JPRS ID: 9671 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

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• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9671
17 April 1981
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
_ p
FOUO No. 717
F~~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
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JPRS L/9671
17 April 1981
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
k'OUO No . 717
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Estimates of Socialist Bloc Countries' Presence in Africa
(L'EXPRESS, 14-20 Mar 81) 1
= coMORO zsLarros
_ President Abdallah Brings Up Mayotte Question
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 Feb 81) 2
~Briefs
National Documentation and Research Center 3
OPF.C Loan 3
Metro Project 3
CONGO
BADEA Loan for Airport Modernization
(M~RCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 13 Mar $1) 4
ETHIOPIA
Official Interviewed on Tripartite Cooperation
(Yilma Tadesse Interview; SUDANOW, Mar 81) 5
- GABON
Briefs
Defamatory Pamphlets 9
GUINEA
Toure's Economic Plans Are Not Materializing
(Sennen Andriamirado; JEUNE' AFRIQiTF, 25 Mar 81) 10
MALI
Briefs
Out-of-Favor Dissident Jailed 14
Dissidents' Candidate 14
- a - [III - NE & A- I.20 FOUO]
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REUNION
Reunion Development Aims, Report on Dijoud Viait
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 20 Feb 81) 15
SENEGAL
West, Moderate Arabs Providing Foreign Aid
(Sylviane Kamara; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 28 Jan 81) 18
_ BADEA Finances Stockraising Development Feasibility Project
~ (MARCHES TRGPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 13 Mar 81) 20
.
Kaolack Electric Power Station
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 13 Mar 81) 22
Briefs
~ Canadian Food Aid 23
Nationa2 Rural Develo~?ment Institute 23
SIERRA LEONE
Briefs
OPEC Loan 24
UPPER VOLTA
Head of State Cited on National Recovery Drive
(Saye Zerbo Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 2-15 Mar 81) 25
New Government's Intentions Remain Unstated
(Ferid Boughedir; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1 Apr 81) 28
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
ESTIMATES OF SOCIALIST BLOC COUNTRIES' PRESENCE IN AFRICA
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 14-20 Mar 81 p 122
[Excerpts] A surprising speech... Fidel Castro speaks behind closed doors on
27 December 1979 to the National Assembly meeting in Havana. In his 5-hour
speech, which will fall into the hands af Western diplomats in Havana a few weeks
later, Castro lists the countries where "our wonderful youth" is operating, or,
in other words, the expedition.ry and technical Cuban corps: "Yemen, I~an, Laos,
Jamaica, Grenada, Guyana, Nicaragua."
For Africa alone, where the first Cuban contingents disembarked in November 1975
following Angolan independence, his figures practically correspond to those
- provided by Western intelligence services.
Most of the Cuban military forces are in Angola (nearly 10,000 soldiers) and in
Ethiopia (from 15,000 to 17,000). To these figures must be added 2,000 to 3,000
civilian technicians in Luanda and 1,000 to 2,000 in Addis Ababa. Next comes
South Yemen, with 5,000 to 6,000 Cuban soldiers. Elsewhere, the presence of
military advisers (MA), civilian technicians (CT) or physicians (P) is men-
tioned. These are the best available estimates: Mozambique: 650 MA, 350 CT.
Tanzania: from 500 to 800 MA, 15 P. Congo: 320 MA, 110 CT. Equatorial Guinea:
210 MA, 20 CT. Guinea: 200 MA, 200 CT. Sierra Leone: from 150 to 200 MA. Sao
Tome and Principe: several hundred MA and CT. Guinea-Bissau: 80 MA, 60 CT.
Zambia: rrom 60 to 80 MA. Libya: 243 CT and some MA. Madagascar: 35 MA and
5 P. Algeria: 74 CT and some MA. Burundi: about 100 CT. Benin: 20 security !
advisers and 17 CT. Cape Verde: 8 P. Mali: 6 CT.
~ Equally active, some S,OUO military and civilian advisers of the GDR's
"Afrikakorps" havz been assigned to highly specialized dtities such as cadre
_ positions in the intelligence and police services in Angola, Ethiopia and
Mozambique, where they are also busy reorganizing the army.
However, the Soviet Union is not only content to operate in Africa through the
Cubans and the East Germans. Thus, 200 Soviet advisers arrived in Bissau follow-
ing the coup d'etat which overthrew Luiz Cabral on 15 November 1980. Before that,
there were only about 100 Soviet technical advisers in Guinea-Bissau. More
recently, Liberia has accepted the presence of 120 new Soviet "diplomats," and
Madagascar has just acquired 3 Sovie~ radar watch systems. In "Red Africa," it
is now commonly said that the "captain is Russian, the sergeant-major Cuban and
_ the sergeant an East German." And this is not only a legend.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 S.A. Groupe Express
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- COMORO ISLANDS
PRESIDENT ABDALLAH BRINGS UP MAXOTTE QUESTION
Paris MA.RCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81 p 441
[Text] President Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane of the Comoro Islands attended the
third Islamic su~nit (see MTM, 6 Feb, p 287) from 25 to 28 January in Taif. He
had prepared a speech for this conference but he, as well as ocher heads of
states in fact, was unable to deliver it due to a lack of time.* In the speech,
he brought up the question of the island of Mayotte, besides more general problems,
such as the Middle-East, Afghanistan, and the Iraqi-Iranian conflict.
"It is a serious problem," he said, "eahich has kept the attention of all countries
- concerned with liberty, justice, and brotherhood. And since France is one of those
countries, I believe that we can hope for a successful outcome to this problem 3n -
the near future despite the delay in negotiati~ns."
"However, my government, sensitive to the full significance of the resolutions of
the United Nations, the African L~iity Organization, and that of the Islamic Con-
ference and the non-aligned movement, remains cvnvinced that the actions of all
these organizations must be increased in order to reestablish the legitimate nation-
al rights of my country, This is why I am asking our organization to show onca
again to~lay its fraternal support for the ~ust, peaceful, but determined fight that
the Comoran people are leading for the integYity of their national territor,y,
* The speeches not givea in Taif will be published in the conference report.
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COMOBA ISLANDS .
BRIEFS
NATIONAL DOCUMENTATION AND RESEARCH CENTER--The national documentation and re-
search center on Comoro (CNDRC), already operational for three years, was
officially in~ugurated on 29 January in Moroni. The Comoran minister of National
Education, Culture, Youth and Sports, Dr Mouhtar Ahmed Charif, noted in his
speech that this center should meet the need for informa.tion and training of all
social and cultural groups and should be considered capable of helping train re-
search workers. It should also be considered a welcoming center for foreign
visitors. Dr Charif also emphasized the efforts of UNESCO, of the Cultural and
Technical Cooperation Agency, and of the National Center for French Scientific
Research, which supplied financial and technical aid in this project. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81 p 441] 9592
OPEC LOAN--Among those developing countries granted loans from the OPEC special
f und totaling 62 million dollars on 10 February, Mauritius received a$2 million
loan with no interest, refundable over 20 years, with a five-year respite of -
debt. This loan was granted for implementation of the Mauritius electrification
plan. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEEN S in French 20 Feb 81
p 441] 9592
METRO PROJECT-The Mauritius Minister for Planning und Development, Mr Ghurburrun,
during his recent visit to Brussels, signed an agreemen t for the study and
implementation of a surface metro ~ransportation network intended to connect the
capital, Port-Louis, with neighboring urban centers. The project is estimated to
- cost approximately two billion Belgian fra~cs. The text of the agreement was
signed with 'Compagnie d'Entreprise~ (CFE) acting in the name of an association
which includes Transurb, Tractionel, and Belgian Overseas Consultants Bureau
(BOCB) for the studies; BN and 'Ateliers de Construction Electrique de Charleroi'
(ACEC) for the rolling stock; and CFE, mentioned above, for the civil engineering. .
