JPRS ID: 9667 TRANSLATION NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND U.S. POLICY BY V.F. DAVIDOV

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~ JPRS L/9667
16 Aprii 1981
Trc~nslation
NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND U.S. POL~CY
By
V.F. Davidov
FBIS FOREI~N BROADCAST INFORMATION SER!/IC~
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JPRS L/9667
16 April 1981
NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND U,S, POLICY
Moscow NERASPROSTRANEN'CYE YAUERNOGO ORUZHIYA I POLITIKA SSHA in
Russian 1980 pp 2, 3-10, 11-35, 97-132, 157-188, 188-211, 255-272,
273-276, 279
[Excerpts from the book "N~nproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and U.S.
Policy" by V.F. Davidov, Academy of Sciences, Institute of the United
States of America and Canada, Izdatel'stvo "Hauka," 279 pages]
CONTENTS
Original Table of Contents 1
Annotation 2
Introduction 2
Chapter 1. Evolution of the United States' Approach to Nonproliferation
Issues 7
Chapter 5. The Policy and Material Potential of the "Near-Nuclear" Countries
in the Evaluation of American Experts... 2T
Chapter 7. Conflict of Approaches to the Far~ulation of a Long-Term Strategy
in the Nonproliferation Sphere 43
Chapter 8. The Problem of Guarantees of tk~e Security of Nonnuclear States..... 61
Chapter 11. U.S. Policy at the Start of the 1980's: Results and Prospects..... 75
Conclusion 85
Footnotes 87
-a- jTT --WW--FOUO]
[TTT WW - 141 FOUO]
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a , ,Y
Original Table of Contents
Introduction o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o e o��� o� e o o������ o o� e 3
Chapter 1. Evolution of the United Sta~es' Approach to Norpro3.iferatiun
, Issues 11
Chapter 2. American Views on. Role o� Nuclear Power on Nonproliferation ~
Quests.ons 36 �
Chapter 3. Interimperialist rivalry of the United States and the West
Europea~n Countrizs in the Nuclear Business 58
Chapter 4o The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 78
Chapter 5. The Policy and Ma.teri~l Pot~ential of the "Near-Nuclear"
Countries in the Evaluation of American Experts 97
Chapter 6. American Specialists on the Danger of the Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons 132 ,
Chapter 7. Conflict of .4pproaches tc the Formulation of a Long-Term
Strategy in the Nonproliferation Sphere _1.57
Chapter 8. The Problen of Guarantees of the Security of Nonnuclear
States lgg
Chapter 9. Nuclear-free Zones ZZ1
~ Chapter 10. Nuclear Disarmament 233
Chapter 11. U.S. Pulicy at the Start of the 1980's: Results and
Prospects 255
~onclusion 2~g
Index 2~~
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ANNOTATION
~ The book is devoted to a study of a most urgent problem of contempo~ary inXernati~nal
= relations--the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and U.S. policy in this sphere. .
_ The nonograph examines various aspects of the problem--the evolution of Washington's
approach to nonproliferation, the attitude toward the corresponding treaty, the im-
perialist rivalry of the United States and the West European countries and relations
with the developing states on nuclear power issues. The book analyzes the contra-
dictory nature of U.S. palicy in the nonproliferation sphere and in the approach to
the USSR's proposals aimed at strengthening the practice of the nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons.
INTRODUCTION
_i _ .
The relevaa~e_ of the problem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is not
in doubt. It is occasioned by the urgency of the struggle against the threat of
nuclear war. L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, em-
phasized in the CPSU Central Com~ittee Report to the 25th party congress: "...the
adoption of further effective measures ~o prevent the spread of nuclear weapons on
our planet remains a most important problem. Tl:e USSR is ready to cooperate in its
~solution with other states."1
In the Soviet Union's foreign policy activity the problem of nonproliferation in-
variably occupies a central place among questions of nuclear disarmamenr and the
strengthening of international security. The USSR was an initiator of the conclu-
sion of the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which at the present time has
been signed and ratified by more than 100 countries. .
The importance of the conclusion of the treaty and the need to strengthen it have
been confirmed rzpeatedly. The Soviet-British joint declaration on the nonprolifer-
ation of nuclear weapons issued at the time of the British prime minister's visit
_ 2
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to the Soviet Union in February 1974 em~hasized the task of "as large a number af
~ states as posstble subscribing to the treaty."2 Nonproliferat ion issues were dis-
~ cusaed at top-l~vel Soviec-French talks in 1977 and 1979. The adopted Program of
the Further Development of Cc+operation Between the Soviet Union 3nd France in ~'aVOr
of Detente and Peace said that, guided by an endeavor to avoid an increa~e in the -
nuclear threat, the ~ountries recognize the urgent "need for further efforts to
prevent the proliferation of nucl~ar weapons.i3
At the time of the signing of the SALT II Treaty Between the USSR and the United
States in Jime 1979 the problem of nonproliferation was caref u11y examined by the
delegations of the two countries. The Soviet-American communique, which was signed
by the head~ of government, observed that the USSR and the L)ni ted States "advocate
a further strengthening of the practice of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons."4 ~
Nonproliferation issues have been and are being examined on th e USSR's initiative
not only at the level of bilateral contacts but also in a number of international
organizations, primarily the iJnited Nations.
Paramount significance is attached to this problem in the Soviet proposals "Practical
Ways To Halt the Arms Race," which were submitted in 1978 for examination by the -
UN General Assembly Special Disarma~ent Session. At the UN General Assembly 33d
Session the USSR presented the initiative of the conc'lusion of an international
convention on strengthening security guarantees of nonnuclear states and on agreement
being reached on the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states
where they do not currently exist. These proposals will be at the center of the
attention of the second conference of countries party to the Nonproliferation Treaty
planned for 1980. The USSR's course toward disarmament--the limitation and gradual
reduction of existing arsenals of nuclear weapons, right down to their total liqui-
dation--is geared to the creation of a political climate in in ternational relations
which wou~d facilitate the solution of the problem of prevent ing the spread of these
weapons.
The importance of this problem from the viewpoint of the stren gthening of inter~a- ~
_ tional security is perfectly understandable. Indeed, if in the process of the crea-
tion and stockpiling, of nuclear weapons states which do not currently possess them
_ were to be involved, the threat of nuclear war would increase immeasurably. It is
not difficult to imagine to what the development of events could lead if there were
to be nuclear weapons also in the arsenals of the parties to a conflict. An increase
in the number of nuclear states could also make extraordinarily more complicated
questions of nuclear disarmamen.t, which are in all their acuteness part of the agenda _
of the foreign policy activity of the majority of countries in the 1980's. All this -
dictates the vitally important need for the creation of approp~riate infiernational
conditions which would re].iably avert the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Processes appreci.ably complicating and thereby imparting even greater urgency to
this problem were further developed in the 1970's. The number of countries material-
ly capab~e of creating nuclear weapons continues to increase in line with the unfold-
ing of the scientific-technical revolution and the broadening of interstate coopera-
tion, in the sphere of nuclear technolo~y included. In the es timation of the Stock-
holm Internationai Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 1975 there were 15 such
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"near-nuclear" or "threshold" states, but at the start of the 1980's their number ~
may have exceeded 20. American specialists believe that by the year 2000 the num-
ber of states with the technical potential for the development and creation of nu- '
~ clear weapons could have risen to 40.
The 1970's were a period of the intensive development of nuclear power engineering.
The growing need for energy, the increased prices fur conventional types af fuel
and the creation of highly economic and safe types of nuclear power reactors condi-
- tion the attractiveness and economic advantages of the further development of nuclear
power stations. However, a bqproduct--plutonium (a fissionable material which, with
the appropriate reprocessing, is suitable for the creation of nuclear weapons)--is
separated off in the process of the operation of conventional nuclear power instal-
lations. Even now many countries are obtaining from the nuclear power stations
plutonium in quantities sufficient for the production of their own atomic bo~bs.
In the estimation of experts, by 1990 a quantity of plutonium will have been obtained -
, in the developing countries alone sufficient for the manufacture of 3,000 3tomic
bombs annually, each with a yield equal to that of the bomb dropped on Hiros~hima.
How, then, to advance along the path of the development of nuclear power engineering
and at the same time reduce the risk of its use for military purposes? This question
has acquired political importance at the current stage.
In the situation of an increase in countries` technical ca~abilities in the nuclear `
sphere the hypothetical probability of the extension of the "nuclear club" could be-
come a reality in the very near future. How many nuclear states are there in the
modern worl.d? It is quite difficult to answer this question accurately. Formally -
there were five nuclear states at the time of the signing of Nonproliferation.Tre.~ty�
--the United States, the USSR, Britain, France and the PRC. In 1974~"India exploded
a nuclear device, categor..izing it as an explosion for peaceful purpeses. In '.97$
then Prime Minister M. Desai solemnly declared at the UN General Assembly Special
Disarmament Session that India would not produce or acquire nuclear weapons, even
if other countries embarked on this path. In 1973, at the time of the Near East
- conflict, Israel, in the opinion of American experts, was close to using the nuclear ~
weapons at its disposal in military operat~ons. In 1977 South Africa was on the
point of testing nuclear weapons, which waa foiled following intensive diplomatic
efforts by the USSR, the United States, Britain and France. A whole number of -
"threshold" countries which do not yet subscribe to the Nonproliferation Treaty
such a~ Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan and others are also very close to actual pos-
~ session of nuclear weapons. Thus there are signs of an increase in the number of
- potential nuclear states, which at times da not even conceal their intentions on
this score.
At tne same time in the new historical situation, wher~ the relaxation of interna-
tional tension is becoming a factor of the consolidation of international security,
real conditions exist for a lessening of the nuclear threat and the danger cf the
further pro?iferation of nuclear weapons. The realization of these possibilities
and success in closing up channels for the ~roliferation of'nuclear weapons which x_r,,,,,,,,.~....
exist and which could emerge in the future will depend to a considerahl~ c~'Cent on
the policy of the Western powers, primarily the United States.
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The United 3tates was the world's first country to create and use atomic weapons.
The policy of confrontation with the socialist world in the cold war period led to
' a nuclear arms race in the United States itself and among its allies--Britain and
France. The from a"position-of-strength" policy and the aggressive preparations of
the Western countries were accoinpanied by extensive use of the nuclear threat. 7'he
- USSR was forced to find a suitable means of neutralizing it--creating its own nuclear
weapons. However, as the United States' original strategic superiority disappeared
and relations between the United States and the USSR in the military sphere came to
be characterized by strategic parity, American ruling circles began to recognize
the need to reduce the danger of nuclear war. Simultaneously the possibility of an
increase in the number of nuclear powers, which emerged back in the 1960's, came to
be regarded as a factor destabilizing the strategic relations of the United States
and the USSR and increasing the threat of nuclear war. As a result in the mid- '
1960's the United States attempted to pursue a more active policy to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons. While far from consistent, this policy nevertheless played
a definite part in the formulation of the principles of the practice of nonprolifer-
ation--the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
In the mid-1979's, when the threat of proliferation had thrown the latest challenge
at international security, the United States was forced to pay greater attention to
this problem. The administration of President J. Carter declared the nonprolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons a priority task of the United States. At the current stage
U.S. policy in the nonproliferation sphere is evolving in an acute struggle among
the ruling circles over questions connected with nuclear weapons and with the relax-
ation of tension between East and West. The continuing threat of the spread of
nuclear weapons is prompting an intensive quest by American scholars and politicians
_ both for ways of refining nonproliferation practice and for new conceptual approaches
to this problem. Where does the specific danger of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.lie, is there a solution to the proliferation problem at all, what practical
steps should the United States take to reduce to nil the risk of the use of nuclear
- power for military purposes and to reduce the significance which is still attached
to nuclear weapons in internatianal relations as a whole and to their military policy
in particiilar, what significance is attached to a relaxation of tension and disarma-
ment for reducing the danger of an increase in the number of nuclear states? These
and a number of other attendant questions are at the center of the attention of the
_ debate in the United States surrounding nonproliferation probl.ems. It obviously
cannot fai"1 to have an impact on Washington's foreign policy in this sphere.
The main purpose of this book is to determiae the significance attached to the prob-
lem of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons in the system of the United States'
, foreign policy priorities and to reveal its impact on the evolution of American -
foreign policy. At the same time the study is devoted to a purely concrete and
practical task--an analysis of current U.S. policy in the sphere pf the nonproli-
feration of nuclear weapons. Without belittling the significance of the investi-
gation of international subject matter in the historical retrospective, it would
appear advisable to concentrate the main attention on how the United States views
thi~~ pY~oblem, what practical recom~endations exist in Americ~n political thought
for its solution and haw they are influencing Washington's concrete political course.
The success of the struggle against the spread of nuclear weapons will depend on
how constructively the cooperation of countries of the world proceeds in this sphere
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and on how far the solution of questions o~ political and military detente progres-
ses. For this reason one of the book's tasks is an analysis of the United States'
approach to relations with its principal allies--the West European countries and
J~pan--the developing countries and also with the Soviet Union.
An objective reality ~f the modern world is that the United States and the USSR, as
the two strongest nuclear powers, bear the main responsibility for av~rting the
threat of nuclear war. It is perfectly understandable that the relaxation of ten-
sion and the positive evolution of Soviet-American relations could facilitate the
accomplishment of this mission. The creation of an ir_ternational climate which
would contribute to the solution oF nonproliferation issues will depend to a cor.-
siderable extent on Soviet-American relations. An analysis of American approaches
to the USSR's initiatives in the field of nuclear disarmament, the limitation of and
reduction in nuclear arsenals and the complete and general banning of tests and limit-
ation of the geography of the deployment of nuclear weapons and the nonuse of force
as a whole and nuclear weapons in particular in international relations appear to be
of importance in this connection. An analysis of the sources of the obstacles which -
the present administration is placing or could place in the way of a solution of '
these problems also appears to be of no less importance.
Of course, the book examines these questions only to the extent that they ar_e di-
rectly related to the tasks of the struggle against the threat of the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. However, there is no doubt that this threat is prompting the
need for essential amendments to be made to U.S. military policy and a reeva~luation
of the significance of nuclear weaporis in ~ts forei~gn policy._ Such a reexamination
could lead to an extension of the sphere of interaction of the United States and the
USSR in various questiions of the strengthening of international security, including
a halt to the nuclear arms race. Revelation of spheres of possible interaction of
the USSR and the United States with respect to the nonproliferation problem and an
analysis of the factors which, under certain circtunstances, could have a positive
impact on their relations and curb the negative consequences af the influence of
reactionary forces on Washington's policy on this issue are an organic component
of this study. The success of the policy of the relaxation of tension will depend
to a considerable extent on how far Soviet-American relations develop. In any event,
despite all the toughness which the present administration~is attempting to demon-
strate, the USSR's position with respect to questions of nonproliferation, disarma.-
ment and detEnte remains the basis for dialog.
L.I. Brezhnev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, emphasized once again
in his speech to the electorate on 22 February 1980 the Soviet Union's adherence to
a policy of detente and disarmament: "We counterpose to the 'doctrine' of war hy-
steria and a feverish arms race the doctrine of consistent struggle for peace and
security in this world. We are faithful to the Peace Program put forward by the
24th and 25th congresses of our party. For this reason now, in the 1980's, as be-
fore, in the 1970's, we advocate the strengthening and not the destruction of detente.
A reduction in and not a swelling of armaments. And rapprochement and mutual under-
standing between peoples and not artificial e.strangement and hostility."5
U.S. policy in the sphere of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons at the current
stage is as yet insufficiently studied in Soviet literature. This is explained by
th~ fact that this problem has acquired extraordinary urgency for the United States
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in the most recent years. At the same time, in attempting to investigate American
policy in this sphere the author has relied on the availabiiity in Soviet science oz
works which have analyzed both general and concrete questions of the foreign policv
- of Che United States and its approach to various problems of nuclear disarmament and
also monographs which illustrate international relations as a whole and the U5SR.'s
foreign policy.6
The book was written on the basis of the use of a broad range of American and West
European sources and literature-government documents, congressional hearings, the
speeches of politici3us- and scientists, monographs and articles p ublished in foreign
periodicals. The material studied has to do mainly with the latter half of the
1970's.
Chapter 1. Evolution of the United States' Approach to Nonproliferation Issues
The threatening conseqi~ences of nuclear weapons have .l~:ig been discussed at all
_ levels of American society--in government and public organizations and by profes-
sional diplomats, politicians, businessmen, scientists and religious figures. Hear-
ings are held in the U.S. Congress devoted, in the c~ngressmen's estimation, to the
most acute problem that has been encountered by the American nation and all mankind.
The mass information organs, from popular through narrowly specialized publications,
comprehensively illustrate this questi.on. The leading scientific research centers
engaged in the elaboration of the long-term foreign policy prospects are uniting
their efforts in a quest far its solution. Stressing the urgency of the problem,
- the editorial office of the a;:~horitative BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS journal has
symbolically moved the hands of a clock on the cover closer to Doomsday--nuclear
catastrophe.
Alongside questions of relations with West Eurog~ and Japan and the developing coun-
tries and the West's relations with the East and nuclear arms control problems in
the system of foreign policy priorities officially proclaimed by the J. Carter ad-
ministration there also stands the task of preventing th~ spread of nuclear weapons
worldwide. Judging by how contemporary American society as a whole has a hostile
attitude toward a further increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear wea-
pons and by the significance which is attached to this question, the impression could
be formed that nonproliferation policy has always been at the cen ter of Washington's
attention and that we largely have to thank for this the consistent aspirations of all
postwar .administrations to this goal. This conclusion, incidentally, may also be en-
countered frequently in the works of American scholars such as J. McBride and G.
Quester, for example, which claim that Washington has always opposed proliferation.
An Arms Control and Disarmament Agency report stressed right out: "The policy of
any U.S. administration since the end of WWII has been to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons."~
However, this conclusion is in serious contradiction with the actual state of af-
fairs and glosses over the indisputable fact that the United States' postwar policy
was largely the cause of the spread of nuclear weapons, contributing to the emergence
- of the difficulties with which the United States has been confronted at the current
stage. An examina~ion of the evolution of the United States' approach to the non-
proliferation problem inevita~ly leads to this conclusion.
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In the historical retrospective the veryidea o� aonproliferation was born simultane-
ously with the creation of the atomic bomb in the United States. The possibility
vf the use of atomic energy for military purposes by other cotmtries was obvious to
the ruling circles of the leading Western countries right from the outset. Back iri
November 1945 the heads of the three countries which had actively collaborated with--
in the framework of the Manhattan Pro~ect--the United States, Britain and Canada--
emphasized in a joint declaration: "The production of atomic energy for militaty pur-
poses is based to a considerable extent on the same methods and transforming proces-
ses inherent in the use of atomic energy in industrial interests."g How to guarantee
that atomic energy would not be used~for militarq purposes? This question was dis-
cussed at the first UN sessions. In accordance with a proposal of the USSR, the
United States and Britain, a resolution was adopted at the General Assembly First
Session in January 1946 on the establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission, which
consisted of the representatives of all 11 Security Cotmcil members and the repre-
sentative of Canada.
At this time the solution of nonproliferation problems largely depended primarily
on the United States inasmuch as precisely it had a monopoly of atomic weapons.
- However, the prescription drawn up by Washington failed to correspond to the
correct diagnosis since it was prescribed for other countries, leaving the pr.ivileged
position of the United States inviolate. American ruling circles did not take ac-
count of the fact that the policy of a monopoly in atomic armaments could undermine
~ a system of ineasures geared to the use of the atom for peaceful purposes on1y. The
short-term political advantages derived from Washington's atomic status prevented it
from evaluating correctly both the genesis of the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and its long-term negative consequences for American interests. As a result the
fate of the America.i initiatives which Washington presented in 1946 in the nonpro-
liferation sphere also proved predetermined,
The terms of the United States' participation in international cooperation in the
- use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes were set out in the Acheson-Lilienthal
report, which was prepared by a special consultative commi.ttee under the auspices of
Secre.Gary of State .I. Byrnes.. The principal propositions of the report also consti- _
tuted the basis of the so-called "Baruch Plan," which was submitted on 16 March 1946
for examination by the UN Atomic Energy Commission.
The "Baruch Plan" proposed the creation of an international body for the development ~
of atomic energy formally within the UN framework, but actually subordinated neither _
to the General Assembly nor the Security Council. This suprastate organization was
to have taken charge of the fuel-producing reactors ar.d plants. It was assumed that
mines and nuclear materials would have to be transferred to its ownership and that _
it would be given exclusive righ ts in all spheres of the use of`atomic energy. Es- ,
sentially the planned organization was a world industrial monopoly determining its
- own laws and rules for atomic power engineering in all countries.
Rf~alization of the plan envisaged the establishmen t of certain stages of control of
atomic energy. Whereas the uran~um mines were controlled at the first stage, only
at the final stage was control of the production of atomic weapons proposed. The
time of the transition from one stage to another was not clearly defined, although
thP stages had been calculated s uch as to observe American interests. The
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Acheson-Lilienthal report pointed out that "during the transitional period all the
atomic enterprises will, as before, be at the disposal of the United States...so
that in the event of any failure in implementation of ~h~ plan dur.ing the transitional
period the ~IJnited States would retain the predominant position in respect of aComic
weapons."9 Formally the plan proposed that at its final stage, following the estab-
lishment of an effective system of international contr~l, the United States was to
have transferred to the disposal of the international body the existing atomic bombs ~
and the plants for their production in operation~ However, to judge by the state-
ments of represent3tives of the administration at that time, Washington intended -
deciding this question unilaterally "in tha light of all the factors of the interna-
tional situation" and proceeding from U.S. security considerations. _
At the same time as discussion of this proposai was under way in the United Nations
American ruling circ].es did not consider themselves bound in respect of the stock-
piling and refinement of the arsenal of atomic weapons. D. Acheson, who replaced
J. Byrnes as U.S, secretary of state, emphasized that "the plan does not require that
the United States cease the production of weapons either in connection with the put-
ting forward of the plan or with the start of the activity uf the international
body."1~ Such an interpretation of a plan ainied at establishing international con- �
_ trol over atomic energy testified that the U.S. initiative was geared to preserving
the monopoly of atomic weapons and at the same time preventing other countries from
having at their disposal what the United States had. This became particularly appa-
- rent after the Soviet Union had submitted for examination by the UN Atomic Energy
Commission on 19 June 1946 the draft international convention "Banning the Production
and Employment of Weapons Based on the Use of Atomic Energy for the Purpose of Mass
Destruction." Th~a draft convention proposed the nonemployment of atomic weapons
unner any circumst3nces, the banning of their production and storage and the destruc-
tio n of all stockp~~les of finished and incomplete atomic weapon products. At that
" time precisely su-~h an approach could have effectively solved the question of the
future of atomi_c weapons, putting them beyond the framework of international law,
which would have led to their proliferation having been halted in embryo. HowEVer,
this praposal proved unacceptable to the United States since the latter believed
that it would be deprived of the advantages ensuing from the monopoly possessicn of
atomic weapons.
The negative reaction to the USSR's proposal was a logical consequence of the U`nited
States' approach which had taken shape at that time to the use of atomic weapons as
the ma~in diplomatic instrumPnt in relations with other countries and as the main f
component of the from a"position-of�-strength" policy. In this context the "Baruch
Plan" concerning thefuture control of atomic energy appeared no more than a dip-
lomatic screen concealing the true intentions of American ruling circles and the cal-
culations of achieving a postwar peace settlement on their terms with the help of the
atomic bomb.
~ Contemporary American historians studying this period--H. Alperovitz, H. Feis, D.
Horowitz and others--are increasingly often reaching the conclusion that the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki opened the way for U.So ruling circles to the use
of atomic diplomacy and that the use of the bomb was not so much a military act of
WW II as a de~iberate act of the cold war against the USSR which the United States was
about to conduct and win, using the atom bomb, in i. Byrnes' words, as a"big stick"
in relations with opponents of its policy.ll The U.S. position at the Potsdam Con-
ference and at sessions of UN bodies testified that implementation of this policy had
begtm.
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On 9 August 1945, in aii address to the American people, President H. Truman stressed
_ the United States' endeavor to maintain the monopoly of the new weapons: "The atom
bomb is too dangerous for it ta be made use of by anyone who wishes.... We must be
the custodians of this new weapon."12 The classificativn of the production of
atomic weapons technology as top secret was accompanied by government circulars on
the need to continue tests for the purpose of their refinement and stockpiling. The
next experimental atomic bomb was exploded, on Bikini Atoll on 1 July 1946 in the
atmosphere of a wide-ranging propaganda campaign aimed at intimidating other states
with the power of the new weapon.
The American approach to nonproliferation, which amounted on the one hand to preserv-
ing atomic weapons on a legimitate basis as an effective military and political means
- in its arsenal and, on the ot1_?e~, to prohibiting their acquisition by the countries
of the world, whether allies or adversaries, was based on an evaluation of the ad-
. vantage of their possession in international relations and at the same titne on cal-
- culations that t;~e United States would be afforded a considerable length of time for
political use of the advantages of the monopoly before other states would be cap-
able of their independent production. Precisely this latter consideration was fre-
_ quently pointed out by Gen L. Groves, leader of the Manhattan Project, who believed
that the technological gap be~ween the l3nited States and other countrie~ would require
- of the latter considerable effort and time before they could catch Llp with the United
States. Despite the existence of opposing viewpoints among American scientists, a
commission chaired by Secretary of War H. Stimson concluded in 1945 that it would -
t~ke the Soviet Union roughly 10 years to create an atom bomb.13 The underesrima-
tion of other countries' possibilities cond~ined with an unconcealed endeavor to main-
tain the monopoly of atomic weapons predetermined Washington's policy in the cold
war period in the nonpraliferation sphere, which was identical to a policy of main-
taining American atomic monopoly at any price.
What was transparently implied in the "Baruch Plan" was clearly set forth in the law
on atomic energy, known as the McMahon Act, which was adopted in July 1946. The new
law provided for the transfer of po~uers in the development of atomic energy in the
L'ni*_~d States to a commission of the sa.me name (Atomic Energy Commission), established
government ownership of all stocks of fissionable material and nuclear equip~aent on
- American territory and dropped a"veil of secrecy" over the u~se of atomic energy for
military and peaceful purposes. It required that the administration cease coopera-
- tion in the nuclear sphere with all other cuuntries, including the allies--Britain
and Canada--~~ho had participated in conjunction with the United States in the de-
velopment of atomic weapons ciuring WWII. Congress gave the "green light" to U.S.
- policy aimed at monopolizing the nuclear arms race and its use as a basic political
means in the international arena.
The McMahon Act drew a demarcation line for the future between the United States and ~
, the nonnuclear countries in questions of atomic energy which the "3aruch Plan," ac-
cording to the official assertions of American representatives in the United Nations,
was, on the countrary, to have eliminated.
Could the "Raruch Plan" have been acceptable to the countries of the world given
th-Ls approach to nonproliferation questions? U.S. President D. Eisenhower declared
in 1960: "In 1946 we had an opportunity of insuring the use of atc~ic energy ex-
cl.~isively for peaceful purposes. This opportunity was let slip when the ~oviet
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Union turned down an all-embracing plan of lacing atomic energy under international
control put forward L~y t~he United States."1~ Since that time many American experts
- in the field of nonproliferation problems have been unablE ta dispense in their works
_ witli a mention of the fact that if the USSR had acc~pted the "Baruch Plan," the prob-
1em would have been solved and the situation in the sphere of the nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons would be differer~t. However, recently a number of specialists
and historians in the United StatES has reached the conclusion that the plan was
"doomed to fail" in advance primarily because Washington "did not intend to link the
' problem of control of the use of atomic energy for peaceful gurposes w~ith the prob-
lem of nuclear disarmament," preferringto retain for itself unilateral advantages in
the military sphere. W. Bader, former counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, emphasizes in this connection: "As long as the United States maintained a
_ monopoly of atomic weapons and intended to use them in this circumstance or ~he
other, the Soviet Union had no real choice other than to reject the proposal, which
coul:~ have impeded its efforts to create an atomic counterweight to America's exist-
i^g advantage."~5
The United States' policy of the monopoly ownership of atomic weapons was not only
obvious and unacceptable to the USSR; although it had supported the "Baruch Plan" at
the official level in the United Nations, Britain, Ameriea's closest cold war ally,
embarked on the independent creation of atomic weapons in January 1946. Following _
tne brea~ing off of Anglo-American cooperation in this field as a result of pas- ~
sage of che McMahon Act, according to the well-known historian M. Gowing, London
stepped up work in this direction. British ruling circles were unwilling to re-
concile themse].ves to an American monopoly and did not trust Washington. Defending
the decision to create an atomic bomb, then Prime Minister C. Attlee, a Laborite,
emphasized: "We must maintain our position vis-a-vis the Americans. We cannot allow -
ourselves to be completely in their hands, the less so in that their position is
not always clear."16 Similar considerations were also characteristic of France's
rulin g circles, who at that time had only just begun preparatory work on implementa-
tion of an atomic program.
The natural consequence of the United States' approach to the nonproliferation of
nuclear ~caeapons set out in the "Baruch Plan" was the deadlock which came about in its
discussion in the United Nations and the disbandment of the Atomic Energy Commission
in 1948. The buildup of nuclear potential and the use of atomic diplomacy by the
United States were the ma.in reasons for the further spread of atomic weapons in the
1940's and 1950's. The Soviet Union tested an atomic weapon in 1949, putting an end
to th2 United States' monopoly, and Britain joined the ranks of the "atomic club"
in 1952. The first round of struggle against the proliieration of nuclear weapons -
connected with the "Baruch Plan" ended in total failure because U.S, policy in the
sphere of nonproliferation amounted to perpetuation of the discrimination against
other countries by way of the preservation of its monopoly of superweapons and their
use for diplomatic purposes in relations both with adv~rsaries and with allies.
Strictly speaking, the term "nonproliferation " is hardly apt for a description of -
U.S. policy inasmuch as it amounted in practice to the stockpiling and refinement
of its own nuclear potential, that is, to its further proliferation to the detriment
and at the expense of the interests of other countries.
