JPRS ID: 9694 JAPAN REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 57
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFF7C[AL USE ONLY ~
JPRS L/9694 '
28 April 1981 ~
;
_ ~
_ ;
~
. ;
_ ;
- Ja an Re ort
_ p p
~
CFOUO 27/81) ~
I
;
_ ;
r
i
~
,
~
- i
- FBiS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE _
' FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
NOTE
JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign
newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency
transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language -
sourcES are translated; those from English-language sources
_ are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
other charaGteristics retained.
Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in br.ackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the _
_ last line of a brief, indicalte ho4; the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phoneti~ally or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion ~cark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in context.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with the source. Times within items are as
given by source. `
The contents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or at.titudes of the U. S e Government .
- COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICLAL USE ONI.Y. _
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FaR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
JPRS L/9694
~ 28 Apri1 1981
; JAPAN REPORT
' (FOUO 27/81)
CONTEf~TS
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
Liberal Democratic Party Factional Strife Discussed
(NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 19 Mar 81) 1
Soviet Threat: Hol:.kaido Citizens' View Reported ~
(YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 30 Jan 81) 3
I Unique Characteristics of '81 Defense Budget Analyzed
(Yu Takaoka; SEKAI, Mar 81) 7
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Epochmaking Super LSI
(NIKKAN K~GYO SHIMBiJN, 17 Mar 81) 18
Status of Super Large Scale Integrated Circuitry Discussed
- NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBt7N, 1, 8, 23 Jan 81) 20
~ 64 K RAM
Super High Speed Elements
Construction of Clean Room
Aircraft Industry Aims at Major Expansion
- (~'arious sources, various dates) 28
~ MITI's Policy
Future of Ind+ustry -
Japan-Sweden MTX Cooperation
Development of~STOL
- a - [III - ASIA - 111 FOUO]
~OR OF'FIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Nuclear P~wer Genera~ion Technology Stressed
. (Various sources, various dates) 36
Fusion Test Reactor Proj~ct
Mon~y for Light Water Reactor
Budget for New Plant Sites
Constructi:~g Underground Plants
~ Plutonium Reprocessing Methods Examined
Tokai Plutonium Reprocessing Facility Capacity
Metai-Cuttxng ~echniques for Decommissioning Reactors
Radioactive Waste Disposal Technology
_ Plans for Off-Shore Nuclear Energy Plant Studied
_ (NIKKAN ROGYO SHIMBUN, 7 Feb 81) 50
Smaller Light Wate�~- Reactor Under Development
(NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN, 23 Feb 81) 52
Policy To Speed Up Plant Site Procurement
(NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN, 18 Feb 81) 54
_ ~
- b -
- ~nn n~~T~+TAT. TTSR OjQj,Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOYt OFFICIAL I1SE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY FACTIONAL STRIFE DISCUSSED
~ Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 19 Mar 81 p 2
-I
; . [Excerpt] "You Would Be Disinherited About This Time"
~ On the night of the 12th [March], the birthday of the deceased Prime t4inister
_ Ohira, "memorial gathering" was held in Tokyo by his relatives and friends.
I MITI Minister Tanaka, in a tribute, spokG in an unusually sob~r tone, "I ~yself
have committed various errors. If he were alive, he would probably reprimand
me, asking 'What on earth are you doing?"'
Whereupon Foreign Minister Ito remarked, "A bad thing never dies."
This was followed by a retart by Yoshitake Sasaki, "If he were alive, you would
be disinherited about this time."
_ One member of the gathering saw these remarks as actual heckling cloaked in seem-
I ing jest. One person reportedly stated, "I am a member of the Kochikai (Broad
i Lake Society) group, but I have never belonged to the Ohira faction." Chief cab-
inet secretary Miyazawa, who once enfuriated Ohira admirers within the Kochikai,
was not present at the evening gathering.
"The close associates of the deceased prime rriinister, who purport to represent
- the politics of harmony, are showing absolut:e lack of harmony," The incepti.on last
fall of the policy group Shin-Setai Kenkyv.'.cai (New Generation Study Group) by '
i MITI Minister Tanaka provided the spark for the internal affairs of the Suzuki -
- i faction (Kochikai) in becoming the subject of gossip among polit~cal circles. The -
~ group attracted many of the younger Diet members of the Kochikai, who were elected
during the past three elections. Like a true "policy gsoup," it began to function
actively by inviting a top economist on 27 January to conduct a lively debate. =
Those close to the MITI minister explain the reason for the inception of the
group by saying, "Because the younger members of the Kochikai increased so suddenly
_ the officers were no longer able to look after them with care." "Therefore, the
MITI minister decided to take them under his wing after consulting with the prime "
minister." "We did not lure them, but they joined in unexpected numbers." _
Auto Issue Is a Good Example
"Rokusan (Rokusuke Tanaka), isn't it rather premature?" (Chief cabinet secretary
_ Miyazawa) Not only the Kochikai, but also the political circles saw it as Tanaka's
1 _
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
� FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
"declaration of intent to participate in the successor race" for the post-Suzuki
leadership. "Rokusan's true intention is probably: 'Miyazawa is not th~~ only ,
of the Kochikai. I am also qualif ied. If he could lead the Heigak~i
gYOUp, what is wrong in my heading another study group?"' Such was the g~~neral
outlook within the Liberal Democratic Party.
Subsequently, Tanaka heeded the advice of former Welfare Minister Saito and other
factional cadres, and promised that "the etudy group would limiti itself to policy
research and refrain from holding general meetings." It avoided all meetings dur- -
ing February and March. As a result, "there is no longer any issue concerning the
operation of the Kochikai." (A Suzuki faction cadre) The Suzuki faction cadres
also take the calm view that "if Rokusuke Tanaka really has power, the faction would
probably move forward under his leadership. On the other hand, if it is merely -
a lone ploy on his part, time will solve the problem," and they appear to be '
tightening control over the younger members. _
Although the actual situation has simmered down, the drama of internal dissension
continues to be a topic of conversation in political circles on various occasions.
In mid-February, the controversy between the ministries of foreign aff airs and
MITI over Japan's mandate for negotiations concerning the Japan-U.S. auto issue
_ was widely rumored as a typical case of the "rivalry between Kiichi M~yazawa,
Rokusuke Tanaka and Masayoshi Ito." Heeding the advice of his advisers who said,
"We regret having to bother the prime minister with such a problem, but we cannot
afford to have this continuing exposure of our internal problems," Prime Minister
Suzuki took it upon himself to coordinate the delegation for the Japan-U.S. negotia-
~ tions.
Lack of Tension Indicates Absence of a Successor
Takeshi Sakurada (honorary chairman of Nikkeiren [Japan Federation of Employers
Associations] and the opinion leader of the Kochikai since the reign of the Ikeda
- faction) could not stand the internal party turmoil any longer. He called the
three factional leaders together and demanded, "What do you mean by bringing such
a predicament to the Kochikai, which has produced three prime ministers and a speak-
er of the Diet?" Nonethel~ss, the three appeared to be unaffected, according to
one member's obser~ation. They appeared to be more concerned about the "culprit
who leaked the details of the meeting with Sakurada to outsiders."
Behind the scenes of the "scandal within the Shogunate," rumors concerning the
various factions are rife, such as "the elders of the Fukuda faction proposed to
- [former prime minister] Fukuda that Tatchan [minister of education Tanaka] might
be able to consolidate the factions," or that "the question of the successor to
the Tanaka faction has become uncertain since the sudden appearance of Ganri
Yamashita." Of course, the fact that the various successor questions are casually
mentioned without any air of tension might indicate that "the appearance of a
= new leader is still premature."
- COPYRIGHT: Ninon Keizai Shimbunsha 1981
= 5884
CSO: 4105
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL
SOVIET THKEAT: HOKKAIDO CITIZENS' VIEW REPORTED
Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese 30 Jan 81 p 3
' [TextJ Amidst the rumor of a"northern threat," the construction of Japanese-
' Sovie~ friendship centers anci the establishment of sister-city relationships
~ are now actively under way in Hokk.aido. Following Sapgoro and Kushiro where
' such [friendship centers) are already geared to action, Wakkanai City com-
~ pleted one last July and other cities are also planning to bu31d similar
centers. In addition, six cities have established a sister-city or friendship-
~ city relationship [with Soviet cities]. Al.though the people involved with
=I these centers simply explain it away by sayir~g "Hokkaido and the Soviet U~ion
are neighbors; its purpose is simply to promote friendship." But it cannot
be denied that there is a real motive "to induce favorable economic trade
including fishery," when one considers the ensuing troubles over tlne
200 nautical miles. Seen from a different angle, however, Hokkaido is "a
starting point" of the campaign for the return of [Japan's] Northern Territories.
The orgar~izations concerned with the Northern Territories issue and
~ participate in the campaign are there�ore voic3ng a warning: "on the pre-
~ text of friendship it is trying to subvert the campaign. There is a danger
of using it as a base for an anti-Japan campaign." The situation is thus
comple:x. With the approaching of the first "Northern Territories Day"
(7 February), heated arguments are taking place in Hokkaido revolving
around the issue of Japane~se-Soviet friendship centers.
, Sister-City Relationships Flourishing
, The first case which became the harbinger of the construction o` Japanese-
~ Soviet friendship centers in Hokkaido can be found in 1972 at Saruharai
i Village, Soya County in the vicinity of Wakkanai City. It began with
the construction of a memorial tower for the crew of the Soviet freighter,
' "Indigirka," which became aground and sank in the Sea of Japan off the
- coast of the village. After completing the construc~ion of its center,
there was no center activity in the village for a while; then in 1977
"Eastern Hokkaido Japanese-Soviet Friendship Trade Center" and "Japanese-
Soviet Friendship Cultural Center" were built in Kushiro City and Sapporo
City respectivel;�. Also opened last July was "Wakkanai Japanese-Soviet
- Friendship Center" in a corner of the Tenboku Pier of Wakkanai City. In
addition, construction plans are on the way in cities like Hakodate and
Otaru. As for the establishment of sister-citq or friendship-city
relationship, it exists between Otaru and Nakhodka, Asahigawa and Yuzhno-
Sakhalinsk, Rumei and Ulan-Ude, Wakkanai and Nevelsk, Kushiro and Kholmsk,
and ~thers.
r 3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
" FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Though generally referred to as Japanese-Soviet friendship centers, their
histaries of establis~unent and managements are different from each other.
[Let us] look into the case of "Hokkaido Japanese-Soviet Friendship Cultural
Cent er" (Director, Yasusaburo Shibano) in Sapporo. Managing Director
Mor io Mizuno said "our organization comes under a financial foundation which
is approved by the minister of foreign affairs. Its advisors are the people
like the governor of Hokkaido and the mayor of Sapporo, and its Board of
Directors is made of non-partisan members with broad backgrounds; all of the
off icials are working without any political party coloration." He seemed
dissayed by being looked at through "tinted glasses."
The total cost of the construction o� the center [in Sapporo] required
500 mi~lion yen. After applying for a permit to raise funds and approved
by the Financ~ Ministry the construction cost was met by raised funds, per
share valued at 10,000 yen. Since the center i;s a"government approved
_ facil ity," all of its businesses and programs are carried out with the
approval of the goverYnnent; and most o~ its programs are limited to those
~ which will become basis for the promotion of understanding and friendship
between Japan and the Soviet Union, and the program includes activities
such as cultural seminars, Russian language instruction, Russian cooking
clas ses, movies and record concerts. [The number of center memberships]
reached 5,000 wiChin 4 months during the first year; it thQn increased to
16,800 by 1978; it nearly doubled to 31,200 in 1979; and it jumped to 136,000
~ last year. Managing Director Mizuno said "there are many people joining
th ese activities, an~ my personal opiizion as the center's managing director
is that I detect no feeling of "dislike toward the Soviet Union" among the
members .
Even Gif ts Are Being Sent to the Soviet Unioxi
Compared to Sapporo where people promote friendship only, Wakkanai seems to
be tainted with rather fishy stories. For it was revealed that, of several
landings made on Sakhalin by the deputp mayor of the city, the secre~ary
gener3l and the deputy secretary general of the Fishing Cooperative and
oth ers between 1978 and September of last year under the cover of "conference
at the sea," among them three were made without going through necessaYy ~
pro cedures at the Immigration Office. Specifically at the time of landing on
' 25 September of last year, [they] took six tape-recorder ;~ets with them without
processing through the custom office, and gave them away to the Soviet side
as gifts. It is said that the tape-recorders were specially ordered to be
- pres ented to the Soviet Union as a commemoration gift for the completion of
the friendship center; but, because the inspector of the Sakhalin Fishing
Co ntrol Bureau who had been invited to the occasion for the presentation did
not show up, they were simply given as gifts. The mayor of Wakkanai City,
Tatsuo Hamaori, comuiented witfi candor: "The incident was revealed at an
inopportune t3me, thereby creating ml.sunderstandings. Because the livelihood
of this place depends on the fish caugfi t within 200 nautical miles of the
Soviet waters, Japanese-Soviet friendship is absolutely essential. If some-
one tells me to lead the way for the campaign [for the return of Northern
Territorie.~], he is asking too much."
~
FnR nFFTCT.AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Fish Catc}i Decreasing Year After Year
In the sea aro~d Hokkaido, tragic Soviet seizure [of Japanese boats] is
taking place even now. Thus far, 1,616 vessels and 13,256 men hav e been
, captured. Of these people, 37 died either from drowning after their ship's
collision with the Soviet patrol boat or during the detention after their
- capture; and 13 are still bei:ig detained. Since the 200 nautical mile limit
was established between Japan and the Soviet Union in March 1977, th e fines
- paid to the Soviet side for troubles stemming from the operation to taled
1.72024 billiori yen for 306 violatione cited. Moreover, the total catch
allowed within the 200 nautical. miles of the SoviQt sea was reduced from
850,000 ton~ in 1978 to 750,000 tons since 1979. As for the total catch of
, salmon and bass in the open sea, it used to be 115,000 tons in 2965; and this
; too plunged, after yearly decreases, to 42,500 tons since 1978 due to the
' pressure by the Soviet side. To maintain friex~dship with the Soviet Union
' is, thus, a way of survival for the coastal fishermen. And it is natural
that those organizations ~:~d people promoting the campaign for the return
; of Northern Territories, including the Association for the Attainment of
~ the Return of Narthern Territories (Narthern Association, for short}, feel
i bitter about Soviet-Japan friendship centers where a friendly mood remains.
~
' Apprehensiv~ About Soviet Pace
~I
'i The managing director of the Northern Association, Ryosuke Matsuzaki, spoke
; emphatically: ''I am told that the construction of [friendship] centers
~ had been initiated ~y the Soviet side. Their target centers are lo cated in
I the coastal cities with the exception of Sapporo. It was undoubted ly aimed
~ at the fishermen who are in need of fish. Would it not be the case that
its Leal intention is to say 'we would not let you catch fish if you
participate in the campaign for the return of Northern TerYitories?' Its
aim is, namely, to erode the campaign."
Managing Director Matsuzaki gave a talk 3n January of last year at the New
i Spring Conference held at the Hokkaido prefectural liuilding. TE1e governor
i of Ilokkaido, Naohiro Dogakiuchi, and 10 organizations participating in the
campaign, including the Northern Territories Association were present, and
! there he said "the number of (friendship] centers in Hokkaido is high in
I density unparalleled in any other prefecture, and there is a danger of them
I becoming the Soviet base for the Hokkaido operation. Although wa cannot
i deny the construction [of friendship centers] we must take some meas ures
for ti1~e better management and control of [each center]. The Ministry of
; Foreign affairs has a similar view, tc~o."
t
~ As if to endorse this speech, Foreign Minister Ito made an emphatic statement
in October of the same year at the Low2r House Special Committee on the
Okinawa and Northern Territories Issue saying "friendship centers are
undesirable if it is going to throw a wrench into the campaign for the return
of the Northern Territories." He thus expressed his displeasure for the
prospect of the centers being used as a Soviet base, and tried to curb it.
Having been charged for "throwing cold water on the campaign," thos e people
involved with the f riendship centers could not keep their mouths shut.
5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- Ikuo Watanabe, the managing director of the Wakkanai Chamber of Coimnerce, who
- once served as the secretary general of the Association for the Constru~:tion
of the Wakkanai Japanese-Soviet Friendship Center, and is still serving as
the managing director of its Executive Council, made a rebuttal, saying "the
statement made by the foreign minister provokes the people and has the
effect of instigating the idea of Northern thxeat. On many occasions it
is necess~ry for us to h ave interchanges with the Soviet Union, such as
emergency entry into each other's territory to avoid sto mry weather or
- to treat injured crews. What is wrong with us being sociable [with the
~ Soviet Union] and treatir:g them like our relatives? We have no intention
whatsoever of trying to ge~ in the way of the Northern Territory campaign."
The Wakkanai Area Branch of the Northern Association, which is in the city
of Wakkanai, has not held its general meeting for the last 4 or 5 years, and
' it has returned its campaign money for 1978 and 1979. An official from
its administrat ive office explained the reason: "[Our] office is located
in the Chamber of Commerce [Building], and the head of the branch is the
- president of th e Chamber of Commerce and ~.oncurrently the secretary general
of the Maritime Fishing Cooperative. If we hold the general meeting, the
SovieC side wil 1 find that out the next day, and ~t may lead, some opined,
to big troubles like our f ishermen getting fined or captured. Besides,
there was some talk about the construction of additional friendship centers..."
In Nemuro City too, there was some talk about the construction of Japanese-
Soviet trade centers this year; but, becasse "the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the government of Hokkaido did not welcome the idea and there were many
other problems involved," construction of the center never materialized.
In 1966, the same city was about to establish a sister-city relationship
with Nevelsk; b ut it did not materialize because the Ministry of Foreign
Aff airs blocked the negotiations by saying "undesirable." At "the Soviet
- Friendship Exh ibition" opened in 1979, the attendance of the diplomatic
_ personnel of the Soviet Consulate General in Sapporo was expected; but they
could not attend because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not issue their
travel permits. Thus enters political consideration in every case.
