JPRS ID: 9678 TRANSLATION HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II VOLUME 11 THE DEFEAT OF MILITARISTIC JAPAN THE END OF WORLD WAR II

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JPRS L/9678 _
21 April 1981
Translation
HISTO~Y OF WORLD WAR li
VO~UME 11
- The Defea~ of Militaristic Japan.
The End of World War II
,
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JPRS L/96~~
21 April 1981
- HISTOR~ OF WORLD WAR II
VOLUME 11 -
; THE DEFEAT OF MILI7ARISTIC .JAPAN~
I THE END OF WORLD WAR II
I ' -
- Moscow ISTORIYA VTOROY MIROVOY VOYNY 1939-1945 Vol 11, 1980 in Russian
(signed to press 12 Mar 80) pp 2-9, 11, 29-34, 46-48, 79-80, 91-92,
107-109, 134-135, 157-159, 161, 211-212, 237-238, 273-274, 295-296,
- 325-327, 348-351, 353, 366-368, 394-398, 426-464, 489, 491-495
[Excerp~ts from the book "History of World War IT 1939-1945" in 11
Volumes, Voyenizdat, 331,000 copies, 496 pages, BBK 63.~(0)62 190]
CONTENTS
Editorial Info rmation~~~~~��~~��~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~a~~~~co~~~~~~~o~o~�0 1
Origina~ Table of Contents............o ..............o..o......o..o............ 2
Annotation .....................~...................oooo..o..o........o.a...oo... 4
' List of Ntaps ........................................o.o.....o..~..o.oo......o.. 5
Introduction...............~ ........................a...........o.o...........0 6
Ghapter 1. Military-Political Situation in the Pacific, and in East
. and Southeas t Asia...........oowo.oo.oooa.oooo.........o.....oo.o.. 9
Chapter 2. Build Up of Forces by the Sides. Diplomatic Maneuvers by Japan.... 9
Chapter 3. Landing Operations by Allied Armed Forces in the Pacific,..o.o.o... 15 ~
- Chapter 4. Completion of the Burma Campaign......o.o.o~.oa....~...o~~......... 16
Chap ter 5. Military Operations in China. . . . . . . . . . o . . . . o . o 0 0 . . . ~ . . . o . . . o . . I6
Qzapter 6. Rise of the National Liberation Movement in the Occupied
Countries of Asia .........................o.......oa~ooo.o..o..o.,. 17
- a - [II - USSR - FOUO] -
; [III - USSR - 4 FOUO] ~
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Chapter 7. Campaign of Sea Communications. Air and Atomic Bombing of
Japanese Cities........~ 17
~
Part II. Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War ~1gai.nst Niilitaristic
Japan 19
(~apter 8. Preparation of Soviet Armed Forces for Military Operations
Against Militaristic Japan 19
(h2nter 9. Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War With Japan.
Beginning of Military Operations 19
(liapter 10. Completion of Rnut of Japanese Troops. Liberation of North-
eastern China .......................................oo........... 20
Chapter 11. Liberatior. of North I~orea, Southern Sakhalin and Kurile
Islar.ds 2U
Chapter 12. The Communist Party--Inspiration and Organizer of the
Victory of the Soviet People Over Imperialist Japano 21
(h apter 13. Rebuilding the National Economy of the Soviet Union in 1945...... 21
(iiapter 14. Capitulation of Militaristic Japan.......a .............o.~....... 23
Chapter 15. Policy of Imperialist States in the Far East and Southeast
Asia 24
Chapter 16. Soviet Foreig,n Policy. Solvir:; Far Eastern Problems.o........... 26
Chapter 17. Military A~t of the Main Participants in the War 29
- Conclusion 66
- b -
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t.
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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES -
~
~
HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II - VOLUME 11
Moscow ISTORIYA VTOROY MIROVOY VOYNY 1939-1945 Tom 11 in Russian 1980 (signed to -
press 12 Mar 80) pp 2-9, 11, 29-34, 46-48, 79-80, 91-92, 107-109, 134-135, 157-159, -
; 161, 211-212, 237-238, 273-274, 295--296, 325-327, 348-351, 353, 366-368, 394-398, _
426-464, 489, 491-495
[Excerpts from book "History of World War II 1939-1945, Volume 11", Voyenizdat,
331,000 copies, 496 pages]
[Excerpts] [p 2] History of World War II 1939-1945, in 11 volumes
Main Editorial Commission
- Chairman D.'F. Ustinov
G. A. Arbatov, V. A. Vinogradov, S. G. Gorahkov, A. A. Gromyko, A. G. Yegoxov,
A. A. Yepishev,~A. S. Zheltov, P. A. Zhilin (vice-chairman), Ye. M. Zhukov (vice-
chairman), S. P. Ivanov, N. N. Inozemtsev, V. M. Kozhevnikov, V. G. Kulikov (vice-
chairman), S. R. Kurkotkin, Ye. Ye. Mal'tsev, D. F. Markov, A. L. Narochnitskiy,
N. V. Ogarkov (vice-chairman), S. I. Rudenko, A. M. Rumyantsev, M. I. Sladkovskiy,
T. T. Timof~yev, P. N. Fedoseyev (vice-chairman} and S. K. Tavigun
(p 3] History of World War II 1939-1945, Volume 11
The Defeat of Militarietic Japan. The End of World War II
- [p 4] Editorial Board for Volume 11
V. I. Achkasov (editor in chief), M. A. Alekseyev, V. F. Buturlinov, P. A.
Gorchakov, A. M. Dubinskiy, G. A. Kumanev, N. M. Pegov, Yu. G. Perechnev, G. K.
~ Plotnikov (deputy editor in chief), B. G. Sapozhnikov, G. N. Sebast'yanov and
P. P. Topekha �
[p 8J Author Collective for the Volucie
. V. I. Achkasov (director), G. K. Plotnikov (vice--director), M. A. Alekseyev, A. A. _
Babakov, V. N. Bagrov, V. F. Buturlinov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, I. I. Gaglov, S. G.
Gorshkov, A. M. Dubinskiy, P. A. Zhilin, S. K. Znobishchev, S. P. Ivanov, S. I.
' Isayev, I. M. Kalinina, V. G. Kolychev, G. S. Kondrat'yev, u. S. Kravchenko, G. A.
i Kumanev, V. N. Levchenko, A. M. Ledovski.y, A. P. Markov, A. V. Mitrofanova, N. M.
; Pegov, Yu. G. P~rechnev, 0. B. Rakhmanin, B. G. Sapozhnikov, G, N. Sebast'yanov, _
M. I. Sladkovskiy, L. N. Smi~nov, S. K. Tsvigun and A. S. Yakushevskiy
1
;
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[pp 491-493] Contents Page
Introduction 5
Part I. Military Operations by the United States, England and China
against Japan. Struggle by the Nations of the Enslaved Countries
Chapter 1. Military-Political Situation in the Pacific, and in East
- and Southeast :.5ia
1. International and Domestic Situation of the Main Participants in the War 11
2. Strategic Situation at the Start of 1945 ls
3. Military-Political Aims and Plans of the Sides 23 ;
Chapter 2. Build Up of Forces by the Sides. Diplomatic Maneuvers by Japan
l. The Yalta Conference. The Decision on the Soviet Ur_ion's Entry into the
War aga~nst Japan 30
2. Build Up of Forces by the Sides 34
3. Diplomatic rlaneuvers by Japa~n to Conclude a Separate Peace 41
Chapter 3. Landing Operations by Allied Armed Forces in the Pacific
1. Completion of riilitary Operations in the Philippines 48
2. Capture of Iwo Jima 5~
3. Landing Operation to Capture Okinawa 64
4. Allied Force Offensive in the Southwest Pacific 73
Chapter 4. Completion of the Burma Campaign
1. Situation in Burma and Plans of the Sides 80
2. Allied Force Offensive in Central and Southern Burma 83
- Chapter 5. Military Operations in China
1. Military-Political and Economic Situation of China in the First Half of 1945 92
2. Plans and Measures by the Japanese Command in China for 1945 99
3. Military Operations at Chinese Fronts before the USSR's Entry into the
War against Japan 102
Chapter 6. Rise of the National Liberation Movement in the Occupied
Countries of Asia
1. SCruggle by the Nations of Indochina 109
2. Activization of the Progressive Forces in Burma 114
3. Rise of the Resistance Movement in Indonesia 117
4. Success of the Liberation Struggle in the Philippines 123
Chapter 7. Campaign on Sea Communications. Air and Atomi~ Bombing of
Japanese Cities
1. Campazgn on Japan's Sea Lines of Communications 135
2. Air Bombing of Japan 142
3. Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 148
Part II. Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Militaristic Japan
Chapter 8. Prepar.ation of Soviet Armed Forces for Military Operations against
Militar.istic Japan '
1. Aggressive Schemes of Japanese Imperialism against the Soviet Union 161
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~ 2. Situation in the Far East and Pacific by August 1945 170
3. r'eatures of the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operat ions.
- Disposition of Japanese Forces at Soviet Borders 176
4. Soviet Forces in the Far East. Strategi~ Regrouping f rom West to East 183
S: Planning and Preparation of the Manchurian Strategic Op eration 197
Chapter 9. Entry of the Soviet Union into the War with Jap an.
Beginning of Military Operations
1. Declaration of War on Imperialist Japan by the Soviet Union and the
~ Mongolian People's Republic 212
' 2. Sta~t of Military Operations. Rout of Japanese Covering Forces and
' Attackers Reach the Manchurian Plain 21g
i
i Chapter 10. ~ompleti.on of Rout of Japanese Troops.
~ Liberation of Northeastern China
I l. Development of the Attack by Soviet-Mongolian Troops 238
' 2. Capitulation of Kwantung Army Troops 247
3. Liberation of Northeastern China and Establishment of the Manchurian
j Revolutionary Base 253
~ Chapter 11. Liberation of North Korea, Southern Sakhalin and Kurile Islands
,I 1. Landing of Amphibious Forces in North Korean Ports. Completion of
Liberation of North Korea 274
2. Southern Sakhalin Operation Zg4
_ 3. Kurile Landing Operation 290
Chapter 12. The Communist Party--Tnspiration and Organizer of the Victory
- of the Soviet People over Imperialist Japan
1. The Tasks of Peaceful Construction after the Victory over Fascist Germany 296
2. The Party's Organizational and Ideological Work in the Far East 304 -
_ 3. The Communist Party--Organizer of the Rout of Japanese Militarism 314
Chapter 13. Rebuilding the National Economy of the Soviet Union in 19G5
l. Features of Rebuilding the Economy 327 -
2. Expansion of Reconstruction Work and Further Developmen t of the
National Economy 335
3. Reduction of Military Production. Acceleration of the Rates of
Shifting to a Peacetime Economy 345
~
~ Part III. Completion of the War against Militaristic Japan
Chapter 14. Capitulation of Militaristic Japan
1. Signing of the InsCrument on the Unconditional Surrend er of Japan 353
2. Surrender of Japanese Troops i.n Japan, China, Korea and the Countries
of Southeast Asia 359
Chapter 15. Policy of Imperialist States in the Far East and Southeast Asia 367
1. U.S. Occupational Policy in Japan at the End of 1945 368
U.S. Interference in Chinese Internal Affairs 373 =
3. U.S. Policy in South Korea 380
" 4. Policy of Imperialist Powers in South and Southeast Asi a 384
3
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- Chapter 16. Soviet Foreign Policy. Solving Far Eastern Prob'.~ams 396
l. Soviet-Chinese,Relations 398
2, Problems of the Postwar Arrangement in Japan and Korea at the Moscow
Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 410
~ 3. The Tokyo International Tribunal. Punishment of the Main Japanese
War Criminals 415
Chapter 17. Military Art of the Main Participants in the War
1. Characteristic Features of Soviet Miii.tary Art 427
2. Military Art of the U.S., English and Chinese Armies and Ivavies 442
3. Main Features of the Military Art of the Japanese Army and Navy 450
Conclusion 459
Appendices
Chronology of Main Events 467
Name Index 471
Geographic Index 478
List of Maps 489 -
Abbreviated Titles of Archives Encountered in the Text 490
[pp 444-495] This volume is based on documents of the USSR Central State Archives
- of the October Revolution, High State Government Bodies and ~tate Administrative
Bodies, the USSR Central State Archives of the National Economy, the USSR Foreign
Policy Archives, the Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Central Naval
Archives, the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Railways, ~he Central ~
Archives of the Border Troops, the Central Party Archives of the Institute of
Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee, the Party Archives of the Kha-
barovskiy Kray Committee of the CPSU, the Party Archives of the Primorskiy Kray
CPSU Committee, the State Archives of Khabarovskiy Kray, the Institute of Military
History of the USSR Ministry of Befense, the Department of History of the CPSU of -
the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Commit~ee and of other
institutions and archives.
Illustrations were selected in the Central State Archives of Motion-Picture and ~
Yhotographic Records of the USSR, the USSR Foreign Policy Archives, the Central
Museum of the Armed Forces, the State Museum of the Revolution, the TASS Pictorial
Review, the :~OVOSTI PRESS AGENCY, the Photographic Library of the Military Publish-
ing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the archives of the journal SOVETSKI'I
- VOIN, the publishing house "Izobrazitel'noye iskusstvo", the personal archives of -
Marshal of the Soviat Union A. M. Vasilevskiy, Army General A. P. Beloborodov and
B. Ravsal, military artist of the MNA [Mongolian People's Army], as well as in
- foreign publications.
The photographs wer.e selected by I. M. Kalinina.
Author models of maps were compiled by G. K. Plotnikov, Yu. G. Perechnev, V. F.
Buturlinov, G. S. Kondrat'yev and made by associates of the Department of Cartogra-
phy and Photographic Documentation, Institute of Military Historys USSR Ministry of
Defense, N. S. Glazunov (director), T. A. Borisova, V. A. Kazantsev, Ye. A.
Nefedova, P. I. Smirnov, 0. A. Smirnova and L. P. Suvorova.
4
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The maps, were prepared for printing and printed by the military topographical ser-
vice of the Soviet Army.
The following contributed data used in writing certain sections: B. A. Vayner,
Yu. K. Vorontsov, V. G. Zorchenko, G. I. Nekhonov, A. M. Noskov, G. A. PozdoroVkin,
A. S. Savin, V, P. 5ologub and I. N. Chaban.
Individual chapters and sections were reviewed by V. V. Voznenko, M. N. Kozhevnikov,
N. G. Pavlenko and M. I. Povaliy.
Consultants for the volume were I. Kh. Bagramyan, P. F. Batitskiy, P. I. Batov,
I. M. Galushko, N. M. Gribachev, I. I. Gusakovskiy, P. I. Yefimov, I. G. Zav'yalov,
P. I. Ivashutin, V. P. Karpunin, P. S. Kutakhov, V. S. Makhalov, K. S. Moskalenko,
I. G. Pavlovskiy, P. A. Rotmistrov, N. D. Sergeyev, Ye. I. Smirnov, L. N. Smirnov,
S. L. Tikhvinskiy, V. F. Tolubko, V. I. Chuykov and N. A. Shchelokov.
~ �
_ Chief of the editorial staffs for the work "History of World War II 1939-1945" was
N. K. Glazunov. Editor in chief for the editorial staff for military history
- literature of Voyenizdat ~Military Publishing House] was P. N. Sharpilo. Super-
- visory editorial staff was N. G. Andronik, B. I. Paviov, A. T. Sapronov and Ye. M.
Fedotov.
Literary editor was G. A. Khvilevitskaya. The chronology of main events and
indexes were compiled by I. M. Kalinina.
The author collective was aided in 5cientific-organizational and checking work by
~ N. N. 'Jinogradova, V. V. Gromoya, N. N. Yefimova, N. V. Ivanova, V. D. KozineCs,
V. G. Konovalov, Ye. Yu. Koroleva, R. N. Kucherova, A. Ye. Moshko, N. F. Smirnova
and V. I. Sokolova.
Auxiliary work on preparing the volume was performed by P. A. Akat'yev, T. N.
Gorbunova, N. M. Zhabinskaya and S. S. Yudin.
The editorial board and author collective express their thanics to all insCitutions ~
and people who helped to prepare the volume.
[p 489] List of maps
1. Strategic Situation in the Pacific and Asia by the Start of 1q45. -
2. Amphibious Landing and Occupation of Iwo Jima by American Troops. .
19 February - 16 March 1945.
3. General Course of Military Operations in the Pacific and Asia.
~ January - September 1945.
' 4. Military Operations in the Philippine Islands. January - August 1945.
S. Amphibious Landing and Occupation of Okinawa by American Troops.
1 April - 21 June 1945.
6. Military Operations in Burma. January - September 1945. -
7. Military Operations in China. January - September 194~.
8. Amphibious Landing and Liberation of Chongjin (Seisin) by Soviet Troops.
13-16 August 1945.
9. Plan for the Manchurian Offensive.
10. Rout of the Kwantung Army. Liberation of Northeastern China and North Korea.
9 August - 2 September 1945.
5
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11. Libera[ion of South Sakhalin and Kuril Islands. 11 August - 2 September 1945.
12. Occupation of Japan by American Troops.
Note. On the maps of the work "History of World War II 1939-1945", state h~~rders
are shown for the period of events being covered.
~Pp 5_8~ Introduction
In May 1945, a destroyed and overrun fascist Germany surrendered unconditionally.
With joy and rejoicing, all the peap~e on earth welcomed the Great Victory that
brought long-awaited peace to the nations of Europe.
But in the countries of Southeast Asia, in the Far Ea~t and the Pacific, the war
still raged on. Korea, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, part of Ctiina, Burma and the
Philippine Islands were under tY~e yoke of the Japanese occupation?_s~s. And although
the United States and Great Britain had been waging war with Japan for over three
years and had made some progress, they had not been able to achieve decisive vic-
tory. The governments of the United States and Great Britain, evaluating the
military-political situation realistically, recognized that the w3r with Japan
would require yet much force, time and, above all, sacrifice, and that it would be
impossible to achieve a quick victory without the Soviet Union. That is why the
American president and the British prime minister persistently s~rove to get the
Soviet government to agree to get the USSR int~ this war.
