JPRS ID: 9794 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000400020033-9
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• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 33
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS Li9794
_ 16 June 1981
- ~ub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
_ FOU~ No. 725
~~I~ ~OREI~N BROADrAST INFORMATION SERV~CE
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- Headlines, editorial reports, and aiaterial enclosed in brackets
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� mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated a~e
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
_ tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
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- item originate with the source. Times within items are as
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- JPRS L/9794
16 June 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REP~RT
FOUO No. 725
CONTEN7'S
INTEK-AFRICAN AFF.AIRS
Reactions to F`rench Vote in African Nations
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 27 May 81) 1
Giscaxd Preferred by French, by Philippe Simonnot
Change in Governments Followed by Africans, by Jos-Blaise Alima
Brief s
New Moroccan Agreements 7
Chadian Protest 7
Libyan-Chadian Treaty 8
Chadian Refugees in Cameroon
ANGOI,A _
Brief s
UNITA Prisoners Released 9
Mocamedes Fishing ~].eet 9
Lobito Port Traffic 9
Belgian Buses 9
Agreement With French Airlines 10
SONANGOL Aircraft Acquisition 10
CHAD
Briefs
Clashes Continue Between Factions 11
CONGO
= Results of 22 April Cabinet Meeting
- (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 May 81) 12
Briefs
Promising Petroleum Prospects i5
- a- IIII - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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GABON
Brief s
~ ~anco-Gabonese Naval Maneuvers 16
BDEAC Road Loan 16

~
GH~NA
Brief s
Gasolime Rationing Coupons 17
Japanese Educational Aid 1'j
Tema Refinery Closed 77
GUTNEA
Brief s
Peace Mission 18
IVORY COAST
Prospects for Economic, F`inancial Development Process Discussed
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANFENS, 1 May 81) 19
President Exhibits Prudence in Prospective Oil Boom
_ (Pierre Gaillard; JETJNE AFRIQUE, 27 May 81j 2!~
~ Brief s ~
Oi.l Find Confirmed 26
MOZAMBIQUE
Briefs
Cabora Bassa Reportedly Immobilized 27
NIGER
Brief s
- Remission of Penalties 28
~ NIGERIA
Briefs
Abuja Postponed Pa~t 1982 29
Credits for Petroleum Developmerrt 29
Philippine Oil Purchase 29
SENEGAL
Constitutional Reform, Supreme Court Role
(NIARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 1 May 81) 30
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Brief s
New Parties, Amnesty Measure 32
Technical, Professional Teachers` School 32
Drought Aid Deduction 33
ENAM Graduating Class 33
TANZANIA
Briefs
Nationalization of Automobil~ Sector 3~
IDA I,oan 3~
TOGO
Five-Year Plari for 1981-1985 Reported
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 2L~ Apr 81) 35
ZAIRE
Ex-Prime Minister Ta:!ns About Reasons for Leaving
, (Jos-Blaise ~'.iima; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 6 May 81) !~0
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INTBR-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
REACTIONS TO FRENCH VOTE IN AFRICAN NATIONS
Giscard Preferred by French
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May 81 p 26
[Article by Philippe Simonnot: "Giscard Reelected in Africa"]
[Text] By a very large majority (70.38 percent of all votes cast), the French
people in Af rica "elected" Giscard on 10 May, thereby confirming their first-ballot
vote (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1062). A total of 49,796 votes were cast in the embassies
and consulates, not counting absentee ballots (counted in France).
- In three African countries, only the French agreed with the national choice: Fran-
cois Mitterrand won in Algeria (52.15 percent), Ghana (52.94 percent) and Zambia
(13 to 10 for Valery Giscard d'Estaing). Elsewhere, Giscard was largely "reelected,"
achieving his best percentages in Mauritius (88.18), Madagascar..(86.46), Gabon
(81.99) and Zaire (80.74).
Despite this "counter tidal wave," there was nevertheless a very clear surge by
Francois Mitterrand on the second ballot, especially in the Ivory Coast, Tunisia
and Senegal. It would appear that in Africa as in France, the new president not
only harvested all the votes of the left and the minor candidates (especially the
ecologists), but also got a substantial bite of the Gaullist backing that is
well-established in Africa. The national delegate frcxn the Socialist Party in
charge of the French abroad, Guy Penne, explains this clear increase, not only
compared with tne results on the first ballot, but also with the European elections
in 1979. He sees in it the results of the "awareness" efforts made by his party
~ for a year among exnatriates and the increase in number of Mitterrand support
committees among the main French "colonies" abroad.
- H~wever, Penne recognizes that despite its recent efforts, the Socialist Party
must counter the antileft trend among expatriates in Africa, a veritable "preserve"
of the former Giscardian-Gaullist majority.
The vigilance of the Mitterrand delegates has made it possible to denounce cer-
- tain fairly discreet pressures exer~ised by the administration, politicians or
"economic lobbies," as well as certain irregularities. For example, there was
that electoral meeting on behalf of the outgoing president organized on 5 May in
Libreville (Gabon) by Jean-Pierre Fourcade (former rninister of finance under
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Giscard), in violation .of the 1976 law on French voting abroad and despite the
reticence of President Bongo hi.mself !
In Mauritius, speeches by promine:~t persons favoring the old majbrity were also
denounced by representatives of the socialist candidate. Likewise, the "visits'~
by Edgar Faure to Tunis and Gen Marcel Bigeard to Abid~an during the election
campaign did not escape Mitterrand's supporters.
_ Furthermore, the poor results in Madagascar have puzzled the Socialist Party,
which plans to investigate voting conditions on the spot. Ir would appear, how-
ever, that because of sociocultural considerations, French citizens "at the ottier
end of the world" will.remain an'election hotbed for the ri~ht. Combining all
the cou~tries, they granted 69.69 percent of their votes to Giscard d'Estaing.
Often well-off materially speaking, French people abroad do not experience the
same difficulties as their fellow citiz~ns at home (unemployment, high cost of
- living). They therefore lose some of the meaning of the election stakes. And
yet, if the "legitimist" reflex were to continue to play a role abroad (in the
sense of identifying France with its government), the Socialist Party candidate
would undoubtedly have a very good chance with the French in Africa...in 1988.
How They Voted in Some African Countries (Votes Cast in Africa Only)
1J May 1981 Giscard Mitterrand
- Algeria 47.85% 52.15% ~
Cameroon 73.02% 26.98%
Ivory Coast 69.48% ~ 30.52%
Gabon , 81.99% 18.01%
- i~fadagascar 86.46% 13.54%
Morocco 69.05% 30.95%
- Senegal 72.00% 30.95%
Tunisia . ' 61.92% 38.08%
All French in Africa ~ 70.38% 29.62%
For the Record Giscard Mitterraud
~ Metropolitan France 47.77% 52.22%
French abroad 69.69% 30.31%
Overseas departments 71.57% 28.42%
Over.seas territories 74.21% 25.78%
Overall results 48.25% 51.75%
_ Change in Governments Followed by Af ricans
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May $1 pp 27-29
[Article by Jos-Blaise Alima: "The Alternation They Dream C~"; and commentary by
Jacques Gautrand: "Cooperation: Celebration and Moving Out"]
[Text] Rarely has a political event been followed with so much interest by Afri-
cans. For the second ballot of the presi~ential'election, Radio-France Interna-
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Internationale (RFI) and its junior co].league, Africa No 1, beat all listening
records. From Dakar to Libreville, Niamey to Kinshasa and Yaounde to Abidjan, tens
of millions of listeners tuned in to the French stations at 1900 hours on Sunday,
10 May, stations that already tend to win out over national radio stations.
In Morocco, French radio stations achieved listener ratings at least equal to
~ those registered 2 days earlier on the occasion of the rebroadcast, from Cairo,
of the Egypt-Morocco soccer game, a World Cup elimination match.
In Cameroon, the eleczion of the president of the French Republic practically
eclipsed the other event of the day: the elimination games for the Africa Cup,
pitting champion clubs against one another. In Douala, Canon of Yaoui:de, reigning
champion, played ASSEC of Abidjan. "My friends came to wake me up at two in the
morntng to break out s~me champaign," one Douala entrepreneur recalls, "to cele-
~ brate Francois Mitterrand's victory!"
The explosion of joy that greeting the announcement of the results was on a par
with the tension that reigned here and there during the ruaiting period. Betting
was heavy. From 1930 hours, the "Mitterrandists" the most numerous were
already convinced of the victory of "their" candidate, And the reason for their
optimism? The announcer on the RFI s~oken newspaper had said that he could not
get to the Rue de Marignan (where Giscard's campaign staff was located).
- On the other hand, on Rue de Solferino (headquarters of Mitterrand's Socialist
Party), the newsman revealed that the buffet was ready and the champagne on ice.
Nothirig more was needed to sharpen the imagination of those who, overseas, had
followed the vicissitudes of the French election campaign so closely.
In Dakar, Abidjan, Libreville and Rabat, the televised 5 May debate was seen
directly by many viewers. The duel had been partially broadcast in Tunis on a
delayed basis. In Cameroon, video tapes replaced television, slo~~T in appearing.
- Ministers, high officials and merchants asked their friends in Paris to record
all the debates, including those organized on the evenings of the two ballots.
A bank director assigned to Paris quitely simply delayed his return by 48 hours in
order to see the 10 May election broadcasts in person.
Followed closely and with passion, the 10 May vote had results that responded to
the expectations of most Africans. "Imagine, we have lived under the same regime
_ for 23 years," commented one executive who was once a member of the tumultuous
FEANF (Federation of Students From Black Africa in France). "Over two genera-
tions have not been able to see the virtues of alternating governments."
At first, such remarks may seem meaningless. Actually, the general feeling is that
changes that occur in France cannot fail to have an effect on French-speaking
Africa.
- Official circles share this opinion, as shown by the congratulatory messages sent
to the new occupant of the Elysee Palar_e. There are obviously chiefs of state
who simply did what they had to do, as in the case of presidents Mobutu (Zaire),
Sekou Toure (Guinea), Dacko (Central African Republic) and Mengistu (Ethiopia)
- (JEUNE AFRIQUE, Nos 1062 and 1963).
~
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But outside of these leaders "on the fringe," there was a chorus of approval, as
illustrated by the warm nature of the official messages and newspapers co~mments.