_ Keiichi Mazaki, the Chief of the main office for Measures To Campaign for the
Return of Territories and the Northern Sea Fishing in the Hokkaido Prefecture,
maintains a cautious attitude, saying: "As for the problem of friendship
- centers, all I hear is rumor on the street and I do not know its real nature.
Therefore, I wi 11 refrain from making any comment. All I wish is that we
can solve t.he problem of territories on the basis of true friendship."
From this statement, we can fathom the complex se:tings tliat Hokkaido is in.
COPYRIGHT: Yomiuri Shimbunsha 1981
9368 ~
CSO: 4105
6
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF '81 DEFENSE BUDGET ANALYZED
' Tokyo SEKAI in Japanese Mar 81 p 250-258
~
[Article by Yu Takaoka, a jourrtalist: "Industry-G wernment--rl~litary Combine Gets
' Underway--Three Problem Areas in the '81 Defense Budget"]
~I
� [Text] Inwardly Happy
~
~ It is still fresh in our memory that one of the news items fxom abroad spread across
i the f ront pages of the various new~papers ~n early spring was: "The United States
~ is dissatisfied with Japan's '81 defense budget." Both the U.S. State and Defense
; departments issued official statements to the effect that "the United States is
~ disappointed with Japan's defense budget."
About the satne time, the official in charge of the weapons department of Mitsubishi
- Heavy Industries Ltd, which is ultrarightist among Japan~s weapons makers, made the
~ following comment: "Since it had been said that the defense outlay in the JFY 81
budget would be noticeably increased, we had big expectations, but we were disappoin ted
with the budget. Only two of the F-1's--a fighter aircraft domestically produced by
~ our company--were approved. I would like to emphasize that the number of aircraft
approved is the yearly production and not the monthly output. From the commonsense
; viewpoint of various European countries, the figure should represent a month's
~ production."
~
! One of the leaders of the Defense Agency analyzed the reaction to the JFY 81 budget
~ as follows: "Actuall ever one is inwardl ha but the are re ressin the
~ Y~ Y Y PPY~ Y P g
; smiles and pu tting on a somber front. They cannot naively appear happy. Because
~ they have been criticized a number of times with regard to the def ense prob lem,
j those associated with it have become wise."
How does the Finance Ministry, which drafted the defense bud~,et, assess it? Finance
Minister Watanabe and his subordinates, including the ranking officials of the
Budget Bureau, were unanimous in stressing the following poin ts:
"Compared with other budgets this was not a particularly outstanding defense budget,
~ but the essential items were adequately covered. With this budget, it appears
possible t~ carry ~ut the early, accelerated attainment of the "Mid-Term Operations
~stimate" requested by the United States and the Defense Agency (Defense Agency's
5-year armament procurement plan starting in 1981). The budget is adequate for
Japan to obtain the full understanding of the United States."
_ 7
FOR OTFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ The defense budget, which was the focal point in the formulation of JFY 81 budget,
is assessed quite differently by concerned authorities, depending on their positions,
but what is the actual truth?
i, '1'here is no doubt that depending on his position, each person's opinion is valid,
~ but the important point is: from the long-range standpoint of the 1980's, how
should one assess next year!s defense budget an.d put it into the proper perspective?
Upon reconsideration with these viewpoints in mind, I think that among the comments,
the one by the Defense Agency leaders is very suggestive: "be inwarcily happy but
put on a somber front." The reasons for the happiness are: first, the defense
, budget was given favorable treatment, and second, the defense budget signified
that confirmation was given, through ttational funding, to the Japanese formation
of an industry-government-military combine. This indicates that in the management
of Japan, from now through the 1980's an extremely important course was decided upon.
On the other hand, a"samber fr.ont was put on" out of political consideration for the
fact that in the spreading conservative mood, criticism of militarization is strong .
and the environment is not conduc~ve for military expansionists to implement their
program hastily.
The defense budget for the coming year contains a number of important facets which
cannot be detected by the rate of increase. To examine this point, the process by
which the def ense budget was formulated should be reviewed. Generally, the process
can be divided into three periods: 1) the period from the May 1980 J apan-U.S.
summit conference to the late July Finance Minister ~datanabe-Defense Agency Director
General Omura conference, when the 9.7-percent increase in defense budget estimated
_ request was decided upon; 2) from the t~me the 9.7-percent increase was officially
acknowledged until the mid-December visit to Japan of Secretary of Def ense Brown;
and 3) from that time to the year end, when the final decision on the defense budget -
was r.~ade (7.61 percent increase over the previous year).
~tao Pillars
It is widely knawn that at the Ohira-Carter Japan-U.S. summit conference last May,
the highest priority was placed on the subject of Japan's defense buildup, and as
a result of the meeting a communique was issuad to the effect that there was mutual
agreement on strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and that Japan would "steadily ~
and noticeab 1y increase" its defense capaBility. Of course, at this stage, no
promise was made as to how much increase there would be in the JFY 81 defense budget
and no figure was mentioned. However, Prime Minister Ohira made it clear at the
- time that he wanted to "show the increase in the coming year's budget." Furthermore, _
the agreement rested on iwo pillars: 1) accelerated attainment of the Mid Term
plan; and 2) sharing the defense burden as "a member of the Western s~de." As far
the early attai:nment of the Mid Term plan, there were a number af preliminary
= coordination meetings prior to the Japan-U.S. summit conference.
As far as the Mid Term plan is concerned, when then Defense Agency DirecCor General
Ganri Yamashita visited the United States and explained the Mid Term plan, which was
_ no more than an internal plan of the Defense Agency, the United States made it the
nucleus of its request to Japan to accelerate tiie military buildup. Through the
8
~-�~TnTAT rrcc f1NT.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
series of Japan-U.S. talks during Defense Secretary Brown's viait to Japan in
,fanuary 1980 and Foreign Minister Okita's visi+c to the United States in March, this
problem of accelerating the completion af the Mid Term plan was discussed. This
was the course followed in arriving at the Japan-U.S. summit conference, and Prime
_ Minister Ohira's statement that "next q~ar's budget will reflect a noticeable and
steady increase in defense buildup" is tantamount to an ~fficial commitment to speed
up the Mid Term plan. Thus, it can be said that at the Japan-U.S. summit meeting
� in May, the groundwork for the defense budget was laid. Since then, the budget
' formulation has been concerned with indicating the early attainment of the Mid Term
plan with figures and supporting it monetarily.
The Defense Agency's budget request estimate was naturall}~ concerned mainly with the
acceleration of the Mid Term plan. On 28 July, at the Wai:anabe-Omura meeting, the
ceiling for the budget request estimate was agreed upon: 1) an increase of 9.7
- percent over the previous year (other general govPrnment expenditures were limited
~ to 7.5 percent);�and 2) in addition, consideration would be given to changes in
the situation. Since the 9:7-percent increase did not include the 2.2-percent
increase for personnel expenses, the total increase would be 11.9 percent, Therefore,
, it was decided that, both internally and externally, the impression would be given
, that the 9.7-percent increase was the maximum limit.
It would not be an overstatement to say that at this point a situation was created
= for the figure of "9.7 percent increase" to race around the world. On 19 September,
in Washington, D. C., Foreign Minister Ito met respectively with Defense Secretary
Brown and Secretary of State Muskie and the American side pressed its demands for
acceleration of the Mid Term plan and the 9.7-percent increase in the JFY 81 budget.
i Former director generals of the Defense Agency, Asao Mihara, Mi.chita Sakata and
' Shin Kanemaru, played a big role in impressing the Americans that the 9.1-percent
~ increase was the minimum limit during their visits to the United States. For 3 days
starting on 24 November they met with Defense Secretary Brown, Deputy Defense Secre-
tary Komer and Richard Allen (present assistant to the President for national
- security affairs in the Reagan administration). Reportedly, Secretary Brown pressed
; for realization of the 9.7�-percent increase while Deputy Secretary Komer questioned
~ "whether Japan can meet its defense reponsibility toward the Soviet threat without
~ raising its defense outlay to 1.3-1.5 percent of the GNP. Although Richard Allen
pointed out the "defense responsibility of Japan as a great economic country," he
did not make any concrete demand in figures. However, the common interest of the
~I!, American side was the implementation of the 9.7-percent increase.
In response, Mihara and others said that "they would make the greatest efforts
- toward realizing it," and it cannot be helped if this ~tatement, made repeatedly
" in various places, was interpretgd as a promisc. It appears that the statement
served to greatly encourage the U.~. side.
Holbrooke's Speech
An organized presentation of U.S. thinking at the time was made on 21 November by
- Ri.chard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs,
at the Japan Society meeting in New York in a speech entitled, "U.S.-Japan Relations
in the 1980's." He said:
9
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
"There is a myth in the United States that Japan does not possess armed forces. The
qiiestion is not whether .Tapan should rearm, since it already has a defense setup worth
noting. Look at the following facts: the Maritime Self-Defense Forces have 45
destroyers and escort 5hips and more than 35 minesweepers, and the Air Self-Defense
- Forces have more than 370 f ighter aircraft. Japan has more naval.ships and aircraft e
than the U.S. 7th Fleet or Sth Air Force, respectively. The r~al problem is to ,
what extent and with what speed Japan wilJ. increase its present defc:nse strength so
as to contribute to its joint defense.
- "During the past 10 years, Japa~?'s defense budget has shown a real increase of nearly _
' 7 percent annually and at present exceeds 10 billion dollars, including approximately _
1 billion dollars for the maintenance, of U.S. forces in Japan. rurthermore, although
- Japan is forbidden to maintain a military attack capability by the Constitution,
which was formulated under American influence, Japan is seventh or eighth in the _
world in the size of its d.efense budget. However, as far as the nation's per capita
burden is concerned, Japan's share (82 dollars) is only about one-seventh of that .
of the United States (550 dollars), and the majority of the American people want
Tapan to strengthen its defense efforts. There is no doubt that during the past 3 ,
years--or even the past 12 months--the nature of the ~efense discussions in Japan
_ has changed greatly. ~
"The Japanese Government at presen~ is considering an~increase of nearly 10 percent
in its defense budget. If the increase in defense outlay, together with economic -
aid, contributes to our joint national security, t~en the criticism of many Americans ~
' that Japan is getCing a'free ride' will soften. We do not think that Japan needs _
- to change its Constitution. ~
i
"To continue a true bilateral partnership betweeci the United States and Japan, we
might not be able to wipe out completely any 'disparity' in our relations, but at
least we must show a significant change. Today Japan occupies an important position
in the world, and it must react accordingly. In national security matters, we are
not asking that Japan's role be redefined, j1e recognize and respect Japan's
constitutional restrictions. However, the challenges are great and financial
- resoucres are gradually becoming scarce. We ourselves are making greater efforts,
but unless the various allied countries take meaningful measures, the Congress and _
the American people probab ly will not approve the shockingly large burden of defense
costs.
"The issue of dividing the defense burden must be considered from a broader
perspective than simply cooperation in the economic, political and national security
matters of the allied countries. Through that means, Japan need not feel that it is
being pressed into assuming an unconfortably high military posture and it would make
it possible for Japan to find its own means to shoulder a'fair share of the burden.'
Also, it would reassure Japan's neighboring countries that it is not adopting
militaristic policies even if the defense budget is increased. -
"It is clear that Japan is gradually, in its unique way, proceeding to increase _
- its defense budget. The Japanese will probably never proceed as rapidly as desired
by a segment of the American nation. As you are aware, the Japanse tend to treat
the defense budget just the opposite of the way we do. We try to make our defense �
budget appear as big as possible to our people, but the Japanese try to make it
look smaller than its actual size. For this reason, there is widespread misunder-
standing among the American people--and even among many concerned officials withi.n
the government--as to how much Japan has already accomplished."
10
~nn ~~FTrTAT. 1TSF. ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Essentially, the United States will keep insisting that Japan accept a fair share
of the defense burden, but since Japan is faced with constitutional restrictions
and is increasing its defense spending in its own way, there is no advantage in making
urgent demands on Japan. This fundamental position of the U.S. Government regarding
requests to Japan is expected to be continued by the Reagan administration. At
the Senate hearings in mid-January, Secretary of State Haig commented: "It is pos-
sible that if we err in our policies toward Japan, it might adopt a neutralist stand."
This is an example of a U.S, judgment that trying to brazenly steamroll demands on
Japan is not suitable to the Japan-U.S. political climate.
At any rate, as can be seen from Holbrooke's speech, there are two U.S. strategic
_ policies toward Japan--one is to push U.S. demands on Japan and the other is to ~
consider the special conditions of Japan. In any case, the focal point of U.S. strateg~
toward Japan at the time was apparently implementation of the 9.7-percent increase.
, The so-called national defense group of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP], including
the former directors general of the Defense Agency, incited the United States to
make this demand. It c:3n be said that through joint Japan-U.S. effo;ts, pressure was
put on Japanese financial authorities. Actually, in response to U.S. actions, Mihara
and others constantly maintained liaison with Defense Agency officials and conducted
j negotiations repeatedly with the Budaet Bureau officials of the Ministry of Finance.
U.S. Insistence
On 12 December, en route to ~he ROK, Defense Secretary Brown stopped over in Tokyo
-i and conf erred with Defense Agency Director General Omura and then with Prime Minister
~ Suzuki and he again emphasized the need for a minimum increase of 9.7 percent. How-
~ ever, at that time the pxime minister's close associates, the LDP leaders and finance
officials had practically reached the decision that a 9.7-percent increase was not
possible.
It could be pointed out that one of the reasons underlying U.S. insistence on the
9.7-percent increase was a lack of understanding that under the Japanese budget
formulation system, the budget request estimate might represent the maximum and not
i the minimum limit. On the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that one of the reasons
~ why the 9.7-percent ceiling was not questioned was the late Ju1y Omura-Watanabe
~i
~ meeting at which there was agreement, in principle, that depending on subsequent
changes in the situation, the 9.7-percent ceiling might be raised. After the meet-
-I ing, the Iran-Iraq conflict began and the Polish crisis arose, with the possibility
! of Soviet intervention. From the standpoint of the Japan-U.S. mi~itary expansionist
group, these changes in the international situation warrantPd special consideration
~ as "changes in the situation."
However, when December arrived, the finance authorities decided that the 9~7-percent
increase was impossible and began a rollback tactic. In principle, soon after the
announcement of a 9.7-increase following the Omura-Watanabe talks, comments were
repeatedly made that "since the figure represents only a budget request estimate,
- it is natural to cut it." However, it was only in December that aggressive efforts
- began to be made to cancel implementation of the 9.7-percent increase, which had
almost come to be accepted as a fait accompli.
11
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
On 3 December, Finance Ministry leaders commented that, "if the increase in defense
spending is kept at the 7-percent level, thP ratio of defense outlay to GNP can be
maintained at the t980 level of 0.9 percent." Following that, on 5 December, Finance
Ministry Budget Bureau chief Matsushita called on Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa at the
prime minister's residence and explained that it was impossible to go througli with
the 9.7-percent increase. As reasons he gave: 1) in the difficult financial situ-
ation today it is not possible to give special recognition only to defense spending;
and 2) criticism might begin of tax increases because of increased defense expenditures,
and the large tax increases planned for 1982 and later might become difficult to
carry out.
In adciition, on 9 December, LDP Policy Affairs Research Council Chairman Abc stated
in a speech at the Nippon Press Club: "The JFY 81 defense budget is a very serious
political problem. The final decision will be made on the basis of three factors--
Japan-U.S, relations, balancing the budget and guaranteeing nationa]_ security.
However, if the defense budget becomes conspicuously large, national feelings might
become a problem." Thus, he indicated that the increase will be less than 9.7-
percent.
At the Suzuki-Brown meeting on 12 December, Prime Minister Suzuki said: "Defense
buildup is not a task for only 1981. In hooking a large fish, you might lose it if
you try to land it in ane stroke. It is important to take your time in landing it.
It is also necessary to spend s ane time in obtaining the full understanding of the
nation's people." Like the expert on fishery matters that he is, the prime minister
used the simile of fishing and hinted that it was not advantageous to adhere to the
9.7-percent increase if defense capability is to be developed over a long-range
period.
If only from the financial standpoint, it was apparent that it would be best to hold
down def ense spending as much as possible. However, if that were done, it would be
difficult to maintain smooth Japan-U.S, relations and to carry out the vital taslc
of guaranteeing national security. The financial authorities were in a dilemma on
this point of hcxa to resolve these two conflicting positions. The compromise measures
adopted were: 1) to hold the increase to less then 9.7 percent; but 2) to draft a
defense budget that wauld enable acceleration of the Mid Term plan as requested by
the United States.
Once the basic policy of budget formulation was decided upon, thereafter the task
- centered on the selection or rejection of the types and quantities of armament. On
22 December, the Finance Ministry plan was revealed and until the government plan
was to be made final a week later, on 29 December, the main types of armament
specified in the Mid Term plan were reviewed one after another, but most of the
requests were "anticipated actions" for the finance authorities. The Finance Ministry
officials, who had stubbornly resisted the 9.7-percent increase, since summer had
expressed very tolerant views toward the necessity of strengthening Japan's defense
capability. ThPrefore, the finance officials were in agreement on cooperating,
from the financial standpoint, in the early attainment of the Mid Term plan.
Of c~urse, in the United States, there were doubts that the Mid Term plan could be
expedited with next year's defense budget. The Defense Agency officials themselves
are publicly announcing that "a start has been made toward early attainment of the
Mid Term plan," while Finance Ministry representat~ves repeatedly comment that
12
~nn nr.~rrT.AT. TTSF ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
"this budget can be fully justified to the United States." Underlying these
statements is the above-mentioned process by which the budget was decided upon. -
Upon reviewing the budget formulation process, one realizes that although there were =
turns and twists, the defense buildup course, centered on the Mid Term plan accelera-
tiori which was proposed at the May 1980 Japan-U.S. summit conference, was adopted -
practically as officially promised to the Un ite~i States. In the words of Holbrooke, -
"through Japan's unique means," a big stride wa~~ taken toward defense buildup. .
Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa sta ted on 25 Januarj 1981 during the NHK television pro-
gram, "Political Debate," that "it is notconceivab le that the U.S. Government will
make any specific requests hereafter with regard to the issue of next year's defense
budget." The statement was made with th~ realization that Japan had expended its
utmost efforts, in spite of f inancial difriculties, and made possible the early _
- implementation of the Mid Term plan, which was actually the focus of U.S. requests. �
Unique Characteristics of the `81 Defense Budget
If the 1981 defense budget is analyzed in greater detail, what are its unique
characteristics?
First, the increase rate in def ense spending is 7,61 percent over the previous year
and slightly higher than the .7.60 percent for social welfare expanses. Of course,
this is the first time this has happened since the war, and next year's budget, while
favoring defense spending--or to be more correct, because of the favorable treatment
of defense outlay--is epochmaking in the sense that it is bidding farewell to "lavish ~
- social welfare."
Second, the defense budget is 0.906 percent of the GNP, showing a very slight
increase over the previous year's 0.900 percent, -
Third, the ratio of defense outlay to general accounts is slightly lower than
~ the pr.evious year, but the ratio to general annual expenditures (general accounts
' minus national debt expenses, and taxes and funds allocated to local governments) -
j which gi�ve the true picture of tfie budget, is 7.49 percent, showing an increase over
; the previous year's 7.26 percent.
~
Fourth, as pointed out earlier, a start was made toward early attainment of the ~
' Mid Term plan. Concretely, wh at is meant by the statement that "a start has been
~ made toward early attainment"? (See Table 1).
Since the Mid Term Operations Estimate is a 5-year armament procurement plan starting
- in JFY 80, the second year is YFU 81. For example, taking the Type-74 tanks listed -
first under the Ground Self-Def ense Forces in Table l, the procurement objective
under the Mid Term plan is 301 tanks. In JFY 81, 72 tanks were approved and together
with the previous year�s 60, the total is 132 tanks. The total of the 2 years amounts
- to 44 percent of the Mid Term plan objective. .
There will be a 100-percent procurement ratio of the E-ZC early warning aircraf t and
the submarine rescue tenders. Except for the 203 mm self-propelled howitzers, short-
range SAM's, C-130H transports, etc, which appear for the first time in next year's
- budget, the procurement ratio is practically 40 percent overall. Within 2 years of
the plan, the procurement ratio will be prac tically 40 percent and some items will
~ 13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tab le 1.
~ Procurement Ratio of Main Armament in Mid Term Operations Estimate (J~'Y 8U-81)
= Goal of Mid Term
Main Armament Operations JFY 81 JFY 80 Procurement
Estimate Budget Budget Ratio (percent)
Ground Self-Def ense
Forces
Type-74 Tanks 301 72 60 44
Type-73 APC's 44 9 9 41
� Type-75 155 mm self-
propelled howitzers 140 30 26 40
*203mm self-propelled
howitzers 43 6 14 ~
84mm recoilless guns 852 219 138 48
- Short-range SAM's 24 4 17
Maritime Self-Defense
Forces
*Missile escort ships
(4,500-ton class) 2 1 50
Escort ships
- (2,900-ton class) 10 2 2 40
Submarines
(2.200-ton class) 5 1 1 40
Minesweepers
(medium class) 11 2 2 36 .
Submarine rescue
- tenders 1 1 0 100
Anti-submarine patrol .
aircraft (P3-C) 37 0 10 27
i
Air Self-Defense i
Forces
Interceptors (F-15) 77 0 34 44
Support fighters (F-1) 13 2 3 38
Early warning aircraft
(E-2C) 4 4 0 100
*Transports (C-130H) 12 2 17
Advanced trainers (T-2) 23 6 4 43
*Short-range SAM's 12 2 17
. *Denotes armament appearing for first time in JFY 81 budget.
11~
^n^ ^^^TnT AT TTCTi' nrrr.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE OIVI.Y
reach 100 percent. Thus, although the condition is for "greater efforts after JFY 82,"
the Defense Agency assesses that a start has been made toward early attainment, i.e,
to complete the plan "within 5 years" instead of taking the full "5-year perlod." To
protect the sea lanes (maritime transportation routes), submarines, missile escort _
ships and even C-i3uH transports, which can blockade the three straits, including
Soya, by laying mines from.the air, are going to be procured.. Since the protection
of the sea lanes and blockade of the three straits are items strongly demanded by
the United States, the armament to be procured can be said to meet U.S. requests.
The view is gaining ground among concerned authorities that the defense spending
increase rate, which was held to a single-digit figure in tP~e JFY-81 budget, must -
inevitably increase to a double-digit figure.
The increase is expected because the aeferred payment system, which i.s a special
characteristic of arms procurements, was used, through the extent to which "early
_ attainment of Mid 'ierm plan" is speed~d up will also affect future increases.
_ For examp.te, again taking the Type-74 tank in Table 1 as an example, 60 were proct~red
in JFY 80 but the number was increased to 72 in JFY 81. With the main armament, ~
there are many cases where noticeable in�reases were made in JFY 81. Although
: armament was approved in large quantities, defense spending was kept relatively low.
The trick is the deferred payment system. In other words, only a small portion of
- the arms procuzement expenses were included in the JFY 81 budget, and the balance
was deferred until later years.
If this system is used, even if arms procurement on a huge scale is approved, the
actual cash cutlay can be held to a minimum for the year concerned. This system is ~
' possible because several years are required from the time an order is placed until
the completion, as in the case of large items like escort ships. Of the 752.5 billion
_ yen approved for procurement of new armament in nQxt year's budget, the actuaJ. amount
~ covered in next year's budget is ubout 45 billion yen, and the remaining 707.5 billion -
yen will be carri.ed over as deferred payment. A total of 1.349 trillion yen is
-I carried as a"charge account" for arms procurement. Furthermore, this charge account
' is increasing annually.
Through use of this so-called loan type method, next year's budget was kept below -
_ the "9.7-percent increase," but to pay off the charge account, it seems that a double-
, digit increase in JFY 82 is unavoidable. -
` Fifth, the ratio of spending for frontlir.e armament (naval ships, aircraft, tanks,
etc) has increased in the defense outlay. In JFY 81, frontline armament expenses
amount to 458 billion yen, an increase of 17.7 percent over the previous year, and ~
accounts for 19.1 percent of the df:fense expenditures. The ratio to defense spending
is as follows: 17.1 percent in 1975, 14,9 percent in 1976, 15,8 percent in 1977,
15.5 percent in 1978, 16.5 percent in 1979, 17.5 percent in 1980, and it suddenly
_ approaches the 20 percent level in 1981.
Adequate Procurement of Frontline Equipment
As the foregoing shows, a ~areful analysis of the defense outlay reveals that emphasis
was placed on adequate procuremerit of frontline equipment and that the defense bud~et _
was given favorable treatment. Although the 9.7-percent increase did not materialize
_ 15
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
as desired by the Japan-U.S. faction supForting military buildup, it would be erroneous
to say that in the struggle between the ideology of the financial authorities who con-
sider financial reconstruction as their supreme task, and the ideology of the Japan-
- U.S. mili.tary buildup faction, the former ideology won out. This would be like not
seeing the forest for the trees and would be a false assessment of the whole situation.
The main theme in this year's defense budget preparation was outwardly reconstruction
of finances, but in spite of the financial straits, the aim was to put Japan's military
buildup on the proper course. Again, borrowing the words of Holbrooke, "in Japan's
unique way," the strategic moves were made to realize the aim by "making the defense
~ budget appear smaller than it actually was for the nation's population."
What significance does this have for Japan in the 1980's? In the final analysis,
wouldn't the priority distri~ution of national funds to the Japan industry-govern-
- ment-military combine stimulate its real functions? A strong impression is given
that the Japan industry=government-military combine has finally begun to get under-
way. The Japanese combine, which emerged in place of the "Japan, Inc" which functioned
as the strategic headquarters for Japanese operations in the 1970's, has placed in
the forefront national security as a strategic objective for tha 1980's, and harbors
deficiencies in the scale of military buildup and in military industries. It also
differs in a number of ways from the U.S. military-industry combine. These are
special characteristics of the Japanese combine (for details, see this author's
7 article, "Emerging Industry-Government Military Combine," in the January 1981 issue
of this magazine).
Naturally, military power is not the only weapon in maintaining national security.
A significant feature of the JFY 81 general account budget is that, together with
the defense outlay, ample funds were distributed for comprehensive national security
expenditures, such as gaining energy sources (17.3 percent increase over the pre-
vious year), giving economic aid (11.2 percent increase), etc. In other words,
the basic strategies of the Japan industry-government-military combine are: 1)
deficiency in the defense share will be covered by strengthening economic cooperation;
and 2) instability of oil supply caused by the Mideast crisis will be made up
through development of alternate energy sources. This course of actio~ meets U.S.
_ expectations. One of the concrete manifestations is the govErnment's rapid policy
decision oz~ 23 January that as the new mid-term objective of Overseas Development
Aid [ODAJ, Lhe grant for the 5-year period starting in 1981 would be "more than double"
that of the 1~.7 billion dollars for the preceding 5 years.
First Year of the Industry-Government-Military Combine
The financial authorities are designating 1981 as the first year of financial
reconstruction and to paraphrase their statement, it can be said that 1981 is also
~ the first year of the formation of the Japanese industry-government-military combine.
However, as mentioned at the beginning of this article, what is the reason for the
unexpected coolness of the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd which plays a leading
role as a weapons maker. in the "industry" element of the industry-government-military
combine? It is true that as the company's official in charge of weapons department
pointed out, only two F-1 support fighter aircraft would be built, but Mitsubishi
also manufactures the T-2 advanced trainers and six of these aircraft have been
authorized. Mitsubishi Heavy Industr~es is also responsible for the F-15's, the
showpiece aircraft of the Mid Term plan, and because 34 aircraft were approved for
the previous year, none was authorized for 1981, but new orders are expected in the
1982 budget. Mitsubishi is also manufacturing the large order of 72 Type-74 tanks
specified in the JFY-81 budget.
16
~-.-.~..T ~T TTCL' nrrr Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ The Defense Agency comm~nts that "on the whole, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd
should have no complaints." Japan's weapons makers, which preach easing of export
restrictions on armament at every opportunity and acheme to use such a breakthrough
to stabilize anci expand the military industries, are in a state of constant dissat-
isfgction. At any rate, because the confusion spread that the 9.7-percent increase
in the JFY 81 defense budget would be implemented, the final outcome did not meet
the expectations of the weapons makers. To satisfy the armament makers, military
_ spen~ing would have to be limitless.
It is anticipated that the Japanese industry-government-military combine will adopt
a policy of gradual progress in its political tactics in order to realize its
strategic goals. The LDP did win a stable majority and on 24 October, in the midst
of the defense budget preparation, Prime Minister Suzuki met with Chairman Sasaki
of the Democratic Socialist Party [DSP] and they mutually agreed on the principles
of defense buildup. From the foregoing, it can be seen that though the DSP has
openly become a member of the combine, the political base is not so strong that the
government can bulldoze its strategic objectives through. Prime Minister Suzuki's
, strategic idea is that "it takes time to land a big fish." However, to land a big
' fish is nothing more than a strategy for the nation's people, who must be burdened
; with an incalct~lably large increased burden.
COPYRIGHT: Iwanami Shoten 1981
I
i
~ 9134
j CSO: 4105
~
I
~
~
~
i
i
i
i
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
~
EPOCHMAKING SUPER LSI
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 17 Mar 81 p 14
[Article: "ECL Masterslice Chip for IBM-Compatible Computers Announced by
Mitsubishi"]
[Text] Mitsubishi Electric (President Jinhachiro Katayama) has developed a high
speed bipolar super LSI logic circuit (ECL) with 2,500 gates per chip which makes
it the highest class ~degree of integration chip in the world with delay time of
0.8 nanosecond. This logic circuit is a master slice which can be used in various
ways by altering the internal distribution lines, and the power-delay time product
is 0.44 PJ (picojoules) which makes it the smallest in the world in this respect
which when used in a computer can be readily accommodated by present heat dissipa-
tion technology. This company plans to use this super LSI chip in the next genera-
tion large and superlarge computer (IBM adaptible) and also anticipates wide use
in high speed and miniaturized applications such as in testers, measurement equip-
ment, and communication equipment.
2,500 Gates, 0.8 Nanosecond
A large computer is a system of several ten thousand logic circuits (logic)
referred to as gates, and this system is divided into a number of LSI logics.
Now, even when the speed of the individual LSI is very fast, too many distribution
lines serve to slow down the overall speed. At any given circuit speed, minimizing
the length of the distribution lines and packing as much logic circuits into the
LSI will serve to increase the speed of the system. This is why recently there
has been the emergence of the superlarge computer equipped with LSI of very high
degree of integration such as, for example, the M280H ~ust announced by Hitachi,
Limited with 1,500 gates and the ACOS 1000 developed by Nippon Electric with 1,200
gates LSI.
Now, there is increasing demand for electric power with increasingly high degree
of integration, and the LSI can burn up if heat discharge is disregarded. There
is need to install cooling devices such as fans and cooling water, but there are
limitations to the degree of cooling which can be effected. High speed without
consuming too much power is considered the performance index of bipolar logic LSI,
and this value is represented by the power-delay time product (energy efficiency
per unit gate, 1 PJ = 1 nanosecond x 1 milliwatt). Just how to minimize this
product is the challenge to the industry. The unit announced recently is said to
come below the 1 PJ level.
18
F~R ~FFTCIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ The master slice developed by this company is a 2.5 micron 64 K plus memory super
fine fabrication technology finished product in the form of a bipolar IC which
incvrporates 21,952 elements placing it in the top class in the world together
with 2,500 gates which also places it in the top of the world status where degree
of integration is concerned.
At the same time, its speed is such that with gate power consumption of 0.5 milli-
watt it operates at the subnanosecond speed of average delay time of 0.83 nano-
second (a 5-7,000 gate item was announced this year, but its speed was 2 nano-
seconds and slow). As a result, the power-delay time product is 0.44 which places
it at the top of the world.
This master slice was adapted to a 1,983 gate 9-bit memory register circuit and
enclosed in a 224 pin plug-in package whereupon its power consumption was said to
- be 1.74 watts. This level of heat production can be adequately handled by heat
dissipation technology currently in use.
The new technology used for producing this master slice utilizes 1) ISAC process
(name of bipolar manufacturing process of this company) to divide the oxide film
in which total ion injection technology is activated to attain a world emitter
~ structure, miniaturization of elements, and reduction in parasitic capacity;
I 2) by joint use of the input transistor of the n.eighboring basic gate, the use
~ efficiency of the input transistor is enhanced in the layout design; 3) use of
~ low logic amplitude and new buffer circuits to bring about low voltage circuit
~ design and realize maximum 2.5 watt low powQr consumption; and 4) use of the
~ world's first two-stage construction inner lead packaga type multiple pin tech-
nology.
~
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha
I
~
~ 2267
CSO: 8129/0878
-i
i
19
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR QFFICIAL USE ONLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
STATUS OF SUPER LARGE SCALE ZNTEGRATED CIRCUITRY DISCUSSED
64 K RAM
Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 1 Jan 81 p 7
[Text] The super LSI (super large scale integrated circuitry) era has finally arrived.
IC has already iafiltrated all areas of industry, and the semi-conductor incorporating
all its peripheral equipment has developed into a large basic trunk industry. Super
LSI technology is the member which has the role of innovating the IC production pro-
cess and further expanding the utilization area. The 64 K RAM is called the first
generation super LSI. The 20 or so large semiconductor makers in Japan and the
Western world have a11 completed research and development on this first generation
super LSI and plan to enter and grab a share of the market.
Early Fireworks Jus t With Sample Shipment
Just how to nurture the super LSI area of the semiconductor industry and bring out
_ its s trength is the strategic theme of all the leading countries. That is because
the smooth trans3tion from "16 K" to "64 K" displayed the power to dra~ along with it
the world's electronic industry.. This is why the struggle for supremacy among the
large electronic makers of Japan and the Western world is so fierce.
The super large computer ACOS 1000 which Nippon Elec tric will market this fall wi,ll
have a memory capacity maximum of 64 megabits. If this were comprised complete~y
_ of the 16 K RAM (instantaneous write-in and readout memory), 32,ti00 such units would
be required. This number was reduced to 8,200 by using the 64 K RAM. If 3ust one
IC of a computer should be damaged, a ma~or catastrophe might occur, such as the
incident last year at the supreme defense command of the United SCates in which a
missile carrying a hydrogen bomb was sCopped ~ust before it was to be launched
against the Soviets or the incident at Che central telephone off3.ce of the city of
Kobe in which all the telephones in Kobe were paraly zed for a whole day. This is why
the super LSI makers and users put in half a year or more to rigorously test their
units. These test samples are called engineering samplea.
American makers including Motorola and Texas Instruments and Japanese makers such as
Fujitsu, Hitachi Limited; Nippon Electric, Tokyp Shibaura Electric, and Mi.tsubi.shi
Electric started sending out engineering samples of 64 K RAM to many of their influ-
ential cus tomers. There are many computer makers ia the United States which buy large
lots of IC, including companies such as Burroughs, Sperry Univac, Honeywell, Digital
Equipment, Hewlett Packard, and Data General. The b attle to become the leader in
supplying 64 K RAM to this large market is really heat up.
20
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
~
FUR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Decrease Malfunctions and Lower Costa
Yasuo Tarui, who was previouslyaa director of the Super ISI Technology AssociatiQn
JoinL Laboratory, said: "A single chip ia an assembly of more than 100,000 elements."
- A chip is usually a single silicon crystal a few millimeters square, but there is also
the large unit prodsced by Japan Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation measuring
3 inches in diameter (76 mm) which uses the entire crystal to provide 4 megabits ROM
(special memory f~r readtng out 4 million bits). The line width of the circuits in-
scribed in the silicon of LSI of the past was a minimum of 5 microns (a micron is
1/1000 of a mm) while a 64 K RAM has reduced this width down to the 3-micron lev,el.