Such an understanding was reached in the Crimea at the Yalta Conference. In the
agreement signed 11 February 1945, it ~as stated that the "leaders of the Three
Great Powers--the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain--had
= agreed that within two to three months after the surrender of Germany and thelend
- of the war in Europe, the Soviet Union will enter the war against Japan.... ~
The agreement by r..he USSR government to enter the war with Japan was dictated pri-
marily by allied obligations. In addition, it was also necessary to secure the
saFety of Soviet far eastern borders, considering the anti-5oviet, aggressive
course of the policy of militaristic Japan that had been making raids repeatedly
- for a long time on the land of the soviets. It had actively taken part in the in-
~ tervention by the imperialist states in 1918-1920, had tried to invade Soviet ter-
ritory in 1938 at Lake Khasan, and started the battle at Khalkhin-Gol.
lluring World War II, while the Soviet Union was Pngaged in a stubbcrn struggle with
f.ascist Germany, Japan, in a gross vio lation of the neutrality pact, moved ~he
Kwantung Army right up to USSR borders; this army was a powerful grouping of ground
troops, ready to invade the Soviet Union at any moment and unleash war on a large
scale.
Consequently, the decision by the Sov iet government to enter the USSR into the war
against Japan was not only an obligation to the allies in the antifascist coali-
tion; it also met Che interests of the sCate, the necessity of protecting its f3r
1"The Soviet Union at the International Conferences during the Great Patriotic
War 1941-1945," Volume 4, "The Yalta Conference of the Three Allied Powers--the ~
USSR, the USA and Great Britain--4-11 February 1945," "Collection of Documents,"
Moscow, 1479, p 273.
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eastern borders. Therefore, the war by the Soviet Union against Japan was a
logical continuation of the Great Patriotic War.
- To end World War II most rapidly, Soviet Armed Forces, strictly carrying out the
obligations agreed to, launched a decisive of.f.~nsive against the Kwantung Army on
- 9 August 1945.
The military and political cirr..les of militaristi,c Japan understood that a state
had entered the war whose army had the strengtt: of many millions and the widest ex-
~ perience of the war in Europe, lasting almost four years, an army the powerful
! military machine of fascist Germany had not withstood. The rout of Hitler's Reich
~ by the Soviet Armed Forces foreordained the defeat of militaristic Japan too.
The war demanded fresh great efforts from the Soviet people, the Communist Party,
the Army and the Navy. The Central Committee of the Communist Party, the State
~ Defense Committee, and the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command exerted
enormous effort cn the strategic regrouping of the Armed Forces from the west to
the east on a scale and for a distance unprecedented in the history of the world.
The country's national economy supplied the powerful grouping, deployed in the Far
East, with everything needed; this enabled carrying out the strongest etrategic
offensive in several disconnected directions, in the shortest time and on an
enormous expanse.
The Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan was a major event that had a de-
cisive effect on the entire s+~bae~uent course and outcome of World War II in the
Far East, in the countries of Southeast Asia and in the Pacific. The rout of the
Kwantung Army, the most trained and well-equipped Japanese grouping of ground
troops, snatched �rom Japan the main means of further waging of war and compelled
it to surrender. Without the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Brftain
could not have accomplished this mission successfully. The Soviet Union made the
main contribution to the attainment of victory in the concluding stage of the r~ar
with Japan.
The decisive rol~ of the Soviet Army in defeating the far eastern aggressor
strengthened the strategic, political and economic positions of the USSR in the
Pacific. in addition, the Soviet Union restored its historic rights to the Kuril -
Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin Island. ~
The rout of the grouping of Japanese troops, over a million in strength, deployed
at the borders of the USSR and the I~NR [Mongolian People's Republic], played the de-
~ cisive role in liberating many nations of East and Southeast Asia, and above all
~ the Chinese nation, from the occupationists. The Soviet L~nion rendered great
-I assistance to the Chinese people in the struggle with the Japanese invaders, the
establishment of the Manchurian revolutionary base and the victory of the revolu-
~ tion in this country.
Immediat~ly after the war, the Sovie~ command transferred in full to ~the troops, led
by the KPK ~Comtuunist Party of ChinaJ, the arms and combat materiel captured in
_ Manchuria by the Transbaykal, lst and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts. A little later, they
were also given a substantial share of Soviet arms. All this made it possible to
rearm the people's troops in Manchuria and to form and outfit new units and large
units, It is precisely this Manchurian revolutionary base that became the
~ ~ -
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N'OR OF'FI('IA1, [ i~l~. ONLY
strategic springboard, relying on ~rhicY~ the troops led by the Chinese Communist
Party were able ta develop the offensive and liberate the entire country from the
followers of Chiang Kai-shek and their protectors.
In terms of saturatian with military-political events, the concluding period of
World War II (May - Septemb er 1945) holds a special place. It is determined by a
number of specific factors; among the chief ones are the radical changes in the
military-political situation in this region as a result of. the surrender of fascist
- Germany, the Soviet Union's entry into the w~r and, finally, the unconditional
surrender of militaristic Japan.
The llth volume of the "History of World War II" is devoted to an examination of
the complicated complex of military, political and economic processes in the
- Pacif ic basin, in the countries of Southeast Asia and in the Far East.
Part I covers the events prior to the Soviet Union's entry irito the war with
militaristic Japan. Studied here is the course of operations, as a result of which
American-English armed forces reached the immediate approac,hes to Japan. Consider-
able space is allocated to the national liberation struggle of the.nations of East
and Southeast Asia against the occupationists. Analyzed in this part are the
operations of the navies and air forces of the allies in their attempts to knock
Japan out of the war by bombing and naval blockade, as well as the barbaric use of I
atomic bombs wrhich did not stem from mili~ary necessity.
Part II looks at the events in the Far Eaa.*. in August-September 1945 that had a de-
cisive effect on the end of World War II and the unconditional surrender of Japan.
- In the course of skillfullq planned and executed operations, and in the shortest
. possible time, the rout of the res isting grouping of Japanese troops was completed ,
and the liberating mission of the Soviet Army in Manchuria and North Korea was _
carried out. This exposes the Beijing falsifiers who try to minimize the role of
the Soviet Armed Forces in liberating northeastern China and establishing the
~ Manchurian revolutionary base or who quite deliberately pass over it in silence.
_ The active participation of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army in liberating
northeastern China ~s shown in thF volume.
In part III, there is an analysis of the events that affected both the course of
the war and the postwar 5ystem of countries of East and Southeast Asia, and of the
complex processes of transition from war to the establishment of postwar relations
in the Far East. Examined in detail are the consistent and active policy of the
� Soviet government on effecting the demilitarization of Japan and the struggle of
the eastern nations for self-determination.
- A special chapter is devoted to the development of the military art of the main
states that waged the war.
T.he Soviet Union's participation in the war with Japan accelerated considerably the
= end of World War II; this saved from death many thousands of inhabitants of the
countries of East and Southeast Asia, spared the Japanese nation itself sacrif ice
and suffering and had great influence on the development of the national liberation
struggle in Asia.
- The victory of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces, guided by the Communist Party,
- and Japan's surrender created favorable conditions for the nations of China, Korea _
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and the other countries of East and Southeast Asia for the si~ccessful struggle for
freedom and independence and for socioeconomic reforms. The path of democraric de-
- velopment was opened for them. But the Soviet Union gave an especially great deal `
of help to the Chinese people. In the postwar period, many countries in Asia,
Africa and Latin America, having been freed from colr~nial slavery, confidently em-
barked on the path of development on their own,. _
Bourgeois historiography, especially American, perverting the nature, course and re- -
- sultR of the war with Japan, tries to make use of the falsified h istory of the past
~ war for their own reactionary aims. Maoist historians are also making such dis- _
' tortions. Despite the apparent difference ~.n pasitions between American bourgeois ~
and Maoist historiography, it pursues a common aim--to be~ittle th e Soviet Union's
contributio~i to the victory over militaristic Japan. A critique of these anti-
scientific versions is made in the volume.
As a result of the roLt of militaristic Japan, the world's democra tic forces headed
' by the Soviet Union won a historic victory of worldwide importanc e. A new stage
began in the history of mankind; the growth of the international author{ty of the
_ USSR, the establishment of the socialist community, the disintegr a tion of the
colonial system of imperia~ism, and the rise of the world communis t and workers
~ movement became its characteristic features.
~
Peace came throughout the entire world.
_ ~P 9~
Part I. Military Operations by the United States, England and Ch ina against Japan.
Struggle by the Nations of the Enslaved Countries
~p 11] Chapter 1. Military-Political Situation in the Pacific, and in East and
Southeast Asia
[p 29] ~ ~ *
Thus, at the start of 1945, ~he military-political situation in th e Pacific, and in
East and Southeast Asia was shaping up in favor of the allies in the antifascist
coalition. They had made great progress in the war against milit aristic Japan,
The forces of the national liberation movement had been stirred to~greater activity
I in the countries occupied by Japan--Indoctiina, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philip- -
I pines.
At the same time, the position of militaristic Japan deteriorated more and more. `
~ With the loss of a number of strategically important islands, it was not only de-
' prived of the sources of raw matPrials. Japan began to face the r eal prospect of
the enemy invading its homeland. In addition, the major victories of the Sov3et
Armed Forces in Europe had forced its main accomplice, fascist Germany, to the brink
of collapse, which led to a radical change in the course of the war,
This was the military-political situation in the theater of urar a t the start of
1945. Both sides were preparing for a protracted, fierce conflic t.
[pp 30-34] Chapter 2. Build Up of Forces by the Sides. Diplomatic Maneuvers by
Japan
~ 1. The Yalta Conference. The Decision on the Soviet Union's Entry into the War -
against Japan
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The United States and Great Britain had been trying to get the Soviet Union to enter
the war against militaristic Japan practically since the very start of military
operations iti the Y~cific. As early as 8 December 1941, the day after the Japanese
navy attack on Pearl Harbor, President F. Roosevelt, in a conversation with M. M.
LiCvinov, the Soviet ambassador to Washington, spoke �rom the viewpoint of US5I'. par~
ticipati~n in the war against Japan being desirable.l On 16 December, Raosev~.,:1t _
broached this subject in a message to I. V. Stalin. _
The actions by the president and the State Department were full.y supported by the
higher command o� the armed forces. Thus, General D. MacArthur wrote in December of
that same year that "the enemy is most of all afraid of Russia's entering the war,"
and persistently recommended speeding up an2attack on Japan from the north, that is,
from the direction of the Soviet Far East.
Similar steps were taken by the U.S. and Great Britain's leaders over the following ~
two years. The Americans were the most interested in this, since it was they, aiid
not the Englisr, who bore the main burden in the war against Japan. As a rule,
appeals to the USSR to open military operations in the Far East would follow events
in the Pacific unfavorable to the United States. Thus, soon after the Japanese cap-
tured Kiska and Attu islands (Aleutian Islands), F. Roosevelt, acting at the request
of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, again raised this subject in his message of
17 June 1942 to I. V. Stalin.3
The Soviet government could not respond at that time to the overtures of the allies.
In 1941-1943, prior to the opening of the second front, the Soviet UniUn was engaged
in the heaviest combat practically face to face with fascist Germany and its satel-
lites, with the main gr~uping of the aggressive bloc. Powerful strikes by the Soviet
Armed Forces were crushing Hitler's military machine and this was having an effect
on all the Axis countries including militaristic Japan. But, while bearing the
main burden of the war against fascist Germany, the USSR could not at the same time
enter the war against militaristic Japan.
Only after a fundamental change in the war was brought about by the eff orts of the
SovieC Union and its Armed Forces did the head of the Soviet delegation at the -
iehran Conference of the three great powers agree in principle to the USSR's entry
into the war against Japan. Timing for this entry was dependent on the surrender of
the main enemy- Nazi Germany.
1"Perepiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s prezidentami SShA i prem'yer-
ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." _
[Correspondence of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with the U.S.
Presidents and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic Waac _
1941-1945) (hereafter cited as "Correspondence of the Chairman of the USSR
Council of Ministers"), in two volumes, Vol 2, "Correspondence with F. Roosevelt -
- and H. Truman (August 1941-December 19G5)," Moscow, 1976, p 12.
~ 2"The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan," p 1.
3"Correspondence of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers," Vo1_. 2, p 21.
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- Such conditions were created in 1945 when the war in Europe shifted to German terri-
tory and its fate i~ad been virtually predetermined. Militaristic Japan remained the
_ most significant barrier on the path to the long-awaited peace. Tha policy for pro-
tracted war that the Japanese militarists chose under the established conditions re-
quired the allies to take effective steps capable of putting an end to the bloodshed
in the shortest possible time. T_hese steps were definitively agreed upon at the
Yalta Conference.
The Yalta Conference of the three great powers was held in Livadiyskiy Palace, near
Yalta, from 4 through 11 February 1945. In addition to the heads of the governments
of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain--I. V. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill,
taking part in its work were the ministers of foreign affairs V. M. Molotov, E.
Stettinius, A. Eden and their deputies, the Soviet ambassadors A. A. Gromyko, in
' Washington, and F. T. Gusev, in London, the American and British ambassadors in
' Moscow A. Harriman and A. Kerr, leaders of the military departments of the three
countries, and military and diplomatic advisors. At I. V. Stalin's suggestion,
; F. Roosevelt presided at the conference.l
! The conference participants discussed and decided a number of important problems
' concerning completing the war against fa~cist Germany, the postwar arrangement of -
I Europe and the establishment of the United Nations.2 The timing for the Soviet
Union`s entry into the war against militaristic Japan was also determined.
As a result of a constructive discussion of the problem (the positions of the par-
I ties, including the need to get the Chinese government's consent, were definitively
I specified during meetings between I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov and F. Roosevelt _
I and A. Harriman on 10 February), the heads of the great powers worked out an agree- _
ment on Far Eastern questions. The British delegation had no objections and on 11
~ February, I. V. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill signed this agreement.3
~ The leaders of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain agreed that the Soviet Union
would enter the war against Japan within two-three months after Germany's surrender
and the end of the war in Europe under the condition of:
I "1. Maintenance of the status quo of Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's
- Republic);
2. Restoration of. the rights that had belonged to Russia that were violated by the
treacherous Jlpanese attack in 1904, namely:
a. the return to the Soviet Union of the southern part of S~'chalin Island and
; all islands contiguous to it;
i b. internationalization of the commercial port of Dairen with safeguarding of
, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in thfs port and restoration
of the lease on Port Arthur (Lu-shun.--ed.) as a Soviet naval base;
c. joint operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railway and the Southern-Manchurian
Railway providing an outlet to Dairen based on organization of a joint
1 "Istori a di lomatii"
y p [History of Diplomacy], Vol 4, Moscow, 1975, pp 420, 533.
2 For more details, see: "History of World War II 1939-1945 " Vol 1Q
, , pp 130-141.
3 W. Churchill, "The Second World War," Vol 6, "Triumph and Tragedy," London, 1954,
p 342.
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Soviet-Chinese company with safeguarding of the pree�~ninent interests of the
Soviet Union. and China retaining full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. Transfer of the Kurile Tslands to the Soviet Union."
When the agreement was signed, the parties took into account that some oF its prv-
visions would require the consent of the Chinese governmfnt. Trying to speed up the
Soviet Union's entry into the war, Rcosevelt promised to undertake to secure this -
consent. For its part, the Soviet government express~d readiness to conclude a pact
of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China "to help it with its armed
forces to liberate China from the Japanese yoke." 1
For obvious reas ons, the document was kept particularly secret.2 The war continued
- in Europe, and the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the Western allies were en-
gaged in fierce battles against fascist Germany. Any hint to this agreement could
reveal the intentions of the allied powers. "Our joinc military plans," it was
stated in a summary statement on the conference, "will become known only when we are
implementing them, but we are confident that the very close working cooperation
- among our three staffs achieved at this conference will lead to speeding up the end
- of the war."3 The transfer of Soviet troops from the European front to the Far East
met the common interests of all the allied powers. It was fully understood, ~
Harriman wrote, thlt this "was the main reason for secrecy."4
Having signed the agreement on the Far Eastern questions, the leaders of the USA and
Great Britain re cognized the valid restoration of the historic rights of the Soviet ~
~ Union to the southern part of Sakhalin and the islands contiguous to it. Responding ~
. to the statement by the head of the Soviet delegation to the Yalta Conference re- ;
garding this, tYie U.S. president declared that to him it "seems like a reasonable ~
proposal on the part of the Soviet ally. The Russians want to get back what was I
torn away from them."5
The United States and Great Britain also recognized the legality of trans�erring ~
the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union. Taken into account in the process was not -
only the circums tance that by hav ing seized the southern part of Sakhalin in 1905,
Japan had violated the Saint Petersburg Treaty of 1875,6 but also the fact, no less
- important, that having gained a foothold in southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles, it
1"Sovetskiy Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiyakh perioda Velikoy Orechestvennoy
voyny 1941-1945 gg." [The Soviet Union at the International Conferences during
the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945], Vol 4, pp 273-274.
2 In accordance with a prior understanding between the governments of the USSR, the
USA and Great Britain, the text of the agreement was published simultaneously in
Moscow, Washington and London a year after it was signed.
- 3 PRAVDA, 13 February 1945.
4 A. Harriman and E. Abel, "Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1945,"
London, 1976 , p 400.
5 Quotation from: W. Leahy, "I Was There," p 373.
6 According to this treaty, Japan gave up claims to Sakhalin in exchange for
tsarist Russ ia giving up its rights to the Kurile Islands.
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closed to the Soviet Union a clear outlet to the Pacific and to the Kamchatka and
Chukotka poxts. Having built military bases and airfields on these islands, Japan
transformed them ic.to a springboard for an attack on the USSR. During World War II,
Japen made use of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin to virtually blockade the
~ Soviet Far East.
