980, which will reach an estimated 62 billion in 1981. Building
constr.uction is tririving, to judge from the recent opening of a 20-story
- highr-~se and tl~e imminent beginning of a few others by Senegalese developers.
The same dynamism prevails in industry, with the opening on 11 March of the
'1`j-billion CFA Fr Dakar-Marine complex, and of the 10-billion CFA Fr SEIB
~xpansion unknown7 at Diourbel on 20 March. In early April the cornerstone
cvill be laid for the mos~ ambitious industrial project yet undertaken in the
~:ountry, that of ICS ~hemical Industries of Senegal7, whose cost is estima-
ted at 63 billion CFA Fr.
With what mone~r? Well, Senegal has never seemed so "credible," though the
interest on the foreign debt reaches 37 billion CFA Fr for 1981. And not a
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week ~oes by without the daily LE SOLEIL announcing a"rain" of billions. i
Among the late:~t "fallouts"--and they are not the largest--are two Saudi !
rlrabian loans on 5 March, totalling 10 billion, and two World Bank credits
on 7 March, for a total of 5.4 billion. To launch a hydro-agricultural pro- '
ject in the Casamance, and to finance construction of the Dakax-Thies high- ,
way, President Abdc~u Diouf has brought back from the Islamic summit at Ta'if
(25-28 January, JEfJNE AFRIQUE Nos. 1048 and 1049) the additional funds ~co- ~
talling 85 percent of the 890 millibn dollars needed to finance the OMVS
jrganization for Senegal River Developmen~ project.
But what Ta'if and Mecca have meant to the Senegalese is a~ove all the extra-
ordinary image of their president emerging barefooted from the Kaaba. It
was the first time a Senegalese had entered that inner sanctum, and there
was great emotion throughout the country. The Abdou Diouf era has thus be-
~un favorably, despite unemployment, inflation, and drought.
- The new president has shown much character and personality, impressing on
tl~e :;tate a style and dynamics all his own. Notwithstanding this, one still
iinds in a few minie~tries, governors' and prefects' offices, or state corpo- -
rations, that o�ficial portraits of Senghor are still on the walls--and no
Abdou Diouf.
It was the head of state who ~`actfully asked that such changes not be made
~ in haste. But such is his new popularity that he could not prevent textile
_ manufacturers from printing his portrait on tens of thousands of ineters of
cloth, which weie quickly transformed, for his visit to the Sine Saloum at
the end of February, into ioincloths or boubous. This illustrates the pop-
ular success of the visit, during which Diouf revealed unexpected tribune-
like qualities. -
A peasant said to him in Wolof :"You are the Ndiol Macka ( the giant of Mecca) _
- Iie replied: "There is but one Ndiol Macka. That is Mohammed, and he lies in
Medina." Another exchange: "i~ou are Abdou Siam (a quality Asian rice much
esteemed here)." "Thank the Minister of Commerce instead. It is he who
imported the r~ce."
Irnported, but--says the opposition--for the most part distributed in the
- Sine Saloum shortly before the presidential visit: in the amount of 14,OOC
tons, says the PDS ~enegalese Democratic Part~, and for essentially elec-
tioneering purposes. Yet it was there, at Kaffrine, that Abdou Diouf on
26 February solemniy promised: "I shall assume my mandate until its expira- -
tion in 1983." He also promised that the next legislative and presidential
elections will be "fair and impartial" and will "reflect the true will of
the Senegalese people."
This refusal to move up the elections goes against the wishes of the Pres- -
ident's friends as well as his opponents. It proves that the new President -
has character. If his political friends plead for early elections, it is
because "the climate is very favorable." Abdou Diouf and his Socialist
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Party have every reason to believe they would win a very considerable major-
ity. That is not at all certain for 1983. By this same means "Abdou" would
- rid himself of a defect imputed to him by the ~pposition: he is president
by Senghor's will alone, and not by that of the people. Certain opposition
papers call him "President 35" by allusion to the constitutional article
which automatically made him head of state.
And yet, to wait until 1983 would enrich political life, since recognition
of new pa rties is foreseen. The present constitution, be it recalled, recog-
nizes but four main strzams: the Socialist Party in power; the MRS [Senegal-
ese Republican Movement] of Babacar Gueye, representing the right; the cen-
trist PDS of Abdoulaye Wade; and the Marxist PAI [African Independence Party],
of Mahjmout Diop. And of the legal parties only the PSD has won representa-
tion in the National Assembly, with 18 deputies out of 100 in the 1978 legis-
lative elections. Other still forbidden currents, notably Sheik Anta Diop's
RND [Nat ional Democratic Rally], which awaits legal recognition (Official
Gazette No 1049), and former Council President Mamdou Dia's MSA [Socialist
Self-Management Movement] consider that they could gain parliamentary repre-
sentation. The ODP [Proletarian Democratic Organization], the clandestine
PAI, the Democratic League, and many other extrenie leftist coteries likewise
aspire to recognition.