"Your election is of considerable importance f or Ivorians~" Felix floup~ouet-Boigny
- wrote in his message to Francoia Mitterrand. "The changes announced can only have
pos~itive effects on French policy in Africa," declared Mauritanian Mohamed KhoUna
Ould Haidalla.
That is obviously not the opinion of the Moroccan Royal Palace, but AL MOUHARIR,
the socialist newspaper, nevertheless ran this headline on Tuesday, 12 March:
- "Historic Day in France: Victory of Socialism and Democracy!" As for L'OPINION,
the organ of the Istiqlal, it took ple~lsure in recalling that "at the beginning of
the century, Jean Jaures, and later, Leon BTum, pleaded for the unitv and indeppn-
dence of Morocco."
That mitigated sentiment is found in Tunisia. While the authorities are apprehen-
sive about the Middle Eastern policy of Francois Mitterrand, the leaders of the
opposition believe that the success of the French socialists could accelerate the
Tunisian process of democratic opening. A lefrist.French government would, it is
- said, encourage such an important measure as general amnesty.
If there were any need of proof, one has the French influence on African affairs,
This is the reason why the En~lish-speaking countries themselves did not fail to
� react with the greatest clarity.
In Zimbabwe, the government daily HERALD hopes that "Mitterrand's victory will
open up an era of confrontation between France and ~outh Africa." Finally, the
- newspaper hopes that "the French policy will be based more on morals than on
profit."
The same feeling is found in Nigeria, where the DAILY TIMES write~: "MittQrrand
- ccrnes to power at a time when France is v~e~ved ~vith suspicion and even distrust
by most countries in Africa and the Third World." The government daily concludes:
"France must became.the main salesman of manuf actured goods instead of being the
largest seller of arms going for the destruction of the masses."
A paradox of history, it was in Nigeria, an English-speaking country. where
- Martin Kirsch, adviaer to Valery Giscard d'Estaing for African affairs, made
- his official farewell although he did not know it at the time to Africa.
~ On 30 April, following a lightning visit to Lagos lasting one day, he met with
President Shehu Shagari. ~
On the evening of 20 May, the grey eminence packed his bags and has since been
restinR at his Sceaux villa in the region of Paris. Previously, Kirsch had been
on the telephone with ~ractically all~the African chiefs of state, who wished to
_ express their sympathy to the out$oing president. The messages of his correspon-
dents did not have the same tone: Everything depended on the quality and close-
ness of the bonds woven since 1974, durinR a 7-year term marked by dissent.
- In Africa itself, the debate is far from over. On the whole, the intelligentsia
boasts about the humanism of the French socialists. With respect to upper-level
personnel, by dint of emphasizing the danRers of collectivism, the old majority
lost all credibility.
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Whence the camment of the ENA [National School of Administration] graduate, who
~ has a number of former classmates on the staff of the mayor of Paris: "If Chirac
3oes not change his propaganda then:es, the left will remain in power for 20 years."
However, one cannot thereby conclude that MitteXrand's victory is unanimously
_ supported. In Dakar, for example, there is an astonish2ng convergence of opinians
of a veteran, nostalgic for the past, and an economics student, who looks reso-
lutely to the future: "Mitterrand's election is a bad sign," the former aays.
"It is Gaullism that ha~ alway~ saved France since 1945. ~t is a betrayal to
elect a non-Gaullist. France withour the Gaulliats will never be able to face its
African reaponsibilities."
The second starts from opposite reasonin~ and ends up with the same conclusion:
"Mitterrand will not be able to distinguish himself, within the framework of his
country's Af rican policy, from the neocolonial style begun by General de Gaulle."
It is up to the 21st president of the French Republic to take up the challenge.
Cooperation
The address is 20 Rue Mansieur, in the 7th arrondissement of Paris. The gendar~ne
posted a~ the door absent-mindedly watches those �~aho come and go: It is rather
quiet at i.his hour of the day. The car of an African diplomat leaves by the main
gate. Everything is absolutely normal at the central headquarters of the Ministry
- of Cooperation.
On this Friday, 15 March, who would ever suspect, at first sight, that 5 days
previously, France had el.ected a new president? An or~inary visitor would have
- trouble seeing any change. And yet, in the office of the "half-time" minister
(Robert Galley had, since 22 December 1980, divided his time between the Ministry
of Cooperation and the Ministry of Defense), bags were being packed, although
regular affairs were being handled.
"The minister continues to function as in the past," reassured one of Galley's
- aides. "Nothing has chan~ed, except that now we are merely handling administrative
affairs. We are making no political decisions, while awaitinR the appointment of
the new government."
- And yet, the head of the press service would not receive me: "No, no; this is not
the time." Apparently there is nothing to say to the press during the interim
_ period. The weekly meeting with newsmen is "suspended until further notice,"
says a circular.
Everyone faces the chan~es in his own way. Two days after the election of Fran~
cois Mitterrand, moving trucks disappeared into Rue Monsieur and reappeared with
doss~ers and documents so that they would not fall into the wrong hands. "Per--
sonal documents of the members of the Cabinet," it was claimed.
I am told that high officials are drawing up their reports (the outgoing president
- asked the Ministry of Cooperation and other ministries for a balance sheet of the
- 7-year term) for their new bosses or...their own successors.

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Among those whose posts are in danger are Christian Joudiou, Michel Van Grevenyn-
ghe and Antoine Frasseto, heads of the three main pillars of the ministry: the
Directorate of Economic Development (DDE), the Directorate of Cultural and Techni-
cal Cooperation (DCCT) and the General Administration Department (SAG). Among
the possible new arrivals.is Jeam Audibert, formerly in the ministry and a metnbet'
of the African Group of the Socialist Party.
In the different departments, there is an atmosphere of anxious expectation.
- Hozaever, the "rank and file" welcomed Mitterrand's election.with a certa~~n satis-
faction: The CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] organized a cocktail
party to celebrate the victory of the leftist candidate. The trade unions expect
employment~~uarantees for contract empl.oyees from the new gwernment.
- But more than the st~atus of emplovees is at stake: There is also some question
about the future of cooperation with Africa fol~awing the June legislative elec-
tions. Will there be a restructuration or will it disappear? a
- "At any rate," one young civil servant told me, "if the Ministry of Cooperation
_ were to disappear, I believe that manq African countries would be disappointed."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
i1,464
- CSO: 4400/1259
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
, BRIEFS
NEW MOROCCAN AGREEMENTS--The Nigerien-Moroccan Commission on Cooperation
met on 22 and 23 April at Niamey under the leadership of Mr Sani Bako, sec-
retary general of Niger's ministry of foreign affairs and cooperation and
Mr. M'Hamed Faouzi, ambassador of Morocco. Concerning the training of high
personnel, Niger r~quested 35 places in Morocco's schools of higher educa-
_ tion for the 1981-1982 school year. On the subject of primary and secondary
- education and professional training, many programs were extended, mainly
implementation of teaching in Arabic starting in October 1983, furnishing
of textbooks and teaching material in Arabic and training of inechanical
technicians. Both parties signed several technical and economic agreements,
especially in aeronautics, and decided to continue negotiating the tariff
- proposal initially submitted by the Moroccans. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 Ma.y 81 p 1249] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
= Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341
CHADIAN PROTEST--In a letter dated 22 April and addressed to the president
of the UN Security Council, the Chadian charge d'affaires at the United
Nations, Mr Ngare Kessely, stated that if Egyptian and Sudanese threats
persist, his government reserves the right to bring the matter to the Secu-
= rity Council. These Sudanese-Egyptian "threats, encouraged and financially
and militarily backed by certain powers~have the sole objective of immer-
sing Chad in war again, something which, in addition to the suffering it
would entail for the Chadian people, would dangerously threaten the peace
and security of the region," Mr Ngare Kessely says in his letter. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1253]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981J 9341
~ LIBYAI~ CHADIAN TREATY--The contemporary magazine AFRIQUE, published by
Documentation Francaise, has just published in its issue number 113 (Jan-
Feb 1981) the French text of the treaty of friendship and alliance signed
by Libya and Chad at Tripoli on 15 June 1980. The text: alludes especially
to "essential bonds rooted in a common destiny, common objectives and common
aspirations beyond all the obstacles" between the two parties, "in the
framework of the alliance between the great revolution of 1 September and
the Chadian revolution led by the Frolinat." The treaty was signed for
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Libya by Dr Ali Treki and for the GUNT [Transitional National Union Govern-
- ment of Chad] by Mr Ib.rahim Yusef, advisor to the late Mr Goukouni Weddeye.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERItANEE~IS in French 1 May 81 p
1253] [~OPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341
CHADIAN REFUGEES IN CAMEROON--Correction--A misprint in our issue of 17
April, 1981, page 1136, stated that there were still 8,000 Chadian refugees
in Cameroon. Obviously, it should have read 80,000. Cameroonian officials
_ consider this figure weak and estimate there are 100,000 persons at the
Kousseri refugee camp alone (opposite Ndjamena) and nearly 150,000 Chadian
- refugees throughout Cameroon. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
= MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1253] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie.
- Paris 1981] 9341
CSO: 4400/1174
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ANGOLA
_ BRIEFS
UNITA PRISONERS RELEASED--The National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola [UNITA] has announced that it would soon free the 26 Portuguese nationals
it is holding and who were taken "during combat operations." This release,
added the movement which oppose~ the Luanda regime, was made possible by the
ending of the period of disinterest if not hostility shown by some Portuguese
_ authorities toward UNITA. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1263] 9516
MOCAMEDES FISHING FLEET--The fishing fleet of the Angolan province of Mocamedes
~ consists of 214 small craft, some belonging to state-owned companies and others
to private companies. It is operating at 75 percent of potential (counting
Mocamedes, Porto Alexandre, Lucira, Cabo Negro, Bata, and Baia das Pipas). The
province has four plants for the manufacture of fish-meal. The fish oil extract
is difficult to market. [TextJ [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1264] 9516
LOBITO PORT TRAFFIC--In 1980, traffic at Lobito amounted to 467,200 tons; the
port was visited by 593 ships, most fo them from n!orthern Europe. In 1981
traffic is expected to reach 785,000 tons. The investment of 74 million kwanzas
i~ scheduled for purchase of handling machinery and equipment, as well as spare
parts; the current year will also see construction of a new 1,000-m long pier.
[Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1264] 9516
BELGIAN BUSES--Belgian buses known as the "flexi-bus," or more commonly "the
- accordion bus," are being called "machimbombos articulados" in Angola. VAN HOOL
already delivered an initial order of these "flexi-buses" in 1979 to the Angolan
capital's public transportation services. A second order of 50 "ma.chimbombos
_ articulados" has just recently arrived. It had been indicated during the visit
to Koningshooikt by Mr Muteca, the Angolan minister of transportation, that new
"flexi-bus" orders would follow those of 1979, provided that the driving and
maintenance results obtained by these buses were satisfactory. Two years of
extensive bus use in Luanda, a city o.f more than 1 million people, was con-
_ vincing since the Angolan authorities ordered a second delivery of buses.
[Excerpt] [Paris MARCHES TR(JPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1207]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745
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_ AGREEMENT WITH FRENCH AIRLINES--The UTA (Air Transportation Union) company and
the TAAG (Air Transportation of Angoia) national Angolan company have just signed
- an agreement where both companies jointly undertake bi-weekly roundtrip flights
beginning 20 April; one of them is a direct Boeing 707 flight; the other is a
D(:-10 stopover flight at Libreville. This cooperation between the two companies
seeks to offer capabilities congruent with Angola's economic development. Also
worth noting is that from now on, L'TA is insuring TAAG`s commercial representa-
tion in France. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
24 Apr 81 p 1208] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745
SONANGOL AIRCRAFT ACQUISITION--The Du~tch firm FOKKER recently delivered an F-27
Ma.rk 500 Friendship to SONANGOL, the Angolan oil com~any. This equipment, ordered
last year and destined to replace the Dokota DC-3, is a combined passenger-cargo
model. It will be able to transport 56 people and will assure SONANGOL and other
- oil companies of the reliable transport of personnel an3 freight between Luanda
and the drill sites in northwest Angola (Soyo and Cabinda). [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1208] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux
et Cie Paris 19$l.J 9745
- CSO: 4400/1140
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' CHAD
~
BRIEFS
CLASHES CONTINUE BETWEEN FACTIONS-- Qadhdhafi's tr.oop~ are watching Habre's
underground forces, while the pro-Libyan soldYers of d'Acyl blame Goukouni's men.
Scarcely 5 months ago, Hissein Habr~'s FAN jNorthern Armed Forcesl started its long
march towards the East, driven out of Ndjamena by Goukouni Oueddei's FAP jPeople's
Armed Forces] and Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi's men. From summits which have collapsed in
verbal condemnations, the Libyans, taking advantage of disagreement among those who
condemn them, have established themselves in Chad since then. "Called upon"--like
, the Cubans in Angola--by a fraction of the ruling team, 5,000 soldiers from Tripoli
camp today in garrisons named Ati, Mongo, Bangar, Fanya. If they are prudently
absent from a South that fears and rejects them, the green soldiers of the popular
army are particularly present in the Center-East: already 2,000 are at Abeche and
Biltine. In fact, 1,500 to 2,000 guerrillas who remain loyal to Hissein Habr~~ are
still fighting r_here. On 16 April, the FAN's commissar on foreign relations,
Mahamat Saleh, and some persons qualified as "pro-Nigerians" such as Mustapha Maitchari
_ and Odoum Idriss, announced the "withdrawal of their confidence" in Habr~. A first
step, without doubt, towards rallying behind Guukoumi by a(minima:~) party of the
FAN. But the Chadian president could hardly rejoice for long: 3 days later, on
19 April, at Abeche, violent fighting opposed his ~wn partisans of the pro-Libyan
; guerrilla of his own Foreign Minister Ahmat Acyl. The clashes were acknowledged,
~ for the first time, at Ndjamena itself by the Council of Ministers. Qadhdhafi's
legionaries, assigned to their quarters, remained spectators. The outbreaks of
meningitis and chicken-pox in the Chadian capital obliged the authorities to decree a
stage of sanitary emergency. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1981]
[Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 May 81 p 26] 9765
- CSO: 4400/1170
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CONGO
RESULTS OF 22 APRIL CABINET MEETING
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 pp 1254-1255
(Excerpts] On 22 April the Congolese cabinet, meeting under the leader.ship
_ of Col Sassuu Nguesso, adopted two regulatory bills related to the realign-
ment of the Congo-Ocean Railroad (CFCO): one agreement involves nearly
$8 million, the other almost 5.7 million Kuweiti dinars.
- In addition the cabinet studied and adopted a protocol between the Congo and
the ELF Aquitaine [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] and AGIP
[Italian Petroleum Enterprise] companies to create a research enterprise to
exploit the Congo's potential gas resources.
Financial Agreements With France
On 21 April three financial agreements amounting to a total of 350 million
CFA francs (7 million French francs) were signed in Brazzaville between the
French minister of cooperation, for the Aid and Cooperation Fund (FAC), and
the People's Republic of Congo.
The first agreement, for 140 million CFA francs (2.8 million French francs),
involves the planning of an "agroindustrial complex." The second, for 160
million CFA francs (3.2 million French francs), will permit transportation
to the CFCO of citrus fruit and other agricultural products cultivated in
the regions of Lekoumou and Bouenza. ~nd the last one, for 50 million CFA
francs (1 million French fr.ancs), will assist Public Health hospitals and
endemic-disease clinics.
On 24 April two other financial agreements amounting to 175 million CFA
francs (3.5 million French francs) were signed in Brazzaville between
France, represented by Mr Darge, chief of the French cooperation mission,
and the Congo, represented by Mr Tsikabaka Lupey, secretary general of the
_ Congolese ministry of cooperation.
The first of these two grant agreements involves the overall planning of
the distribution of electricity in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire and study
of the expansion of the diesel power plant in Pointe Noire; the other in-
volves the establishment of a mining plan.
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These are some of the details of the projects covered by the dlfferent
agreements:
. Mantsoumba Agroindustrial Complex: a grant of 208 million French francs,
= that is, 120 millic~n CFA francs. The accord aims to make possible the
creation of an agroindustrial complex in Mantsoumba for the production of
manioc flour (fou-fou) from local produce. .
The FAC financed for some 5 years a technical support group (233 million
CFA francs) and, since 1979, has been helping to rehabilitate the factory.
The FAC's contribution to this rehabilitation reaches 325 million CFA
francs, giving a total, since 1973, of 558 million CFA francs for
Mantsoumba. FAC funds take care of agricultural and industrial technical
assistance, equipmer.t ?urchases and research; the Congolese budget is res-
" ponsible for exploitation expenses and large part of the investments. Pro-
duction of manioc flour began in February 1981.
Study of the Bihoua-Loudi.ma Road: a grant of 3.2 million French francs,
that is, 160 million CFA francs. The road will make possib~e to transport
to the CFCO timber and agricultural groducts grown in the regions of
Lekoumou and Bouenza. It will also make possible the exploitation of the
Zanaga forest, rich in okoume. The work will include hydrologic, lay-out,
geotechnical and economic studies of the rolling and highly wooded area,
as well as drafting implementation plans and establishing documentation to
call for bids.
Therefore, Congolese authorities will be ready to launch the call for bids
as soon as the EDF estahlishes the necessary investment credit. In fact,
that financial organization has retained the Bihoua-Loudima highway cons-
truction pro~ject among its priorities under Title V of the EDF program.
Mining Plan: a grant of 2.5 million French francs, that is 125 million CFA
� francs. This project resulted from conversations during the last French-
Congolese Commission (January 1980) and some working sessions which took
place in May 1980 between a Congolese delegation and representatives of the
BRGM (Geological and Mineral Prospecting Office).
'I`wo operations are planned: establishment of a mining plan and study of
the Mayombe. The first is the subject of this contract, and the second
must be financed under the annual subvention that the FAC allots the BRGM.
As for the mining plan, it will consist of putting together all geographic
and mineral studies in existence. Field inspections will help verify the
value of the studies. There are also provisions to carry out chemical and
geotechnical analyses 3nd metallurgical tests if needed. A final report,
including photographic dncuments, will be published. The project is
expected to take 1 year.
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Development of Electricity (Second Stage): a grant of 1 million French
francs, that is 50 million CFA francs. This is the second stage of a credit
opened in 1979 with 90 million CFA francs. The objective is to insure
maintenance and devElopment of electricity generation and distribution in
southern ('~ngo.
The contract w~ll make two studies possible:
1) Establishment of an overall plan for the Brazzaville and Pointe Noire
network: Ir involves short- and middle-term planning of the distribution
networks in the two cities, as well as the possibility of connecting certain
secondary centers to the plant of one or the other of these cities.
2) Study to expand the diesel-powered power plant at Pointe IJoire. Ttiese
studies must include a detailed draft of the project, a call for bids in
the civil and electromechanical fields and the exami-~ation and comparison
of these bids.
Public Health Assistance: a grant for 1 million French francs, that is
50 million CFA francs. In this field, FAC involvement since 1971 has made
possible the modernization and equipment of some hospitals (Brazzaville,
Pointe Noire and Mossendjo) and has contributed to the operation and
equipment af endemic disease centers. Ten contracts amounting to 650 mil-
lion CFA francs have been signed. In addition, technical medical assis-
tance plays an important role in some organizations.
The current contract has two parts: assistance to endemic disease clinics
for 20 million CFA francs and assistance to hospitals in the amount of 30
million CFA francs, making it possible to completely furnish the Brazzaville
Pointe Noire and Mossendjo hospitals with technical equipment.
Large Transportation and Telecommunications Pro~ects
Congolese authorities have been involved for some time in operations aiming
to develop domestic and international transportation and telecommunications.
These are the projects under consideration or currently in progress:
Roads: Since the Congo only has 547 km of paved roads outside urban cen-
ters, work will begin in 1981 on three branches of the NQrth road: Owando-
Makoua, Makou-Ouesso and N'Go-Djambala-Lekana.
CFCO: The CFCO's current problems stem from the decay of the equipment and
the need to realign the track if traffic is to be increased.
Ten locomotives have just been reconditioned. In addition, realignment work,
which started in 1976, ought to be complr.ted in April 1982 at the earliest,
at a cost of 75 billion CFA francs (compared to an estimate of 33 billion
CFA francs in 1976).