~~There are some who refer to this product as auper LSI because of this superfine line
width, and a 64 K RAM is an asaembly of about 150,00~ elements, so that this degree
of integration also warrants the name super LSI.
The 16 K RAM, with some 35,000 eleme~ts, is roughly the same size as the 64 K RAM,
! so that a memory device using the 64 K RAr; with the same memory can be made just about
~ one-fourth as large. Electronic equipment suffers Che greatest incidence of mal- -
! functions at the ~oint sections, and an enhancement in degree of integration of four
i times should reduce the probability of malfunctions to one-fourth. At the same time,
~ the operating speed of an IC is faster the shorter the pathways through the unit. A
I highly integrated circuit will enable cutting down the power consumption, and it may
j be said of LSI that "smaller is better."
~
' Another expectation semiconductor makers are anticipating of super LST is its effect _
in reducing costs. IC uses repeated photographic treatments to create several tens
of thousands of elements in one step. When a 5 mm square LST is formed in a 4-inch
diameter (102 mm) silicon wafer, simple calculation will show that more than 300 such "
LSI units can be made, but if the size is cut down to 3 mm squa~~e, close to 900 such -
units can be produced. As long as the problem of rejects can be resolved, it is not
- a dream that a three-fold production can be attained by the same process. By putting
the capabilities of four units into a single unit, the metal used for containers and
external terminals can also be reduced to one-fourth.
The fly in the ointment at present where the 16 K RAM is concerned is that only about
30 percent of the product is serviceable, while the same figure is at best 7-8 percent
for the 64 K RAM. This is why where the 16 K RAM cost about 2-3 dollars apiece, a
64 K RAM costs 20-30 dollars. It is thought that it will be at least 1982 before the -
price of the 64 K RAM will be at a level advantageous to the user. The world market
~ for the 64 K RAM is expected to rise to "1.8 billion dollars thro..ghout the world _
I
- (about 360 billion yen") (BUSINESS WEEK magazine of the United States) while th~
~ super LSI market in Japan is expected to be "500 billion yen in 1985 and 1 trillion
i
yen in 1990" (survey department of Mitsui Bank), indicative of the large potential
market.
Promote Research Through Joint Government and Private Efforts
The joint government-private pro~ect on super LSI basic technological development
was initiated in JFY 76 and completed in March 1978. The government subsidy to this _
pro~ect was 30 billion yen, and the private sources accounted for 40 billion yen for
research. Since then the super LSI Technology Research Group (the seven companies,
Fu~itsu, Hitachi Limited, Nippon Electric, Tokyo Toshiba Electric, Mitsubishi
Electric, Combined Computer Laboratory and Nippon Electric-Toshiba Information System)
_ 21
FOR O~FFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
started on a 3-year pro~ect from 1980 through 1982 Co complete the next generation ~
computer equipped with super LSI. The initial year's budget was 10 billion ,yen. ,
The Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation, which is playing a major role
in super LSI development together with the Ministry of Internati~nal Trade and Indus-
try, started construction of a large laboratory intended for use in super LSI develop-
ment. This building is being cons~ructed at the city of Atsugi in Kanagawa prefecture
= at a cost of 23 billion yen and is expected to b e completed in 1982. This public cor-
poration hopes to install a f.ully 64 K RAM compuCer and electronic exchange this year.
Aside from the joint government-private research effort, other independent super LSI
development efforts on the party of private interests are appearing. The "independent
route" industry is one such effort. Matsushita Electronic Industry is constructing
a"super LSI plant" on the gounds of ite Nagaoka Plant (Nagaokakyo city in Tokyo Pre-
' fecture) at an outlay of 20 billion yen. Sharp is investing 10 billion yen to add to
its lv'o 3 plant in Tenri city in Nara Prefecture, and plans an ~dditional 15 billiun
' yen funding. There is also the super LSI plant of Oki Electric for which 30 billion
yen has been allotted, and this plant now under construction in Miyazaki is expected
to start actual operation this fall. Sanyo Electric has assembled the technologists
of the Sanyo Group at its Gifu plant where.there i~ a super LSI technology develop-
~ent center at which practical development of "1.5-micron-width" technology is under
~ development.
The super LSI production facility is undergoing major changes from the LSI production
facility of the past. The mask (original circuit diagram) which used to be prepared
by an optical process is now being replaced by an electron beam engraving facility. -
The photographic etching process has been changed from the wet process using a
chemical solution to a dry process using gas. The implanting of impurit3es in silicon -
is mainly through an ion beam implantation method in place of the diffusion furnace.
The placement of this thin memb rane on the silicon surface is now carried out by
sputtering (formation of a thin crystal layer) device or a CVD (chemical vapor phase
deposit3.on) instead of the usual deposition device used before. All of these unit
costs run into the hundred million class, and a single electron beam facility can
- run up to several hundred million yen. -
- Practical 1 M~egabit RAM Is Possible
Since a 3-mm-wide line width is used, the presence of a speck of dust or other foreign _
material will render a unit unsatisfactory. This is why clean rooms have to be set
up in the planta (rooms where the air is filt~red and purified), and super clean water
is used. Because of the particular production system it employs,the various types of
equipment and materials used in a super LSI production effort are creating a whole
pexipheral industry to provide the necessary items. The 11 large makers in this
country put out a total of 170 billion yen for facilities in 1980, when the semi-
conductor makers turned over all their plants to the production. of super LSI, and this
was a 50-percent increase in o utlay over the preceding year. If to this sum are added
the outlays of Texas Instruments and Motorola which are promoting product~on in Japan
and Nippon Denso and Suwa Seiko which are planning LSI production for use in their
own products, the total will b e considerably larger.
To be sure, this year finds the investments coming closer to the practical stage than
last year, and many products are appearing on the market. In addition to the 64 K RAM,
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
various 64 K RAM (spec3.a1 memory readout) , 4 K super high speed bipolar RAM, and 16
- bit and 37_ bit parallel treatment microcomputers have made their appearance. The
- . American Intel Company, whic:~ is an internationally known maker of microcomputers,
is publicizing the 16 bit to 32 bit fami.ly of microcomputers and it hopes to display
- its full line of computers in the near future. It is said that these m~.crocomput~rs
have the same capabilities as the large compu~ers of the previous generati~n. It is
possible that a 256 K RAM with four times the degree of integration of the 64 K RAM
and a 1 megabit RAM of one-fourth scale may also become practical in the eighties.
Super LSI technology has entered the stage of the "hundred flowers campaign."
- Figure 1. Examples of 64 K RAM Products (MOS Dynamic Z~pe)
II 64KRAM CMOSS?'-fti�~rJ'~
1~.-~-$ 2;~f3,~~i' 3'f~ f1~7C 4 t~7~A1l4@
- iI5 o;~d t'~-~i MB8264 150/2C9 g 1980~
7 o B~~N'`~Pl"ir HM4864 150/200 !
. g,~,:,~�4~, v P D416d 150/200/250 ~
c~ o ,~y};~;
.~~'4~'~ T'MM4164C 150/200 ~
~ , M 5 Ei4'.645 15~/200 ~
1 ,~~;:~;~�:~I::~; MSM3164 150/200 12?981i~
I 3~-c (3~) MCM6665 150/200/2508 1980fE
4~ Tt+i~x�-f J~~ TMSe'64 150/200/250 7
~t:i"1(7)
~ ~ 8 o.(~i�~l.�ty? 2164 ~ 100/150/2001~981~
g o~:Z7' "l J l~i) r1Ka~6a ~2oi~soi2oo
~ ~ t'vj )�l~�'~=~? NMC41Gd 12o/t50 !
r~~l,t"(i) ~
- i 8 0 7s 3--f ~(y) FblK t2U/t50/200 ~
_ I 9~ i7=~T-r �i'1 ~(y) 216A 6C/HC/120
o~ F~~~~ F� ~'-f 7 Am9064 100/150/200 21
~ 0 rs�?-ie-(vX(%) ,14a . ~#t~
; l a I B'M(~) - 110
~ o~)V{t~l~~t(%) 22 -
~ o j~--J~:?iZ([3-?3,')23 HYB4S64 150 12 1481~
' j ~ ITT-L_a~~~15~ ITT4164 150/200 ~
i -x'(r) _ _ y .
~ o,~ ~ t~ c~~ 25
2~ ~c~:~~~L~~~n~a~r~n. ~c~~-~~ c+t~sw~-~>
;
i Key:
1. Name of mak~r 14. Texas Instrument (USA)
2. Product number 15. Intel (USA)
' 3. Capacity 16. Mostec (USA)
' 4. Start nf sale 17. National Semiconductor (USA)
~ 5. Fujitsu 18. Fairchild (USA)
6, l9gp 19. Signetechs (USA)
7. Hitachi Limited 20. Advanced Microdev~:es (USA)
8. Nippon Electric 21. for own use
, 9. Tokyo Shibaura Electric 22. Bell Laboratory (USA)
l0. Mitsubishi Electric 'l3. Siemens (West Germany)
11. Oki Electric Industry ~ 24. ITT Semiconductors (USA)
12. 1981 25. Inmos (UK)
13. Mot~rola (USA) 26. *1 nanosecond unit for readout and
write-in time (1 b311ionth of a second)
Statement by Vice Presiden~ Jun Ouchi of Nippon Electric
Super LSI (VLS very large scale + IC) is a term which was coined in Japan but now
has come into use throughout the world, indicating tha~ Japan's technology has risen
to the level of the top group in the world. k'ollowing the technology of producing
23
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ON1.Y
= fine products, the subjects from now on will be to perfect methods of design and
examination. The examination of super LSI can be likened t~ the search for troubles
within a computer large enough to occupy an entire bui.lc'~'�~.g without opening the doors,
buC in order to go into mass production, we have to acqui~a the technology to be able
to do so.
The super LSI age ~aill probably conCinue to the end of this century. More precisely,
this will be the age of super LSI "technology" or the age of super fine fabricatian.
It ~.s not necessary that all IC compress 100,Q00-1 million elements into the s-.~ace
of a few square millimeters. On the other hand, superfine fabrication technology
influences the production process of a11 IC. This is because there is demand foY
even smaller, faster, higher reliability, and lower cost IC. The stage of production
- of 64 K RAM in the quest for the most economical and optimum degree of integration
was attained by an annual doubling raCe. The developments will become even more
difficult as we now approach the submicron (less than one micron) level, and I be-
lieve that the situation will not be as hectic.
Super High Speed Elements
Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 8 Jan 81 p 5
[Text] Research has been started on technology to control the production of the
material used as the base p~.ates of super high speed elements of silicon semicon-
- ductors operating at extreme limits at atomic levels. These efforts are directed at
the development of elements variously referred to as super lattice elements, three-
dimensional circuit elements, perfect crystal elements, or high degree of electron
transfer transistors, and the development of the base material is the key to the
practical state of the element. Research on these elements has just started at the
fringes in the United States, and competitive research has just seen its beginnings
in Japan.
- Nippon Electric, Hitachi Limited, Tokyo Shibaura Flectric, and Mitsubishi Electric
are directing their research efforts on super lattice elements and three-dimensional
circuit elements. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry in its 1981
- budget activated the Next Generation Industrial Foundation Technology Research and
Development System under the Agency for Industrial Science and Technology and is
- planning to support research and development on a broad front.
- Super lattice elements can be used to enable super high speed responses several
dozen times faster than present elements and can also be used to receive visible
light, ultraviolet light, and x-ray radiations. The crystal which is the base of a
semiconductor has atoms arrayed in regular order, and this network-like array is
= called the lattice. Dr Reona Ezaki, working at the IBM Laboratory in the United
- States, stacked alternate layers of potassium and arsenic and aluminum and arsenic
in one hundred-millionth millimeter thickness and test produced elements with the
same lattice configurations as single crystals.
= Single crystals can be produced cou~aratively easil~ with a single element such as
silicon or a single compound such as that of gallium and arsenic, but it is extremely
difficult to prepare perfect single crystals of two or more compounds. It is clearly
evident that if the production of a"super lattice state" can be achieved, a very
high speed element is possible. It is said that IBM is using a computer to control
the deployment of molecnles and thereby control cxystal growth.
24
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
= FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A three-dimensional circuit element is an atte~t to go from the planar array of
elements which has been the practice up to now to a stereo arrangement of the circuit
elements. A stereo deployment of circuit elements involves the stacking together -
_ o~ crystal base plates one after another. The technology whereby these base plates
can be stacked together with the molecul~s in perfect array is called epitaxy, and
- the stacking together of base plates with differing properties has experienced great
difficulty in the past.
At ttre Massachussetts Institute of Technology in the United States, a technology
- called "grapho (notched) epitaxy" has been developed in which a laser beam is used
- to cut notches into the base plate over which crystals are grown, and this technology
is being applied in attsmq~ts to alternately sandwich silicon single crystals and
silicon oxide layers and obtain three-dimensional integrated circuits.
~ Prof Junichi Nishizawa of Tohoku University has been researching pe.rfect crystal
_ elements, and the Science and Technology Agency in the new system it is projecting
for 1981 is considering this subject for inclusion in its project of promoting
structural science technology. Many semiconductors are prepared by adding a controlled
; amount of impurity such as phosphorus to a pure base plate such as silicon. According -
to Professor Nishizawa's thesis, th~ occasional substitution of phosphorus of much _
smaller diameter than the silicon atom is bound to cause some loosening in the
crystal structure. This loosening may be one of the factors responsible for degra-
~ dation in properties of the crystal. Now, the controlled insertion of an element
' such as tin with a larger atomic diameter than silicon will make up for the lo~sening -
i; caused by the presence of phosphorus. '
i
~ Fujitsu succeeded in test producing the high degree of electron transfer transistor,
and this is an effective elemQnt in the research subjects of hte large project "super
! computer (a high speed science and technology computation unit with speed a thousand
! times greater than the present computers) development" which the Agency for Indus-
i trial Technology is starting in JFY 81. This element uses a base plate of gallium -
arid arsenic compound over which is formed a compound of gallium, aluminum, and arsenic.
- The flow of electrons at super high speeds at the ~unction of these two compounds is -
utilized. This company is alignzng a single atom layer per second in vacuum in the
j relaxed molecular beam single crystal growth (epitaxy) technology it is developing. .
I
~ Construction of Clean Room
~ Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 23 Jan 81 p 1
[Text] The large construction companies have started to zero in on obtaining com-
prehensive orders for design to completion in the construction market involving con-
- struction for the leading technologies such as IC (integrated circuit) plants and
- biochemical research labo-ratories. These stzuctures have to be provided w~th dust-
free and vibration-free capabilities and require micron-Ievel precision, and a
comprehensive array of interior and exterior finishing plus air conditioning must be r
installed. This is an area which is being called fine building (high add-on value
b uilding). As industrial structures are taking on this high level of sophistication,
the construction companies are going all-out in the new markets this tide is producing,
and they are increa~ing their development type orders which are pushing technological
strengths to the foreground.
~ 25
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
i
~
Dust Prevention and Vibration Prevention to Extreme Lim:i.ts
The industrial world is seeing great activity in the electronics area as represented
by super LSI (large scale integrated circuitry) and the life sciences area as repre- j
sented by genetic engineering as the expected leaders in the coming order. The tying ~
together of these activities with the activities of thP construction companies is a
common practice among these companies. That is to say, where the in.vestment in semi- I
conductor plants has been increasing at the rate of close ta 40 percent per year for I
the past few years, the development of systems to receive orders for construction of
these buildings is also accelerating.
_ Takenaka Komuten has set up a system which will construct a semiconductor plant starti.ng ~
with the siting diagnosis and including design and con~truction for which it has formed i
- a technology business team of IC plant apecialists. Starting with the Oki Electric ~
Industry's Miyazaki plant, this company has to date designed and constructed seven ;
IC plants, and it has used this experience to systematically accululate data on IC I
plants so that it can design the optimum production environment through Che unique
- capability it has developed. ~
The main strength of this capability includes the prevention of very fine vibrations
and the aix cleaning technology. Since the structural environment must assume
greater levels of cleanliness the higher the degree of integration of the IC, a super-
fine vibration simulation system has been devfloped which is run by computer while �
a compreheasive cleaning technology including air conditioning volume, filters, and I
check of air contaimination sources is being developed.
The Taisei Kensetsu Company recently established an IC construction development team
comprised of a technological development department, a design department, and an
engineering department. ThiS company has already finished five projects in which
~ only construction was involved and~~one semiconductor plant in which both design and
construction were involved, b ut ~t has already reorganized the technological system
it had been operating in anticipation of the oncoming super LSI era in which more ~
precise dust and vibration control can be exercised together with a more advantageous ;
design system. !
In addition, Shimizu Rensetsu has also developed about 15 years' experience (includ- ~
ing seven design and construction projects) on semiconductor parts production plants
centered on LI and has acquired a"fine vibrations diagnostic system" using a mobile
measurement vehicle as part of its arsenal to fight for orders. Kashima Kensetsu
- has in its background the design and construction of the pioneer plant devoted solely
to IC production, the Kofu Business, and_is actively operating in tfie semiconductor-
related market.
Clean technology is the base of the "IC strategy" of all of these companies. This
is a technology which was developed in line wi~h medical and pharmaceutical products
production and hospital construction. Becriuse the production of precise machinery
and precise chemicals now requir.es a degree of cleanliness on a par with that of the
- medical area, the construction has been changed to one in which not only the items
which "enter" but the whole plar.t is provided with a unified high performance which
, must always be assured.
26
- FOR OF'FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
_ At the head of this present flow in the market area is an item which the various
- companies are keeping their eyes fastened on, and that is the so-called bioclean
room as represented by those used in an animal experimental laboratory. The Ministry
of Health and Welfare will introduce the GLP (appropriate standards for experimental
facilities) in the ar~a of the medical and pharmaceutical industry where an experi-
_ mental facility for preparing data nec;essary for permit applications on medical
aad pharmaceutical products will set up appropriate standards, and the various medi-
cal and pharmaceutical companies are hurrying to fall in line.