The rolling stock is to be a vehicle of three connecting cars on rail, with over-
head contact wire. One must be mindful of the fact that for several years now,
Mauritius has had no railway system for mass transportation. Thus, the pro3ect
is a new attract.ion for the island's inhabitants. [Textj [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81 p 441) 9592
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CONGO
BADEA LOAN FOR AIRPORT MODERNIZATION
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Mar 81 p 684
[Article--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in ital:ics]
[Text] Improvement of Brazzaville Airport: $10 Million BADEA Loan
The administrative council of the /Arab Bank for African Economic Development
(BADEA)/ approved in February the awarding o� a$10 million loan to the Congo
for the financing of improvements to Brazzaville international airport. The
pro~ect thus to be financed at a total cost estimated at $30 million, involves
improving the Brazzaville international airport, more accurately promoting and
modernizing the airport infrastructure with a view to encouraging growth in
the air transport sector.
Built in 1949, the main runway of the Brazzaville airport has been lengthened
three times, in 1950, 1952, and 1961. Since then, the runway has hardly changed
its configuration, but has been able to receive the first-generation ocean-going
jets (/DC-8's and Boeing 707's/); nevertheless, its condition has deteriorated
little by little despite various repair efforts. The airport-improvement pro-
ject consists therefore in strengthening the runway and in modifying it to the
standards for receiving the /Boeing ~47/. Improvements (which were recommended
by the Africa-Indian Ocean Regional Air Navigation meeting in Arusha in November-
December 1979) involve reinforcing and improving the traffic zones of the strip
as well as the access braces in the parking area, by means of an overlay of as-
phalt concrete of 15-cm thickness and a 5-cm layer of tread, the building of
anti-wind strips here and there along the runway, improving the parking area,
installing an appropriate system of luminous devices to permit the airport to
direct the big carriers, and to enlarge the fuel depot.
The work, which is anticipated to begin in August 1981 and to be completed in
a 12-month period, will be carried out under the surveillance and control of the
/National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC)/ and the /Agency for Air Navigation and
Safety in Africa and rtadagascar (ASECNA)/.
In addition to BADEA, financing for the project will come from contributions of
the /African Development Bank (ADB)/, $12.3 million; the /Development Bank of the
Central African States (BDEAC)/, $12.3 million; the /FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund
[Fr]]/, $1.36 million; and the Congolese Government, $5.12 million.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981
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- ETHIOPIA
OFFICIAL INTERVIEWID ON TRIPARTITE COOPERATION
_ Khartoum SUDANOW in English Mar 81 pp 16-18
[Interview with Yilma Tadesse in Khartoum; date not given]
[Text]
T+~ith improved relations with Sudan further ways and means of consolidating
arrd growing relations with the West, relations to the benefit of the two
Et/~iopia has recently made the head- peoples. Given the historic fraternity of
lines, both locally arrd ab~oad. Yet our two peoples and the desir~ on both
many questions remain, among them sides to make our neighbourliners
the status of the con~?tct in Eritrea, the mean~gful, I am optimistic that our
Ethiopian government ~r position on the relations will continue to be streng-
disputed Ogaden tenitory, and the thened.
possrble outc~nme oj tsipartite cbopera-
tion between Ethiopia, Kenya and Pr~sident Nimeiri seems ro be goinq
Sudan. on in his atiempts in negotiate a peace-
Ambassador Y~Tina Tariesse, Ethiopia s fu/ satdernenr in Eritres. ln November,
highest-ronking diplomQt in Sludan, who the EPLf came out wi~ a peac~
has served in Khartoum for six years, propvsa/ offering ~ree altematives -
recently spoke to S~uudcnow about the ~ndependence, lfedereLion, or regional
past, p~�~sent and futwe of our eastem autonomy - tr~ ~e EriLriean peop/e in a
neiRhbour. The interview: supe~yfy~d n~ff~iendum. Whac is your
SUDANOW: How wvu/d you as~ss rhe GovsmmenCs po~iLio~ on tl~isT
pis~nr and futuns re/ations betw~een A: To rep~y to your question, I have no
Sudan and Eth~vpia fol%wing Presi- reaction to the so~alled declaration
denr Nimeiri's visit ro Ettriopie /ast which I'd rather describe as a traas-
NovemberT parent maaauvre,
YI LMA TADESSE: The visit of Presi-
dent. Nimeiri to Ethiopia has, among
other things, led to the sigming of a very a: Does ~a mean ~at you sti// siick ro
important document - a Declaration of the N~he-Poiint Programme concerning
Principles that w~71 govern the conduct ~e nationa/ity prob/ems in Eritr~ea, or
of relations between our two Govern- are you prepared to go m~e UN nesfilu-
ments. I believe that the results achieved t~on of 195~
by the visit, about which we aze very
pleased~ have injected significant A: You will recall that the Re+olutio-
momentum into the process of norma- nary Covemment of Socialist Eihiopia
lisation. Since the visit of Comrade issued in May 1976 a Nine-Point Decla-
Chairman Mengistu to the Sudan last ration to resolve the problem in Eritrea
May and Presdent Nitneiri's visit to and subsequend~+ accepted the
Ethiopia in November, a numbor of initiatives of friendly Governments to
Goveaunental delegations have visited meet with the secessionists to discuss
each other's country to agra upon
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the modalities of reaolvIus tlr~ problem Q: /i /ooks /ike ~udan, Erhiqois arx/
within the framework of our National Kanya ar~ moving rowards c%str co- _
Democratic Revoludon programme. operadon. How wi// it work, 9iren dre
As for your question on our prepared- fact thar the rhree regimes have
lfess to go to the United Nations on the diKeieni poliilce/ outlooks, and ahat
matter, the categotic nply is no. We Sudan and Kenya aie noi in favarr of
believe the IJN has done its job. There is Soviei and Cuben mi/itary pres+~nce in
no reason that would call for an inter- Eayppie?
vention by the iJN - thirty years after
disposing of the question. It had then A: Ethiopia, Kenya and the Sudan are
ascertained, through Commissions reviving a machinery for tnlateral co-
dispatched to the region, the wishes of � opcration which has been in existence
the population in Eritrea as to their aiace che early 1970's. The bad state of
future ~political relationship with relations between Sudan and Etkiopia -
Ethiopia. It was because the iJN was haa impeded the functioning of the
convinced tbat the Eritrean massea machinery for the last few years; but _
wished for their hiatoiic unity with the with confidence now cestored between
test of their brothers in Ethiopia that it uur two countries, the leaders of the
did not dismember the territory. The three statas have agreed t~ the
federal structure wea subsequently d9s- resumFtion of the activities of the
mantled as unworkable and ardHcial by Tripaztite Ministerial Commission, aad
tha da~cision of the then reg{onsl the next meeting shall be convened in
Eritrean Legislative Assembly - the Addia Ababa soon,
members of which were elected in I do not share the view that the
accordance with t~e terms provided for clifferent political oudooks of the three
~ by the UN. States will make cooperation impos-
We are aware that those icnown sible. Don't furget that the three
quarters in our region who failed to countries are neighbours whose peoples
secure the disnemberment of Eritrea, are inextricably bound by such factors
for their own strate~c or religious as geography, h'story and culture. Poli- -
reasons, despite fanning the flames of tical outlooks are evolved in the exercise
war and fratricide through the delivery of sovereignty. I believe the three
of money and arms to the separatists, Govemments respect the right of each
are now talking about a UN involvement other in choosing their respective
in the matter, The Revolutienary friends. Our relations with the Soviet
Govemment will obviously resist such Union or Cuba threaten none of our
attempts and I don't believe even the neighbours.