~ Pointing out the threat to USSR security and to peace in the Far East that the
Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin repres~nted while Japan possessed them, the
! head of the Soviet government raised the question of transferring them to Che USSR
; in conversations with the leaders of the allied powers.l
~
~ The decision made at the Yalta Conference was a recognition and confirmation of
' USSYt rights to these territories. These rights of the Soviet Union, it was stressed, -
j "must be unconditionally satisfied after the victory over Japan."2
The agreement by the three great powers on Far Eastern questions became an important
part of the overall system of ineasures approved by the conference to not only hasten
the end of the war, but also to ensure the establishment of a lasting peace and the
preser~�ation of it in the postwar years. In the process, military plans and
strengthening cooperation in waging the war against the aggressive bloc made up the
main portion of its work. The Yalta Corference took place under the conditions of
decisive victories by Soviet Armed Forces and immeasurably increased authority of
_ the USSR and its consistent foreign policy. I.t became a major stage in the
struggle by peace-loving mankind for the quickest end to the war and a democratic -
solution to postwar problems.3
The Soviet press noted that the conference would go down in the annals of the war as
an historic demonstration of the close combat cooperation of the great democratic
powers. A similar evaluation of it was also made by the realistic-minded leaders
of the Western powers. President Roosevelt wrote Stalin: "The nations of the world,
I am sure, will look upon the achievements of this conference not only with approval,
but also as a true guarantee that our three great nations can cooperate well in
peace as in war." 4
However, while the Yalta Conference has always been considered in the Soviet Union
as the most fruitful stage in the development of relations between the aZlied
- powers in World War II, the lofty spirit of cooperation that prevailed in it did not
1"The Soviet Union at the Internatiortal Conferences during the Great Patriotic War
1941-1945," Vol 2, "The Teheran Conference of the Leaders of the Three Allied
Powers--the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (28 November-1 December 1943),"
Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1978, p 142.
2"Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny. Dokumenty -
i materialy" [~Soviet Foreign Policy during the Patriot~c War. -
Documents and Materials], Vol 3, Moscow, 1947, p 112. '
3"Istoriya vneshney politiki SSSR. 1917-1976," [History of USSR Foreign Policy,
, 1917-1976], in two volumes, Vol 1, "1917-1945," Moscow, 1976, p 485.
4"Correspondence of the USSR Council of Ministers," Vol 2, p 204.
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suit the taste of many reactionary figures in the United States and Great
- Britain.
Tize first attempts to place the Yalta Conference decisions, including the agreement
on the Far Eastern questions, under doubt were made in the United States already
within a month after the death of F. Roosevelt.l Attacks on the conference results
were especially intensified in the ye ars of the "cold war." Reactionary poli~ical
- figures made accusations against Roos evelt, charging that the "concessions made by
the United States to Kussia at Yalta were too great," that by that time, they said,
there was no need whatsoever for the U SSR to enter the war, and that in general the
leaders of the Western allies had committed neither more nor less than "treachery."
During the work of the Yalta Conference, there were really compromises: the Soviet
delegation met the desires of the U.S. and British representatives, and the latter _
in turn had to take the interests of the USSR into account. And with respect to
_ the restoration of the historic rights of the Soviet Union in the Far East,
Churchill spoke most clearly. He dec lared: "We will be glad to see Russian ships
on the Pacific Ocean and we approve of making up for the losses suffered by Russia
in the Russo-Japanese War."2 Moreover, the Yalta Conference decisions on the Far
- Eastern question were in full accordance with the letter and spirit of the Cairo
Declaration of 1943 in which it was s tated that Japan would be deprived of all
territories seized by it.
- And the thesis that there was no need of Roosevelt and Churchill trying to get the -
Soviet Union to enter the war agains t militaristic Japan does not hold water. It
should not be forgotten that at the s tart of 1945 when the Yalta Conference was
held, the allied forces had reached only the outer edge of the defense of the
Japar.ese empire, which still had maj o r ground forces in the homeland and on the
continent, and the resistance of Japanese troops had not only not weakened, but s
even increased. All the war experien ce gainEd by the allied command indicated that
Japan's armed forces would fight to the end. According to estimates by the U.S.
and British leaders, the war against Japan would be long and bloody. They viewed
help from the USSR as the sole practical way out of the impasse of protracted ~tar.
As E. Stettinius wrote, at the Yalta Conference the U.S. delegation wanted above all
to get the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan.3
The agreement on the Far East was not a result of just Roosevelt's efforts alone and
was not a consequence of his lack of p olitical foresight or poor health, as sup- _
porters of the "anti-Yalta" current try to represent it in Western bourgeois his-
toriography. At the time, the presid ent was supported by many political figures and
the higher command of the U.S. Armed Forces (Secretary of State Stettinius, General
Marshall and others). In particular, prior to the start of the conference,
1 F. Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945. H. Truman was sworn in as the U.S. president
on the same day.
2 W. Churchill, "The Second World War," Vol 6, p 341.
3 F. Stettinius, "Roosevelt and the Russians: the Yalta Conference," London, 1955,
pp 90-91. ,
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Roosevelt's considerations were approved at a sesaion of the Combined Joint Chiefs
_ of Staff, held in January 1945 on Malta.l Therefore, accusations by "anti-Yaltans"
that Roosevelt made a"deal behind the back of Congress and the nation" are
complei~ely unfounded.
The Yalta agreement on Far Eastern questions was a farsighted step that playPd a
major role in hastening the end of World War II.
~ ~PP 46-47] * * *
i
Analysis of the actions of the opposing sides during the period January to August
_i 1945 shows that they did a great deal to carry out the plans adopted by them. The
United States and Great Britain substantially increased their naval and air forces,
and somewhat less, their ground forces in this theater of war. At the same time,
recognizing that without the USSR it would be impossible to achieve a rapid and de-
cisive victory, at the Yalta Conference they reached agreement with the Soviet
government for the USSR to enter the war against militaristic Japan within two to
three months after the surrender of fascist Germany.
The leaders of militaristic Japan placed all their hopes on dragging out the war.
In the f irst half of the year, they too significantly increased their armed forces.
- By the start of August, Japan had the largest ground army in its history. The de-
_ fense of the homeland, Manchuria and Korea was being strengthened at a rapid rate.
Simultaneously, the empire's ruling clique actively carried out diplomatic maneuvers,
while trying to disrupt the united front of the allies in the antifascist coalition
and primarily prevent the Soviet Union from entering the war. However, these
attempts ended in utter failure.
[p 48] Chapter 3. Landing Operations by Allied Armed Forces in the Pacific
[P 79] * * *
As a result of offensive operations, by August 1945 U.S. and Australian armed
- forces had definitively deprived Japan of sources of oil, occupied extensive terri-
tory and improved strategic positions, having built new air and naval bases. The
Japanese armies in the countries of the South seas were completely blocked and the
imperial headquarters could not make use of them in the decisive battles for the
homeland.
- The last aircraft the blocked armies had were destroyed or disabled in the battles
for Balikpapan. Naval convoys no longer needed air cover in the entire southwestern
part of the Pacific, and the allied command was able to transfer disengaged large
i units to the Ryukyu Islands.
1 FRUS [Foreign Relations of the United States], "The Conference at Malta and
Yalta, 1945," Washington, 1955, pp 395-396, 827-830.
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_ [p 80] Chapter 4. Completion of the Burma Campal.gn
LP 91l * * *
Th~ fight for Burma in 1945 was characterized by new changes in the structure di the
armed forces: mobile units emerged for use in the off.ensive in the Irrawaddy v~lley
and along the Mandalay-Rangoon road, 3nd the navy greatly increased its activit;~,
carrying out landing operations in contrast to past years. Employment of combat
and transport aviation underwent additional development.
At the same time, a~ifference in the aims uf the allied powers began to stio~a eve~i
before completion of m~ilitary operations on the Burma front. After getting ground
lines of communication from India to China at the start of 1945, the Chinese refused ~
to fight for English interests and demanded immediate withdrawal of their troops to
the homeland. Allied ties were unstable between the United States and England too.
After abandoning aircraft, the Americans withdrew on top of that small ground
forces from the Burma front, after restricting the English commander in the right to
make use of their materiel at this front. U.S. imperialists directed their efforts
to China to strengthen their positions there.
~ Japanese troops, even though deprived of vital reinforcements after the defeat in
the Imphal Operation of 1944, resisted staunchly, often fighting to the last soldier.
[p 92] Chapter 5. Military Operations in China
[pp 107-108] * * *
Military operations in China against militaristic Japan in the last year of the war
were extremely limited: the Kuomintang and the Communist Party were primarily en-
gaged in preparing for civil war, building up forces and arms and strengthening
strategic positions. Both parties held their congresses, in the resolutions of
which the armed forces and party organizations led by them were aimed at more inten-
sive preparation for a decisive fignt.
American ruling circles, in trying to become stronger in Asia, allotted a major role
- to China in their plans. They were counting on the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek.
~ The hopes of the Chinese Communist Party leaders to pit the United States against
the Soviet Union were not realized. Mao Zedong, for support of his mercenary mo-
tives--to survive and be able to continue the struggle for power, under pressure
from below, from the popular masses and local party organizations, had to switch
over to USSR support. The Soviet government, guided by the principles of proletar-
ian internationalism, rendered and continued to render assistance to the Chinese
people in the liberation struggle.
In the summer and fall of 1945, especially after the USSR entered the war against
Japan, troops led by the Chinese Communist Party managed to achieve some local suc-
cesses. This resulted from the Kwantung Army going Co pieces under the thrusts of
the Soviet Armed Forces, while the Kuomintang government did not then have suffi-
cient forces to fight the Chinese Communist Party, ::ince it was transferring its
armies to the north--to Manchuria and north China. ciowever, the revolutionary
forces needed several years to establish the Manchurian revolutionary base and the
modern and well-armed, for those times, Separate Democratic Army of Northeastern
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; China. All this would have been impossible without the military, economic and
moral-political assistance of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces.
[p 109] Chapter 6. Rise of the National Liberation Movement in the Occupied
Countries of Asia
[P 134] * ~ * -
Thus, in the concluding months of the war, the situation in fihe Far Eastern and
Southeast Asian countries was exceptionally complicated. Under these conditions,
i primarily thos e organizations that used the method of scientific analysis could
_ correctly assess the numerous and often contradictory phenomena and processes, pro-
perly divine the leading sociopolitical tendencies and develop appropriate strategy _
! and tactics. In the Philippines and Vietnam, the liberation movement was more pop- -
; ular precisely because the anti-Japanese mo.vement was headed by communist parties.
~ `
Very important to the successful activity of the communists was the moral support
i of the international communist movement, which resolutely and consistently always
I upheld the principle of self-determination for nations.
~ The Communist Party of the Soviet Union had a great mobilizing effect on the commu- �
_ nist parties of the countries occupied by Japan; it led the fight against fascism 1
~ and always resolutely supported the national liberation mo~rement of the oppressed `
~ nations. "Zn the annals of the liberation etruggle of the Asian nations,1� noted
L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, "there is not a
single page on which would not be imprinted the effective support and solidarity _
on the par.t of the Soviet Union, on the part of our people, and on the part of our
- party." 1
The Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan also was of major importance to
the development of the national liberation movement in the occupied countries.
Peonle who had experienced the yoke of Japanese militarism associated with its
definitive rout the possibility of radical changes in their own fate.
[p 135] Chapter 7. Campaign on Sea Communications. Air and Atomic Bombing of
Japanese Cities
[pp 157-158] * * *
By August~1945, the armed forces of the allied powers had made co.siderable progress.
! They had damaged tlie Japanese navy and air force, and had also gained complete
- supremacy in the air and on the ocean. An invasi,~n of Japan could have been
; launched from thF springboards seized on the immed iate approaches to it. Here were -
the forward naval nnd air bases that enabled them to build up force for strikes on
- the enemy and implement an ever more effective naval blockade.
Nevertheless, many of Japan's political and military leaders did not believe the war
was ]ost and stuhburnly strove to continue it. To this end, they intended making -
use of the political di.fferences between the allies in the antifascist coalition,
- 1 L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom. RechL i stat'i" (F,y Lenin's Course. Speeches
and Articles] , Vol 4, rioscow, 1974, p 252.
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especially the anti-Sovfet attjcude of a ce~-tain part of the ruling circles of the
United States and England that was showing up ever r~ore distinctly. _
Japan's higher military leaders nlaced their tic~pes on being able to pralt~n~ thP w~r,
wear dnwn the enemy, cause great losses and in the end get honorable cond:.tionE of
peace. It was considered in the p~~ocess that Japanese ground forces, i.n contra:;t to
the air force and navy, had suffered relatively small losses and maintained full ~
combat capability. In addition, the Manchurian-Korean military-economic spring-
board was hardly damaged and could become the base f or establishing a protr.acted
and firm defense. It was also cc+nsidered ttiat rtie U.S. ~-~nd Brit~.ish arni~cl fc,r,es,
concentrated in the Far East, did not yet have experience in conducting large-scale
ground operations, that they had insuffici~nt strength, and that no little time
would be needed to trat~sfer personnel and combat materiel from the European
theater of war.
Neither bombing nor blockades, which caused consider able damage to Japan's economy
and seriously weakened its military-economic potential, could shake the resolution
of the militaristic circles "to perish, but to not permit defilement of the sacred
land of the emperor." They also did not affect the overall combat morale of the
armed forces, and in any case, those who wished to continue the war faced no serious
- and organized opposition. Even the atomic attacks, that some political and military
figures in the United States and Great Bri+:.ain believed would force Japan's immedi- -
ate surrender, did not yield the expected result.
This circumstance should be emphasized also because the ob~ectivity in assessing the
value of the air operations of the summer of 1945 was sometimes less than adequate
in U.S. military circles after the war. Typical in this respect are the r~ports by
- General Arnold, commander of the Air Force, to the Secretary of War. In them, avia-
tion is depicted as almost the main means that ensured victory. Arnold wrote, in
particular, that thelmass raids on Japanese cities seriously weakened its economic
and moral potential. In contrast to this, General Marshall, the U.S. Army Chief of
Staff, believed that "the Air Force will not be able to knock Japan out of the war,
just as it could not accomplish this mission in the war with Germany." Air Force _
capabilities were limited further by the fact that Japan's armed forces were dis-
persed over extensive, hilly territory."Z
Indeed, neither bombings, nor blockades, nor any other measures could weaken the
combat capability of the Japanese ground army in a short time and in a substantial
way, that is, the force the Japanese militarists were counting on primarily in their
p~.ans for continuing the war. But their last hopes were lost definitively when they
found themselves face to face with the Soviet Armed Forces.
1"The War Reports," p 440.
Z VOYENNO-IiTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, 1963, No 8, p 79.
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[p 159] Part II. Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Militaristic Japan
- [p 161] Chapter 8. Preparation of Soviet Armed Forces for Military Operations
against Militaristic Japan
LP 211] * * *
After the rout and ~~urre.n_~cr of fascist Germany, the Soviet Union could no~: consider
its security safegu~xrd~d while the hotbed of war and aggression existed in the Far
� East. Destruction o: this hotbed met the vital interests not only of the Soviet
Union, but also of many other nations in East and Southeast Asia.
~ All mankind awaited the quickest end of World War II. However, achieving Japan's
unconditional surrender in good time could be done only after the rout of the
Kwantung Army. Prior to May 1945, the Far Eastern grouping of Soviet troops carried
~ out defensive missions. Moreover, it had insufficient strength for a quick rout of
the enemy. As a result of the regrouping, enormous in its scale, troops that had
i , abundant war experience and that had taken part in many ma~or offenaive operations
in Europe were transferred to the Far East. To strengthe~ the fronts with experi-
! enced cadres of commanders and political workers, generals and officers who had gone
' through the hard school of war with fascist Germany were sent there.
~ For three months, a great effort was made to prepare the major strategic operation
for the rout of the P~aantung Army. The experience of the war with fascist Germany
was taken into account in the comprehensive combat and political preparation of the
troops and staffs. By the start of August, Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East
had all that was needed to carry out the operation successfully and were ready to
inflict a crushing sCrike on the Far Eastern aggressor.
(p 212] Chapter 9. Rr,try of the Soviet Union into the War with Japan.
Beginning of Military Operations
fp 23~~ ~r * ~c
As a result of six days of operation, Soviet and Mongolian Croops dealt a severe
_ defeat to the Kwantung Army. They routed the enemy troops in ~16 fortified areas and
advanced the Transbaykal Front 250-400 km (reaching the line (Dolonnor), Linhsi,
(faoan'}, Wangyehmiao), the lst Far Eastern Front 120-150 km (the line (Lin'kou,
Mulin, Nachzhin)) and the 2nd Far Eastern Front 50-200 km (the line (Heihe, Haolizhen,
Baoging)), accomplishing the missions assigned by General Headquat~ers ahead of
schedule.
i The J~panese command, having already lost control of the troops in the first days,
' was unable to organize staunch resistance in any sector prior to 15 August. However,
in a number of fortified areas and centers of resistance, enemy garrisons put up a
stubborn defense, and then the fighting became fierce. This was the case in the
areas of Hailar, (Soluni, Fujinia, Jiamusi, Suifynhe, Dunnin and Mudanjiana).
The combat operations of the troops of all fronts were highly maneuverable and de-
- veloped over very isolated operating directions. This was especially typical for
the operations of the mounted-mechanized group of Soviet-Mongolian troops who
operated in the arid steppes of Inner Mongolia.
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[p 238] Chapter 10. Completion of Rout of Japanese Troops. -
- Liberation of Northeastern China _
lp 273] * * *
- Thus, the elimination of the main base of operations of Japanese mi.?.itarism in -
Manchuria created the conditions for forming a revoluCionary base in th3.s part of.
the country. The presence of Soviet troops allowed the Chinese people and Cheir
Co~unist Party to tdke a number of steps to establish and strengthen the Manchurian
revolutionary base.