At the same time, chemical companies and food companies are looking toward the growth
_ of biochemical technology and are directing their research and development activities
in that direction, and the entry of new construction groups into this area can be an-
ticipated. Should genetic engineering research become very popular, there may develop
a need for a superfine sealed type laboratory to guard against biohazards (formation
of abnormal life) .
When the activities of the different com~anies are reviewed, Shimizu Kensetsu has
entered into construction of biochemical laboratories for Showa Denko and Toyo Kozo,
while Kashima Kensetsu has start~d design and construction of safe laboratories for
Taisho Pharmaceutical and Yamanouchi Pharmaceuticals Company. Taisei Kensetsu has
_ already designed and constructed 15 buildings housing animal laboratories at a total -
cost of 7.2 bi113on yen, and~it is eyeing a capability for the construction of
_ higher order experimental facilities which will conform to the GLP.
Une of the reasons the large construction companies have put so much effort in this
area is that "more than 60 percent of the fund assigned to a clean room is for equip-
ment, and the add-on value is high as a result," (Iiiromu Kitamura, head of the design
_ department of Taisei Kensetsu). In addition, where Chere is a trend for the general
type of construction contracts to end up as a discounting contest, there is an area
- where the competition is based on technological strength,and the various companies
are eyeing "escape from an honest poverty industry" by developing this new market
capability.
- COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1981
- 2267 -
CSO: 4105
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY =
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY AIMS AT MAJOR EXPANSION
MITI's Policy
Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 8 Feb 81 p 7
[Article: "Development of MTX (Intermediate Jet Trainer) as Leverage;
Aiming at Independence of Aircraft Industry; MITI; Technological Development
in the 1990's"]
[Text] The new domestic development of the intermediate jet trainer (MTX)
for the next generation is scheduled to be undertaken by civilian aircraft
mak.ers in fiscal 1981 commissioned by the Defense Agency. The Defense
Agency is said to be procuring 200 of them. In view of this move the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has decided on a policy
of promoting the technical development of Japan's aircraft industry in the
1980's by using as a leverage the development of defense aircraft led by
MTX. The minist.ry is planning to make the aircraft industry as a vanguard
technology industry self-dependent in the 1990's. Thus, the ministry intends
to work on the Defense Agency so as to also shift to domestic production the
large transport planes which are scheduled to be imported from the United
StaCes following MTX. Given tne si.tuation wileze the incicaseci Ql.'1CI-.~
spending is being strongly criticized, resistance is expected f rom the
opposition parties against the ministry's policy for developing aircraft
by taking advantage of this defense demand.
It is accepted by the industry as standard that the development of a new
aircraft can be undertaken once every 10 years, because it requires huge
sums. The current orders by the Defense Agency for a new development of
MTX have been placed after about 10 years since research and development
- of the F1 support fighter were undertaken in fiscal 1972. As for civilian
� aircraft, no surely domestic development has taken place since the last
domestic transport plane, YS11 (its �irst flight was in 1963). On the
grounds that the development and production of the next generation, and the
next generation af ter that, civilian transport planes (YX and YXX) are too
risky for a single nation to undertake, it is now being shifted to joint
international development.
Also, as for the F15, the latest jet fighter of the United States, and P3C,
the anti-submarine reconnaissance plane whose introduction has already been
decided, only licensed production (that is, domestic productis~n after re-
ceiving designs and technical know-how from U.S. makers) is being carried out.
_ 28
~w-. ..w~TnT AT rrc~ n7J7.y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The ministry assesses that in order to make the aircraft industry self-dependent
it is important not to have disruption between the two projects for the
development ~f YX and YXX and the plans for the development of defense air-
craft, th~,~s avoiding interruption in the demands for aircraft. Especially
since che design and development of YX have passed the peak, the ministry
views that the significance of the research and development of MTX as an
un3erpinning of the demands for aircraft is great.
The Defense Agency has decided to develop MTX because T1 and T33 used as inter-
- mediate trainers have become obsolete. MTX is expected to be develuped as a
two-seater plane with a speed of 0.9 mach, equipped with two domestically
built engines. The research and development of MTX will begin in fiscal 1981
and its procurement will b e started in 1989. The costs for its ~r.eaearch
and development and for its mass production (about 200 planes) are estimated
to be from 230 billion to 290 billion yen. The Defense Agency plans to
decide on who will receive the order by this su~er or so.
, Following MTX, the ministry intends to demand the domestic development of a
' large transport plane for defense as we11. The Defense Agency is planning
; to purchase 12 C130-type large transport planes from the United St~tes, accord-
ing to the "Medium Term Defense Program" (The Defense Agency plans for
procurement for the 1980-1984 period). But the ministiy's thinking is that
: it should be shifted to domestic development soon~r or later. At the defense
; conference held last December which decided on the procurement of C13Q's,
' MITI Minister Tanaka demanded the domestic development of transport planes
~ by stating "We will soon need a large ninnber of large transport planes, and
' th e developmQnt of a ngw plane will require 7 to 8 years. Therefore, we should
~ start making preparations now."
i MITI judges that "the demands for defense aircraft offer the last chance for
~ achieving the independent development of domestic planes " because as of now the
complete domestic development of civilian aircraft is difficult. Therefore,
~ it is the policy of the ministry to strongly work on the Defense Agency for
shifting its policy to the domestic development of~ large transport planes
! for defense in order to bring about the self-dependence of the aircraft
' industry in the medium to long-future.
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbunsha 1981
Future of Industry
Tokyo NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 10 Feb 81 p 8
[Article: "This Year's Prospect of Aircraft Industry; Not To Be Hasty in
YXX Negotiations; Efforts To Build Up Technological and Managerial Capability"]
- [Text] In the aircraft industry, the licensed domestic production of the
F15 combat fighter and P3C anti-submarine reconna.issance plane and then the
- large government and civilian pro~ects for large planes such as YX (Boeing 767)
have been put on a right track. The plans for the development of new YX (YXX,
the next-generation civilian plane) and MTX (the next-generation intermediate
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
trainer) will be put into effect in fiscal 1981. As iarge-scale projects
which will determine the direction of Japan's aircraft industry in the
1980's have now been all lined up, this will be an important year for building
a foundation for the aircraft industry. In view of this, Chairman Ohara
Eiichi (chairman of Fuji Heavy Industries) of the Japan Aerospace Industries
Association has been asked to make comments on the prospects for this year's
aircraft industry. (The questions were asked by the writer of this column.)
- Question: As large-scale government and civilian projects have been well
- lined up, some are saying that it is finally the aircraft industry's turn -
to get started....
Answer: As in the 1981 government budget expenditures related to YXX and MTX -
have been appropriated, we will see this year the concrete development of
various projects. Now that the money has been appropriated, we can no longer
remain idle. Because the industry is required to utilize civilian vitality
with reaponsibility, now is th e time when we can demonstrate how well the
industry manages it. Works related to the Defense Agency cannot be allowed
- to make exhorbitant profit, but they should bring moderate profit. However,
a large risk is involved in the civilian sircraft industry. Moreover, there _
is little technological and managerial capabil3ty in the aircraft industry
- in Japan. It is necessary for us to rapidly build an independent set up in
the aircraft industry looking ahead into the future.
Question: Negotiations for YXX seem to have made considerable progress. When
do you think it will finally be settled?
Answer: In this period when we need to develop�civilian demands, it is timely
that negotiations for international c4operation are being concretely advanced,'
But since YXX planes are to be presented to the market from 1985 to 1990, we
need not be so hasty about it. Now we are in the stage in which we must
decide what kind of agreement we should have with the Boeing Company of the _
United States and Vocker Company of Holland. It is only natural th3t it will
take longer as we proceed wit;~ negotiations for details. Thus, it is not that
we must absolutely conclude negotiations before the deadline of March.
Question: Some report that Boeing is careful about YXX, even though it is
interested in it, because it wants to avoid a conflict with the existing
development plans.
Answer: Boeing is certainly cautious, and its business plans are scrupulous. -
- Our industry is not hasty about it either. With the managen,ent and technology
lessons obtained in connection with the YXX plans, we must conduct rational
negotiations. For it we must huve our own plans as to what kind of market
we can expect, what kinds of aircraft we need, and what kind of technology
" we require for it. Then we must endeavor to fully utilize our own expertise. _
Question: Those who are involved in the Anglo-Japanese joint development
- of jet engines are natural_ly interested in the progress of the YXX plans.
Is there coordination betw~~en the two?
3~
FOR (1FFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Answer: If we change the number of seats in the aircraft, we must change
engines too. It may not be immediate, but I believe the coordination will
b e car.ried out sooner or later,
Question: In relation to the Defense Agency, they are ready to proceed
with the development of MTX, following F15 and P3C.
Answer: The significance of the domestic development of MTX is great.
The reason is that it has been more than 10 years since Japan developed
th e entirety of an aircraft domestically. This wi11 encourage the tech-
- nological development of not only the body manufacturers but also parts
manufacturers.
; Question: "Arms export" is being vigorously discussed. Don't you believe
th at there will be stronger restrictions placed on the export of parts by the
aircraft industry?
I
i Answer: Arms export is not something that the industry can decide one way
I or the other. We can move only within bounds defined by laws. In European
! nations the defense industry forms the base of other industries. But Japan
is in a totally different situation. We cannot help the restrictions placed
on tlie joint development of weapons either. I thin~. the only thing for
the aircraft industry to do is to develop civilian demands from now on.
COPYRIGHT~: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsl~a 1981
Japan-Sweden MTX Cooperation
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 17 Feb 81 p 1
I [Article: "MTX Jet Engines; Volvo Inquired About a Joint Development With
I Ishikawajima-Hariroa"]
~
I [Text] Executives of Volvo, an influential entrepreneur group of Sweden with
its automobile manufacturing at the center, have revealed that they are
proposing a joint development of a jet engine for military aircraft to
~ Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries and
i Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The Volvo group is developing a jet engine
i jointly with Garret Corporation of the United States. On the b_sis of this
' engine the Volvo group is proposing the ~oint development of a jet engine
j for MTX (the next-generation intermediate trainer) whose research and develop-
ment the Defense Agency is scheduled tfl undertake in 1981. As in the case
of the fuselage, the independent development of the en~ine for MTX by domestic
manufacturers is hoped for, Research far its test fabrication is already
under way. But the Defense Agency has also been confidential.ly scrutunizing
the adoption of the engine developed by Volvo-Garret. Because the Volvo
group has proposed a joint development which has a tremendous advantage in te nns
of development costs, amidst this attention is currently being focused on how
the Defense Agency and related industries would respond to the proposals.
Volvo-Frigg Motor Company9 the jet engine division of the Volvo group, has
joined since 1978 with Garret Corporation of the United States in promoting
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
ru?t urr lc;iai. U5L UNLY
the development of a~et engine for military aircraft. They have achieved
the development of a jet engine with about 7_-ton propu7.sion, or 4-ton pro-
pulsion with an af terburner device attached. They are reportedly getting
ready to supply s uch engines to the users in as early as 3 years.
MTX which th e Volvo group is interested in is a large project that Japan attempts
to develop with its indepandent technology. Its development is scheduled to be
completed by fiscal 1987 for mass production. Thus, since fiscal 1980 the
Defense A~ency has appropriated the budget for the domestic development of a
small F3 military aircraft engine.for possible adoption of this engine on
MTX. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries and other makers have been con-
ducting its research and test fabrication.
The proposals of the Volva gr~up are to join these two sets of plans. The
Defense Agency and the industry are strongly inclined to the adoption of a
domestically built engine. However, according to related sources, there has
been a persistent view in the government from the beginning that the develop-
ment and production of MTX by introducing foreign technology would cost less.
The final conclusion as to which plan to be adopted will be reached in 1982.
Therefore, there has emerged a possibility of exchanging views with the
- Volvo group until then.
As for the Volvo group, G.L. Johanson of Volvo-Fr3gg Motor Company stated:
"We have merely presented our ideas iri uur recent contact with the Japanese
Government and industry." He has refrained from revealing the details of the
proposed development plan. However, he plans to continue working on the
Japanese Government and industry by emphasizing the fact that the development
and production of such an engine will cost about $500 million, and that
efficient development can be achieved by joining hands.
However~ if Japan's industry is to undertake in earnest joint development
and production, there is a fear that the supplying of parts may violate the
government policy on banning arms export. For this reason, therefore, a
neagtive view on joint development is held in Japan's industry circles (such
as Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries) that "we sre already moving toward
the direction that the F3 engine will be adopted as the MTX engine, and a
~oint development is one-sided wishful thinking on the part of the Volvo group,"
However, others consider that although Japan has established a policy for the
domestic production of the engine, proposals from a powerful northern European
enterprise cannot be ignored in view of the 3ncreased international trade
confli~t, centering on the automobile. Thus the progress in future negotia-
tions will attract the attention of those who are concerned,
Statement by T. G. Gyllenha~nar, president of Volvo: "In the future we want
to continue open negotiations with three jet engine makers of Japan. I think
there is a possibility of setting a jo3nt company."
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1981
32
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
� Development of STOL
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 2 Mar $1 p 11 -
[Article: "Can STOL Development Take Off? The First Large Jet Transport
� Aircraft To Be ~omestically Produced; A Successor of Y511; Great Concern
Is Its Reliability and Economy"]
[Text] Amid the talks about YX (the next-generation civilian ~et passenger
plane), the development of the first large j et transport plane, to be
- domestically produced in Japan, is quietly making steady progress. It is
the "fan-~et STOL (short takeoff and landing) plane." It is being tackled
, by th e concerted efforts of Japan's aircraf t manufacturers with the Science
and Technology Agency and Aerospace Technology Institute at the center, This
, ~et plane requires a short runway. The nois e level is low, and it best fits
the conditions of Japan's airports. Its design was begun in 1977. The
; manufacturing of the domestically built eng3ne to be installed is currently
; in progress~ and its completion is expected in 2 years, in 1983. The Science
! and Technology Agency has been promoting this development pro~ect and is
i elated to offer this plane as a replacement for YS11 which has been the
i mainstay of domestic air transportation but is becoming obsolete now.
- ~ Short-Distance Takeoff and Landing _
I
~ The volume of sir transportation in Japan is increasing year after year. Yet,
the expansion and new construction of airports have proved difficult due to
~ environmental and noise problems. A1so night time Cakeoff and landing are
stringently controlled. This fan-~e~ transport plane is suitable to such
stringent aviation environment. It is a new type of plane which has been
! developed with strictly domestic technology.
~
~ Characteristically, the fan-~et engines are installed in the upper front
side of the main wings. When the large f laps are dropped, exhaust gas flows
I downward along the surface of the wings and flaps. Thus, even at a low
speed, large lifting power is generated. Because of this lifting power, the -
- plane is able to take off and land in a short distance.
~ Current medi~ and short distance ~et transport planes require 1,500 to 2,000-
- meter runways. But in the case of the fan-jet STOL it can take off and land
' with about half the distance, that is, abo ut 800 meters. Also because the
engines are mounted on the upper side of the m~in wings, and it takes off and
lands at a sharper angle (the approaching angle for regular planes is three
degrees, but that for STOL, it is double, or six degrees), it can reduce
- the area in the vicinity of the airport wh ich is affected by noise to
one-tenth of that by current jefi planes.
For this reason, this jet plane with a large transport capacity can be intro-
- duced to local airports of t1~e 1,200-meter runway class which only YS11 has
been using. Consequently, also the airport maintenance costs are expected
to be drastically reduced.
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR O~FICIAL USE ONLY
According to the designs recently consolidated, the full length of STOL is
29 meters and it weighs 45 tons. For its fuselage, a remode~ed Fuselage of
domestically built jet transport C-1 (twine engines) which the Defense Agency
- has been using will be adopted. As for. the engines, four sets of domestically
built fan-jet engine FJR 710 developed by the large pro~ect of the Agency of
Industrial Science and Technology of the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (6-ton propulsion class) will be used. Except for importing
very small portions, including titan3um alloy, all domestic materials and
equipment will be used for STOL,
Development Costs Are Low
_ Because STOL under development is an experimental plane, the fuselage of the
- cargo transport C-1 will be used as it is. It is not designed as a passenger
plane, But Tak eda, a science research officer of the National Aerospace
Laboratory, who is the leader of this development pro~ect explains: "If its
budy is made long and slender, it can be changed into a 100-150 seat passenger
- plane which can become competitive with the currently used B737 and DC9.`'
1'he manufacturers of the fuselage are the same five as thase of C-1. They
are: Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Mitsubis~i Heavy Industries, Fuji Heavy
Industries, Shin Meiwa Industry and Japan Aircraft Industries. Three companies,
Ishikawa~ima-Harima Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki
Heavy Industries, are participating in the development of the engine. Thus,
most all domestic aircraft manufacturers are involved in the development,
The last production of C-1 was completed with the No 30 plane 2 or 3 years ago.
But jigs used in the manufacturing are still maintained at the manufacturers.
Such tools will be put to a fullest use for the current development, Therefore,
the development of the first large domestic jet plane entails comparatively
low costs at the level of about 20 billion yen.
Among the developments of postwar aircraft, only the trainer T-1 (which
carries J-3 engines with 1.4 ton propulsion made by Japan Jet Engine, a
government-controlled company) used by the Self-Defense Forces has both
domestically built engines and fuselage. It will be the first time that
the development of a large civilian jet enp,ine will be undertaken in Japan.
The significance of the development of STOL is enormoiis because it will serve
as a springboard for Japan's aircraft industry which lagged during the blank
period after the war.
Its development was started in fiscal 1977. The basic designs for deter-
- mining t~te overall structures were completed by the end of 1978. Beginning
in fiscal 1979 the development of a high lifting power system characteristic
- of STOL was undertaken. Following this, the manufacturing of j igs for the
manufacturing of the fuselage will begin this year. The building of engines
also has already begun. All assembly will be completed during fiscal 1983,
_ and the first flight is expected by the end of fiscal 1983.