Since S enghor's departure all these parties, recognized or not, have been
more or less tearing each other apart, and have lost their uniform hostility
to the regime in power. Als~ a~ an end is the quarrel of the oldsters, which
made Senghor the favored target of Sheik Anta Diop and Mamadou Dia.
It is precisely the latter who seem most interested in the will to democratic
opening shown by Abdou Diouf and his Prime Minister Habib Thiam. But not
_ without expressed reservations. The "three demands" of Sheik Anta Diop, as
published in his paper TAXAW (a multiparty system, honest elections, a gov-
ernment of national union) gave rise to "legitimate anxieties" on the part
of other opposition organs, particularly the ?farxist semi-monthly JDB (Jaay
Doole Bi) . Nlar~adou Dia also made much of his demands, and his "contribution,"
which appeared in his monthly AAIDRE SOPI, ends with words which have been
much not iced: "Bezween Ahdou Diouf and myself there is nothing at issue.
There can be no rivalry between us. Was I not the first to urge him tcward
the podium, together with a few other young people of his generation? Our
refusal of today could be replaced. by active and total support if the new
regime in power would put an end to equivocations and contradictions and
take i;he path of national liberation and restoration of democracy. Such
would be--if I rr~ay say so--oun man2ier of helping Abdou Diouf . If he asked
. . .
our advice . "
That a~vice may have assumed concrete form during discreet meetings. Whence
tt~e moderation of reactions to the announced adherence to the 1983 date for
elections, which allows time to amend the Constitution and to legalize the
most representative trends.
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I:n this ambience a certain confusion has entered the ranks of the legal PAI.
Its leader Mahjr~out Diop had in a way won Senghor's preference. But Ab dou
- Diouf's advisers, for their part, attribute to the clandestine PAI as much
i.f not more truly representative character. Consequently there have been
Qome attempts to help the two groups reconcile their differences and meld
= into a singl.e PAI. Perhaps at the price of Mahjmout Diop's retirement.
In recent months many "small things" have moved in Senegal: the new orienta-
tions of national education, for example. And even as far as foreign policy,
where we no longer ~uite find the "exclusive friendships" of Senghor. Per- '
fectly lucid, the former president declaxed in his farewell address of 31
December 1980.that: "Abdou Diouf has a stronger character than is ,
thought . You u~~ill soon f ind out
But a serious problem confronts Abdou Diouf: how to bring about prof ound
changes wYiile remaining faithful to Senghor? lhe latter, now in retirement, ,
has admitted that priority no longer goes to cultural affairs, but that "eco-
nomic and social matters demand all attention." And Diouf needs internal
~~eace more than palaver in order to combat poverty, unemployment, inflation,
and drought, which remain the country's plagues--behind the Dakar show win-
dow .
- COPYRIGHT: ~Teune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1981
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SIIVEGAL
ACTIVITIES OF PDS LEADER
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 18 Mar 81 p 11
~rticle by A. D.: "91 Meetings in 15 Days"/
~ex~ Principal legal opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade has also changed -
since his resounding declarations of December, when he sought to bar Abdou
Diouf from the presidency. Since then, his Senegalese Democratic Party has
been shaken by divers currents, notably by the resignation of two deputies
_ out of 18, and of three political bureau members, though that body does
number 120.
Since then, Abdoulaye Wade has had as his major concern the reorganization
of the PDS and the needed restoration of the confidence of its militants.
Hence in the 15 days ending 1 March he covered some 3,200 km within Senegal, _
and held 91 meetings in Bakel, Matam, Podor, Dagana, and Saint Louis depart-
ments. Before that, he had organ~zed rallies at Pikine, Thies, Kaffrine, ,
and Kaolack. At Bakel the PDS reportedly gained the support of seven muni-
- cipal counci'llors who resigned from the Socialist Party. _
_ What is surprising is that the PDS organ LE DF~iOCRATE has not appeared for _
seven months, while in Dakar there are swarms of other opposition papers,
_ some of which in particular give expression to sereral marxist currents,
including the pro-Albanian. "Lack of ineans," replies Fara Ndiaye, Wade's
principal deputy, who categorically denies any r.otions of a quarrel or mis- _
understanding between himself and Wade. And ye�, as spokesman for the�group
in Parliament, he has given the impression of boy~otting the work of the As-
sembly for several months past. The reason given is that he was put in
_ charge of several missions abroad by Secretary General Wade in order to en-
lighten several. friendly parties which no longer understood PDS positions, ~
and particularly t he call f or arbitration by the Army in December 1980.