Playing a large role in this were the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of 14 August 1945 and
the agreements that consolidated the presence of Soviet troops in Port Arthur,
Dal'niy and on the KChZhD [Chinese-Changchun RailroadJ. Within a relat ively short
time, the Chinese Communist Party succeeded in creating in Manchuria revolutionary
formations that were armed with captured weapons and combat materiel and well-
supplied with ammunition. It was fn Manchuria that the main strike force of the
Chinese revolution was created--the United Democratic Army, supported by the union
of the working class and the working peasantry under the active guiding role of the
Chinese Communist Party organizations.
The experience of the Manchurian revolutionary base shows once more that only a
regular army supported by the people could in a relatively short time rout the
Kuomintang troops who enjoyed the all-round support of American imperialism.
[p 274] Chapter 12. Liberation of North Korea, Southern Sakhalin and Kurile Islands
[P Z95] * *
The combat operations to liberate the naval bases and porCs of North Korea were
carried out in the close conCact of the troops of the lst Far Eastern Front and the
forces of the Pacif ic Fleet. They began after the success of the 25th Army in the
maritime sector had been determined. The ships and units of the Pacif ic Fleet
facilitated the swif t offensive of the Soviet troops wh ich completely contained the
Japanese grouping.
Soviet troop actions on Sakhalin were a combined operat ion of ground and sea forces -
supported by air. Here the ground troops overcame a strong fortified area, orga->
nized in mountainous-wooded and wooded-marshy terrain. Attacks by the air force
and landing forces prevented the enemy from maneuvering his reserves.
The Kuriles landin~; operation, although not developed in a main sector, was one of
y the mast important and most complex in the Far East.
A significant role in carrying out the joint operations was played by the ships and
air forces of the Pacific Fleet. In addition to defend ing the coast, during the
Far Eastern campaignlthe ships in the fleet completed 29 convoys and the air force -
made 5,419 sorties.
1 Calculated from: IVI jInstitute of General History, U SSR Academy of Sciences],
Documents and Materials, inventory No 1284, folio 354.
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, The high morale, heroism and decisive actions of the soldiers, sailors and officers `
facilitated the success of the troops of the lst and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts and the
Pacific Fleet in North Korea and on South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.
Soviet troops and Porces of the Pacific Fleet completed operations in the maritime
- sectors in good time. They made a ma~or contribution to the liberating mission of
the Soviet Armed Forces who gave freedom to the people of North Korea and returned
to the homeland the age-o.ld Russian lands--South Sa~.halin and the Kurile Isl.ands.
[p 296] Chapter 12. The Communist Party--Inspiration and Organizer of the Victory
- . of the Soviet People over Imperialist Japan
jpp 325-326] * * *
The Soviet Union's victory in the war against militaristic Japan showed the vital
force of the policy of the Communist party and its organizational an~l ideological
activity. Reflected in it were the historic invincitility of socialism, the advan-
tages of the economic and political organization of the Soviet system, the socio-
political and ideological unity of society, socialist patriotism and proletarian
~ internationalism. USSR workers, united closely around the Communist Party, dis- _
; played unparalleled heroiam and courage in the rear and at the front.
' Based on Lenin's legacy of military theory and the experience of the fight with
~ fascism, the party developed and implsmented a scientifically substantiated program
~ to mobilize the forces of the people to eliminate the second hotbed of war and to -
; strengthen the sect;rity of the Far Eastern borders. It was able to fully make use
-I of the advantages of the Soviet political system and the socialist system of economy
; to achieve victory. '~he farsighted policy oi t:he pz.rty on all development posaible
i of the economy of Siberia and the Far East had a huge effect on the course of events. -
,
~ Commanders, military councils, political organs and party organizations of the army
~ and navy, and the entire party-political apparatus firmly and consistently carried
out the policy of the VKP(b) [All-Union Commun.ist Party (of Bolsheviks)] in the -
Armed Forces, and imbued the personnel in the spirit of iron discipline, high organ- _
ization and loyalty to the duty to the homela.nd. Communists were in the front
~ ranks of those who fought and inspired Soviet warriors to a feat by ardent words and
j personal example. During combat operations against imperialist Japan, the party
enriched and multiplied still more its mult.ifaceted experience of leading the armed
~ struggle in defense of the socialist homeland.
' [p 327] Chapter 13. Rebuilding the National Economy of the Soviet Union in 1945
[pp 348-350] * * *
The long and exceptionally severe war with fascist Germany and its allies inflicted
tremendous damage to the Soviet national economy. The Hitlerites destroyed and
plundered 1,710 cities and urban settlements, and burnt more than 70,000 villages
and rural settlements. They destroyed, completely or partially, about 32,000 indus-
trial enterprises, destroyed 65,000 km of rail track, plundered 98,000 kolkhozes,
about S,U00 sovkhozes and MTS ~machine and tractor stations], and destroyed tens of
- thousands of hospitals, schools, tekhnikums, WZes and libraries. On the o~hole,
the Soviet Union lost about 30 percent of its national wealth in the war.
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_ The Communist Party and rhe Soviet government set about restoring the national
- economy destroyed by the war long before the end of the war. As early as August
1943, the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] and the Central Committee of the
A].~.-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) adopte3 the decree "On Urgent Measuretl td
RestoYe the Economy in Areas Liberated from German Occupation."
Base3 on this and other decrees, extensive measures were implemented in the follow-
ing years to revive the economy in the republics and oblasts that had been occupied
by the fascist aggressors. Plants, faGCories, mines, railroads, schools, hospitals,
cultural institutions and dwellings were rebuilt. This was a gigantic effort made
by the Soviet people with great enthusiasm led by the Communist Party; this effort
entailed great difficulties.
L. I. Brezhnev, in the book "Rebirth," recalling the devastation and labor efforts,
in particular on the revival of Zaporozh'ye, wrote: "In full s~zing, obstructions
were being taken apart, and many thousands of builders ~rere ~zorking on projects, on
almost all of them simultaneously. They worked almost without machinery, manuallv- -
it seemed there would be no end to this work. On the ~ray, I met people, many of
whom I later got to know and remembered, but for the time being I just listened to ~
their explanations, and basically observed, for the main thing was clear anyway:
a beautiful city of inetallurgists and power engineers essentially no longer existed
on our earth. Everything was.blown up, burned and destroyed by the ~rar." 1 And .
such fate befell thousands of Soviet cities and settlements. ~
And all this was restored, built and filled with confident labor activity. Cities, ~
villages and rural settlements ~rere revived. The sovkhozes and kolkhozes appeared
again. The ~hole country helped the agriculture of the republics and eblasts
destroyed by the fascist occupationists.
Ne~r and ever more broader possibilities in restoring the country's national economy
were opened with the r_ompletion of the rout of fascist Germany and with the end of
the war in Europe. The Soviet state could now direct considerably more money and
material to restoration work. Numerous industrial and other facilities ~ere re-
vived and quickly put into operation in the national economy, ne~z ones were built,
and the output of paacetime production grew continuously.
Al1 5oviet people took part in rebuilding the national economy. Millions of Soviet
people, and a large percentage of them were women and youths, demonstrated in the
process high labor enthusiasm and strove to heal the serious wounds of war as
quickly as possible.
While solving the prohlems of restoring the national economy after the end of the
war against fascist Germany, the Communist party and the Soviet government took into _
account the needs for preparing and ~raging war against militaristic Japan.
Attaching great importance to strengthenipg the defensive capability of the Soviet
Far ~I;ast, the party and government paid continuing attention to its economic deve-
_ lopment and to establishing an industrial base there. This ~ras facilitated by the
1 L, I. Brezhnev~ "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth], Moscow, 1978, pp 3--4.
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vast natural resources in the area, the abundant minerals and raw materials.
During the years of Soviet power, the gross industrial production in this territory,
poorly developed in former times, increased 173-fold, land under cultivation in-
- creased 3.9-fold and population grew 4-fold. But additional material means were
needed to prepare and wage the military operations of the Far Eastern grouping of
Soviet troops against militaristic Japan. And the country supplied the Armed Forces
' with everything needed to successfully conduct the campaign in the Far East.
The main tasks of the Communist Party and the Soviet government in 1945 were to sup-
ply the needs of the Soviet Armed Forces at the Soviet-German and Soviet-Japanese
- fronts and to shift the economy more rapidly to peacetime functions. These huge and
complicated tasks were successfully accomplished. Socialism, based on a planned
national economy, demonstrated its insuperable force.
The restoration of the national economy during the war and in the postwar period is
yet another glorious heroic page in the labor exploits of the Soviet people.
[p 351] Part III. Completion of the War against Militaristic Japan
[p 353] Chapter 14. Capitulation of Militaristic Japan
~P 366] * * *
The signing of the instruruent of Japan's surrender on 2 September 1945 was the his-
i torically inevitable finale of the aggressive aspirations of Japanese militarism
; and put an end to a long series of military adventures. For nearly 70 years, the
military-bureaucratic clique in Japan had waged war almost continuously, condemning
its people and those in neighboring countries to cruel ordeals, severe sacrifices,
j hardships and suffering.
_i After receiving from the allies the right to head the process oi Ja~an's demilitari-
, zation, Americari military representatives began carrying out a policy of seizing .
preferential rights for the United States in allied agencies. Starting with the
ceremony for the signing of the instrument of surrender and up to the concrete steps
on demilitarizing the country, they were guided by the interests of American
i monopolies. -
~ Under the new conditions with the Truman adminis~ration at the head of the United
States, many ideals that Roosevelt had supported were forgotten. 4lready in the
course of disarming Japanese troops, a tendency showed up in the Far Eastern policy
; of the imperialist powers that was dangerous for the postwar peace--the striving to
; restore at any price the colonial domination in its possessions.
With the signing of the instrument of surrender, U.S, f lirtations with leaders of
the national liberation movement in Asian countries ended. Despite the fact that
~ the people in this vast region of the world received the opportunity of expanding
the struggle for national liberation, many of them were a long way f rom being aUle -
_ to immediately enjoy the fruits of victory gained primarily as a result ur the
selfless struggle of the progressive forces of the whole world headed by the USSR. -
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[pp 367-368] Chapter 15. Policy of Imperialist States in the Far East and '
Southeast Asia ,
World War II led to a major political changes in the whole world, _ncluding in the
Far East and in Southeast Asia. While the war was in progress, the nations of th~
_ colonial countries and the ruling circles of the imperialist powers making up Zhe
antifascist co alition w aged a fight against a common enemy, and to a certain extent
this smooChed over the acuteness of the contradictions between them. But as victory
approached and especially after it, the irreconcilability of their basic inter~sts _
became more and more acute and an important political factor that largely determined
the development of events in this part of the world.
A special pos ition with respect to the countries of the "colonial periphery" was
held by the United States that advocated in words their political liberation, but ~
in deeds tried to squee ze out, and if successful, then replace their European com-
petitors and secure for itself a preferential position in these countries.
American prop aganda str ongly emphasized that in contrast to Great Britain, France
and the Nether lands, the United States of America had always been an "anticolonial"
country.l However, in the Philippines, representatives of the America.r. -:ilitary and
civil administration acted the same way as the colonia.l authorities of the other
imperialist p owers in their own possessions. U.S. officials restricted democratic
organizations in every way possible and disarmed the detachments of patriots who had
actively par t icipated in liberating the Philippines, etc. At the same time, they in
essence did nothing to resolve the agrarian problem that was most acute for the over-
wlielming maj ority of the Philippine population--the peasantry. 2
- In selecting areas for penetration and obtaining preferential rights, American polit-
ical and mili tary circles proceeded from the interests of U.S. monopolistic capital
for the postwar time. In the process, strategic interests were also considered:
military bas es on the annexed mandated territories of Japan allowed the United
States to turn the Pac ific into an "American ocean." Supporters of a more cautious
policy sugges ted that the United States not resort to direct annexation, but try to -
get control over these territories using the institution of trusteeship as a new
form of colonialism replacing the "classical" and making it possible to first elimi-
nate the advantageous positions of the European parent states in their possessions, -
and then using economi c and financial levers to obtain access to new sources of raw
materials and markets.
The U.S. attempt to squeeze the European states out from their possessions in the
Far Fast and Southcast Asia was naturally met with extreme disapproval in the capi-
tals of the " old" colonial powers. Interimperialist contradictions became a
serious facto r thae de termined the political climate in Southeast Asia and the Far
Eas t af ter the end of World War II .
There were a lso some d ifferences between the "old" colonial powers, but in the con-
crete situation established in this region h; che end of 1945, they were of
1"Problemy istorii mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy i ideologicheskaya bor'ba. Sbornik
statey" [Problems of History of International Relations and the Ideological
Struggle. Collection of Articles], Moscow, 1976, pp 102-103.
2 Alaayya} ~"Nerasskazannaya istoriya Filippin" [Untold History of Philippines],
translated from English, Moscow, 1970, p 54.
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secondary importance. By the time of Japan's surrender, neither France nor the
Netherlands had the armed forces that would havp permit ted them to fight the
' national liberation movement on their own. The3r units were too small in strength
and completely dependent on the British Army for mater ials and equipment. In view
of this, France and the Netherlands were forced to rely on the aid of Great Bri.t~in.
For their part, the English authorities tried to suppor t these colonial powers in
the fight against the national liberation revolutions in Vietnam and Indones ia,
fearing their spreading to British colonies.
The joint operations of London, Paris and Amsterdam aga inst the nations that ile-
manded independence were yet another major feature of the political situation in
' the Far East and Southeast Asia. The class solidarity of the imperialists in the
face of the impending general crisis of the colonial sys tem became a more important
~ factor than the disagreements within their camp.
i .
i Resolving Far Eastern questions was also complicated by the reluc~ance of certain
~ circles in the United States and Great Britain to cooperate with the USSR, although
; the war experience had sho~rn that an agreement on problems of this scale could be
' reached only with the participation of the Soviet Union. Realistically thinking
I AmEricans recognized that attempts to bar the USSR from discussion of the Far
Eastern questions were doomed to fail. But subsequent s teps by the White House
~ showed that the policy on isolation of the Soviet Union prevailed there.
' fPP 394-395] * * ~
Thus, in the second half of 1945, the determining factor of the policy of th e
governments of the United States and Kuomintang China in the Southeast Asian
c.ountries was the attempt to make use of the difficulties of the "old" colonial
powers for territorial acquisitions or expansion of their political and economic
influence. At the same time, Great Britain, the Netherlands and France tried to re-
store political and economic positions in th~ir former possessions, relying primari-
ly on armed force. The immediate consequence of this was the aggression aga inst
the independent states of Indonesia and Vietnam, while Burma, Malaya, Cambod ia and
I Laos were actually reoccupied.
I However, under the new historic conditions established af ter the end of World War II,
the colonizers could no longer freely carry out their plans. The rout of fascist
j Germany and militaristic Japan had fundamentally changed the alignment of forces in
; the world arena in favor of the forces of peace, indep endence and socialism. The
~ positions of imperialism weakened substantially and the crisis of the whole
~ capitalist system grew deeper.
In addition, in the conf lict with the Japanese aggresso rs in the Asian c;ountries,
patriotic organizations sprang up that gained experience in political mobilization
of the masses, and in a number of states, national armed forces were formed too.
For all these reasons, even in the regions actually occupied by the troops vf the
former parent states, the colonizers did not succeed in suppressing the national
liberation ~novement. Its growth indicated the start of a second stage in th e crisis
. of the colonial system and foreshadowed its inevitable downfall.
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[pp 396-398J Chapter 16. Sovi2t Foreign Policy. Solving Far Eastern Problems
The historic victories oP the Soviet Army over Hitler's Germany and militarisric
- Japan led to further growth in the authority and influence of the world's first
soeialist state. A major achievement of che foreign policy of the Communist PaYty
- and Soviet government was the establishment and successful activity of the anti--
fascist coalition wl~ich in turn promoted strengthening of the alliance uf a11 people
who fought against the forces of world reaction. A great contribution to strengthen-
ing the international positions of the USSR was made by Soviet diplomacy which
throughout the war strived to secure the most advantageous foreign poli.r.y conditions
for the quickest military and political rout of rhe fascist bloc and th~ establish-
ment of a stable democratic world.
After the war, Soviet diplomacy was aimed primarily at consolidatin~; its results in
international legal documents, creating effective agencies to monitor the demilitar-
- ization and democratization of the conquered Axis states, and organizing competent
international courts for the perpetrators that unleashed World War II.
The most important place in the foreign policy activity of the Communist Party and
Soviet government was held by the questions of the postwar system of the world. The
USSR was on~ of the founders of the United Nations and took an active part in the
development of its basic documents. In the process, the USSR showed special concern
for ensuring representation of the "new states" of the w~rld in the United Nations..,
Thus, guided by the desire to ensure the new states o` Asia that had not yet _
ac.hieved independence the opportunity to make their contribution to creating a last-
- ing peace, the USSR supported inviting delegations from India and the Philippines *_o
the first UN session.l Soviet diplomats established and maintained extensive con-
tacts with representatives of the Asian countries that arrived for the founding
conference of the United Nations in San Francisco.
The Soviet government paid much attention to the Far Eastern problems. It had al-
_ ready gained some experience in working with the new Au?erican administration headed
by President Truman. Soviet diplomacy could not but consider the "tough policy"
that Truman pursued with Churchill's agreement and support; Churchill believed that
they had "in their hands the means2that will restore the correlation of forces with
Russia" (meaning the atomic bomb). It was clear that the U.S. government intended
to make use of nuclear blackmail to achieve its aims in the postwar time.
Soviet diplomacy, resting on the increased international authority of the USSR, the
- mood of- the progressive world public and the growth of national consciousness of the
liberated nations of Europe an~' Asia, insisted that the United States of America and
Great Britain carry out the interalliance agreements on questions of the postwar
� ~�orld system reached during the war.
The basic principles of the U.S. post~ar policy with respect to Japan were worked
out back in 1944 by Roosevelt's government which had quite a few supporters of the
1"Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny" [Soviet -
Foreign Policy during the Patriotic War], Vol 3, p 241.