Now, a short runway distance, low noise, increased transport capacity, the
promotion of the domestic aircraft industry- with all these, STOL seems to
be loaded with positive things. But following the development of this experi-
mental plane, can this mass-produced purely domestically made passenger plane
compete in the international market? R
3L~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
~
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
There are only five large STOL's in the world now. The United States Air
Force owns two military transport planes. NASA of the United States has
developed a civilian experimental plane. Another test plane has been
developed 3o intly by NASA and the Canadian Government. Then another plane
is reported to be in the Soviet Union.
Some Risky Elements Too
NASA's experimental civilian plane mas developed in the early 1970's. But
- they concluded that there were several technolog3cal difficulties, and
accordingly no successor planes have been developed. -
In th e background of the Agency of Science and Technology having pramoted
, this pro3ect, there was consideration for a3rport conditions and environmental
problems in Japan. At the same time, there was an understa~nding that the
poss~bility for Japan to cut into the world aircr~ft market lies with -
~ 100-seat 3et passenger planes equipped with engines of about 5-ton propulsion.
i
~ I'or this reason, the current developmient of STOL undoubtedly contains con-
~ siderably risky elements. One of them is maneuverability.
~
! The landing speed of a jumbo jet plane is about 140 knots. gut that of STOL
~ under development 3s one-half of that, 72 knots. It is by far slower compared
to 103 knots of C-1, and 130 knots of B737. For this reason, STOL is to be
~ equipped with automatic maneuvering devices which extensively uses computer
technology, but it leaves many elements for technological development.
~
-i Also STOL lands at an approaching angle twice as large compared to that of
ordinary aircraft. Thus, a pilot from an aircraft maker who test.ed
j maneuvering the plane with a simulator acknowledged its diff iculty as: "It
' was rather like dropping down than sliding in." _
- Reliability is one of the points to consider. For a newly developed engine
i to become practical, its reliability must be fully confirmed after testing
it for 10,000 hours on the ground and over 10,000 hours in the air. Actually,
~ the FJR 710 engine to be installed in STOL has a record of only 2,000 hours -
I of test on the ground.
I
Another point is economy. The National Aerospace Laboratory has calculated that
when this plane is mass produced, per plane costs will be 3 to 4 billion yen. -
' It is relatively expensive for that class of plane. It also has the weakness
in that its fuel costs wfll be high.
Whether or not STOL as the first large domestic ~et plane wi11 become a
successor to YS11 depends on the success of the test plane, and on the future ~
technologi~al development.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon ICeizai Shimbunsha 1981
10372
CSO: 4105
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONI.Y
SCIENCE AND TECE~TOLOGY
NUCI,EAft POWER GENERATION TECHNOLOCrY STRESSED
Fusion Test Reactor Pro3ect
Tokyo NIKRAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 26 Dec 80 p 1
[Text ] K;~oto [fiiversity's Heliotron Nuclear Fusion Research Center (Golcaeho, Uj i, -
Kyoto; Director: Professor Mitsuharu Ubi), has, with the development of nuclear
fusion technology usin~ the method of locking helical magnetic field, finally
decided to place its target on "Heliotron F Plan," to achieve the Lawson criterion
- needed trigger nuclear fusion. Since the Heliotron E(P1an], which was carried
out by the joint efforts of industry, academia, and government to establish Japan's
autonomy in fusion technology, resulted in plasma [formation] in excess of the
Center's expectation, the next stage will be the implementation of the F Pla~n. The
F Plan aims at establishing the Lawson criterion of 100 million degree ion tem-
perature, 100 trillion particles per 1 cm3 ion density, and 1 second lock-up time,
and at generation of electric power by utilizing the heat on the blanket. The plan
is expected to be completed in 5 years from 1982, at a cost of 70-100 billion yuan.
If this plan is materialized, 3t will become the world's first testing reactor; how-
= ever, to conduct power generation tests would mean that an attempt will be made to
~ move a step further in the creation of a prototype reactor.
Construction Will Start in 1982 at a Cost of 70-100 Billion Yen
The goal of the Heliotron E, which began its experiments last August, was to arrive
at a stage just prior to that of nuclear fusion, i.e., 100 trillion particles per
1 cm3 plasma density, 10 million degree plasma temperature, and 0.01 second energy
lock-up time; the goal wa~ also to obtain some positive sign regarding the con-
struction of a testing reactor. Within 3 months, however, the various goals were
achieved at maximum values, and the lock-up time is increasing nearly fivefold--all ~
in all an extraordinary feat. Ordinarily, [the results of] a nuclear fusion test
are expressed in terms of nt, the product of plasma density and lock-up time; the
values of E were recorded at 1018-1019, the target values.
- In~comparison to the large-scale Tokamak-type, E is capable of producing ~oule plasma
which is nearly equal to those produced by the U.S.'s "PLT" and USSR's "T-10," both
of which are now under operation. The Tokamak-~type is extremely involved, as it
requires f ive coils, for the toroidal, magnetic surface restoration, joule heat,
current position control, and diverter; and heliotron-t}r~e is more compact, since
it is capable of adding heat to the plasma by neutron incidence and by high fre-
quency (electronic cyclotron resonance) heating; thus, plasma can be controlZed
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
by one helical coil. The beta value (ob~:ained by dividing plasma pressure by mag-
- netic pressure; the greater the value, the better) indica~es the stabili.ty of the
- plasmay which is related to the lock-up time. While the Tokamaic�s [beta value] is
2-4 percent, [that of heliotron] shows a minimum of 7 percent, accarding to a -
theoretical computatio,r, based on the three dimensional code of Mr Galahedian [7]
at the P1ant Institure of Mathematics, N.Y., U.S.A.; [Heliotrc;n's] superiority is
thus recognized. I:i addition, while the Tokamak type can only op erate intermittently,
the Hili~tron can operate can~inuously; because of this, the l3tter requires less
plasma heating cost, and is therefore equipped with conditions better suited for
pra~tical reactors.
The Heliotron F measures 8 m in large torus radius; Che helical co i1 is 1.2 m in
small radius, ~J.~ m in thickness, and 4t~-50 kilo gauss fn magnetic field intensity.
, Its hydrogen discharge is 15,000 times, heavy hydrogen discharge, 5,000; its goal is
" to burn for 100 seconds at an extremely high D-T combustion ratio of 50 percent, a
process which produces helium through nuclear f,.?sion of heavy hydrogen and tritium.
The hrat added to the plasma is 30-50 megawatt; the toroidal coil is not used, a -
power generator is attached to ~he blanket locally. The helical coil uses a super
- conductive material, niobium titanium; its development and the engineering develop- -
; ment of the energy exttacting method are the problems for the future.
~ The targeted plasma ion temperature is 100-~50 million degrees; ion density, 100-200
- trillion particles per 1 cm3; average beta v~lue, over S p~rcent; and lock-up time,
- over 1 second.
For the construction of the reactor, Hitachi, Ltd. has developed high prec:tsion thick
discharge tubes, helical coils, power sources, and neutron incidence system, all of
which represent the world's highest technological standards. Mitsubishi Electric -
and Tokyo Shibaura Electric are responsible for microwave heat addition system and
laser Thomson scattering measuring systQm; since manufacturing technologies of
these systems are almost complete, the conatruction period is expected to last 5
years. However, since the project will cost 70-100 billion yen and there is no
, space at the Uj i Campus of Kyoto University, it appears that the project cannot be
' executed unless a national research organ is created.
j Beginning next year, the researchers from Kyoto University, including Toshio Sawada,
president of the University, and prof essor Ubi, and the interested industries will
~ try to persuade Prime Minister Suzuki and Minister of Education Tanaka to have the
construction started in 1982. Also, with a thought of improving ..:ze E plasma's
various individual performances on a comprehensive level, Toshio Doko, honorary .
chairman of Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, visited the Heliotron
[Center]; it is said that he showed a strong interest and support toward the F
Plan, in its effort to establish domestic technologies. The dream of nuclear fus ion
has progressed a step further toward realization.
- COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha 1980 -
37 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
_
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY'
Money For Light Water Reactor
Tokyo DENKI SHIMBUN in Japanese 24 Dec 80 p 3
[Text] In order to enhance the reliability of light water reactor by independent
technology, improve the rate of operation, and radically reduce the level of con-
tamination by employees, MITI has been promoting the improvement standardization
program since 19$0; the program is now entering its final stage. As a result of
MITI's repeated negotiations, which lasted until the 26th, on the drafting of the
budget of the Ministry of Finance for the next f iscal year, the budget requested
for the third improvement standardization program was almost totally approved; the
~ MITI feels that, "With this, the autonomy of Japanese-made light water reactors will '
be established, and that Japan can engage actively in surveys for the third plan
and in proving tests during the coming fiscal year." ~
The amount that MITI asked for to achieve the third jmprovement standardization ;
program is 1.25 billion yen for the Electric Power Special Association and 200
million yen for general accounts; total, 1.45 billion yen. Of these the Ministry ;
' of Finance approved almost the entire amount of development consignment expenses {
for internal pumps and high performance fuels (total, 750 million yen), requested ~
by the Special Association. As for the development consignment of the automatic
inspection system (500 million yen), 2/3 of it was approved as subsidy. A request
for survey expenses under general accounts was also approved almost in its entirety.
The third plan, which seeks to complete a Japanese light water reactor by 1990,
will conduct large-scale proving tests and, simultaneously, develop long-lasting
fuels, etc. In particular, the focus is on domestic production of the reactor.core,
" and it is forecasted that a light water reactor suitable for operation by the .
Japanese will be constructed, i.e., its (1) capacity will be 1.3-1.4 billion kw;
(2) it will be easily loaded and followed up, and (3) it will further reduce the
amount of contamination by employees.
On the other hand, the light water reactor multi-purpose utilization survey consignment
expenses (70 million yen), which had been newly incorporated into the budget for the
next fiscal year and requested under MITI's nuclear energy development and utilization
prom.otion policy, were almost totally (62 million yen) approved, but on condition
that they will be applied to develop~ient survey of small and medium ligl~t water
reactors principally for power generation. It was also decided that, as of next
fiscal year, the planning subcommittees, newly established under MITI's advisory Com-
mittees on Comprehensive Energy Investigation and Nuclear Energy, will discuss the
= significance of the development of small and medium light water reactors, their ;
prospects, and their develo~ment schedules.
Budget For New Plant Sites
Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 29 Dec 80 p 3
[Text] At the resumption of budget negotiations for the next fiscal year, MITI
received approval of its "power plant sites countermeasures suUsidy" system, designed
to promote acquisition of land for nuclear power oeneration and other sources of
- electricity. The system, in its approved form, consists of two parts ("Regional
promotion countermeasures subsidy for power plant sites" and "City-town-village sub-
- sidy for hydroelectric power generation facilities") and not four, as it was ori-
ginally requested. A summary of the system was revealed on the 28th. ,
38
FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFFICiAL USE ONLY
The subs~dy for regional promotion is comprised of those given to "areas surrounding
nuclear power generation facilities" and to "prefectures exporting electric power."
~ The former applies to prefectures wherein are found nuclear reactors, test reactors,
and processing facilities oY whose cities, towns, and villages are located near them.
The breakdown of the firsz subsYdy is as follows: (1) Depending on the capacity of
the facilities, the unit cost for private citizens will be 300-900 yen per contract
kilowatt, for enterprises, 75-225 yen. The total amount of subsidy is derived from
multiplying the unit cost by the contract kilowatt hours of the households and the
enterprises; (2) a 50 percent increment will be added to subsidies applicable to new
facilities; (3) the applicable facilities include those now under operation, under
construction, and those which will be completed by 1985. The recipient prefecture
_ will distribute its subsidy among residents aad enterprises as "cooperation funds,"
but it can be used for regional promotion as well. The subsidy program will begin
on October 1, with a budget of 3.027 billion yen.
The second subsic~y, given to "prefectures exporting electricity," applies to those
whose volume of power generat~ed exceeds cor.sumption by more than 1.5 and more than
half of whose land is comprised of `~.ndustrial] inducement areas" and areas conjoining
them, as determined by the Law to Promoto Redistribution of Industry. (1) Depending
on the volume of electricity exported, subsidy will range from 50 million to 400
million yen; (2) subsidy will be given for large-scale creation of employment in
ciries, towns, and villages where power generation facilities are located, and for
modernization of regional industries. The budget calls for 2.3 billion yen.
As for hydroelectric subsidies, a sum equal to 0.05 yen per annual kilowatt hour
generated will be gi.ven to cities, towns, and villages within which are located
hydroelectric plants (output exceeding 100 kilowatts; electric power output, over
- 5 mtllion kilowatt hours) that are 15 years or older. The minimum amount of guar-
aateed subsidy is 3 million yen, the maximum, 30 million yen. The applicable period
- is seven years, but it will be extended to eight years for cities, towns, and
villages that are willing to cooperate in new constructions. The budget calls for
= 3.538 billion yen. ,
- The subsidy to cover the expenses for the upkeep and management of public facilities
was not approved; in its place, the application of the existing "power plant sites
countermeasures subsidy" will be expanded, and the upkeep expenses will be met by
operating profits derived from a reserve fund equal to maximum of 10 percent of the
allowed subsidy.
. Furthermore, it was revealed that the Power Plant Site Procurement Special Committee's
surplus of 10 billion yen will be applied to the establishment of these new sub-
~ sidies, and the increase in power geaeration tax will be postponed until fiscal 1982.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha 1980
_ Constructing Underground Plants
~ T'okyo NIKKEI SANGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 18 Dec 80 p 1
[Text] Due to crude oil price hikes, expectation toward nuclear power generation as
an alternate energy source has intensified; in the meantime, major constru~tion
companies have all at once embarked on studies of underground nuclear power plants.
39
FOR OFFICIAI, USE ONL.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
This is because, since construction of nuclear power plants continues to be delayed `
greatly due to difficult site conditions and anti-nuclear movements, such locations
as formerly considered impossible to construct plants, as along the slopes teading
to the sea and national parks, are now, thanks to the underground method, con- ~
- sidered possibilities. The [underground] construction method has drawn much
attention as a breakthrough in coping with difficult site conditions, and the com-
panies are seriously committing themselves to und~rground projects by organizing _
_ project teams, etc. The underground nuclear power plant in particular requires com-
parably greater amount of construction work than surface plants, ar:d also needs
- romprehensive technologies, as in earthquake-proof designs and digging of large
underground caves; therefore it constitutes a new market for the comprehensive con-
- struction companies which are suffering from shortage of large-scale construction
works. A]-ready they have started preliminary battles to obtain orders.
Resolving Difficult Site Conditions
According to the "Long-term Energy Supply and Demand Tentative Prospect" compiled
last September by the Comprehensive Energy Survey Committee of the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, Japan plans to increase nuclear power generation
from the present output of about 15 million kw to 53 million kw by 1990. It means
Chat four nuclear power plants of 1 million kw capacity must be built eacYe year _
during the next 10 years; however, due to difficult site conditions and public ~
opposition, the increase in output is in danger.
For this reason, MITI has had an eye on underground nuclear power plants whose
research is most advanced in the U.S. and in Europe. In 1977, [MITI] established
the "Underground Nuclear Power Plant Study Co~ittee," comprised of nuclear power
equipment makers and general construction companies, and has been promoting a study
of overseas examples and conducting earthquake-proof experiments. As a result,
it concluded that such plants are "technologically feasible" in Japan. This f iscal
year [riITI] has consigned Electric Power Development Co. to conduct a feasibility
' study of a 1 million kw-class underground power plant; it expects to finish a con-
ceptual design by next March; it is also studying the construction of an experi-
- mental plant.
Under these circumstances, the major construction companies are seriously conducting
studies of underground power plants. Ka~ima Corpoxation, Taisei Corporation,
Ohbayashi-Gumi, Ltd., and Hazama-Gumi, Ltd.--all with experiences in nuclear and
underground power generations--have been participating in the enterprise research
of power development from the very beginning. In addition, the Shimizu Construction
Co., Ltd. will handle the earthquake-proof design of underground spaces. So the
~ battle for bids for underground generation plants has already begun.
The major construction companies are interested in underground power generation, =
because, in comparison to surface construction, the volume of construction work is
, far greater and because the added values are higher. For example, for an under-
ground plant with power outpu~ of a million kilowatt, a turbine wiil require a
~ large space, measuring 31 m in width, 80 m in height, and 230 m in width; additionally,
seven or eight large tunnels and side tunnels are needed for the reactor and `
related facilities. In sum, about 2 million square meters of earth must be removed.
As a result the proportion of plar~t related expenseG to construction expenses would ~
increase from 10:1 on the surface to 7:3 or, depending on the condition of the land,
6;4 below the surface.
1~0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Since domestic demand for large-scale construction works like dams and railroad
tunnels is declining, the underground plants are very attractive to these companies.
Kaji.ma Corporation, which holds the greatest performance record for consCruction of
_ boiling water reactors, has set up an underground nuclear power generation project
group, comprised of specialists from all areas under the leadership of its Atomic
Energy Room; it is also engaged in ~oint research with Tokyo Electric Power Co.,
Ltd., as one of its new on-the-spot measures. Hazama-Gumi, which is fast catching
up with its competitions in pressurized water reactors, has assigned 15 full-time
specialists to the underground project at its research center, indicating, thereby,
. the great expectations it harbors.
In the West, small-scale underground generators are in operation. On account of
the Three Mile Island incident and for reasons of defense, western countries are
actively engaged in developing underground facilities, It is expected that in Japan
too research will be quickened. In a new field such as this, the enterprise that
- succeeds in winning the contract f irst will lead others by a great margin. For
this reason, competition is f ierce among the major construction companies.
~ COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1980
~ Plutonium Reprocessing Methods Examined
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 26 Dec 80 p 4
[Text] The Japan Nuclear Fuel Service (2-2-2 Uchisaiwai-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo;
president, Kiyoshi Goto), which has been making preparations for the building of the
[world's] first privately owned plutonium reprocessing plant, has established a
committee to e~ine the various reprocessing methods; the committee will begin the
process of selecting the method to be used in the plant. It will examine the
method used in the Tokai Reprocessing Plant operated by the Power Reactor and
Nuclear ~uel Development Corporation; it will also examine the methods used in West
' Germany, the U.S., and other countries. Based on their examina.tion, the committee
will select a method which is most appropriate for commercial operation of a
reprocessing plant; this will be completed by next May. Already, the company has
received offers of technical assistance from France, West Germany, and the U.S.;
its final decision is expected to dra.w much attention.