UN itsalf would n+mish to set the _
dangerous precedent of revising its own Q: Don'r you think that rhis policy of
earlier decisions. It would not be Tripartite arrangements is an a~tempi to
difficult to find examples from among ~voo Eihiopia inio dre Wes[ein camp?
former colonial territories disposed of A: I do not agree with attempts to
by the UN who have later and by them- attribute motives to this exercise,
selves opted to enange their status into a because, as I said, this machinery was
more suitable form of political exis- already in existence before the
tence. Ethiopian Revolution. Any attempt to
link it to this or that objective is not
a: Do you mean thai yov ero noi only speculative but also unproductive,
- willing ro~store the federa/ stsaus of I think.
Eritrea7
A: In 1962 the federal structure in Q; Whai do you think of Sudan's posi-
Eritrea was voted out by the reptesen- iion on Eritrea a[ the Islamic Summir
tatives of the Eritrean people, who were Conference in January?
then elected on the basis of rules set up q; 'I'he position taken by the Sudan at
by the LJN, when it prescribed a federal the Isfamic Conference in Taif relative
formula. There is no reason for us to go to strenuous efforts made by some
back and nvllify the deci~on taken by members to antagonize Ethiopia by
the then Eritrean Assembly in 1962, meddling in her internal affairs was
~
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indeed commendable. The constructive internal affairs. Relations with some
and independent role played by countries continue to be strained
President Nimeiri during the Conferpnce because of the desire of the latter to
is higtily apprECiated by the Ethiopian impose their choice of system on the
Govemment as being principled and Ethiopian people.
consistent with the requirements of our
fratemal relations. We are satisfied at But is is obvious thar the Wesr is
Sudan's withd~awal from a so-call~d w+vnied about Soviet and (.'uban
committee set up by the Conterence on priessnce in Eihiopia ??hy do you think
Eritrea as well as its registration oC irishelpingyou?
A: No one should worry over what you
reservations on the resotutions on call the Soviet and Cuban presence in
Eritrea and the Hom. [ don t believe the Ethiopia. They are there at our request
~ purpose of the Conference is served and, as [ mentioned earlier, because of
, when it operates in flagrant contradic- the kind of relations we have with them.
tion with principles Africa considers 'The Soviet Union and other peace-
supreme.
loving states supported us when our
= n� Western dip/omats say thai ihey have rewlution and territorial integrity was
in jeopardy. Such assistance rendered to
a policy of helping Ethiopia a victim of aggression is legitimate even
economical/y and tryirg to cool down
under Articie 51 of the UN Charter.
the military situarion so tha[ the ps to why the West is helping
Russian inf/uence will decrr.aae. They Ethiopia is a question that must be
say they have tried to conra~. ~uerrilla addressed to the `West' itself. But as to
xtions fro~n neighbouring countries sv Why Ethiopia should be assisted, I
thai the Soviet miliiary presence is not
needed and Et~hiopia can improve rela- would say firstly because Ethiopia is
rions wirh d~e~l~est. /s rhrs rhe way you one of the least developed among the
see Westein policy now, and can it developing countries and, in the context
?~vork? of the prevailing conception of interna-
tional cooperation, such countries merit
A: Some interasti~g points are raised in priority consideration in matters of
_ the question ~ one of the important assistance and the developed countries
ones being the admission uf a fact !o hu~e, at the very least, the moral obliga-
which weve been pointing all along: tion to help us help ourselves. Secondly,
that Western countries have been I personally see nothing wrong with
interfering in our internal affairs by such assistance so long as it does not
pro:noting secession and counter- seek to infringe upon our sovereigr~ty.
revolution. Cooling down guerrilla On the other hand, some Western
activities against us implies its genera- countries do assist other Socialist
tion in the first place! What more reason countries and why should whatever
is needed for a deterioration of relations assistance that comes to Ethiopia from
with the ~Vest? the West be conditional or a subject of
As f'or relations with the Soviet unwarranted speculation? In any ~ase,
Union, ( hasten to point out that they the commitment of the Revolutionary
are not confined to the military sptiere unwa erinnt of Ethiopia to socialism is
alone. Tl~e inilitary assistance received g ~
from tfie Soviet Union for wliich we are There have been reporrs that
grateful, continues to be of cr~tical Ethiopia might consider %oining the
importance to tfie defence of the qrab League if ~he Arab countries stop
country ~nd the revolution. k3ut our ~ppoKing the Ericrean~ ls this true?
, relations with Saviet Union are also
i~ieological, economic, cultural etc. A: As far as ( know, there is no
However, this relationship does nut substance to such reports. in any case,
preciude ail others. We fullow an anti� if the Arab countries refrain from
imperialist ~~on-aligned Foreign policy interfering in the internal affairs of
and as such are prepared to conduct Ethiopia, then certainly our relations
relations with all on the basis uf with these countries would improve.
equality, mutual respect of sovereignty
and non-interference in each other's
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Q: With your recent success against the WSLF in the Ogaden, Ethiopian forces
are now reported camped all along the Somali border. Meanwhile, there have been
reports of bomb explosions i.n Mogadishu, which might be attributed to the Somali -
5alvation Front. Where do you see the military situation going in general, and
what is your position regarding the Somali Salvatioii Front? _
A: The ~thiopian Government has issued a statement rECently denying the allega-
ti~n from Mogadishu that our troops are massed along the border. This is the
_ usual lie from the regime designed not orly to disguise its own continued acts
of provocation a~ainst us but also to divert attention from its own internal
troubles. The bombings in Mogadishu, the riots in Hargeisa, the formation of
what you referred to as the Salvation Front and its activities or the student
= demonstrations in London, Bonn and other capitals against the Embassies of
Somalia are all manifestations of the growing wave of anti-Barre sentiment in
Somalia. As for our recent successes against the so-called 'WSLF', it is not a
success against the 'WSLF'--for 'WSLF' does not exist. I~ is in reali_ty a suc-
cess against the.regular forces of Somalia infiltrated into the Ogaden under a
- supposedly non-incriminating label.
What I feel about the Somali Salvation F'ront is really not that important: its
~ struggles and successes against the regime in Mogadishu are in the first instance
the prime concarn of the masses of Somalia alone.