U.S. ruling circles evaluated the USSR's 1949 atomic test as an end to their mono-
poly of the ownership of superweapons and removed the nonproliferation problem f~om
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the agenda for a certain time. The news that its ally, Britain, was preparing to
rest an atomic ~aeapon independently was even received with satisfaction in Washing-
ton for at the height of the cold war this was regarded as a contribution to the
military efforts of the Western coim tries. Obsession with the id~a of "cuntaining
communism" prompted the United States' endQavor to make %ffective use of atomiC
superiority and to continue its buildup and refinement. 'I'he race in atomic weapons
led to the creation of even more powerful weapons--thzrmonuclear. The L'nited States'
atomic potential overstrode national boundaries and settled on the territory of other
countries, on military bases girding the socialist co~itries. It was in precisely
this period that various military-strategic doctrines of its use, primarily the
"massive retaliation" doctrine, were in full bloom. At the peak of the cold war _
a policy of nonproliferation was inconceivable in the context of Washington's stra-
tegic preparations and the policy of confrontation with the socialist countries,
In the f:tr~t half of the 1950's the loomtng threat of atonic war and the Soviet
Union's repeated attempts to attract the people's attention to this problem elicited
the unprecedented sweep of the movement of public forces of co~ntries of the world
fo r a halt to the nuclear arms race. In this situation Washington was compelled
in order to neutralize the argument s of the supporters of disarmament to present an
initiative aimed at channeling the development of atomic energy into peaceful pur-
poses .
In 1953 President D. Eisenhower put forward a proposal for other countries' extensive
use of the peaceful atom. The "A'tioms for Peace" pro~gram had been tnought up to cre-
ate the illusion of a reduction in the use of atomic energy for military purposes. `
The p~o gram's main postulate--the more the atom is used for peaceful purposes, the
less it will be used for military purposes�~--had, as subsequent events showed, no
re lation to nuclear disarmament. As the American professor R. Barnett r.ightly ob-
served, "the 'Atoms for Peace' plan was not a disarmament plan."17 However, the
underlying political motives of the program--an endeavor to lessen opposition to the
Ur~ited States' nuclear arms race--contrib uted to the development of secondary pheno-
mena--the extensive proliferation of nuclear technology and the corresponding in-
fo r.mation, which in ttle future could have been used for military purposes.
Ol~her factors also had an impact on the formation of the United States' approach to
in ternational cooperation in the sphere of atomic energy. First, the United States'
growing need for supplies of uranium ore from abroad for the refinement of nuclear
we apons. Then Secretary of State J.F. Dulles emphasized in a speech to the Joint
Atou~ic F.nergy Commission that the provisions of the 1946 McMahon Act banning coopera-
tion in tYl~.nuclear sphere even with allied cotmtries were hindering the receipt of
"indispensable" strategic raw material. Second, the development of research in the
atomic sphere by other countries (at a time when Britain had built its first sci-
en tific research reactor in 1947, France in 1948 and the United States only in 1950).
, Accentuating attention to this aspect, Dulles emphasized that the United States no
lon ger tiad it in its power "to halt the flow of pertinent information" and that if
it were to attempt this, such a policy would lead to a diminution in American in-
fluence on countries of the world. The idea can be traced in his pronouncements
th~.t via cooperation with a�llied countries the United States would be able to exer-
cise certain control over the development of atomic research.18 Third, the endea-
vor of U.S. monopoly circles to occupy tha dominant position in world nuclear tech-
nology markets and to derive financial benefits here earlier than their potential
coinpetitors.
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New legislation in the atomic energy sphere enacted in 1954 was the basis for the
9 development of cooperaticn with the allied countries in spheres not directly related _
to proble~ of the United States' "national security."
The bilateral agreements concluded with other countries contained clauses en rights
of control and inspection and also on the other countries' commitments to use the
information, materials and equipment obtained solely for peaceful purposes (as of
195! the control functions were performed by the International Atomic Energy Agency--
IAEA). Each agreement drawn up by the American Atomic Energy Commission required
the app.Yoval of the President, who had to determine "whe,ther or nut it represented ,
an unjustified risk in respect of the defense and security" of the United States,
and the support of the congressiona]_ Joint Atomic Energy Commission.
At the same time questions of control in the new program ~.took a back seat behind
the extensive development of atomic energy internationally. As M. Willri~h and
T. Taylor rightly observed, "'Atom~: for Peace'...signaled a radical shuffling of
priorities...prior to 1953 international control figured in first place, and the
development of atomic energy for peaceful purPoses secand; now development is in
first, and control and inspection in second."i9
The negative consequences of these changes~ which made their presence felt much
later, were the logical consequence of a policy as a result of which not only the
secrets of the production of atomic weapons but also the necessary technology proved
accessible to other cotm tries. As colorfully expressed by the American scientist
A. Kramish, "the nuclear genie was handed to other nations on a plutonium platter."20
In the historical retrospective the problems of control over the proliferation of nu-
clear technology which the United States encountered head-on in the 1970's emerged
largely as a result of its policy in the 1950's. It is not fortuitous that a number
of American experts now make a critical evaluation of D. Eisenhower's proposal. D.
Rosenbaum, an employee of the A'~omic Energy Commission, declared in 1975: "The
sorry truth is that we opened a Pandora's box..., and it may be that the 'Atoms
for Peace' prag~.am was the most stupid idea of our time."21
Whatever the case, implementation of the "Atoms for Peace" program contributed to
an increase in the nonnuclear cotm tries` material-technical potential for the cre-
ation of nuclear weapons, which was a principal factor compelling Washington in the
mid-1960's to adopt a serious approach to the need for the formulation of interna-
ticnal measures preventing the use of atomic energy for military purposes.
~
However, in the 1950's the program of the peaceful use of the atom went hand in hand
with the nuclear arms race in the United States. Under the conditions of the cold
wsr the military atomic programs of America's allies frequently received Washington's
direct polit~cal assistance and material-technical aid. A consequence of this was _
the resumption of the nuclear partnership with Britain following the enactment in
1958 of far-reaching amendments to the McMahnn Act.
What was the reason for President D. Eisenhower's decision to seek Congress's revi-
_ sion of the McMahon Act and to abandon to a certain extent the foreign policy course
toward the preservation of hegemony in nuclear questions initiated under Truman?
After all, the development of the West European countries' national nuclear programs
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promised unfavorable consequences for the United States in the long-term. The spread
of nuclear weapons could lead to tha gradual loss of America's overwhelming military
superiority in NATO, to the allies being on a par with the American "nuclear giant"
and, as a result, to the inevitable weakening of the United States' influence in
West Europe. But considerations connected with tre interests of the so-called ~~ng~
tional security" of the United States itself and tlie need to heed the nuclear claims
of the allies, which were leading to a crisis i~ NATO, had an impact on the adoption
of this decision bq the U.S. Administration.
A secret report of a gro~:p of Pentagon and State Department experts on the conse-
quences of the launcb,i:xlgof an artificial satellite in the Soviet Union stated that
ir~ a military-strategic respect the United States was in a dangerously d~s advantage-
ous position compared with the USSR. A new view of the NATO allies' national nuclear
programs began to spread rapidly among the American ruling circles. In the State of
the Union address on 8 3anuary 1980 President Eisenhower emphasized the need for the
Uni.ted States' cooperation with all its allies in the hope of "surmounting" as quick- ~
1y as possible "the technological gap with Russia which has come about as a result
of. the launch of a satellite."22 This trend toward a broadening of coopera tion with
the allies came to predominate in the militarq-strategic thinking of the then U.S.
Administration. In practice Washington was thinking not of the problem of p rolifera-
tion b ut of the restoration of military superiority over the Soviet Union, even at
- the cost of encouraging and stimulating the national nuclear programs of its allies.
In this situation the priority task, Atnerican strategists believed, amounte d to the
mor~~ flexible use and deplo}r~ent of existing nuclear weapons on the territory of the -
NATO countries and also the enlistment, in Eisenhower's urords, of the "ener gy and
talents ot the allies" in the development of nuclear weapons. For this reason: ~ `
' when, in March 1958, the Soviet Union unilaterally halted the testing of nu~lear
weapons and opened the way to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the United States did
not follow its example. The refusal was dictated not only by considerations con-
necred with America's nuclear program but also with the interests of the nuclear
programs of the European allies, primarily Britain, which had not then fully completed
a series of its own nuclear weapon tests, and, i.n part, of France, which had only
just embarked on implementation of its own program. "~1s a whole, the American
position in this period was determined," Bader wrote, "by the priority of our own _
testing program, defense of the interests Qf Great Britain...and, ultimately, the
plans for sharing nuclear knowledge and nuclear weapons with our allies to nullify
the advantages of the Soviet Union which had come about with the launch of the
satellite. "23
At the same time under the conditions of the new global correlation af mil itary
Forces and the development of the "crisis of trust" in NATO a trend toward the West
European countries' military independence of the United States began to be displayed.
That is why the idea of "nuclear autonomy," which had been engendered in Paris, and
the atter~pts of certain West European NATO members to obtain access to the control of
American nuclear weapons were phenomena of which America's r;.~ling circles had to take
account. Although Washington's endeavor to retain monopoly rights to the use of nu-
clear weapons remained the main foreign policy line, it nevertheless came to be
combined with attempts to neutralize the threat of further exacerbation of contradic-
tions concerning nuclear problems in relations with the allies and simultaneously
to take advantage of their "nuclear ambitions" in the interests of strategi c prepara-
ti~ns against the USSR. There was no unanimous opinion among U.S. ruling c ircles in
this period on the granting of nuclear weapons to the NATO allies. The Eis enhower
administration's official position in this connection, which was set out by J. Dulles
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on 17 April 1958, amo:u~.ted to the following: "there ~.s no necessity in peacetime for
the United States to turn over nuclear weapons in their entirety or the nuclear com-
ponents thereof to the national control of the NATO allies."24 However, prominent
figures of the Republican Party, who believ~d that resistance to the West European
countries' joining the "nuclear club" would be a source of further contradietimns,
did not agree with this viewpoint and, like N. Rockef.eller, called for nuclear wea-
pons and their delivery vehicles to be handed over to the NATO allies. A certain ~
section of America's ruling circles believed that the United States' so-call~d "na-
tional security" interests required cooperation with i~s allies in the nuclear field
in one form or another. However, the U.S. Administration's first atte~pts to combine
to a certain extent the interests of the United States and its allies and to institute
cooperation in nuclear questions within the framework of the Atlantic alliance by way
of enacting amendments to the McMahon Act led to the emergence merel~ of a"special
nuclear relationship" with Great Britain, which emphasized the discrimination in the
Atlantic alliance and strengthened the disagreements among the allies.
When, in January 1958, the President asked Congress to revi3e the 1946 Atomic Energy
Act for extending cooperation in the sphere of nuclear weapons with the allies, he
was undoubtedly aware that this proposal would encounter strong opposition in Con-
~ress, which had adopted a far more conservative position in its approach to atomic
problems than the White House. This opposition:_ca~.e to light during discussion of
the amendments to the 1946 Act. Tize congressional Atomic Energy Commission firmly
flpposed "providing access to additional countries in the sphere of nuclear we~:pons -
production." The vague wording of the amendments to the effect that American
nuclear information would be available only to countries which had achieved "signi-
ficant progress in the development of nuclear weapons" elicited a counter question
in Congress as to which countries might be included in this cat~gory. The Atomic
Energy Commission rep~ied unequivocally to this question: "Only Great Gritain meets
the set standards."25 Indeed, following Congress's passage of the amendments, it
turned out that Great Britain was the sole NATO country which fell within their terms
of reference. "Despite the f act that President Eisenhower had emphasized multiplicity
in his appeal for cooperation with friendly countries'," W. J3ader wrote, "the purpose
of the legislation was merely to include Great Britain, and only Great Britain, in
a�special nuclear partnership' with the United States."26
As distinct from Great Britain, France, which as of this time had yet to carry out
a single nuclear weapon test and thus, according to the enacted amendments to the
� McMahon Act, had not achieved "significant progress in the production of nuclear
weapons," found itself outside of the initiated nuclear partnership of the t~ao prin-
cipal NATO allies. Despite Paris's persistent attempts to obtain assistance ~ram
Washington in carrying out its nuclear program, its request for the granting of nuclear
information was regularly turned down by the U.S. Administration. In July 1958, -
_ when, at the time of Dulles's talks with the French Government in Paris, the secre-
tary of State made it understood that France could not count on a privileged posi-
tion analogous to that of Britain, the French Government officially confirmed its
intention to continue its national nuclear program independently.
Undoubtedly, it was not only the technological gap between Britain and France whi~h
predetermined the latter's exclusion from nuclear partnership with the United States.
Political motives were also at the bottom of this. Following the 1956 Suez crisis,
which caused a sharp exacerbation of Anglo-American contradictions, relations
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. between Britain and the United States were gradually restored and became even closer,
whereas relations between France and the UntLted States continued to deteriorate.
The mutual underatanding on which the "special relationship" between Washington a,nd _
Loridon was bu31t was lacking in the diplomatic sphere between Paris and Wa~hington.
As a consequence of this, "the Americans trusted the British more than the FrenCh....
The United States is not," British exgerts wrote �"at this time about to snare its
atomic secrets with a country which might use them in circumstances not appro~ed by
it."27 De Gaulle's attempts to creatQ a"triple directorate" in NATO~and thereby
secure for France a privileged position akin to that occupied by Great Britain did
not encounter a favorab~le response in America's ruling circles and led merely to a
further exacerbation of American-French relar.ions and a deepening of~the crisis in
the Atlantic alliance. The subsequent withdrawal of France's Air Force and part of
the Mediterranean fleet from NATO's military organization was accompanied by a demand
for the removal of American nuclear bombers from French territory. As a result of .
the exacerbation of American-French relations there followed a further strengthening
of relations between Washington and London, which predetermined the joint coordina-
tion of the use of nuclear forces and was the b asis for the sale of long-range Polaris
missiles to Britain in 1962.28
Formally the amendments to the 1958 McMahon Act did not, as it were, contribute to
so-called "horizontal" proliferation, that is, an increase in the number of nuclear
. countries (Britain had already tested both atomic and hydrogen bombs). But ~he formu-
la in accordance with which Britain could obtain technological assistance j.n an improve-
ment of its nuclear forces undoubtedly reinforced the endeavor of other countries
to achieve a status in the nuclear sphere similar to that of Britain's in order to
achieve privileged cooperation with the United States. In this period the United
States still adhered to a selective policy, distinguishing its closest and special
partners and also cuuntries allied with it from other states. This selectiveness
was prompted by attempts to use the proliferation of nuclear weapons to regulate not
only the correlation of forces in the nuclear sphere between West and East but also
mutual relations within NATO. The passin~ of the 1958 amendments objectively put
Washington in the difficult position where any allied country which had created
independent nuclear weapons could on legitimate grounds turn to the United States
for technological assistance. This was fraught with serious consequences for U.S.
policy in the f uture.
However, even at this stage Washington was rendering real assistance to so-called
_ "vertical proliferation," that is, a buildup of existin g nuclear armaments, having
taken charge of the development of Britain's nuclear forces. Thus the "special
nuclear relationship," which was codified in American legislation, was a most import-
ant step of the United States along the path of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Despite congressional opposition to the further direct proliferation of nuclear
weapons among the NATO allies, Washington took a number d~f steps to increase their
role and participation in the use of American weapons deployed on the European
continent. As of 1947, when two bomber squadrons armed with atom bombs were
stationed at bases in Brit~~~n, American troops in Europe acquired atomic and hydrogen
weapons as new delivery systems were created. The tactical nuclear weapon in the _
form of the short-range Sergeant, Pershing and Honest J6hn missiles were part of
the armament of the American forces in the FRG. The intermediate-range Jupiter and
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~
Thor missiles were deployed on the territory o~ Britain, Italy and Turkey in 1958.
- The stockpiling of nuclear weapons on the territories of the European countries was '
accompanied by the instruction of t~e military personnel of the nonnuclear NATO _
countries in the handling of tl:ese weapons and the granting to them of the correspond-
ing information and, ultima*ely, the possib~lity of the joint operational use Of Che
weapons (given retention of the presidential veto). These measures stimulated the
NATO a?lies' nuclear ambitions. Far-reachir~g plans came to be drawn up in Washington
for sharing nuclear responsibility in the North Atlantic alliance.
In 1959 ttie American general L. Norstad, supreme NATO commander in chief, proposed
- handing over part of the nuclear weapon stockpiles directly to NATO control and
maki~xg the bloc a"fourth nu~lear power" where the Atlantic partners might cooperate
on equal terms in the ope~ational use of these weapons. In December 1960 this pro-
posal was officially submitted to a NATO Cowncil session in Paris by U.S. Secretary
of State C. Herter. The endeavor to preserve the maximum flexibility in the use of
nuclear weapons, including the policy of sharing nuclear responsibility with the NATO
allies, was prompted largely by the D. Eisenhower administration's negative approach
to nonproliferation problems, which at this time were being discussed in the United
Nations.
At the UN General Assembly 12th Session in 1957 the USSR had in a memorandLm on
partial measures in the disarmament aphere raised the question of states possessing
nuclear weapons undertaking not to pass these weapons on to other states. In 1958
Ireland submitted to the First Co~ittee a draft resolution on the prevent~on of the
further spread of nuclear weapons which implied a need for a renunciation of their
transfer to other nonnuclear countries. The resolution was adopted with the support
of the socialist countries, while the United States and its allies abstained, fear-
ing that such measures could have a negative eff~ct on the plans for the use of tac-
tical atomic weapons in Eui~.ope and cooperation in the nuclear sphere within the NATO
framework. A similar scene was also observed in 1960 in the voting on a resolution
of Ireland's which called for countries to "refrain from handing over not only con-
trol over nuclear weapons to any country not possessing them" but also the "it~for-
mation essential for their production." The resolution was approved by the General
Assembly, but the United States and a number of its allies abstained, as before,
thereby testifying to their disapproval of the outlined limitations on their policy
with respect to the spread of nuclear weapons.
The policy of broadening cooperation in the~~nuclear sphere with the NATO allies which
was set during the D. Eisenhower admintstration actua.lly contributed to the further
spread of nuclear weapons, which ultimately could not have failed to have contradic-
ted the interests of the United States with its long-term agpiration to maintain con-
trol of the solution of questions on which the problems of war and peace depended. .
At the start of the 1960's, at the time of the J. Kennedy administration's assumption .
of office, the threat of a further increase in the number of countries possessing
, nuclear weapons was so real that the problem of nonproliferation gradually came to
occupy a principal place in the system of the United States' foreign policy priori-
ties, forcing the ruling circles to take a new look at their nuclear policy. �
In the 1960's, when it transpired that the s~-called "missile gap" had proved to
be no more than a fiction employed by the Pentagon to stimulate the nuclear arms.
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race, the mutual relations of the United States and bhe USSR at the strategic
level developed in the direction of the establishment of nuclear parity or equivalence, E
when each side had acquired the capacity for, in the words of then�Defense Secretary ~
~t. McNamara, each other's "assured destruction in the event of the onset of a ta~.li-
tary conflict." In this situation the nuclear forces of the NATO allies lost their
military significance from the viewpoint of the interests of the Un~ted States'
"se~~urity" since they could no longer influence the outcame of a po~Qible confronta-
tion between the Uni ted States and the USSR. At the same time the attitude toward
the:m of America's ruling circles was increasingly determined by ~ears that at the '
- wi~l of the West European allies the United States might be dragged into a nuclear
. co�~zflict in Europe without even wishing this. "We do not believe in national forces
of containment...," President J. Kennedy set out the American position in NATO's
nuclear questions at a 17 May .~1972 ~ress conference, "and inasmuch as one country
after another would embark on the development of its own means of containment, I
believe that we would become involved in an increasingly dangerous situation."29
The adoption of the "flexible response" doctrine presupposed that fihe West European
NATO members would mainly represent the conventional forces (the "sword") and the -
, United States nuclear weapons (the "shield"). This led to a raising of the "nuclear
threshold" and reduced the automatic nature of the United States' nuclear forces'
involvement in military operations on the European continent characteristic of the
"massive retaliation" strategy. At the same time the a.llies' nuclear ambitions were
publicly assailed by representatives of the administration, parti~ularly Defense
Secretary R. McNamar a, on the grounds that they contradicted the concepts of centralized _
nuclear strategy which retained for the United States the right to decide the ques-
tion of activating NATO's strategic foxces. Whereas for the D. Eisenhower admin- _
istration the main `ask in long-term military planning had amounted to assisting the
nuclear programs of the West European countries, a possible "sharing of nuclear se-
~ crets" and an increase in their direct participation in the use of nuclear weapons
provided for in the "Norstad Plan," under the J. Kennedq administration the main
attention was transferred to an endeavor to put the lid as far as possible on the
development of the allies' independent nuclear forces. However, this policy encoun-
tered serious resis tance ~rom the NATO allies, which, endeavoring to increase their
independence of the United States, were attempting to enhance their nuclear role.
Thus Britain, despite serious failures in its rocket-building program, did not intend
to wind up its nucle ar potential. In 1960 France tested an atomic weapon and de- ~
clared its resolve to create full-fledged independent "deterrent forces." The FRG
also aspired to possession of nuclear weapons.
The glan for the creation of multilateral nuclear forces (MNF), which emerged fol-
lowing the December 1962 Nassau meeting of the heads of government of the United
States and Britain, was designed to reconcile the irreconcilable. On the one hand
the main purpose of the MNF was preservation of the United States' dominant position
in the sphere of the use of nuclear weapons and the establishment of certain control
over the nuclear potential of Britain and France. On the other, this plan pre-
supposed the development of cooperation in the sphere of the use of the nuclear
weapons of the Unitied States and its NATO allies and a certain enhancement in the
West European countries' role in decision-making in the military-strategic sphere,
tY:at is, a certain infringement of U.S. positions fdr the sake of neutralizing At-
lantic contradictions.
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A bitter struggle developed within U.S. ruling circles on the question of implemen-
tation of the MNF. A group of political figures from the State Department and the
Pentagon such as M. Bundy, R. Bowie and Gen L. Norstad insisted on ~ontinuation of
the policy of partnership in respect of the West European countries in the nuclear
- weapons sphere, even at the expense of the United States' renunciation o~ the right
to veto the use of nuclear weapons in Europe. Opponents of the MNF believed that
the "sharing of nuclear responsibility" was too high a price for preservation of the
Atlantic partnership for in contribut~ng to a further growth of the nuclear forces of
Britain and France and facilitating access to nuclear weapons *_o the FRG the United
States would lose control over the solution of questions of war and pe`ace. As dis-
cussion of the MNF plan continued, the following alternati~es confronting the United
States gradually crystal~ized: continue the policy ot nuclear partnership with the
allies, transferring part of its nuclear forces to their control and their possession
or give preference to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, adopting a policy of
limiting the number of countries possessing them.
For President J. Kennedy the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons was a night-
mare, and he emphasized repeatedly that the United States must effectively "use the
_ time remaining to prevent the spread and persuade other countries not to test or
possess or produce, transfer ~r acquire such weapans."30
Even then a number of American experts had come to realize that the numerous negative
consequences of proli.feration would inevitably lead to reduced security throughout
the world and to the increased probability of the outbreak of a nuclear confl~ict
_ into which the United States could also be dragged. The 1962 Caribbean crisis showed
as obviously as can be the urgent need for the joint efforts of the Uni~.ed States
and the USSR in averting the nuclear danger. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty was
the prolog to an agreement on controlling and limiting the nuclear arms race under
the conditions of nuclear equivalence between the USSR and the United States. U.S.
Administration representatives' characterization of the further spread of nuclear
weapons as a"threat to the national secu~ity of the Urrited States," the testing of
an atomic device in 1974 in the PRC and the increase in ti-~e material-technical
possibilities of a number of countries in the creation of nuclear weapons conditioned
the evolution of Washington's constructive approach to the discussion in the United
~ Nations of nonproliferation problems, which had occupied s central place in the work
of this international organization by the mid-1960's.
Initially the American UN delegation attempted in its nonproliferation proposals to
. leave loopholes :~or the possible transfer of nuclear weapons to military blocs and
various military formations of the MNF type. They did say, it is true, that nuclear
weagons should not be handed over to the national control of states which did nat
possess them. But the sphere of nuclear cooperation with the allies remained un-
affected by the limitations. Such proposals of the United States elicited sharp
criticism in the United Nations on the part of the socialist and developing countries.
, The UN General Assembly decree of 25 November 1965 appealed that a nonproliferation
treaty contain no loopholes which could allow the direct or indirect spread of nu-
clear weapons in any form. A resolution was passed on 4 November 1966 which called
for an end to actions making it difficult to come to an agreement on nonprolifera-
tion.31 '
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Under the influence of the wor'_d community voices began to ring out increasingly
often in the United Sta*_es in support of the speediest conclusion of a nonprolifera-
tion treaty. W. Foster, then director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
emphasized that the United States must choose--either to continue "nuclear mergere"
of the MNF type or embark on the creation of a. nonproliferation process. In his
opinion, it was desirable to give preference to relations with the USSR and the
im~ediate conclusion of an appropriate treatq.32 This viewpoint was supported by
G. Seaborg, chairman of the Atomic Energy Coartnission, and a number of political
figures and scientists such as J. Wiesner, C. Kaysen, R. Gilpatrick, H. Stassen and
others. An inf luential group of supporters of nonproliferation was formed in the
U.S. Congress--R. Kennedy, J. Pastore, J. Anderson, A. Cooper and others--who believed
that the plans for nuclear cooperation with the NATO allies would be corztrary to the
achievement of the long-term goal of U.S. policy in the nonproliferation sphere.
, Sen R. Clark warned: "As long as we are toying with the idea of creating MNF and
as long as we are flirting with West Germany, offering to grant it the right to stand
closer to the nuclear trigger, the Soviet Union will not, in all probability, wish
to conclude a treaty which would prohibit the further spread of nuclear weapons."33
In May 1966 the Senate adopted a resolution calling on the U.S. President to seek
the speediest conclusion of a treaty in this sphere. The resolution pushed the L.
Johnson administration toward a more constructive approach to negotiations with the
USSR. In February 1967 the United States was compelled to abandon the clauses in the
American draft of the treaty which could have left open the possibility of the cre-
ation of M[JF and to proceed to coordinate it with the USSR's draft.
By this time the MNF plan also was virtuall~ doomed. From the very outset France
had openly refused to participate in it, Britain had put forward alternative plan~,
whlch only muddled things and created insurmotmtable obstacles for the United
States, and only the FRG continued to stubbornlq cling to them, which testified to
its aspiration to gain access to nuclear weapons.
The contradictions with the allies, the dubious benefits of the sharing of "nuclear
control" in the MNF, which impeded nonproliferation policy, and the position of the
USSR and the other socialist countries were the reasons for Washington gradually
growing cool toward this plan. For this reason when R. McNamara presented the
proposal of forming a Nuclear Planning Committee in NATO, many political observers
evaluated this step as a retreat from the idea of the handing over of control and
_ the nuclear waapons themselves contemplated in the MNF plan. Although discussion of
it continued, seemingly by force of inertia, the center of gravity in Washington's
policy had nevertheless shifted from "nuclear partnership" with the allies to Soviet-
American cooperation in the nonproliferation sphere.
Following constructive negotiations between the United States and the USSR, a draft
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was ultimately formulated which was opened for
signing on 1 July 1968 simultaneously in Moscow, Washington and London. On the
very first day the treaty was signed by 58 countries, including the nuclear states
~ of the United States, the USSR and Britain, and the process of its ratification by
the three nuclear powers was completed on 5 March 1970, and the treaty came into
effect. �
Thus an examination of the evolution of the United States' approach to nonprolifera-
' tic-1 issues shows that American policy in this sphere was determined only in the
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1960's. The buildup of the nuclear arsenal in the United States itself, direct
assistance in the development of Britain's nuclear potential and the policy of nu-
clear cooperation with the allies within the NATO framework were factors which con-
- tributed to both the "vertical" and horizontal" spread of nuclear weapons. Thie
policy could not have failed to have led to the appearance of nuclear weapons noC
only among the United States' adversaries but also among its closest allies. How-
ever certain American scholars may attempt to claim that the United States was
always a supporter of nonproliferation, postwar history testifies convincingly that
it was precisely Washington which was to blame for the spread of nuclear weapons.
At the heigl:t of the cold war American ruling cirGles were unwilling to understand
that the race in nuclear weapons in the United States and their nonproliferation
among other countries were mutually exclusive goals of Washington's policy.
Realistic American political figures' correct evaluation of the consequences of the
further spread of nuclear weapons as a threat to the interests of the security not
_ only of the United States but of the whole world promgted the gradual movement of -
the nonproliferation problem to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy in the 1960's.
. Th3.s.;afforded an opportunity, given close cooperation with the USSR,for the creation
of a nonproliferation mode consolidated in an appropriate international treaty.
The latter became the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the sphere of the nonprolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons. -
- The United States' ruling circles' high evaluat~on of the treaty's significance for
American int~rests was unable to long glose_ over the fact that its conclusion was
not the crown of a policy b ut, rather, only a point of departure for the more suc- -
~ cessful prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. Although in the period of the
first R. Nixon administration at the threshold of the 1970's the acuteness of the
nonproliferation problem had abated to a certain extent owing to the fact that
Washington believed that the treaty would solve if not all, then the majority of
problems, the further increase in the nonnuclear countries' possibilities in the
use of the atom for military purposes nevertheless compelled the United States to
take a new look at this problem. Since the mid-1970`s Washington has been attempt-
ing to find the appropriate political course for preventin g the spread of nuclear
weapons: Questions of the spread of the tech~ological possibilities of nonnuclear
_ countries for nuclear weapons production connected in one way or another with the
rapid development of peaceful atomic power engineering have emerged at the center
of the attention of American political figures and scientists.