The company was formed in March with the aim to reprocess spent nucleax fuels from
- nuclear power plants; it was established with investments from te-+. electric power
companies and ninety firms from various industries. According to its plan, the
company will invest about 700 billion yen and construct a plant with at:~ annual
. capacity of 1,200 tons; it is expected to be com~leted by 1990. In addition to
reprocessing, it will also engage in transportat:r..0I1 of spent fuels, safegsarding of
nuclear wastes, and related services. It will be the first privately owned
reprocessing company in the world.
To reprocess spent nuclear fuel is to recover uranium that remains after nuclear
- fuel is burnt inside a light water reactor a~d to recover the new substance,
plutonium, produced when uranium is burning. This process is az~ important part of
the nuclear fuel cycle in terms of secuzing nuclear fuel and in terms of efficient
use of uranium, the fuel for nuclear power generation. The f irst reprocessing
plant in Japan was built in Tokaa.mura (Ibaragi prefecture) by the Power Reactor and
Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation; the proposed commercial plant will be Japan's
second. .'~t present, the company is searching for a plant site, but has decided to
go ahead with the selection process of the reprocessing method.
1~1
FOR OFFICIAL USE; ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFEICIAL USE ONLY
Basically, the company will follow the method now being used in the Tokai plant.
- Because the company will be operating a"commercial plant," the electric power
industry is looking at the cost aspect of the new plant and will study as many can-
didates as po~sible. Recently, president Goto and top executives of the company
v isited Great Briea~ocessinCet chnol gry.~nItawastat these talks that offersaofs
with leaders in r p g
technical cooperation were made.
The reprocessing examination committee will select the method from among domestic
and foreign sources that is b~st suited for the new plant. The committee is com-
prised of specialists on reproces5 X~~�mionTis expectedato endhnextgMay~.ency, and
the electric power industry. The e
- COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1980 -
Tokai Plutonium Reprocessing Facility Capacity ;
i
Tokyo DENKI SIiIMBUN in Japanese 26 Dec 80 p 1 ~
[Text] On the 25th, Director Nakagawa of the Science and Technology Agency issued ~
the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation a certificate for operation
of the Tokai plutonium reprocessing p].ant� The certificate allows the Corporation ~
to manage the facilities under the name of "Tokai Reprocessing Plant" and to operate
it at full capacity beginning January 1981. The approval comes after nine years of
construction work that~began in 1971. The policy of the Corporation is to operate
the plant through two compaigns" a year during which it will handTh~10apac~ity of
(daily reprocessing capacity = 0.7 tons) of spentc nuclQar fuels.
the Tokai plant, however, has been lifted to 99 tons by the 1977 U.S.-Japan joint
statement, and the present period of operation will terminate at the end of next
April. For this reason, the policy [of the Corporation] is to strongly request the
U.S. to allow for continued operation of the plant. Because of the transition to
Reagan administration, it is expected that the agreement between the two countries '
will be a tentative one. f
I
Japan-U.S. Conference, the Possibility of a Tentative Agreement -
As he handed the certificate, Director Naka.gawa said, "I wish to express my respect
for a decade of hard work which finally brought the plant to full operating capacity.
In the'~future, all precautions must be made to ensurs the safe operation of the
plant. Chairman Segawa of the Corporation responded that, "the world is watching
Japan's reprocessing method. We will do our best to establish Japan's own repro-
cessing technolegy."
The construction of the Tokai plant was begun in June 1971; chemical tests started
The operation of the
in 1974; uranium tests in 1975; hot tests, since July 1977.
plant was halted at one point for a year and several months, when the acid recovery
evaporation canister broke down. This January a comprehensive test was conducted
The present
- for spent fuels of the BWR type, and hot tests were also concluded.
certif icate was issued as a result of two compaigns to check the performance of
the plant, as required by the amend.ment to the Nuclear Reactox Regulatory Law passed ;
toward the end of 1979� tudiedetheeresultsiofthotatestsuand giventitscapprovalSafety
Commission had already s
1.~2
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFF[CIAL USE ONLY
With the upcoming full-scale operation of the plant, the Corporation has decided
to rename it from Tokai Business Office Reprocessing Construction Office to Tokai
Reprocessing Plant. The reprocessing cost will also change from the present ten-
_ tative rates to more perm.anent [i.e., official] rates, which have "99 percent cer-
tainty of being approved, requiring only the signature." (director Nakajima) 7'he
daily reprocessing capacity at Tokai is 0.7 ton; the annual capacity was originally
set at 200 tons, but at present "the goal is set at 100-140 tons, and will be
raised a s performance increases gradually." (chairman Segawa) This is because if
the number of days spent on aunual inspection, on clearing proced~ires for [nuclear]
material accountancy needed as safeguards for plutonium production, and on resuming
the once-halted operation are subtracted, the total number of operating days, at
present, stands at "200 on average." (director Nakajima) The policy of the Cor-
porat ion is to increase tr~is number as technology is upgraded. The plant will
operat e twice a year, before and after the Bon Festival [i.e., July 15]. The
shearing process will begin on or about January 17.
Although full-scale operation is thus expected, the 1977 Japan-U.S. joint statement
limits the reprocessing volume to 99 tons. Although the applicable period was
_ extended, it will still terminate at the end of next April. For this reason, in
order to prevent the shut-down of the operation in mid course, non-official nego-
tiations with the U.S. are already taking place thLough diplomatic channels. Japan
would 1 ike to conclude a complete agreement instead of a tentative one, but for
practical reasons it is considered difficult in light of the transitional state of
the Reagan administration. To achieve an agreement by next spring, it is strongly
felt that what can be obtained will be a tentative and partial Flgreement. At present,
the t hree reprocessing plants in operation are located at Karlsruhe (W. Germany),
La Hague (France) , and Tokai.
Metal-Cutting Techaiques for Decommissioning Reactors
Tokyo NIHON KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 27 Dec 80 p 5
[Text] Fourteen years have elapsed since commercial reactors began operation in Japan.
In general, a life-span of a reactor is 30-40 years, so that in another 20 years the
reactors in Japan will face retirement. The Atomic Energy Co~aission and MITI, in
preparat ion for the future, have been working on a policy to deal with "used"
reactors. Accompanying this is the development of [metal-] cutting techniques for
- decommissioning nuclear reactors.
There are three ways in which reactors can be decommissioned.
(lne of these is called the "Lock and Perpetual Care Method," whereby plutonium,
coolants, and nuclear wastes, and all other radioactive materials are removed from
the site, the facility Locked up and radioactivity monitored perpetually. A number
of reactors, principally experimental and test reactors, throughout the world has
been decommissioned by this method,. In 1970, the Japan Atomic Energy Research
Institute [JAERI] decommissioned its experimental reactor, the "JRR-1" (thermal
output: 50 kw), using this method.
- The second is called the "Seal and Isolate Method," whereby, after removing radio-
active materials, the facility, containing highly contaminated reactor and steam
generator, is sealed with concrete or asphalt. This is the method used in the U.S.
and Sweden.
~~3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
EOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The third is imown as the "Disassembly and Removal Method." The reactor facility
is literally disassembled cotapletely and removed from the site.
This method is also used in the U.S., the most we1Z-known being the decommissioning
_ of the experimental BWR (Boiling Water Reactor) "Elk River" (thermal output: 80,000
kw), completed in two years from 1972. Another, though not off icial, is the decom-
missioning of DOE's (U.S. Department of Energy) commercial PWR (Pressurized Water
Reactor) "Shippingport" (electric output: 50,000 kw). "NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission) feels that it has the technology to decommission it safely." (Saburo
Yamada, chief researcher, Nuclear Energy Development Research Institute, The Tokyo
Electric Power Company, Inc.)
It is uncertain which of the three methods Japan would use, until the results of a
study recently began by the Atomic Energy Commission's Reactor Decommissioning
Committee are in. It is, however, strongly felt that "methods other than disassembly
would create reactor 'graves.' Considering the difficulty of locating new nuclear
generation sites, the two methods are inadequate. The principle, method for Japan,
would be that ~f disassembly and removal." (Takao Hirakawa, vice-director, Nuclear
Energy Development Headquarters, The Tokyo Electric Power Company, Inc.; Kiyoshi
Ragimoto, chief, Technology Promotion Section, Atomic Energy Bureau, Science and -
Technology Agency).
For this reason, as a test case, the Science and Technology Agency is planning a
project to disassemble and remove by 1985 the JAERI's power test reactor "JPDR"
(thermal output: 90,000 kw; Tokaimura, Ibaragi prefecture). The above furnishes
the background for the development of inetal-cutting techniques for decommissioning
nuclear reactors. Four techniques are under study now.
A nuclear reactor is constructed of concrete and metal. Since concrete is used in
a way that is Zess susceptible to radioactive contamination [than metal], it can be
removed almost like an ordinary concrete building. The problem is the metal. In
= order to disassemble and remove contaminated pressurized containers, steam generators,
and piping for primary coolants, remote control underwater-cutting technique is
needed. In particular, since stainless steel, which is difficult to cut, is used
throughout, a new cutter becomes indispensable. One cutter, an arc-saw, is being
developed now. ~
The arc-saw technique, developed 9n the U.S., has not been seriously studied in
Japan. A metal is cut by the energy generated by an arc, which is created when a -
cathodic disk made of soft metal or copper is rotated near the z_nodic metal at high
- speed. Although it requires a large amount of electricity to rotate the disk under-
- water, and this is its drawback, the technique is said to be appropriate for cut-
ting pipes.
Recently Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries succeeded in actual application of an -
underwater plasma cutting technique. This technique is similar to the one described -
above in its use of the arc heat,
[Under the Ishikawajima-Harima technique,] easily ionizable gases like helium,
hydrogen, nitrogen, and argon are turned into plasmas (a condition in which electrons
and nuclei are dispersed) by the arc heat created between the material to be cut and
the electrodes. The plasma, extracted thr~ugh a nozzle, is spouted against the
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFF[C[AL tISE ONLY
material, melting it and dispersing the melted portion. "The temperature of the
plasma reaches 10,000-30,000 C�." (Uhachiro Nakamura, Ishikawajima-Harima Welding
Research Center) Accordingly, any heat-resiating metal can be cut.
Ishikawajima-Harima has sold its f irst model [Mode'. 1] to the Power Reactor and
Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation. The Corporation will use it for decommissioning
- the facility for testing materials used in the new-type convertor reactor. This
facil ity, which is attached to the JAERI's Material Test Reactor (JMTR; Oarai,
Ibaragi Prefecture), has already undergone intra-reactor irradiation testing.
Model 1 is still weak in power, and so would require power-up research before it can
be used for decommissioning nuclear reactors. Still, it ha.s been reported that a
similar plasma cutting technique was used to decommission the Elk River Reactor.
- With the eventual goal of establishing a reactor decommissioning business, Ishikawajima-
_ Harima plans to emphasize the research in improving the plasma cutter.
- The third technique is called the "Melt-poles waterjet cutting technique," which
is being developed by the Shikoku Experiment Station of the Agency of Industrial
- Science and Technology.
- Their technique also uses arc heat to cut the metals, but its special feature is
the use of soft wire. To cut through a sheet of inetal, an arc, generated between
the wire and the sheet, is moved up and down the sheet, while applying a jet of
water to the portion being cut to disperse the molten metals.
- This cutting-technique is a Japanese invention, developed by the Shikoku Industrial
[Science and Technology] Experiment [Station]. The Sankyo Engineering, which holds
the commercial rights, is moving toward its actual application, and has entered
into joint research with Kawasaki Heavy Industries.
"Because of the nature of electric power source, there is a limit to the thickness
of the sheet to be cut. It may not cut sheets exceeding 10 cm in thickness," says
Masanobu Hamazaki, Department of Machinery and Metals, Shikoku Station. The
specialists, however, evaluate it highly.
The fourth technique, using gas, is divided into two methods, being developed also
by the Shikoku Station. One is called the "wire-cutting method," based on the
powder-cutting technique that is used for cutting stainless steels in atmosphere.
The powder-cutting method uses metal powder which is mixed into the oxygen blasting
against the metal. The metal is cut by the heat generated by this mixing and by
the energy resulting from the bombarding of the iron oxide against the metal.
This, horaever, cannot be done underwater, since the powder is wet. To avoid this,
the first of the two gas-cutting techniques uses wire. The thickness of the
= metal is limited to 10-15 cm, but this disadvantage is overcome by the fact that
"~,�hen hydrogen is burned, excess oxygen r_ontaminated during cutting combines with
hydrogen to produce water. Since radioactive gas returns ta the water, contamination
is held down to a considerable extent." (Hamazaki)
~5
FOR OFFICIAL [JSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFF(CIAL l!tiH; ONI.Y
The second gas-cutting technique, the development of which is being pushed by the
Shikoku Station, tries to cut thicker metals than the wire-cutting method. Because
of patent, the details are not available, but testings thus far have shown that it
is capable of cutting a stainless sheet, 15 cm thick, at a speed o� 7-10 cm per
- minute. Mr Hamazaki feels that "the tests show that the technique can be applied
to metals more than 20 cm Chick."
A pressurized container of a 1.1 million-kw-class nuclear reactor (BWR) is huge; it
is over 6 m in circumference, 23 m high, and weighs 750 ton. The maximum thickness
of the metal, the interior of which is crudded with stainless steel, is ab~ut 20 cm
(the flange sections, etc.) The second gas-cutting method is then fully capable of
cutting through the metal. Due to these various developments, MITI will begin
testing several of these cutting-techniques for actual use. It plans to begin
testing in 1981 and summarize the results by 1983.
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Kogyo Shimbunsha 1980
Radioactive Waste Disposal Technology
Tokyo DENKI SHIM3UN in Japanese 20 Dec 80 p 1
[Text] At the extraordinary meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on the 19th,
the Special Co~ittee on Radioactive Wastes Policy [hereafter, Special CommitteeJ
(chairman: Fumio Yamazaki, director, Japan Radioisotope Association) submitted a
~ report, "On the Promotion of Research and Development of High-level Radioactive
Wastes Processing and Disposal." The Power Reactor snd Nuclear Fuel Development
Corporation [hereafter, Power & Fuel Corporation] and the Japan Atomic Energy -
Institute have been conducting on-the-spot surveys in accordance with the provisions
of the "Research and Development Plans for Radioact ive Wastes," compiled in 1976.
= The present report, based on reviews of the past plans, sets new guidelines for
processing and disposal of high-level radioactive wastes. These differ from the
past plans in three major respects: (1) the emphasis is on the use of borosilicic
acid glass for solidifying and disposing high-level radioactive liquid waste; (2)
the five-stage research and development of ground disposal technology; and (3) in
grounci disposal, the basic policy to be followed will be to combine natural and _
man-m;3de "barriers."
_ A Report by the Special Committee of the Afiomic Energy Commission
In October 1976, the Atomic Energy Commission revealed its basic policy for radio-
active wastes. In June of the same year, the then "Special Technical Committee for
Radioactive Wastes Policy" compiled a plan (in the form of interim report) for
research and development of technologyfor processing and disposal of these wastes.
The Power and Fuel Corporation and the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute have
be~n engaging in research based on this [interim] plan. But since the plan was no
more than an outline, the Special Committee compiled a new R&D program for htgh-
lev~l wastes, based on studies of developments that have since emerged after the
- establishment of the first plan. The new plan is compiled on "the premise that
matters close to completion in terms of R&D will be described in detail, while those
requiring future work will be viewed from the perspective of the antire project."
For aIl practical purpose~, however, the plan provides concrete guidance for all
~ future R&D.
- 46
- FOR OFFIC[AL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2047/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL t)SE ONLY
The high-level wastes refer to contaminated liquids containing large quantities of
- radioactive substances that remain when spent nuclear fuels are reprocessed. They
are disposed of after being turned to stahle solid states and temporarily stored.
The report first emphasizes the use of borosilicic acid glass in the disposal
technique employing the solidification process; this particular glass is the most
widely used material in the world. Cold and hot tests an the engineering and
experimental room scale, respectively, will be conducted. Already, for the purpose
of hot test in an experimental room where solidification of actual liquid waste is
- to take place, a high-level radioactive substance research facility (CPF) is being
Gonstructed; the test will b egin in 1981. Engineer~ng hot test, which wi11 be
based on the results [of the cold test], is expected to begin in 1987. With the
latter in mind, the design and construction of a pilot plant for solidif ication and
storage will be promoted; glass solidification disposal and temporary storage
technologies will be verified; and safety evaluation test will also be promoted.
As for R& D of waste ground disposal, the present report recommends the introduction
of grout and buffer materials, and other forms of engineeriug barriers. "Based
~ on the princip~e that by combining natural, i.e. earth's strata, and engineering
barriers, [the wastes] must be separated from the human environment," the report
specifies five stages for developing the ground disposal technology: (1) a study
. of the earth's strata which hold posaibilities as barriers for disposed wastes; (2)
a study of strata which can be used effectively; (3) a simulated on-the-spot solidi-
f ication test; (4) an actual on-the--spot solidif ication test; and, (5) experimental
disposal. In the f irst stage, research will center on ground disposal9 engineering
barrier, and ground disposal system. The selection of "effective" strata will be
concluded by the end of 1984; the selection of a test site will begin in 1991, and
by the end of 1994 an appropriate site should be decided upon. 1"he simulated test
will be conducted during 1995-2005; the "actual" test, during 2005-2015; the experi-
mental disposal will b egin from 2015 and continue for about five years.
The report also cites the need for R& D in new solidif ication technology like the
metal matrix method, group separation of nuclides w~th long half-lives, and
"extinction process" for converting tran,suranic elements to nuclides with ehort
half-lives.
