JPRS ID: 9711 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9711 ~
6 May 1981
~ Near East North Africa Re ort -
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_ (FOUO 15/$1)
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JPRS L/9711
6 May 1981
�
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT
(FOUO 15/81)
CONTENTS
1NTGR-ARAB AFFAIRS
France, Morocco Allegedly Conspire Against Mauritania
(Simon Malley; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 30 eiar 81) 1
- ~GYPT
New Role of Police Viewed as Step in Establishment of Capitalism
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 27 Feb 81).......' 5
LIBYA
Opposition to al-Qadhdhafi Mobilizes .
(AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI, 13-19 Mar 81)..........., 10
Li_byan dpposition Struggl~
- ' Opposition Leader Predicts Victory
Diplomatic Resignations Signal Awakening
- a- [I2I - NE & A- 121 FOUO]
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- INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
' FRANCE, MOROCCO ALLEGEDLY CONSPIRE AGAINST MAURITANIA
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE ir. French 30 Mar 81 pp 6-8
[Article by Simon Malley: "Giscard Gives Hassan II The Green Light"]
[Excerpt] When Kino Hassan II of Morocco departed Paris last March Sth he had good
reason to be confident, even optimistic. Those escorting him in the airplane
carrying him back to Morocco were all agreed: the king appeared radiant. He
has ~ust held s~veral hours of discussion, shrouded in complete secrecy, with
Valery Giscard d'Estaing who had been assured from Rabat that such t-alks could
~ prove a real boon for his presidential campaign and enable him to strengthen
- his position v3.s-a-vis the superpowers, the United States in particular, but
also vis-a-vis the African countries that were starting to have misgivings about
the Elysee's consistency in its African policy, especially its loyalty to govern-
' ments it was supp~sed to defend.
' Valery Giscard d'Estaing agreed immediately to the meeting in Paris with Morocco's
sovereign. He listened at length while the latter outlined for him a"bold,
- risky" plan of action. Afterwards d'Estaing gave Hassan II the "green light."
After thinking it over a while d'Estaing is supposed to have told Hassan, "G~
ahead. Even if the operation flops it wi11 prodilce valuable side-effects..."
The operation that King Hassan II and his political and military advisors ::ad
been working on for several weeks had a well defined objective. But its farLher-
reaching goals were more significant, more diabolical: a plot to tc~pple the
government of Khouna Ould Haidalla in Mauritania and set up in its place a group
fu11y dedicated "to the protection of the vital interests of Morocco, of France,
and of the free world in North Africa and in Black Africa, and dedicated to the
struggle against Algerian and Lib~an hegemony, Polisario terrorism, international
- communism..." As he detailed at length to Valery Giscard d'Estaing, "all of the
; preceding were a Gordian knot. Cut it and the whole situation would resolve
itself.,."
_ Valery Giscard d'Estaing supposedly confronted him wlth several questions. For
instance, what would be the reactions of the Algerians, the Libyans, the Senegalese,
even the Tunisians anc~ certain of the Gulf kingdoms, some of which backed
Nouakchott? What would th~ Americans and some social~st countries sa~? "We
gave him every assurance possible," King Hassan II confided to some of his close
' associates. "We 'proved' to him that Algeria is too taken up with :its domestic
problems to be able to take action if the operation was successful. It would
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limit itself to a number of purely fermal protests, nothing more. Anyhow, *ae'd
_ be i.n a p~sition to intensify its domesti.c concerns. As for the Libyans, Sadat
is standing by to discourage any attempt at rescue by Qadhafi. As far as ~he
- Senegalese go, [some circles obviously were going t~ get it involved in the opera-
tion], President Leopold S. Senghor assured us that Dakar wouldn't press its
reaction too far, despite President Diouf's desire to restore normal relations
with Algiers and Nouakchott. Iu Washington, where the Reagan administration
is engaged in labeling all liberation movements as "terrorists," there is no
- problem cl.assifying POLISARIO among the Iatter.
A11 Planned
No mistaking the calcu~ations of the king and his strategists: Nouakchott would
- fall in a few hours and the new administration would immediately seek military
assistance from France under the cooperation treaties in force between both -
countries, and from Morocco, in its right as a sovereign nation able, like Dacko
in Central Africa, to call for direct intervention by Morocco (or any other
- country), under the UN and OAU charters, etc. How could it be refused cahat was
allowed for Tanzania in Uganda, for Libya in Chad, for Vietnam in Cambodia, and
within the Warsaw Pact countries, for the USSR in Afghanistan...This was the
auestion put to the French president by the Moroccan monarch. As regards "our -
friends from T�~i:~ia, Saudi Arabi and elsewhere, Black Africa above all, we can _
guarantee you that prefer to have in Nouakchott a government that favors
- Rabat and Paris rather than Algiers, an administration that is opposed, not
friendly, to POLISARIO." And if the operation flopp~.d? Woul.dn't it be wise to
contemplate such an occurrence and anticipate its consequences? Optimism not--
~ withstanding, Hassan II had to assert that he had planned for any eventualitv.
Here's how:
1. The "liberator" commandoes (sic) would not cross any Moroccan borders an}�where.
_ Morocco's troops and aircraft would intervene only at the specific request of
the new Mauritanian government. In less than 72 hours there wo~ild be 10,000 -
- Moroccan troops position inside Mauritania. Complicity on the part of certain
political and military groups in Senegal would enable the commandoes to penetrate
into Mauritanian territory across the Senegal river. In the event of a flop the
groups in Senegal that were involved would immediately disavow their role and
not implicate Paris or Rabat.
2. The commando l~aders solemnly swore not to be captured alive "under any cir-
_ cumstance." No matter what, the Mauritanian officers would in no way implicate
- Paris, Ra~at ~r Dakar in arranging or carrying out the plot.
3. If the operation failed and Mauritania's government appealed for Algerian
_ forces to intervene, Algeria would automatically ber_ome a party to the conflict
and its direct role in any POLISARIO action originating on Mauritanian territory
would be clearly established. Algeria would be almost exclusively responsible
- for the danger of a Moroccan-Algerian military showdown that would be almost -
unavoidable. World public opinion would see Algeria as the one responsible for
the military showdown(!).
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4. No doubt Algiers and maybe even Nouakchott would hurl charges at Morocco
and probably also at France. That would inevitably result in worsened relations
_ between France and Algeria. The upshot would, first, benefit our vital interests
in the area, and, second, give a boost to our propaganda directed toward high-
ligt?ting Algeria's and Libya's "hegemonistic designs" in Africa, north and south
of the Sahara, just the way we succeeded in propagandizing during the time of
Boumedienne.
Hassan II also confided to one of his associates: "I told Giscard what a feather .
it would be in his cap to outwit his political opponents [critical of his foreign
- policy] by showing them a major diplomatic coup in a region of strategic importance
for I'rance's vital interests. He nodded. He saw what I meant."
"Hot Pursuit"
- So "D" day for the operation was set for 16 March. President Haidalla was away
from the capital touring the north of the country. The prime minister and members
_ of the Military Committee of National Salvation (CMSN) were scheduled to meet on
that day in the office of the president to discuss nothing other than what action
to take to confront the constantly growing threats from Rabat to Mauritania's
na~ional in.dependence and sovereignty. No one doubted but that Morocco was
getting ready to attack Mauritania. Various military units all across the terri-
tory had been put on alert.
Accident, coincidence, watchfulness? The fact is that at the last moment the
prime minister and his colleagues had decided to adjourn sine die the meeting
of the CMSN. As a leadir,g member of the CMSN was to confide later, "We knew
what our jobs wer~. Danger seemed imminent to us. So we decided to beef up
our defense preparations...The ministers, the leaders of the political parties
in Morocco, after all, had given us their warnings and threats vis-a-vis alleged
_ POLISARIO actions originating in our territory. They did allude to 'hot pursuit.'