Chapter5. The Policq and Material Potential of the "Near-Nuclear" Countries in
the Evaluation of American Experts
American scholars' numerous studies devoted to nonproliferation issues pay very close
attention to an analysis of the approach of the "threshold" countries to the prob-
lem of the possession of nuclear weapon~. What factors might influence decision-
making in this sphere, what material basis exists for proceeding toward the path
of the creation of nuclear weapons, at wh~t pace might the process of their pro-
liferation develop--these questions are constantly being discussed by American poli-
tical scientists in an evaluation of the political intentions of the "near-nuclear"
countries.
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There are a number of reasons why the ruling circles o~ this state or the other
might endeavor to acquire nuclear weapons. However, what for some plays a decisive
part in making a decision in favor of takir.g the path of nuclear armament exerts
a directly opposite influence on others. Each country has its own considerations
and special circumstances in which this decision is made. At the same time it
possible to roughly pick out three types of motive which in one way or another in-
fluence the poZitical leaders of the "threshold" countries to make a decision to
embark or not to embark on the path of nuclear armament--~military, political and
economic considerations.
Considerations connected with questions of security, the majority of American experts
believes, traditionall~ play the predominant part. Military strength is considered
the main instrument of ins uring security. The incorporation therein, as a com- _
ponent, of nuclear weapons is direct~y connected with expectations of advantages in
the military sphe~+e in relations with opposed states, whie.h in the past amounted to
the following;
achieving milit3ry superiority over a real or potential enemy (the creation o~
atomic weapons in the United States in WWII, for example, was connected with the need -
for the military destruction of the Germany-Japan axis powers);
obtaining strategic predominance in milita~~y relations with other countries (the
stockpiling of America's nuclear ar~enal has been subordir.ated to this task since _
the war);
achieving effective means of neutralizing the nuclear threat on the part of a state
possessing nuclear weapons (putting an end to the United States' nuclear monopoly,
for example); and
achieving a greater degree of independence in the military-political sphere of one's
bloc allies (the nuclear programs of Britain and France).
Such are the principal motives f.or taking the path of the possession of nuclear
weapons. In the opinion of Western experts, the logic of the arguments connected
with military interests which led to the emergence of the present nuclear powers
could also be extrapolated in this combination of the other to other countries'
approach to the solution of the question of the acquisition of nuclear weapons.34
However, a decision to acquire nuclear weapons by one country might also prompt a -
reciprocal reaction to their spread in this region or the other since neighboring
states would attempt to nullify these military advantages. W. Epstein, special
assistant to the UN secretary general for disarmament, emphasizes the metamorphosis
= in certain countries' a~proach to nuclear issuES following such acts by neighbor
states. Thus India, which throughout the 1950's and the start of the 1960's was an
active supporter of nonproliferation, was forced, following the PRC's nuclear
explosion, to look to its security in the atmosphere of continuing tension in
relations with Beijing. In turn, in the ruling circles of its neighbor, Pakistan,
there has been an in~reased aspiration to acquire nuclear weapons. At the same time
it is not difficult to realize that in the future Pakistan's nuclear ambitions
could lead to a growth of feeling in favor of the acquisition of nuclear weapons .
in ~eher states, particularly Bangladesh and Iran.35
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For this reason it should not be forgotten also that short-term "advantages" in the
military sphere acquired with the aid of nuclear weapons could in the long term prove
to be a complication in a given country's relations with ~its neighbors for the simple
reason that the latter will attempt to do everything possible to start their own
nuclear programs. However, as T. Greenwood�, a research scholar at MIT, correctly
emphasizes, farsightedness is not always characteristic of this decision or the
other in the military sphere. "Temporary military advantages accruing from the
position of the f irst and sole country in a given region to possess nuclear weapons
glosses over the long-term roblems ensuing from the position of being only one of
several nuclear countries."~6 Out of considerations connected with security questions
a number of "near-nuclear" countries is still not a subscriber to the Nonprolifera-
- tion Treaty, and, furthermore, their approach and policy are largely adjusted by the
attitude toward the treaty of opposed neighboring states.
American scholars emphasize that a definite part in the question of whether to have
or not to have nuclear weapons is also played by political cons iderations and expec- ,
tation that with their help it will be possible to enhance prestige and status in .
the world. The nonnuclear countries often draw attention to the fact that in the
modern world states possessing nuclear weapons still have greater political weight
in international ralations. They regularly participate in the majority of interna- -
tional fora, where their views invariably attract greater attention than those of
nonnuclear states. France and, particularly, Britain could hardly retain their spe-
cial international positions in today's world under the conditions of the economic
superiority of the FRG and Japan without nuclear weapons. Yet they continue to be
categorized as great powers. Undoubtedly, it is not only the possession of nu-
clear weapons which has secured these countries' present-day positions, but in the
eyes of certain nonnuclear countries this possession is, as before, associated with
higher status in the world.
The political calculations of the "threshold" countrkes may be reduced to the follow-
- ing:
first, attempting to achieve a status in the world similar to the position of the
nuclear powers and thereby secure for themselves the'right to attend all interna-
tional fora where present-day global problems are decided;
second, increasing political prestige in this region or the other. Nuclear weapans
are still regarded by certain states as a symbol of technological progress and cauld,
in line with economic development, be an integral attribute in the political ambi-
tions of regional "power centers";
third, strengthening their independence and resisting political gressure on the
part of such nuclear powers as the United States and the PRC. This consideration is
present in the majority of "threshold" countries in crisis regions of the world;
fourth, attempting to do away with inequality in the economic, political and mili-
tary relations between the capitalist countries and their former colonies. The
developing countries' clashes with the capitalist states over political-economic
questions, which grew more frequent in the 1970's, are also reflected in one way
or another in the attempts to redistribute military strength; and
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fiftl-:, utilizing nuclear weapons as an instrument o~ political pressure on opposing
states. This calculation is primarily typical of the ruling circles of Israel and
South Africa.
However, it should be mentioned that the real political minuses which ensue from
_ the possession of nuclear weapons could at first sight prove imperceptible against
this background of theoretical "pluses." Fears th at the majority of nuclear and
nonnuclear states which subscribe to the treaty will revise in a negative manner ~
their attitude toward a cotm try which takes the path of nuclear armament are play-
ing an increasingly big role in political calculat ions. It is perfectly natural
. that a country which has the technical capability of cre~ating nuclear weapons, but
~ which deliberately refrains from such a step could derive far greater benefits fxom
- the pursuit of a nonproliferation policy than otheYwise. A number of industrially
developed nonnuclear states like Canada, Sweden and Australia, for example, are
~ncreasing their political weight in the international arena in precissly this way.
American scholars believe that economic factors may largely operate in parallel with
political considerations in this sphere. Despite the truiam that the nuclear arms
race is a heavy burden on the economy, views still exist ~ustifying the possession -
of nuclear weapons economically. The viewpoint that the technical knowledge ac-
quired in the creation of a nuclear device could play a decisive part in the inten- -
sive development of the peace~ul atomic industry still finds supporters. But this
connection is not at all obligatory in practice, as the experience of Staeden and
Canada, for example, shows. Neverth~less, economic dividends connected with nuclear
explosions for peaceful purposes and with the achi evement of a high technological
le~~rel in the nuclear sphere, which, it is hoped, will bridge the gap economically
between tne developed and developing capitalist countries, could be present in these
- calcula~ions. In developing nuclear power certain "threshold" countries bElieve
that it will be able to reduce the expenditure and time needed to create nuclear
. weapons if such ma.y be required in the future. It is not fortuitous that countries
situated in crisis regions have, as a rule, a relatively high level of develo pment
of peaceful nuclear programs.
Accurdi.ng to D. Gompert, research assistant of the Council for Foreign Relations
, (New York), an i.ncentive to the creation of nuclear weapons could also be the en-
deav~r oF countries liberated from colonial dependence to rid themselves of the poli-
tical tutelage and ecenomic exploitation of the capitalist countries and to use
this weapon in the future or the threat to cre~.,=c~ such as a lever of pressure in -
the reorganization of economic and golitical reiitions with the capitalist countries
on fair terms and also as a means of defending the ir economic independence against
the former metropolis.3~
The factors adduced above in this combination or the other could have an impact on
the evolution of the "threshold states"' approach to the problem of nuclear wea-
pons. Doubtless, nor can we un~3erestimate here factors of a military, political
and economic nature, which are wor~cing increasingly strongly against the "nuclear
option" ar the current stage. Importance is attached to a precise determination -
oE the correlation of "for" and "against" and the ascertainment of the main motives
for tlzem for the achievement of the greater efficiency of nonproliferation policy
in respect of ~he "thr~shold" countries. -
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We~~crn specialists are paying great attention to nine "threshold" countries which
in terms of technological potential and poli~ical intentions could under the impact
of this combination or the other of the factors adduced above at a certain time
openly or secretly take the path of use of the atom for military purposes. ThQae
are South Africa, Israel, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Iran, the A-rab Republic of
Egypt , Taiwan and South ~~Korea .
When, in August 1977, a TASS statement was issued to the effect that South Africa
was close to completing work on the creation of nuclear weapons and that direct
preparations for the testing of such were underway at a firing range in the Kalahari
Desert, initially, according to the NEW YORK TIMES, "this news was not taken ser-
iously in the West."38 Furthermore, there were foreign policy observers who as-
sessed it as a"simple propaganda maneuver" of the USSR aimed at torpedoing Anglo-
American plans for settling racial problems and increasing its influence in southern -
Af-rica at the expense of the interests of the Western countries. But the intensive
diplomatic campaign aimed at averting the test in preparation which followed the
USSR's warning forced even skeptical observers to adopt a sober approach to an
evaluation of the real threat of the racist regime's possession of nuclear weapons.
Following the timely warning signal on the part of the USSR, Washington, London,
Paris and Bonn were forced to undertake a vigorous probe o~ Pretoria's intentions.
The South African authorities angrily officially rejected the accusation leveled at
it, but this only increased fears in the West that South Africa was ready to test a
nuclear weapon. Satellite photographs of facilities installed in the Kalahari ob-
- tained at the Carter administration's urgent request left no doubt as to Pretoria's
true intentions. These photographs were passed on to London, Paris and Bonn, and
the latter immediately issued statements concerning the serious consequences for
South Africa in the event of it testing a nuclear weapon. Tl~?e threat of universal
condemnation of the action in preparation forced Pretoria's ruling circl.es to back
down. As President Carter reported at a press conference on 23 August 1977, South
Africa had promised that "neither now or in the future will it conduct the test of
a nuclear weapon."39
Summing up the results of the August events, foreign policy observers in the West
unanimously observed that only the USSR's timely warning signal and the diplomatic
efforts of all the cotm tries concerned prevented the implementation of South Afri-
ca's plans in respect of nuclear tests. As the WASHINGTON POST wrote, "without
outside pressure, South Africa would possibly have moved to explode a bomb within a
few weeks, if we assume that it has the explosives and that it had resolved to pro-
ceed at full speed. "40
How could it have happened that South Africa had come that close to creating a
nuclear weapon and how is the high technological level of its nuclear program to
be explained? A concise history of South Africa's cooperation with Western coun-
tries provides an exhaustive answer to these questions.
Immediately after WWII, the United States and Britain, attracted by the large re-
serves of uranium ore necessary for the develapment of their nuclear potentials
(South Africa has the capitalist world's third largest reserves), rendered effective
assistance in the formation of Pretoria's uranium industry: 27 mines with 17 ex-
tracting plants built with the direct participation of Anglo-American firms were
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incorporated in the uranium business. South Africa's proceeds from exports of uran-
ium ore predominantly to the United States and Britain amounted to approximately
- $2 billien. As ascertained during congressional hearings in 1977, South Africa's
ur~ium monopolies occupy a leading place in a secret uranium cartel, cooperating
closely with the corresponding monopolies of the United States, Australia and France
in the division of sales markets and the regulation of prices for this strategic
raw material.
At the start oE the 1960's the United States sold South Africa the first atomic
reactor, which, with the participation of American specialists, was commissioned in
the township of Pelindab near Pretoria. This reactor, which came to be called Safa-
ri I, became the basis of South Africa's nuclear program. The enriched uranium
necessary for its operation, which may be used for the manufacture of an atomic
bo~r~b, was regularly supplied by the United States. It was precisely the imports
of enriched uranium from the Un~ted States which played a significant part in the
- development of the nuclear program since at that time there were no other alterna-
tive sources of supplies thereof. A large number of the 120 physicists sent to
Western countries were trained in laboratories of the Atomic Energy Co~ission in
Oak Ridge. When South Afirca embarked on the installation of an experimental facil-
ity for uranium enrichment at the start of the 1970's, the American Foxborough
Corporar_ion sold South Africa two computers which it sorely needed. An agreement
was reached between Washington and Pretoria on long-term supplies of slightly zn-
riched uranium as fuel for the nuclear pawer stations being installed in South
Africa.41
Cooperation with the FRG came to be developed intensively in the 1960's. Counting
. on receiving i~s sh~re of uranium resources (40 percent of uranium consumed in the
FRG is currently exported from South Africa), Bonn readily agreed to contacts be-
tween the two countries' atomic scientists ai~d encouraged the exchange of scientific
information. The closest informal relations were established between the specialisbs;
of Pelindab and the atomic center in Karlsruhe. South Africa maintained contacts
with 1.5 of the FRG's scientific research centers, including the Max Planck Nuclear
Physics Institute.42
Easy access to scientific research work in the sphere of nuclear physics being con-
ducted in the FRG could not have failed to have contributed to the development in
South Afr.ica of a"new, unique process" of uranium enrichment, as a leader of South
Africa's atomic program proudl.y declared at the start of the 1970's. True, the see-
ret of South Africa's success was revealed by the West German physicist E. Becker,
~ who heads the work in this field and who, according to the NEW YORK TIMES, declared
bluntly and indignantly that "the South Africans had appropriated West German tech-
nology illegally."
According to the magazine DER SPIEGEL, the West German STEAG firm had bePn rendering
South Africa assistance since 1974 in the construction of an experimental installa-
ti_on for uranium enrichment in Walindab. As a result by the mid-1980's, when a com-
merc~.al uranium enrichment plant will begin operation, South Africa will not only be
"totally independent of foreign sources of supply" but will also become a major
expor~er of strategic raw material suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.43
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France's monopolies have also contributed to the development of South Africa's
atomic program. In the summer of 1976 in most bitter competition with General
Electric and West German and Dutch firms a French consortium headed by "Framat"
concluded an agreement with South Africa on the supply of two 1,000-megawatt nuclear
power stations. The deal was closed for a sum of $1 billion. In accordance With
the contract, the spent fuel is sent to France for reprocessing (the stripped plu-
tonium may be used for the further develc~pment of French nuclear potential here).
Nuclear power stations provide 10 percent of total electric powPr consumed by South
Africa. Considering that South Africa experiences no acute need for additional en-
ergy sources for peaceful purposes, the nuclear power stations will mainly provide
energy for the uranium enrichment pl~*~t (enrichment techniques require great energy
expenditure).
A report appeared in the French press in 1977 that the corporation for the produc-
tion of nuclear fuel, COJEMA, had concluded a contract with South Africa on long-
term supplies to it of natural uranium and, furthermore, that COJEMA had agreed to
grant South Africa as an advance an interest-free loan of $105 million for further
development of the uranium industry.
A concise en~eration of the principal stages of South Africa's cooperation with
Western countries shows convincingly that without active assistance on the part of
the monopolies and scientific research centers and without equipment supplies and
the exchange of scientific information South Africa would hardly have achieved on its
own what specialists t~rm "a high level of atomic development," which has broubht
it as close as can be to the creation of its own nuclear weapons. This was frankly
acknowledged at the start of 1977 by Dr [Rouks], head of South Africa's atomic re-
search: "We may attribute our present successes to a considerable extent to the
instruction and assistance so readily granted by the United States in the early
years of aur nuclear program, when certain Western powers joined efforts to intro-
duce our scientists and engi_neers to atomic science."44 Such moving compliments
to the West seem nothing more than malicious mockery of the myopic and suicidal
policy of leading capitalist countries in relation to Pretoria.
If we now attempt to give an answer to the question of what factors contriUuted tu
the cooper~tion of countries of the capitalist world with South Africa, it first
needs to be said that South Africa's current nuclear potential is a poisonous see3
of the cold war which germinated in the 1970's. It was precisely at the height of
_ it, when the United States and Britain were leading the nuclear arms race, that t~?e
need for a strategic raw material--uranium--led to the c~nception of the uranium
industry in South Africa. A parallel course of switching South Africa in to the
West's military-strategic system for fighting the "communist threat" was expressed
in large-scale supplies of arms--missiles, aircraft, warships, radar systems and
so forth--on the part of the United States' NATO allies. Following the embargo
in the 1970's on direct supplies of arms by Britain and France, Pretoria has con-
_ tinued to receive them in accordance with purchased licenses via third countries.
As a result South Africa already possesses modern nuclear weapon delivery vehicles,
particularly the British Buccaneer aircraft and the French Mirages. Immutable
stereotypes of the mentality of the times of the cold war are perceived even now,
as before, in the West's military-strategic plans, in which South ~',frica is con-
stantly assigned a leading role in the so-called "defense" of the "free world's"
sea commtmications at the Cape of Good Hope at the junction of the Indian and
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Atlantic oceans. Such an approach to South Africa's military-strategic significance
in the world balance of forces was also prompted by the fact that the capitalist
countries� ruling circles essentialiy closed their eyes to the rapid development of
South Africa's nuclear pro gram and failed to react properly to the numerous early
. warnings of authoritative experts and organizations.
The London Institute of Strategic Studies long since placed South Africa first on a
list of 14 states which co uld provide themselves with nuclear weapons in the very
near future. As far as the American press is concerned, the WASHINGTON POST re-
ported in February 1977 that South Africa needed "at the most, from 2 to 4 years to
produce an atomic bomb" and that this time could be shortened to just "a few months"
if Pretoria were to imdertake a crash program.45 Incidentally, even South Africa's
ruling circles repeatedly gave transparent hints in the past that Pretoria was cap-
able, if necessary, of creating its own atomic bomb. Thus then Prime Minister
- Vorster proudly declared in 1916 that "South Africa can enrich uranium and has the
possibility" of creating nuclear weapons.
Pretoria's course toward the creation of its own nuclear potential was determined
by the constant refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Despite the
obvious signs and realistic forecasts, ruling circles of the Western countries were
nevertheless unable, prior to the USSR's warning signal, to take prevent3~ve steps
in rPSpect of South Africa. The main reason for this inactivity can be er,plained
by the traditional obsessi on with preserving the West's strategic positions and con-
tinuing the policy of military rivalry with the East, which prevents priority being
given in good time to new problems .
In the development of its nuclear program South Africa has taken advantage not only
of the tension between West and East but also the bitter interimperialist strug-
gle in the modern nuclear technology and materials markets between the United States
and the West European coun tries, France's deal with South Africa, which the United
States simultaneously wished to conclude, was put together in this atmosphere. Pre-
toria is even now continuing to play its trump card--uranium raw material in exchange
for the technology it needs for development of the atomic program--in the interim-
perialist competition of the Western countries.
- Fo1l~owing the events of August 1977, there has been an ongoing debate in the Ameri-
can pr.ess about whether South Africa is continuing the course toward nuclear arma-
men t. On the whole, the majority of observers agree that Pretoria's promises not ~
ro test a nuclear weapon are a sufficient guarantee that this will not occur. True,
there still exists the viewpoint, largely inspired by Pretoria's statement concern-
ing the peaceful nature of the atomic program, that South Africa does~not need nu-
clear weapons for they are of no military-strategic value--"Pretoria has sufficient-
ly strong conventional armed forces, no one is posing a threat to it from outside,
and the use of nuclear weapons to suppress racial disturbances within the country
would be catastrophic for the interests of the whites." But such reasoning does not
withstand criticism. As T. Greenwo od rightly observed, "in deciding the question
of whether to be or not to be a nuclear country the dominant role is perfnrmed in-
creasingly not by military but poli tical calculations."46 From Pretoria's view-
point, the possession of nuclear weapons or the capability of their immediate pro-
duction is a principle lever of diplomatic pressure not only on the policy of
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African states but also on the policy o~ leading capitalist countries, including the
United States. In the racist regime's calcular_ions it is precisely nuclear weapons
which would afford an opportunity of decisively influencing development of the inter-
national situation in southern Africa.
At the same time Western observers note that having given up nuclear testing in the
face of serious economic sanctions and political isolation South Africa could never-
theless continue the course toward nuclear arms, without demonstrative explosions,
and employ the threat of the immediate acquisition of these weapons. Accentuating
attention on the new tactics of the "near-nuclear" states, the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
- MONITOR emphasized in this connection: "Like Israel, South Africa has understood
that politically it is very convenient to retain the right to keep a'bomb in the
basement'."47
Thus it is logical to assume that Pretoria�s threat of acquiring nuclear weapons has
only been indefinitely postponed. This conclusion is also corroborated by continu-
ing statements of inembers of the racist regim~'s government. 7."hus even after South
. Africa's official promises, on 30 August 1977 Finance Minister HOrwood provocative-
ly declared: "It is time we told Carter and anyone else that if at some time we
suddenly decide to use our nuclear potential differently, we will do this very
quietly and will consider only our own assessments here."
What consequences could South Africa's possession of nuclear weapons entail? There
is no doubt that this event would signal the start of a nuclear arms race on the
African continent in which sooner or later other countries would become involved.
Faced with a real nuclear threat or diplomatic blackmail, the African countries
might turn for assistance to other co~tries (for example, members of the British
Co~nonwealth to Britain and the former French colonies to France, confronting the
?_atter with the need to participate in the "nuclear restraint"~~of South Africa).
- "Making South Africa a nuclear power," the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR wrote, "would
only lead to the great powers increasing military support to Africa and, possibly,
compel some of them to extend the nuclear shield to the black countries."48 Such a
step by Pretoria would strike a palpable hl~w ar rhe idea of making Africa a~~ne
free of nuclear weapons and would contribute to the kindling of international ten-
sion in this area of the world.
This would have even more serious consequences for struggle against the further
spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. A nuclear South Africa would not
only be an example for the ruling circles of countries which have yet to renounce
the intention of acquiring their own nuclear weapons but also a principal supplier
of the necessary technology and materials for their manufacture. The WASHINGT0~1
POST emphasized in this connectian: "The campaign to prevent the world's armament
with nuclear weapons...would suffer a serious setback and its future would be un-
certain, particularly when it is considered that South Africa possesses rich natural
uranium deposits. If it could process and enrich sufficient uranium to manufacture
its own bomb, it could be a potential exporter of uranium suitable for weapons gro-
duction to other coim tries also."49
Reports appear regularly in the Western countries' press that South Africa is even
now performing a noticeable role in the spread of the nuclear danger, having estab-
lished close bilateral z�elations with a number of "near-nuclear" countries. Thus,
according to the NEW Y~~RK TIMES, an agreement has long been in effect between South
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Africa and Israel in accordance with which Pretoria has committed itself, in ex-
change for nuclear technology and information, to "guaranteed supplies of uranium"
needed for the development of Tel Aviv's nuclear potential. The BOSTON GLOBE re-
. ported the existence of contacts in the nuclear sphere between South Africa and
5outh Korea and South Africa and Taiwan.
The threatening consequences urgently confront the leaders of the West, primarily
the Unitecl States, with the question of the need to take urgent steps to cut short ~
the South African racists' hankering after the acquisition of nuclear weapons and to
make adjustments to foreign policy corresgonding to the interests of the struggle
against proliferation.
First, Che jdest's lea.�ing powers are in a position to put immediate pressure on South
Africa For the latter~�to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and put its nu-
clear grogram under international control, and not only those areas of it which are
being implemented with the direct participation of other countries. The West, which
maintains close economic and political relations with South Africa, has in its arse-
nal sufficient levers for influ~ncing it, from a halt to supplies of enriched uran-
ium and cancellation of the order for nuclear power stations through the imposi-
tion of a total economic embargo and Pretoria's political isolation.
'Phroughout the period 1978-1930 the United States sounded out at government level
South Africa's positions on the question of the latter signing the Nonproliferation
Treaty. In the event of the treaty being signed South Africa would undertake in
principle to agree to IAEA control of its nuclear program. For its part, Washington, _
~s "rn~pens~t7on3" would continue supplying South Africa with enriched uranium.
Washington categorizes this potential "deal" as evidence of the United States' far-
sigi~ted policy in southern Africa, while the South African press regards it as a big
win for Pretoria. The point being that the manifold forms of South Africa`s nu-
clear cooperation with the United States and other Western countrias would enable
it to save t_ens of millions of doll~lrs on its nuclear research program. Simultaneous-
ly the hroadening of official ^hannels of communications with the Western countries
would contribute to a deceleration of the process of Pretoria's isolation in the
international arena. Assessing the agreement with South Africa which was in prep-
aration., LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE emphasized in September 1978 the dubiousness of
the facr. that it would provide for stricter control over its nuclear capacity. It
is rather, according to the ~ournal, an indication of the strengthening of relations .
between tlie "custodian of the interests of the West" and the "white authorities"
at a time when the struggle in southern Africa is assuming extensive proportions.50
Second, the Western countries' ruling circles could have adopted a more constructive
approach to a study of the idea of making Africa a zone free of nuclear weapons. But
short-term strategic calculations of the leaders of the Western states, which are
constr~icted from standpoints of the cold war times, still prevent an understanding
of the fact that their lon -term interests will be in jeopardy in the event of the
spread of nuclear weapons.~l
Third, the fact of the coincidence of South Africa's preparations for testing a
nuclear ~veapon with the accelerated development of new nuclear missile systems in
th~. United States--neutron bombs, cruise missiles--indicates that the further race
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in nuclear arms is continuing to stimulate the process of their acquisition by other
countries. In 1977 Pretoria calculated that the wave of protests against th~. United
States' neutron bomb would deaden the resonance of its tests and facilitate its
entry onto the path of nuclear armaments.
All this leads to the conclusion that the Pentagon's caurse toward obtaining unilat- -
eral strategic advantages and an endeavor to lead the nuclear arms race could have
a directly opposite, negative result for the long-term interests of the Western
countries' "security" since they are complicating the struggle against the spread
of nuclear weapons worldwide.52
The threat of the further spread of nuclear weapons in the world urgently dictates
the need for the Western countries to abaiidon the foreign poliGy approach of the
times of the cold war, when all changes in the world were viewed through the prism
of bilateral West-East confrontation. Only a policy of relaxation of tension and ~
cooperation on key issues of world politics can guarantee the successful solution
of the acute new~ Y~oblems, including the problems of nonproliferation, confronting
mankind.
We have to agree with the opinion of the WASHINGTON YOST, which valued higlily the
interaction of countries of East and West in frustrating the nuclear tests in South
Africa in August 1977 and expressed the hope that this interaction would b~ conti-
~ nued: "If such cooperat~on could be strengthened and extended...the events of these
last few weeks...could serve as a historic precedent.~"53 Indeed, removal of the
nuclear threat at the Cape of Good Hope would be an important contribution to the
consolidation of peace worldwide.
As in the case with South Africa, Wrastern countries have played the main part in
building up Tel Aviv's nuclear potei:tial. ~
Israel has a comparatively small nuclear prooram, which at the present time includes
two scientific research reactors: one was built in 1959 with the assistance of the
United States, the other in 1960 with the assistance of France near Dimona. Whereas
the fi.rst reactor is controlled by the IAEA, the second operates without any con-
- trol in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy. When, at the start of the 1960's,
an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft discovered nuclear facilities in Dimona
and President J. Kennedy demanded explanations from Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, the
_ latter replied that it wzs a"textile factory." A11 U.S. attempts at the highest
level to inspect this reactor throughout the 1970's were fruitless since they en-
countered a categorical refusal in Tel Aviv (a group of inembers of Congress visit-
ing Israel was refused in 1976). It is precisely this reactor which produces the
plutonium which Israel is using for military purposes.
- Economically Israel has no burning need to develop nuclear power stations and
greeted Washington's 197~ proposal to sell it a nuclear power station unenthusias-
tically. Althaugh talks are currently coritinuing on nuclear power station suppliea,
it is nevertheless believed that Tel Aviv will not accept the terms of the sale form-
ulated by the J. Carter administration, which provide for the establishment of IAEA _
control over hhe country's entire nuclear activity. ~
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In the .SIPRI's estimation, Israel has a small installation ~or extracting plutonium
from spent fuel and is working on the creation of uranium enrichment equipment. The
Dimona reactor annually produces 40 kilos of plutonium, which is sufficient for the
productiQn of four atomic bombs.54 Israel does not have uranium ore reserves~ ~nd
this objectively prompts the endeavor to obtain it from various sources and in var-
ious ways.
The ["Plambet"] affair concerning the sale of 200 tons of American uranium ore,
which was shipped to the Euratom countries in 1968, but which did not reach its
destination, became a scandal in 1977. An investigation conducted by the appropriate
authorities of the United States and the West European countrles conta3ns the con-
clusion that the missing cargo of uranium ore was stolen and sent to Israel, in all
probablity with the direct connivance of Z. Shapiro, then president of the American
Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, who is known for his ties to representa-
tives of Israel's atomic industry. Despite its compromising nature for the Unitied
States, this conclusion is shared by the majority of Western specialists wha well
recall the theft of PT boats from the French port of Cherbourg in 1973.5~
Currently the main supplier of uranium raw material to Israel is South Africa, which
receives from Tel Aviv highly developed nuclear technology in exchange. CooFeration
in the nuclear sphere continues with France and the United Statps.
Does Israel have atomic weapons? This question is now being debated increasingly
in the Western press, particularly followi.ng an article which appeared in TIME mag-
azine on 12 April 1976 whose authors concluded that Tel Aviv possessed nuclear
weaparis uad was close ro using them during the 1973 Near East conflict.56 Offi-
cially Tel Aviv holds to the version expressed by Prime Minister L. Eshkol in 1964:
"Israel cioes not have atomic weapons and will not be the first country in this area
to acquire them." However, with time, a certain ambiguity has been observed in
statements on this score. The same L. Eshkol emphasized in 1968 that Israel pos- -
sessed the secret of the production of nuclear weapons, but was still far from the
possibility of producing them.s~ In 1974 Israeli President E. Ratzir (himself a
nuclear engineer) gave the following ambiguous answer to a question from American
journalists as to whether Tel Aviv possessed nuclear weapons: "Why should this con-
cern you? Let others worry about it." In sum, Tel Aviv's official line amounts to
an official denial of the presence of atomic weapons and indirect confirmation of
the capacity to produce them. This tactic affords Israel an opportunity to make
flexible use a�:its nuclear potential as political and military blackmail in re-
spect of the Arab countries, at the same time "not exasperating" the United States
in its policy of nonproliferation and not openly challenging world public opinion.