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= This realignment work is financed as follows:
Billion
Financing nrganization CFA Francs
The Congo $.8
_ Local banks 2
FAC 4.6
CCCE [Central ]~und for
Economic Cooperation] 2.68
ADB 3.554
- World Bank 13.12
EDF 10.296
CIDA 3.58
Italy 2
- Arab countries 24.755
Toi:ai 75. 385
Airports: The CRETH (Center of Environmental Research and Technical
Studies) is still considering a project to provide Pointe Noire, economic
capital of the Congo, with a new airport capable of accommodating large
"Boeing 747"-type carriers. Two options are to re offered: the construc-
tion of a runway paral~el to the present airdrome and the construction of
a new airport on Mont Kamba. This last possibility, technically prefera-
ble, poses some problems since the site could be set aside for other
projects. The only decision already made involves paving 2000 meters
for mid-sized carriers (70 to 80 tons): the work is now in progress.
In Brazzaville Maya-Maya, a call to bid has ,just been launched for works to
reinforce some runways and prepare them for large carriers. Financing is
assured by the ADB, the BADEA [Arab Bank for African Economic Development],
the BDEAC [Development Bank of the Central African States], the French
FAC and the Congolese state.
Finally, the ASECNA [Agency for Air Navigation Safety] is studying the
secondary airports of Ouesso-Loubomo-Djambala and Sibiti with a view to
making them fit to receive mid-sized carriers such as the "Boeing 737."
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981
9341
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~'ONGO
BRIEFS
PROMISING PETROLEUM PROSPECTS--The reserves of that country will exceed, according
to French experts, all the reserves of its neighbors, and r,ffshore exploitation will
cost less than possible drillings i~,the Ivory Coast (in the forest) or in north
Cameroon (savannah zone). [Text] LCOPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique, GRUPJIA 1981] [Paris

~ JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 May 81 p 19J 9765
CSO: 4400/1170
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, GABON
BRIEFS
FRANCO-GABONESF. NAVAL MANEUVERS--~ao French naval ships, the frigate "Duguay-
Trouin" and the "D'Estrees," a squadron escorct vessei, sailed into the Gabon
_ harbor on 15 April. These ships are expected to participate in the Franco-
Gabonese exercises named "Okoume 81." [Text] [Paris MARCHES TR(JPICAUX ET
- MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1198] [COPYRIGHT: Rene M4reux et Cie Paris
1981.J 9745
_ BDEAC ROAD LOAN--The BDEAC (Bank of Central African States) has just granted a
loan to Gabon for the placement of a 70-ton reservoir in Eboro, and within the
framework of the reconditioning program, the construction of concrete access
ramps for the highway servicing north Gabon, from Bifoun to Ndjole, Mitzic,
Oyem, and Bitam. The total amount of the loan is 146 million CFA francs. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1199]
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745
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GHANA
BRIEFS
- GASOLINE RATIONING COUPONS--The Ghanain Government on 13 April issued new gaso-
line rationing coupons which will be valid for 4 weeks starting 1 May. Sales
outlets for the coupons were announced to the pnpulace so they can acquire the
coupons on a timely basis. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1251] 9516
JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL AID--In early April Japan agreed to provide a 30-million yen
credit (more than 410,000 credis) to Ghana for the purchase of educational equip-
ment. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1251] 9516
TEMA REFINERY CLOSED--The Tema oil refinery, which has been in operation for 18
- years, was closed on 9 March for maintenance work and should not be reopening
before the middle of April. Also, the government recently prohibited the dis-
tribution of certain oil products determined to be unfit for consumption, after a
suspicious substance was discovered. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris
1981J [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1251] 95I6
~
CSO: 4400/1167
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GUINEA
BRIEFS
PEACE MISSION--With the intent of making peace with Francois Mitterrand, Sekou
Toure has dispatched his brother-in-law Mamady Keita to visit the entourage of the
new French president. The Guinean leader has thus notif ied him that he will make
a resounding statement in his favor, after having publicly called him a"scoundrel"
in the past. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 Ma.y 81 p 51] ~OPYRIGHT:
Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 198J
CSO: 4400/1271
I
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IVORY COAST
PROSPECTS FOR ~CONOMIC, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROCESS DISCUSSED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAiJX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 pp 1246-1a48
[Article: "Economic and Financial Situation in the Ivory Coast"]
[Excerpts] The years 1980 and 1981, as a part of wha.t Mr Henri Konan Bedie, the
p~:esident of the national assembly, recently described as "this phase of uncer-
tainty and instability," will doubtless see a turn to new directians for the Ivory
Coast.
After 15 years of sustained and regular growth, Ivory Coast was inspiz~ed in
1976-1977 by the increase in the market price of coffee and cacao, its two major
export products, to further accelerate its investment programs, which in 1978
reached the unprecedented level of FR CFA 480 billion, or more than 25 percent of
the GDP [gross domestic product]. Imperfect control over the projects undertaken,;
- underestimation of the expenses that would be incurred, and an exaggerated swelling
- of the public sector placed the Ivory Coast in a position of serious imbalance from
the moment the terms of trade turned against them.
To get out of this predicament, Ivorian ?ucnorities tried to resist the trend
toward the decline in the market price of cacao by withdrawing from the market
at the start of 1980. But this effort failed, like the initiative of the Bagota
group, which tried to make itself a buyer on the futures market in order to arrest
the fall of coffee prices. Thus the 30 percent decline of its two leading
products in 1980 deprived tl'ie Ivory Coast of important export earnings, which were
estimated to be Fr CFA 360 billion below the high levels of 1977.
Today the Ivorian state is confronted by an alarming situation. The balance of
payments will, for the third year in a row, have a deficit of between 160-180
billion. External assets.were believed to have fallen to Fr CFA -240 billion by
the end of 1980, while the net position of the government remains just barely in
the black. The high level (29 percent) of the "export debt service ratio" dis-
turbs international private financiers(responsible for 50 percent of the credit
provided to the Ivory Coast). And the balance of trade will probably come to
+70 billion, a fall of 30 per~ent from 1979.
_ This state of affairs required resorting to the International Monetary Fund, which
in exchange for temporary assistance amounting to 484.5 million SDR's [special
drawing rights] (stretched out over three years) obtained the enactment of a
_ "structural adjustment" plan.
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Rehabilitation of the public finances and the current external account are the
primary objective of that plan, and in light of it the following measures are
envisaged: controls on budgetary expenditures, regulated growth of the money ,
aupply, revision of the tax ~ystem, and dynamization of the financial flows in
- order to curb capital flight.
~ Restrictions on investment w~re established in mid-1980, and the special investment
and infrastructure budget scheduled for 1981 (273 billion) will be lower than the
one for the previous vear. Similarly, a reduction in real ogerating expenditures
- (general operating budgEt: 37o billion) is accompanied by the traditional odds and
ends of neo-liberal policy: truth in public pricing, reduction of subsidies, dis-
- solution of the state-owned companies.
But one may hope that the "structural ad~ustmertt" desired by the international
~ monetary authorities will not cripple the process of development. In effect,
the growth rate planned for 1981 is only 1.5 percent, compared tc~ the normal 7
to 10 percent. A young country, and one which up to now has been in a privileged
_ position, the lvory Coast is not accustomed to austerity andhas no taste for it:
thus the realignment of worker's salaries in the state-owned companies with those
in effect for civil servants caused such dissatisfaction that the measure had to
be postponed. Too harsh a recession would have regrettable repercissions on ivorian
economic and political structures, at a time when the future seems promising.
In addition to its rich agricultural patrimony, the Ivory Coast can from now on
take advantage of its hydroelectric capacity a~d the oil deposits which lie hidden
on its coasts. It seems almost certain tho.t within the next 2 years the Ivory
Coast will be completely free from its energy constraints: 80 percent of the
electricity it produces already comes from water sources and "Belier" will produce
1.5 million tons of oil in 1981. Moreover, as the FINANCIAL TIMES pointed out in
_ its supplement on the Ivory Coast, that the "Espoir" deposit, believed to con-
tain 500 million tons, holds excellent prospects for the country to become one of
black Africa's leading exporters. Now, in early 1981, the Ivory Coast must deal
witii a delicate situation, as can be seen clearly from available projections for
the upcoming fiscal years and a rapid review of 1980.
~ Agricultural Production: One-Third of GDP
Agriculture in 1980 performed unevenly in the various sectors, but its weight in
the national economy continues to increase: 24 percent in 1977, 24.5 percent in
1978, 29 percent in 1979, it represented 31 percent of GDP in 1980 and should
_ stabilize at that level through 1983, as its rate of growth i.s declining in rela-
tive terms.
The cacao crop in 1980 reached the record level of 380,000 tons, or up 22 percent
from 1979. Statistics have established the fact that cacao production in the
Ivory Coast is correlated strongly with two variables: the area harvested and the
purchase price to the producer. Between 1979 and 1980 the area cultivat.ed increased
12 percen~ and the price to the producer went from 250 to 300 Fr CFA per kilo,
which explains the strong growth that was recorded. By contrast, a very mild de-
- cline is predicted for 1981, even though here one should note the determination of
the Fund for St:abilization of Prices of Agricultural Products to leave buying
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agents in doubt rather than to accentuate the fall in market prices by announcing
too good a harvest: somewhere in the 370,000-400,000 ton range is an educated
guess at the 1981 harvest for the world's biggest producer.
Coffee production, which in 1980 was 245,000 tons, was down 12 percent, while
market prices, which had a brief upsurge in June, were down 35 percent from the
previous year. In 1981, the Ivory Coast, the third largest producer in the world,
claims it will be able to export more than 250,000 tons, but its quota by terms
of the international coffee agreement is only 190,000 tons. Thus, desirous of
fighting against "arbitrary allocations" of quotas and inadequate floor pr.ice
levels, Ivory Coast is now taking a very forward position at international meet-
ings, both on coffee as well as on cacao, the agreement on which it still refuses
to sign.
. Forest exploitation, traditionally one of the principal economic activitips of the
country, is going through a difficult period. The erosion of production and
exports in 1980--which were respectively 4.8 million cubic meters and 2.75 million
cubic meters, representing declines of 4 and 12 percent from 1979 levels--requires
a two-fold explanation: after the good performance shown in the first half of the
year, the tropical wood market plunged in May into a profound depression, and no
resurgence is expected before next September. To this temporary problem is
- added the threat of exhaustion of the forest patrimony, unless the massive land
clearing is counterbalanced by a program of reforestation.
The situation in the palm-tree/coconut tree sector also shows worrisome signs.