It is said that from a ton of spent nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive substances
equal to 100 liters of glass solid state can be obtained; from a million kw
[reactor], about 30 solid states. At present power generation lc~el, it is cal-
culated that a thousand states will be produced in 1990, four thousand in 1995.
The establishment of processing and disposal technology is being pushed from the.
viewpoint of securing a nuclear fuel cycle. France leads the world in R& D of
_ this technology.
' The following is a summary of the report, "On the Promotion of Research and Develop-
ment of High-level Radioact ive Wastes Processing and Disposal." (A report prepared
: by the Special Committee).
G~7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFiCIAL USE ONI.Y
1. Basic Approach: The high-level radioactive substances are produced in small
quantities, but their half-lives are long and they possess radioactivity. From
the viewpoint of preventing environmental and human contamination, the wastes must
- be isolated and controlled.
For this reason, high-level radioactive wastes are to be put into stable solid
forms, stored temporarily, and disposed.
The R& D of high-level waste proces8ing and disposal has been conducted by the
Power & Fuel Corporation and by the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute. This
was done in accordance with the "Research and Development Plans for Radioactive
Wastes." (interim report of the Specia.l Committee, June 1976).
This report presents new R& D plans, based on the premise that matters nearer to
completion in terms of research and development will be detailed, while those
requiring future work will be viewed from the persp~ective of the entire project.
2. Development of glass solidification processing technology: Thia technology wi11
- emphasize the use of borosilicic acid glass, the application of which is expected to
be realized soon and which now represents the most widely used tech;.iology in the world.
~ The follow3ng R& D will be pursued;
(1) Engineering-scale cold test (solidification using simulated liquid wasCe): The
development of technologies related to glass solidif ication using uncontaminated
simulated wastes; these include technologies for liquid waste processing, melt ing,
- off-glass processing canister handling, temporary storage, etc.
(2) Test-scale hot test (solidification using actual liquid waste): The development
of technologies related to glass solidification using contaminated liquid in the
"high-level radioactive substance research facility (CPF)" now being built.
(3) Engineeriaig-scale hot test (verification test): Based on the results of above
_ tests, design and construction of "solidification and storage pilot plant" will be
promoted, with the gaal of opening the plant by 1987. The plant will be used to
verify the glass solidification and temporary storage technologies.
(4) Safety Evaluation Test: At the "Wastea Safety Testing Facility" (WASTEF),
special characteristics such as leakage, heat transmission, and heat expansion rates
will be measured, using the glass solidif ication of contaminated liquid wastes.
3. Ground Disposal R& D: As a rule, ground disposal will be based on "comb ination
of natural, i.e. earth's strata, and engineering barriers;" by this method, high-
lsvel radioa~tive wastes will be removed from human environment. The long-term
R& D of ground disposal technology will be divided into the following five stages;
- running parallel to these will be research on safet~~ evaluation: `First stage: A
survey of possibly effective strata~ = Conduct research based on the available
liter~ture on strata (rock), natural, and social factors. Select a number of "pos-
sible strata for ground disposal research. The results of examination of the
special features of each stratum and of the research on engineering barrier will be
combined for the purpose of selecting "effective strata."
!~8
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPR~VED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
I
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~Second stage: Examination of effective strata~ = On-the-spot survey of selected
~ites, including drilling, extensive land surveys, and on-the-spot testing of
engineering barriers. After comprehensive r.eviews, a final test site will be
selected.
~Third stage: On-the-spot testing of siv;,ulated solida~ = At the selected testing
site, the cold disposal aystem will be ec;�tablished by testing the simulated solids.
~Fourth stage: On-the-spot testing of actual solids~j = Conduct a test using the
actual solids and establish the hot disposal system.
~Fifth stage: Exper3mental disposal7 = The solids will be carried into the testing
site, and experimental disposal will be conducted.
Of the five stages, the emphasis now is on the "Survey of Possibly effective Strata,"
found under the first stage; for this, the following R& D will be promoted:
~First stage: Survey of possibly effective strata~
(1) Survey and research on strata = In order to clarify the stratification of the
possibly effective strata, various surveys, water permeability tests, and nuclide
suction tests, etc. will be conducted. The strata~s ability to contain wastes will
be examined also.
(2) R& D on engineering barriers = Along with the development of buffer technology
for engineering barriers, a test will be conducted to evaluate ite soundness.
(3) Research on Ground Disposal System = Along with the clarif ication of the
general concept regarding the ground disposal system appropriate to conditions in
Japan, the eff iciency of the ground and engineering barriers will be evaluated.
(4) Research on Safety Evaluation = In order to evaluate the effects on human beings
of dispoEing high-level radioactive wastes, an environment mobile model will be
developed.
(4) Others = In addition to those which are now under research and development, there
is a need to promote R& D of new solidif ication technologies like the metal matrix
- method, of group separation.of nuclides with long half-lives, and of "extinction
- processing" that converts transuranic elements to nuclides with .,hort half-lives.
- 9710 '
CSO: 4105
49
FOR OFE'[CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SCIENCE AND TECI~IOLOGY -
- PLANS FOR OFF-SHORE NUCLEAR ENERGY PLANT STUDYED
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SHIMBUN ia Japanese 7 Feb 81 p 4 _
[Article: "Location of Nuclear Power Sources; 0�f-shore if not on Hand;
Feasibility Study for Realization; MITI To Set Up an Investigation Committee
Soon"]
[Text] Uader a 4-year project from 1981, the Ministry of InternaCional Trade
and Industry (MITI) will pursue the possib ility of actualization of a method .
of locating nuclear power statioas at sea, so as to be helpful, even in a
small way, in the elimination of difficulties in locating nuclear plants
through conetrucCing nuclear power stations ~t sea. Off-shore nuclear
plants are to be constructed by ths dock method at ~rater depths of
20-150 meter~. They are much expected as medium and small dispersion- tyge
gower sources that can be constructed near electric p~wer consumer areas.
- For this purpose, the MITI decided to set up a Commission for Studying -
Nuclear Reactors Located at Sea in the near future and to nin an in~ves~iga-
tion and study of the economics, safety, aad power transmission systems,
and flexibility in terms of selecting the location of the plants per four
methods; 1) Float-~ype, 2) anchoring to the bottom-type, 3) man-made island
type, and 4) caisson-type. -
The Four Methode: Float-Type, Etc.
Nuclear reactors are considered as oil-alternative energy sources. But, there
is a bit of uacertainty as to their safety; and electric power companies are
experiencing difficulties in procuririg plant s3tes. According to the MITI,
th e sites for nuclear power plants which are to coa~ence their operation
by 1990 are aecured. But, the MITI saqs that other than those, it will be
very difficult to secure sites. Thus, they have conceiued an idea of
- underground and marine-type nuclear plants designed for effective utiYization _
of the land and for enviro~ental safety. Studies of underground nuclear -
plants have already been progressing undar a 4-year pro~ect from i977. From
next year, they will be in the stage of establishing a guideline aimed at
actual plant construction.
Meaawhile, starting from next year, there w3.11 be more and more research on
locating nuclear plants at sea. Under the Float~iethod, a nuclear plant
= wi11 be built on a steel box at the dockyard, taken by tugboat into th e
50
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
- FOR QI'FICIAL USE ONLY
breakwater of an intended location, and will be anchored. Under the
anchoring Co the Bottom Method, a steel box will b~ conatructed, taken by
tugboat to a scheduled spot, and fixed in such a way that the space between
the ocean floor base and the steel box is little.
Under the man-made island method, the in.tended aea area for a generating
- station will be encloaed in a breakwater sc~a wall and enclosed area will be
filled in, hedged off from the open sea. Then, a nuclear plant will be
constru~ted oa the man-made island in tihe same way as those constructeci
. on shore. Under the Caisson-Method, the foundation of the power station
facility will be made o~ concrete or steel caissons with nuclear power
plar_ts set on them. The advantages ot locating nuclear reactors at sea are:
1) Offshore locating at water depths of 20-150 meters is possible, and a
flexibility in location selectivity is increased. 2) It is posaible to
construct the most part of a plant in a factory~ and a large-scale reduction
in manufacturing time can be achieved. On the ather hand, the disadvantages
are pointed out as: 1) The greater the distance from the coast will be,
- the more difficult the method of transmitting electricity will become.
2) There is a problem in guaranteeiag plant safety in withstanding natural -
conditions such as wind and waves. _
'I'here will be a study and investigation, by a commission to be set up in the
near future by MITI, of the four methods, the Float-Method, etc., concerning
economics, safety; and the possibility of their realization will be pursued.
At present, since the difficulties in locat3ng nuclear reactors are being
felt, great interest is being concentrated on this unique research of
locating nuclear plants at sea.
_ COPYRIQiT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1981 ~
9 713-R
CSO: 4105
51 _
~
~'np n~rr;~rnT rtc~ n~tTv
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
- Sr,2ENCE AND TECI~IOLOGY
SMALLER LIGHT WATER REACTOR UNDER DEVELOPMENT
Tokyo NIKKAN KOGYO SflIMBUN in .Japanese 23 Feb 81 p 1
[Article: "Towards Development af Medium and Small Light Water Reactors;
Committee To Be Formed by Industry, Gaver~ent a~:~i Academic World Starting
April: Mode1 Reactor in 1983"] -
[TextJ The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) which is
newly tackling the issue of inedium and small light-water reactors to diversity
and to~supplement light-water reactors which are in the process of expanding
- will inaugurate a"Medium and Small Light-Water Nuclear Reactor Itesearch
and Development Commission" (temporary name) composed of experts from
business, government and the academic world, at the end of April. At first,
_ they will star~ in fiscal 1981, a feasibility study (FS = Development and
Industrialization Research) on mediwm and small reactors capable of having
- multi-purpose utilization including generating electricity in response to
actual region~l conditions. They intend to do their planning and general
conceptualization of inedium and small reactors in f~,scal year 1982, based
on the FS, and to proceed to a trial prodLCtion of their model reactor
- in fis cal 1983. Construction of a small nuclear reactor of the sub -
metropolitan (undergroimd) type has recently been planned also in Grenoble, -
France. The MITI [Ministry af International Trade and Industry] plans to
in~ect more energy into promption of this meditun and small reactor research -
project. ,
The reason why the MITI has tackled this development plan is that the MITI -
has judged rhat reactor manufacturers have brought about sufficient matura-
tion of lighC-water reactor technology by having built many light-water =
reactors, and therefore have acquired enough ability to deal with the new
research of new medium and small reactor devel.opment. At the same time, the
d~velopment of inediiun ar.d small nuclear reactors will make it possible to
establish new power sources close to such sites ae Osaka and Tokyo where
- there is a great demand for electric power, and will provide an effective
_ means of diatributing a large ntmmber of power sources as principal sources
of energy for various regions throughout the entire nation.
- There is also the appeal of their b~ing able to be set up in the midst of
industrial zones an~i camplexes as eaergy reactors far industry not only as a
ge~eral source of electricity but also as a nuclear heat source.
52 -
t'^r '~~.+7rTAT TTCF. n~Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- Thus, through the diversification of nuclear reactors which are the most�
important alternative energy sources, the MITI aims at preparing for future
society which no longQr depends on oil.
In addition, there is also the aim of developing medium and small type
reactors for export purgoses because the developing countries have started -
to want them. These are truly multi-purpose reactors. They are designed
to have aa output of 50,000-300,000 kilawatts. As a result, these medium
and small r~actors will give variety to the present light-water reactor
whose output exceeds 1 million kilowatts.
In 1981, the ministry�will stimulate the needs of various medium and small
reactors, will conduct the FS in relation to their utilization, and will
- consolidate the concept of reactors Co be developed. The commission will
be composed of nuclear reactor manufacturers and the electric power industry
as well as governmer~t and academic eaperts. It is intended that the chairman
will be selected among those who take a"neutral" attitude.
- They intend to set up a working group of specialists under the aegis of the
_ coIImmiss ion and also to entrust a part of the FS to think tanks.
- COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1981
- 9 713-R
- CSO: 4105
53
- FnR n~r~rer TTCF nr~ v
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5
� v~~ v~ ~ ~..a~al.+ uNU VL~L~
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY TO SPEED UP PLANT SITE PROCURIIKENT
Tokyo NII~AN KOGYO SHIMBUN in Japanese 18 Feb 81 p 1 -
[Article: "Speeding Up the Location of Power Sources; Rationalization of
Regulations and Procedures; MITI To Set Up a Study Meeting; To Review the
Review System; Outline by June"]
_ [Text] As there is an urgent need for hasteaing the development of large
power sources including plants, the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) has set up a"Study Meeting for Facilitating ttie Acquisition
of Nuclear Plant Sites" (Chairman Teiichi Yamaaioto, Chief, Development
Branch, Public Utilitq Department, the Agency of Natural Resources and
Energy) within the ministry in order to rationalize the legal and procedural
aspects that are the bottle~eck.for facilitating power source development. And,
it has begun reviewing a series of inspection spstems, procedures, and laws.
- They intend to studq by June a plan, for rationalization of nuclear reactor
- saf eiky~inspection systems and a reasonable combination of procedures and laws,
- and to reflect this on a policy for promoting the development of power
sources to be implemented in 1982 and thereaf ter. On the 17th, the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) also convened the first meeting of the "Headquarters
for the Pro~otion of Nuclear Power Pla.nt Site Acquisition," wh ich is the
LDP's organ to promote the developmeat of power sources. Thus, the develop-
ment of new power sources has come to be a natioual issue and the MITI's -
recent moves �is a part of it. , _
It is the general opinion that the laws and procedures associated with the
establistmient of power plants resemble ~ungle branches which spread in a
complicated manner. Generally, it is sai3 that there are 33 laws and 66
procedures. First, there are those laws that have a principal relationship,
such as: The Territorial Utilization Law, The Rivers Law, The Cultural -
Assets Protec*ion Law, The Natural Parks Law, The Forests Law, The Agricul-
tural Lands Law, laws concerned with the consolidation of agricultural _
promotion areas, The Land Expropriation Law, The Public Waters Reclamation
Law, The Nuclear Reactor Regu]ation Law, The Power Source Promotion and
Development Law, and The Electric Utilities Law. And there are other related
laws too u~erous to mention.
In the case of a large nuclear plant, especially which, it is anticipated
at present would serve as the greatest source of power, tremendous numbers
- of laws and regulations are controlling it from selection of the site where
the plant will be located to commencement of its operation. Saf ety inspections
as well are being designed very strictly.
- 54
*+r~+~ ^,**'+TnTAT 1TC~ nrrr.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
The strictnesa of successive legal and procedural iuvestigations is for the
purpose of eliminating anxiety aad the victimization of local self-governing
bodies and the local population. On the other hand, it is a reality that
= it takes a lot of time and man-power to develop and secure power source that
_ is urgen tly needed aationally.
In the case of locatiag a nuclear plaat, it is said to take 10-20 years.
The cause for this is that it takes a lot of time to dispel the anxiety of _
the local population and to implement local compensation and indemnities
, such as the fishiag industry. Hawever, the fact that legal and procedural
, investigations are complex and are strict cannot be overlooked as a cause
fo r the dela.3~ .
The Study M~eeting established within the ministrq is founded on this pressing
task of the promotion of power soisce development, and will insert the
scalpel of rationalization to the laws, procedures and investigative systems
that are becoming one of the bottlenecks. But a difficult problem is that
the MITI does not have exclus ive ~urisdiction over these laws, procedures
and examinations. It is a fact that almost all ministties and agencies
have a connection with power source development in some form or other. For
this reason, the study meeting wi11, for the present, concentrate on those
laws under the MITI's ~urisdiction, and intends to seek for a series of
- rational combinations of laws and procedures.
To start with, while maintaining the strictness of laws and procedures, they
will look for a way to eliminate a waste of time by rationalizing their
combinations and, by reconstructing the entire legal and procedural systems,
- will pursue the possibilitq of locating power plants in a shorter period
- of time than heretofore.
Also, in relation to the system of nuclear reactor safety, investigation
through studying rational combinations of investigative systems such as
simultaneous enecution of enviroumental iavestigations and safety investiga- `
tions that are not being done at present, they intend to search out the way
to speed up the pracess without losing the strictness of their investigations -
and procedures.
The LDP's Headquarters for promoting the locat3ng of power sources which was
inaugurated on the 17th, also held up a slogan of smooth and speedy -
- licensing for procedures for the location of power sources. The co~encement ~
of the MITI's study may develop into a situation in which all minist~ies
and agencies are involved. -
55 -
Fno n~T~TnT r~c~ rnvrv
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000300104457-5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
Strengthening of the Support System for Areas Experiencing Difficulties in
- Locating Nuclear Plants: Course of Action of the LDP's Promotion Headquarters
The LDP opened the f irst meeting af its "Power Source Locating Promotional
_ Headquarters" (Headquarters Chief: Yoehitake Sasaki, formerly MITI minister)
at its party headquarters,~Nagato-cho, Tokyo, on the 17th, and decided upon
its course of action for the next 2 years. The course of action adopted
that day (agreement an the establishment of the promotional headquarters) ~
_ star_ed that in order to rapidly promote the location of power sources the
who le party must grapple with solutions to such prolilems as compensation to
the fishing induatry, and also expressed the importance of developing strong
support activities in those areas in which difficulties in locating nuclear _
- plant and drawiag local cooperation`have been experienced.
Among the concrete activities of this headquarters are:
, 1) Development of a nat~onal movement; holding a study and training meeting
of party members ia those areas in which power sources are to be located;
and holding round table discussions with consumer organizations, city heads,
governors and organizing power source location caravans.
2) Support activities in those areas where the location of a plant is facing
difficulty by means of providing the Headquarters' support and investigatory
activities, organizing people who are promoting nuclear plant location, and
providing suppor~ to local leaders who are promoting plant education.
3) Promotion of various pQlicies for propelling power source location pro-
cedures; efficient enforcement of nuclear reactor safety investigation;
- strengthening and consolidating the three power source laws; and the luring
of plants into areas where power s4urces are to be located. ~
COPYRIGHT: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbunsha 1981
9713-R
CSO: 4105 END -
56
F0~ OFFICIAL US~ ONZY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000300100057-5