But basically it was all an attempt to distract us from the actual plan of attack.
We had our eyes on Morocco's borders, whereas our opponents' plan was to assault
us with commandoes across the Senegal River, i.e., ~rom the suuth. 7; was our
watchfulness, and our sense of loyalty most of alZ, it was our mobil:~zation and
- the awareness of our people that made the operation a miserable failure."
Actually, when Lt. Col. Ahmed Salem Ould Sidi, one of the two commando leaders,
had his men charge the buildings housing the office of the president, where the
member~s of the CMSN were scheduled to meet, he encountered only a handful of
gendarmes on dut;~. He mowed them down in cold blooci. As he was in the Nouakchott
radio station appealing to Rabat to dispatch its aircraft the national guard
arrested him. The other commando had the same fate. In an a~tempt to take over
th~ army headquarters it was forced to surrender to loyalist elements of the
Mauritanian armed forces.
The operation was a comolete fiasco. But its side- and after-effacts were
_ unexpected. Contrary to the Moroccan king's assuratlces and promises, Algiers'
reaction tvas swift, vigorous and decisive. Neither Rabat's efforts to keep
France out of the fracas, nor Dakar's categorical denials, as well as those of
Morocco's leaders, won over third world public opinion, especially in Africa,
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as to the innocence of ;:he criminals who armed and remote-controlled the atta~k
on Mauritania and the plot aimed at plunging it into a bloodbath and dragging
nori:h Africa into a fratricidal war from which only imperialism, neo-colonialiam
and zionism would benefit.
A Sorcerer's Appre.ntice
The meeting of the political bureau of the FLN on 16 March resulted in Algeria's
m~st vigorous official position against Morocco's expansionist and aggress~ve
designs since PresidPnt Chadli Bendjedid came to power. Despite his own scepticism
about the intentions of Morocco's royal government vis-a-vis Algeria, President
Chadli Eendjedid, shortly after his election to occupy the presidency, had to
ado~t in his relations with neighboring countries, especially Morocco, a posture
strict in principle but flexible in form. The search for. a solution to the
POLISARIO conflict based on the Saharan people's national aspirations was a
standing aim of his foreign policy, albeit never to the detriment of the higher
and vital interests of the POLISARIO fighters.
- Neither the vicious propaganda of some political and diplomatic groups nor Rabat's
tendentious "leaks" to newspaper people supporting its cause or in its pay caused
Algiers' determination to waver: it was oppo~ed to any compromise likely to
undermine its basic positions.
It was a miscalculati.on to believe that the people of Algeria and its leaders
would stand with ~rms folded when faced with the attempt by Rabatand its accom-
plices, especially those hiding behind declarations of 'good intentions' on the
Elysee, ro destabilize Mauritania and topple its government to set up in its
place a neo-colonial puppet government in the pay of French-Moroccan imperialist
and capitalist interests.
~ ~
- "Hassan II is a real sorcerer's apprentice," I was told the other day by a leader
- who is quite knowledgeable about Morocco and its leaders. "If Algeria has sided
with t;he Saharan people, sometimes sacrificing some of its economic and diplomatic
interests, how can anyone think one single moment that we would remain inactive
if it should occupy Mauritania directJ.y or by proxy^: Our independence, security
of our entire national territory necessarily entail the security of our borders,
of all our borders. Infringing on the independence and the security of Mauritania
- is the same as encroaching ~~n Algeria's. No Algerian could tolerate that...."
- CuPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie
cso: 4400/1086
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. , EGYPT
~
NEW R~LE OF pOLICE VIEWED AS STEP IN ESTABLISHMENI' OF CAPITALISM
- Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 27 Feb-5 Mar 81 pp 24-26
[Article: "A New Egyptian Army--From the Police Forces!"]
[Text] On 25 Januarq, President Anwar al-Sadat wa~.ched the first review of the -
Egyptian po~.ice forces.
_ The celebration on this occasion was unlike any in past years, since a holiday was
given to some police workers, an allowance was paid to those assigned to work that -
day, and symbolic awards were distributed to several officers. Then commemorative
_ pictures were taken, and a soccer match was held between the police team and one
_ of the major Cairo clubs.
= However, things are di�ferent this year, when Cairo witnessed the biggest review of
its type of the largest police force in the region. Naturally, the Egyptian presi- -
dent was seeing the results of 3 fu11 years of continual, secret preparati~ns to
form a new police army of the sort he wanted and which he had personally outlia~.ed,
which was implemented by Inter ior Minister al-Nabawi Isma'il under the name "C~ntral
Security Forces." -
Without going into too many details on how these forces were established, their .
sole, main purpose, naturally, is to strengthen the grip on the domestic front, and -
to react to any activity which might take the form af a threat to the regime, es-
pecially in areas having a ma ss character, such as university youth organiz ations,
religious societies, and soccer matches.
However, after the incidents of 18 and 19 January 1977, and the popular uprising
- which threatened the Egyptian regime to the core, al-Sadat was forced to refigure
all his calculations. Instead of resigning himself to the failure of his policy in
all fields--social, economic and foreign--he deluded himself into thinking ti~at what
had happened was only an "isolated uprising," and that the people were unaffecLed
by and unconnected with what had happened.
A1-Sadat tried to pretend that he believec: this, but in �act he was looking at
matters in an entirely diffe.rent manner. Even though he was the one who ordered
the payment of damages to the owners of the nightspots and cabarets along al-Haram
~ Street (compensations which Egyptian embassies had obtained from Egyptians working
overseas in the form of stamps and additional fees for every kind ot transaction),
the matters which were subsequently revealed to the Egyptian president had far-
, reaching implications.
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First of all, he discovered that his regime was really being threatened from within.
- Secondly, he discovered that the domestic security forces, as represented by "central
_ security," were unable to preserve the regime's safety, after several Cairo streets
were set on fire and his residence in Gizah was besieged by demonstrations, which
even extended to Aswan, the southernmost city, where al-Sadat would go swimming in
the sun, The army had to be calied into the streets, and tanks were actually brought
into the streets and stormtroopers occupied the public squares. However, what was
new about the matter, and what al-Sadat was well aware of, was that the army was
issuing directions to not fire a single shot at the people, while the police forces
fired on '�:ie citizens in the streets for 2 days, wounding and killing many people.
~ The Army Is On the People's Side
A1-Sadat was well aware of this lesson, and perhaps f~r the first t ime sensed that
the army, even though it was standing still, or "observing," or "being contralled,"
would never take his side against the people if matters came to that.
At just about the same time, p~epar3tions were be3ng made with America to eliminate
the Egyptian military organization, to the benefit of Israel and the purposes and
goals of the "coming regional peace." Iiere, plans had to be made on two bases:
firstly, eliminating the Egyptian armed forces and transforming them into a sort of
civilian or "functional" organization, i.e. an army composed of employees or civil
servants, and, secondly, making the police replace the army as an alternative for
protecting the regime, under such pretexts as the claim that the peace phase does
not need increased military expenditures, which could be spent on more benef icial
and usefui civilian purposes, and the claim that changes had occured which necessi-
tated an increase in the number of police forces and the improvement of their train-
ing and armament, the chief change being that the greater part of Sinai would be
occupied by forces subordinate to the police, not army forces.
- As f.or the first point, the Egyptian military organization's elimination, its drain-
ing of all substance, and its deflection from its particular purposes, in imple-
mentation of thE Camp David agreement, several steps were taken.
First, senior army officers were given free rein to take over "new" territory in
- reconstruction areas, and they were ~nabled to establish new "f iefdoms" in the form
~ of hundreds of feddans of gardens and farmlands.
' To this end, President al-Sadat issued his recent decree, declared at the end of
his speech in the al-Salihiyah area near al-Isma'iliyah, which provided for raising
- the maximum farm land ownership to 200 feddans, thereby superceding the agrarian
reform law, the first fruit of the July revolution, which limited ownership to 100
feddans per family, not per person.