After the exceptionally high level of palm oil production in 1980 (171,000 tons),
the 1981 forecasts call for a decline to the 1979 level: 120,000 tons, some 30
percent less. By contrast, copra (43,000 tons in 1980) continues its improvement:
up 42 percent in both the 1979-80 and 1980-81 seasons. But it may be necessary to
- increase the price paid to the producer to halt a growing disinterest on the part
of village planters in such speculative ventures. Finally, a general reorganiza-
- tion of this sector is under consideration to enable the Ivory Coast to preserve
its potential for production of oily substances up to 1990.
The cottonseed harvest in 1979-80 amounted to 143,000 tons, or 25 percent more than
for the 1978-79 season, while the area seeded, 123,000 hectares, only grew by 15
- percent. The yield per hectare in cottonseed--1.16 tons--thus improved, as well
as the yield from extraction: 41.3 percent, compared to 40.5 percent.
The su~ar program, deemed risky because of the very large investments it required,
has undergone rapid expansion: 32,400 tons of sugar in 1978, 53,700 tons in 1979,
103,000 tons in 1980, and 138,000 tons anticipated for 1981, to which must be
added 94,000 tons af treacle. Despite the strong increase in sugar prices in 198~J,
the net production cost, estimated by President Houphouet-Boigny at Fr CFA 250 per
kilo, remains higher than the international market price: Fr CFA 160 per kilo,
But the cost is coming down as production from the sugar complexes increases, and
this will eventually result in profitability.
Industrial Production: Predominance of Agro-Industry
Industrial production was 26.9 percent of the GDP, or Fr CFA 600 billion, in 1980.
It is becoming a larger factor in the Ivorian economy: 21.5 percent in 1978, 24.8
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percent in 1979, and 29.8 percent estimated for 1980. The interdependence with
agriculture is clearly shown by the existence of ma~or agro-industrial activities
sur.h as the p ineapple canneries, the factories for processing of cacao, coffee,
and cotton, industries Cied to wood and edible fatty substances, and the sugar
complexes. Development in these industries is closely tied to that of agricultural
products whose processing these industries assure. Agro-food expansion in 1979
was close to 29 percent, mostly as a result of the going into operation of several
new units (the sugar-works, de-barking); growth in textile production was slower in
- 1979 than grorwth in the domestic market, and growth in wood production follows the
vagaries of the international market. Oil refining and the chemical industries,
because of rhe increase in the cost of the raw ma.terials employed, have grown
considerably in value, but real growth is probably only about 10 percent.
Balance of Trade and Monetary Situation
The performance of agricultural and industrial production as well as variations
in the international market for the raw materials have an impact on foreign
trade. Exports for 1980 should be between 61.0 and 640 billion Fr CFA, or a 6 to
11 percent increase over 1979, with imports reaching 540 billion, exceeding the
- 1979 level by 15.4 percent. The balance of trade, not counting the freighting
expenses, which are responsible for a 50 billion deficit, will come to between
+70 and +100 billion Fr CFA, compared to +110 billion in 1979. Foreign trade
statistics for the first 5 months of 1980 confirm the predominance of coffee
(58 billion), cacao (53 billion), and wood (47.5 billion); these three items
account for 70 percent of export earnings. France remains by far the country's
largest trade partner (45 percent of Ivorian imports and 24 percent of its exports),
ahead of the FRG, the second largest supplier, providing 5.S percent of the Ivory
Coast's imports. But its leading position in the automobile sector has been taken
away by Japan, which in 1980 supplied 60 percent of the Ivorian fleet, compared to
30 percent f or France. The Japanese threat, however, remains limited to 4.7 per-
cent of total imports. The balance of payments deficit will substantially exceed
100 billion f or the second year in a row, if the pessimis~ic projections for the
trade balance are confirmed. Facdd with a constrained monetary supply and wanting
to conform to the recommendations of the IMF mission, the government determined to
present an austere budget in 1981.
In accordance with Article 51 of the Ivorian constitution, the general operation
budget for 1981 is balanced, this year at Fr CFA 37G billion, or an increase of
11.1 percent in current francs over 1980 (338.4 billion), which is a decline in
real terms but a slightly larger portion of the GDP (15.5 percent in 1981, com-
pared to 15.2 percent in 1980). Fifty-seven percent of the general operating
budget--which is sustained solely by tax revenues--will go to personnel expenditures
(215 billion), and it should be noted that training gets a high budgetary
priority (110 Uillion, or 20 percent more than for 1980).
At the end of 1979, the overall total of external debt had gone beyond the Fr CFA
1,000 billion mark, the more precisely had gone up to 1,074 billion, or 11 per-
cent more than in 1978 (968 million). With this growth continuing in 1980, the
- actual total is probably now close to 1,300 billion. However, fresh commitments
made by the Ivory Coast have been declining steadily since 1977, the year when
they suddenly shot up to 492 billion. They went down to 366 billion in 1978, then
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to 329 billion in 1979, and approach 240 billion for 1980. But this decline
will only have an effect in the medium term, and for the moment, because of the
quick maturity of the loans contracted under the most pressing circumstances,
Ivc~ry Coasi: must sustain a heavy debt service: this increased from 71 billion
in 1977 to 94 billion in 1978, 120 billion in 1979, and 183 billion in 1980.
Report on Companies in the Ivory Coast
New Companies
- --Ivorian Explc~sives Company (IVOIREX). S a RL [limited liability compan_~] urith
a capital of Fr CFA 8 million. Headquarters at Abidjan O1~(BP 1593). Activity:
importation and manufacture of mine explosives. Management: Explosives and
Chemical Products Company, French Explosives Corporation and Company, Nitrochimie,
- general partnership company in Paris 8, 61, Rue Galilee, associates.
--Ivorian-Lebanese Brokerage Insurance and Re-Insurance Company (SILICAR). SA
[business corporation] with a capital of Fr CFA 6 million. Headquarters in Abidjan
05 (BP 789). Activity: agent for insurance companies. Board of direetors:
Mrs Maurani Na~wa, secretary, in Abidjan-Marcory 05 (BP 789) and Blal Haydar,
merchant, at Grand-Bassam (BP 246).
--Piscine Service. S a RL with a capital of Fr CFA 5 million. Headquarters in
Abidjan 04 (BP 809). Activity: Importation of swiunning pools and accessories.
Management: Mr Bruzzese Diego Philip, in Abidjan, partner.
--CBLH, S a RL with a capital of Fr CFA 2 million. Headquarters in Abidjan 04
(BP 380). Activity: importation of electric generating sets. Management:
Mr Le Hur Pascal, dieselist, in Abidjan 04 (BP 380), partner.
--Ivoire Marine Service. S a RL with capital of Fr CFA 2 million. Headquarters
in Abidjan O1 (BP 4068). Activity: Supplying navigation equipment.
--Abidjan Technical Company (CAT). S a RL with capital of Fr CFA 1.5 million.
Headquarters in Abidjan 08 (BP 2066). Activity: construction research. Manage-
ment: Miss Petit Claude, Jeanne Josette, in Abidjan, associates.
--Ivorian Industrial Watch and Clock Company (SODORIV). S a RL with a capital of
- Fr CFA 1 million. Headquarters in Abidjan O1 (BP 899). Activity: import and sale
of watches. Management: Fetouni Selmane, in Abidjan, partner.
--Promotion Exploitation Hoteliere Immobiliere (PROMOTEL). S a RL with capital
of Fr CFA 1.5 million. Headquarters Abidjan 11 (BP 1071). Activity: restora-
tion. Ma.nagement: Mr Aka Jacques, Abidjan, partner.
- --Societe Auxiliare d'Etudes Techniques et de Travaux de Cote d'Ivoire (AUXITEC-CI).
S a RL with a capital of Fr CFA 1 million. Headquarters: Abid~an O1 (BP 1271).
Activity: real estate research and construction supervision. Management: Mr Rene
Tocqueville, Abidjan, partner.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
9516
CSO: 4400/1167
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IVORY COAST
PRESIDENT EXHIBITS PRUDENCE IN PROSPECTIVE OIL BOOM
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 27 May 81 pp 38-39
[Article by Pierre Gaillard: "Ivory Coast: Everything Can Change"]
[Text] The Ivory Coast, this year, is evoking a number of cliches and grand-
iloquent images in true "nouveau Texas" style.
Ivorian oil is on the way. Is this euphoria justified? Of course; but the exact
size of t'.:~ new Ivorian riches cannot be measured at present. The secret is too
well kept at this time by the U.S. company Phillips Petroleum, which is in charge
of the Espoir deposits, reputed to be able to produce 300,000 to 400,000 barrels
per day in 1988. The secret is so well kept, in fact, that Ivory Coast officials
themselves only know what Phillips is willing to tell them, and even this is not
much. The rumor is of a production amounting to about 20 to 25 million tons in
1985. It is known that Phillips--which has only one branch in Abidjan--has just
offered itself approximatel.y 4,000 square meters of office space. It is rumored
that the Belier deposits alone amount to about 20 million tons. It is known that
four new exploration permits have been granted be.tween March and November 1980.
~xact information is still lacking, but one thing is certain: the oil is really
there, and doubtlessly in quantities sufficient to make the Ivory Coast tne second
most important producer in sub-Saharan Africa. The Ivorian problem could thus
be easily solved. Oil expenditures now account for 135 billion francs CFA: a
heavy burden indeed.
Deb t
Moreover, the country's f inances are in bad shape. Debts have reached the danger
point. Income from cocoa and coffee has not fulf illed expectations; as a matter
of fact, the attempts to protect the price of these basic export products have
worsened the outlook for immediate profits. Due to the lack of money, the whole
economic system is suffering. Investments are becoming rarer and so are purchase
orders, notably in the construction f ield.
With oil, all this can change. It will then be a matter of cashin in, not paying
out. The economy will improve. The debt will not be reduced accordingly--on the
contrary, it will be necessary to borrow in order to develop petroleum exploitation--
but it will not rise to a critical level. The Ivory Coast will feel more secure
in its struggle on the cocoa and coffee front when it will be less dependent on
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these two resources. In general, the entire Ivorian economy will be stimulated,
or will at least be able to catch its breath. Oil investments wi11 of course play
a big part, but so will other invest:ments that a newly affluent state will be able
to afford. The prospect of an economic boom should even attract new candidates
- for investment within the country.
Is this the Ivorian miracle? Let us not exaggerate the advantages of oil. Gabon's
example should be indicative that riches can be poorly emgloyed. Other examples
also show that an oil boom brings as many problems as those it solves. Let us
simply say that the Ivory Coast is given an additional chance. At any rate, this
is always ple~sant. However, it will be necessary to go and look for the oil.