Q: A Soviet official at the United Nationr.; recently gave a radio interview in
which he said that one of the Eritrean movements is now willing to consider
regional autonomy. I presume this is the ELF. Can you describe your recent
contacts with the ELF, and explain the results of these meetings?
A: First of all, I have not listened to the interview, and I am therefore in no ~
position to comment on its substance. As far as contacts with the so-called ELF
~ are concerned, or whether or not it is willing to consider autonomy, suff~ce it
only for me to reiterate that the Ethiopian Government has made its position
clear on the modalities of resolving this problem and to that end has, as I
indicated earlier, proved itself unafraid to seek the path of peace. Whatever
contacts made earlier turned out to be futile not because of us: rather, the
efforts failed because the secessionists were obdurate in seeking to achieve
from the conference table what they were unable to attain from confrontation on
the battlefiel~i. In any case, we have a clearly enunciated political platform
in our National Democratic Revolution Programme, and I am certain that any group
or individual prepared to accept fully and work toward the realization of the
principles of our Revolution will not be denied the opportunity to do so.
COPYRIGHT: AlI rights reserved, Sudanow 1981
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GABON -
F -
BRIEFS
DEFAMATORY PAMPHLETS--On 16 March President Bongo asked the minister of defense to
reinforce the gendarmerie, police and presidential guard military structures in ~
order to "rapidly" discover "rumor-mongers." On 14 March, the head of state, in .
a speech at the council of ministers, stigmatized "the acts ~f banditry, the circula-
tion of defamatory pamphlets and the propagation of lies" impugning "his honor and
that of his wife and family, as well as of h is government." The authors of these
"falsehoods," no matter who they happen to be, will be brought to court "and should be
punished according to the law," President Bongo declared. Already in 1980, following
a series of incidents among high school students in Libreville, the head of state
had complained about the distribution of defamatory pamphlets against him or his
family. [Excerpt] [Paris MARCEES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
20 Mar 81 p 791]
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~ ~ GUINEA
1
TOURE'S ECONOMIC PLANS ARE IvOT MATERIALIZING
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 25 Mar 81 pp 24-26
[Article by Sennen Andriamirado: "Change at Eye-Dropper Speed"]
[Excerpts] Karamoko Sankou, a Malinke griot [witch doctor cum minstrel] who had _
emigrated to Touba, Senegal, had predicted it: "When a man called Ahmed Sekou will
reign in Malinke country, the sons of my sona ~aill leave with their families. But
their sons will get ready to return the year .Ahmed Sekou will be abandoned by his
totem bird. It will be the last year of his reign."
Against the President
This was about 130 years ago. No direct descendant of old Sankou lives in Guinea
' any longer. But it seems that in mid-February ~.981, the man called Ahmed Sekou Toure
was abandoned by one of his totem birds that flew away. Gossip maintains that the
head of the Guinean state has since ordered that an army helicopter search for it.
Skeptics and Western pseudo-rationalists may well smile, but an African would not dare.
If it is actually untrue that a helicopter is searching the sk3es for the runaway
bird, a degree of concern does exist in the Conakry Pal~ce of the People. All the
marabouts are almost on a war footing.
On 21 February 1981, the Gbessia-Conakry international airport was rocked by the ex-
plosion of a number of mines set along a runway. For the first time, the assassin-
ation attempt was not perpetrated by amateurs. On that day, it was a serious alarm.
Professionals reportedly are members of the mysterious Patriotic Front which was un-
known until last year, to the extent that if Sekou Toure, as usual, suspects the
existence of plots everywhere, he must be asking himself whetner the East Germans--
who are building an extension to the Gbessia airport--did not have their hand in this
spectacular operation. His mistrust is iiable, once again, to stop his slow ~narch
toward the economic take-off that he had decreed exactly 2 years ago. Once again,
businessmen fear that the deterioration of the political climate will affect new
investment projects. ~
Ghost City
Guinea is really in need of a genuine economy. Conakry, the capital, has remained ~
frozen in the condition in which independence found it in 1958. :~t is just more
dilapidated. Each neighborhood has a right to its own power shox~tage. Di~lotnats
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and the dignitaries of the regime resort to their own generators. In cErtain sectors,
water leaks from ancient pipes into the ~aae of little streets that it transforms
into stagnant pools.
- However, Conakry residents are relativ~ly privileged. Elsewhere, electricity has dis-
- appeared. Guinea's second-most important city, Kankan, looks like a ghost town:
candles are the only source of lighting, since generators are out of the question due
to the high price of fuel. The large houses with beautiful balconies that were the
pride of the city stand empty; they used to belong to either businessmen (mostly '
_ Lebanese) or local dignitaries who long ago emigrated or disappeared as fast as real
or imagined plots wer2 uncovered in what used to pass for the country's political
life . ~
Foreigners' Mistrust
~ Since 1978, slowly and gradually, businessmen are exploring the country. Europeans,
Americans or Guineans from the diaspora, tney are taking Guinea's pulse and are evalu-
ating the regime's chances of survival before deciding whether to stay and invest.
Foreign firms are signing agreements that should rebuild the production apparatus.
Thus the Canadian Lauda group is participat3.ng in the SOGIF (Guinean Forestry Industry
Company) which is working in the reforestation of the southeastern region at the
foot of Mount Nimba, and also will establish industrial saw-mills in N'Zerekore.
Negotiations Are Too Slow
_ However, agricultural production in itself is not attracting the interest of foreign
partners. A French businessman back from Guinea admits: "Investors do not demand
special treatment. Like many other African leaders, Sekou Toure is wrong: we can
deal with anyone under any conditions--everything is negotiable--but we do demand
one thing, a stable political climate. Unfortunately, this condition is not met in
Guinea."
Therefore, negotiations are very slow. The take-off coffee production will not
happen soon, a~.d there are only a few isolated projects for pineapple growing.
In every other sector, production has stopped, just like the Romanian tractors left
to rust in each village for lack of spare parts.
Nothing to Sell
Another of Sekou Toure's obsessions has survived: collectivization. The FAPAs
/Agro-Pastoral District Farms/ are no longer productive. Peasants are growing millet
and sorghum, but barely enough to cover their needs. As a result, state stores in
towns and villages have nothing to sell.
The liberalization of trade, decreed after the "women's march" in August 1977, has
still not borne fruit. Lebanese merchants have come back, but a young Guinean woman
living in the Ivory Coast told us: "There can be no trade if there is nothing to
sell or buy. I returned to Conakry and stayed for 3 months. True, the political
atmosphere is more relaxed, but I cannot do business. I prefer to remain here."
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An official from an international organization says: "Do you know Bamako? Well,
_ Bamako is a paradise of opulence compared to Conakry." This says a lot when one
~ is aware of the chronic shortages affecting th~ Malian capital. -
Why such poverty? Because Guinea, which only e~~ports bauxite--whose r~ceipts are
entirely consumed by fuel imports--has no other source of foreign currency .to buy
anything at all. The r_ountry lives on what it produces, and therefore, on very little.
People are living off the "parallel" market, largely supplied by certain Foreign
communities. In �their neighborhood, for instance (nicknamed Little Moscow), Soviet
experts, directly supplied by the USSR, flood Conakry with canned goods, cigarettes ~
and even wine from the Caucasus.