- The important thing here is that a new class of large landowners arose among the
senior army off icers, who consequently bec.ame more covetous of their private inter-
ests and more concerned with and attentive to looking after them. They also came
- to believe more in the new society, or the capitalist society which was being cre-
ated under various names, the latest being "food security."
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As for the other class of ser.ior officers, the stormtrooper officers 1n garticular,
the greater ma~ority of them were also managing the new "openness" offices, and were
- engaged in extensive imp~rt, export and middleman operations. In fact, some of _
them, especially the stor~troaper officers, benefitted from their lmowledge of an
- experience in Egypt's mountains and desert areas to acquire some mar~le mines in
th~se mountains, extract this raw mater.ial, and deal in it extensively.
_ As for the new officers, or the young officer generation, their preparation in
this direction is beginning early now, since it has been decided that as part of
the War College curriculum they are to take a compl.ete commercial c~urse, so that
the officers wi11 ultimately acquire a baccalaureate in commerce and another in
- military arts. Then, after graduati~n, each will find himself a position in one of
= the openness companies or the other foreig~ companies and off ices now so widespread
in Egypt.
Naturally, studying these commercial sciences will doubtless be at the expense of
the military sciences and will take time away from them. The natural place for
whoever �remains "zealous" or enthusiastic about military traditions after all of
this wi11 be the E~yptian-Libyan borders, cahere he will not be a thorn in the side
_ of the regime. Besides this, the rest of the army will be tr.ansferxed to purely
civilian sectors, where the members of the military uolice, for example, would
direct street traffic, other un its would work in bakeries making loaves of bread,
and still e*_:;er units would pave streets and plant new land to achieve "food securi-
ty," as well as build the al-Qasr al-'Ayni Hospital!
Special Training -
The second point--the new police forces' replacing th~ Egyptian armed forces--has -
actually taken place. The "police army" of Egypt has now become one of the centzal _
security forces, comprisin.g 160,000 enlisted men and officers armed with all sorts
of modern and heavy weagonss from artillery to machineguns to mortars. Members o� -
these forces are chosen from the young people being drafted into tiie army, and the
young Egyptian is nc?w permi~ted to spend his conscription period in any agency sub-
i ordinate tothe police instead of the army. Thus the number of policP forces has
increased, at the expense of an obvious shortage in the number of armed forces con-
scripts. This year's budget for this new army amounts to 100 million Egyptian
pounds, as opposed to 78 million pounds last year. These forces number 100,000
enlisted men and off icers, whereas in 1977 the~ numbered 50,000 enlisted men and
off icers, with a budget of 20 million pounds. This means that the number of police _
arniy forces has more than tripled in only 3 years. It has been decided that by
- next year the number will reach 250,000 enlisted men and :,ff;cers well trained i.n
- acts of repression and the use of violence!
Consequently, it has hecome only :Zatural for the pol'ice tu completely control the
various ~gyptian domestic utilities, and f~~r permanent assembly centers and posts
to have sprung up in the streets and squares, along with other mobile positinns
- such as roadblocks an.d vehicles patrolling the quarters night and day.
While this phenomenon has attracted the attention of the man in the street, it has
also attracted the attention o~ military personnel., The armed forces members feel
that a substitute army is being prepared. Some infla~atory acts have actually beEn `
perfurmed by some police officers; one of them arrested the wife of an armed forces ~
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(stormtrooper) officer. She was badly treated by police personnel, being detained
for 3 days without Ueing per~itted to contact her husband or family. After that,
she was cha.rged with "indecency." Once news of this spread through the army, the
tex~sion reacheci its peak and rumors flew that the stormtrooper unifis, which would be
- participating in the military re~iew on the occasion of the 22 July holiday, might
make a move to occupy the capital. Therefore, the regi.on was besieged by large
military intelligence forces and other combat units. However,.Officer Nabil Shukri,
then commander of the stormtrooper forces, did not want ma.tters to come to this, so
he purposely attacked and kicked a senior police off icer in the street, in plain
view of the citizens, wheii the police officer tried to prevent him fr4m parking his
- car at the side ~f the road. Because of this incident, and because of reports that
several stormtroopers, acting on Nabil Shukri's orders, had demanded an interview
with then Defense Minister Kamal Hasan `Ali to frankly declare their inability to
protect the honor of the Egyptian military forces, Nabil Shukri was finally removed
from the ranks of the armed forces and sent into retirement.
= The second incident which was sure to cause an explosion between the police and the
army took place in the Jabal al-Ahmar area. An armed forces truck was en route to
this area to get some sand, and some "central security" soldiers from thE police
forces tried to prevent it from doing so. The army men then demolished all central
security camps i.n the region, and if the military police had not stepped in at the
_ right ti~e, the explosion would haQe spread much further.
Returning to the Past
This new phenomenon--the formatioa of a new Egyptian army `-om the police to replace
- the Egyptian armed forces, which are laeing wiped out ~t top speed--i_s only one of
many stPns being taken across the ~oard in Egypt, in an attempt to return ta the
pre-rEVOlutionary years and to reshape the Egyptian manner af th3nking and psyche
~ by creating new customs and values which will serve the new capitalist socie~y
_ being planned.
They are trying to transform young people into n~ v landowners, merchants, smugglers
and middlemen, by means of concentxated American propaganda to which an entire ~
television channel has been devoted (Egyptian television is broadcast on only two
channels), which attempts to deepen these new concepts, values and ideas. The
most dangerous aspect of this lies in the attempts to convince the young people,
by means of information media, of the useJ.essness of education and the failure of
educated people and intellectuals in their lives--as opposed to the success which
uneducated merchants, middlemen and professionals achieve. In several programs,
, these information media simplify the comparisons bei~ween the garbage collector and
the university professor, stooping so far as to tell the young peopl~ that the
university professor has failed in his emotional ar.d family life because he has no
- money, while the garbage collector disregards these oustacles and lives a happy
married lif e because he can fix up his home, which the un iversity professor cannot
do himself .
In no case can what is going on today within the Egypt~an regir~e be separated from
the nature of the Egyptian ruling organization, which holds all the key positions
through its principle leaders, such as 'Utluuan Ahmad 'Uthman, Sayyid Mar'i, and
_ Mansur Hasan, who have become widespread throughout all decisi.onmaking agencies
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, such as the executitre agencies, the party, the army and the government. Their main
purpose is *_he creation of a new capitalist society in Egypt and the resboration
- of capital's dominion aver all aspects of life.
The news has been con�irmed that the limited cabinet change which the president
eff.ected in the cabiniet last month, when he appointed "Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman deputy
prime minister and gave M~cnsur Hasan unlimited powers, is intended to pave the way
to a more imgortant step: the appointment of 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman as prime min-
- ister in the next cabinet, preparatory to becoming vice president of the republic,
and the appointment of MansuY Hasan as deputy pr3me minister, in preparation for
the position of prime minister after that. These two model citizens have found the
favor, liking and intense concern of the new American admtnisi�ration.
CO~'YRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN `.L-'ARABI
8559
CSO: 4802/559
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= LIBYA
OPFASTTION TO AL-(IADHD~iAFI ?4(1BILIZES
- Libyan (Toposition Struggle
- Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 Mar 81 pp 14-15
['i'ext] The worshipers wound up the Friday prayer at the central mosque
- in London, and they walked out to the courtyard of the mosque, greeting =
. each other. Suddenly a professional killer fired four shots into the
chest of one of them. [The victim] fell dead while the killer tried to
escape. _
Why was the Libyan journalist, Muhammad Mustafa Ramadan killed?
- The only answer [to that question] is because he was [a member] of the
Libyan opposition abroad.