2 Quotation from: "History of Diplomacy," Vol ~S, p 667. _
26 ~
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democratization and demilitarization of Japan. A State department draft at that
time stipulated: "a) Japan must return the territories seized by it as a result of
aggressive wars; b) during the military occupation, the Japanese government will
cease to exist as a political entity. Only the ministries having administrative
functions (home affairs, finance, health and welfare, etc.) will be retained and
they will continue their activity under the direction of the allied administration;
- c) the allied powers that fought against Japan will participate in its occupation
and administration. Contingents from Asian countries (China, India, Philippines,
etc.) will alsa perform occupation service to prevent the impression that the war
against Japan was a war by the white race against the yellow." 1
However, the Truman administration began to back away from these principles and be-
' gan actively taking measures to maintain monopolies in Japan, the emperor's author-
; ity and a court bureaucracy on which the United States could rely in its policy in
i the Far East.
I
~ American political figures held talks with Japanese diplomats about Japan surrender-
~ ing prior to the USSR entering the war. Precisely on these grounds, the Japanese
~ Minister of Foreign Affairs in the review "Attitude of Public Opinion of the United
Nations to Japan on the Eve af the Adoption of the Potsdam Declaration" wrote:
"Among Americans who maintain faith in the military aims of the United Nations, but
do not trust the Soviet Union and fear it, attitudes in favor of reconciliation
with Japan are quite strong."2 The United States, England and China tried to carry
out these same goals and they prepared and publicized the text of the Potsdam
Declaration on Japan without USSR participation.3
The Soviet government, informed about the political maneuvers of the allied powers,
did not �oliow in their footsteps. And when the Japanese government, trying to end
the war on terms advantageous to it, asked the USSR to mediate, the Soviet govern-
ment immediately informed its allies about this. It put the interests of nations
in first place and their desire to bring peace closer to the Far East.
Taking the repeated official requests by the leaders of the allied states to the ~
Soviet government into account, the Soviet Union entered the war with Japan, routed
the Kwantung Army and thereby forced Japan to surrender. The faithfulness of the
USSR to its allied duty and its policy based on principle foiled the plans of the
~ Japanese ruling circles to split the antifascist coalition in order to drag out the
~ war and escape from unconditional surrender.
~
! The Soviet Union, being a consistent fighter for the creation of a stable peace,
~ directed its efforts after the war too toward maintaining allied relations with the
~ United States and England and reaching coordinated decisions with them on questions
of the postwar arrangement.
1"History of Diplomacy," Vol 4, p 701,
- 2 Ihid., p 717.
3 Ibid., p 689.
27
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~P 426] * * *
A ma~or result of the Tokyo trial was the recognitj.on that aggression is the most
~ heinous international crime and the people responsible for it are subject to eevere
punishment. It is hard to overestimate the special importance of this thesis since
it was established in spite of the changed foreign policy situation and intensifi-
cation of the 10cold war," and despite the fact that the conclusions of the
Nuremberg tribunal evoked the violent protest of the entire reactionary camp and by
the time of the announcement of the sentence in Tokyo had given rise to much
literature that attempted to discredit the Nuremberg court and shake the pub~.ic's
faith in it. The flow of it increased after publication of the sentence in Tokyo.
It was precisely the decisions of the court on the recognition of the criminality
of preparing for and waging aggressive war that provoked the most malicious and
sharp ob~ections by the apologists for imperialism.
- The Tokyo trial declared and applied in practice those legal principles that had
entered into contemporary international law and had been subsequently approved by
the United Nations as the establishment of international r_riminal law providing for
responsibility for crimes against peace, military crimes and crimes aga3nst
humanity.
28
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[pp 427-458J Chapter 17. Military Art of the Main Participants in the War
1. CharacterisCic Features of Soviet Military Art
During the war with fascist Germany, Soviet troops in the Far East as a component
of the USSR Armed Forces had reached largely the same stages of development as
all the troops in the field fronts. Of crucial importance in this process was
the combat experience acquired on the Soviet-German front.
By the staxt of the Great Patriotic War, the large units and units of Che Far
Eastern grouping in organizational structure, effective strength for combat,
; availability of arms and combat materiel, as well as dispusition fu11y corresponded
( to the missions that stemmed from the operational plan for covering the Far Eastern
~ borders, that had been drafted on the eve of the attack by fascist Germany. On
22 June 1941, the Far Eastern grouping had the following personnel strength:
100 percent for the Ground Troops, 88.6 percent for the Air Force and 97.4 percent
for the Navy.l
During the period 1941 to 1945, the General Headquarters of the Supreme High
~ Command, considering the experience of the war with Hitlez's Germany, devoted
much attention to the development in the Far East of the Air Force, the Air Defense
Force and the Navy. At the same time, the General Headquarters had information
that materialistic Japan was systematically building up the combat might of its
ground forces in Manchuria; therefore, in strengthening the Far Eastern grouping,
the policy on the predominance of ground trooRsin it was followed. This is con-
firmed by the data given in Table 20.
Table 20. Ratio of Branches of the USSR Armed Forces in the Far East during the
� Great Patriotic War (by personnel strength in percentages)2
Branches of the Armed Forces 22 19 1 1 9
June Nov. July Jan. May
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Gro- und ~roops 73.5 78.5 77.8 78.1 74.7
Air Force 11.3 7.6 8.2 8.0 7.9
Air Defense Troops - 2.6 2.7 2.7 3.2
Navy 15.1 11.3 11.3 11.2 14.2
~
i
i
1 Calculated from: IVI jInstitute of General History, USSR Academy of Sciences], `
_ Documents and Materials iIGH, D&M], f. [fond = archive group] 244, op.
[inventory] 287, d. [item] 1, 1. [folio] 3; f. 239, op. 98, d. 599, 1. 25.
Z Calculated from: IGH, D&M, f. 239, op. 98, d. 101, 1. 28; d. 520, l. 7; d. 523,
11. 7, 8, 16, 30; d. 525, 11. 46-47; d. 599, 11. 25, 32, 54, 73; d. 613, 11. 8,
29; f. 244, op. 287, d. 1, 1. 3; d. 14, 1. 5; d. 32, 1. 59; d. 52, 11. 32, 67, 85. -
29
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FOR OI~N'ICIA1. USE: (1NLY
The years of the Great Patriotic War were characterized by great changes iZ
organizational forms and combat and numerical strength of all the branches of
~he Soviet Armed Forces. The basic factors which had an effect on the impr.ove-
ment of the structure of the Soviet troops, as well as on the change in their
combat and numerical strength were: military-economic capabilities oF the
socialist system, the continuous build-up and improvement in combat hardware,
the growth in numbers and improvement of the combat strength, and the scientifi-
cally established ratio of the branches and arms of the troops based on the
correct assessment of the strongest aspects of each of them and the nature of
the missions they had to perform, and the skillful use of the great experience
of the combat operations acquired at the Soviet-German front. Also affecting
the building of the Armed Forces were the features of the military-political
aims of the Soviet Union in the Far East, as well as the peculiarity cf the Far
Eastern nature and climate.
The development of the optimal organizational forms of the combined units and
units, and the ratio of branches and arms, the determination of the numerical
_ and combat strength of the Far Eastern grouping, and the implementation of all
the plans and calculations for the country's defense in this theater in the
tense years of the Great Patriotic War were performed by the General Headquarters
of the Supreme High Command, the General Staff, the commands and staffs of the
Far Eastern and Transbaykal Fronts,1the Pacific Fleet and the formations and
combined units that comprised them.
To manage the Soviet troops in the Far East during the war with fascist Germany,
_ special sectors for operational control--the Far Eastern and the Transbaykal--
were established in the General Staff. In addition, during the time that was
most difficult for the country (1941-1942), the position of Deputy Chief of the
General Staff for the Far East was established.
Serving as the agencies for immediate military control of the Far Eastern grouping
during i:he war were: the commands and field directorates of the Far Eastern and
the Transbaykal Fronts, the Commands and staffs of the Pacific Fleet and the Red
Banner Amur Military Flotilla, and the directorates and staffs of the Far Eastern
and the Transbaykal air defense zones.
The general growth of the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces made it possible
to increase the combat capability of the Far Eastern grouping. The primary con-
cern was to increase our capabilities, maneuverability and striking force of
the combined units and units.
1 The F'ar Eastern Front was formed on 28 June 1938, and the Transbaykal on
15 September 1941.
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Up to 70 percent of the ground troop personnel in the Transbaykal and Far Eastern
Fronts were in large infantry units. The number of large infantry units and
units increased steadily and they were equipped with the latest types of combat
equipment and arms. For example, the number of submachine guns in an infantry
division from 22 June 1941 through 9 May 1945 increased almost 21-fold and auto-
matic rifles more than doubled. With the growth in output of artillery equip-
ment, more modern cannons and mortars entered the inventory of the divisions
- in increasing quantities. However, transportation remained inadequate. This
, was due to the complicated relief of the Far Eastern theater which restricted
- the mobility and maneuverability of a division.
The number of infantry troops in the Far East doubled during the war despite
~ the fact that a great number of large units were sent from here to the Soviet-
. German front . �
i
, Artillery was the main fire power of the ground troops. Durin~ the war, the
' artillery of the Transbaykal and the Far Eastern Fronts increased considerably
~ in quantity and quality. At the end of 1943, gun, tank-destroyer mortar and
anti-aircraft regiments were assigned to each combined arms army.i The artillery
pool of the Far Eastern grouping of ground troops increased 1.8-fold during the
war, despite the fact that about 5,50~ guns and mortars were transferred during
this time to the Soviet-German front. This was achieved thanks to the efforts
of the defense industry that was being rapidly restored and developed; during
the war this industry sent about 11,000 gwns and mortars to the Far East. In
1943 alone, the Transbaykal and Far Eastern Fronts received more than 8,000 guns
and mortars for 23.8 percent3of the deliveries during this time of this type
of arms to the field forces.
i It is generally known that a fundamentally new and effective weapon for combatting
enemy personnel and equipment--rocket-launching artillery--appeared in the Soviet -
Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War. In the summer of 1942, the Supreme
High Command General Headquarters explored the possibility of introducing it in
the ground troops of the Far East, having sent rocket-launching artillery to the
Far Eastern and Tr~nsbaykal Fronts for the purpose of conducting combat training
for each regiment . -
1 USSR Ministry of Defense Archives, f. 15a, op. 161, d. 53, 1. 8.
2 IGH, D~M, f. 244, op. 287, d. 54, 11. 50-52.
3 Calculated from: USSR Ministry of Defense Archives, f. 41, op. 11584, d. 13,
_ 11. 131-141; f. 81, op. 12074, d. 32, lI. 103-106, 120-122.
4 IGH, D~M, inv. [inventory] No 34, 11. 97, 117. -
31
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Major artillery formations, such as artillery corps, divisions ancl brigades that
had become widespread in the ground troops at the Soviet-German front, appeared
in the Far Eastern and Transbaykal Fronts only after the rout of fascist Germany.
Throughout the entire Great Patriotic War, the basic formation in troop artillery,
artillery of the RGK [reserve of the high command] and antiaircraft artillery
in the Far East was the regiment. During the war, 107 artillery, tank-destroyer,
mortar and antiaircraft artillery regiments were formed there, and some of them
were sent to the Saviet-German front. By the end of the war with fascist Germany, ,
the artillery of the Far Eastern grouping of the ground troops was gradually
shifted from horse-drawn to mechanized.
Armored and mechanized troaps, being the main striking and maneuvering force of
the ground troops in the Far Eastern grouping, at the start of the Great Patriotic
War were1represented by eight tank and motorized divisions and a motorized armored
bra.gade .
The experience of combat operations at the Soviet-German front demanded improve-
ment of the organization of armored and mechanized troops. In connection with
this, in 1941, the tank (except for two) and motorized divisions in the Far East
were inactivated, and their personnel and materiel were transferred for organiza-
tion of lighter and more maneuverable formations--tank brigades, separate tank .
regiments anc~ batallions. During the war, 27 tank and mechanized brigades were _
formed here. While new types of tank formations--armias and corps--were created
at the Soviet-German front, this process was delayed in the Far East because of
the weakness in the material and equipment base of the armored and mechanized
troops. Not until December 1944 did the.formation there of the 10th Mechanized
Corps b~gin, the only one in the entire Far Eastern grouping of the ground -
troops.
However, prior to 1945 both the ~rganization and the arms of the armored and
mechanized troops in the Far East made it possible to make effective use of
them in coordination with other arms in event of defensive actions against Japan.
Offensive missions required decisive reinforcement, or rather the creation of
a new grouping oi armored and mechanized troops. Therefore, in preparing for
the war with Japan, the armored and mechanized troops of the Transbaykal and the
Far Eastern Fronts underwent significant reorganization and were substantially
- sl:rengthened as th~ result of the regrouping from the West.
1 IGH, D~M, f. 244, op. 287, d. 1, 1.. 8.
2 IGH, D~M, f. 244, op. 287, d. 54, 11. 7~-~2�
3 IGH, D~M, f. 244, op. 287, d. 18, 1. 64.
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During the war with fascist Germany, there was practically no change in the
tank pool in the Far Eastern grouping of ground troops, either in quality or
in quantity. In 1941, the light tan~s made up 100 percent of the tank pool,
in 1942-1945, from 90 to 95 percent. Their low effectiveness under the condi-
tions of the mountainous-swampy-taiga relief reduced the scope of employment
of these combat vehicles. In 1941-1944, the Far Eastern Fronts were completely
lacking the new type of armored weapon that was used extensively at the Soviet-
German front, the self-propelled artillery.
' The orgar~izational structure of the Soviet Air Force in the Far Eastern grouping
; underwent the most substantial changes in 1941-1945. The General Headquarters
~ of the Supreme High Corrmiand decided to renounce the scattering of aviation, just
~ as in the field fo~ces, and to unite large air units and units into larger forma-
; tions--aix armies. In connection with this, in August 1942, all frontal avia-
tion in the Far East was concentrated into four air armies. The creation of
i air format ions was a major stage in improving the organizational structure of
aviation in the Far East.
Another major measure in strengthening the Far Eastern grouping of the Air Force
was the shift in 1942, just as in the entire Air Force, from large units and
units of mixed composition to homogeneous large units and units of bomber, attack
and fighter aviation.
The improvement of the organizational structure of the Air Force led to changes
in their combat strength. All these measures made it possible for the command
_ of the Far Eastern and Transbaykal Fronts in event of necessity to make use of
- aviation in a more massed and purposeful manner, which facilitated coordination
of it with ground troops.
The Far Eastern Air Force had been reinforced with new types of war planes since
1944: Yak-3, Yak-9, La-5, La-7 fighters, I1-4, Tu-2 bombers and I1-2 attack
planes. While bombers made up most of the aircraft in the Far East at the start
of the war (42.2 percent), taking into account the combat experience of aviation
at the Soviet-German front, the command began to gradually change the ratio of
arms of aviation in favor of increasing the number of fighters. At the time of
_ fascist Germany's surrender, the Air Force in the Far East had the following
composition: 55 percent were fighters, 22 percent wer~ bombers, 16 percent were
attack aircraft and 7 percent reconnaissance aircraft. In tactical and technical
data and numbers, the Soviet4Air Force was far superior to the Japanese Air
Force grouping in Manchux~ia. ~
1 Calculated from: IGH D~M f. 244 0 287 d. 1 1~. 7 8� d. 12 11. 5 6� -
> > > P� > > > > > > >
d. 15, 11. 50, 51; d. 16, 11. 5, 6; d. 32, 11. 5, 6, 59, 60.
2
In December 1944, one of them (the 11th Air Army) was regrouped into the 18th
- Air Corps, included later in the 10th Air Army.
3 Calculated from: IGH, D~M, f. 239, op. 98, d. 599, 1. 93.
4 IGH, D~M f. 211 0 253 d. 9 1. 66; f. 239 0 98 d. 599 1. 93.
> > P� > > > P� > >
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During the war with fascist Germany, the National Air Defense Forces in the
Far East did not undergo ~ubstantial change. While their structure was continu-
ally improved and combat and numeric strength increased in the Western Theater
in 1941-1945, the air defense system underwent radic al reorganization only once--
at the end of 1941 when the appropriate large units and units were transferred
from the Far Eastern and the Transbayk~l Fronts to the direct subordir,ation of
the commanders of the Far Eastern and the Transbaykal air defense zones.
The Far Eastern grouping of the National Air Defense Forces consisted of fighter
aviation (consolidated in each air defense zone into one division) and antiair-
craft artillery (consolidated in the Transbaykal Air Defense Zone into three
brigade regions, and in the Far Eastern, into seven). Air observation, warning
and communication (VNOS) was har.dled by batallions established in each air defense
brigade region. This air defense troop organization provided for sufficiently
flexible control and the concentration af forces and means to protect troops
and the most important facilities in the Far East from possible attacks by the
Japanese Air Force.
The USSR Navy in the Far East during the Great Patriotic War consisted of the
Pacific Fleet (which included the North Pacific Military Flotilla) and the
Red Banner Amur Military Flotilla. The strategic mission of the Far Eastern
grouping of the Navy in 1941-1945 was, in conjunction with the other branches
of the Armed Forces, to reliably defend the coast of the Soviet Union and to
protect its sea communications from the aggressive operations of militaristic
Japan.
Throughout the entire war, the Soviet Pacific Fleet was considerably inferior
to the Japanese Navy. It had no aircraft carriers or battle ships, and it had
only two cruisers and then only at the start of 1945. However, it had sufficient-
ly strong aviation and coastal artillery and a considerable strength in submarines.
The Red Banner Amur Military Flotilla was superior in all respects to the Japanese
Sungari Militar_y Flotilla.
Thus, the Soviet Supreme High Command during the Great Patriotic War, in devoting
the main attention to the armed conflict at the Soviet-German Front, improved
the organizational structure and strengthened the combat and numerical strength
of the Armed Forces in the Far East. The Far Eastern warriors persistently
studied the combat experience of the field armies and fleets. Many officers
and generals were sent to the field fronts for training. Upon their return to
the Far East, they passed on their acquired experience to the troops. Sending
soldiers, master sergeants, officers and generals who had already gained combat
- experience at the Soviet-German front to the Far East was also of positive value.