_ Undercover
_ The black market reigns supreme. The state looks the other way because, after all, '
any kind of fore3.gn exchange serves the purpose. In Conakry, the International
Hotel and a state store only accept payment in fore~gn currency, thus effectively
barring any Guinean nationals. ,
No Money
Deep in poverty, Conakry has not been invaded by the,rural emigration; unemployment
is almost unknown. It is also true that famine does not bleed Guinea to death. West
Africa's water tower, this country blessed by the gods produces what it consumes;
even if they do not sell anything, peasants are able to live on what they produce.
The real problem, therefore, is monetary. In rural areas, commerce is non-existent,
for lack of products as much as for lack of buyers. Salaries are very low, but,
according to a Guinean civil servant, "it does not matter, there is nothing to buy
anyway." Without products, without money, Guinea can thus go on for years in such
self-centered fashion, until something else happens, something economists call
"an innovatioiz."
Since 1980, and while waiting for a gradual take-off, Sekou Toure's regime has found
2 safety valves: diamonds and gold. There are some small artisanal gold-digging
projects. In Kerouane in the southeastern region, in the Milo River valley, tradi-
tional gold washers freely exploit a nutnber of deposits and sell nuggets and gold
dust even in the smallest villages. The state does not intervene, only to happy that
_ this activity is re-establishing a degree of monetary circulation, no matter how
- restricted: the more the Guineans will earn, the more they will buy and the more
goods will continue to arrive...
Slowly, economic detente is making its appearance. Small shops are opening in Conakry.
True, they are empey: but they at least shine by their presence. Merchants still
hesitate to fill ttiem, just like businessmen are hesitating to invest. However,
the consensus of the foreigners is unanimous: even though Guineans are extremely
poor, they are extremely dignified.
The 22 November 1970 attempted coup by Portuguese mercenaries reportedly served the
purpose of uniting Guineans behind their intractable leader, enhanced by an aura of
invincibility. But more than 10 years have passed since then. A new generation of
Guineans has grown to adulthood, and they have not gone through a revolution.
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According to Sekou Toure's forecasts, theirs should have been an economic revolution. '
But it is only coming at the speed of an eye-dropper. It may become political:
Sekou Toure's overthrow, or, once again, his v3ctory over an opposition which is
hounding him.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1981
CSO: 4400 ~
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MALI
BRIEFS
OUT-OF-FAVOR DISSIDENT JAILED--Didi Demba has been in a Swiss jail since 11 March
1981. The Malian citizen who wanted to assume power in Bamako with al-Qadhdhafi's
assistance fell into disfavor in Tripoli following his statements about the
Libyan project for the United States of the Sahel. He was jailed in Libya for _
15 months. However, thanks to his disclosures, Swiss authorities were able to
trace him and issued an international arrest warrant, not because of plotti:lg, ~
but on the basis of fraud, for an amount of 80,000 to 90,000 Swiss francs, perpe-
trated between March 1977 and June 1978 during his frequent stays in Switzerland.
At the request of the Tripoli government, Swiss authorities then decided to dispatch
two policemen to Libya to arrest him. Since that time, Didi Demba Medina
- Soumbounou has been waiting in the Lausanne Bois-Mermet prison for his trial
to start. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Apr 81 p 40]
DISSIDENTS' CANDI"DATE--Mahamane Alassane Haidana: this name is unanimously invoked
~ by all Malian dissidents against the regime of Gen Moussa Traore. However, there
is a problem: the f ormer president of the National Assembly (during the Modibo
Keita regime) is seriously ill and has been undergoing treatment in Paris for the
last month. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 Apr 81 p 40]
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REUNION
REUNION DEVELOPMENT AIMS, REPORT ON DIJOUD VISIT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MIDTTERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81 p 448
[Text] During his trip to Reunion from 29 January to 1 February, Mr Paul Dijoud,
state secretary to the minister of the interior in charge of Overseas Departments
and Territor`ies, attended the "Economic Conference of Reunion" organized on
31 January by three departmental and regional assemblies. At the end of the con-
ference, he gave an address summarizing the d~partment's economic and social
situation at the beginning of 1981 and defining the means and ob~ectives for
development.
Three points clearly can be made from a rapid examination of the situation, he
stated initially:
The political and administrative departmentalization is a
complete success.
S~cial departmentalization is nearly completed.
Economic departmentalization is well on its way.
Concerning the f irst goint, the minister emphasized that the departmental con-
stitution, which is 35 years old and has an irreversible character, has given
Reunion a political and administrative framework comparalble in all aspects to that
of a metropolitan department.
On the social level, the state secretary recounted the achievements over the past
years--protection against unemployment, insurance reg~ilations regarding old people,
illness, and maternity, etc.--and confirmed the new decisions concerning old people
and the activity criteria to obtain family allowances. Furthermore, sn effort had
been made regarding schooling (193,000 children attended school in 1980 compared
to only 13,700 in 1970), sanitation, and social needs: a"decisive effort" has been
made to eliminate insanitary dwellings.
The economic departmentalization is based on five fundamental measures: training
men, equipment, outside connections, Europe, and access to the Indian Ocean. These
measures are intended to implement four essential objectives: agricultural develop-
ment, handicrafts and industry, ocean-related activities, and tourism. -
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Measures for Econamic Development
Regarding training men, an overall study of the impact of existing str~sctures
wi11 be started, and new formulas wi11 ~e researched to replace those that do
not fit the present organized actions. Training sessions could be organized in
view of the development of new enterprises. At the same time, exchanges between
the parent state and Reunion will be encouraged and the Bumidom mission reinforced
with the ob~ective of 6,000 to 7,000 mtgrants per year. Reimion will be equipped
with a special antenna so that Bumidom may best carry out its selection mission.
Considerable progress has been made these past years concerning equipment essential
to economic development: an international airport opened in 1977, an ambitious
z~oad transportation policy, and hydroelectric equipment satisfied needs.
Of all the pro3ects, four have pr~ority:
1. Creating a second harbor ~n the bay of Possession, with 480
million francs �inanced by the state and chamber of commerce. '
The contribution of the latter w311 be limited to 240 million
and will benefit from guaranteed loans. The state must unfreeze
80 m~llion as early as 1981.
2. Regarding the telephone, ~IDOM [Overs~as Departments
Investment Fund] will make an e~fort to equip the Hauts in 1981.
3. Regarding resorption of unsanitary dwellings, the goverment
decided this past 19 December to start a program that will last
several years for all DOM jOverseas Depa~tment}. Reunion will
receive in 1981 a sum of Fr 175 million (140 million in 19$0).
_ 4. Protection of inhabitated locations from flooding, with two
priority operations: (1) the Galets river and (2) the Ra.vine
des Patates in Durand. The state will subsidize 60 ~ercent of
these operat~ons.
Regaxding ai.r transportation, new Ai.r Fxance fares have made possible an i.ncrease
i.n exchanges between the parent country and Reunion; however, a satisfactary solu-
tion must be found to encourage natives of Reunion to return to their country.
Regarding maritime transportation, studies are in progress to organize a framework
for competition; however, more restraining formulas will have to be put into effect
if reason does not prevail.
Integration within Europe represents a capital and irreversible achievement. Paul
Dijoud wants to request a special on-site Franco-European mission to inform the
elected and socio-professional classes o~ methods of access to community aid.