_ What is curious is that Muhammad used to present his ideas clearly, as he
understood them, in a general and comprehensive manner. He was not a -
member of any group or organization that was seeking to overthrow a
government or a regi.me. Sut in spite of that, they killed him.
What baffles one is the fact that the killers who ganged up on him later
confessed that they worked for the rr_gime of Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi;
that they had come to the British capital specifically to kill a few
Libyans; and *_hat Muhammad himself was among those.
Pluhammad is one of a group of Libyans who lost their lives. Libyans have
been dying one after the ather in Rome, London and other capit:als accor-
ding to orders from Col al-Qadhdhafi himself. This is because Coi
al-Qadhdhafi wants no political opposition to his government.
_ And so I,ibyan intellectuals die one by one in public purges while the
Arab and the world press print pictures of bodies in the streets, one
body after the other.
And the regime persists in tk~e s~ries of "purges."
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The Libyan president himself declares on behalf of his people and in _
front of his people, "The revolutionary committees have another task ~
inside the country pertaining to the Libyan Revolution. It follows the
new national task which defines and explains the form of unity so that
the masses can fight for it. The other task--and we have to say this _
quite frankly--is to kill the opposition. If the counter �c~rces want to
stand against the revolution, this is their business; if t;~ey want to
surrender, escape or not join the revolution, rhis [too] is their
business; but. if they want to resist the revolution, we have to attack
them inside 'che country and abroad. L~t every member of these life~ess,
collapsing and de�eated ~orces know--and they are few and limited--that
if he were t:o go to the ~lorth Pole or to the ~outh Pole, whicti is as far
as any one of them can go, we wi'L1 go after him and we will muunt an
attack agai.nst him because he is the one who perpetrated an injustice
against hiT.nself. It is inevitable that we will f~l"low anyone who goes to -
any country in the world and works against the revolution, and we will _
attack hirn anywhere iri the world. This is the law of war. He who wants
to fight the revolution has to bear the consequences [of his actions],
whether r~e is a student or a member of a reactionary Arab intelligence
- body."
' The Lib~~an president adds, "We have to challenge every enem;~ of the revo-
lution, and we have to go to him. If the counter-revoluti~nary forces are
found inside the country, their position must be attacked and destroyed
even if it were a mosque. If a person anywhere in the world has been sen-
tenced t:o death because he deserves to be executed, you have to carry out
that ser,itence
This is exactly what Col al-Qadhdhafi said in his address on 8 March 1979
at the meeting of the Revolutionary Committees in the city of Benghazi.
On 28 A~~ril 1980 the Revolutionary Committees announced that the physical
eliminat:ion of the enemies of the revolution had actually begun and that
"Not Br:itain, which had failed to protect its lords; not Italy, which had
failed ~_o protect its prime minister; and no ~ower on earth wi.ll be a~le
to protect the Libyan opposition." The same committees explained that -
- the [members of the] oppositien who will be eliminated will not be buried
in Liby,a. "The graves of Libyan Arabs will not accept vile bodies reeking
oE vileness."
- On 5 May 1980 the Revolutionary Committees threatened to kill every Imam
who prays for the body of a Libyan [member of the] opposition. Why? The
statement said, "Because praying behind such an Imam is basically imper-
missible."
580 Mi?~lion Dollars for Foreign Repression ,
Nevertheless and in spite of all this the Libyan opposition does exist,
and it has become effective. It can be found in all the Arab capitals
except Aden and Damascus. It can be found in all the European capitals
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and i.n other Islamic and non-Islamic capitals. It is making itself heard
' in it~ c,wn way in weekly and monthly magazines, in secret periodical pub-
lications and in personal communications. If it has been cautious so far,
_ it has observed caution so that innocent bload wolld not be shed. The
- Libyan regime designates 580 million dollars every year--some observers -
~ say more --for repression and murder abroad.
It may be said that from now on and untLl the Libyan opposition [groups],
which are scattered in the form of movements and communities, come
- together as a single political entity--at least this is what the leaders -
of the opposition are affirming--the Lebanese scene will have been pre-
_ pared for the occurrence of a major change on the popular scene. For the
first tim~ in its ancient and cont~mporary history, Libya is experiencing
a drain such as the one that is occurring riow in its intellectual -
capabilities: ~0,000 Libyan citizens have immigrated for political
reasons. For the first time the various sectors of production--agricui-
. tural, vocational, commercial and industrial--are seeing a decline in
- production such as the one they are seein~ now because of the peculiar
~ lst of September laws which enlist almost all the manpower in the service
of President al-Qadhdhafi and his expansionist, military ambitions
abroad. [These laws have put Libya's manpower to work] to protect the
- regime from its adversaries inside the country on the b.ssis of the fact -
that the revolution cannot actually exist and be strong unless it elimi-
nates its opponents completely.
Who are the Libyan [members of the] opposition?
~ They ar~ a group of movements, communities and fronts distributed among
= Egypt, Sudan, the cauntries of the Arab Maghreb and the Gulf and even
_ Lebanon. 7n a~idition, there is a league of secret offices in Europe and
in some of the Islamic capitals under the following names:
~ --The Democratic National Move~ent which publishes the magazine, SAWT
LIBYA.
- --The Libyan Community which publishes the magazine, AL-JIHAD.
--The Libyan National Movement which publishes SAWT AL-TALI'AH.
--The Democratic Libyan Front which publishes AL-'URUBAH.
--The Islamic party which publishes AL-MUSLIM. -
- Recently, a group of Libyan intellectuals joined [hese movemer?ts, and
they took it upon themselves to publish a series of pamphlets entitled,
"All the Truth for the Peo~,le." The group began this series of pamphlets
with a set of statements and letters by Dr Muhammad Yusuf al-Maqrif, for-
mer director of the Libyan Accounting Office and Libya's ambassador in
- India until May 1980. The second pamphlet was devoted to Muhammad Mustafa -
Rama~n and was entitled, "Who Is the Killer and Why?" The same group
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is preparing a series of studies--about 10--on the following subjects:
al-Qadhdhafi: how did he ruin Libya's treasury; al-Qadhdhafi: how did
- he ruin Libya's economy; al-Qadhdhafi's experience in the context of
Islamic balances; al-Qadhdhafi in the eyes of the West; ideas on revolu-
tion; the legislative chaos in al-Qadhdhafi's government; administrative
chaos; the magnitude of cases of bribery and financial corruption; views
on the foreign policy of al-Qadhdhafi's government; and the social
changes that are being sought by the government.
Dr al-Maqrif was in fact the first Libyan diplomat whu called openly for
- the overthrow of the regime. He combined this appeal with calling atten-
tion to the Eollowing data:
The speech which Col al-Qadhdhafi delivered in the city of Zawarah in
1973 abolished all the laws and suspended all the platforms and organiza-
tions, replacing them with the chaos of "the revolutionary committees."
Ever since that day al-Qadhdhafi has involved the Libyan people in imagi-
nary batt?es whose purpose appears to be [to establish] "the authority of
the people" but whose actual purpose is "to control, stifle and humiliate
the people."
_ Libya's innocent sons have been hung on the gallows; bullets have penet-
rated the chests of scores of Libyan officers inside the camps; many
people wasted away in prison cells; a~~~d bullets spared none of the cream
of [Libya's] intellectuals abroad.
The Libyan opposition is striving to establish a developing, sensible,
democratic state, wherein every citizen can feel safe about his human
dignity, his freedoms, his inviolable rights and the objects he holds
sacred, a state where human capabilities and energies can be utilized in
- a way that would benefit all the people of Libya and its neighbors and
_ brothers.
After Dr al-Maqrif two Libyan diplomats announced that they were joining
the opposition. The first was Mr Ahmad Ibrahim Ahwas, who wants to be an
- i.ndependent and a cooperati~ng voice. The second was Mr 'Abd-al-Salam 'Ali
'Aylah, the Libyan charge d'affaires in India. Both want to put an end to
political murder inside and outside Libya, and they want to make prepara-
tions for a new democratic formula that would be based on responsible,
popular choice and contemporary constitutional principles.