Preliminary information is clear: there is no easy access to Ivorian oil. The
Belier deposits, for instance, are widely dispersed and therefore costlier. The
depth of the Espoir deposits, on the other hand, is 360 meters, entailing signif i-
cant investments. As for the oil shale in the southeastern part of the country,
oil reserves (probably 3.5 billion barrels) are too expensive today to be profitably
exploited. In other words, a miraculous manna is not about to rain on the country.
A great deal of industrial activity must be developed, and in the proper order.
The Trump Card of Gas
As in the judicious use of these new riches, the utilization of gas can apparently
be safely entrusted to President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. He has always proclaimed
that agriculture has priority. He apparently intends to continue this prudent
policy without giving in to the oil euphoria. His peasant temperament plays a
part, as does his judicious mind: a brutal acceleration of the rural exodus, a
_ potent but anarchical development could well undermine the very foundations of
his power. There is no reason why the Ivorian president cannot understand what the
- Cameroonian president has already understood: he has also been touched by the
miracle of oil, but has been careful not to let himself be carried away by it.
The comparison with Cameroon, actuallq, does not stop there. Oil is the order of
the day. This is normal when discoveries are recent and their extent still unknown.
However, there are already some rumors to the effect that, all things being equal,
the trump card of gas could well became as important as oil. Is African gas
arriving?
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981.
CSO: 4400/1271
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IVORY COAST
BRIEFS
OIL FIND CONFIRMED--The discovery of exploitable oil and gas fields throughout
the Ivory Coast were confirmed according to a 21 April report published in London
by the American oil company, Philips Petroleum. A third drill site 135 m deep �
and approximately 5 km northwest of the first drill has just been successfully
completed. The first drilling took place approximately 20 km from the coast and
56 km southwest of Abidjan. A secon3 drill site had been conducted 4 km east-
southeast of the first site, and a fourth site east of this one has just been
undertaken. Philips Petroleum adds that many other drillings are being pro-
jected from now until the end of the year to determine the extent of the oil-
field. Due to the transformation of the DAN DUKE drilling site into a tempo-
rary production site, and its location in an o~l storage tank area, present and
future plans are being made to rapidly undertake exploration. In these explora-
tions, Philips Petroleum heads a group in which it holds 57.5 percent interest,
- and of which the other members are AGIP (22.5 percent), SEDCO (10 percent), and
PETROCI (National Ivory Coast Oil Company: 10 percent). [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr 81 p 1186] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745
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MOZAMBIQUE
BRIEFS
CABORA BASSA REPORTEDLY IMMOBILIZED--An official Johannesburg source indicated on
15 April that the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric dam, which furnishes approximately
10 percent of South Africa's consumed electricity, stopped functioning 10 April.
An ESCOM [Electricity Supply Commission] company spokesman responsible for the
distribution of electricity in South Africa, confirmed that many electrical
interruptions from the Cabora Bassa have been experience3 in the past, but that
the center was now entirely disabled. Onlookers note that this could be due to
acts of sabotage conducted by the Mnzambique Resistance Movement (MRM), which is
struggling against the Mozambique National Liberation Front (FRELIMO), currently
in power in Maputo. The MRM had already claimed responsibility for the partial
destruction of the Cabora Bassa last November. The electricity purchasing con-
tract between Mozambique and South Af rica is regularly cited as the best example
of economic relations between neighboring countries of diametrically opposed
ideologies. [TextJ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
24 Apr 81 p 1208] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981.] 9745
i
i C`;(1; :F!~(1t),~'1 l /~r)
~
, , . ~ _ ~
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NIGER
BRIEFS
REMISSION OF PENALTIES--This 17 April, on the occasion of the seventh
_ anniversary of the Nigerien armed forces' takeover of power, some prisoners
were granted pardons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS
in French 1 May 81 p 1249] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981]
9341
CSO: 4400/1174
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NIGERIA
BRIEFS
ABUJA POSTPONED PAST 1982--The Nigerian Government will not be able to establish
its future capital in Abuja in 1982 as anticipated. Work on the pro~ect has in
fact been delayed for several months. Also, a number of newly constructed build-
ings have developed cracks. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981]
[Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 13 Muy 81 p 43] 9516
CREDITS FOR PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT--In accordance with the recommendations made
by the parliamentary committee on energy and oi1, headed by Dr J. Taribo Sekibo,
the federal chamber of representatives approved substantial credits in April to
the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) for development of its three
existing refineries at Port-Harcourt, Warri, and Kaduna. It took this step in
spite of criticism about the corporation's inefficiency. It is also known that,
following the famous "Oilgate" that involved the disappearance of funds from its
accounts, a complete reorganization was contemplated. The affair seems at the
moment about to be forgotten, but the NNPC was not in any case able, it is being
emphasized, to utilize the credits it previously had for the expansion of the first
refinery at Port-Harcourt. Out of the 60 million it had been provided in 1980
~ to increase the production capacity of the said refinery from the current 60,000
barrels per day to 200,000 barrels per day by the end of 1983 or beginning of 1984,
it reportedly made use of only 300,000. In any case, it is difficult to see under
these conditions how the NNPC could carry out its plans for a fourth and even a
- fifth refinery (on this subject see MTM of 24 October 1980, p 2620 and 16 .January
1981 p 140). [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEllITERRANEENS in French p 125].] 9516
PHILIPPINE OiL PURCHASE--The Nigerian federal minister of mines and energy, Alhaji
Mohammed Ibrahim Hassan, went to Manila the second half of April to negotiate with
his Philippine counterpart, Mr Geronomo Velasco, on Philippine purchase of Nigerian
oil. An accord is expected to be concluded shortly. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Rene
Moreux et Cie Paris 1981] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
p 1251] 9516
CSO: 4400/1196
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SENEGAL
_ CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, SUPREME COURT ROLE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1243
[Text] On 24 April the Senegalese national assembly adopted a constitu-
tional revision bill introduced by the government. The number of political
parties allowed in the country had been limited to four since 1976. The
new bill abrogates this limitation and, by this act, establishes an out-
rightly multiple-party system.
The constitutional revision also eliminates the requirement that these four
parties adopt onP of four labels: socialist (Socialist Party, in power),
liberal (Sene;alese Democratic Party), Marxist (African Party of Indepen-
dence) and conservative (Senegalese Republican Movement), but it forbids
political parties to identify themselves with a race, ethnic group, sex,
language, sect or region.
The multiple-party system existed in Senegal before 1976, but successive
merging of political parties had in fact made the socialist party the sole
party for 8 years.
Favoring a revival of the multiple-party system, the government had, in
contrast, estimated in 1976 that it was convenient to limit the number of
~ parties to avoid the proliferation of political groups. It appears from
the parliamentary debates that the current government believes it is pos-
sible to open up the political field without danger of anarchy.
The main beneficiaries of the constitutional revision, to be accompanied by
a broad amnesty (mainly for political crimes, press offenses and minor in-
fractions), will undoubtedly be Egyptologist Cheich Anta Diop's Democratic
National Rally, former Premier Mamadou Dia's socialist followers and the
marxist groups.
Revision of the Supreme Court's Role
In addition, the bi11 revising the constitution gives the supreme court a
broader role from now on: it will be responsible for verifying the legality
of the electoral campaign and of the voting in both legislative and presi-
dential elections.
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The constitutional reform also deals with the period of time between both
rounds of voting in the presidential election. This time period was in-
creased from 10 to 15 days to accommodate appeals against the second round
of voting and to give the supreme court time to settle any possible claime.
Finally, the swearing-in of new chiefs of state will be public from now on.
- COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981
9341
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SENEGAL
BRIEFS
NEW PARTIES, AMNESTY MEASURE--Since 24 April Senegal is the first French-speaking
black African state to recognize the total multiple party system. The national
Assembly has ratified in fact a constitutional revision of a draft bill introduced
by Mr Habib Thiam's government. Thus, the famous article 3 promulgated by Leopold
Sedar Senghor in 1976 came to an end. The former President had limited the Senegalese
democracy to four parties (J.A.ri�1061). His successor, Mr Abdou Diouf, has decided
to play the game of an open democracy. One restriction: no party will claim itself
to be of a race, region, ethnic group, sex or language. Religion, in turn, is
excluded. Since the 27th the National Democratic Rally (RND) of Pr Cheikh Anta
Diop has requested recognition. It was followed by the Maoist movement And-Jef,
the socialist Autonomy Movement of Mamadou Dia, the Proletarian Democratic Organi-
zation of Abdoulaye Ly, the African Party of Senegalese Independence of Amath
Dansokho and Maguette Thiam, and finally the Democratic League. At the same time
that it formalized this overture, the Assembly adopted an amnesty measure regarding
political and press offenses. The deputies also approved the suppression of exist
visas for Senegalese going abroad. Less than 4 months after his accession to power,
Mr Abdou Diouf, of whom some said that he would be the man of continuity, seems to
have decided on the contrary to assure change. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique
GRUPJIA 1981) [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 May 81 p 25] 9765
- TECHNICAL, PROFESSIONAL TEACHERS' SCHOOL--On 15 April, the Senegalese minis-
ter of education, Mr Abdel Kader Fall, laid the fcundation stone of the
future technical and professional teachers' training school at the Universi-
ty of Dakar. For 5 years the institution has been operating on the premises
of the university with some 100 student-teachers, some of which are citi-
zens of other African countries. This year 18 of them make up the first
graduating class. The new school will open its doors in August 1982. The
first stage of construction will cost 1.7 billion CFA francs. The complete
unit including complementary infrastructures will cost some 2.5 to 3
billion CFA francs. Mr Abdel Kader Fall also annour.ced that he will soon
lay the foundation stone of the technical and professional industrial high
school of Diour.bel. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French p 1243] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341
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DROUGHT AID DEAUCTION--On 24 April the Senegalese national assembly passed
a 1aw imposing a solidarity deduction corresnonding to 12 day's pay.