But this integration with Europe does not contradict being open within one's
- geographic zone, and Re uiion must establish friendly and cooperative reiations with
its surround~ng neighbors. These relations can be commercial, economic, and
cultural. The minister would even like to propose that a business consultant be
assigned to Saint-Denis.
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= Four Priority Ob~ectives
Agriculture. According to Mr Di~oud, agriculture is the basis for Reunion's
~Conomic development.
Concerning sugar, the modern.ization plan has made it possible in the last 5 years
to clear 13,500 hectares and to replant 17,000 hectares. Production went from
, 226,000 tons in 1975; to 261,000 tons in 1979. The objective for 1983 is to
reach 300,000 tons. The industriaZ reorganization plan will be followed, and
the state will keep its commitments. Propositions to revalue the sugar non-
products, nav.ely for energy purposes, will be carefully studied.
Geranium must remaiii a leading production sector of the department's agricultural
econonry, and a production of 80 tons of "Bourbon" extract must be achieved. A '
modernization plan for the essential oils sector must be drawn up, with an
improv~ement of productivity and diversification of crops.
As far as breeding is con~erned, corrective meas ures carried out in 1978 have
yielded results. Meeting the local needs for beef ti~~r~t from 20 percent to 30
percent in five years. The local production of parc ensures 80 percent of total
consumption. However, development plans must be pursued so that R~eunion does not
nec~d to import 75 percent of the dairy products that it consumes. '
. Still in the agricultural sector, the development plan for the Hauts received ~oans
of Fr 69 million in 1979 and 120 million in 1980. It will be the recipient of 160
tnillion in 1981. SAFER jReal Estate and Rural Development Company] plays an
important part in this program.
Handicrafta and industry. A plan vf development for handicrafts must be drawn up;
800,000 francs will be ~et aside for tfiis operat ion on FIDOM. A position of
"delegate for handicrafts" will be created, as well as a coordination co~nission
for public markets. The intervention of popular banks will be maintained by
Mr Dijoud.
Industrial development is well on its way. However, the system of investment aid
must be fully tested before it is modified. The state secretary's office will cen-
tinue to support the Reunion Bureau of industrial development in its searGh for
investors, and the office is ready to examine a project for an industrial fair. As
for new energies, a program is being studied witfi COMES [Saharan Methane Trading
Company] for solar energy, and with BRGM [Geological and Mineral Prospecting
Office] for geothermics.
Ocean resources. The Reunion maritime zone covers 312,000 sq km. Modernization
- and renovation of the small-scale fi~hing fleet must be pursued, and marketing the
products must be better organized. As for deep sea fishing, an agreement must
soon be reached with Maurice to preserve the rights of Reunion's fishermen. Fur-
thermore, Reunion is the home base for French f ishing within the French southern
and antarctic waters.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
9592
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SENEGAL
,
WEST, MODERATE ARABS PROVIDING FOREIGN AID
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 28 Jan al p:i0 ~
[Article by Sylviane Kamara: "Credits From AJ.1 Directions"]
[Text] (1) Drought, (2) decline in the terms of trade, (3) the oil bill, and
(4) rain clutter:
The familiar theme explaining Senegal's economic situation. Of course the gang
of four struck hard. Who can deny it? But in Senegal, as in China, the four
scapegoats are collecting and taking it for everybody.
Nobudy breathes a word about unsuitable organizational structures, malfeasance,
administrative mistakes, accommodation, errors in understan3ing the country's
problems, inordinate ambition, or the uselessness of certain projects. Yet, a
country as precarious as Senegal needed an especially sound and inflexible admin-
3stration, f ailing which it was obvious that it would quickly find itself on its
knees and even on its back.
Realizing this, in 1980 Leopold Sedar Senghor increased steps in all directions
to find aid, funds, and loans co leave, if not a decent economic balance sheet,
at least the necessary (but insufficient) resources to straighten it out.
A Difficult Situation
For a year, a week did not go by without the country's daily LE SOLEIL announcing
on the first page a new loan or another extension--proof that the country was
still enjoying a certain credibility, but also that the situation was really very,
- very difficult. The biggest chunk was France's allocation of a 21.5 billion CFAF
loan in July (JEUNE AFRIQUE, No 1022). But in the euphoria, people forgot to ex-
plain that the government was to use almost half first to pay several billion it
owed French companies.
Special Loans
As far as Senegalese contractors are concerned, they are still waiting. France
announced an overall assistance of Fr 600 million (30 billion CFAF) for 1980, but -
147 million were used to pay the salaries of 1,400 volunteer workers (their num�-
- bers are going to be reduced). Moreover, Senegal pledged 43 percent of its in- ~
come, compar ed with 25 percent in 1977.
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The French Central Bank for Economic Cooperation (CCCE) granted three loans for
an overall total of 14.55 billion CFAF (Fr 291 billion), and the European Invest-
ment Bank granted a loan of 782 million CFAF, raising the total of its loans to
18 billion CFAF. Kuwait contributed 4.8 billion CFAF and Abu Dhabi 900 million.
International organizations did n~t lag behind. In January 1980, the IMF an-- -
nounced that Senegal could take advantage of 140 percent of its quota in the IMF.
On 30 June, the total of the World Bank's loans and the loans granted by IAD (a
branch of the World Bank) amounted to $296 million.
On 11 December, the European Development Fund released 275 million CFAF for
native handicrafts. On the 12th, the German Federal Republic g~ve 1,000 tons of
rice. The 18th, the CCCE released Fr 120 million (24 billion CFAF: a special
loan "to cope with difficult overall circumstances"). The 26th, Saudi Arabia
lent $50 million (11 billion CFAF) in order to back the recovery pro~ect. The
29th, the United States, which had already promised 2.2 billion CFAF in irriga-
tion pro~ects and contributed 150 million CFAF to communication and research
projects, granted additional assistance in the amount of $7 million (approxi- _
mately 1.6 billion CFAF) to assist Senegal in achieving food self-sufficiency.
~ It Is Not Over
On 13 January 1981, Canada promised food assistance of 1.1 b~llion CP'AF. More
than 100 billion CFAF have fallen into Senegal's coffers in 6 months. And every-
thing leads us to believe that it is not over.
Because the West and the moderate Arab countries seem to be taking pains to save
Senegal at any cost. For strategic and political reasons, is not Senegal one
of the rare, stable, moderate countries in this threatened region?
C()PYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique. GRUPJIA 1981
9064
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SENEGAL
BADEA FINANCES STOCKRAISING DEVELOPMENT FEASIBILITSt' PROJECT
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET tiEDITERRANEENS in French 13 rlar 81 p 671
[Article--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics] -
[Text] The administrative council of the /Arab Bank for African Economic Devel-
opment (BADEA)/ approved in February, in Khartoum, a grant of $46,Q00 to Senegal
to finance a feasibility study for a stockraising improvenent pro~ect. The
_ study is supposed to produce an economic and financial analysis of a proposal for
integrated development of stockraising in the wooded pastoral zone that extends
over some 18,000 square kilometers in the north central part of t~ie country.