Another major PDS concern is to convene the opposition round tab1E, which
}ias been announced several times but always put off owing to the reticence
- of certain parties. The PDS has finally adopted the tactics of bilateral
contacts, and agreement is being reached on a document to be published in
early April. The project is now circulating among the leaders of the PDS, -
4i .
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- P.Nli, and the two PAIs. On the other hand, there is a total a~sence of all
t.he movements which gravitate around Mamadou Dia and the rightist MRS of
Boubacar Gueye.
COPYRIuFi�r: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1981 '
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SENEGAL
Y~ARGEST INDDSTRIAI. PRflJECT HAS INTERNATIONAL BACRING
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar 81 p 39
[Article by Abdelaziz Dahmani "Towa.rd Industrial Adventure"]
[Text] Dakar-Marine, the oil refinery of the SEIB [expansion
_ unknown], awaiting a large chemical complex and certain ~
. rrojects in the mineral field... -
~The largest industrial project ever carried out in this country wi1 1 start in
early April. In some 34 months, at an estimated cost of 63 billion CFA Fr, the
_ Chemical Industries of Senegal (ICS) will produce sulfur~.c and phasphoric acid
from the phosphates of Taiba. Another remarka~ble point is the firm commitment
of several Third World countries to this ambitious operation. In addition to the
- IFC [International Finance Corporation] (a subsidiary of the World Bank), the
- Islamic Bank and the European Investment Bank will 3n fact handle the main part
of the financing.
Also participating in the capital (21..3 billion CFA Fr) are India (20 percent),
Ivory Coast (10 pe~cent), and Nigeria (IO percent). ~ameroon, for its part, has
promised a 10 percent participation. India has undertaken to buy all the
production surpluses that are not marketed in S~neg~,l and West Africa.
- Repair Shop
This ICS undertaking will follow two other industrial achievements which were
inaugurated recently: namely, SE~B's oil refinery in Diourbel (which cost some
10 billion CFA Fr in investments) and Dakar-Marine (17 billion CFA Fr) (JEUNE
. AFRIQUE No 1054). The latter installation places at the disposal of Dakar's
industrial zone a floating dock, a new 1,200-ton traveling-gantry crane, a dry
dock, a wharf, ~a balasting and gassing station. _
Dakar, located at the crossroads of the maritime routes from Africa, Europe,
America and even from the Middle East and Asia, is also becoming an important
repair shop for the big tankers that do r.ot go through the Suez Canal. The main
work was done with Scandine.vian technicians and capital. In order to carry
through the r~peration, the former French military arsenal, built SU years ago,
was ceded back to the Senegslese state in 1980. As luck would have it, the -
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fariner general-manager of Dakar-Marine, Sheikh Hamidou Kane, who launched tihe
- work in 1976, is terminating in 1981 his assignment as minister for industrial
- developr~~nt and craft trades . With this dossier ciased, he is taking ovsr thaC of
~ the ICS .
The Water Problem -
He is not dismayed by this. He is even thi.nking of other "sure" pro~ects, e.g.,
- mineral exploitation, namely, of iron in Kidougou [sic] in eastern Senegal, oil
in Casamance, peat, or certain agro-industrial complexes, whi~h are also ir~ the
_ air. Since this presupposes that the water pxoblem is solved in the meantime,
it is, consequently, the current priority; and the first work envisaged by the
OMVS is going to stai~t without delay. "It will soon be seen that Senegal is not
as poor as is thought, " Sheikh Hamidou Kane told us . That reca.i.ls the title of
his famous book, published just ZO years ago, "Uncertain Adventure."