In the CIA's estimation, Israel has in fact already created nuciear weapons. This
viewpoint is reinforced by the following facts: first, Te1 Aviv has accumulated
- targe stocks of plutonium and uranium, partially with the help of secret operations;
second, its efforts in the sphere of the development of techniques of uranium en-
richment and plutonium conversion are of an ambiguous nature; and, third, great
attention is being paid to the creation of its own nucl.ear weapon delivery vehicles.
It is believed in the West that Israel will not endeavor to demonstrate its nuclear `
capabilities by way of the open testing of nuclear weapons, the less so in that
there is currently no need for this technically. However, indications of a refine-
mer..t of the nuclear weapons and the further development of atomic potential could
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be manifested obliquely in subsequent decisions on the development of its own nu-
clear missile systems, particularly in an increase in the range and accuracy of the
Jericho missiles, and also in decisions on the acquisi.~ionof American missiles far its
owri air force.58
The existence of the obvious technical capacity for creating nuclear weapons also
conditions Tel Aviv's negative attitude toward the Nonproliferation Treaty. While
the Arab countries under+took in principle to maintain their nonnuclear status,
having signed the corresponding treaty, Israel declined to do this. It is for this
very reason that a number of Arab countries has not ratified the treaty. Even at
the present stage Israel continues to adopt a negative attitude toward the question
of being a party to the treaty. The main reason for this position is that sub-
scribing to the treaty would, iai the ruling cirles' calculatiaa~s;. reduce the signi-
ficance of the "psychological means of restraint" which the nuclear potential re-
presents and would deprive Israel of a"valuable trump card" in political negotia-
tions in the Near East.
Another factor determining Israel's positian is the fact that subscribing to the
treaty would signify official renunciation of the acquisition of nuclear weapons,
as a result of which it would be far more difficult for the United States to recon-
cile itself to a subsequent decision on the production of nuclear weapons if some ~
ne~w circumstances, in the opinion of Israel's leaders, required this.
As a whole, the general opinion among politicians in the West is that Israel is
technically and materially capable of producing atomic weapons and delivering trem
to the target and that, considering the ambiguous statements of its leaders and
the ne:gative attitude on the question of subscribing to the Nonproliferation Treaty,
it cannot be ruled out that, under certain conditions, the country could make a
" decisive" choice in favor of nuclear weapons. This situation continnes to engender
suspicion in the Near East countries in respect of Tel Aviv's nuclear intentions ~
and could be the detonator of a chain reaction of proliferation in this crisis area
of the world.
Pakistan does not subscribe to the Nonproliferation Treaty and has not signed the
1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Pakistan's attitude toward t~onproliferati~n
is largely determined by its traditional rivalry wi th India. Back at the end of
the 1960's the future head of state, A. Bhutto, emphasized that in the event India
acquired nuclear weapons, the Pakistani people would "eat grass," buL ~o everything
possible to catch up with it.
Information was prevalent in UN circles in 1979 that Pakistan was preparing in the
verynear future to test its own nuclear device.59
By the start of the 198d's Pakistan had only one nuclear reactor, which had been
supplied by Canada. In 1976 Pakistan signed an agreement with France an the pur-
chase of a plant for the conversion of spent fuel, which caused acute contradictions
between the United States and France and the United States and Pakistan. The
acquisition of equipment for breeding is un~ustified economically and merely testi-
fies to Islamabad's true intentions. As the newspaper LE MONDE emphasized, "it
is hard to ima.gine why Pakistan, which has just one nuclear power station...can
be in economic need of a nuclear fuel reprocessing installation which could only b60
justified by a big nuclear program based on the construction of breeder reactors.
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Following certain changes in France's export policy at the end of the 1970's,
steps were taken to modify the original agreement to reduce the risk of the accumul-
ation of plutonium in Pakistan. A report appeared in the Western press in August
1978 that the Franco-Pakistani agreement might be canceled owing to France's un-
willingness to supp.ly dangerous equipment and a refusal to compromise on these is-
sues on the part of Pakistan. The ~ournal NUCLEAR NEWS reported simultaneously
that the possible annulment of the deal was caused by a PRC proposal to supply
analogous equipment.61 American political scientists believe that Beijing's en-
deavor to create a new military-political geometry in South Asia could prompt the
PRC's more active assistance in the nuclear sphere to its allies, including Paki-
stan.
Initially the United States, for its part, put considerable pressure on Pakistan
for the latter to cancel the deal. In 1977 Washington imposed as a repressive mea-
sure an embargo on supplies of modern American arms to Pakistan, particularly 110
- A-7 aircraft. In 1979 the United States made the decision to discontinue economic
assistance to the tune of $40 million for the current fiscal year and $45 million
for the following year in response to Pakistan's attempts to clandestinely create
a uranium enrichment plant. '
However, at the start of 1980 Washington all but abandoned the policy of restraining
Pakistan's "nuclear ambitions" when it proposed massive supplies of modern arms to
= Islamabad for the purpose of incorporating it in the Pentagon's aggressive prepara-
tions in Asia. The American press evaluated the arms supplies as "silent encourage-
ment" of the aspirations of Pakistan's ruling circles' to acquire nuclear weapons.
Argentina has not subscribed to the Nonproliferation Treaty or the Limited Test
Ban Treaty. It has signed the Tlatelolco Treaty on a nuclear-free zone in Latin
America, but has not ratified it. Argentina is considered a country with a com-
paratively high level of development of the atomic industry. It has considerable
reserves of natural uranium, and, given the absence of other sources of ener~y,
attaches importance to the development of nuclear power stations. A 320-megaWatt
nuclear reactor supplied the FRG has been operating in the country since 1974.
A second will come on stream at the start of the 1980's. The installation of fac-
tories far the production of uranidm fuel is continuing. Argentina possesses its
own low-r_apacity nuclear fuel reprocessing installation, which enables it to re-
cover and store plutonium. By 1983 the average annual plutonium product will con-
stitute 340 kilos.62 A large industrial plant for converting spent fuel is being
installed simultaneously with France's assistance. In addition, there are six
scientific research reactors in Argentina, one of which is the biggest in Latin
America. As a whole, Argentina has sufficient economic resources and trained per-
sonnel far carrying out a nuclear arms program.
A distinctive feature of Argentina's policy in the sphere of the peaceful use of
nuclear energy is emphasis on the need to preserve independence in the nuclear
sphere. For example, its nuclear reactors operate on natural uranium. It opted
for. such a path specially in order not to export [sis] enriched uranium from other
countries,, particularly the United States, and thus not be dependent on them. In
- 1974 Argentina signed an agreement on an exchange of nuclear information with
India.
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Argentina consistently pursues a policy of keeping its hands free in the nuclear
- sphere. Its reasons for not signing the Nonproliferation Treaty am~ount, as a
whole, to the fact that it could i.mpede its economic development (the reference
beirlg, in particular, to the article on nuclear explosions for peaceful purpo~ee)~
The country's leaders have emphasized repeatedly that Argentina has the right to
the independent use of explosions, which, as they put it, "are most promising trom
the economic viewpoint." At the same time SIPRI experts believe that economically
Argentina "would stand to gain far more from joining the ranks of those who have -
subscribed to the treaty, which provides for supplies of nuclear fuel and techno-
logical assistance in the nuclear sphere."63 They draw attention to the fact that
not signing the treaty is not a direct indication that Argentina intends to create
nuclear weapons. But such a decision could be influenced by the position on these
issues of its traditional rival in Latin America--Brazil. As emphasized in a CIA
document on the spread ~f nuclear weapons carried in the press in 1978, political
considerations concerning prestige in Latin America could largely prompt Argentina's
decision on taking the path of nuclear armament.64
Neither has Brazil joined the Nonproliferation Treaty. Although it has signed the
Tlatelolco Treaty, it has nevertheless repeatedly stressed its right to independent-
ly conduct nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which is contrary to the
articles of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Until recently Brazil was behind Argen-
tina in the level of development of the atomic industry. Its first industrial
500-megawatt nuclear reactor, supplied by the United States, was commissioned in
1977. But the situation changed following the signing in 1975 of a 15-year agree-
ment with the FRG on the sale of nuclear equipment to the tune $5 billion. In ac-
cordance with the agreement, the ~RG obtained guaranteed access to natural uranium
and thorium reserves. In turn, Brazil acquired 8 industrial reactors operating on
enriched uranium, a plant for the production of uranium fuel and a plant for ~
uraniimm enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, whtch insured the complete nuclear
fuel cycle. And this essentially affords an opportunity for proceeding to the cre-
ation of nuclear weapons, if such a decision were to be made.
Following the signing of the agreement with the FRG, Bxazil's foreign minister de-
clared that the country had acquired new technological and political status in the
world arena as a result. Brazil's leaders have repeatedly made it understood that
_ they consider nuclear might and international positions inseparably interconnected.
Wil'~ Brazil follow along the path of use of the atomic program far military pur-
poses? A decision on this question will largely depend, as a number of experts
emphasizes, on the course opted for by its neighbor--Argentina. The ruling cir-
cles' endeavor to enhance the cuuntry's ir~ternational status and a certain apprehen-
sion as regards Argentina's intentions are, it is believed, strong factors which
could lead in the future to a policy of nuclear armament.
In addition tc agreements with the FRG, ~ance and the Uni~ed States in the atomic
energy sphere, Brazil has similar agreements with Britain, India and Israel. Bra- -
zil's objections to the Nonproliferation Treaty are largely similar to those of
Argentina, and experts emphasize that its position on joining the treaty will
largely depend on the evolution of the approach of this neighboring country.
The Arab Republic of Egypt has signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, but has not
ratified it. The reason why Eygpt continues to hold off from the treaty basically
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amounts to the f act that the s tate opposed to it--Israel--is also not party to the
treaty and that its policy has all the indications of the accelerated development
of the nuclear potential. Furthermore, Egypt believes that the security guarantees
to the nonnuclear countries contained in the UN Security Council resolution are in-
sufficiently dependable and that they should be of the precise form of commitmeritg
of the nuclear states to regard the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear subscriber-countries as perfectly adequate grounds for the collective pre-
vention of nuclear aggression or retaliatorq measures against the aggressor.
Egypt is far behind Israel in a technological respect. It has only one sma3.1 and
inefficient scientific research reactor. During a tour of Near East countries in
19~4 U.S. President R. Nixon proposed selling Egypt and, simultaneoulsy, Israel _
600-megawatt industrial nuclear reactors. This proposal aroused strong opposition
both in the United States its elf and in other countries as an act contrary to the
spirit of the Nonproliferation Treaty, particularly since the sale proposal was not ,
made dependent on a precise system of control of the equipment. Critics also em-
phasized that the sale proposal failed to take accotmt of the fact that the intro-
duction of nuclear technology in crisis areas of the world could lead to its use in
the future for military purpo ses also.
According to press reports, talks on the sale of the reactors are almost complete, _
and, according to the p1an, in the event of the sale, the nuclear power stations
will be commissioned by the rnid-1980's.
It needs to be pointed out that Tel Aviv's position on nuclear issues is the prin-
cipal factor determining Egypt's policy. As the majority of American specialists
believes, the country will hardly ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty until Israel
takes similar steps in this direction. An increase in Israel's nuclear potential
could prompt Egypt, given the ~senceof an adequate technological base of it own,
to purchase nuclear devices from other coimtries with the help of the rich oiI-
producing Arab countries and also to strive to extend cooperation in the nuclear ~
sphere with the leading West European countri~s.65
Right up to the ouster of the monarchy in Iran in January 1979 Tehran's policy of
building up its technical potential in the nuclear sphere was a cause for uncon-
cealed anxiety even among American experts. Although the country had signed and
ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty, the great-power ambitions of the monarchist
ruling clique nevertheless made a change in the approach to the question of the
possesion of nuclear weapons a definite possibility. In September 1975 the former
shah of Iran declared in an interview with the NEW YORK TIMES that, given certain
changes :tn international relations, Tehran might reexamine its position on this
issue: "If 20-30 ludicrously small countries, were to attempt to create nuclear
weapons, in this case I would be forced to reexamine our policy."66
The monarchist regime's ende~var to occupy the dominant position militarily in the
Persian Gulf and make the co untry the world's fifth strongest state by the start of
the 21st century could have prompted the inclusion of nuclear weapons in the mili-
tary arsenal if only as a symb ol of future political status.
Of course, proceeding along this path could have prompted simi.lar steps on the
p~~t of a number of Arab coun tries situated in the Persian Culf zone and also the
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negative rea~tion of the states bordering it. The monarchist ruling clique would
have been forced to take serious accotmt of these consequences before making the
decision to create its own nuclear weapons. At the same time the large-scale
program of the development of Tehran's atomic energy, which was hardly justified
from an econamic viewpoint, testified that the monarchy intended to preserve its
freedom of choice in this question.
According to preliminary plans, nuclear power station capacity in Iran was to have
constituted 34,000 megawatts by 1995. Iran would have had to have purchased 25
nuclear power stations to achieve this figure. Only one scientific research reactor ~
was operating by the start of the 1980's. But the number of completed deals and
the shah's government's negotiations on new purchases indicated that the country`s
technical potential in the nuclear sphere a*ould increase sharply. In 1974 Iran
concluded an agreement with the FRG and France on the purchase of nuclear power
stations which were to have been commissioned in the mid-1980's. To obtain access -
to enriched uranium Iran granted a loan of $1 billion to France's atomic agency
and secured for itself 10 percent of the stock of the new CORDIF uranium enrichment
consortium. In parallel with the development of relations with the West European
countr~i~s Tehran also maintained course tow~rd the acquisit3~sn of nuclear power
stations from the United States.
Agreement was reached between the United States and Iran in the latter half of the
1970's on the supply of eight nuclear reactors to the tune of $7 billion. In the
negotiations with the United States, France and the FRG on new purchases the monar-
chical government repeatedly att~mpted to obtain equipment for uranium enrichment
and spent fuel conversion. This testified that Iran aspired to the achievement of
independence~in the enrichment and breeding sphere, which ~rould have afforded it
uncontrolled possibilities in the event of a decision to proceed to the creation
of nuclear weapons.
The reexamination of the cotm try's foreign poli~y following the ove*:throw of the
monarchy led to a certain reevaluaiton by Tehran of the plans for the large-scale
development of the atomic industry. After the new Iranian Government canceled a
number of arms purchases which the shah had concluded with the United States and
West European countries, the implementation of deals in the atomic industry sphere
was also questioned.
In this situation certain American specialis.ts believe that although the idea itself
of the creation of a strong technological potential in the nuclear sphere in the
long term could remain within Tehran's sights, the complex problems of the coun-
try's socioeconomic reorganization will, in all probali.ility, play the paramount part
in the system of the cotmtry's political priorities.
South Korea and Taiwan have subscribed to the Nonproliferation Treaty; but, Ameri-
can experts believe, factors brought about by their strategic vulnerability and
the traditxonal confrontation with the PRC could have a strong impact on the deci-
sion to take the path of nuclear armament. In 1976 Taiwan built a laboratory device
for the breeding of nuclear fuel on which, according to reports of SIPRI specialists,
work came to a halt at the end c+f the same year under pressure ~rom the United States.
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South Korea has two scientific research reactors and ia creating two nuclear power
_ stations, and a rsactor is also on order from Canada. In 1976 Seoul declared its
intention to purchase a conversion plant from France, but these plan5 were canceled
tutder pressure from the United States.
In the opinion of the well-known American com~entator J. Anderson, the CIA has suf- -
ficient information to the effect that, despite Seoul's official assurances that
- it will not produce a nuclear device, the South Korean regime "possesses the neces-
sary knowledge and resources for its manufacture."67 South Korea and Taiwan, which
are situated in a crisis area of the worid, require closer attention in the sphere
of the threat of proliferation, all the more so in that an endeavor to acquire
= nuclear weapons can be clearly traced in their policy. Thus a CIA report pointed
out direct~:y that "Taiwan's currPnt policy {s most probably leading to the creation
of nuclear weapons."~8 As is believed in the West, these states' decision on the
question of whether to take the path of nuclear armament or not will ~argely depend -
on the evolution of the international situation in this region and on their. relations
in the military sphere with the United States.
' It has to be noted that in addition to the above-mentioned countries, which the
majority of American experts cat egurizes as the main candidates for the "nuclear
club," there is a further numbe.r of coimtries which hint from time to time of their
aspirati_on to the acquisi~ion of their own nuclear weapons, but which as yet lack
the tecr~nical potential. Thus when the United States cut off military assistance to
Turlcey a t the time of the Greek-Turkish conflict connected with the Cyprus problem,
certain of its leaders also began to talk of the desirability of the acquisition
of such weapons . Rumors circulate regularly in the Western press that Libya has
requested that the PRC and France sell it atomic weapons (it was announced in
- 1976 that France had supplied Libya with a 600-megawatt scientific research reactor) .
The i'ugoslav press also discusses the possibilities of the creation of nuclear wea-
pons from time to time.69
To this i t should be added that a number of industrially developed countries has
long had the teclinical potential for the independent creation of nuclear weapons,
but for certain considerations prefers not to take this path. These include the
FRG, Japan, Ttaly, Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Netherlands and others.
Expert~' attention is drawn to the positions on nonproliferation issues of the
fi.rst tw~ states for the success of the struggle against the spread of nuclear wea-
pons could largely depend on their position. ,
Currently the FRG and Japan are full--fledged parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty, ~
but it was ratified in these eauntries in an atmosphere of acute internal political
struggl.e arter an interval of 5 years since it was signed. In accordance with the
1954 Paris Accords, the FRG had undertaken not to create nuclear weapons on its
territ~ry, but this undertaking did not rule out, however, the possibility of their
purchase o~ rreation on the territory of other countries. At the time of the sign-
~ ing of the treaty the FRG's ruling circles insisted on obtaining commitments from
the United states that the treaty would not prevent the possibility of the creatton
= of European nuclear forces (ENF) . L. Dimn and H. ~Cahn, research fellows of the
Hudson Institute, observe that, by all inaicat~ons, the FRG is in its export policy
in the nuclear sphere pursuing a la~ig-term ~aurse toward the ~pread . of nuclear
we:~pons in the world, endeavoring to weakeii the positions of the existing nuclear
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powers and, as a consequence, lift the taboo on its own nuclear weapons in the
future.~~ Thanks to the FRG's high technological level, a very insignificant length
of time would be needed to embark on this path. Nevertheless, the majority of
experts agrees on the little likelihood of such a step since it is perfectly clear
that such a turnabout would elicit sharp opposttion on the part of the socialist
countries and the states allied with the FRG. In the CIA's estimation, "only the
total co3.lapse of the existing security structures (which is of little probability
in the immediate future) in Europe accompanied by an increase in military tension
in the world might prompt the FRG to take this path. Even a limited proliferation
among other countrdes would hardly have a serious effect on the approach to this
problem."71 The FRG's ruling circles currentlq prefer to derive the increasing
economic benefits from the position of a nonnuclear power, profiting from the
United States' "nuclear umbrella."
Japan's position is largely similar to the FRG's approach. Provisions of Japan's
Constitution prevent to a certair~ extent independent provision with nuclear weapons,
although repeated attempts have been made to revise the constitutional barriers
under the pressure of a number of military and political groupings. Emphasizing

. the high level of development of the country's atomic industry, former U.S. Secretary
of State H. Kissinger stressed in an interview with the ASAHI EVENING NEWS in July
1978 that "there are no technical means preventing Japan creating nuclear weapons."
But the sharp opposition to such a step both inside the country an3 abroad is the
cause of the Japanese ruling circles' restraint and caution on this matter. A
number of military specialists believes that acquiring its own nuclear weapons
would prove "a disastrous step" for Japan's strategic position as an island state.
It has to be noted that there is no uniform opinion among American e~erts in an
evaluation of Japan's future policy. True, the majority of them, including high
- CIA and State Department officials, believes that, given the absence of abrupt
changes in the balance of forces in the Far East, Japan is unlikely to take the
- path of nuclear armament. However, representatives of the Defense Department (par-
ticularly the navy ) believe that to achieve its long-term goals in the developing
Asian countries and to create a favorable alinement of forces in the plane of eco-
nomic and political interests Japan's leaders could begin to seriously reexamine
the gossibility of the creation of nuclear weapons. In their estimation, such a
decision could be made at the start of the 1980's and rapidly in the event of the
further spread of nuclear weapons in the world, which could lead to a lessening of
the traditional domestic oppositton and the disappearance of the "atomic allergy."
At the same time experts agree that Japan's future course in nuclear issues wi41 be
conditioned to a considerable extent by the development of the situation in As~a and -
the evolution of its military relations with the United States.72
In order to become a nuclear countr.y in the full sense of the word it is not enough
to have tested nuclear devices or to have secretly fabricated them; it is also neces--
sary to have dependable delivery vehicles. And here the majority of specialists
emphasizes that, owing to imperialisttrade rivalry in conventional modern types of -
armament, a situation has evolved wherein a number of "threshold" countries, while
not yet testing nuclear weapons, already has at its disposal vehicles for their
guar4nteed delivery to the target (table 1). For example, the Skyhawk A-4, Star-
fighter F-104, Phantom F-4, Mirage V, Canberra and Buccaneer have a capacity of
4.5, 2, 7, 4, 3 and 6 tons respectively. The range of the Skyhawk, Canberra and
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Buccaneer is up to 6,000 kilometers; that of the Phantom, Starfighter and r~rage
up to 3,000 kilometers.
Table 1. Nuclear Weapon Delivery Vehicles in the Arsenals of Certain "Threshold"
Countries
Country Vehicle potentially capable of delivering nuclear weapons
Argentina Skyhawk A-4, Canberra, Mirage III-E
Egypt Phantom V
Brazil Mirage III-EB
Israel Phantom II, Skyhawk A-4, Mirage IIIs and the Jericho missile
Iran Phantom IV, V
Pakistan Canberra, Mirage V, Mirage III-E
Taiwan Starfighter F-104
FRG Starfighter F-104, Phantom II and Honest Johr~,Pershing I and
Sergeant missiles
South Korea Phantom V an.d Honest John missile
South Africa Canberra, Buccaneer, Mirage F-1, Mirage III-E
Japan Phantom II, Starfighter F-104
T~.Ule compil.ed on the basis of data of "Mi.litary Balance 1979-1980," London, 1979.
The ground-to-ground missiles such as the Israeli Jericho (range of 1,000 kilo-
meters) and the American Pershing 1(720 kilometers), Lance (139 kilometers),
Sergeant (135 kilometers) and Honest John (40 kilometers) also have the necessary.
specifications for delivering nuclear weapons. If necessary, these missiles, which
are used for s~udyir.g the atmosphere, can be adapted for other purposes.
Considering the scale of the trade in modern and refined weapons, the majo:�ity of
states will encounter no serious difficulties in acquiring the above nuclear weapon
- delivery vehicles . Specialists aZso d~raw atten~ion totl~e fa~t that aircraft of civil avia-
tion like the Boeia?g: 707 could alsobe used, with eertain siight modifications , as a delivery
vehicle for "crude" atom bombs.
Thus the majority of "near-nuclear" countries possesses nuclear weapon delivery
vehicles capable of striking targets in states which border them.
As experience testifies, the development and maintenance at a modern level of even
"modest" nuclear forces is an extraordinarily costly business. For example, ex-
penditure on the creation of the nuclear forces of Britain and France has amounted
to more than $10 billion. However, whereas previously countries began their mili-
tary nucleax programs almost from scratch, now progress in the peaceful use of
atomic energy has created the conditions for programs of the fabrication of nuclear
devices with a sharply reduced degree of corresponding expenditure. In the SIPRI's
estimation, India's expenditure on conducting a nuclear explosion f.or peaceful
purposes in 1974 amounted to approximately $500.,000, mainly because this explosion
was a b~product of a wide-ranging program of the peaceful use of atomic energy. _
Cost is no longer a significant obstacle on the path of the creation of atomic bombs
on the b asis of plutonium. In F. Barnaby's estimation, for many small countries an
atom bomb with a yield of 20 kilotons could be the weapon for striking strategic
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_ targets in neighboring states. Considering the relatively low cost of various de-
livery systems and their availability on the world market, "modest" nuclear forces
_ based on the independent creation of nuclear devices would cost several hundred
million dollars, which would correspond to the cost of a modern cruiser.73
More modern nuclear forces could cost more, but not so much as to be beyond the
means of a number of countri~s whose military budgets are growing constantly. Thus
E. Lefever, a research assistant of the Brookings Institution, believes that the
cost of creating "moderate nuclear forces" (120-kiloton atom bombs, 30-50 nuclear
weapon carrier bombers and 50 ground-to-ground guided missiles with a range of
1,500 miles) would amount in 1978 prices over a decade to $3.5 billion.74
Thus the availability of deli~ery vehicles and the high level of development of
nuclear technology theoretically bring about the existence of the "physical" poten-
tial for the creation of "deterrent forces" by a number of "threshold" countries.
It must be noted that the American experts' forecasts concerning the rate of pro-
liferation has pxoved extraordinarily overstated in the past and, consequently,
unrealistic~ Immediately following the testing of a nuclear weapon in the United
States, scientists who worked within the Manhatten Project framework were predict-
_ ing the rapid proliferation of atomic weapons in the absence of the strict inter-
national control of atomic energy. The physicist H. Uri believed that half a
dozen countries would join the "nuclear club" within 5 years. Another atomic sci-
entist--[I. ~LendzhmuirJ--believed that in the wake of the United States nuclear
weapons would be acquired by the states which participated in joint work with the
United States, namely Canada and Britain, and then by states opposed to the United
States.
The second wave of alarmed forecasts came at the end of the 1950's and the start of
the 1960's, when the consequences of the "Atom~ for Peace" program--an increase in
countries' technical capabilities in the nuclear sphere--made themselves keenly
' felt. Official representatives of zhe D. Eisenhower administration predicted that
not only Canada and Sweden but also the FRG would possess nuclear weapons at the
start of the 1960's. The American Academy of Sciences and the National Planning
Association emphasized in a joint study in 1960 that, given tha absence of intern.a- -
tional. control, there would be 10 nuclear states in the world in 5 years. The well- =
known atomic physicist K. Snow declared in 19oG, speaking of the prevailing opinion
among his colleagues, that all physicis~s "know that more than a dozen countries
will need possibly only 6 years to acquire nuclear weapons."75 In the mid-1960's
Lord Chalfont, then a British foreign minister, believed that by the mid-1970's
_ the number of nuclear countries would have risen to 10 or 12.76 But these forecasts
have not been corroborated. Compared with the early anxious predictions the real
increase in the number of countries which have tested nuclear weapons has occurred
comparatively slowly. Following the testing o~ an atomic weapon bq the third state
--Britain--in 1952, the three subsequent countries conducted tests at intervals of
8, 4 and 10 years over a 22-year period.
Such forecasts proved grotmdless largely because they were based on false premises. .
It was believed, for example, that achievement of the technical capacity for the
production of x~uclear weapons would also automatically entail a politic~l decision,
that is, that the lat�ter would play a part derived from the technical patential.
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But it gradually became clear that it is precisely political considerations in the
question of whet'.,er to have or not to have nuclear weapons which play the decisive
_ part and that factors exist impeding embarkation:� on the path of nuclear armament.
Past forecasts took account neither of the degree of risk to a country's position
in the world ensuing from a decision to possess nuclear weapons nor the degree of
_ benefit in the event of refraining from such a step.
To take the temporal aspect, it might appear at first sight that with the passage
of time the proliferation process abates and could finally be reduced to nothing.
Thus in the first decade of the atomic age (1945-1955) three countr2es tested nu-
clear devices, in the second (1955-1965) two, in the third (1965-1975) one and in
the fourth possibly not one. But this manner of reasoning does not take account
of the fact that the nonconducting of tests is accompanied by radical quantitative
and qualitative changes in the technical potential of many states. As pointed out
above, the existing programs of the use of atomic energy in a number of cou~ztries
could shorten the path which has to be traveled by this country or the other if
its ruling circles decide to provide themselves with nuclear weapons. The distance
which they would have to cover technically could now be covered far more quickly
and with less expenditure of effort than hitherto. As the American expert
A. Wohlstetter believes, under the conditions of the proliferation of nuclear
technology "m.zny states need only a small push" to finally complete the path which
will lead them to the mastery of the technical cap acity for the creation of nu-
clear weapons.~~
It is not surprising that the third wave of anxious forecasts concerning prolifera-
tion began in the mid-1970's. The forecast of W. Epstein, special assistant to the
TJN secretary general for disarmament, contains the conclusion that by the 1980's
, some 17 states will have the capacity for producing nuclear weapons and approximately
40 by 1995.78 Incidentally, it is not only the experts but also officials (like,
for example, J. Nye, then assistant U.S. secretary of state for nonproliferation)
who are inclined to believe that the number of "near-nuclear" states could be 40
by the year 2000.79
Of course, these forecasts, which were compiled on the basis of an estimation of
the proliferation only of technical potential, without regard for other factors, do
not afford an opportunity of determining the real number of states which could
talce the path of the possession of nuclear weapons, even less in that entirely
specific political conditions exist for each state. However, there is no doubt that
in the current situation the "nuclear club" could rapidly and easily expand if a
number of "near-nuclear" states takes a political decision in this sphere. Thus
D. Gompert of the Council for Foreign Relations does not rule out the possibility
that by 1990 "the nuclear community eould consist of 10 'manifest' nucl~ar powers,
5'probables' and 10 'threshold' states, which wculd be in a position to manufac-
ture a nuclear weapon within several weeks." He also be1~.QVes that more than 100
- countries will most likely not follow the ~:ath of the acquisition of their own
weapons owing to the lack of a serious threat on th e part of other states and also
owing to technological backwardness.