The feasib ility study will be carried out with regard for the overall stock-
raising policies set out by the fifth quadrennial economic and social plan and
by the /Association for the Development of Stockraising in the ~looded Pastoral
Zone (SODESP),/ and in conjunction with the general and particular ob~ectives for
exploiting the wooded pastoral region through the combined development of human, _
animal, hydraulic, and plant resources.
The study will also attempt to prescribe a 4-year plan of organization and pro-
tection and to determine the various things required to implement the pro~ect:
logistical infrastructure (buildings and technical installations); hydraulic,
agricultural and technical equipment, and transport as wPll as other production
input~ ~uch as, in particular, organizational and management personnel, veteri-
nary care, bank credit, etc. When one sees the full extent of the harsh blows
inflict,sd on the livestock of Senegal by tihe drought, the fact rhat 2 to 3 percent
~f the Senegalese population subsist off livestock-related activities and the
fact that the agricultural sector contributes some 30 percent of the nation's
income and 65 percent of the currency earnings; when one also knows that the
market for meat is presently suffering a serious imbalance, the supply being un-
able to meet demand, one imagines the importance of the project being attempted.
This ma3or pro~ect aims at developing the Ser~egalese Sahel through integrated
development of human, animal, hydraulic, and fodder-plant resources. This pro-
ject is especially important because it aims at overcoming the problems which in
general handicap stockraising in Africa: non-integration of stockraising with
agriculture; inadequacy of stockraising methods and techniques and veterinary care;
insufficient food resources. BADEA has already given out a loan of $1.6 million
in a stockraising pro~ect in Senegal, a fairly ma~or project since it covers
500,000 head of livestock and extends over 60,000 square kilometers. Three
other actions have been taken by the bank in that country: development of
small irrigation pro~ects (loan of $927,000); improvement of a fishing port
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($7.2 million) and development of chemical industries ($10 million). Senegal
is also one of the African countries where Arab aid tends to be concentrated.
Thds, at the end of 1980 it had benefited from capital on the order o� about $556
million.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981
~ 9516
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SENEGAL
KAOLACK ELECTRIC POWER STATION -
~ Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Mar 81 p 672
[Articl.e--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]
[Text] During his trip to Sine-Saloum (23 February-7 March), President Abdou
Diouf laid the foundation stone for the Kaolack electric power station that will
be bui~t in the Kaolack industrial area.
The general maaager of SENELEC [Senel~alese Electric Energy Distribution Company~,
Mr Issa Diop, reviewed on that occasion the various phases of the project which
was put out for bids in 1977, but which because of new needs of industry and the ~
- population required additional studies.
Kaolack consumed some 6 million kilowatts in 1975, a figure which grew by 12 p~r-
cent between 1975 and 1980. The concern of EDS-SENELAC in building this sta- -
tion is also to decentralize its operation on the whole. Work on this iiew station
will begin n~xt April, and it is expected to go into service in November 19$2.
The first installment will represent an investment of 2,856 million CFA Fr
financed by the /Central Fund fox Economic Cooperation [CCCE]/ through a loan,
the remainder being credit provided by the /Alsthom/ company.
- In addition to the production of electricity for Kaolack's industries and popu-
lace, the station will supply the towns of Diourbel, Fatick, Nioro, Sokone, and
Foundiougne, through an interlock with Gambia. .
Also, President Abdou Diouf announced that a call for bids will soon be issued
on electrification of the old quarters of Kaolack, made possible by 500 million
_ CFA Fr of financing provided by the fWest African Development Bank (BOAD)/.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1981
9516
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SENEGAL
BRIEFS
CANADIAN FOOD AID--Canada will provide emergency food aid consisting of 14,000
tons of corn to Senegal in April, by the terms of an accord signed in Dakar re-
cently. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUR ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Mar 81
p 672] 9516
NATIONAL RURAL DEVELOPMEN~ INSTITUTE--Rural Development: Foundatiun-Stone of a -
National Instirute. The national rural development institute, which should train _
650 engineers between now and 1995, will be of ficially opened in 1982. The
corner-stone of the building was laid on 27 February by the minister for higher
education and scZentific and technical research, Mr D~ibril Sene. This advanced
institute will recruit students who will spend their first year--what is called
the common trunk--in the science department. Three more years of study will be
required of them, in one of the following fields: plant, animal, forest, or
horticultural production, and agro-food indus tries. The number of students ex-
pected, once the institute hits full speed, is about 120 for the preparatory
year, with graduation of 40 engineers per year. The institute should cost about
2 billion CFA Fr. It is financed jointly by the World Bank and the Central Fund
for Economic Cooperation [CCCE] . The Senegalese counterpart is being supplied
by the provision of 50 hectares of land. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Mar 81 p 671] 95 1 6
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- SIERRA LEONE
BRIEFS
OPEC LOAN--The OPEC Special Fund approved loan~ totaling 62 million dollars for
several developing countries on 10 February. Among them, Sierra Leone received a
$7 million loan for its road transportation program. Refundable over a period of -
20 years, this loan was approved with no interest and has a five-year respite of
debt. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81
" p 430] 9592
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- UPPER VOLTA
~
~ -
HEAD OF STATE CITID ON NATIONAL RECOVERY DRIVE
I,D111123 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 2-15 Mar 81 pp 29-30
[Interview with Upper Voltan Head of State Saye Zerbo by Rommert Kruithof: "At
Present Our Main Aim Is To Prevent Mistakes"--date and place not given]
[Text] [Question] Mr President, the Upper Vo~ta population seems to have wel-
comed with relief and hope the change which came about on 25 November last year.
Some measures which were adopted immediately received the population's approval.
What do you intend to do to mainrain this favorable atmosphere? '
Saye Zerbo: This upsurge of patriotic feeling will be sustained and promoted by
our determination to reveal all the facts about the way in which the Third Repub-
lic dignitaries ran public affairs. A special investigation committee has been
set up to do this and, since its formation, it has been working intensively. We
also intend to constantly pursue our policy of social appeasement.
_ [Question] Can you explain what you understand by "recovery" and "national
progress," which were fixed as objectives in the 25 November proclamation?
Saye Zerbo: All in all, recovery is the application of our dear Upper Volta
motto: "Unity, work, justice." As La Palice said, "You only straighten things
that are bent." Mistakes were made in the past, and if it is to be real and far-
reaching the recovery requires national solidarity, the affirmation of authority,
an awakening of professional conscience, the development of patriotic feeling,
social justice and the correct administration of public affairs.
The definition of recovery leads to that of national progress, which combines
all the nation's vital forces.
[Question] So far the curfew has been maintained. Why?
Saye Zerbo: Since 1978 our country has imported, proportionally, ma.ny more
weapons than in previous years. It would be unwise to assume the real destina-
tion of those arms. Thus, to avert the worst, the Military Committee of
Recovery for National Progress [CMRPN] deemed it necessary to establish a curfew,
which is one way of guaranteeing our population law and order, peace and public
security.
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[Question] When do you think things will return to normal?
Saye Zerbo: As regards the return to a civilian government--assuming that is
what you mean--it should be noted that for the time being our main concern is
to prevent the mistakes which twice, in 1970 and 1978, brought men to power who~
on each occasion, led the country to the brink of disaster.