This tax, which should bring some 6 billion CFA francs, will help purchase
f.oodstuffs for the farmers affected by the drought or finance the transpor-
tat~ion of the lnternational food aid that Senegal has been granted. This
year the food shortage in Senegal is estimated at 140,000 tons; 73,000
tons of international aid are expected. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1243] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et
Cie. Paris 1981] 9341
ENAM GRADUATING CLASS--The ENAM [National School of Administration and
Magistrature] graduating class of 1980 received their diplomas during a
ceremony presided by the chief of state, Mr Abdou Diouf. The class of more
than 70, of which four are women, is made v.~ of 32 civil administrators,
15 magistrates, 6 customs inspectors, 6 treasury inspectors, 5 foreign
affairs secretaries, 4 tax and property inspectors and 2 labor inspectors.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET M~DITERRANEENS in French p 1243J
[COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341
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TANZANIA
BRIEFS
NATIONALIZATION OF AUTOMOBILE SECTOR--The Tanzanian state enterprise State
Motor Corporation (SMC) which, among other activities, monopolizes import
licenses for vehicles and automobile spare parts, expects to have complete
- control of the country's automobile sector in the long run. SMC holds 90
percent of shares in the Saab Scania factory of Dar-es-Salaam which manu-
factures industrial vehicles of 8 tons or more. This plant was to be com-
pleted in 1980. SMC is also negotiating with foreign companies to estab-
~ lish in Tanzania an assembly planr_ of light coimnercial vehicl.es ranging
from one to seven tons. In addition, SMC wants to manufacture an increas-
ing number of the replacement parts that are now being imported. The first
stage of this project would involve controlling and distributing the im-
ported parts through an SMC branch. These long-term measures reveal the
will of Tanzanian officials to reduce the importance of automobile and
replacement-parts imports in their balance of trade as part of a policy
that aims to replace imports. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
_ MEDITERRANEENS in French 1 May 81 p 1258J [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Ci~.
Paris 1981J 9341
~ IDA LOAN--The Interrcational Development Association [IDA], a branch of the [dorld
Bank, has j~ist extended '1'anzania credit for 49.9 million SDR's [special_ dra~ving
rights] ($5U million) to finance imports of agricultural machinery and equipment
and vehicle spare parts, in order to increase production and improve market-
ing of the main food crops intended for domestic consumption and for
exportation. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET I~DITERRANEENS in French
1 May 81 p 1258] [COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981] 9341
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TOGO
FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR 1981-1985 REPORTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 24 Apr S1 pp 1188, 1193
[Text] Togo's fourth 5-year plan for economic and social development, covering
the 1981-1985 period, is viewed as a program of great achievements which, when
completed, should open the way for Togo's economic takeoff.
, The plan will help guarantee real indep~ndence of the national economy, the
transformation of the administration into a genuine instrument of development, the
~ increase of the means and productive capacity of the factors of production, the
regional balance and the adaptation of outlooks to fit the new type of citizen.
The gross domestic product [GNPJ should increase, at the prevailing prices, from
260 billion CFA francs in 1980 to 356.2 billion in 1985 with the primary sector
contributing 26 percent of that sum (28.1 percent in 1980), the secondary sector
32 percent (28.3 percent) and the tertiary sector 42 percent (43.6 percent).
I! Therefore, the fourth 5-year plan aims to bring about a GDP annual rate of growth
I of 6.5 percent at constant prices. Taking into account the population growth (up
2.7 percent in 1980), the per capita income will rise from 96,375 to 125,435 CFA
i �rancs.
The first 5-year plan, which was 82.1 percent completed, ended in 1966 having
~reated the basic structures. The second plan, 64 percent completed, represented
a r.ecessary stage while the third plan, 78 percent completed, was characterized by
a program of diversified production.
The 1981-1985 plan totals of 368.5 billion CFA francs and consists of a minimum
priority program and an optional supplementary program broken down as follows, in
billion of CFA francs:
~
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Minimum Priority Optional Supplementary
Program Program
Production:
Rural Development 66.6 49.8
Industrial Development 73.4 25,2
Equipment:
Infrastructure 7~~.1 26.6
Social 23.7 9.7
- Employment 1.2 1
Administrative Organization 12.0 5,2
Total 251.0 117.5
_ The financing of the plan will be covered by the yearly investment and budgets, by
capital and credit investments from the private sector and from quasi-public organi-
- zations, by people's savings and by all kinds of foreign aid.
During the 5 years covered by the plan, the overall allocation for the investment
and budgets cannot be less than 44 billion CFA francs. The volume of public and
private savings in the country should reach 38.8 billion CFA francs in 1985, that is
to say, 10.9 percent of the GDP.
By 1985, Togo will have a population of over 3 million people and Lome, its captial
city, will have 300,000 inhabitants.
By the year 1985, the aspect of the countryside will have radically changed offering
improved farming methods and yields per hectare which will be double or triple;
- carefully tended, coffee and cocoa plantations wi11 have yields of 1 ton per hectare.
_ Furthermore, thanks to the exploitation of two agro-industrial poles of development
(in the north, the high valley of the Oti River and, in the south, the low valley
of the Mono River), the earnings of the Togolese farmers will not be loiaer than
those of the urban wage earners.
. The plan also calls for palm-based industries in Tabligbo, Kpalime and Atakpame; a
sugar complex (refinery, distillery and yeast plant) processing the cane from
intensive cash crops; a plant producing cattle feed; a cottonseed mi11. Rice-process-
ing plants will treat the paddy rice from irrigated areas to compete with the rice
imported from the Far East. After conclusive tests, the wheat grown in the north of
the country will supply a flour-mill, a biscuit factory and a pasta plant but in the
initial stage these plants will use imported wheat.
Several important projects which could not be carried out during the third plant
will be realized during the fourth plan, among others, the dam on the Mono River,
a phosphate fertilizer plant, canning, tanning and cigarette factories and machine
tool shops.
To see these projects through, the government is authorized to negotiate all the
necessary loans, to make all the required administrative and financial changes, to
reorganize the state-owned companies and to acquire equity in the companies or
agencies taking part in the execution of the plan.
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At the same time, it is imperative to seek a surplus in the trade balance, to encouragc~
private savings, to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and to keep foreign
aid flowing at a satisfactory level. Greater domestic production of goods and servicc~~~
less imports of unnecessary foodstuffs and the introduction of strict price controls
and of an effective distribution system will also help to curb an inflation which
remains disturbingly high.
- Data for the Various Sectors
Agriculture is the authorities' top priority.
In addition to self-sufficiency in the production of food supplies, t:he plan has set
the following targets for 1985: 50,090 tons of cottonseed, 13,050 tons of coffee,
10,700 tons of cocoa. Soya farming, with a crop of 17,200 tons of soya beans, should
yield 3,300 tons of oil and 14,500 tons of oilcake. The expansion and improvement
of palm groves grown as cash crop will result in the production of 35,000 tons of
clusters of dates which, after grinCing, will yield 6,500 tons of palm oil and I,750
tons of palm kernels. The agro-industrial sugar complex of Tchaoudja will produce,
on an average year, 53,(100 tons of sugar, 26,000 hectoliters of alcohol and 5,000
tons of molasses. The Chinese sugar program in the Anie area calls for the exploita-
- tion of 2,000 hectares of cane fields which should yield 6,000 tons of sugar, alcohol
_ for medical purposes and molasses for the livestock. When the coconut programs gets
underway, it will produce an average of 5,00~ tons of copra.
The program also contemplates planting more tobacco crops, a return to peanut
farming, improvements in stockbreeding, reforestation measures, the modernization
and expansion of sea fishing, the improvement of grain storage facilities and the
creation of a refrigeration system.
Projects involving the savanna areas, the Kana region and the plateaus of the central
_ and maritime regions will be financed out of the 66.6 billion CFA francs earmarked for
_ rural development in the minimum priority program and the 49.8 billion CFA francs
~ allocated to the optional additional program. ~tao new cotton ginning plants, located
in Notse and Atakpame, will require an investment of 2.1 billion CFA francs.
In the industrial sector, several important projects have been completed or are
underway, among others: Cement of West Africa, expanding the Togolese Mining Company
of Benin (phosphates), the Cement of Togo company and the Lome oil refinery. The
electrical steel plant of the National Iron and Steel Company went into operation
during 1979. The plant was built by a Swiss, Austrian and Swedish consortium (cost:
_ 9.8 billion CFA francs).
The 1981--1985 fourth plan also includes a study on the mining of iron deposits
located in the central region where reserves are estimated to be close to 1 billion
tons with an average iron content of 50 percent and even 65 percent in some loca-
tions. Other projects involve prospecting for mineral and oil, reorganizing and
expanding the Potash Company of Togo; a study to increase from 1.2 to 1.8 million
tons the output of the Cement of West Africa multinational company; diversifying
and expanding the food industry; creating a sugar industry; producing alcohol and
- proteins from ma.nioc; setting up canneries for pineapples, vegetables, tomatoes, meat
and fish; reorganizing the Ganave starch plant owned by the Benin Company; starting
an instant coffee plant; building a second brewery in Lama-Kara; producing fruit
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bottling mineral water; starting a sawmill and two packing-case plants; restructuring
the Togolese Textile Industry company to boost its production and make it more cost
efficient; manufacturing bandages; reorganizing the Togolese Detergent Company and
paying off its liabilities; building an industrial complex to produce phosphoric
acid from local phosphates (estimated cost: 70 billion CFA francs); manufacturing
pharmaceutical supplies; creating a medium-sized paper industry using recycled
materials; producing compost; increasing the annual output of the Cement of Togo
company to 850,000 tons; building a brick factory in Lama-Kara; making farming tools,
corrugated and galvanized iron sheets, metal frames, metal boxes, small electrical
appliances; producing cattle feed. Some of these projects are included just for the
record without giving their estimated cost.
Included in the investments allowed for industrial development under the minimum
priority program (73.4 billion CFA francs) and under the optional additional program
(25.2 billion the main projects are: a study of mining and energy resources
(1 billion CFA francs); the industrial section of the Anie sugar complex (2.3 billion);
a multiple-use pressing plant for the port of Lome to process palm kernels and cotton-
seeds (1.5 billion); a vegetable cannery (1 billion); an industrial complex to produce
phosphoric acid (70 billion); the expansion of the Cement Company of West Africa
(2.9 billion); a brick factory in Lama-Kara (1.2 billion); the building of a commer-
cial center in Lome (5.6 billion); the modernization and refurbishing of commercial
_ and service enterprises (3.5 billion). Part of the investments required will be
provided by the private sector.
Investments allocated to the chapter of infrastructures for communications and for
urban and tourist facilities amount to 74.1 billion CFA francs under the minimum
priority program and 26.6 billion under the optional additional program.