Certain American specialists assume that with the increase in the numb~r of nuclear
powers the significance of this weapon as a symbol of international prestige will be
devalued and that this will lead at some point in time to diminished motivations to
acguire it. While acknowledging the logic of such arguments, Gompert inclines to
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a more pessimistic conclus~ri; "As long as such prestige symbols as skyscraper~,
national airlines, a national steel-casting industry and a national atomic engineer-
ing program exist, it could happen that in the future there will most likely remain
in the wo ld only a few states which will lack the capacity for creating nucleer
weapons."~~ But the rate of prolife~ation will depend increasingly less on techni-
cal capabilities and more on the evolution of international relations and factors
which have an impact on the problems of the security of this "threshold" country .
or the other. It could increase given the development of tension in relations be-
tween East and West (North and South) and in the relations of the developing coun-
tries among themselves. And, on the contrary, de~line if th~ policy of a relaxa-
tion of tension predominates in relations between countries.
In the current situation, when the task of nonproliferation has assumed world signi-
= fi~ance and been made a part of the foreign policy priorities of the majority of
states both of the West and the East, an important part is played by consideration
of the further increase in the technical potential of the "threshold" countries
and the policy aimed at neutralizing the factors whi�h could bring about its use for
military purposes.
Comrade L.I. Brezhnev stated in a message to the participants in the 21st IAEA Gen-
eral Conference: "We cannot close our eyes to the fact that there are still forces
in the world which would like to get their hands on nuclear weapons in order to
threaten the peoples with these weapons. For this reason the task of placing a
reliable barrier on the path of the spread of nuclear weapons and averting the dan-
ger of a nuclear war is now more acute than every."81
Under conditions where there is a real possibility of an increase in the nuclear
states an analysis of the consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons for
international relations acquires special significance.
- Chapter 7. Conflict of Approaches to the FormLlation of a Long-Term Strategy in
the Nonproliferation Sphere
While displaying a comparative community of interes~s in an evaluation of the con-
sequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons American scienrists express, as a
rule, the most diverse and frequently directly opposite viewpoints when the question
of possible measures to reinforce the nonproliferation process arises. An analysis
of American political thinking in this direction pro~�ides an opportunity of por-
traying the complex picture of struggle arotmd these problems.
Disagreements begin with the estimation of the practical possibility of preventing
proliferation. A group of scientists continues to exist in the United States which
regards the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world as an inevitable process
since, they believe, it is impossible to imagine that the "threshold" countries
will renounce the temptation to dispose of nuclear weapons. The supporters of this
viewpoint are skeptical concerning the possibility of the formulation of effective
nonproliferation measures. Thus W. Griffith, a professor at MIT, claims that the
arguments and measures against proliferation are "a nonproliferation thealogy
which, crudely speaking, is equivalent to King Canute's commands to the sea to re-
_ main still. It is clear that proliferation is proceeding, and some people are
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attempting to slow it down, while others haye no great hopes of success. All this
is like the eternal struggle against sin."82 In a word, since it is no longer pos-
sible to restore "nonnuclear virginity" in the world, so also the formulation of
the question of resistance to the pressure of the supporters of the possessiot? of
nuclear weapons, as also the pursuit of a practical policy against their prolifer&-
tion, is, he believes, fruitless.
The particular danger of this concept is that it could serve as Cheoretical 3usti-
" fication for a further arms race and be the point of departure for the active en-
couragement of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is not fortuitous
that this concept has supporters among the disciples of a"from-a-position-of-
strength" policy, the advocates of the hard line of the confr~ntation of the two
social systems and also the initiators of the nuclear equipment of the countries
of the "Atlantic world." The same Prof Griffith urges, for example, the creation
, of "new centers of nuclear might," particularly the creation of joint West European
_ nuclear forces.83
Such fatalism brought about by the hopelessness of the struggle against prolifera-
tion could ultimately indeed prove fatal for the world community. It fails to take
account of the fact that the scale of the danger to mankind depends on the extent o~
proliferation and on how many and which countries take the path of the creation of
nuclear weapons. "For the preservation of world peace it is far from a matter of
indif�erence whzther there are 8 or 20 nuclear states in 10 years time. Which
_ staL-es acquire them is equally:significant,"84 A. Pierre, research assistant of the
Council for Foreign Relations correctly as~erts. For this reason it is essential to
distinguish the problem of a total and irrevocable halc to proliferation from the
.problem of its limitation and control.
Ma.ny American scientists emphasize that from the very start of the atomic age few
people believed that further proliferation could be halted inasmuch as nuclear wea-
pons were regarded as an important diplomatic and military set of tools for the
achievement of foreign policy goals. It was believed that as long as this signifi-
cance was retained nuclear weapons would not be swept into the background of world
politics and that the task of a complete halt to proliferation would be unrealistic
as distinct from the problem of limitation and contxol,�ahich in this situation is,
they believe, the sole acceptable and possible goal.
The policy of control and limitation stipulates that considerable political and
technical obstacles should be placed in the way of proliferation, that slowing down
its pace will provide time for the limitation of existing arsenals of nuclear wea-
pons, that the negative consequences of proliferation will be reduced to a minimum
and largely neutralized and that ceilings will ultimately be placed on the further
development of the very process cf proliferation. It is precisely this formulation
of the tasks, this group of experts believes, which could be a guarantee of effec- ~
tive policy in this sphere, which is counterposed to the Qessimism and fatalism
of the supporters of the inevitabiliry of proliferation cuncepts.
At the same time we cannot agree with the propmsition which is often put forward
by American scientists that if yet another country takes the path of nuclear arma-
ment, this will create a"nuclear domino" effect, that is, produce a chain reaction
of ttie proliferation of nuclear weapons.85
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Indeed, embarkation on the nuclear path by this cotm try or the other will have nega-
tive consequences for the cause of nonproliferation. Bu t the factors which prompted ~
a given country toward the nuclear path might not have an analogous impact on another
Couritry. Diversity in the evalua~~.on of the significance of nuclear weapons for the
interests of this state or the other represents the predominant characteristiC of
the state of affairs in this sphere of international relations and presupposes the
need for the formulation of a differentiated approach for each individual instance
and a careful consideration of the singularities of this country or the other. Those,
on the other hand, who believe that if one further country reinforces the "nuclear
club" this will signify the failure of nonproliferation strategy as a whole largely
ignore the concrete realities and peculiarities of the very process as such. De-
spite all the attractiveness of the aspiration to a complete halt to proliferation,
the maximalist "all or nothing" strategy could prove doomed to failure in the long
term insofar as it largely suffers from the same fatalism characteristic of the
representatives of the viewpoir.c of the inevitability and unavailing nature of the
struggle against proliferation--such is the opinion of certain American experts.
A number of American experts believes that the problem of proliferation has already
reached the stage where the question is not that of the need to prevent prolifera-
tion but of ineasures and methods of adapting to the consequences whicti it might
- bring about. Starting from a futurological analysis of the evolution of the situa-
tion in the wo~ld.over the~ext 10-20 years, they insistently recommend that techni-
cal assistance be rendered countries which will take ithe path of the creation of
nuclear weapons in instruction in the "rules and laws" of nuclear strategy to re-
duce the likelihood of chance incidents in this sphere.86
However, it should be acknowledged that such assistance could only stimulate
"threshold" countries to take the path of open nuclear armament and legalize the
proliferation process. However useful and valuable the futurological conclusions
may be, these scientists' recommendations are frequently of no positive significance
for the practical solution of the problem and are, furthermore, fraught with ob- _
vious negative consequences. In short, they could more likely bring closer the
consequences which they are attempting to avert.
It has to be noted that the predominant belief among U.S. political scientists is
that the proliferation process is susceptible to management and control. According
to their concepts, it is primarily necessary for the achievement of effectiveness
in the solution of the problem to do away with "abstract horror" in the face of the
consequences of proliferation and to concentrate attention on concrete actions in
this sphere. However, this community of view on the question of the manageability
of the prolife?-ation process exists simultaneously with a broad diversity of ap- `
proaches to the formulation of practical recommendations for U.S. foreign policy.
The classification of these approaches is extraordinaril,y complicated, which is
caused primarily by the complexity of the nonproliferation problem itself. The
proposed reco~endations depend on how the proliferation process is understood, on
its place in the system of foreign policy priorities and also on who is making them
and what forces they represent in the United States. It would appear expedient for
a correct orientation in this wave of opinions and reco~nendations to dwell briefly
on~a determination of the genesis of the pr~liferation of nuclear weapons.
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The difference in the approaches of American scientists to averting the spread of
nuclear weapons is often determined by the qualification of the very process of
proliferation upon discovery of the reasons for it. One viewpoint amounts to the
fact that it is a purely "technical" problem for the creation of nuclear weapons
depends on the presence or absence of technical potential. Proceeding from this,
recommendations are made concerning the need for the main accent in nonproliferation
strategy to be put on limiting the use f.or industrial purposes of the particularly
dangerous components of atomic engineering and fissionable material. In a word,
the less of the latter at other countrie~' disposal, the less the likelihood of
proliferation. A large group of American eacperts believes that it is difficult
to justify the further development of atomic power engineering, considering its
manifold negative consequences. Control over the use of nuclear technology and
materials is, in their opinion, simply an analgesic incapable of removing the "di-
sease" itself. Radical surgical measures are needed, these experts believe, which _
could place definite ceilings on the development of atomic pawer engineering in the
immediate future.
The opposite viewpoint amounts to the fact that proliferation is a purely "political"
problem not connected with questions of the development of atomic power engineering.
Political and military considerations dlctating the decision to acquire nuclear wea-
pons--this is the main cause of proliferation, and by no means the presence of
technical potential. The supporters of this viewpoint believe that the creation of
technical barriers in the way of proliferation are doomed to fail. The main atten-
tion, they believe, should be paid to poli~.ical influence on the position of this
state or the other, that is, neutralizatior. of the very causes of proliferation.
It sho uld be observed that each of the two approaches in question.has both positive
and negative aspects. On the one hand, few people doubt that if this country or
the other possesses the material capability of providing itse3f with nuclear weapons; -
this facilitates a decision being made to create such. Furthermore, politica3: in- -
fluence for the purpose of preventing such a step might in this case prove insuf-
ficiently effective. A scenario in which a majority of countries, including a num-
ber of reactionary regimes, possesses the technology and materials necessary to
. produce nuclear weapons appears sufficiently intimidating to underestimate or
altogether ignore the problem of limitation and control in the use of particularly
dangerous technology and materials.
On the other hand, the inadequacy of such an approach is no less evident since it
identiFies the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons with that of the
proliferation of nuclear technology. Acquired capacity for the creation of nuclear
- potential is far from synonymous with its pracrical use. If material capacity were
the main driving force of proliferation, it would be logical to assume that over
20 countries possessing the necessary technology would already have nuclear weapons,
these including Canada, Japan, the FRG, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland and
others. It has to Ue noted here that a nostalgia is sensed in the views of the -
supporters of the so-called "technical" approach for the times of the "bipolar
world," when the United States could disregard the political parameters of the non- ~
proliferation problem inasmuch as the technology and knowledge in the sphere of
nuclear ~veapons were accessible to only two-three countries.
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- In the contemporary politically "multipolar world" with the extensive proliferation
of the appropriate technology and knowledge such an approach could fail .to pass the
test in a confrontation with reality. The well-known experts in the nuclear physics _
ephere, T. Taylor and H. Feiveson, believe that in atomic engineering "no magicel
meagures will be able to convert a basically political problem into a technical
one.... In the long term it will be impossible to seriously inhibit proliferation
as long as nuclear weapons are regarded as of political benefiti only to those who
possess them.~87 -
The purely "technical approach" to the problem of nonprol~feYa~ion is very convenient
to those who advocate the need to continue the nuclear arms race within the United
States itself and the policy of confrontation with the USSR. Military experts and
representatives of the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex are inclined to
view this problem in isolation from the Uni�ed States' practical policy in the
nuclear sphere, closing their eyes to the close connection between the policy of
nuclear armament and the problem of nonproliferation. As a rule, the supporters
of this direction support the Nonproliferation Treaty and pay lipservice to the
urgent need to cap the spread of nuclear weapons. However, they attempt to reduce
the entire policy in this sphere to measures for controlling other countries' use
of nuclear installations and materials. Their inconsistency becomes obvious when
the question arises concerning the need for an ad~ustment of American military
policy and the formulation of concrete proposals to limit the arms race lest the
American nuclear arsenal serve as motivation for other countr~ies' creation of their
own nuclear weapons.
The representatives of this approach display a double~ standard towards other couni
tries and themselves, declaring that the interests of U.S. security take pre-
cedence over all considerstions connected with nonproliferation and asserting that
it is necessary to continue to refine America`s nuclear potential and ach ieve super-
_ iority over the USSR.88 ~
It is perfectly obvious that the blindera of "bipolar" thinking prevent the repre-
sentatives of this direction from ob~ectively and sol~erly evaluating the exter.t
of the threat of proliferation to the ~ecurity of the United States itself. Char-
acterizing their views, Pro,f G. Rutgens emphasizes: "If we look at the annual r~-
ports of the secretary of defense on the United States' military needs, it is hardly
possible to find even half a page devoted to the problem of nonproliferat ion. There
- wi11 be hundreds of pages on what we 'need to respond to an operation of the Saviet
Union' and so forth. There is hardly a place dealing with what is going on in
the rest of the world."89
Such an approach stimulates proliferation, and sooner or later this "concern" for
security is directly damaging to it. According to G. Frank, professor of psqcho~ogy
at Johns Hopkins University, the underlying psychological cause of this phenomenon
is obvious---"an inability to quickly change the way of thinking and behaving to
adapt to an abruptly changed situation. "90
Indeed, nonproliferation considerations recede into the background when the ques-
tion arises of b uilding up NATO's armament with intermediate-range missiles and "of .
the nuclear reinforcement" of the Atlantic alliance to create an "additional
counterweight" to the socialist community countries. In calling for rhe United
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States to support the idea of the creation of European nuclear forces on the basis of
the nuclear forces of Britain and France a n~ber of American experts holds to the
belief that the nonproliferation problem does not, as it were, apply to the Atlantic
region and that the main threat of proliferation emanates exclusively from the de-
- veloping co~tries.91 Political circles coanected in one way or another with the
military-industrial complex and supporters of the active use of "nuclear pressure" �
in implementation of the United States' foreign policy aline themselves with this
direction. Senators H. Jackson, S. Nunn and B. Goldwater, Yale professor E. Rostow,
Gen A. Haig, former supreme commander of NATO, Gen M. Taylor and so forth may be
put in this category.
, While acknowledging the greater conceptual depth and theoretical substantiation of
the second ("political") approach as distinct from the first ("~echnical") inasmuch
as its orientation is to a greater extent taward disclosure of the cauaes of pro-
lif~r.atian we cannot atthe sametime fail to emphasize its sometimes practical ina-
dequacy, which ensues from an underestimation of the part played by nuclear tech-
nology and ma.terials in the prol~feration process. Correct theoretical conclusions
as to the origin of the problem are sometimes combined, however strange it may seem,
with a disregard for urgent questions connected with the spreau of dangerous tech-
nology, and they could, fur.thermore, be a serious argument in favor of its further,
even more widespread proliferation. It is not fortuitous that the supporters of
this second approach include representatives of "atomic business,~~ who support the
unrestricted development and proliferation of nuclear technology and materials on
the pretext that the problem of nonproliferation is of a purely political nature.
Since the time of the adopti~n of the "Atoms for Peace" program~large influential
groups economically connected with atomic power engineering have formed in the United
States, as ::lso, incidentally, in other capitalist countries, in the corresponding
sectors of industry and scientific research and government establishments. These
groups have an interest in the further use of atomic energy even to the detriment
of such an important problem as the nonproliferation of nuclear devices. Further-
- more, when the question arises of the need to limit the trade in dangerous tech-
nology or to halt its further development to prevent proliferation, these groups
are inclined to qualify such measures as "antinuclear" measures aimed against atomic
power engineering. Indeed, they are inclined to regard the very process of proli-
feration as largely inevitable for in this case uncontrolled trade and the high
profits connected with it acquire the necessary theoretical basis.92
A composite approach which synthesizes the positive recommendations of the first
two has emerged and is rapidly avolving in the confrontations of thESe two extreme
viewpoints. Its supporters believe that the solution of the nonproliferation prob-
lem lies not in setting technical measures against political ones but in their
organic combination.. The presence of nuclear reactors, uranium enrichment and spent
fuel conversion plants and plutonium and uranium reserves could undoubtedly be the
material basis of the creation of nuclear weapons. International control and also
certain restrictions in the sphere of technology are intended to narrow the possi-
bility of the use of this basis for nonpeaceful purposes. While simultaneously
taking account of the fact that nuclear proliferation, as I. Smart emphasizes,
"despite the technical form, was never anything other than a political problem
brought about not by the capability of states but by their will" the main accent
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in long-term strategy should be shifted to reducing the influencecsf military and
political factors on international relations which could still push this country
or the other toward the possession of nuclear weapons.93
Thus a strategy combining technical and political measures may be successful only
in the event of the deep-lying causes of proliferation being neutralized, that is,
a reorganization of international relations being effected wherein nuclear weapons
gradually become costly ballast for those who hav~e them and a useless and dangerous
business for those intending to have them. SIPRI experts emphasize: "Without
repudiating the need for further changes in the sphere of control and corresponding
restrictions in commercial exports, there is an urgent need to shift the main accent
onto questions connected with national security and political prestige and the
fundamental causes of nuclear proliferation. The best method of slowing down
- nuclear proliferation amounts to the nuclear states showing by their practical
actions that they wish for and aspire to a lessening of the political and military
role of nuclear weapons...implementing practicable measures in the nuclear disarma-
ment sphere."94
Having determined the general ~oint ~subordination of the "technical" and "political"
approaches to the solution of the problems of the nanproliferation of nuclear wea-
nons, it is advisable to examine the concrete reco~endations of the American
scientists representing these approaches.
Two directions exist in approaches to the formulation of ineasures to reduce the
risk of the use of atomic engineering for military purposes. The first unites the
scientists who are supporters of the so-called "technical denial" policy. The
essence of this policy amounts to minimizing, where possible, the international
exchange of potentially dangerous equipment such as,~~for example, uranium enrichment -
and spent fuel conversion plants. As a result, the supporters of such measures
believe, it would be possible to create high technological barriers, difficult to
surmount economically, separating the peaceful use of the atom from the military
use. An embargo on trade in this equipment on the world market and a halt to the
further industrial assimilation of spent fuel conversion processes are proposed as
practical steps.
Arguing their position, the supporters of this approach emphasize that under condi-
tions where enterprises for converting spent fuel function under the conditions of
the national control of this coim try or the other, the possibility arises of the use
of plutonium for purposes other than intended. Having the appropriate training
in the sphere of the design, testing and production of the "nonnuclear" components
of nuclear weapons,.any country could in theory create a nuclear arsenal in a very
short time after having acquired plutonium. While acknowledging that there also
exists anotherwaq to acquire plutonium--construction of a small secret installation
for breeding--the supporters of this approach emphasize that this way could be very
risky politically inasmuch as there exists a high probability of detection of this
secret operation.
Plans for the creation of breeder reactors operating on plutonium should also be
reexamined, they believe, in parallel with the deferment of the proliferation of
industrial installations for converting spent fuel. These recommendations are
based on the postulate that under the conditions of the further devel:opment of the
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so-called "plutonium economy," where plutonium becomes an indispensable and main
element of the nuclear fuel cycle, the technical barriers on the path of the crea-
tion of nuclear weapons diminish and the time needed for a reorientation from the
peaceful use of the atom to military use is reduced considerably.
The authors of the study "Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices," which collates these
recommendations, believe that the question of "tihe technological capabilities and
possibilities for the creation of nuclear weapons in the long run appears more
important than the present intentions of this state or the other."95 The logic of
their argtunents is not without certain justification. Indeed, the current approach
of a number of states to the problem of nonproliferation cuuld in theory change
in favor of the creation of nuclear weapons, whereas the necessary technology would
always be at their service in the event of the existence of "plutonium installa-
tions."
This approach envisages the necessity of dependable supplies of nuclear fuel and
reactors to the importer-countries as compensation for the latter's renunciation of
the acquisition of dangerous technology on condition that the latt~r~~ undertake
to place under international control all atomic engineering facilities instaZled
with the assistance of other countries or independently and also the return to the
exporter-country of used fuel containing plutonium. T:p American experts which
adhere to this approach believe that the supplier-countries should employ as a lever
of influence the recipient-country's dependence on the export of equipm~nt and fuel.
They believe that a halt to cooperation in the sph~xe of atom.ic engineering with all
the ensuing negative consequences would be the retaliation to which this country
or the other could be sub~ected in the event of it taking the path of the creation
of its own installations for uranium enrichment and spent fuel conversion.
Various proposals for the achievement of the close coordination of the policy of
the exporter-countries and even for the division of s~heres of influence in the nu-
_ clear techno logy markets in order to reduce the negative effect of the competition
of the main suppliers96 are also part of this direction.
But the main weakness of the "technological denial" policy is, its critics believe,
that such a formulation of the question is to a certain extent belated and therefore -
insufficien tly effective. The critics of this approach base their objections on the
fact that th e breeding of spent fuel in other countries, particularly the West
- European countries, has already become economically profitable in its development. -
Investments in breeder technology are caused by an endeavor to obtain the correspond-
ing dividends from their industrial assimilation. Under conditions where the power
- engineering situation in this country or the other differs from that of America
th~~ recommendations for slowing down the further development of these sectors of
atomic power engineering are difficult to implement. Conversion installations
and breeders regresent for many countries a way to achieve independence of the
UniL-ed States in the sphere of uranium fuel supplles.
They believe that even if joint steps come to be taken with the West European
countries and Japan on restricting access to the market of dangerous technology, it
' should not b e expected that a numl~er of "threshold" countr3~es will cast off their
efforts to create analogous equipment. Rather, on the contrary, this could intensify
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their independent activity in this direction. This is indicated by historical
experience even. Thus when, in 1944, the United States closed off to Canada access
to plutonium breeding research, it began its own program and was successful in this
sphere of nuclear technology. Analogously, despite the United States' endeavoY
to keep secret from other countries uranium enrichment techniques, the West European
countries developed enrichment methods independently. Thus the "technological
denial" policy could be doomed to failure in the long run.
At the same time the coordination of the exporter-countries could be assessed as
evidence of the cartelization of the "nuclear business" and as attempts to preserve
the "technological hegcmony" of the industrially developed capitalist countries and
lead to the f urther estrangement of the d~veloping countries from the industrially -
developed states of the West. Furthermore, restrictions on supplies of nuclear
technology contradict to a certain extent article IV of the Nonproliferation Treaty,
which envisages the development of broad exchange in this sphere among those party
to it. This could be used as a pretext for violations of the treaty by other par-
ties to it. Prof G. Palfrey, former adviser to the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, warns of the possible consequences of such a policy: "...the result could
be a political explosion and increased polarization between the developed and de-
veloping countries. This could seriously undermine the support which the third
world continues to lend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty."97 Is the exacerba-
tion of relations withthe allied and developing countries "an acceptable political
price to be paid to slow down proliferation for only a few years"? This is the
question being asked by the critics of this approach.98
A second direction could be characterized as "regulated exchange." Its supporters
believe that it is necessary to authorize the transfer of any technology and mater-
, ials on condition of the observance of strict international control and the conclu-
sion of bilateral agreements between the exporter-countr.y and the importer-country
~ which contain the latter's commitment not to use the technology, materials and
equipment for other than peaceful purposes and not to transfer them to a third coun-
try without the exporter's consent. The basis of this approach is the convic~ion
that the combination of political commitments with control measures will be an
effective barrier on the path of the "military" use of atomic engineering. Account
is taken here of the fact that certain countries could, jf required, create nuclear
installations without the help of others.
The supporters of this approach observe that it corresponds to a greater extent
to article IV of the Nonproliferation Treaty and conforms to the aspiration of the
nonnuclear countries to derive the maximum benefits from the peaceful use of the
atom as a kind of compensation for renunciation of the path of the creation of nu- _
clear weapons. At the same time it presupposes the achievement of the greater
effectiveness of averting proliferation at a far lower price. As American scien-
tists, particularly T. Greenwood, believes, the supplier-countries could take ad-
vantage of the endeavor of certain countries to purchase "dangerous" technology and
not create tt.eir own to estab lish a dependable system of control over this type of
equi,pment and obtain additional political commitments which they would not have in _
_ the event of the creation of national enterprises with their own forces.99
Whereas for the countrips which subscribe to the treaty such "regulated exchange"
would signify an extension of commitments already assumed, for the countries which
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are not party to it it could represent one of the few means in the gradual establish-
ment of control over hlieir entire nuclear power engineering and in obtaining com-
mitments not to use it .for military purposes. Insofar as the po~_irical commitments
of. this government or the other are of great significance for an evaluation of their
intentions, their violation could lead to the undermining of their prestige atfd
positions in the world. Furthermore, the international commitments would also be an
obstacle i_n domestic political debates in the event of certain forces attempting to -
adopt a decision to produce nuclear weapons.
The "regulated exchange" policy, a number of American experts believes, seems more
effective than the "technological denial" policy since it presupposes as an in-
dispensable prelimi.nary condition obtaining additional political coimnitments and
the extensi~n of the sphere of international control over the atomie activity of all
states:.
As a whole, American scientists' quest for a solution of the problem of reducing
the danger of the use of nuclear technology and materials for military pur~oses is
aimed at finding this combination or other of elements of all the enumerated direc-
tions which takes account of the specific peculiarities of this country or the
other.
At tlle same l-ime specialists agree that competition in the trade in nuclear equip-
ment and materials makes this problem extraordinarily complex and increases the
poss:ib:ility of prolifer.ation. S. Baker warns that "the nuclear suppliers' economic
riva]_ry with one another could soon lead to a situation in the world in which 20 or
more countrj.es would be several nonths or so away from the creation of nuclear
forces."l~~ F~r this very reason the question of the trade in and transfer of
; technology is not su *nuch a commercial as political question directly related to
. sec~irity. T;:e recom.mendations of the ma~ority of American scientists on the need
for the achievement of international agreement with respect to the expediency of
supplies of particularly dangerous elemenzs of nuclear equipment are based on pre-
cisely this conclusion. Certain experts, particularly S. Ebinger, research assist-
ant ar Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, warn
here oE thc negative consequences of unilateral acts and the need to solve problems
of the elaboration of technical measures to reduce the risk of the problems of the
elaboration of technical measures to reduce the risk of the use~~of technology for
mili~ary purposes by way of the couperation of all p arties concerned, both e~cpnrters
- and a]so importers of nuclear technology and materia1s.101
_ At tt~e same time a number of American scientists believes that neither attempts to
limit suppl-~es of particularly dangerous technology and materials rior the elabora-
tion oE affective measures for subsequent control over them can halt the process
of tfie proliferation of nuclear weapons. "A cotm try which has made a decision...
to create nuclear weapons," M. Guhin emphasizes, "can acquire them with time, when
its resources permit." But the majority of American scientists agrees that the
policy and measures aimed at "win.ning time" are perfectly justified since "the
' prospect or becoming a nuclear pawer could prove less attractive and more risky if
a greater interval of time segarates the decision to produce from the actual pro-
duction of nuclear weapons."102
.
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Under the conditions of the relative accessibility of nuclear technology and ma-
, terials the center of gravity of the struggle against proliferation is gradually
shifting from the technical to the poii:tcal sphere. As a result long-teim efforts
in Chis sphere, certain American scientis~s believe, should be geared to dimi~si~h-
- ing an d ultimately nullifying the effect of the political and military factors in
contemporary international relations which could. still prompt countries' aspira-
tion to the acquisitivn of their own nuclear weapons for considerations of securitys
- political pres~ige or economic benefit.103
A number of American experts believes that a principal ta5k in the nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons is to prompt the "near-nuclear" countries to renounce the aspira-
tion tc acquire their own atomic arsenal inasmuch as this possession will not ult.~-
mately be of economic,.political or military benefit to them. At the same time it
not only will not s':engthen but, on the contrary, will weaken their "national se-
curity."104 As arb ments supporting these assertions the experts cite, as a rule,
examples connected with the United States' nuclear policy.
They recall tnat since the war the United States has spent colossal amounts on main-
taining and refining its nuclear forces, while the military expenditure of other
Western countries has been consider~a~aly more moderate, which has enabled them to
allocate additional capital for ecanomic development. The endeavor of certain
American strategists to "wear out the USSR" with the constant intensification of
the arms race has proven in practice to be the wearing out of the United States
itself and its closest partner--Great Britain.
As a result such nonnuclear countries as Japan and the FRG, which have far surpassed
the United States in a number of indicators, have become hhe United States' strong
economic competitors. As far as Britain is concerned, this country has switched
from the level of a"great world power," in the estimationcs,f its leaders, to the
category of a"secondary" power. Specialists emphasize that a principal cause of
such changes in the correlation of forces in the Western world is the difference
in levels of military spending. For example, from 1945 through 1970 the United
States spent more than $1.3 trillion on military purposes, the lion's share goin~
on nuclear armaments. Japan, however, in the same period spent $10 billion on the
same pur.poses, that is, approximately 1 percent of U.S. expenditure.105
while the United States was perfecting its military forces, its Western allies were
allocating additional capital for economic development. However, if the nuclear
race inflicted more than perceptible losses on the United States, which has tremen-
dous economic strength, it can be imagined what damage would be caused the ecor_omy
of the developing countries if they were to attempt to take the same ruinous path.