COPY~tIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
. -
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ZAIRE
BRIEFS
PALM OIL PRICES--A departmental decree of 2 February 1981 has set the maximum ex-
factory sale price of palm oil at 2,221.40 zaires per ton throughout the Republic
of Zaire. This price includes the amotmt of 50 zaires for the economic recovery
- fund. For the city of Kinshasa and other urban areas, the urban and regional
governors will set retail and whclesale prices by adding a 10- to 12-percent profit _
margin, actual transportation charges and amortization charges to the ex���factory
price. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITER�cANEENS in French 27 Mar 81 p 848} ,
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915
FERROSILICON PLANT--A Presidential Studies Service (SPE) mission visited Bas-Zaire
in February to gather information about the possible installation of a ferrosilicon
plant in that part of the country. The study conducted is f inanced jointly by the
United States, Norway and UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization).
As ram materials, the plant under consideration would use quartz, large amounts of
which are found in Bas-Zaire, and timber from Mayumbe. Its installation would pro-
vide 500 new jobs. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
27 Mar 81 p 848] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915
MINING ACTIVITIES--The French Geological and Mineral Prospecting Office (BRGM) in-
tends to de�~elop its mining operations in Zaire. BRGM's director in Kinshasa,
Mr Gerard Vincent, as quoted by AFP, acknowledges tl:at involvement in mining activities
is moc~est at the present time, but pzojects, some of which ar~. sizable, are in prepa-
ration or on the verge of being launched. In Zaire, the BRGM i.: also implementing
programs to provide the Zairian Government with technical assistance and to train
personnel. 'rhe new mining projects include a copper and silver deposit discovered
in the north of Shaba provi*?ce by the Goma Mining Company, 80 percent of whose stock -
is held by the BRGM. A feasibility study is being conducted. In Kivu in the eastern -
part of the country, the Goma Mining Company is cuzrently extracting 60 tons of
- cassiterite (tin) annually and annual production is scheduled to be increased to -
100 tons over the next 2 years. The BRGM, which is the operator for the Zairian
Department of Mines, is also planning to expand the operations of the Kania Mining
Company (SOMIKA) in the north of Shaba province. Through its mining subsidiary,
COFRAMINE, the BRG~I controls 80 percent of SOMIKA stock. Outfitting operations
have begun and production, which should start in the spring of 1982, could reach
750 tons annually. Another larger but longer-term project is also under study by _
Zairian and foreign mining experts: revival of the Tenke-Fungurume Mining Company
(SMTF) in the south of Shaba province between Likasi and Kolwesi, where a copper
and cobalt deposit is estimated at 50 million tons of high-grade.ore. Exploitation
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r
of this deposit will depend on completion of the high-voltage line intended to supply
electricity from Inga to Shaba sometime this year. The BRGM holds 34 percent of
SMTF's stock. [Text] [Pari.s MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81
p 79'~] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915
BUDGET CUTS--The Zairian Executive Council, which met in Kinshasa on 13 March under
- the chairmanship of Gen Mobutu Sese Seko, has made "deep cuts" in the 1981 budget,
in particular reducing to a"strict minimtun" the number of diplomats abroad while
keeping all embassies open. The Executive Council also amended the budget of the
- Department of Education because of the "chaotic recruitment" of teachers in both
the public and private sectors: President Mobutu has decided to halt "until further
notice" the recruitment of teachers, who numbered more than 236,000 as of June 1980,
while the 12,000 teachers not recognized by the government will be paid by those
who recruited them. The Executive Council also decided to reduce auxiliary budgets
and the expenses of diplomatic missions domestically and abroad. These reductions
of expenses will be accompanied by an increase in revenues as a result of two draft
ordinances-laws concerning certain tax and customs provisions. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 792] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 1981] 11915
'JEANS' PLANT--A project for installing a textile plant to produce "1J0-percent
cotton denim" fabric and clothing (Lois--brand pants and shirts of "~eans") has been
submitted to Zairian officials by the president of the Spanish European Textiles
and Clothing company, Mr Joaquim Saez Merion, who visited Kinshasa in February.
This project would require an investment of about $7 million. The plant could largely
_ use 'Lairian cotton if production of the latter were adequate. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MIDITERRANEENS in French 20 Mar 81 p 793] [COPYRIGHT: Rene P~ioreux
' et Cie Paris 1981] 11915
IVORY TRADE BAN--Zaire has decided to ban, for 5 years, any ixnauthorized possession
of ivory and any operation involving the purchase, sale or export of ivory throughout
Zaire. This decision, which will become effecfiive in April, was made on 13 March
during a meeting of the Execui.ive Council. The council also decided to set 3i.March
as the Pxpiration date for any current permit for transferring ivory and to oblige
any holder of a supply of ivory to declare its exact weight to authorities. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in Fren~h 20 Mar 81 p 793] [COPYRIGHT:
Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] 11915
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