In preparing for the war with Japan the strength and organization of the Far
Eastern grouping underwent radical change. During the period May-July 1945,
the agencies for operational-strategic command of the Soviet troops in the Far
East were restructured taking into account the experience of the Great Patriotic
War and the peculiarities of the Far Eastern Theater: the High Command of the
Soviet Troops in the Far East was established. This stemmed from the great dis-
tance between the theater of mil.itary operations and the General Headquarters
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of the Supreme High Command, as well as the huge spatial scale of the farthcoming
military operations in this theater. All ground, air, air defense and naval
forces in the theater were subordinated to the High Command of the Soviet Troops
in the Far East. _
At that time, the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General
Stdrf as before had direct communication with the fronts and fleets. The organiza-
' tion of the High Command of the Soviet Troops in the Far East made it possible to
expeditiously implement the orders of the Supreme High Command for routii?g the
Kwantung Army, to thoroughly consider all changes in the strategic and operation-
al situation, and to react to them in a timely manner.
~ In the spring and summer of 194b, there was an intensive and substantial build
i �
I up of combat forces and means needed for decisive offensive actions in the Far
East. Transferred for this purpose was a large quantity of personnel, arms and
' combat equipment, mainly of ground and air formations--combined arms and tank
armies, aviation corps and divisions, and large air defense units. At the same
~ time, the large units and units of all the Armed Forces and branches and arms
~ of troops that had been in the Far East throughout the entire war with fascist
I Germany were reorganized.
In the Ground Forces, the infantry divisions were shifted completely to the or-
ganic organization which had well proved itself in the concluding engagements
against fascist Germany. A large share of them were reinforced with modern -
types of arms and combat equipment--self-propelled artillery, automatic weapons,
trucks and mechanical traction.
I
i In the period May-June 1945, the large units and units of the armored and mecha-
( nized troops received heavy and medium tanks and self-propelled artill~ry, both
delivered by industry and transferred from the West. As a result, by 9 August,
- heavy and medium tanks and self-propel~ed artillery made up 45 percent of the
total number of tanks in the Far East. Artillery changed both in quality and
quantity. As a res~lt of the measures implemented, the pool of artillery was
increased 1.4-fold.
During the strategic deployment of Soviet troops in the Far East, all three
fronts each had an air army; two bomber corps of the RVGK [Reserve of the
j Supreme Command] were attached to the 12th Air Army, and a long-range bomber
I corps was operationally subordinate to the 9th Air Army. Thanks to industrial
~ deliveries and transfers from the Soviet-German front, the number of aircraft
1 Calculated from: IGH, D~M, f. 244, op. 2.87, d. 54, L 10.
2 Calculated from: IGH D~M f. 239 0 98 d~. 599 L 93� f. 244 en. 287
> > > P� > > > > ~ ~
d. 54, L 11.
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increased almost 20 percent within three months, and the ratio of1air arms was
changed somewhat (the number of bombers was increased primarily). Considering
the peculiarities of the region for the forthcoming operations, the High Command
strengthened the air armies with air transport divisiuns and regiments. As a re--
sult of this restructuring, the s~riking power of the Soviet Air Force had sub-
stantially increased by 9 August.
The National Air Defense Forces in the Far East were also reorganized. The air
defense system est ablished at the Soviet-German front was used as the basis for
the new organization. Based on the Far Eastern and the Transbaykal Air Defense
Zones, three air defense armies were created to protect the troops of the Trans-
baykal and the lst and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts. The former air defense brigade
regions were reorganized into air defense divisions. In addition, three air
defense corps were transferred from the West to here. As a result of this re-
organization and increase in combat forces, the artillery of the National Air
Defense Forces in the Far East increased a~most three-fold within three months, _
. and fighter aviation increased 13 percent.
- The naval air force was equipped with new aircraft; the ship strength of the .
Pacific Fleet (TOF) was augmented with frigates, patrol vessels and landing ships.
The naval infantry was replenished with personnel that had combat experience.
However, the Pac~fic Fleet as before was inferior to the Japanese Navy in major
surface vessels.
In preparing for military operations against Japan, the Soviet Supreme High _
Command restructured the Armed Forces in the Far East. Within a short time, a
powerful offensive strategic grouping of troops was created that was capable ~
of performing the mission to rout the Japanese troops in Manchuria, North Korea,
on southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.
In transferring the front directorates, formations and large units to the Far
East, the concrete experience gained in combat operations at the Soviet-German
front was taken into consideration. Formations and large units that had ex-
perience in breaking through strongly fortified positions were assigned to the -
1st Far Eastern Front. Troops that had skill in operating in mountainous
terrain were assigned to the Transbaykal Front which had to surmount the Greater
Khingan Mountains.
1 Calculated from: IGH, D~M, f. 239, op. 98, d. 599, l. 93; f. 244, op. 287, -
d. 54, t. 11.
2"Sovetskiye Voyer~no-Vozdushnyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945
gg." [Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945], Moscow, 1968,
p 425.
3 IGH, D~M, f. 244a op. 287, d. 52, 1~.. 89, 106; d. 54, 1. 17.
4 S. Zakharov and others, "Krasnoznamennyy Tikhookeanskiy flot" CRed Banner
Pacific Fleet], p 168. _
36
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The peculiarities of each strategic dirFCtion, the capacity of the operating
directions, the nature of defense and numeric strength of the enemy grouping
had considerable influence on the organization and combat strength of the fronts. -
Since the Transbaykal Front faced no prepared defense, the Soviet command sent
more tanks and self-propelled artillery there, but more artillery and mortars
to the 1st Far Eastern Front where there was a solid zone of perm~nent defensive
fortifications.
The experience of the operational-strategic cover of the deployment of Soviet
troops is instructive. Major steps had to be taken in this diraction, for the
enemy had o~~er a million men ready for active operations.
During the deployment of the Soviet .Armed Forces, the troops and fortified regions
_ in the Maritime Territory and the Transbaykal area were brought to full combat
readiness, a plan for conducting defensive operations was drafted, an air defense
~ sy5tem to protect in advance the prepared unloading stations, major rail junctions
and areas of concentration was est ablished, measures were taken to counter air
assaults, defense of the seacoast was organized and brought to readiness, and
reconnais~ance was strengthened in every possible way. The questions of camouflage
j and fabricating information for the enemy were resolved during the defensive
efforts.
; The Border Troops played a definite role; they strengthened protection of th~
state border and reported intelligence on the enemy grouping and condition of
i the terrain in the border zone to the units that had arrived, and took a direct
part in the combat operations of the troops of the fronts.
~
I
~ The measures taken to insure the secret transfer of a large number of troops
- from the West to the East, and of the large-scale intrafront regroupings, and
the operational-strategic deployment of tro~ps and concentration of materiel are .
extremely interesting and instructive. The requirement to maintain secrecy was
strictly taken into account in the entire complicated system of preparing for
the Manchurian operation. _
I
i
The Japanese command knew about the offensive being prepared, but it did not
; know the time that it would start, nor the true scale, nor the directions of ~
attacks. Consequently, Soviet troops on the scale of the whole campaign succeed-
ed in attaining surprise which had strategic value.
;
; The campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East was of short duration.
Its aims were achieved during the Manchurian strategic offensive, the southern
Sakhalin offensive and the Kurile landing operations. ~he Manchurian operation
was the main one in the Far Eastern campaign. Taking part in it were the three -
- fronts, the Pacific Fleet and the Red Baaner Amur Military Flotilla, the Border
Troops and the National Air Defense Forces in the Far East.
The most important feature of the Manchurian operation is that the strategic aims =
of the war were achieved at the start of it. As an operation it is also character-
- ized by certain other features typical for the initial period of war: secrecy of
37
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concentration and deployment of groupings of troops, surprise shift to the offen-
sive at night and a crushing initial strike with the participation of the maximum
of forces and means in the 1st echelon. All this required precise organization of
coordination between the three fronts, ~the navy and river flotilla in time, ob-- _
jectives and lines.
Consequently, in the war with Japan, the Soviet Armed Forces were enriched with
the experience of preparing a major operation designed to seize the strategic
initiative, and a rapid maneuver of part of the troops and aircraft over great
distances, and of organizing coordination of the Ground Forces with the Air Force
- and Navy. At the same time, experience was gained in organizing and conducting
a major offensive operation under the conditions of mountainous-taiga and desert-
steppe theater of military operations.
The development of the strategic concept and plans for the Manchurian operat ion
was the result of intense creative activity of the Supreme High Command, the
General Staff and High Command of the Soviet Forces in the Fax East, and tize ~
commands and staffs of the fronts and the fleet. The personal visit by the High
Commander and Front Commanders of the main sectors of the fronts, their acquaint-
ance with the troops, and reconnoitering were of great value in planning the
operation. After appropriate discussxon, the necessary changes were made to the
plans that had been adopted earlier. A problem of strategic importance was the de-
termination of the amount of force needed for the Manchuriar. and other operations.
- The strategic concept of the Manchurian operation was disting~~ished by purposeful- '
ness and decisiveness of actions and insured a quick rout of the Kwantung Army.
The decision by the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on two
powerful strikes in opposing directions to encircle the main forces of the Kwantung
Army proved its value fully. The offensive plan made it possible for the Soviet
command to maintain the initiative throughout the entire operation. Indicative
of this in particular is the fact that the enemy border fortifications in the ~
ridge of the Greater Khingan Mountains were surmounted as of the 5th-6th day of
- operation.
The choice of the main thrust directions was exceptionally fortunate. The selec-
tion of them was determined primarily by the form of the strategic operation for
encirclement. Also taken into consideration were the advantageous configuration
of the state border, the nature of the placement of areas fortified by the
Japanese, the peculiarities of the grouping of the main forces of the Kwantung
Army (two-thirds on the Manc:i,~.irian pla~n and in the area of the Korean ports),
and the inadequate network of internal lines of communications which restricted
the enemy's capability to maneuver reserves.
The main thrust directions brought the Soviet troops to the flanks and into the
rear of the main enemy grouping and deprived the enemy of contact with the home
country and with the strategic reserves located in North Korea. Thus the
Transbaykal Front reached the shore of the Yellow Sea over the shortest direction
(from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic to Kalgan and Beijing)
and carried out their mission of isolating Manchuria in an extremely short time.
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Simultaneously, the main forces of this front with a deep cutting thrust to
Shenyang, Lu-shun and (Dalyan') divided the troops of the 1st and the 3rd Fronts
d~ the Kwantung Army which hastened its capitulation.
- Such decisiveness and purposefulness of actions also described the operations
of the remaining fronts. The 2nd Far Eastern Front with the operational.ly sub- -
ordinate Amur Military Flotilla swiftly advanced in the Sungari sector which
made it possible to subsequently mop up northern Manchuria.
~ Troops of the 1st Far Eastern Front, after breaking up the reinforced concrete _
belt of fortified regions, in the course of fierce combat reached the central
; Manchurian plain and rushed to l~nk up with the Transbaykal Front, and on the
~ left wing in coordination with the Pacific Fleet they liberated North Korea and
deprived the enemy of communications with thF home country. In the zone of the
1st Far Eastern Front tlie main efforts were shifted from the main direction to
~ the direction of the secondary attack where more decisive success was indicated.
This became possible thanks to the preplanned alternatives for operations of the
troops and the availability of substantial reserves to the front commander. -
i
As a result of the series of strong attacks on his defense, the enemy was pinned
down on the entire extent of the Soviet-Manchurian and the Mongolian-Manchurian
borders and had no opportunity to establish where the Soviet troops were making
the main thrust.
Because of the geographic conditions of all the strategic directions, a feature
of the operation was that Soviet troops did not attack with a solid front, but
only in selected operating directions, often separated from each other by
hundreds of kilometers. The disconnection uf th~ operating directions determined
the relative independence in operaticns of the fronts, armies and even large
units. For example, there was a 200-km gap between the 6th Guards Tank and t~ie
17th Armies which made up the main attack grouping of the Transbaykal Front.
The flanks of the fronts were separated by hundreds of kilometers of inaccess-
iblE; mountainous-taiga or swampy terrain. Because of this, coordination of the
fronts was organized in time, ~nissions and directions of the main as well as the
secondary attacks. This made it possible to subject the enemy defense to simul-
taneous strong attacks on a huge front.
I
The operations of the fronts and armies in the Manchurian strategic operation
took place in a huge space. The width of the zone of the offensive of the
Transbaykal Front reached 2,300 km (the active sector was 1,500 km), for the 2nd
Far Eastern, it was 2,130 km (the active sector was 520 km), and for the 1st Far
Eastern, it was 700 km. The depth of the front operations was: 800 km far the
Transbaykal Front (reaching the line (Chihfeng), Shenyang, Chungchun, and
(Buhedu)), and 200 km for the 1st Far Eastern (rnaching the Mudanjiang River).
The fronts were able to execute missions at such a great depth because of the
_ power of the initial thrust, the great swiftness, boldness and continuity of
the attack by the troops, the availability of strong large mobile units, air
supremacy, and the lack of defense zones in depth of the enemy disposition in -
the operating sectors. The scale of the offensive by the fronts and the armies
is shown in table 21. ~
1 VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, 1975, No 8, p 19.
i
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Table 21. Scale of Soviet Troop10ffensive in the Manchurian Operation
(as of 19 August 1945 )
~y Depth of Width of Average Ually
Advance, Zone of Ra~e o~ Advance -
km Advance, km km
Transbaykal Front
In the direction of the main attack '
6th Guards Tank Army 820 200 82 _
39th Army 330 200 38
17th Army 450 200 45 -
In other directions
36th Army 450 700 45
Mounted-Mechanized Group of Soviet
and Mongolian Troops 420, 550 300 4?_, 55
1st Far Eastern Front
In the direction of the main attack
1st Red Banner Army 300 135 30
5th Army 300 65 30
In other directions
35th Army 250 250 25
25th Army 200 285 20
2nd Far Eastern Front
In the direction of the main attack
- 15th Army 300 330 30
In other directions
2nd Red Banner Army 200 150 20
16th Armyy'~ 360 150 24 -
_ The 16th Army attacked on 11 August.
1 Compiled from: IGH, TJ&M, inv. NQ 55, 1. 62.
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The High Command of the Soviet Troops in the Far East, considering the features
of the theater of military operations and the high individual training, stamina
and fanaticism of the Japanese soldier, expected stubborn resistance from the
~riemy. Therefore, front operations were planned for a period of 20 to 25 days~
The strong attack groupings created in the major sectors and the high aggressive-
n~s s of the Soviet troops made it possible to more than double the rate of the
offensive and reduce the duration of the operations on the average to 10 days.
~ A ch aracteristic feature of the offensive operations by the fronts and the
~ armies was the skillful massing of forces and means in the sectors of ~he main .
j thrusts. With the total extent of fihe front in Manchuria of 5,130 km, the
act ive offensive operations were conducted on 2,720 km, while the main groupings
attacked on a still narrower front: 300 km for the Transbaykal Front, 200 km
for the 1st Far Eastern, and 330 km for the 2nd Far Eastern. The Transbaykal
Front concentrated 70 percent of the infantry troops and up to 90 percent of
_ the tanks and artillery in the sector of the main thrust. This made it possible -
to establish superiority over the enemy: 1.7-fold in infantry, 4.5-fold in
cannon, 9.6-fold in mortars, 5.1-fold in tanks and self-propelled artillery and
- 2.6-fold in aircraft. In the 29-km breakthrou~h area of the 1st Far Eastern
Fron~, the ratio of forces and weapons was: 1.5:1 in manpower, 4:1 in cannon "
and 8:1 in tanks and self-propelled artillery. The ratio was about the same in
the breakthrough areas in the sector of the main thrust of the 2nd Far Eastern
Front . -
Two echelons were used in the operational formation of the troops in the fronts
and a large part of the armies; the 2nd echelons of the combined-arms armies
were committed to engagement earlier than had been planned. This stemmed from
the st~.ccessful development of the army operations and the necessity of making use
of the advantageous situation fc~r increasing the rate of the offensive.
In the Transbaykal Front, the operational formation of the troops differed by the
presence of a tank army and a mounted-mechanized group in the 1st echelon, which _
was due to the necessity of forestalling the enemy in seizing the passes of the
Geater Khingan Mountains and of quickly reaching the Manchurian plain. In the
1st Far Eastern Front, the 10th Mechanized Corps operated as the echelon for
explo itation of success. Up to 30 individual tank brigades attacked on all
fronts with the 1st echelons of the infantry division. They insured a high rate
of attack. _
An appreciable role in the offensive was played by airborne landings at Changchun,
~ Shenyang, Harbin, Kirin, Lushun, (Khamkhyn, Pkhen'yan) and other major cities and _
port s. They paralyzed the operation of the rear communica~ions of the enemy and
prot ected major military and industrial facilities, preventing their demolition
and destruct.ion, prior to the approach of the ground forces.
1
Included is the difficult sector of terrain stretching about 2,000 km between
the left wing of the Transbaykal Front and the right wing of the 2nd Far
Eastern Front.
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The depth and rate of advance of the Soviet troops in each direction depended _
on the nature of the enemy defense, the forces and strength of his groupings,
the degree of his power to resist, and the relief of the terrain. Thus, in the
zone of attack of the Transbaykal Front, the enemy had built forti~ied regions
only in isolated sectors. The nature of the terrain permitted bypassing these
fortified regions. The enemy main forces withdrew in depth, and ~the covering
forces were inadequate to offer serious resistance to the powerful thrusts of
the armies of the Transbaykal f~ont. As a result, within 10 days these armies
advanced to a great depth with a high average daily rate. -
The situation was different in the 1st Far Eastprn Front where the enemy had an
almost continuous chain of fortified regions in the Manchurian border zone and
had posted troops greater in number than those facing the Transbaykal Front.