In the foreign policy plane possession of nuclear weapons has not averted seri~u~
U.S. failures in the international arena. The attempts to use them as a means of
- political blackmail or pressure have not produced the desired results either in
relations with the socialist states or with the developing countries or with the
principal Western allies. The latter, worried by the potential danger of being
dragged into a nuclear incident, have repeatedly endeavored to dissociate them-
selves from Washington's policy in periods of international crises. This was
manifested particularly in the period of the war in Indochina and during the 1973
Near East crisis. The example of the American draft "Atlantic CharteY"(1973)
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ahowed thar_ the United Statea' allies are by no means about to pay for their
"nuclear protection" with concessions either in the sphere of the economy or in
the political fie1d.106
Dis illusionment with nuclear weapons as a basic instrument for conducting foreigtl
po lic,y k~as been reflected in the works of many serious American political scientists
- --H. Morgantha.u, S. Hoffmann, R. Still and others. Former Secretary of State H.
Kissinger emphasized in his book "American Foreign Policy" that at the contemporary
stage a country'~ nuclear might cannot be directly transformed into political in-
fl uence in the international arena.107
Critics of the United States' nuclear policy also point out that the devel~pment of
strategic atomic armaments not only has not contributed to the strengthening of
America's "national security" but has rather, on the contrary, undermined it.
Whe reas previously American military strategists could in their plans regard U.S.
- territory as virtually invulnerable, with the development of nuclear delivery ve-
hicles "the threat of being comp letely wiped out in the event of the outbreak of
a world thermonuclear conflict"108 has hung over America. Former U.S. Secretary
of Defense R. McNamara wrote on this score in his book "The Essence of Security":
"A country may reach a stage where, while purchasing ever increasing military equip-
_ men t, it no longer strengthens its security; we have reached this stage."104 To
the question of what is leading to a weakening of U.S. "national security" s~riaus
~1me rican research scholars, particularly H. York, are compelled to acknowledge--
the acquisition and refinement of nuclear weapons systems, primarily by the United
States itse1f.110
Co untries which atteiupt to provide themselves with cheir own nuclear weapons to insure
~aeir"security" could find themselves in an analogous situation. As F. Ikle em- 1
phasizes, in this event there would take effect "the iron ].aw of p;alifera*_ion:
if one country makes the decision to create nuclear weapons, its potential adversary
will attempt to do the same. "111
Thus the historical experience of the United States ~estifies sufficiently con-
vincingly that the possession of nuclear weapons not only has not yielded American
nat ional interests the dividends of an economic, political and military nature on
which Washington counted in the postwar period but has been a factor which has led
to a diminution in the United States' role in international relations at the start
of the 1980's. It is not fortuitops that a realization of such negative political
consequences prompted the resolve of the ruling cirlces of a number of industrially
developed countries like Canada, Japan arid Sweden not to go the route of nuclear
armament .
_ However, fo~ the effective solution of nonproliferation problems it is not enough to
cre ate merely a system of argumentation against the acquisition of nuclear weapons
~ these measures must be accompanied by essential adjustments to the nuclear powers'
fo reign and military policies.
]t is perfectly obvious that a weakening of the motivations for other countries'
to acquire their own nuclear weapons can be achieved only as a result of a diminu-
rion in the political and military significance of nuclear weapons. This goal can
be achieved only by way of cencrete and real changes in the approach to nuclear
weapons on the part of thepowers which possess them, primarily the United States.
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In attempting to determtne th~sources of proliferation many scientists come to the
conclusion of the direct interconnection between the race involving nuclear arms
and their proliferation. Thus, H. Morgenthau, head of the school of "political
regZism," emphasizes: "As long as the present nuclear powers continue to compeCe
with one another in building up nuclear weapons and their delivery systems as the
mAin instrument of their national policy, it will hardly be poesible to keep other
countries from following their path. Nuclear proliferation is only the spatial
~ extension of the nuclear arms race. The former may only be averted by a ha~.t to
the latter."~12
Taking this conclusion as a basis, a number of American scholars--G. Rutgens, C.
Yost and R. Betts--believes that a fimdamental reappraisal of American foreign policy
priorities is essential owing to the threat of proliferation~�2r it is precisely
this, they are profoundly convinced, which in the future may prove tli~.main danger
for the United States and the world community as a whole. To the extent that pro-
liferation threatens U.S. security, they believe, "policy in this sphere must be
nothing other than a subordinate component of policy in the sphere of national se-
curity."113 ~d whence the conclusion that measures to diminish the significance
of nuclear weapons, the limitation and reduction of arsenals, no first use and no
use of them against nonnuclear countries, the creation of nuclear-free zones, that
is, everything which at first sight weakens, in the opinion of the Americare military,
U.S. security essentially strengthens it_ since it diminishes for other countries the
motivations to acquire nuclear weapons, that is, impedes their proliferation. It
is precisely such a"nonstandard" view of the interests of national security which
is ~he sole effective one under the conditions of the reality of the threat of pro-
liferation.
At the same time the representatives of this direction observe that the United
States is still far from concrete and consistent accomplishment of the tasks of a
diminution in the role of nuclear weapons in its foreign policy. Sober-minded
American research scholars express concern that the United States is continuing in
foreign policy strategy to stress nuclear might, seeing force or the threat of fcrce
as a most important instrument of its policy. Many specialists, scientists, poli-
tical figures and representatives of public circles emphasize that attempting under
the new historical conditions to shape political policy with the old methods and
means is fraught with the most serious consequences for the security of the whole
world co~unity. Unfortunately, S. Lens observes, the United States evidently
sometimes forgets that by its personal example it is "wittingly or unwittingly"
contributing to the spread of the nuclear danger worldwide.114
They note particularly the fact that the United States, while paying lipservice to
preventing the outbreak of a nuclear conflict, is not supporting this policy with
practical steps, declaring its readiness to be the first to employ nuclear weapons
and use them in so-called "limited conflicts."115
' The propaganda of every conceivable doctrine of the use of nucl.ear weapons consider-
ably harms the cause of the creation of a new international climate free of feai of
the atomic threat and, particularly, the cause of disarmament. Prof G. Rutgens warns
with alarm in this connection that official statements "whose purpose is to make
nuclear weapons an effective instrument of foreign policy ar.e inevitably increasing
incentives in the third world countries to the acquisition of their own nuclear~~
weapons."116
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American scientists emphasize that a principal factor stimulating proliferation is
the nuclear arms race. Despite the fact that the United States currently has a
nuclear potential 12 times greater than required to destroy the wnole world, the
Pentagon is continuing to increase appropriations far atrategic nuclear forces.117
The "excess" nuclear might of the United States is dangerous, a number of American
e xperts believes, in that it is constantly expanding the spheres of application,
embracing new areas of influence and setting new goals. It is doing appreciable
damage to the political and strategic "balance of forces," giving rise to negative
propaganda consequences, for this "excess" nuclear might is regarded as a direct
challenge to the United States' political opponents and at the same time an open
appeal to the allies to continue to build up their own nuclear potential.
In this connection a number of American experts, particularly W. Epstein, G. Rutgens,
L. Bloomfield and H. York, declares that the:nuclear race is directly contrary to
official U.S. policy aimed at achieving control over proliferation. It is impos-
s ible, they believe, to demand of countr~es whihh d~ not have nuclear weapons that
they renounce acquisition thereof infinitely if serious progress i~ not achieved in
the sphere of ~he:limitation and reduction of existing arsenals of nuclear armaments.
The correctness of this conclusion was corroborated once again by the sharp debate
. o n problems of the nuclear arms race at the 1975 Geneva conference of the parties
to the treaty.
The supporters of decisive measures for fighting the proliferation of nuclear wea-
pons evaluate positively, as a whole, the ~merican-Soviet agreements that have been
reached in the sphere of strategic arms limitation. While welcoming their results
they insistently recommend that the administration strive for implementation of the
SALT agreements and prevent delay in further American-Soviet talks on limiting and
reducing nuclear arsenals, which is only to the benefit of states endeavoring to
acquire their own nuclear weapons.118 Professors G. Kistiakowsky and S. Drell be-
- lieve that the~lack of significant progress in the nuclear disarmament sphere could
be a convenient pretext for a decision by any country, irrespective of whether it
_ is party to the Nonproliferation Treaty or not, to go the route of the creation of
nuclear weapons.119
It is precisely in the face of such a threat that prominent scientists and political
f igures are giving preference to questions of nuclear disarmament over other of the
United States' foreign policy goals. Sen A. Cranston warned during congressional
- hearings: "Regardless of the fact that big differences exist in viewpoints between
Moscow and Washington on problems of trade,~human rights and diplomacy, regardless
of the fact that detente will not provide magical solutions to the real differences
in national interests andregardless of the fact that the United States wishes to
improve its relations with the PRC,:~*e must not and cannot llow the talks on limit-
ing nuclear weapons to slow down and become deadlocked."12~
Thus in formulating their reco~endations mn the question of nonproliferation a num-
b er of American scientists and political figurQS is coming to the conclusion that
U.S. policy can only produce effective results if the Unitied States itself follow
the path of nuclear disarmament and strive for a diminution in the roZe and signi-
f icance of nuclear weapons in its foreign and military policies.
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In a broader plane the United States' foreign policy course in the world arena
should, they believe, be geared to removing existing and preventing new centers;of
tension and solving disputed problems not with force but at the negotiating table
and on paths of the development of relaxation of tension processes. Ultimately it
is precisely the relaxation of tension which is the main factor which will contribute
to other states' restraint in the questionst~ whether or not to acguire their own
nuclear weapons, that is, in the solution of the problems of their nonproliferation.121
Howeve~, the recommendations of the supporters of disarmament are encountering the
strong opposition of the disciples of a"from-a-position-of-strength" policy. Many
scholars and political f igures like [V. Khan], research fellow of Georgetown Uni-
versity's Center for Strategic Studies, Prof M. [Khog] and former Secretary of
Defense J. Schlesinger are giving advice with respect to a solution of nonprolifer-
ation questions from cold war positions. They are persistently forcing off on others
_ the idea that the bigger the arsenal of the United States' nuclear weapons, the less
the likelihood that the nonnuclear countries will wish to take the path of nuclear
armaments. In a word, the United States' nuclear weapons are allegedly capable of
performing the functions of "deterrence" and "restraint" in the sphere of their
proliferation.122 The main attention here is given to propaganda of the proposi-
tion that the United States' nuclear commitments to its bloc allies are a guarantee
against proliferation and that it is necessary to strive to increase their dependa-
_ bility and extend them to other coim tries. A further buildup of auclear farces,
use of which should not be restrained by either legal or geographical limitations,
is, they believe, an indispensable condition of the Untied States' military com-
mitments to its allies. Measures leading, on the other hand, to a diminution in
the effectiveness of the nuclear forces could lead to an undermining of the military
commitments and, as a consequence, increase the incentives for certain allies to
acquire their own nuclear weapons. Thus the policy of extending the United States'
military commitments abroad based on nuclear might is viewed by this group of scho-
lars and political figures as an effective way of solving the nonproliferation prob-
lem.
Yet it is clear even to many of these that this approach has ~ts limits under the
conditions of the continuing crisis of the bloc structures (the collapse of SEATU
and CENTO, for example, and contradictions within the NATO ranks).
First, the IJnited States' assumption of military commitments in respect of one coun-
try could be assessed by a state opposed to it as a"hostile act," which would only
push this country toward the creation of its own nuclear weapons.
Second, at the current stage even the security guarantor-countries view with ever
increasing distaste the possibility of an extension of tHe military commitments on
account of the fear of being dragged into a conflict by their new ally. The promo-
tion of the "Nixon doctrine" at the start of the 1970's testified to an. endeavor
to revise the~goals and forms of U.S. global involvement in order to prevent a re-
petition of the humiliating defeats of the time of the war in Indochina. In the
light of the opposition within the Unitied States to the new commitments even their
supporters have been forced to acknowledge at times that "the policy in the sphere
of nonproliferation which basically provided for an extension of America's commit-
ments to insure security is doomed to fail, at least in the immediate future."123
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Third, extending commitments to insure security to new countries in only possible
given the latter's readiness to cede their political independence to a certain ex-
tent and grant. Washington levers for influencing their policy. However, the pro-
8pect of diminished independence will har$lq find a response even in countries which
formally have allied relations with the United States, let alone nonalined cotiet~iea.
As a whole, the present situation in the sphere of the United States' military com-
mitments abroad is such, the ma~ority of American scholars believes, that the prob-
lem could amount more to attempts to somehow maintain their "dependability," which
is gradually declining in the eyes of the allies, but by no means to their exten-
sion to new countries. Moreover, in the estimation of certain specialists, main-
taining even the existing military commitments in respect of countries situated in
crisis areas such as South Korea atrilTaiwan could be fraught with serious consequences
for the security of the United States itself.
However, that which the United States is not in a position to do, certain American
experts believe, could be performed by the USSR, which is rapidly developing bila-
teral political relations with a number of countries, which in the long term could
exert a braking influence on their aspiration to acquire their own nuclear weapons,
that is, a prescription which is dubious from the viewpoint of the possibilities and
interests of the United States is proposed to the Soviet Union with assurances that
the extension of global involvement would be met witH~understanding to a certain
- extent in the United States.1~4 Of course, on the one hand these recommendations
- take accolm t of the growth of the USSR's international influence and the consistency
of the Soviet posi~ion on nonproliferation issues, which is, undoubtedly, a positive
aspect, but, on the other, they completely ignore the fact that the USSR has always
been opposed to bloc policy as a basis of international relations. As a whole, they -
imply shifting the burden of the prevention of proliferation onto other countries.
Whereas at the current stage the possibility of the implementation of a bloc approach -
to the solution of nonproliferation questions is frequently evaluated pessimisti-
cally, its supporters continue to put their hopes in these measures for the long ~
- term in the even t of frustration of the policy of relaxation of tension. Thus
T. Greenwood emphasizes: "If a trend were to develop in practice toward the grea- -
ter confrontation of the superpowers, the result could be a trend toward the exis-
tence of strong alliances and toward the extension of the spheres of their activity
to other regions which previously were outside or in the neighborhood of areas of
East-West confrontation."125 Such a development of events, a number of American
scholars believes, would lead to the world's even greater polarization and its di-
vision into opposed blocs whose leaders would be able to keep their allies from em-
barking on the path of independent nuclear armament by way of consolidating their
military commitments.
The recommendatians concerning a reanimation of bloc policy involve a nostalgia for
cold war times. Their supporters entirely disregard the fact that the "bipolarity"
in international relations of the 1940's-1950's has sunk into the past and that the
d~velopment and emergence of new independent "political poles" remains the prevail-
ing trend. �
Even if in the short term bloc policy is capable of producing some limited results
in nonproliferation policy, in the long term its effectiveness is a matter of
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" doubt and skepticism to many American scholars. Their critical evaluations are based
on historical experience, which testifies that a bloc structure (NATO, say) prompts
others to create their own weapons to increase the possibility of influencing U.S.
policy (Britain, for example) and dissociate themselves from a danger emanating
from one-sided deper_dence on the United States (France, for example) or to obtain
access to the use of American nuclear weapons (the FRG, for example).
The fact that Britain tested its own nuclear de~rice in 1952, when there was absolute-
ly no question of the dependability of America's commitments to NATO and to another
bloc member--France--in 19b0, pEior to its withdrawal from NATO's military struc-.
ture; trhat the FRG at the start of the ~.960's was longing for nuclear weapons, en-
deavoring to participate in the MNF--all this indicates that blocs and America's
military commitments within their fra~ework not only do not cunb the proliferation
of nuclear weapons but rather, on the contrary, encourage it. This conclusion is
supported by the fact that among the "threshold" co~mtries which frequently do not
conceal their nuclear ambitions are America's allies--Israel, South Korea and Tai-
wan.
A number of American research scholars, particularly R. Still and J. Gara, are of
the opinion that the United States overestimates the extent of its influence on
its bloc allies aimed at keeping them away from a course toward independent nuclear
armament: "Whether we continue to carry out our co~i.tments to NATO or not, we
will hardly be able to control th,e behavior of the FRG and.Japan like before."126 _
In this connection it has to be noted that all the United States' attempts to pre-
v~nt its ally--the FRG--from selling nuclear installations to Brazil failed com-
pletely. Certain experts suspect that the cooperation of one of the United States'
principal NATO allies--the FRG--raith other countries in the nuclear sphere such as
South Afi-~Lca and Brazil is being undertaken in order "not to waste time in the event
it becomes necessary for it to have nuclear weapons."127
The above recommendations:are being accompanied by advi;.e which is to be heard in-
creasingly often for the more effective use of supplies of conventional arms,
which could lead to a"nonnuclear" solution of the;security problems of this caun-
try or the other. Behind this approach is the simple calculation that any state
which is provided with modern-tpge conventional arms would have greater confidence
:Ln 3.ts capacity for resisting a potential aggressor and that there would be less
temptation for it to acquire nuclear weapons. Supplies of modern arms, which the
United States alone undertakes to the tune of over $10 billion, have come to be
regarded as a kind of lever of influence on the evolution of nonnuclear countries'
political course in the nonproliferation sphere.
At the insiatence of Sen S. Symington an amendment was made to the Military Assist-
ance Act in 1976 banning the sale of modern arms to a country which intended to
create independently or with the help of other countr~~s spent fuel conversion and
- uranium enrichment plants in circumvention of international cantrol by the IAEA.
At thet time this measure was directed primarily against Pakistan, which had con-
cluded such a contract with France, but was in the long term aimed at putting pres-
sure on other countries also.
Evaluating the significance of such measures,a number of American~experts draws
attention to their dubious effectiveness for nonproliferation. First, they
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' emphasize, the "threshold" countries importing American arms could, to obtain more
military equipment, blackmail the United States with the threat of taking the path
of the possession of nuclear weapons (like South Korea, for example). Second, the
supplies of conventional arms include modern missile installations and strategie
_ aviation which could be used as nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, which would '~whet
- the appetite" of military and political leaders and increase the temptation to ac- -
quire nuclear weapons. Third, an increase in supplies to one state could push other
states toward a decision to provide themselves with their awn nuclear weapons in
order to balance the inequality th~t ha~ come about, in their opinion, in conven-
tional forces in a given region~~28
As a whole, critics agree that supplies of con~entional arms could lead to increased
- political and military tension in the relations between states of one region or
another, while their use on the battlefield, considering the destructive power of
modern armaments, is fra~ught with consequences whlch are hardly balanced by proble-
matic benefits in the nonproliferation sphere. At the current stage, when the prob-
' lem of limiting ~he trade in mpdern arms is on the agenda, tl-~e above prescription
could largely be evaluat~d as an attempt to j ustify its continuation with the
plausible excuse of insuring the interests of states' security to keep them from
going the route of nuclear armament.
Thus it should be emphasized that the question of reducing the incentives for other
counL-ries of the world ro acquire nuclear weapons is being solved in the United
States in an atmosphere of acute struggle between the supporters and opponents of -
_ nuclear disarmament and the relaxation of tensi~n as a whole.
Questions conne~;ted with a quest for a solution of nonproliferation problems are
inevitably leading American scientists to the conclusion that the United States must
clearly determine its principal allies in the achievement of this goal. The aline-
ment of forces in the modern world points to the need for hroader and more c~nstruc-
_ tive cooperation. It is perfectly natural that the opinion exists among American
scientists that the solution of these problems in the long term is impossible with-
out the USSR's assistance. They emphasize in this connection that the parallel
concern of the United States and the USSR for preventing proliferation is just as
obvious as for liquidation of the threat of nuclear war and that the USSR has always
been more responsible than the United States and the West European countries in
questions of the proliferation of nuclear technology. It played a positive part
at the Loridon conference of exporter-countries and has always advocated universali-
zation of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Foiling the nuclear weapon tests in South
Africa in Augu'st 1977, which was the result of the initiative of the Soviet Union,
was the first joint action of countries of East and West in the practical:prevention
of proliferation, and this could be a working model of American-Soviet relations
in the fuCura. A. Pierre is firmly convinced: "The United States and the Soviet
Union must coordinate their foreign policies in relation to unstable regions and
'threshold' countries to prevent their taking the path of nuclear weapons."129
M. Mandelbaum believes that "the United Statas and the USSR could with joint effo~ts -
provide guarantees of the security of the majority of inembers of the world community '
and solve the questions connected with nuclear technology." However, many experts
have been forced to state with regret that "the political barriers on the path of
their close cooperation are still very high."130
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At the same time attempts are very frequently made to portray the organization of
such cooperation as "superpower" policy and something like a condominium of the
USSR and the United States against third countries aimed at perpetuating their pre-
dominance in the nuclear sphere over the nonnuclear states. This argument is v~ithout
foundation inasmuch as the goal being�~pursued by the Soviet Union, at least, iS ndt
only a strengthening of the nonproliferation process but also the liquidatior., of
all existing nuclear arsenals. It is essential here to also take account of the
fact that policy in the nonproliferation sphere is global and that more than 100
states concerned to strengthen their security by way of renouncing possession of
nuclear weapons pa~ticipate therein. Soviet-American relations could become thP
central and, at the same time, an organic element of th�is strategy, and the world's
nonnuclear countries would hardly object, but would welcome it rather if the solu-
tion of the basic problems in this sphere were to be assumed by the United States
and the USSR in cooperation with other members of the world community.
Appeals to rise above bloc obsession and for a broadening of the United States'
practical possibilities in the sphere of nanproli.feration strategy with the aid of
cooperation with the USSR have become the leitmotiv of the reco~endations of many
supporters of nonproliferation ir. the United States who have repeatedly recommended
that the administration seek closer and more constructive relations with the USSR,
not allowing ideological differences to prevent the successful solution of the prob-
lem which will decide whether mankind enters the 21st century safely nr not.131 _
However, this approach is not to the liking of the disciples of a"from-a-position- `
of-strength" policy and a course toward confrontation with the USSR, who for the
sake of achieving short-term ~advantages are ready to forgo the long-term interests
of world security as a whole and U.S. security in particular. Supporting the nucl:ear
arms race and recommending a tough bloc policy against the socialist and developing
countries, they are thereby actually encouraging the proliferation of nuclear wea-
pons.
Realizing that proliferation represents the main danger to the United States
in the long term, sober-minded politicians propose far-reaching measures aimed aY.
a halt to the nuclear arms race and at a relaxation of tension. The supporters of -
confrontation with the USSR, on the other hand, sometimes deliberately belittling
- the significance of the problem of nonproliferattton,- are attemtping to get off with
palliative solutions, adhering to a continuation of "power politics" based on thp
United States` nuclear might.
The degree of effectiveness of U.S. strategy in the sphere of the nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons will depend to a considerable extent precisely on tne outcome ~
of the clash of these trends and approaches.
Chapter 8. The Problem of Guarantees of the Security of Nonnuclear States
In the complex of ineasures to reinforce the nonproliferation process a particular
place is occupied by questions of guarantees of the security of the nonnuclear coun-
tries which have renounced the acquistion of nuclear weapons and do not have such
on their territc~y. The majority of international affairs specialists agrees that
a country which has signed the Nonproliferation Treaty has voluntarily deprived -
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itself of the possibility of resorting to nuclear weapons in the event of a con-
frontation with states F.'~ich possess nuclear weapons. For this very reason it has
a right to demand of all nuclear states as compensation for renunciation of the
acqui$ition of nuclear weapons commitments that the latter not use nuc].ear weapons
against it. Only given this solution of the questions of the security of the non-
nuclear states is it possible to strengthen th8 nonproliferation process. However,
as Iong as there are no security guarantees established by international agreements
the nonnuclear cotmtries will continue to fear the threat of the use of nuclear
weapons against them, and their perception of weakness in the military sphere com-
pared with the nuclear states could be a motivation for acquiring their own weapons.
The need for a further consolidation of the nonproliferation process makes pressing _
and urgent the implementation of the proposal "Conclusion of an International
Convention on Strengthening the Nonnuclear States' Security Guarantees," which was
presented by the USSR in 1978 at the UN General Assembly 33d Session.
This initiative of the USSR in the United Nations has a history which it might be
expedient to briefly illustrate.
Back in 1966 the Soviet Union had advocated banning by treaty the use of nuclear
weapons against states undertaking to observe nonnuclear status. A message of
A.N. Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to the D~Lsarmament Commit-
tee of 1 February 1966 emphasized: "The Soviet Union's presentation to the commit-
tee of a draft Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is imbued with a single aspiration--
to close off all paths of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.... To facil-
itate agreement on the conclusion of the t~eaty the Soviet Government declares its
readiness to incorporate in the draft of the treaty an article b anning the use of
nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states which are party to the treaty which do not
have nuclear weapons on their territory."132 _
At that time this USSR proposal was broadly supported in the majority of countries
_ and corresponded entirely Co the nonalined states' aspirations to make the use of
nuclear weapons illegal. As is known, with the support of the socialist countries
and nonalined states the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 1961 which
said that the use of nuclear weapons would contradict "the letter, spirit and aims
- of the United Nations" and that any state using nuclear weapons should be regarded
as "violating the UN Charter" and perpetrating "a crime against humanity and civil-
ization." However, despite the fact that the USSR's 1966 proposal was an organic
consequence of Lhis UN resolution, the Western powers at that time opposed 1.t, al-
though a number of nanalined countries like India, Pakistan, Nigeria and others
evaluated the significance of this initiative highly. As American research scholars
themselves admit, the United States' opposition to commitments on the nonuse of
nuclear weapons was at that time caused by the fact that America's ruling circles _
assigned nuclear weap~~ns a principal place in the realization of mi.litary and poli-
tical plans in the world arena.133
As distinct from th�~ American approach to the question of the nonuse of nuclear wea-
po~s, "the USSR's approach to this problem," R. Ulman, former N SC employee and pro-
fessor at Princeton, emphasized, "has been characterized from the very start of the
atomic age by open hostility to nuclear weapons and has amounted to the fact that
they should be banned and existing stockpiles liquidated."134 In view of the dis-
ag~eements with the Western powers which participated in the fo rmulation of the
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Nonproliferation Treaty, the Soviet Union was forced to withdraw its proposal.
At that time the m~in attention wss paid to adopting guarantees to the nonnuclear
countrie~ of another kind--an understanding on assistance to countries whi~h were
th~ victims of nuclear aggression.
In June 1968 the governments;of the USSR, the United States and Britain issued spe-
cial statements. They dealt with the three powers' intention to seek i~ediate
Security Council action to secure in accordance with the UN Cha~ter support for a
state not possessing nuclear weapons which was the victim of aggression or the
subject of the threat of aggression involving the use of nuclear weapons. Security
Council Resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 contained approval of the corresponding state-
ments of the three nuclear powers and their promises t~ assist a victim of aggres-
sion.
The three powers' statements and the Security Council resolution laid the foundation
for providing security guarantees for the nonnuclear states which had signed the~
Nonproliferation Treaty and countr~es which promised not to create nuclear weapons.
At that time they were evaluated positively by the majority of countries.
However, ~ust over 10 years after the adoption of the Security Council resolution
there has been a change in a number of countr ies' attitude toward its significance,
despite the fact that the 1968 statements of the three nuclear powers remain fully
in effect. As the American statesmen who participated in the formu3.ation of these
commi.tments themselves, particularlyA. Fisher, former deputy director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, acknowledge, after the PRC became a permanent UN
Security Council member, the 1968 resolution's effectiveness diminished on account
of the;.~possibility of a PRC veto of the collective actions of the nuclear states
which had undertaken to assist a country which fell victim to nuclear aggre5sion.135
- In this situation a return to the USSR's 1966 proposals was an urgent necessity
for strengthening the security of the nonnucle ar countries. The UN General Assenb-
ly resolution of 29 November 1972 un the nonnuse of force in international relations
and on banning forever the use of nuclear weapons was a kind of prolog to a new
discussion of the problem of the nonuse of nuclear weapons.
At the 1975 Geneva Nonproliferation Treaty review conference a number of states,
including not only the nonalined countries but also America's allies--Australia,
Japan and New Zealand--presented a proposal on strengthening the security guarantees
- for the treaty's nonnuclear states by way of the ad~ption of a commitment on the
_ nonuse of nuclear weapons against them. The p roposal which had been,~put forward
was not examined constructively at that time ma.inly owing to the opposition of the
West's nuclear powers. As W. Epstein, essistant to the UN secretary general for
disarmament, emphasized, "the United States' negative approach was not surprising
since it had always opposed any commitments on the nonuse or no first use of nuclear
weapons."136
At the current stage the military interference of the United States in the Persian
Gulf and of the NATO coiuitries, including nuclear countries, in the internal affairs
of African states, China's aggressive intrigues in Southeast Asia, the expansionist
policy of the "near-nuclear" states of Israel and South Africa--all this is occur-
ring with regard for the possib il~ty of also putting, should an opportunity arise,
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nuclear pressure on this nonnuclear coimtry or the other. It is not surprising
that the task of neutralizing such threats has become a principal foreign policy
concern of the ma.jority of countries .
The nonnuclear countries' concern for a strengthening of guarantees of their securitiy
is also increasing in view of the fact that the race in nuclear arms, stockpiles of
which have already reached a quantity entirely sufficient to destroy every living
thing on earth many times over, is continuing. By their refusal to participate in
the race in these weapons the nannuclear states are making a definite contribution
to nonproliferation and thereby to an easing of the threat of the outbreak of nu-
clear war. They have a right on these grounds to expect firm guarantees that nu- -
clear weapons will never be used against them.
Proposals concerning a strengthening of the guarantees to the nonnuclear states were
also put forward by a number of countries at the UN General Assembly Special Disarma-
ment Session. Considering such proposals entirely ~ustified, on 26 May 1978 the
Soviet Unian issued a statement which emphasized unequivocally that it would never
use nuclear weapons against states which renounce the production and a~quisition ~
of such weapons and do not have such on their territory. The special session's
final document contains a proposition on the need for persistent e.fforts to be made
for the conclusion of effective agreements aimed at preventing the use of nuclear
weapons against countries which do not have such wgapons. Certain delegates of
nonnuclear countries emphasized at this session that security guarantees would be
best legalized in the form of a multilateral treaty.
The new Soviet proposal submitted at the General Assembly 33d Session represents the
fur~her development and concretization of the USSR's position set forth in May 1978.