Opposition Leader Predicts Victory
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 Mar 81 pp 16-18
[Text] The Arab countries welcome our movement, but it
is unfortunate that Europe is bowing down to circumstantial
interests.
I had to go to Rome during last week's holiday to meet three r~en I did
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not know in a place I did not know. I boarded the airplane with the tele-
phone number of one of the friznds of AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Italy in my
pocket. This telephone number was my only guide. In Paris I had been told
that the men were three leaders of the Libyan opposition; that they were
preparing for an internal movement in Libya; and that "the telephone
- number would lead you to them."
On the way to the airport unpleasant thoughts crowded into my head: Rome,
_ the Red Brigade, al-Qadhdhafi's brigade, Aldo Moro's body, a U.S. jumbo ~
= jet bucning in Fiumicino, the body of a Libyan, another body of a Libyan
_ and yeC another body.
- I closed my eyes and I reopened them on another scene: thousands of
Libyans in GrePn Square clapping for Col al-Qadhdhafi; some 10,000
soldiers filin~ by in an armed parade. The man talks about his accom-
glishm~nts; everybody cheers; and sh~uts of approval are hearci in the
square. Under the lights of "the conqueror" everything has been con-
sidered; everythin~ indicates that al-Jamahiriyat~ is devoted to its
- leader.
[I see] another scene [in my mini's eye] before I reach the airport:
' several hundreds of Libyan soldiers going to Uganda and not coming back;
1,000 Libyan soldiers (the figure is endless) storm int~ Chad and are
buried there; a Libyan pilot escape~ with his MIG airplane to Greece
_ because he wants to join his sweetheart--this was the official explana-
tion; Libyan camps for volunteers from all over the world [are being set
up] for a majox mission: al-Qadhdhafi's expansion; 12 billion dollars for
tanks, airplanes and missiles; and hundreds of millions of dollars to
kill people for a fee.
The airplane takes off. The man sitting next to me is a French business-
man going to the Itali.an capital for rest and recreation over the week-
end. The woman sitting next to him was only his wife. I asked her if she
was going to vote for Giscard in April--I did not find another question
to ask her. She smiled and r~ferred me to her husband who gave me a
lecture on Giscard about whir_h I remember nothing. However, I still remem-
~ ber that he and most French businessmen favor another term for Giscard.
Three Faces I
i
At the Fiumicino Airport theldriver of the taxi who drove me to the hotel
in one of the suburbs of th.^I.Italian capital told me that two Libyans had
fired shots at a civilian ai~'~plane 2 weeks ago. [The driver gave me this
- information] when he found ou~1: Erom my accent Chat I was an Arab. He did
not forget to offer his servi~es as he bid me farewell. I understoo~ from
his looks that he liked Arab c'lients because he was convinced that they
all carried an inexiiaustible supply of oil in their pockets.
I contacted the man who knew the secret of my trip, and I told him tl~:at I
had arrived. He told me that the appointment was~ [set for] 11C0 hours
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[he followinc; morning and that I had to stay in the hotel until he con-
tacted me again. At 1000 hours the following morning I had a telephone
call from [this] friend who said without explanation that the appointment
had been postponed to 3 pm. I was in my room when the phone rang a few
minutes beforelSQO"~iov.rs. I understood that they had arrived, and I
~ suggested that we meet in the hotel where I was staying, but my conver-
sation partner said he would prefer a quieter place.
In a circle that brought me together with the three men I found myself
in front of calm Libyan faces. One of them declined to mention his name.
The second, for security consiclerations, preferred to give me his action
name, Brother Yusu.`-:. The third was Ahmad Ibrahim Ahwas with whom we had
this interview.
[Question] Ahmad Ibrahim Ahwas, who are you?
~ [Answer] I.am a Libyan, born in 1938 in Benghazi. I graduateci from the
Military Col~ege in 1962, that is, S years before the revolution. After
military courses in Bri[ain and in the United States in the ar.ea of my
specialization, the corps of engineers, I was apgointed upon riy return
instructor at the Libyan Military College for 1 year. Mu'ammar
al-Qadhdhafi was one of the students I taught in the final year.
After the revolution 1 was placed under house arrest. Then in 1970 I was
sent away to the diplomatic corps. I moved from Copenhagen (1970-1972),
~ as second secretary at the embassy, to Djibouti (1972-1973), as first sec-
_ retary, [o Aden where I was charge d'affaires until late in 1975. From
there I went to Singapore as adviser on Islamic Affairs until late 1976
and then to Guyana as charge d'affaires. On 18 January 1981 I submitted
my resignation to declare my opposition.
[Question] Are you from a wealthy or a poor Libyan fanily?
_ [Answer] I come from an average family that is closer to poverty than
to wealth. My father is a simple merchant. I attended the offi.cial Libyan
_ schools, and I remember that I excelled in my studies. ~
[Question] In the Military College too?
_ [Ans~oer~ I was first among my colleagues and a master sergear~t in my
graduating class. Besides military affairs I took evening courses in
Islamic culture and Isla:nic thought.
He Was Slugg.ish
[Question] k~hat about Col al-Qadhdhafi, the student at the Military
College?
, [Answer] He was not one of the outstanding students, and he did not
excel in his studies. I recall that he did not come to the graduation
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~ ceremonies, claiming that he was ~.ick that day. I remember that he was
- physically sluggish, ~nd sluggishness is one of the major flaws in the
military.
[Question] Were the Free Officers superior [in the~r studies]?
[Answer) The Revolutionary Command Council is a group of very ordinary
_ officers.
- [Question] Do you consider yourself more devout than al-Qadhdhafi?
[Answer] l~fter we graduated from the Military Colle~e, I recall that
- a1=Qadhdhafi and I were in the same camp. I noticed [then] thak he was
: somewhat devout, and I tri.ed to establish a special relationship with
him, but it soon became evident to rr.e tiiat underneath his obvious devout-
ness lie much malice and a complex, diseased disposition, so i turned
away from his friendship.
[Question] What is it that made you discover what yo~ call a~'diseased
disposition?"
[Answer] It was the violence that he practiced an.d his foolish behavior.
I recall that he worked as a duty officer. When one of the soldiers made
a mistake that he did not like, he ordered the officer tied to a vehicle
and dragged for a).ong distance. When the soldier lost conscience,
al-Qadhdhafi order~eci his soldiers to run him over. But then another
officer came, gave the soldier first aid and took him to the hospital.
The soldier had been lying mo~ionless on the ground and had remained so
- for a short period of time until the officer arrived. I still remember
the name of ?hat soldier. It is 'Uthman al-Najjar. There are many who ~
remember this incident with me.
- 'i'his conduct did not ~o unpunished~ A military cour.t then sentenced
al-(2adhdhaFi to jail. This caused a delay i.n his promotion. (A1-Qadhdhafi
says t~~rat the delay in his prumotion was due ta his political ideas.)
[Question~ Is it possible to find a psycholog.ical reason in Col
_ al-Qadhdhaf.i's chi.ldhood for this disposition?
[Answer] A1-Qadhdhafi had a deprived childhood in the desert. He is
known to have been a troublesome and an unpleasant child, and he was not
- popular among his peers. I do not remember. much about him in the Military
Coilege because I went there to teach only. But I still remember quite
we11 that he Eelt isolated. ~le did not take his meals with his col-
lea~;ues; instead, he used to eat by himself after they would leave the
rc~staur.ant. I st.ill remember that as an instructor I used to defend him.
I felt that his colleague's treatment of him could add to his complex. I
felt some reponsibility towards him when they used to make fun of h?.m and
to laugh at his clothes. Today, contrary to what was his custom, he makes
~ himself c:le~ant; hc lets his hair grow; and he wears large ~;lasses.