[Question] After the 25 November events Western press reactions were, on the
whole, negative. That press chiefly saw the change as the "death of Upper Voltan
democracy" and the "end of trade uninn freedom." Other, less numerous commenta-
tors admitted that the former government's laxity had encouraged a degree of
ariarchy and, accoxding to them, the president "was sitting on the fence," with
career politicfans on one side and the army on the other. The army has just
seized power again. What political prospects are there?
Saye Zerbo: As snon as the change came about on 25 November some sections of
_ the press did indeed talk of the death of democracy in Upper Vol~a. That is
understandable when you know that the previous -regime had painted a very flatter-
ing picture of what it called "Voltan democracy" to the outside world. But we
Upper Voltans are well acquainted with the true face of the regime under which _
we were living. That regime was one of intrigue, irresponsibility, favoritism
and fruitless discussions.
We want to establish a regime which, while asserting the state's authority,
guarantees collective and individual freedoms while strictly respecting the
_ law and social justice.
Of course we know that, to the West, "democracy" implies elections, a parliament
and so forth. In Upper Volta we have livQd under several regimes claiming to
. follow that type of democracy. We really do not have much reason to be proud of
it, judging from the results we have achieved after 20 years of independence.
With regard to our political prospects it should be noted that, on the domestic
scene, our action will be aimed primarily at establishing national unity. At thP
same time we will give new value to work in a context of social justice. We will
seek and mobilize all the available resources to overcome the water p'roblem and
to attain self-sufficiency in food as soon as possible. The exploitation of our
mineral wealth could effectively contribute to this effort. Some projects have
already been drawn up and studies have demonstrated their profitability. The
difficulties which might arise would stem from the problem of financial resources
(Note: In this connection Col Saye Zerbo hopes that in the framework of clear
cooperation Upper Volta might benefit from Western help for the financial
resources vital to its economic development).
In the overseas sphere Upper Volt~. reaffirms its adhesion to the nonalignment
principle. In addition we will respect all decisions already taken in full
_ sovereignty. We advocate cooperation with all nations wYeich love peace, freedom
and justice, and it is in that framework that we remain attached to the principles
laid down in the charters of the United Nations, the OAU and subregional organi-
zations. We are convinced that solidarity and friendship among nations are not
empty words, and we will work to achieve them.
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[Question] The CMRPN has promised to establish structures "for the installation
of real democracy involving a11 the nation's vital forces." Do you envisage the
drafting of a new constitution?
Saye Zerbo: The CNIEtPN intends that Upper Volta regain its real personality and
its soul, in keeping with its desire. 'Z'he sons of this country must regain their
ancestors' confidence in the future of their land. The CMRPN's priority task is
to gather all the country's energies so that together we might work for a better
life for the national community without losing sight of autonomy and individual
freedoms. It is a"new deal," a gamble which the CMRPN will win with the Upper
Voltan people's help.
The drafting of a new constitution, moreover, does not strike us as appropriate
at the present time. More urgent tasks await us for tackling pressing issues.
As I have already said, our main aim in the short term is to avoid the mistakes
which have twice brought ta power men who have led the country to the brink of
disaster.
[Question] Foreign missions in Ouagadougou seem to have been caught completely
by surprise by the army's return to the forefront of the political scene. The
secret seems to have been well guarded....
Saye Zerbo: The foreign missions in Ouagadougou were surprised by our 25 November
action because the secret was indeed well guarded--and that was, moreover, bound
to be the case. It is generally thought that there can be no change of government
in West Africa without Paris' consent. The Upper Voltan people have always known
what they wanted. In other words, aside from the principles of cooperation and
solidarity among nations, they will never accept intervention from any source in
affairs which come under their sovereignty.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Afrique-Asie.
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~
UPPER VOLTA
N~W GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS REMAIN UNSTATED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 1 April 1981 p 32
[Article by Ferid Boughedir: "Unanswered Questions"]
[Text] The action they have taken since their takeover of the government on
25 November 1980 has buttressed the military's image as "righter of wrongs." Eight
- days after the coup d'etat by the CMRPN (Military Co~nittee of Recovery for National
Progress), elementary teachers began receiving their pay. It has been frozen be-
cause of a 7-week strike (1 October-21 November 1980) that had the support of the
four central trade unions.
Prohibitions
That prolonged strike was one of the indications of the crisis of confidence widely
attributed to the previous administration~s strongman Gerard Kango Ouedraogo, leader
of the UDV-RDA (Upper Voltan Democratic Union-African Democratic Rally), who was
chairman of the national assembly at the time.
Otrer action inc:luded shuttiug dowi. the bars during government employe.: working
hours, wage ceilings for civil servants managing government concerns (salary plus
allowances not to exceed 150,000 CFA francs per month); abolition of "tokens of
attendance," bonuses awarded to administrative board members of government or mixed
companies, and of government vehicles assigned to individuals; a ban, effective
immediately, against any transfer of buildings or property by government agents.
Arms imports and sales have also been outlawed. As a precaution hunting too has
been prohibited and a~unition outlets are going to become a government monopoly.
Ranking members of the former administration are still imprisoned (the expression
. here is "administrative internment") in various of the country's barracks while
investigations of their activities continue.
Tt~ey appear to be reasonably well treated and they are being put up in officer
housing. In late February, for reasons of security, detainees from the center and
the east of the country were moved to the west, to a barracks at Bobo-Dioulasso.
In the meantime the ranks of the prisonexs both here and at the other locations
are being swelled by fresh "suspects," many of whom are chairmen of the board of
- national companies.
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All Upper Volta has its attention riveted on the investigations and the rumors are
flying. Even government employees who are not targeted by the thorough preliminary
investigations find their jobs in jevpardy: the CMRPN has decided to get rid of
the professional bureaucrats *o demonstrate clearly that it is above party concerns.
Open Letter
The only protest (albeit muted) lodged since 25 November has come from the trade
unions that are quite active in Upper Volta (JEUNE AFRIQUE No. 1040). An "open
letter" distributed on the street on 12 February demands a return to freedom of
assembly. Public opinion, however, considered the document premature and did not
approve of it. It was issued by the CSV (Upper Voltan Trade Union Central) office
only.
The CMRPN is enjoying favorable publicity since it has been restoring order. More-
over, it doesn't make sense to irk the military. They have given repeated assur-
ances that press and union freedoms wi 11 be respected. Besides, the unions form
part of those conunissions investigating the III Republic's running of the country.
All the less reason for them to creat e a ruckus.
Wait-And-See Attitude
- On all levels there is a wait-and-see attitude. Strongmen like pro~essor Joseph
Ki-Zerbo and Joseph Ouedraogo, leaders of the former Upper Voltan progressive front,
_ are no longer squaring off. How long a honeymoon will the CMRPN get to fix up the
situation? What's going to become of the poJ.itical parties (all suspended)? Is
the CMRPN contemplating a new party or movement (president Saye Zerbo has mentioned
future "youth organizations")? Exact ly how many weapons have been discovered? Who
own them? What's going to happen to III Republic officials found guilty? The cur-
few was suspended for the FESPACO (Ouagadougou Pan-African Cinema Festival) (JEUNE
AFRIQUE No. 1053). Following that it was restored effective midnight. When will
it be lifted?
All Upper Volta is waiting for answers. It is also waiting for the colonel-presi-
dent's program speech covering the new administration's grand designs. Designs
that are still quite blurred, apart f rom the reform package.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 198 1
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