Not confining itselt merely to a solemn statement concerning the nonuse of nuclear
weapons, the Soviet Union confirmed its resolve to conclude special agreements on
this score with any nonnuclear country. The USSR believes that the conclusion of an
international convention in which states possessing nuclear weapons ready to give
the appropriate guarantees on the one hand and countries undertaking to preserve
their nuclear~free status and prevent the deployment of weapons on their territory
on the other would participate would contribute to accomplishment of the task of
strengthening security guarantees.
The conclus ion of such an agreement would impart to the security guarantees for
the nonnuclear countries universal backing in international law, and the participa-
tion of other nuclear states therein would undoubtedly increase its effectiveness.
It is perfectly obvious that the nonnuclear states would derive considerable bene-
fits of a military and political nature and they would only be required to observe
nuclear-free status here.
What is the textual content of the convention? .
The preamble of the draft convention presented by the USSR explains discursively and
- specifically the purposes of and the need for its conclusion. In p~rticular, it
emphasizes that its adoption would contribute to a lessening and, ultima.tely, the -
removal of the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, a halt to the nuclear arms
race, more effective measures in the area of nuclear disarmament and, particularly,
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the prevention of the extensive proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time
it draws attention to the fact that this docimment ensues organically from correspond-
ing earlier UN resolutions ~nd documents like Security Council Resolution 255 of
19 June 1968, Resolution 2936 of the 27th Utd General Assembly of 29 November 1972 and
documents of the 30 June 1978 UN Special Disarmament Session, corresponds to the non-
nuclear states' endeavors to keep their territory free of nuclear weapons and.their
requests for security to be provided against the threat of their use and represents
an important means of strengthening peace and general security and also the nonpro-
liferation process.
- Article I of the draft convention stipulates that the participant-states possessing
nuclear weapons will undertake not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten their
use in relation to the nonnuclear states party to this convention, which will re-
nounce the production and acquisi tion of nuclear weapons and not allow them on
their territory or elsewhere--on land, at sea, in the air and in space.
Article II says that the above-mentioned undertaking extends not only to the terri-
tories of the nonnuclear states which have signed the convention b ut also to the
armed forces and facilities under their jurisdiction and control wherever they may
be.
Article III regulates the procedure of consultations among the participant-states
in the event of this violation or the other of the commitments assumed on the part
of both nuclear and nonnuclear states.
Article IV determines its effective period and the right to withdraw from it. It
stipulates, in particular, that agreement will be permanent. In exercise of its
state sovereignty each of its participants here has the right to withdraw from the
convention if it deci~es that exceptional circumstances connected with its content
would threaten its higher interests. I:t would give al.l parties to the convention
and the UN Security Council 3 months' notice of this withdrawal. This notification
must contain a statement of the exceptional circumstances threatening its higher
interests.
Article V deals with amendments to the text of the document. In particular, taking
into account the possibility of th e emergence of concrete wants or the need for
- certain changes, any state has the right to propose amendments, which take effect
for the states which consent to them following their adoptian by a majority of the _
participant-states. Subsequently for each remaining participant-state the amend-
ment takes effect on the day that it presents a document on its adoption. This
provides for a certain flexibility of the operation of the convPntion and a con-
sideration of singu?arities in th e interests of different states.
Articles VI and VII of the convent ion determine the rules of its ratification and
the procedure of its validation. They emphasize that each state which has not
signed the convention prior to it taking effect may subscribe to it at any time.
- Such is the content of the main articles of the draft International Convention on
Strengthening Security Guarantees for the Nonnuclear States137 presented by the
Soviet Union.
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IF we w~ere to attempt ~o briefly describe the positive significance of this convention
for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, we would have to highlight the follow-
ing. Fi~st, the nonnuclear coimtries which signed it would have con,firmed once
again their inrention of not taking the path of acquiring nuclear weapons. The
failure to sign it on the part of a number of "threshold" countries and treaty non-
subscrtbers would summon a negative reaction in the world co~unity and testify to
these countries' true intentions . Second, there would be an increase in military
- benefits to the nonnuclear countries in the event of their renunciation of the acqui-
sition or creation of nuclear weapons . Otherwise, however, taking the path of their
creation, a state would forfeit the security guaran,tees on tl:e part of the nuclear
powers extended to it hitherto, which would sharply weaken its s~curity as a whole.
Third, limitation of the scale and forms of the threat of the possible use of nu-
- clear weapons would lead to the further devaluation of the significance of nuclear
- weapons as a means of conducting military operations and exertingpolitical pressure
legitimized on an international.. law basis. Fourth, an alternative path ~f strength-
_ ening security would be opened to the nonnuclear countries distinct from participa-
tion in bloc structures , which, without affording dependable guarantees from the
_ military viewpoint, threaten their interests on account of the participation of this
ceuntry or the other in conjunction with an allied nuclear power in conducting
strategic preparatioais providing for their territory to be made over for the deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons. Fifth, there would be a diminution in the risk and threat ~
of the outbreak of nuclear war as a whole.
In a word, adoption of the convention would be an effective mea~ure in the sphere
of s Lrengthening internatttonal sec:urity an~ averting the threat of nuclear war .
The Soviet initiative stirred great interest in the assembly. Even in the course of
gecieral debate at the time of its discussion representatives of the socialist states,
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Argentina, Pakistan, Finland and other countries expressed
- many interesting and concrete considerations apropos the draft convention. They
expressed the prevailing opinion that the conclusion of the convention would con-
ti~ibute to reducing th2 danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict and to limiting -
the sphere of the possible use of nuclear weapons with regard for the interests of
the securi~ity of the nonnuclear states. The nucl~ar powers' adoption of commitments
on concer~ed guarantees enshrined in international agreements would be an effective
solution oF ti~e-problem of protecting the nonnuc'~ar states from the use of nuclear
weapons a~ainst Lhem.
Discussioil of the Soviet proposal on the conclusion of the International Convention
on Strengthening the Security Guarantees of the Nonnuclear States also continued in
the UN General Assembly First Committee. The course of the debate, in which the ~
~ representatives of more than 50 countries participated, showed that the overwhelming
ma.joriryo uf inembers of the international community regards the Soviet initiative as
a timely and important step.
~
� On 14 December 1978 at its plenary session the UN General Assembly 33d Session ap-
pro ~ed by the overwhelming majority of 137 for and 2 against (the PRC and Albania)
th~ USSR's proposal and called on the Disarmament Committee in Geneva for the speed- .
i~:st elaboration o.E a draft of this document. _
Wh�_:t is the position of the Western powers on this question and, primarily, the
attir.ude of the United States to this problem? In order to understand the sources -
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of Washington's official position it is advisable to dwell on a brief analysis of ~
American political scientists` different viewpoints on the problem of security guar-
antees for tr.e nonnuclear coimtries .
The assertion may be encountered frequently in American political literature that ~
the nuclear states' co~itments concerning the nonuse of nuclear weapons against
nonnuclear countries will hardly exert any noticeable influence on braking the in-
centives of the latter's approach to the question the acquisition of nuclear
weapons since military considerations in their favor ensue primarily from an evalua-
tion of the threats to security on the part of neighboring states in this region or
the other and not from fear of an attack by the nuclear szates. "The governments
(of nonnuclear countrias--V.D. ) are usually more worried about tY:e behavior of
neighboring states and not remote nuclear powers. And when they do sense a threat
Qn the part of nuclear states, they are more afraid of an attack with the use of
conventional forces and not atomic weapons," T. Greenwood, research assistant at
MIT claims.l~8 Analyzing the n.ili~tary factors influencing the "threshold" coun- -
_ tries' choice in favor of nucl~;ar we~pons, L. Dunn� research assistant at the Hud-
son Institute, similarly believes thar "tne decisive role in this question is per-
formed by considerations of restraining a potentially nuclear regional opponent
or strengtheiiing their own influence in this region. i~39 In a word, decidin.g the
question of whether to acquire nuclear weapons or not does not depend direc tly on
the restrictions imposed on the nuclear powers' ~iYitary strategy in the sphere of
their use.
But this proposition does not withstand criticism in the histor~cal retrospective.
A real threat of the United States' use of nuclear weapons in military operations
against nonnuclear countries has arisen repeatedly throughout the postwar period.
The question of the use of ato~c weapons on the battlefield was discussed at the
highest level in political and military circles at the initiative of Gen. D. Mac-
Arthur, U.S. commander in chief in the Far F~st, in 1950, at the time of the ag-
- gression in Korea. At that time even the United States' closest cold war partners
such as Britain were forced tu vigorously intervene to prevent America's ruling
circles taking such a catastrophic decision. A similar situa.tion was also observed -
in 1954 during the Indochina crisis.
In the 1960's, during the war in Indochina, a riumber of U.S. mil~.tary personalities
called for the use of these weapons in Vietnam, citing U.S. Army Field Service
Regulation 4~35, which points out that the use of nuclear weapons by the air force,
navy and ground forces cannot be regarded as a violation of international law or
the international convention limiting their use. According to the newspaper THE
TIMES, in 1968 President L. Johnson was subjected to strong pressure from certain
Pentagon figures, who were insisting that tactical atomic weapons be used to assist
the American garrison besieged in Khe Sanh. In February of the same year the
- Pentagon sent to 9ietnam a group of nuclear specialists to study the problems of
the use of atomic weapons at the scene of combat opera~io.ns. Western observers
stressed repeatedly that more than 5,000 nuclear weapon units were concentrated in
_ the Southeast Asia region for this purpose,140 ~e U.S. military circles' inten-
tions which had become known caused considerable anxiety in the West at that time.
- Then British Prime Minis~er H. Wilson declared that the use of nuclear weapons in
~ Indochina would be insane and could lead to an escalation of the conflict and the
outbreak of world war. �
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In 1973, at the time of the Near East conflict, the United States, having put its
armed forces on the alert, made understood its resolve to use all r ans, including
atomic weapons, in the event of a possible escalation of the military conflict in
the Near East. As is known, this evoked a negative reaction from the West European
" countries (with the exception of Portugal), whose leaders, confronted with such a
threat, almost unanimously dissociated themselves from their ally, barring the use
of their territory for such actions.
Throughout the postwar period in all conflicts and crisis situations in which on the
one hand Western countries possessing nuclear weapons and, on the other, nonnuclear
countries have particip3ted the factor of the possibility of their use in military
operations or to exert diplomatic influence has constantly been present in the cal-
culations and fears of the opposed parties. Whereas the former have endeavored to
use nucle~r weapons for blackmail purposes as an effective means of atomic diplomacy,
the latter have been forced to seek the possibility of neutralizing such threats.
There were many examples of "atomic diplomacy" in the 1970's. Thus in 1971, at
= the time of the Ir.do-Pakistan conflict, Washington, having sent the aircraft carrier
"Enterprise" into the Indian Ocean to the Indian coast, unequivocally attempted to
put pressure on Delhi with the threat of the intervention of its armed force~, in-
cluding nuclear forces, in the affairs of the Hindustan peninsula. It is not for-
tuitous that certain experts believe that the threat of the use of military force in
1971 on the part of the United States was one of the reasons prompting India to
- explode a nuclear device in 1974.
In 1950, at the time of the Iranian-American crisis, Washington sent to the Indian
- Gcean an armada of warships with a variety of nuclear weapons systems.
As a whole, it was precisely a number of countries' nonpossession of nuclear wea-
pons which was regarded by Washington as a condition conducive to the use against
them of "atomic" and "power" diplomacy with impunity. According to a paper of the
Brookings Institution, in the period 1946 through 1975 American forces were deployed
in support of political aims on 215 occasions. The iTnited States threatened the use
of nuclear weapons directly or indirectly on 19 occasions.141
Pentagon leaders and miiitary theorists do not exclude the possibility of the use of
nuclear taeapons not only against nuclear but also against nonnuclear countries.
Particular anxiety, among American scientists included, was caused by a statement
in 1975 by then U.S. Secretary of Defense J. Schlesirger, who, with the DPRK in
r.tind, declared that under certain circumstances the Lnited States would be prepared.
to be the first to use nuclear weapons in so-called "limited conflicts." This
statement caused legitimate alarm in the DPRK, which qualified it bluntly as nuclear
b lackmail against a nonnuclear country.
At that time a number of American political scientists was forced to acknowledge
that the threat of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states and the promotion of
milirary-strategic concepts of waging "limited nuclear wars" were contributing to
the spread of nuclear weapons. "In threatening nuclear weapans for the purpose of
the so-called defense of South Korea American officials would like to preserve an
iaexpensive method (compared with Vietnam) of intimidating a nonnuclear country,
, in this case North Korea, by the prospect of its nuclear devastation. Such diplomacy
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undoubtedly undermines the strategy or nonproliferation to the extent that it assumes
that only a nuclear country may feel secure against unilateral blackmail.... Use
of the nuclear threat to influence the behavior of nonnuclear countries is not only .
incompatible with the purposes of nonproliferation but also ~ustifies as going with-
out saying the discrimination ensuing from the existence of nuclear and nonnuclear
countries," R. Falk, a professor at Princetnn, emphasizes.142 It is obvious to many
experts that on the pretext of insuring their security from real and not hypothe-
~ tical threats on the part of a nuclear power--the United States--certain countries
could be con~pelled to give serious thought to the passibility of creating their own
nuclear weapons.
Specialists in the nonprolzf~ration and disarmament sphere have repeatedly drawn
attention to the manifest contradiction between official Wash3.ngton's endeavor to
maintain the maximum effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a means ofi conducting mili-
tary operations and an instrument of diplomacy and official policy aimed against
the spread of nuclear weapons. Addressing the U.S. Congress, A. Fisher, former
deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, drew attention precise-
Iy to the inconsistency of U.S. policy in the nonproliferation sphere: "We are
attempting to motivate peoples to subscribe to and support the Nonproliferation :
Treaty, but at the same time we insist that any form of restraint in questions of
the nuclear bombing of these peop~e...does not apply to the foreign policy of the
United States."143 ~
It is not fortuitous that perceptions of open and concealed threats on the part of
the West's nuclear powers in diplomatic practice prompted the nonnuclear countries'
~ prolonged struggle for the adoption of commitments on the nonuse of nuclear weapons.
These include not only nonalined states but alsn U.S. allies. Fears of finding `
themselves one-on-one in confrontation~: with a nuclear power and not having a
chance (owing ta commitments assumed not to acquire nuclear weapons) to show effec-
- tive resistance are the cause of a certain reluctance on the part of a number of
- "threshold" countries to subscribe to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Incidentally,
similar considerations connected with questions of security are also being expressed
by countries wY:ich subscribe to the treaty which have renounced nuclear weapons and
have not obtained adequate guarantees that they will not be used against them. W. _
Epstein emphasizes: "Problems of extending security giiarantees are of interest to
all nonnucle~r countries and not only third world state~. Concern for questions of
, security is a principal reason why certain near-nuclear and potentially nuclear
countries have not subscribed to the Nonproliferation Treaty."144
A number of disarmament specialists (R. Falk, R. Ulrr,ezan, W. Epstein, A. Myrdal,
R. Tacker and o.t_hers) believes that the adoption of commitments on the nonuse of
nuclear weapons against nonnuclear cnuntries which are party to the treaty would lead
to a situation where the participating country would be in a safer situation than a
state refraining from subscribing to it. Precisely such an action would be a moti-
vation not to acquire nuclear weapons for security considerations, that is, a factor
_ strengthening the nonproliferation process. Otherwise--given the absence of limi-
_ tations on the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countr~es--discrimination
against the nonnuclear countries on the part of the nuclEar powers threatariing to
undermine the nonprolifer~tion process will be revealed in all its poignancy.
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Princeton University professor R. Tacker believes that the problem of the nonuse
of nuclear weapons is directly related to the creation of an effec tive system of
their nonproliferation for the following reason~. First, because this is an effec-
tive means of providing the nonnuc.~:ear states with security guarantees against nu-
clear blackma3l on the part of powers which possess such weap~ns. Second, the
adoption of this principle would lead to a considerable diminution in the signifi-
cance of nuclear weapons for a country's international position. In this event the
nuclear states would not be able to regard nuclear weapons as a le gitimate means of
conducting military operations, and they could in the future essent ially be made
_ illegal together with toxic gases and biological means of warfare. This, in turn,
could lessen the motivation to their creation by nonnuclear states which might
still regard these weapons as a means to achieve great-power status. Third, a com-
_ mitment not to use them would lead to a real strengthening- of the moral-political
positions of the nuclear powers as the initiators of nonprol~iferation for otherwise
it would be a case of their requiring of other states that they no t acquire what
they themselves consider important from the political and military viewpoints. Re-
nunciation of the use of nuclear weapons "would legitimize their ro le as advocates
of other states' nonpossession of nuclear weapons."145 _
As a whole, such a policy would be of positive significance in aver ting a nuclear
war since it would lessen the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons and prevent
the development of the "nuclear reflex" as a response ta all military operations
employing conventional means.
Another Princeton professor--R. Falk--goes even further in his con clusions and re-
commenda~.ions, believing that it is difficult to halt the nuclear arms race without
limiting their use. He wrote in the journal FOREIf~ POLICY: "At the currenC stage
the creation of new weapons systems such as the Trident represents nothing oCher
than a resumption of the military's endeavors to maintain freedom o f maneuver in
the strategy of the first use of nuclear weapons. It would therefo re be advisable
to present an initiative on the nonuse of nuclear weapons for a hal t to the nuclear
arms race. At the initial stage this declaration could refer to th e nonuse of nu-
clear weapons against nonnuclear countries and subsequently to the total renuncia-
tion of their use as the said m~ans of conducting military operatior.s except for
_ instances of self-defense." Falk believes that steps in this dire c tion could
_ ultimately contribute to the emergence of agreement among countries of the world
community concerning the fact that the use of nuclear weapons is a crime against
humanity.146
Discussing various circumstances in these matters, a~�number of American~~e}iolars
emphasizes that in the plane of averting proliferation the concept of the nonuse of
nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries is the most effective. The other com-
mitment on not being the first to use nuclear weapons laxgely appli es to relations
between nuclear powers. In this connection, they believe, it woul d be advisable
to examine the corresponding 1976 initiative of the Warsaw Pact in a regional aspect
--in Europe--which could contribute to reducing the risk of the "nuclear opposi-
tion" of the blocs. However, glob~lly, this approach, it is claimed by a number of
American research scholars, might not procure the obviouG advantage s for nonprolifer-
ation which ensue from the first commitment. As R. Garvin, former ~cience and tech-
nology adviser to presiden~s�i~.. Johnson~~and-� R.~ Nixon,~beZieves, given co~itments on -
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the nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states, a country deciding to
take the path of the creation of its own weapons would ~eopardize its own security,
having forfeited guarantees on the part of the nuclear states, and given commit-
mehts on not being the first to use nuclear weapons, its decision would not be re~
flected in a weakening of its security. It would be necessary to embark later on
realization of the no-first-use concept and mainly in the context of relations be-
. tween nuclear powers.147 -
Specialists' attention is also drawn to the question of the form in which the secur-
ity guarantees will be given--in official statements or international accords.
The overwhelming majority of American scholars, even those who doubt the effective-
ness of such measures against proliferation, agree that solemn promises not enshrined
in the form of international treaties will hardly be ta~Cen seriously by other coun-
trias and will have no marked influence on their approach to nuclear weapons. The
same T. Greenwood emphasizes: "The threat of the use of nuclear weapons will in-
evitably exist as long as the~weapons themselves exist. The fears of the nonnuclear
states will hardly be quieted by a declaration of abstention, however. solemn it may
be. The threat of the use of nuclear weapons w ill inevitably exist as long as the
weapons themselves exist. The fears of the nonnuclear states will hardly be quieted
by a declaration of abstention, however solemn it may be. The threat is the same
before and after the declaration."148
- R. Garvin believes that "the conclusion of a formal international agreement on non-
_ use would contribute more to the nonnuclear states' confidence" in respect of guar-
antees of their_ security than unilateral declarations. In this case an international
treaty on the nonuse of this weapon with simultaneous real adjustments to the nu-
clear powers' military strategy would be an effective instrument of the prevention
of proliferation.149
An argument frequently put forward against the idea of the nonuse of nuclear weapons
- is that such a step on the part of the United States could bring about a crisis of _
the West's alliances, having undermined trust in America's military guarantees in
various multilateral and bilateral blocs. "The assimm*~tion of cou~itments not to
use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries shoi~ld be viewed with caution. _
There is danger that such comm~itments could undermine the cohesion of the alliances," �
such military experts as P. Doty, M. Nacht and others warn.150 Extreme opposition
to the idea of the nonuse of nuclear weapons is expressed by the Pentagon, whose
- representatives are always stressing that limitati.ons on the use of nuclear weapons
for the purpose of so-called "restraint" and "deterrence" will lead. to a change
_ in the strategic situation in East-West relations not in favor of the United States
and will increase the risk of the outbreak of conflicts with the use of conventional
arms. In their opinion, in this case the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons
in West F.urope and South Korea would be shorn of military-political significance,
which could allegedly bring about a"dangerous" military imbalance and the threat
of conflict. Precisely from considerations of bloc interests a number of experts
warns that the United States should not unconditionally renounce the use of nuclear
weapons and that "if it has to choose between preserving the durable structures of -
the alliances and a commitment on the nonuse of nuclear weapons, the first path
is preferable."151 =
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However, there is a group of scholars in the United States which believas that in
the situation of "nuclear parity" between the United States and the USSR continuing
reliance in military strategy on tactical nuclear weapons and a readiness to use
them are fraught with the danger of any conflict developing into a nuclear contl3ct
threatening all mankind with catastrophe. For example, analyzing the military-poli-
tical situation in Europe, B. Russett, professor of Yale University, believes that
whereas freedom of maneuver in the use of nuclear weapons to insure the sa-called
"defense" of West Europe made some sense in the 1Q40!s, when the United States pos-
sessed superiority in the nuclear sphere and its allies were experiencing a short-
_ age of conventional forces and when a high degree of tension existed on the European
continent, in the new situation, given nuclear parity and equivalence in the con--
ventional forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, there is no sense in cling-
~ ing to the preservation of freedom in nuclear questions. "To reduce the risk of
- the outhreak of a nuclear war threatening the total destruction of West Euorpe it
would be expedient to declare firmly and unilaterally even no first use of nuclear
weapons,"15Z B. Russett declares.
Considering the potential danger of a limited conflict in this region or the other _
developing into a global conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, Adm G. La Rocque,
B. Russett, D. Record and others urgently recommend a start on the gradual reduction
af the United States' nuclear presence in its allied countries and the withdrawal
of tactical nuclear weapons from them. At the same time as a step conduciv~~.~ to
this long-term goal R. Garvin emphasizes the need for the pursuit of a polic3~ of
the nonuse of nuclear weapons, which would "contribute to the withdrawal of nu-
clear weapons from the territory of other ~tates, which corresponds t~ the recom-
mendatior:s concerning the reduced dependence of the United States and its allies on
tactical nuclear weapons,"153 � _
In a debate in which military arguments against nonuse are losing their significance
owing to th~ obvious nature of the increased risk of nuclear war the opponents of
_ this measure continue to emphasize persistently that the preservation of the bloc -
structures and the United States' unconditional readiness to use nuclear weapons are
a dependable guarantee against proliferation and that a policy of the nonuse of
nuclear weapons leading to the undermining of the United States' "nuclear commit-
ments" to the allies would promote the lat~~'s decision to take the path of inde- -
pendent nuclear armament, that is, further proliferation. "If the dependability of
NATO continues to di~3.nish," L. Dunn, research assistant of the Hudson Institute,
declares, analyzing the consequences for West Euxope of a renunciation of the use o�
nuclear weapons, "independent ~st German nuclear forces may appear by the end of
the 1980's and start o� the 1990's."154 ~e consequences of such a development of
events would lead to the increased aspiration of other West European countries to
provide themselves with their own nuclear weapons and the undermining of the entire
nonproliferation system.
A number of American experts believes that a policy of nonuse in Southeast Asia
also could have similar consequences. In particular, reviewing the situation on the
Korean peninsula, T. Greenwood believes: "Inasmuch as America's tactical nuclear
weapons are deployed in South Korea, to that extent a declaration on their nonuse
could be seen as a reluctance to abide by its military commitments." Such a con-
clusion would push Seoul toward starting on its own nuclear arms program. South
Ko~ea could be followed by Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia and others.155
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But the proposition of the positive significance of military alliances for the cause
of nonproliferation does not withstand criticism. As emphasized in a previous chap-
tet' historical experience ~estifies that bloc policy encourages the proliferation
of nuclear weapons rather than restraina it. In 1978 a report of the Houae Int~Y-
national Relations Committee which the press acquired contained facts testifying
that despite the United States' military commitments to South Korea, Seoul embarked
at the start of the 1970's, unknown to its ally, on the development of programs of -
the creation of its own nuclear weapons. It is with good reason that American scho-
lars caution th~ United States against overestimating its influence on its bloc
allies and capacity for keeping them away from a course toward independent' nuclear
armament, believing that this solution of nonproliferation questions cannot be
dependable and effective over the long term.
Nevertheless, the opinion still prevails among America's political scientists that
a policy of the unconditional renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons could lead -
to the erosion of the bloc structures and that in its approach to the nonprolifera- _
tion problem the United States should be concerned to preserve the military alliances
which it heads. Thus T. Greenwood cautions: "The United St=~.tes should accompany
possible declarations on the nonuse of nuclear weapons with vigorous assurances of
its continued.commitments in respect not only of South Korea but also the states
whose confidence in American guarantees could be undermined--Taiwan, Japan, Australia
and the West European countries."156 One perceives as the basis of this approach _
the aspiration of America's military and politicians and the supporters of a tough
U.S. foreign policy course in the world arena to preserve, as before, nuclear wea-
pons as a principal instrum;nt of the "from-a-position-of-strength" policy.
Thus to sum up the debate in the United States on the problem of the nonuse of
nuclear weapons, we may conclude the following. On the one hand the United States
cannot fail to take accoim t of the fact that the task of averting the threat of the
proliferation of nuclear weapons requires immediate limitations on their use against
nonnuclear countries in order to reduce the latter's motivations to acquire them.
On the other hand, the adoption of unconditional commitments in respect of the nonuse
of nuclear weapons is being impeded by Washi*_:gton's endeavor to preserve the effec-
tiveness of these weapons as a military and diplomatic means and the gravitation
toward bloc policy.
This ambiguity was also distinctly reflected in official U.S. policy, when, in 1978,
the problem of the nonuse of nuclear weapons was the subject of international dis-
cussion and the USSR presented the initiative of the conclusion of the correspond-
ing convention.
The positive reaction of the nonnuclear states to the Soviet declaration that the
USSR would never use nuclear weapons against states which renounce the production
and acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not have such on their territory largely
compelled the United States also to take a step in this direction: on 12 June 1978
_ Secretary of State C. Vance read out a statement from the President which said
that "the United States will not use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear country -
which has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or which has given some similar
internationally binding imdertaking not to acquire nuclear explosives. An attack
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on the United States, its territory or its armed forces or its allies by states
which are allied to some nuclear state or linked with some nuclear state in carry-
ing out or developing this attack will constitute an exception."
U.S. officials specified that this statement in no way affects Washington's readi-
ness to use nuclear we~pons for ~he purpose of the so-called "defense" of the United
3tates' allies in Europe and Asia. Evaluating the White House statement, American
e~erts emphasized that this promise will hardly have a significant practical in-
fluence on U.S. policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. According to
the NEW YORK TIMES, the main purpose of the statement was "an attempt to allay the
conc.ern of the developing countries, which are expressing dissatisfaction that at-
tempts are bei g made to force them to rer.ounce the development of nuclear weapons
unilaterally."~57
- When, however, an INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE correspundent requested specific
clarification of what practical limitations this promise inaposes on the Unified
States, the official State Department representative declared with un~:oncealed irony:
"Whereas prior to the adoption of the commitments, in the event of some subject of
Ruritania (~he name of a fictitious kingdom from the romantic novel "The Prisoner
of Zenda" by A. Hope--V.D.) hitting a GI, the United States had a right to re~porid
to this attack with the use of nuclear weapons against this state, but now, follow-
ing the promises, it does not have this right."158
Such an interpre~tgt~on,: which essentially amounts to a ridiculously minimal limi-
tation of the use of nuclear weapnns, is perfectly logical, considering the reserva-
tions which Washington made in paraZlel. At the same time diplomatic observers
emphasized that unila_teral official promises, at however high a level they may be
made and however solemnly they may be enunciated, will hardly contribute to the
nonnuclear s~ates' confidence in their security until they are enshrined multi-
laterally in an accord in international ~aw.
The Soviet Union's proposal formulates precisely its high-minded position on the
prevention under any circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons by a power possess-
ing such weapons against a state which does not have such and does not allow another
country to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory. According to the.American posi-
tion, however, the United States could employ nuclear weagons on the pretext that
this was being done for self-defense.159
Whereas for the Soviet Union its declaration at the UN General Assembly Special
Disarmament Session was a point of departure for subsequent measures in the sphere
of limiting the use of nuclear weapons, in particular, the proposal on the conclu-
sion of a legal agreement, for the United States similar promises appeared the limit
beyond which they were not prepared to go.
The endeavor of America's ruling cireles to preserve as much freedom of maneuver
as possible in the use of nuclear weapons became particularly apparent following
submittal for examination by the General Assembly session of the Soviet proposal
on the conclusion of a convention on strengthening security~guarantees for the non-
_ nuclear states. During discussion of this draft in the UN First Committee Washing-
ton's position was sharply criticized by the nonnuclear states, who asked the
perfectly legitimate questions why American statements on nonuse were accompanied
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by reservations and why they did not welcome the concept of an official treaty com-
mitment. The nonnuclear states were completely dissatisfied with the demagogic
explanations given by the American delegate, who declared that since "nuclear wea-
pons represent an element of the agreements in respect of security which have up to
now helped us insure peace and preserve the lives of all of us here in this hall...
such a promise cannot be applied to the nonnuclear states unconditionally." For
the latter it is precisely the threat of the use of nuclear weapons which is the
principal factor making their security unreliable, and references to the Unitred
States' bloc allied commitments in no way diminish their concern.