Therc~ is no doubt that tie has his own barber.
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~
[(ju~stion] Whal� leads you to believe that his devoutness was not sincere?
[Answer] He kiiled scores of officers, civilians and intellectuals. He
set the cr~mmittees and the regions up against each ot:~er and his under-
standing of Islam is very superfii:ial. At any rate he is nut prepared fot'
any dialogue. He practices vanity as a~ denomination, haughtiness as a
religion, and this has nothing to do with Islam.
- They Usurped Power
[Question] However, al-Qadhdh~fi did succeFd. How do you explain the
- reasons for his success?
- ~Answer] After the 1967 war the Arab homeland was in turmoil. The
- changes were raoid, and everything indicated that, because of his age,
the end for King Idris, was approaching. The king was pawerless and the
- crown prince was weak. A graup of nationalist officers was prepared to
take action to help hand over the power legally to a democratic authority
through the two houses of parliament. The coup occurred during tt~at
_ period. Ever since the first weeks of its occurrence it was confirmed
that a number of junior officers had usurped power with the hElp of a
superpower with interests in Libya and that foreign intelligence had made
their mission easier. Civilians ar?d officers who were arresteci later pro-
vide pr.oof of this. There is an outside power which found that
al-Qadhdhafi wouJ.d defer to its interests. Thus, it placQd power in his
hands before the good nationalist farces were able to ensure a legal
transfer of power [to them]. This is the power that is still protec[ing
al-Qadhdhafi's regime today, [allowing it] to commit offense~ right and
left; to strike in the east and in the west; and to enter Chad and
threaten that it would enter other countries.
[Question] How do you explain the popular support for the movement?
[Answer] The Libyan people are few in number. Before the coup they used
to live in a state of expectation. They felt that state agencies were
~orrupt and that an uprising of some sort w~ould not be delayed. The
people were prepared to support any action, ancl so they supported the
- action of the junior officers, thinking that the change they were calling
for was the change that was hoped for. The Libyan people have no expe-
- rience in military coups and in the army's interference in politics. It
was this that enabled a very limited number of military sectors to take !
action in Tripoli and Benghazi without any problems to speak of. The ele-
ments that used to protect the former regime knew that change was coming.
Foreign intelligence agencies interfered at the proper time to enable
al-Qadhdhafi and his group to gain control of the situation.
- [Question] You have had a diplomatic responsibility ever since the revo-
lution. How do you describe ynur relationship to al-Qadhdhafi throughout
the last 10 years?
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[Answer] I have been careful of nat having a personal relationship wfth
al-Qadhdhafi ever since the coup that was called a revolution occurred.
A few days after the coup while I was still under house arrest,
- al-Qadhdhafi sent me one of the members of the Revolutianary Cauncil who
is my relative, to ask me whether or not I wantea to leave the military.
I[old him, "I don't want anything. I leave the whole matter up to you."
My intention wds not to be tied at all by any obligation to the new
~ regime. What happened was that they classified the officers into groups,
and the y turned those who had intelle~tual or political affiliations over
_ to the diplomatic corps. In their opinion this was a kind of banishmenr
or exile. Later, one of the members of the Revolutionary Command Cauncil
told me that al-Qadhdhafi wanted me to st~?y outside the country.
[Question] In the end, howev~r, you were cooperating. Did you not stay
in the diploma[ic corps for years?
[Answer] The chaos that al-Qadhdhafi created in the official institu-
tions enabled me [to pursue my convictions], just a5 it allowed many
_ others to puruse their intellectual convictions wherever they were. In
� numerous situations I used to declare that I did not represent
al-Qadhdhafi, but rather my country. [I used to say] that al-Qadhdhafi
was a temporary disturbance in the history of Libya; that he did not rep-
_ resent i.ts true role, its ambitions or its hopes; and that the appearance
- that he wante~ for Libya was an evil one.
Muhammad Is My Example
_ [Question] Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir was an example for the Free Officers.
- Was he an example for you, and wer~ you one of his admirers before the
revolution?
~ [Answer] My example is the Prophet~ may God 'oless him and grant him sal-
vation. He is example enou~h for me.
[Question] We come to Col al-Qadhdhafi's regime. What faults do ~~ou find
in it? (And here I looked at the three men.) ~
(They all took par[ in tye response and made the following observations.)
= [Answer (1)] Col al-Qadhdhafi's regime is a one-man, tribal regime tha[
is closed upon itself and upon a group of al-Qadhdhafis in addition to a
few profiteers. It is not a popular regime at all.
- [Answer (2)] A1-Qadhdhaii claims that his Green Book solves t.he problems
oE r.1ie world. Then he claims that power and wealth are in the hands of
the people. As intellec~ual, political substance, t11e pamphlet is worth
. nothing. Furthermore, power was not handed over to the people or to the
_ revolutionary committees. These committees are a cover cor autocracy,
a cover that does not do its job in the absence of strong institutions.
Those who are governing Libya today are the few ~rafiteers. Chief among
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them is Ahmad Qadhdhaf al-Dammy Col al-Qadhdhafi's cousin. He is respor-
sible for the assassinations and terrorist operations committees. Among
his recent actic~s is one whEn he was in Paris: he asked one of the
- officials of tht al-Jamahiriyah News Agency for a sum of money. The
official declined tc give him the money pending sending a telex to
Tripoli to ask for permission. Fouz days later an airplane with four or
five Libyans arrived in the French capital. In the name of the revolu-
tionary committees, the Libyans went Co the offices of the news agency ,
= and replaced that off.icial who was returned with his children to Libya.
The revolutionary committees are a tool for carrying out the wishes of
al-Qadhdhafi and his men.
[Answer (3)] A1-Qadhdhafi's regime has destroyed the Libyan economy com-
pletely. It has amassed weapons tha~t Libya does n~t need and that the
Libyan army cannot take in. Under a democratic regime, Libya could have
been the Switzerland of the Arab Maghreb or rather of the entire east.
Until now there are still areas in Libya that do not have fresh water, -
and there are still Libyans who live in tin homes. The national wealth
is squande:ed to satisfy the whims and desires of Col al-Qadhdhafi and _
the group around him. The projects which they are talking about were not
set up on scientific bases, and popular management means the absence of
- technical abilities or specializations from these organizations. The
directors are people who sing the praises of the regirne and glorify it. ~
They are 1~enchmen, not people with q~.talifications. Libya does not have
a private sector any more. Even grocery stores have been shut down.
- Selling and buying take place in the public markets according to stan- .
dards of favoritism and influence. The people who clap their hands for =
the regime have priority, but [the rest of] the people do not find basic _
= goods when their turn comes. _
[Answer] (4)] A1-Qadhdhafi. has imposed mandatory military service on _
all young men born in 1942 and after. These people ~re the real produc- _
_ [ive force [of the country]. Their conscription means paralyzing busir~ess
facilities whose productivity has declined to 1Q, 20 or 25 percent. _
- A1-Qadhdhafi is preparing a huge army, and he believes that "he can con-
quer the world."
[Answer] (S)] The judiciary in Libya has been suspended since
al-Qadhdhafi has completely abolished the legal profession. Tti~s has
never happened in ancient or modern history. The revolutionary courts
do not rely on any texts, and [hey issue free, groundless sentences. A
short timE ago a student in the Girls' College tried a senior officer, _
and the trial was shown on television. She was heard telling the officer _
in the indictment, "A bullet would be wasted on you!" .
[Question~l Who puts a murderer on trial in Libya? .