Moreover, the difficult mountain passes and taiga blocked the way of the Soviet
_ troops. Al1 this naturally had an effect on the rate of the offensive of the
armies in the 1st Far Eastern Front.
The experience of breaking through fortified regions at night without artillery -
and air preparation in the Manchurian operation deserves attention. The sudden
a~pearance of Soviet forward detachments in the disposition of the strong points
of Suifenho, Tungning and other fortified re~ions caught the Japanese garrisons
by surprise, and the swift actions of the t:~oops prevented the possibility of
organized resistance. The strong points w~~re bypassed or blocked. Large gaps
were formed in the enemy defense and the r,iain forces of the attacking troops -
rushed through them. This decided the f�te of a large part of the enemy forti-
fied regions that were captured in the very first days of the operation.
Forward detachments played a very large role in attaining the high rates of the -
offensive. They were established in almost all divisions and corps of the f irst
echelons of the armies. The strength of a detachment ranged from a tank battal-
ion to a tank brigade, from several companies to a regiment of infantry in
motor vehicles, a battalion of self-propelled artillery, a battalion (regiment)
of artillery, tank-destroying and antiaircraft ~atia?ions and other subunits
for support.
In some cases, separate tank brigades operated as forward detachments; they
were capable of a swift attack even while cut off from the main f~~rces of the
large units.
Surprise and. bold and decisive actions were the basis for the combat operations =
of the forward detachments. Their mission included: capture and holding of
advantageous positions until the approach of main forces, envelopment of enemy
flanks and gaining his rear, and parallel pursuit of the withdrawing enemy.
Forward detachments advanced at the rate of 100-150 km/day, main forces of
the armies--infantry--35-40 km/day, and cavalry at 50-60 km/day.
The'rzte of advance of armored and mechanized troops of the Transbaykal Front
on some days reached 150-160 km/day and averaged 70-90 km/day, in the 1st Far
Eastern Froni--50 km/day, and in the 2nd Far Eastern Front--40-50 km/day.
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Troops of the 16th Army in southern Sakhalin in coordination with naval and air
landing operations advanced during the 15 days of the offensive to a depth of
360 km with an average rate of 24 km/day.
Combat operations in Manchuria developed primarily along roads built oii mountains,
and often without any roads--along ridges, mountain valleys, over the centuries-
old taiga, unsteady swamps and deserts. They had the nature of an offensive by
individual columns that operated without direct tactical contact between them.
, Therefore, prior to the start of the offensive, all needed measures for combat,
engineering, road, materiel ~?nd air support for these columns were provided for
~ and they were given full independence.
The Soviet Air Force, covering the main groupings of the front forces from the
' air, attacked enemy railroads, defensive constructions, control centers, concen-
' trations of manpower and equipment, interdicted the approach of reserves from
j north China and Korea, and conducted intensive aerial reconnaissance on all the
; main directions of the troop offensive. For the operations of frontal aviation,
~ the efforts of the three air armies and the separate long-range bomber corps
were combined under the unified command of the commander of the Air Force of
I the Sovie~ Army, which under the conditions of the disconnected attack directions
and the special geographic and weather conditions in the theater had vital
i importance. To disorganize enemy rail shipments and deny the approach of reserves,
- up to 85 percent of all bomber sorties were flown in the attack zone of the
Transbaykal Front alone.
As a result, the engagement regions were isolated from the inflow of enemy fresh
~ forces, and his measures to evacuate physical assets from the border regions
I and to withdraw large un~ts from the thrusts of the attacking troops were
disrupted.
~ Another feature in the operations of combat aviation was the enlistmen~ of a
substantial amount of forces to conduct aerial reconnaissance in the interest of
~ the commanders of the fronis, combined-arms and tank armies. This was necessary
I due to the lack of precise data on the enemy and the fact that Soviet troops went
~ on the offensive immediately after the declaration of war. The air armies used
~ from 20 to 33 p~rcent of a13 sorties to perform this mission.
i
With the development of the attack by the ground troops, the efforts of aviation
; were switched to supporting forwarcl detachments and large mobi].e units. A
~ special role was given to aviation in its coordination with the 6th Guards Tank
- Army. In surmounting the ridge of the Greater Khingan Mountains, �wo air assaul:t
and one fighter division acted in direct coordination, while two bomber divisions .
attacked enemy centers of resistance on the route traveled by the tanks.
Transport aviation played an active role in the subsequent offensive by the
combined-arms and tank armies, delivering fuel and ammunition to the attacking
- formations. It subsequently executed missions to land airborne forces at the
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airfields of the major political-administrative and industrial centers of
Manchuria, North Korea, and southern Sakhalin, which were carried out to hasten
~he surrender of the Kwantung Army and to prevent destruction of physical assets.
The landing of the airborne forces was supported by the operations of co~iibat
aviation of two air armies and special air reconnaissance. Fighter and bomber
aviation patrolled above the airfields, ready to support the landing forces at
any moment.
Coordination of the Pacific Fleet with the ground forces consisted in covering
the maritime flank of the 1st Far Eastern Front during its attack into North ~
Korea. The Red Banner Amur Military Flotilla coordinated closely with the main
grouping of the forces of the 2nd Far Eastern Front throughout the entire
Sungari operation.
Most characteristic ef the operations of the fleet and the flotilla were the -
air strikes, and the landing and support of naval forces at the ports of Yuki, ~
Seishin, Rashin, and Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands where nine forces were
_ landed. This made it possible to quickly liberate the major ports of the
northeastern coast of Korea, to suppress enemy resistance and take the Kurile
Islands, as well as the southern part of Sakhalin Island. Fleet war ships, F
especially torpedo boats, were used in the majority of cases to land the forces, ~
= and special landing vessels only in some cases. Use of fast torpedo boats was
dictated by the necessity to quickly capture the enem,~ ports and bases. Naval
infantry, setting br]l.liant examples of boldness and courage, were usually land-
ed in the first assaults. Ground force units also operated courageously in the =
landings.
The Pacific Fleet landing forces acted quickly in capturing the North Korean ports
and bases and the ports were captured before ground troops could approach. As ~
a result of the Forestalling attacks by the fleet, the Kwantung Army was deprived
of maritime communications and completely isolated.
The flotilla had the major missions of landing forces and their artillery support,
- helping ground troops ~ forcing wide water barriers, and providing river trans-
portation. Thus, the Red Banner Amur Military Flotilla transported across
the Amur almost all of the 2nd Red Banner Army of the 2nd Far Eastern Front and
up to half of the 15th Army forces and means of combat. The coordination of the
15th Army troops of the 2nd Far Eastern Front with the large units and ships of
this flotilla is of considerable interest.
The thorough practice of fleet coordination with the ground troops and training
ship personnel for operations against enemy ground troops which was carried out
long before the start of the war with Japan played a large role.
Flotilla ships with ground troops on board operated continuously in the advance
guard of the main forces of the 15th Army. In the beginning of the operation, ~
forces were landed and troop river crossings made at various sectors of the
Amur and Ussuri rivers. During the operation, the flotilla supported with
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artillery fire the landing detachments who fought to expand and maintain beach-
heads, as well as the 15th Army that attacked in the coastal zone. After 10
days of operation, the flotilla main forces, in coordinatioi: with the 15th
Army, had covered more than 900 km along the Amur and Sungari--from (Fuyuanya)
to Harbin.
At the beginning of the operation, 15'ch Army troops in turn used artillery to
support the forces landed by the flotilla and the capture and holding by them
of islands and beachheads, and during the operation they protected flotilla ships
operating on the Sungari River from enemy ground forces. The operational sub-
ordination of the flotilla to the front command, and a brigade of river vessels
to the armies and the 5th Separate Infantry Corps fully proved its value.
The enemy was taken by surprise and stunned by the force of the attacks by the
Soviet Armed Forces, and was unable to make use of its Sungari Flotilla in an
organized manner.
The success of the operations and their rates were largely determined by the
i proper and precise organization of coordination which was achieved thanks to
i the personal contact of the commanders who coordinated the units and large units,
_j the exchange of liaison officers, and the control of the heterogeneous forces
~ from one command post. The contact and joint operational training of the front
and flotilla officers in the period preceding and during the operation played a
large role.
The National Air Defense Forces were constantly combat ready in the Far Eastern
- campaign, although they did not carry out major combat operations, inasmuch as
the Japanese Air Force was not very aggressive.
In preparing for and during the campaign, the rear organizations faced missions
~ of great complexity. Rear supply was one of the major factors limiting the
I start of the Manchurian operation.
~ Measures associated with troop materiel and equipment supply began as early as
March 1945 and continued right up to the very start of military operations, and
~ some were taken even after the start of the offensive by the Soviet troops. In
all three fronts, the main difficulty was the huge space, the shortage of trans-
portation and the poor possibility of making use of local induscry and raw
; materials to support the troops with ammunition and fuel. A large part of this
materiel had to be delivered over many thousands of 'cilometers. Thanks to the
timely measures taken, by the beginning of August 1945, the necessary reserves
of all types of ammunition and rations were established in the forces.
All the work accomplished by the rear agencies in the preparatory period ensured
the successful course of the operation. Despite the fact that Soviet troops
advanced 300-800 km dur.ing the first 10-15 days, they did not experience serious
supply difficulties, with the exception of temporary interruptions in fuel
supply for the 6th Guards Tank Army.
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Special note should be made of the noble and selfless labor of the Soviet
medics who accomplished much work in eliminating the various epidemic diseases
~mong the local rlanchurian population.
_ The brilliant victory of the USSR Armed Forces in the Far East once more con- -
firmed the unquestionable advantages of Soviet military art in the field of
strategy, operational art and tactics. The Manchurian strategic operation by
three fronts, the Pacific Fleet and the Red Banner Amur Military Flotilla in
concept, scope, performance, methods of executing missions and final results -
is one of the outstanding World War II operations. The simultaneous attack by -
several fronts and armies, using all branches and arms of the Armed Forces,
united by a common strategic cor_cept, made it possible to achieve utter defeat
of the enemy in a short time.
Even bourgeois historians who try to belittle the Soviet linion's contribution -
to the rout of militaristic Japan, in an analysis of the Manchurian operation,
admit that it "deserves careful attention and a definite place in the history of .
World War II" primarily because the Soviet command "was forced to employ a new
_ strategy here to deal with the Japanese defense." This "new strategy," in their
opinion, showed up primarily in the high rates of the offensive, the close
coordination of the branches of the Armed Forces, the open flanks, the landing
of airborne forces in front of the attacking troops, etc. All these features,
they assert, were more typical of the "post war1strategy and doctrine of the
Soviet command" than for the period of the war.
The tremendous experience gained by the Soviet command, officers and soldiers
in the uncompromising conflict with a strong and experienced enemy, fascist
Germany, was embodied in the Manchurian operation. That is precisely why in
it were displayed such features of the art of command and military skill as the
high level of strategic planning, the maneuver, unprecedented in scope and time,
of part of the Armed Forces to a new theater 8,000-12,000 km away, and the
organization of a surprise and simultaneous attack by three fronts, the air
force, the navy and air defense forces in the various strategic directions.
Also characteristic of it were the great depth of the front and army operations,
the unusually high rates of attack in the separate operating directions, the
extensive maneuvering with employment of envelopments, turning movements and
encirclements of the enemy grouping, and the use of large tank units to swiftly
cover broad expanses of desert-steppe and desert-mountainous regions. Also
significant were the efficient coordination of the ground troops with the navy
on the maritime flank, the dropping of airborne forces for coordination with
forward units and capture of strategically important objectives, and the organi- _
zation o.f close and thorough coordination of the air force with the ground troops
and the navy in the interest of their most rapid advance. Thus, victory was
achieved with lightning speed: after only 24 days the powerful enemy grouping
- was utterly defeated. ~
1"History of the Second World War," Vol 6, No 16, London, 1968, pp 2663-2666.
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2. Military Art of the Armies and Navies of the United States, England and China.
- By the beginning of 1945, the United States, Great Britain and China had con-
siderable naval, air and ground forces in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. There
were twu commands in the Pacific, one in the central portion and the other in
the southwestern part. The central command was headed by a navy commander with
army forces subordinate to him; the southwestern command was headed by an army
commander who had naval forces operationally subordinate to him. With the
approach of the American forces to the Japanese home islands, the U.S. Joint
' Chiefs of Staff reorganized the command in the Pacific in March-April. In
place of the central and southwestern Pacific commands, a commander in chief of
allied ground forces in the Pacific and commander in chief of allied naval forces
' were designated and the appropriate staffs established.
~
; In the winter of 1945, the situation in the European theater was such that the
United States and England were able to transfer part of the navy, especially
! landing forces, and the air force to the Pacific. The opportunity for transfer
~ increased with the end of the war in Europe. Meanwhile, the American command
i estimated that the forces in the Pacific and even the reinforcements ~hat could
be sent from Europe by America and England were'insufficient to defeat Japan.
~ Therefore, the allies tried to get the Soviet government to agree to enter the
USSR in the war against Japan.
Military operations in the Pacific were characterized by the army and navy fight-
ing for possession of islands to bring naval and air bases closer to Japan itself.
'The strategic offensive to attain intermediate objectives was carried out from one
~ line of bases to another. Much work went into equipping the captured bases and -
I nsuring sea communications with them. Possession of the Philippine Islands, Iwo
~ Jima, and later Okinawa, the main island in the Ryuku archipelago, made it
possible for the American cotmnand to intensify air and naval attacks on Japan's
sea communications with the South seas region, and to bring its naval and air
i bases substantially closer to the Japanese home islands (it is 1,200 km from
Iwo Jima to Tokyo, and about 600 km from Okinawa to China, Taiwan and Kyushu).
! This enabled better preparation for the invasion of Japan.
~ Al1 major offensive operations by the American Armed Forces in the Pacific in.
1945 were conducted by the joint efforts of the army and the navy. Some of
them were strategic in terms of the objectives set and the amount of forces
and means enlisted. Such was the Anglo-Indian operation to liberate southern
~ Burma which was conducted primarily by air and ground forces with naval support.
A strategic offensive was carried'out in a broad expanse of several thousands _
of kilometers along the front and in depth. Thus, for Operation "Iceberg" to
= capture Okinawa, forces were drawn from almost all over the Pacific, from �he U.S.
~�zest coast, and from the islands of Hawaii, Fiji, Solomons, Phi~.ippines
- and others. The nature of the theater and the plan adopted dictated waging
offensive operations only by separate disconnected directi~ns.
Naval landing operations were the only possible way to conduct military opera-
tions to occupy enemy territory in the Pacific. The islands of Luzon, Iwo Jima,
_ Okinawa and many others were occupied as a result of such operations.
47
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The naval forces of the United States and, in part, those of Great Britain
during the strategic offensive fought to gain and maintain sea supremacy, carried
out amphibious operations and supported th~n,disrupted Japan's sea communicat3.ons
and provided transport for troops and equipment on a substantial scale within
the Pacific theater.
The experience of the war on the huge expanses of the Pacific Ocean overturned
the theory on the dominating role of battleships that had previously existed
in the United States and England. Their place was taken by fast-moving aircraft
carriers which became the navy's main striking force. They not only fought
successfully for supremacy on the sea and in the air, but also supported other
naval operations. Major surface vessels of other classes lost their former
importance, although they played an important role in protecting and supporting
the operations of aircraft carriers.
Employment of carrier aviation almost completely supplanted in combat practice
the operations of artillery-torpedo groupings of surface vesse ls. Clashes
between carrier forces replaced them. While the United States, England and
Japan had 43 carriers of various classes at the beg~nning of the war, these
states constructed 178 carriers during this period.
In the strategic ofFensive, aviation carried out missions by independent air
operations to weaken the military-economic potential of the enemy. Air strikes
were carried out on objectives, as a rule, at night using a large quantity of
incendiary bombs. However, the results of the so-called "burning" of Japanese
cities, conducted over a period of four and one half months in 1945, show that
of the 98 cities destroyed, 72 had no major military objectives.
Large units of strategic aviation were also enlisted for direct support of ground
forces, mine laying in the enemy coastal waters, supporting landings of naval and
airborn~ forces, and inflicting strikes on naval bases and ships.
Tactical aviation was used to support ground farce operations both in direct
support and in strikes on operational enemy targets in depth. The basic princi-
ple of its employment was massing of force in the main direct ion of the attacking
troops and on major groups of targets.
With the emergenc~ of airborne and ship radar, broad possibilities were opened for
advance detection of enemy aircraft and ships, and for successful conduct of
combat operations not only during daytime, but also at night and in fog.
U.S.Armed Forces gained substantial experience in amphibious operations of various
scales. They were all conducted under the conditions of complete superiority
over the enemy in ground, naval and air forces. Thus, the battles for Iwo Jima
were fought by 111,000 soldiers, 680 ships and vessels, and 1,500 aircraft,
1"Istoriya voyenno-morskogo iskusstva" [History of Naval Art], Moscow, 1969, ,
p 522.
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against about 23,000 Japanese, 5 submarines that carried the "Kaiten" human
torpedoes and up to 40 aircraft. In the operation to capture Okinawa, on the
American side, there were almost 550,000 men (183,000 in the first line),
_ 1,500 ships and vessels, 1,727 carrier aircraft and over 700 strategic aircraft,
while at the time of the landing, the Japanese had a garrison of 87,000 and
- insignificant naval forces.
,
The planning and preparation for the operation were characterized by great
' thoroughness and on the basis of prearranged places and time included: deter-
mining the necessary forces and means, the points of embarkation for the troops
and loading of equipment, the sea routes for transporting the landing detach-
mez~ts; development of plans for operations of ground, naval and air forces,
organization of support and cover from the sea and the air; organization of
communication and materiel supply and a number of other questions. Enemy naval
force opposition in the landing areas was weak in many cases, but despite this,
, major large units of carriers and other surface ships and large units of sub-
~ marines were allocated to cover the landing teams from Japanese naval strikes.
;
, The composition of a landing force depended on the forces of the defending enemy, .