The main projects planned are building a second jetty in the autonomous port of Lome
(16 billion CFA francs) and creating a fishing port (3 billion); expanding and improv-
ing the network of asphalt roads (5.5 billion); building new highways and a cross-
country link, building bridges and so on (8.4 billion); improving the central railroad
line and extending it to Bandjelli (3 billion); purchasing rolling stock (1.3 billion);
relocating and rebuilding Lome's Central Rail Station (1.5 billion); creating a
national mass transit company and purchasing 50 buses (1.8 billion); building and
expanding the telephone exchanges and circuits of district capitals (1.5 billion);
building the Nangbeto dam on the Mono River (22 billion); bringing electricity to
upcountry areas (1 billion); improving and expanding the electric power network of
Lome (1 billion); building high-voltage power lines which start in Lome and in Lama-
Kara (5 billion); supplying water for the town of Dapaong (1 billion); improving and
- expanding the water supply system in Lome (2.5 billion); expanding the water supply
system in secondary towns (1 billion); drilling, 1,500 pump-operated wells in rural
areas (3 billion); making improvements in the city of Lome (3 billion); doing road
maintenance work in the port of Lome (1.5 billion); building the Akodessawa road
(1 billion); building 4,000 housing units in Lome and in major towns of the interior
(4 billion); purchasing and developing plots of land in towns (2.5 billion) and so
on.
As for projects in the social and cultural sector, here is the breakdown of investments
amounting to 33.3 billion CFA francs for the minimum program and the optional program
put together--figures are given in billion CFA francs:
38
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Public Health 2,2
National Education 21.6
Social Affairs and Women's
- Condition p,g
- Information 4.5
= Youth, Sports, Culture 4.1
Nutrition 0.1
Total 33.3
These projects involve medical facilities and equipment, educational centers and
equipment (including 2.5 billion CFA francs earmarked for five agricltural education
centers and 1 billion CFA francs to build a technical school in Pya), and the
_ building of an olympic stadium in Lama-Kara (3 billion) among other projects.
Under the chapter of administrative organization for development, 17.2 billion CFA
francs are allocated for both the minimum program and optional program with the
money going chiefly to: National Defense (8.4 billion CFA francs which will be used
- primarily to build a military camp and expand four other existing camps), interior
(2.6 billion for various buildings in Lome and in the interior), Foreign Affairs
(1.2 billion to purchase diplomatic representation buildings in Lagos, Ottawa and
Libreville).
_ The receipts of the state budget will jump from 70.7 billion CFA francs in 1981 to
92 billion CFA francs in 1985 and the source of this increase will be direct taxes
and customs duties and taxes, Expenses will show the same rate of increase.
The minimum priority program will be financed as follows--with figures in billions
of CFA francs:
Domestic Resources 89.6
I State 44
Quasi-public companies 10
' Secondary communities 12.6
Private sector 23 ~
Foreign resources 161.3
Bilateral grants and loans 93
Multilateral donations
- and loans 63.3
Total 250.9
The accompanying measures attached to the 1981-1985 fourth plan to prevent bottlenecks
. include an administrative reform to reorganize the Treasury and tax departments, a
reform of the tax legisl~:tion, a revision of the investments' code, steps to harmonize
the plan and the budget, the preparation of budgets which will offer better guidance
to the economic policy, the creation of a land bank specializing in the financing
- of housing, the creation of a consumers' institute and of a higher council of arts
and crafts, the reorganization of some state-owned companies.
.i
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
8796
CSO: 4400/1143
39
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ZAIRE
EX-PRIME MINISTER TALKS ABOUT REASONS FOR LEAVING
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 6 Ma.y 81 pp 17-18
_ [Article by Jos-Blaise Alima--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]
[TextJ /"Except for God, I am the only arbiter of my fate."/ From his private
Rhodes Saint Genese residence in Brussels (Belgium), Nguza Karl I Bond for the
first time lifts up a corner of the veil over his surprise resignation announced
16 April.
When the first c~mmissar of the state (prime ministe~) left Kinshasa on 10 April,
nobody suspected he had decided to take the path into exile. With the authoriza-
tion of President Mobutu, he went to La Haye (Netherlands) to accompany his wife
- who needed a surgical operation at Bronovo hoapital.
On 16 April, the couple left the Dutch capital for Brussels. In the meantime,
Karl I Bond called the Zairian ambassador in Paris, Mokolo Wa Mpombo, to meet with
him in the Belgian capital. And to request him to transmit to the Zairian presi-
_ dent his letter of resignation. Officially, the former prime minister e~xplains
his decision by /"reasons of personal convenience."/
Stricken with cancer of the uterus, Mrs Karl I Bond, who underwent a surgical
operation (successful), needs to be close to her loved ones. The Zairian poli-
tician explained this at great length in hia letter of resignation. But in Kinshasa
no one seriously thinks that the state of health of his wife was the only thing
motivating Karl I Bond. And for good reason! As Mobutu`s prime minister, Nguza
was considered his hostage.
When Nguza Karl I Bond, who had formerly been a minister of foreign affairs,
ret~~rned to government on 6 March 1979, the move was perceived as a rehabilitation.
Accused of colluding with the Shaba insurgents--he is a native of Shaba--he was
arrested on 13 August 1977. Condemned to death on 13 September, he was pardoned
and freed several months later, under pressure, it appears, from certain western
powers. He subsequently got back his position as minister of foreign affairs.
/"In reality,"/ he says, /"Mobutu never rehabilitated me. He acted under the
pressure of events and I laid down conditions for re~oining the government. They
were accepted."/
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Having taken up his pilgrim's staff, Nguza Karl I Bond flies around the world to
talk about the "Zaire dossier," which is at present characterized by a particularly
troublesome economic con~uncture. It is no exaggeration to say that he was the
principal architect of the country's recovery from its financial predicament.
His designation on 28 August 1980 as prime miniater tends to confirm Chis idea.
Was it success that brought about the split between Mobutu and his closesC col-
, laborator? To tell the truth, the mutual suspicion never dissipated. Karl I
Bond's rise drew hostility from the president's entourage. Mentioned several
times as a possible successor to Mobutu, the former prime minister believes he
was the victim of a/"cabal mounted by the president's special security affairs
adviser, Seti Yale."/
The latter was reported to have convinced Mobutu that /"Karl I Bond`s loyalty
was only an appearance...And that he supported the regime like the rope supports
the hange~ man."/
According to his political enemies, the former prime minister was mostly involved
in building up a constituency in regions other than his native Shaba. Thus, he
was accused of showing favoritism to regions with the highest percentage of school-
age children attending classes, by handing out 180 of the 300 scholarships given
out by the state last year to Kasai students. Now Karl I Bond maintains that,
/"since independence (1960) the United States has provided only 200 scholarships
to Zaire."/
It is in this context that we come to the ministerial shake-up of February 1981.
Unlike his two predecessors, Mpinga Kassenda and Bobaliko Lokanga, Nguza Karl I
Bond was given a vice-prime minister, Bomboko Lokumba.
The decision tr~ name a vice-prime minister was supposedly made in January while
Karl I Bond was taking 2-weeks' leave in Europe. /"The rumor was spread that I
had decided nat to return to Zaire,"/ he says.
- Whether right:ly or wrongly, Bomboko's nomination was minister of foreign affairs
- and as vice-prim~e minister was interpreted as a maneuver by President Mobutu
intended to neutralize the prime minister.
The Zairian head of state, according to friends of Karl I Bond, did not want him
to receive all the credit for the success of the recovery program. This gave rise
to his decisio~l to put at his side someone thoroughly familiar with international
negotiations. ICarl I Bond saw in this last maneuver a desire by President Mobutu
to remove him from events by marginalizing him.
Feeling the vise tighten, Nguza Karl I Bon,3 was convinced that the scenario that
unfolded in 1.977, which had at that time led to his e3ection (and to his death
sentence) was, going to begin again. So he took the initiative, this time, to
slam the door~ shut. To avoid having it shut on him.
In Kinshasa, Karl I Bond's departure created a furor in the ruling circles, who
were surprised by an event that no one had anticipated. Following a special
meeting of the Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) held on 17 April, the
Zairian Press Agency (AZAP) wrote: /"This is an act that bears the mark of the
most gross cowardice."/
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The government in Kinshasa, which we have questioned, criticizes Karl I Bqnd for
not having informed President Mobutu of any possible impediments he may have
encountered in carrying out his duties. /"He left because of his own pre~udices,"/
we were told.
As one would expect, this resignation is read by President Mobutu as proof of
his former prime minister's lack of loyalty. /"The nomination of Bomboko,"/ main-
tains the Zairian head of state, "was noC intended to neutralize Kar.l I Bond. On
the contrary, given the scope of the task, it was a matter of giving him an assist-
_ ant who likewise had international stature."/ Also, President Mob utu believes
that it was he who made it possible for Nguza Karl I Bond to acquire international
stature by naming him to foreign affairs. So the chief of state thinks he has
been paid back with ingratitude by a man who deserted a position which carried
important responsibilities. The Kins:~asa government states that /"Nguza does not
have a monopoly on international credibility, there have been other prime ministers
before him, and there will be others after him."/ And to prove conclusively that
/"no one will miss Karl I Bond,"/ a new prime minister, Nsinga Udjuu Ongwakebi
Untube, was named on 23 April.
Obviously, the buried hatchet has been exhumed, and the conflict between Mobutu
and Karl I Bond has taken on new proporti~ns. However, the latter is refusing
to join forces with Zairian opposition figures who find a special welcome in
Belgium.
But in Kinshasa it is regretted that Karl I Bond chose Brussels, the former colo-
nial capital, as the site for the announcement of his resignation. And people
are not reluctant to insinuate that Belgium is mixed up in it. /"Those who give
asylum to this kind of people are only allowing themselves to be taken in by
Nguza's rhetoric. This kind of bird always flies in the same direction."/
Was Nguza, who will be 43 in August, assured of the support of certain European
friends before venturing, by leaving Zaire, into what surely looks like exile?
On the eve of his flight to the United States, where he will spend several weeks,
the former Zairian prime minister confided to us quite simply: /"It was putting
myself in the voluntary reserves."/ Suddenly everything was clear: Nguza put
himself "in the reserves...of the republic."
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
9516
CSO: 4400/1196 FND
L~2
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