[Answer] The regime is killing everybody, and the killers are ''innocent"
people who are not pursued by anyone. Today, Libya is experiencing a case
of genocide and the Eirst mass immigration in its modern histury. Fifty
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tt-~ousand Libyans who are the best intellectuals, businessmen and students
left their country after al-Qadhdhafi's address at Zawarah in 1973 and
aftr_r the economic chapter of al-Qadhdhafi's booklet was published and
put into practice (1976-1977). Immigration then increased since February
1980 during the open season on political assassinations and public
purges. The regime is killing scores of people abroad, and it is killing
them by the Iiundreds inside the country. The victims are officers and
intelLectuals who "are being wasted" by the committees. The authorities
may send an assassination team for a specific mission, then tltey would -
~ send another team to kill [the first], and that group too would not come _
back to Libya.
~
~
[Question] ~1hat about the regime's foreign policy? -
[Answer] For.eign policy is tantamount to a set of "diplomatic" pouches
_ filled with doilars for mercenaries who work in al-Qadhdhafi's service.
The money is spent on the Arab and world media. These pouches represent
al-Qadhdhafi's real power in the world. It is evident that Libya's tempo-
rary relations with Syria and South Yemen are due to the difficult econo-
mic situation, the isolatior. and the need which the two countries are
experiencing, as well as to the isolation which al-Qadhdhafi himself is
- nat~~rally experiencing. _
[Question) But the Libyan regime is helping Islamic revolutions, is it
not?
[Answer] It uses Islam. Today, the good people of Libya are convinced
_ that al-Qadhdhafi is an apostate. He desecrates people's graves; he
exhumes the bodies; and he ti~rows the bodies into the sea. }ie takes the `
prayer leaders from the mosques to kill them, just as he did with
al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Bishti and al-Shaykh Lutfi Qaya, who is the brother -
of one of the officers. This officer did not dare accept condolences for
the death of his brother. The other proof that al-Qadhdhafi is not a
Pluslim lies in the fact that he did not attend the Islamic Summi.t Con-
ference in al-Ta'if. Islamic revolutions are a card a:-Qadhdhafi plays
- and then drops under the influence of Soviet strate~y. This is what -
- happened in Eritrea, for example; and this is what is happening today on
the borders of Niger, Sudan and Mali. He establishes a Polisario every-
where in addi.tion to the well-known Palisario.
~
The Tobruq Incident
[Question] }{ow can al-Qadhdhafi's strategy be described in general?
[Answer] He sells oil, and he buys weapons, experts and clients with
the money he gets for the oil. The Soviets have taken considerable advan-
_ tage of his propensity for destruc[ion [by usinp, him] against the neigh-
bors of Arabs and Muslims and sometimes against the Palestinian question.
In the final analysis, al-Qadhdhafi is helping Israel in his cwn way, and
_ he is trying Co have the Islamic minorities work for him, taking advan-
tage of their difficult financial conditions. When he attacked the
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Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the last feast of Bairam, he sent telegrams to
all the Islamic societies and organizations which he funds and asked them
to support his position publicly.
[Question] ~dhat is his future in Africa?
[An~wer] He has no future in Africa or in Libya itself. His end will
- come soon, God willing. We are not ignoring the international conditions
that helped him take action in Chad and in some other places, but we are
hoping that the concerned outside forces will realize that their support -
for hi:n means that th~y are helping him destroy the world. The popular
turmoil that Libya is experiencing inside the country will take care of
the rest.
[(~uestion] Was the Tobruq incident a plan for a coup?
[Answer] This was not the first incident, and ir may not be the last.
_ There was a similar attempt in the al-Kafrah camp. At Benghazi Airport
several bombs exploded mysteriously. In Sabha there was an attempt to
blow up a podium for. public everits. All this is nothing but the beginning.
[Question] What is the actual size of the opposition?
[Answer] Between 90 and 95 percent of the Libyans reject al-Qadhdl~afi's
conduct. These people are the si.lent majori[y. Those who can act and who
can take the initiative were able to leave the country, and tt~ey are
waiting to organize themselves into capable movements. Some of them have
declared their names and are issuing periodical publications. The good
national elements are increasing. Along with the leaders of these move-
ments, they are trying to establish a unified political entity for the
Libyan opposition. We are grateful for Dr al-Maqrif's July initiative
because it gave the opposition a strong, new impetus. It came immediately -
after the assassinations and political purges campaign inside the
country. It was al-Maqrif who was the target of the recent assassination
attempt at Rome's airport. His name was on the list of names of those who _
were sentenced for execution 2 days after the incident.
Libyans inside the country and abroad are determined to overthrow
al-Qadhdhafi's regime by the various means [hat are available, no matter
how much it costs them in loss of lives and in sacrifices. A regime whose
~ survival depends on mercenaries and foreign intelligence will not be des-
tined to live.
[Question] Who guarantees you protection? -
[Answer] The communities that can be found in the Arab countries and
which reject al-Qadhdhafi's regime do not in practice have any security
problem. But in the European countries there is courageous cooperation
between students and some members of the popular committees in the embas-
sies for the purpose of keeping track of the activities of the. assassina-
tion teams and limiting their ability to strike.
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It Seems Strong
[Question] Aut al-Qadhdhafi's rngi;ne ~ecros strong, and most people do
not dare oppose it, [is not that rigi~tl?
[Answer] It seems so, but it is not strong. A1-Qadhdhafi controls
people's livelihoods after he suspenued their sources of earning in the
private sector. [He c~ntrols) government agencies, monthly salaries and
barracks. It is 5U to 60 percent of those vivil servants who come to
Green Square to clap for his speeches e~rery year. At festivals a group
of soldiers i.n civilian clothing are given chants which they repeat in
return for rewards. This is a Nazi system in the field of psyc.hological
= action.
We realize that the overthrow of al-Qadhdhafi will not come about from
abroad unless such an effort has close contacts inside the country. I was
- in Libya a short time ago, and i found out for myself the tremendous dis-
gruntlement among the people. This is what is encouraging us to continue
in our action.
[Question] What about the Arab re~imes?
[Answer] The Arab officials we have contacted welcomed us. All the Arabs
are welcoming us.
[Question] t,till you resort to violence?
[Answer] We will utilize all legitimate means to overthrow the regime.
Lebanese Pied in Libya
[Question] Did Lebanese [citizens] die in Libya?
[Answer] Lebanese citizens did die in Libya. (This was a reference to
Imam rfusa al-Sadr and his two companions.) But I do know that there were
volunteers who took part i.n the fighting with a Palestinian team in 1972.
- Among them were those who were charged to assas~;inate Mr Hedi Nouira in
Tunisia. They may have gone to Lebanon to receive training in special
operations and not to Eight against Israel.
[Question] F{ow do you explain al-Qadhdhafi's position on the invasion
of Afghanistan?
_ [Answer] The Libyan regime is not Libyan. It carrit~s out the wishes of
Moscow, no more and no less.
[Question] Is the regime cooperating with the Americans?
- [Answer] There are U.S. experts who were working as mercenaries in the
Vietnam war. A1-Qadhdhafi has engaged them in his service at high
salaries.
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. [Question] Wha[ about the point of weakness in al-Qadhdhafi's sECUrity
system, where is it?
[Anscaer] The regime is based on one man. If we were to get rid of him,
the regime would come to an end.
Who Is Helping You Financially?
It was almost 6 pm. About 2 hours had gone by since we had begun the
interview when my conversation partner excused himself to perform the
afternaon prayer. When he returned, he showed me a collection of state-
ments that were issued by Libyan intellectuals. So I asked, "Who is
helping you financially?"
[Answer] We rely on Libya's own capabilities. So far, these are enough
even though the Arab brothers are prepared [to give us] every assistance
- whenever that is necessary.
[Question] In addition to coordinating the opposition, what are the ques-
tions that you ar~e interested in?
[Answer] Everything that happens in the Arab and Islamic worlds is of
- interest to us. However, at this stage Libyan questions have absolute
- priority. The Libyan people have had a role in the question of Palestine
since 1948. No one can deny the Libyan people that role. We ace hoping
that the Islamic delegation will be successful in stopping the fighting
between Iraq and Iran, and we are surprised at what some of the media
are saying regarding cooperation between Iran and al-Qadhdhafi's regime.