' the nature of his defense and the missions to be accomplished by the landing
! force. Marines and infantry were used in a landing force. In the overwhelming
~ majority of amphibious operations, the number of infantry participating did not
i exceed two reinforced divisions, except for Okinawa and Luzon where four divi-
~ sions were landed just in the first echelon.
-I
The ground, naval and air forces allocated to an operation were consolidated into
~ so-called large amphibious and other operational units (actually formations).
~ Nine such large units were created for the operation to capture Okinawa and nine
for Iwo Jima.
; Landing ships, vessels and specially built debarkation craft that provided rapid
and convenient troop debarkation and equipment unloading on an unequipped shore
_i were used extensively to take the landing forces to the assigned region.
~ The rapid development of combat hardware had a great influence on the ways and -
means of conducting amphibious operations. During the war, special transport, _
i landing and landing-debarkation craft for infantry, and tanks (t~nk carriers �
and tank barges) as well as amphibious tanks and transporters-amphibians were
! developed and improved; this made it possible to deliver the landing subunits
~ and units to debarkation points and successfully land them on the shore in a
' short time.
An amphibious operation included the following stages: preliminary air and
artillery preparation of the landing area, concentration and embarkation of
troops on to vessels, sea transport of the landing force, direct air and artil- -
lery support, debaz~kation of the landing force and consolidation of the beachhead.
Subsequently, support was given to the landing force while it performed its
- missions on the shore.
49
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Much attention wd:~ paid to operational support (reconnaissance, camouflage, and
cover), materiel and special types of support (navigational-hydrographic, hydro-
tneteorological, emergency resc~ie), as well as to the problems of organizing
antiaircraft, antisubmarine, antimine, and anticutter defense.
In all amphibious operations carried out by the U. S. Armed Forces in the Pacific
in 1945, an important role was played by large aircraft carrier units. Their -
mobility made it possible to maneuver aircraft over a great distance, concentrate
large forces in the major sectors, and to achieve air superiority over the ~nemy
at the chosen time and in the chosen area.
Large aircraft carrier units had the following missions: fighting for air and
sea supremacy in the area of forthcoming operations by destroying enemy aircraft
- and naval forces at sea and at their bases (it was precisely the American carrier
aircraft that did the most damage to Japanese aircraft eG..�iers and battleships),
preliminary and direct air support of the landing area, air support of the landing
forces while they were performing their mission to capture islands.
To create favorable conditions for landing operations, large units of fast-moving
aircraft carriers and strategic bombers (B-29, B-24 and B-17), and sometimes even
large gunboats began attacking aircraft at airfields and ships at naval bases, I
_ ar.d enemy antilanding defenses in the zones contiguous to the landing areas ,
two to three months before the start of the landing. That is how the preparation
was made before the amphibious landing on Iwo Jima. Several days prior to the
start of the operation, aircraft and large ship units began preliminary preparation
of the landing area with fire support, and provided direct support on the day of -
the landing. It was characteristic that in the operation to capture Iwo Ji~a,
' aircraft bombed the island itself for 72 days before the landing operation.
The troops embarked and equipment was loaded on the landing-transport craft on
a broad front. Departure of the large landing units began according to the time
needed to cover the route to '~he landing area and the prearranged sequence of
arrival of the particular landing echelons. To capture Okinawa, 183,000 troops
and 747,000 tons of freight were loaded at 11 different points from Seattle on
the U. S. west coast to the Island of Leyte. The distance from Seattlz and Leyte
to Okinawa was 5,400 and 900 miles, respectively.
Each lar~;~~ landing unit, which, as a rule, transported a division with reinforce-
ments, was made up of about 25 transports and 50 landing ships and vessels that _
traveled in groups protected by escort ships; measures needed for all types of
defense were taken. When the forces reached a point about 5 to 18 km from
shore, the division was landed by the "sea-shore" method.
Upon the arrival of the large landing units in the area of deployment, and in
some ca.ses even earlier, direct artillery and air preparation of the beachhead
began. To reliably suppress the forces and means of antilanding defense, prepara- _
tion was conducted over several days (three days for Luzon and Iwo Jima; twa and
a half days for Okinawa).
1 380.
(F. Khaf), "Voyna na ostravakh" [The War on the Islands], p
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Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, gur.boats, and small ships, cutters and barges
with rocket-launching weapons were used extensively for direct artillery prepa-
ration of the landing and artillery support for the landing forces. Thus, in
the Okinawa landing, 10 battleships, 13 cruisers, 32 destroyers as well as many
small ships and barges were used for this purpose; this made it possible to create
_ a rather high density of fire of rifledand rocket-launched artillery (100-200
launcr,ers per kilometer of the landing front).
Artillery and air preparation during the Iwo Jima landing continued for 2 hour,s
and 20 minutes. First came fire from the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers,
and then large mortar-firing cutters were included. An hour before the landing,
ship-fired artillery ceased firing and aircraft began working over the landing
sectors with bombs, napalm, rockets and machine gun fire. At 35 minutes before
the landing, fire was resumed from all artillery weapons from 16-inch (406.4 mm)
guns to mortars to a depth up to 1,000 yards (900 m). Aircraft made strikes dur-
ing the last seven minutes. During the landing, a rolling barrage was used for
the first time in the Pacific combat operations, This was conducted by 5-inch
(127 mm~ guns supporting a 400-yard (360-meter) security zone for the disembarking
troops. The line of deployment for the landing force was two miles (3.7 km) from
the shore, which it had to cover in 30 minutes. Troops were landed in waves with
an interval of three to five minutes.
In some operations (Luzon and Okinawa), frogmen teams were used extensively. As
soon as artillery preparation began (and sometimes even earlier), they made gaps
in the enemy antilanding obstacles. For example, ten 100-man teams took part in
_ the Okinawa landing. For the first time the Americans landed on the shore one to
. two Ranger regiments and detachments, and the English landed one to two Commando
brigades and detachments. Tanks-amphibians and armored cars were included in the
forward regiments and detachments.
Foratard detachments, suppressing enemy resistance, captured his strongpoints and
shore positions. Ships and aircraft made strikes upon the call by the landing
forces, while simultaneously covering the landing from the sea and air.
The landing front was from 3.2 to 12.5 km for a corps of marines or army corps,
and from 1.6 to 6 km for a division in the 1st echelon. In attacking the shore,
- a corps generally had a single-echelon formation. As a rule, after the landing
on the shore, the large reserve units moved immediatelS� into the first echelon.
Infantry and marine divisions used an order of battle of one or two echelons,
depending on the nature of the Japanese defe~:zse. The width of the attack z~ne
was determined usually by the width of the island and was not large. Infjntry
attacked the shore together with tanks supported by aircraft and artillery
(including ship-fired artillery).
- 1 G. Garand and T. Strobridge, "History of the U. S. Marine Corps Operations in
World War II," Vol 4, Washington, 1971, pp 502-504.
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The use of specia~ landing-debarkation craft, as well as the lack of -.~~ious
enemy resistance in the landing area made it possible to develop relatively
high landing rdtes on the unorganized shore: 68,000 men wer.e l.nded in a day
at Luzon, and 60,000 on Okinawa. On the avera~e, an Ameri.r.an infzntry d~.vis:i.or
was landed in 8 to 10 hours.
After capturing the beach and suppressing enemy resistance in the tactical zone
of his defense, landing forces, supported by ship artillery and aircz~aft, tried
to expand the beachhead. The rates of advance depended on the degreF of enemy
resistance. Thus, on Okinawa, a corps of marines that nad landed in the northern
part of the island did not meet serious resistance and within ~our days reached
lines that had been planned for the 21st day of the operation. But an army corps
that operated in the southern part of the island where the enemy put up a stubborn
defense could accomplish its mission for the 20th day only aiter three months of
combat. On Iwo Jima, combat lasted for 36 days instead of the planned 5.
- A landing operat.ion was considered terminated when the troops capture~ the
designated beachhead and consolidated their hold on it or when they accomplished
the asaigned mission by complete capture of the island.
- Providing amphibious operations with supplies and equipment was one of the most
important problems in the war in the Pacific. Troops, supplies and equipment
had to be concentrated on a captured beachhead in sufficient quantity to success-
fully execute subsequent missions on shore. If one considers the hugh expenditure
of materiel in the operations, as well as the conditions of time and weather that
_ affected sea transportation and landing of the forces, it becomes clear how com-
plicated this was.
A feature of the Pacific amphibious operations was that the troop landing areas
were located at a great distance from supply bases. Therefore, continuous supply
of the landing forces was one of the major problems. Intermediate supply bases
were established for this purpose on previously occupied islands. Large service
" units (the "floating rear") were extensively developed to support naval forces.
They had facilities to repair ships to docks inclusive and consisted of separate
detachments of ships, transports, tankers and available floating facilities.
Following immediately behind the invasion forces, they were always ready to
replenish ship supplies, tow a damaged vessel, perform repairs, etc.
, The large service units made it possible for American large maneuvering units
_ to operate for a month or more without returning to base. Special supply de-
tachments, for example protected tankers, delivered fuel from the Caribbean Sea
to the Marshall Islands where it was transferred to fleet tankers or barges;
- other transport detachments carried ammunition, arms and rations for the landing
forces.
= 1(F. Khaf), "The War on the Islands," pp 419-420.
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Military operations at the Burma front were conducted primarily on ground. The
largest were the operations on the Mandalay plain (January-February 1945), and
the attack on Rangoon (March-April) in two isolated directions. The British
had made advance preparations for these operations: two divisions had been re-
- equipped with modern and light arms and made more mobile. Attacking under the
conditions of weak resistance from Japanese troops, the two Anglo-Indian corps
advanced along the roads practically in columns.
The British command twice made airborne landings in 1945: a brigade at Taungtha
and a separate battalion at Rangoon, but only the former affected the successful
outcome of a battle. The latter was landed in an area where there was no enemy.
Operations of the British East Indian Fleet in the Indian Ocean were limited in
objectives and value and consisted in landing tactical forces on the island of
Akyab, Ramree and Cheduba near the Arakan coast and on the coast (Myebon, (Ruiva
and Letpan)), as well as at Cape Negrais south of Rangoon. These landings were
made by small forces with no opposition from the Japanese from the sea.
_ With the departure of Japanese warships from the Bay of Bengal, British ships
shelled the shores of Malaya, and the Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Bay of
Bengal.
~ Aviation played a great role in the success of the allied p,round troops in Burma.
In addition to the combat effect on the enemy, aviation -~3rried supplies and
equipment to the majority of combat units in the theater wbi~�h la~ked an adequate
quantity of communications. Allied air supremacy over Burma and ~~eas adjacent
; to it was complete, since the enemy h~d only several dazen planes against the
approximately 2,500 allied warplanes.
The allies succeeded in a~taining greater coordination in employment of aviation
than in the other arms. Under Mountbatten was the post of the h~gh command of
_ the air force which was held by British Air Marshal (G. Gerrod), Subordinate to
him was the Eastern Air Command (commanded by the American General G. Stratemeyer,
and he was deputy commander in chief of allied air forces), two British air groups
and a subunit of combat aviation. Making up the Eastern Air Command were two
' other British air groups, two air armies (one of them American, the other--
~ strategic aviation--Anglo-American), and an Anglo-American oper~tional group for.
transport of freight and troops and special aviation squadrons.' The American
1
(Dzh. Erman), "Bol'shaya strategiya. Oktyabr' 1944-avgust 1945" [Grand
Strategy. October 1944-August 1945], p 172,
2 Mountbatten's Report, p 273~
3 S. Kirby and others, "The War against Japan," Vol 4, pp 441-445.
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20th Bomber Command with 100 B-29 heavy bombers was based in India. In FeUruary-
~ March 1445, it coordinated with large units under Admiral Mountbatten, commander of
allied forces in Southeast Asia. The long rarige of the strategic aircraft made it
poesible for them to attack Japanese bases located at a considerable distance, 3.n
Saigc~n, Cam Ranh and Singapore.
The air force performed combat missions on bombing tactical targeL-s on land and lay-
ing mines in harbors at the enemy coast. During the offensive for Rangoon, the air
force sub~ected the Mandalay-Rangoon and Burma-Thailand ratlroads and the Irrawaddy
River to continuous attack, preventing thereby the Japanese command from maneuver--
ing forces. In the process, guidance stations i.n the enemy rear area were used ex-
tensively. For example, in April 1945, almost all fighter-bomt~ers of the 224th1Air
Group operated with guidance provided by scouts located in the enemy rear area.
= T.ransport aviation operated inCensively. The British and t~merican commands, conduc-
ting combat operations under jungle conditions and an extremely limited number of
communications, were forced to devote great attention to establishing air transpor-
tation services to carry personnel as well as supplies.
- The Indian-Chinese Command of the U.S. Air Transport Command, which delivered sup-
plies to China, continually built up its forces. In December 1944, 249 aircraft
were used on the air route; in January 1945, 287 aircraft; and in July, 332 air-
craft.2 During the period January-August 1945, 430,898 tons of freight were
delivered to China.
At the Burma front, the British and later the allied command assigned transport
aviation impo~tant and crucial missions to deliver supplies and equipment to the
forces operating in jungles under difficult climatic conditions. While there was
one air transport squadron (25 aircraft) in the British Air Force in Southeast Asia
in June 1943, the decision was made to make maximal utilization of transport avia-
tion with the establishment of the allied command for Southeast Asia. Then all
transport aircraft in the British and American air forces in this region were con-
solidated into a transport command for air delivery of troops, which transported a �
considerable amount of both troops and freight. For example, the air force deli-
vered supp~ies to the 150,000-man grouping in the Imphal area, after transferring
there two infantry divisior.s, two infantry brigades and smaller subunits.
The allies reorganized the air transport command in October 1944. An operational
air transport-landing group was established to replace the command for air troop
transportation. This group consisted of 17 squadrons (9 British and 8 American)
and a headquarters for delivery of air freight (6 squadrons). There were in all
600-650 aircraft with 25-30 aircraft per squadron in the 23 squadrons. They
delivered about 2,000 tons of freight daily.
The availability of a large number of transport aircraft made it possible to
transfer troops to the needed sectors of the front and to support the combat
activity of the grouping of land forces which had almost 350,000 men.
1 Mountbatten's Report, pp 175, 178, 179.
2 This does not include American Air Force aircraft (120-130 planes) that supported
the domestic Chinese and Indian airlines and the aircraft of the commercial
Chinese national transport civil air company that flew the same route.
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In the opinion of British historians, the operation of transport aviation was one
_ o.f the decisive factora in the success of the allied troops in Burma and China.
The experience of the offensive operations by the forces in Asia and in the Pac~.fic
confirmed the possibility of coordinated employment of all arms and aviation in _
mountains, deserts, forests and jungles. However, these special conditions re-
quired special measures to overcome various diff iculties and limitations. On the
whole, American forces gained quite varied experience and displayed skill in con-
ducting offensive operations employing the most modern means of combat for that time.
Military operations in the Pacific enriched the military art of the United States
and Great Britain in the first place in the area of preparing for and conducting
amphibious operations at a great distance away from bases. The main principle for
conducting them was the establishment of overwhelming superiority in air and naval
forces and multifold superiority in troops. Typical of these operations was the
efficient operational and tactical coordination between a 11 branches and arms of
the armed forces. -
Major factors in attaining the successes by the allied armed forces were their high
level of technical equipment and the ab ility of the commands and staffs to plan and
support operations, to quickly react to a changing situat ion anci to persistently
strive for the goal set. The knowledge of the Japanese c iphers was also of great
value.
;
~ The U.S. military and political leaders used the atomic b omb against Japan. Em-
' ployment of this w eapon was not due to military necessity; it was a b arbaric act
with reapect to the peaceful population and done for imperialistic purposes. More
' than 100,Q00 peaceful inhabitants perished from the explosions of the two bombs
dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.l At the same time, it became quite evident that
this new means of combat would cause the most profound changes in military affairs
and in the entire system of combat operations on land, at sea and in the air.
I Military operations were conducted against the Japanese Armed Forces in China by
! the troops of the Kuomintang government, and the 8th and the New 4th Armies and
! the guerrillas led by the Chinese Communist Par.~ty.
The Kuomintang command, confident that the allies would handle the Japanese for -
them, did not plan independent ma~or offensive operations, but concentrated its -
- main efforts on preparing for civil war. For this purpose, in zddition to the
existing 11 militar.y re~ions, Chiang Kai-shek created four fronts that included
almost all the divisions trained and armed by the Americans. These troops could
be transferred to any part of China. -
The Chinese command in 1945, just as in previous years, could not organize proper
opposition to the Japanese troops, although they did conduct offensive operations
with only limited forces to safeguard traffic on the Beij ing-Hankou and Hankou-
Guangzhou railroads. The Chinese troops withdrew into the mountains and did not
engage in protracted combat. More aggressively, and even then only under the pres-
sure of their American advisors, they did defend the air bases at (Zhejianie and -
Laohekou).
~ 1 When the victims of radiation sickness and other factors c~ere taken into
account, this figure grew to 447,000 ("History of Dipl omacy," Vol 4, p 720).
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- The two armies and the guerrillas led by ttie Chinese Communist Party were ~;pread
over a huge territ-ory in the rear of the Japanese troops or within the Border
(Special) Region established in 1937. They operated with small forces--regiments
ar brigades, detachments or columns numbering from several thousand to sever.al tetls
of Chousands of fighCers.
They could not conduct major offensive operations. Their efforts were directed
most often to repelling the attacks by Kuomintang, Japanese or puppet troops that
took part in punitive operations, or to expanding the territory of the occupied
region on a small scale.
After 10 August 194~, they were all enlisted simultaneously for attacks on communi-
cations and combat operations to expand territories. About 100,000 of them were
transferred in August-November to Manchuria, to the territory liberated by the
Soviet Armed Forces from the Kwantung Army where they established the Manchurian
revolutionary base with the aid of the Soviet Union.
3. Main Features of the Military Art of the Japanese Army and Navy
The sharp deteriori