There is no doubt that the Islamic countries are a major asset to the
- Arab nation. They help the Arab nation in every pan-Arab victory. When
l,ibya goes back to its natural role, it wi21 perform its duty fully in
_ serving all Arab and Islamic questions.
[Question] what are you asking for now?
We are asking the Eur.opean countries an~ the United States to work for
the protection of Libyan citizens in their territories. We are asking
them to stop their cooperarion with a regime that does not respect human
_ rights. At the same time we are warning those who have enlisted in the
battle of purges that the day will come when they will find themselves
- without al-Qadhdhafi's protection. The I.ibyan people will then punish
those hired criminals. The population of Libya is small, and people in .
Libya know each other. Those people must not assure themselves of
al-Qadh dhafi's protection.
To be a declared political assassin c~penly is a blatant violation of all
the principles of contemporary civilization and alI the teachings of the
divine religions. What is curious is that more than a few European
regimes have knuckled under such killings for the sake of circumstantial
interests. Our mission is to work for the stability of the Arab world so
that Israel would not remain "the flourishing garden" in the tliddle East.
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Diplomatic Resignations Signal Awakening
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 Mar 81 pp 18-19
[Text] 'Abd-al-Salam 'Ali 'Aylah Says Diplomatic
_ Resignations Are Si.gn of National Awakening.
Revolutionary committees open secret accounts in
European banks.
The resignation of Libyan diplomats and their [subsequent] association
with the opposition movement is a growing pher?omenon. It may be an expres-
= sion of the awakening of Libya's intelligentsia. Mr 'Abd-al-Salam 'Ali
'Aylah, Libya's charge d'affaires in India was the la st diplomat to
submit his resignation. We met him by accident in one of the hotels in
~ Athens, and we had this interview [with him].
[Question] What are the foundations of the Libyan opposition, and why
. did it come into existence?
[Answer] Col al-Qadhdhafi did not come to power by accident. He came
to power in acordance with a well-considered plan. The forces that
plotted the coup chose him as a young officer who speaks about Arabism
and unity to abort a national movement at the height of its activity in
opposition to the royal age. That national movement ha d honorable posi-
tions. The role that the Libyan regi~~~e is practicing today is nothing but
an affirmation of this.
If other proof has to be provided, that proof lies in the fact that
al-Qadhdhafi has not yet touched U.S. interests. After 11 years of the
_ revolution, 49 percent of Libya's oil is still being exported to the
icnited States. It was the United ~tates that gave al-Qadhdhafi the
winning card of "liquidating foreign bases" when II.S. strategic experts
decided that the United States did not need these bases at the time of
naval fleets, intercontinental missiles and rapid deployment forces.
The People Are Capable
[Question] How do you see the future of the Libyan regime?
[Answer~ The regime of the Libyan president has been able to divest
_ unity, freedom and socialism of their meaning so as to traffic in them.
_ The regime is pursuing those who are fighting, and it is fab ricating
- civil strife and disturbances to tear up the Arab rank. The best example
of this [can be foundl in the events of Gafsa and the Egyptian-Sudanese
borders. The Green Eook is full of fall.acies. It contains theories that
the age has gone beyond. In this case the crisis of the regime is the
crisis of the Arab regimes th~t are cooperating with it. These Arab
regimes are well-known:
The Libyan people who were able to overthrow the bygon e royal regime and
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to overthrow Italian Fascism before it are capable of settlin~ their _
battle with the new dictatorship. The Libyan National Movement includes
- educated, revolutienary and progressive national~~* cadres. It can res-
- tore to Libya its radiant Arab ap~earance.
~ [Question] liow does the Libyan opposition view the plan for unity -
between Libya and Syria?
- [Answer] The Libyan president is manipulatin~ the most sacred slogan,
which is the slogan of unity. The purpose of this manipulation is to
divest unity of its true content. A1-Qadhdhafi tried to establish unity
with Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Malta and Syria at a tirne when the Syrian
- regime is bein~ subjected to painful blows from the Syrian National Move-
ment. The outcome of that is well-known.
- The Libyan regime is bankrupt of people, nationalism and pan-~.rabism and _
so is the Syrian regime. It is a plan for unity between two bankrupt _
[states]. There is no doubt that the Syrian and the Libyan peoples will
settle the battle with these two regimes. -
~ [Question] jdhy is al-Qadhdhafi interfering in AErica?
[Anst~er] The Arab nation was able to gain much support in Africa, and -
many African countries cut their relations with Israel. However, the
Libyan regime's blatant military intervention in the Black Continent will
_ bring back the African nations to a position that we do not wish [for -
them]. The Libyan regime's interference serves international interests
that want to see the Libyan army depleted, and what is happening in Chad
confirms this.
Internal Struggles
[Question] L~'hat is the story about the revolutionary committees' take- _
over of the embassies?
[Answer] Ever since the Libyan regime wanted to keep the people pre-
occupied with internal struggles. At first it utilized the popular co?n-
mittees. Then it brought other committees: the revolutionary committees
which took over the embassies abroad. These and the other committees have
= no relationship whatsoever with the people and with the real revolution.
Those who took over the Libyan embassy in New Delhi committed fatal mis-
takes of which I mention [the following]:
- First, they opened personal bank accounts in Germany with large amounts
of money in Deutschmark. _
~ Second, they gave themselves salaries that cone to 8,000 Deutschmark per
month; that is more than an ambassador's salary.
Third, they bought the most modern and the most luxurious automobiles
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- for tliemselves, and they dispensed with the automobiles that used to
belong to the embassy. Tkiey used the embassy's budget to pay for their
new automobiles, and they attached to all of this the purchase of certain
~lectrical and electronic luxury items for their hours of leisure.
These are the revolutionary committees that claim to represent the Libyan
people. In the name of the people they are stealing the people's money.
[Question] How do you see the unification of the Libyan opposition rank?
[Answer) Today, the opFosition is very strong. Its circles and bases
havP expanded considerably inside the country and abr.oad. It is making
- preparations for unifying its groups into an aligned front. The overthrow
.of al-Qadhdhafi's reg,ime would be the first stage. That would be followe~j
by a second stage which is that of building a modern state that would
achieve the aspirations of the Arab citizen for united pan-Arabism and
socialism and would impel the~Libyan state to play its role in the Arab
_ revolution any movement. Today, the Libyan people are isolateci from their
nation.
[Question] But is the series of purges continuin~?
[Answer] This does not scare us. Ide are fully aware of the fact that we
must sacrifice and offer our lives. Let everybody know that our reach is
_ long and that we are capable of "dishin~ out" twice as much as what was
- "dishPd out" to us. I do not wish to reveal our military hand inside the
army, but we d~ }~ave great hopes in the civilian and military national
- elements.
[Question] F'hat is your opinion of al-Qadhdhafi's relationship with the
Palestinian Revolution?
[An.swer] He tried to use his funds to retrench this revolution and to
_ impose his guardianship over it. Everyone knows that he sent t~is men to
occupy the offices of the liberation organization in Tripoli and to expel
the officials who were there.
[Question] Did you submit your resignation for all these reasons?
[Answer] I was charge d'affaires in.Delhi, and I had to talce a positi.on
_ on these deviant practices. I was convinced that continued cooperation
- with this re~ime caould be high treason and that it was the duty of every
honest Libyan to assume a clear position on this. I was convinced that
pursuing the course of opposition was the right course and that it would
- achieve the aspirations of the Libyan people.
I am also convinced that there is increasing vigilance in the Libyan dip-
lomatic corps. The resignations will come one after the other. l~ur people
- support this uprising. I[ is a phPnomenon of health and patriotism.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 AL,--WAT~N AL-AR4BI
8592 E*1D
_ CSO: 4802 2(
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