The significance of the Soviet proposal for the interests of the nonnuclear states'
security was so obvious that the American representative did not dare cast doubt
on the idea of the conclusion of the convention, referr.irig~ merely to the impossi-
bility of i~s realization at this stage, in view of the considerable divergence in -
the approaches of the five nuclear powers to the question of the nonuse of nuclear
weapons (Britain supported the U.S. position, and France and the PRC merely declared
that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons). Considering the negative
reaction to the position of the United States, its r~presentative was forced to
emphasize that the United States was ready to continue discussion of questions of
security guarantees.
Throughout 1979 and I980 the Disarmament Commi.ttee in Geneva examined the possibil-
ity of the formu3.ation of an international agreement on security guarantees for
the nonnuclear states. However, because of the resistance of the Untted States
and Western countries, this effective measure for curbing the spread of nuclear
weapons has yet to become a reality.
' A fear can be traced in the American approach to the USSR's initiative that this
- limitation or the other in the use of nuclear weapons will lead to an undermining
of bloc policy and to the reduced effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a military
and diploma.tic means, in a word, to a further loss of the possibility of acting
"from a position of strength," to which Washington is so accustomed. HOwever, the
acute problems confronting the coLmtries of the world and the urgent need to curb
the race in nuclear arms, prevent their proliferation and reduce the threat of nu-
clear war demand a radical reexamination of the United States' foreign policy course
and an end to ambiguity in the approach to problems of nuclear disarmament. It
is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States to combine a policy of
building up the nucl ear arsenal and preserving freedom of maneuver in the use there-
of with the tasks of averting a nuclear war. In the modern world a situation has
evolved wherein it is essential to make a clear and firm choice in favor of the
strengthening of world security and the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. _
Otherwise the threat and danger of nuclear war will not diminish but grow.
Chapter 11. U.S. Policy at the Start of the 1980's: Results and Prospects
The President's 1980 State of the Union address once again demonstratively emphasized
that the administrat ion was fully resolved "to insure American leadership in halt-
ing the s read of nuclear weapons, which could...threaten the security of the United
States."1~0 With what foreign policy activity luggage in this sphere does the
Washington administration enter the 1980's? What were America's ruling circles -
seeking more--"leadership" or real success in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons?
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Taking accoimt of the mood in the coimtry, as presidential candidate, J. Carter .
endeavored to devote more attantion to the problem of the nonproliferation of nu-
clear weapons in the world, criticizing the Republican administration for its in-
ability to adopt effective measures to neutralize this threat. In his repeated
stump speeches he stressed the need for this issue to figure highlq in the systiem
of the United States' foreign policy priorities and promised to take the appro- '
priate steps in this direction. Describing the long-term goal of U.S. foreign policy,
J. Carter asserted at that time: "The spread of nuclear weapons in the world re-
presents the biggest waste and the greatest danger. Our final goal must be to elim-
inate the nuclear potential of all countries."161
Initially such statements might have given rise to the hope that the United States
would attempt to find a comprehensive app~oach to the solution of the problems of
the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons taking into consideration its "technical"
and "political" parameters. However, the administration's very first steps showed
that the central place in U.S. policy in the nonproliferation sphere continued to
be occupied by questions connected not with a diminution of the factor of nuclear ~
weapons in international relations but with the use of atomic power engineering.
What are the results of American policy in this sphere?
When, in Agril 1977, the basic propositians of a program to reduce the risk of the ~
use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes were put forward and, in March 1978, a
law was passed on increased control over exports of nuclear technology and materials,
, the administration was fully optimistic concerning tt~e success of its initiacives.
First, Washingtan was counting on ~he fact that, having abandoned for an indefinite
period the industrial breeding of spent fuel and halted the creation of breeder
reactors, it would set a"good example" to other countries. Second, the United
States hoped to persuade them to follow this "good example" at the diplomatic level.
Third, where persua.sion was of no avail, the United States proposed using as an
instrument of pressure a new law providing for the curtailffient of fuel supplies for
- nuclear power stations if other countries failed to observe the criteria in the
approach to the development of atomic engineering prescribed by the United States.
However, by the start of the 1980's this optimism of the U.S. ruling circles had
changed to despondency: the opposition of the ma~ority of countries of the capital-
ist world to the American initiatives was obvious. .
The philosophy of the Carter administration's approach to nonproliferation issues
differed sharply from the views and concepts of previous administrations. Whereas
at the time of the conclusion of the Nonproliferation Treaty the basis o� policy
- was that a11 states should enjoy the benefits of the peaceful atom equally, having
undertaken here not to acquire nuclear weapons, now, in "b lacklisting" the process
of the breeding of spent fuel Washington made it understood that the nonnuclear
countries should also renounce such technology, irrespective of whether iC is
profitable to them economically or not and whether it is under IAFA control or not.
The formal logic of such a philosophy might appear convincing to the United States,
if the potential scale of the spread of plutonium in the world is taken into con-
sideration, but whether it will prove acceptable to the nonnuclear countries
economically and politically is the question on whose solution the fate of the new
initiatives depends.
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When, in the 196 0's, talks were being held concerning the Nonproliferation Treaty,
many nonnuclear countries justifiably suspected that the Unfi.ted States might attempt
to take advantage of it to preserve its dominant positions in the sphere of nuclear
technical knowledge on the pretext of preventing tihe spread of nuclear weapons. Much
effort was required at that time to persuade the ma3ority of countries to sigrt the
treaty even given the presence of article IV. When the text of the treaty was of- ~
ficially submitted to the United Nations in May 1968, A. Goldberg, at that time
U.S. representat ive in this organization, attempted to remov~ these doubts, de-
ciaring: "There is no reason to fear that this treaty will impose any restrictions
on the possibili ty of states which do not have nuclear weapons developing their
potential in the sphere of nuclear science and technology."162 The current abrupt
turnabout proved manifestly contrary to this position and article IV. Essentially
Washington openly questioned the confidence in the commitments of the treaty's non-
nuclear countries not to acquire nuclear weapons and expressed doubt concerning the
dependability of the guarantees of control on the part of the IAEA. A research body
of the U.S. Congress, which in 1979 prepared a report on the consequences of U.S.
policy in relations with West Europe, was forced to acknowledge that if Washington
had presented ;such initiatives at the time the Nonproliferation Treaty was being
drawn up, the latter would hardly have been signed either by the industrially de-
veloped or the developing countries.163
It is not surpris ing that the American initiatives evoked a sharply negative re-
action in the majority of countries of the capitalist world. Indignation at the
unilateral changes in the principles of international policy in ~he sphere of the
use of atomic energy extended to both the developing and the industrially developed -
capitalist coun tries.
The former viewed this step as a continuation of economic discrimination and went as
far as to charge that the new technological policy was nothing other than a hangover
of colonialism. "As in the good old days of colonialism, when assimilation of the
Bible was accomp anied by the sword, so now also the assertion of American views ~n
nonproliferation is, it seems, a forerunner of atomic colonialism,"164 a scientist
from India caust ically observes. The majority of developing countries believes
that fear as regards the spread of nuclear weapons is being used by the United
States for attempts to deprive them of the benefits of the comprehensive use of
atomic energy. Washington's new export policy has been described as undermining the
entire concept of North-South cooperation, which envisages the broadest possibZe
exchange of progressive technology. The policy of "technological denial" in the
atomic engineering sphere was viewed negatively at the 1979 Havana conference of
heads of government of nonalined countries .
The West European countries and Japan viewed the United States' actions as an en-
deavor to neutralize the strengthening of the positions of its main competitors in
the world nuclea r technology markets, particularly in the sphere of the industrial
assimilation of reprocessing and the creation of breeder reactors. France, Britain,
the FRG and Japan have not concealed their intention of continuing the development
of the "plutonium economy," which, they believe, is irreplaceable in catering for
- energy requirements at a time of an acute fuel shortage.
According to preliminary plans for the industrial assimilation of reprocessing, in
the 1980's Britain intends to obtain a quantity of approximately 2,000 tons of spent
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fuel from Japan and approximately the same quantity from the West European countries;
and France approximately 6,000 tons from Japan, the FRG, Sweden, Switzerland, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands and Australia. Roughly 50 tons of plutonium will be obtained
~ as a result of reprocessing, and the profits will run to over $3 billion. Th~ 1~'Itd
and Japan have not abandoned th e intention of becoming a part of this business,
having begun the creation of analo~ous installations. What position should the U.S.
Administration opt for in respect of the industrially developed countries: supply
them with enriched uranium, which would soon be reprocessed, and thereby create
precedents for the developing cotmtries or adhere firmly to the principles set out
in the new law--this was the dilemma which immediately confronted Washington. Re-
f lecting on the fate and consequences of the U.S. initiatives, American scholars
emphasize precisely this deadlock situation. M. Brennar, a professor at the University
- of Pittsburgh, warns: "The new strategy in the nonproliferatior~ sphere will lead
to an inevitable dilemma: on the one hand, it vill hardly be successful without the
support of the allies, but, on the other, excessive pressure on them could end in
its complete failure."165
There w~,s sharp opposition to the White House strategy in the United States also.
Even in the first year of office of the Democratic administration the Westinghouse
and General Electric nuclear giants suffered considerab le losses as a result of the
increased competition for orders for reactors on the part of the French and West Ger-
man monopolies. According to IAEA data, 12 power reactors costing approximately
$1 billion each were ordered worldwide in 1977. The United States did not obtain
a single foreign order, and its share of the world market was zero. Only in 1978
were American companies able to obtain ~two orders from South Korea.
The American firms' concern is caused not only uy the financial losses but also by
the fact that ultimately their main competitors will ge t even further ahead of the
United States in the development of new areas of atomic engineering and will prac-
tically monopolize the services to other countries in the sphere of spent fuel
conversion. This prospect, a number of Amexican experts believes, could simultaneous-
, ly nullify the possibility of achieving the goals set by the administration in the
program to prevent proliferation. A report prepared fo r Sen J. Biden (Democrat,
Delaware) pointed directly to the need for a reexaminat ion of the original postulates
of the government programs in view of the fact that th e Uni~ed States' unilateral
measures are insufficiently effective: "The restrictions that have been introduced
in respect of American nuclear materials and equipment are so strict that countries
not possessing a nuclear potential could turn to other states and thereby circum-
vent all or almost all the American restrictions."166
Washington's strategy in the sphere of the nonproliferation of dangerous.technology
was built on the premi.se that countries using atomic energy for peaceful purposes
would readily accept increased dependence on the United States in the sphere of
supplies both of nuclear reactors and the necessary fuel. In order to stimulate
a renunciation of the creation of dangerous technology--enrichment and conversion
plants--Washington even undertook to make "timely, guaranteed and profitable sup-
plies of fuel." The idea of setting up an international fuel bank which could grant
the necessary uranium to the cotm tries which for some reason were unable to obtain
it along bilateral relations channels was aimed at achieving this goal. In October
1977 the U.S. President declared the United States' readiness to contribute to such
a fuel reserve and, together with other countxies, to s tudy the question of its
institutionalization.
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i
However, a riu.mli~er of American experts, particularly M. Brennar, emphasize that the
promises so~u~ded good in words, but when it ca~e~to practical deals, the complex ~
procedure of lthe issuing of licenses for exports of nuclear materials provided for
bp the new 1aw caused doubts among the importer-coimtries as to the dependability of
ttiese supplies.167 The idea of the creation of a fuel bank remained unrealized at
the start of the 1980's. Considering the furth~r aspiration of the majority of
countries to political independence of the United States, it can hardly be expected
that such economic dependence would be acceptable +to them over the long term. The -
threat of a halt to sup~lies of nuclear fuel from the United States would bring
about other cotmtries' attempts to creat national enterprises for the manufacture
of fuel for nuclear power stations.
In addition, Washington failed to consider the fact that the energy situation in
other countries sometimes differs sharply from the situation in the United States, -
which can permit itself to get by with traditional types of energy sources, in the
main. As nuclear technology expert E. Wood correctly observes, "for other countries, -
_ which regard breeder reactors as the only hope of securing for themselves their own
energ~ sources, the arguments of the United States are simply irrelevant, and fuel
conversion for them is the sole possible way to obtain plutonium for the breeders."~68
It is not fortuitous that a number of experts agrees that concrete U.S. strategy -
aimed at a renunciation of the introductiion of installations for spent fuel con-
version and the slowing down of the development of breeder reactors could lead to
the directly opposite resu~.ts. .
The British political scientist I. Smart concludes that the aspiration to independ-
ence of the Unitecl States will contribute to other countries' adopting decisions to
proceed to the creation of their own installations for fuel enrichment and breeding
following the example of West Europ~: "There is obviously a risk that the policy
being pursued by Carter could sooner or later stimulate an increase in rather than
a limitation of enrichment and breeder installations."169 ~is viewpointis also
, shared by the organ of America's businass circles--the magazine FORTUNE--which,
_ summing up the results of the Democratic administration's policy in the nonprolifer-
ation sphere, concludes that "the policy and tactics approved by the United States -
are actually contributing to precisely the development which they were intended to
' halt."170
The organ of the Council for Foreign Relations, which is influential in the United
States--the journal FOREIGN ATeFAIRS--sharply criticized U.S. poli~y in the nonproli-
feration sphere. Throughout 1979 it regularly carried articles of prominent experts
_ in international relai:ions such as M. Bundy and S. Hoffmann who called on the admin-
istration, before it was too late, to change its policy and abandon the "punitive"
clauses of the legislation. In the opinion of Harvard professor S. Hoffmann, it
would be advisable in the interests of the United States "to partially retreat from
the ambitious goals proclaimed in 1977." But he, like others, was forced to
acknowledge that doing this is not so simple now because of the law, guided by
which Congress could "block the majority of future pr~gmatic decisions aimed at a
search for compromise."171 M. Bundy, former adviser to presidents J. Kennedy and
L. Johnson, expressed serious concern, believing that if "the United States continues
' to insist on being right, a new coali~ion could be formed uniting the suppliers and
consumers of nuclear technology and materials with freer standards and differing
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from American estimations of dangers and benefits.'i72 In a word, the United States'
he&emonist policy could in the practical plane lead to the further pruliferation in
_ the world of dangerous technology and dimtnished control over it on the part of the
IABA, that is, to reverse results.
This threat and the clear opposxtian of the ma~ority of countriea forced th~ .;.5.
Administration to agree to certain co~romises and an easing of its policy. In
1978-1980 Washington was forced to give its consent to the ship:aent to West Europe
and Japan of spent fuel for reprocessing and the inauguration of tlie firs~ sta~e of _
- a conversion plant in Tokai-~Iura (Japan). But such a modus vivendi with the in-
dustrially developed capitalist states would inevitably entail a.fur*_her adjustment
to polic3~ in rPspect of other cotm tri~s for otherwise there would be obvious dis-
crimination against the latt2r. Despite a certain easing of U.S. poli~y, there is
n~ c'oubt that the general conclusion is that all this can only postpone "head-on
= confrontations" until the transition period envisaged by the new law is over.
Why is it that a principal U.S. initiative in the international arena in the sphere
s of the nonproli�era~ion of nuclear arms--the 7 April 1977 J. Carter program and the
. law on increasing control over exports of nuclear technology and materials--have
~ encountered such strong opposition and their fate ~.~pears in a somber light?
The majority of experts believes that a fundamental miscalculation of the administr- �
ati~n was that: th~~ United States attempted to operate by proceeding merely from its
own interests, ignoring the requirements of other countries, and that, in imposing .
its goals, f ailed to -eckon with the fact *_hat other countries have a right to
- beliets~~ and views different from those of the United Staties. A number of prominent
Western political scientists such as S. Hoffmann, M. Bunday, K. [Kayzer], director
' of the ColognE (FRG) International Relations Institute, I. Smart (Britain) and others
conclude that t~e ~ources of such foreign policy miscalcu~,ations lie in U.S. ruling,
circles' underestia~ation of the realities mf the modern world and a hypertrophied
overestimation o.f their own capacity for continuin.g to lead it, as before. The
approach to a solution of nonproliferation problems was ~onceived in the spirit of
traditional U.S. omnipotence without regard for the fact that in contemporary inter- _
national relations its role ha~ diminished considerably.
, The sharp contradiction:a between the United States and other coun~ries of the capit-
alist world on questions of the nonproliferation of nuclear technology and naterials
testify that it is impossible in contemporary international. relations to find a
satisfactor~- solution of urgent problems outside of the framework of tir~ad inter-
national cooperati.on. Unilateral initiati;-es by the United ;~tates, whatever their
i.ntentions, can hardly be successful if they fail ~o take account of the vitally
important interests of other countries. Furthermore, an approach oriented toward -
_ unilateral American interests could harm policy in the nonproliferation sphere.
- Justifyi.n~ the pursu~t of the United States' aggressive course, representatives of
the U.S. Administration ofter~ adduce the argument that as a result of this approach
~ "we have managed to force ather countr3es to recognize that the problem of prevent-
ing further proli.fe~~tion is of paramount importance and merits the most sariaus
steps bei: g taken." 3
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However, sober-minded experts in the United States and other capitalist countries
approach an evaluation af the results o~ the administration's policy differently.
Thus the Japanese scientist R. Imai enphasizes: "The United States is no longer
capable of foisting its own ~-arsion of the truth on the world...in this plane U.S.
policy in the nanproliferation sphere has evidently uone more harm than good."174
Washington's endF~avor to unilaterally set limits on the development of atomic engi- -
- neering and to use its positions in the nuc:lear sphere as an instr.ument of pressure -
on sovereign ~tates has led to even the positive results in the business of non-
proliferation achieve~l~~ithin the framework of infiernational coopPration going
virtually unremarked.l Tn order to co~ensate to some extent for the unfavorable
impression craated by its unilateral approach Washington was forced to agree to
certain steps in the further refineme~t of the process of control and inspection on
the part of the IAEA. Granting a special subsidy of $10 million for training a
staff of specialists and creating instruments for the technical detection of viola-
tion.s, the United States declar.ed that it would insist on all countries obtaining
American materi3ls or benefiting f.rom American services agreeing to the extension of
control and iiispection measures to all the nuclear facilities on their territory.
' The i-itroduction of maximum precautionary measures, the need for which the USSR has
= long insisted on, cni.ght make it possible to close a loophole in the international
. system for using ~~:terials and technology not as intended. Simultaneously, thanks
to this, the inequa.lity of the cotm tries which, having signed the Nonproliferation
Treaty, have already adopted a legal commitment on placing all nuclear facilities
under international control, as distinct from the countrias which are not party to -
the treaty, could be removed. Having passed the corresponding act, the United States
_ may now require the extension of precautionary measures to the ent~re nuclear activ-
ity of these states. Such an approach would force other supplier-countries also to
adopt analogous measures in respect of the importer-countries. All this would
strengthen the nonproliferation proc~ss.
, The U.S. legislation also contains a provision concerning the need for the importer-
countries to adopt measures for the physical protection of the reactors and correspond- -
, i.ng :na,terials which must be sufficiently reliable to prevent the risk of their theft.
The possibility of sanctions on the part of the United States in the event of non-
observance of control measures or the use of fissionable material for military pur-
poses, if implemented selectively, could contribute ~o i~suring that the "nuclear
option" of this country or the other prove a costly imdertaking since this would -
have to be paid for with a halt to economically important cooper~tion in the ator~ic -
engineering spheYe. It is precisely this consideration whicl~~ may now play a sigrii- -
ficant part in some country or the other's decision on whether to take th e path
of the creation of nuclear weapons or not.
At the same time the administration has expressed readiness to take certain steps
to enhance the privileged status of the coimtries which subscribe to the Nonproli-
feration Treaty compared with nonsubscribers in the use of atomic power. At the UN
General Assembly Special Disarmament Session in June 1978 the American representa-
tive A. Young confirmed the U.S. intention to strive for the creation under IAEA
- auspices of a fund to assist countries party to the treaty to develop atonu.c engin-
eering. For its part, Washington undercook to allocate $5 million for these coun- ~
tries' purchases of enriched uranium to h~l;p them perform the necessary scientific
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research. In addition, the A.merican representative emphasized the United States'
intention to finance through th ~ Eaport-Import Bank nuclear programs which conform
to conditions leading to a le ssening of the danger of the use of atomic power for
- mi.iitary purposes.
The supplier-countries maintained unity, agreeing on the announcement of a moratorium
on supplies of potentially dangerous ma~erials snd technology, and promulgated the
general principles determining their export policy. A fundamentally new dialog
was conducted on an international level on ~.n evaluation ot the nuclear fuel cycle,
and it marked the first. step on the way to the formulation of a common approach of
consumers and suppliers of nuclear technology and mater.ials to the use of atomic
power for peaceful purposes.
The fact that by the efforts of the socialist community countries the problem of
nonproli�eration has come to occspy a central place in the activity of the United
Nations, as a result of which the majority of courtries of the world community had
a sharply negative reaction to Sotath Africa's preparations for testing a nuclear
weapon, is also logical. Thus where Washington has thought less about "leadership"
and where the policy of confrontation has yielded to the idea of cooperation, U.S.
policy has not impeded the achievement of certain positive results,
Is U.S. strategy adequate for the challenge of the threat of the proliferation of
nuclear weapons at the start of the 1980's? This is the question whi~h unavoidably
confronts American experts in summarizing the results of iJ.S. policy. The majority
of them responds to this ques tion negatively. This viewpoint is justified primarily
_ by the fact that Washington's strategy is oriented mainly towar~. the creation of
"technical barriers" on the p ath of the acquisitiion of nuclear weapons an~ hardly
tcuches on the political asp ect of the issue, namely, neutralization of the main
_ motivations to proliferation, which, as an indispensable preliminary condition,
should presuppose a cardinal reorganization of international relations on the path
- of an extension of the proces ses of the relaxation of tension and a devaluation of ~
the role and significance still attached to nuclear weapons. Whatever is made of
America's proposals concer�nii~g a limitation of the spread of dangerous technology
and materials and a~trengthening of international control over the use of atomic
power for peaceful purposes, this strategy will hardly change countries' attitude
toward nuclear weapons--this is the leitmotiv of the critical remarks leveled at
the Carter administration.l~~' This is particularly topical today, when Washington
has set course toward stimulating the nuclear arms race and when it has openly an-
- nounced an aspiration to achi eve military superiority over the Soviet Union.
Does the United States understand this? To judge from individual sta~ements of
certain officials, this aspec t of policy was initially within the sights of the
administration. For example, J. Nye, adviser to the President on nonproliferation,
j acknowledged in an iiiterview with the newspaper INTER DEPENDENT: "in the long term
the problem cannot be reduced merely to technical parameters, and a refusal to make
available dangerous technology cannot be an adequate policy in th~ nDnproliferation
sphere." As if justifying post factum the "punitive measures" against plutonium
- breeding, he emphasized that th e United States never believed that if it prevented
breeding, this would avert the spread of nuclear weapons. In his opinion, the
accentuation of this issue was prompted merely by the fact that it "brooked no
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delay since it was essential to maintain the existing distance between the use of
nuclear power for peaceful and military purposes and postpone the time when 40-50
countries might possess the technical potential for producing nuclear weapons."177
But the policy of creating additional "technical barriers" and "gaining time" c~ri
only appear justifiEd in the event of this time being used primarily to weaken the -
nonnuclear countries' motivations to acquire nuclear weapons, which s t ill exist in
contemporary international relations, aiid to curb the nuclear arms race, taking
into consideration here the fact that technical knowledge cannot be eradicated and
that technical capacity can hardly be limited for long.
In a situation where factors stimulating proliferation continue to ope rate and
where ruling circles ~f the United States themselves are attempting to considerably
- increase their arsenal, regarding it as the basis of its increased influence on
other countries, the threat of states' transition from the ranks of "near-nuclear"
to nuclear will remain and increase even. It will become increasingly diffic:ult to
neutralize this threat with some "technical barriers," and only a poli tical imp act
will be able to exert a braking influence on their "nuclear option." The effective-
ness of this impact could be conditione~l by the extent of the devalvation of ttie
military and political significance of nuclear weapons in international relations
and will depend on how far the nuclear powiers progress along the path of the limita-
tion and reduction of their arsenals of nuclear weapons, the adoptian of cownttments
on their nonuse, limitation of the geography of their deployment and so forth.
This conclusion could hardly be a discovery for the administration. Even as presi-
dential candidate in 1976, J. Carter emphasized that the effectivenes s of nonpro-
liferation policy would depend on progress in the nuclear disarmament sphere: "I
believe we do not have sufficient right to ask others to renounce the acquisition
of nuclear weapons infinitely if we do not demonstrate significant pro gress in the
control, subsequent reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear arsenals."178
Among the President's promises upon taking office figured the task of reducing the
role of nuclear weapons in the world political arena in order that pre stige con-
siderations connected with ti~ese weapons not perform a role prompting their acqui- -
sition. The complex of questions which then required, the President b elieved, im-
mediate solution included the limitation and reduction of nuclear ars enals, the
complete banning of nuclear weapons tests, the withdrawal of U.S. tac tical nuclear
forces from a number of crisis regions, the creation of nuclear-free z ones,.the
adoption of commitments on the nonuse of nuclear weapons and the aband onment of
military doctrines which assert that nuclear weapons perform a useful "restraining"
role. As a whole, in the approach to the solution of intern~tional F.oblems, admin-
istration representatives initially repeatedly gave the assurance that the United
States would caref ully avoid a policy which created the impression that nuclear
weapons lent it exceptionally high prestige or a strong position in in ternational
affairs.179
'i'he solution of questions of nuclear disarmament presupposed as an indispensable
condition continuation of the:policy of relaxation of tension in relations with the
USSR and a course toward extFnding mutual understanding and cnoperation on problems
of world politics.
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But such a foreign po li cy perspective evoked bitter resistance from supporters of
the "from-a-position-of-strength" policy and opponents of a relaxation of tension.
As a result the majori ty of the President's 1976 election promises were "shelved." ~
7'he administration sig_ned the SALT II Treaty, but, taking the position of the right-
wing forces, proceeding from electoral considerations, postponed its ratification
and signed the protoco 1 to the f irst treaty on a nuclear-free zone in Latin America,
b ut has dragged out it s ratification. Taking into consideration the popularity of �
the Soviet declaration, it was forced to declare the nonuse of nuclear weapons
against nonnuclear coun tries, but with such reservations as make this declaration
questionable, an~? to begin talks on a total ban on nuclear weapons tests, but sub-
sequently adopted a pos ition which actually prevented agreement being reached.
Moreover, Washington no t only abandoned plans to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons
deployed overseas but also set course toward the deployment of new intermediate-
range nuclear missile systems in West Europe, disrupting the existing nuclear equi-
valence in Europeo The White House adopted the decision to create a new generation ,
of nuclear missile fo r ces--the MX, Trident II and cruise missiles--in order to
attempt to achieve wi th them military superiority globally.
- In the eyes of the nonnuclear countries this military policy of Washingt~n's by no
means testifies to pro gress along the path of a reduction in the significance of
nuclear weapons in the world arena, that is, along the path of neutralization. of
the main long-term fac tors which are the basis of proliferation. It is not fortui-
tous that a number of Western experts is convinoed that at the second conference
reviewing the effect of the Nonproliferation Treaty and party countries' fulfill-
ment of their commitments the nonnuclear countries will express their dissatisfac-
tion caith the results of nuclear disarmament and will raise the question of the
need for the United St ates' fulfillment of commitments in accordance with article
VI of the treaty, poin ting out that otheYwise the nonproliferation process will be
unstable and unreliable.
The 3. Carter administ ration's transition to a policy of hard-line power confronta-
tion with the Soviet Union undermining world security will unavoidably do serious
damage to the solutior. of questions of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Even
in the estimation of 4~_;r_ern experts the United States has departed from the poiicy
of "restraining" the nuclear ambitions of Pakistan, counting with its assistance
on strengthening its s trategic g~sitions in South Asia. Such a myopic approach is
fraught with negative consequences for nonproliferation as a whole since it could
be reflected in the nuclear policy of other "threshold" countries which Washington
regards as outposts of its influence in the world. These and other countries
which are not party t o the treaty could take advantage of the tension in interna-
tional relations to emb ark on the path of nuclear armament without fearing joint
actions on the part of the states concerned.
Sober -minded American scholars and political scientists have repeatedly opposed
such a U.S. policy, be lieving th at it could only contribute to the spread of nu- ~
clear weapons. For example, Prof G. Kistiakowsk}r cautioned: "Without Soviet-
American cooperation...the proliferation of nuclear weapons worldwide will undoubt-
edly accelerate."180 However, as events at the start of the 1980's have shown,
Washington is ready fo r the sake af short-term and dubious benefits to forgo the
long-term interests of international security.
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~ Farsighted experts agree that to achieve effectiveness in the nonproliferation
sphere the United States must rid itself of the one-sided orientation toward the
creation of "technical barriers" on the path of the acquisition of nuclear weapons
and ehift the accent to the political side of the issue--a surgical removal of ttte
_ "nuclear cancer" continuing to destroy the fabric of international relations. They
emphasize that the situation in this ~phere could have been more favorable if the
United States had brought the debate on nuclear disarmament to the same pitch of
acuteness as the discussion of technical I.ssues concerning the proliferation of
plutonium-reprocessing installations and breeder reactors, supporting it with con-
sistent concrete actions on its part, and if with its actions aimed at exacerbating
Soviet-American relations the United States had not impeded the solution of this '
question. Only a policy of relaxation of tension can guarantee the success of the
strategy of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Otherwise the policy being
pursued by Washington will only lead to the appearance of a world in which there
will be several dozen nuclear states. The alternative is obvious: either relaxa-
tion of tension and nuclear disarmament or the further proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
Evaluating the results of world politics in the nonproliferation sphere, Western
experts frequently point to the fact that prior to the 1980's there had not been a
single nucl~ar weapon test by any nonnuclear country. Indeed, a positive phenomenon,
but the reason for it was not the actions of the United States but to a considerable
extent the consistent position of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries,
which is shared and supported by the broad peace-loving community. At the same time
by the start of the 1980's, given th.e further increase in the technical potential
of countries and the lack of significant progress along the path of military detente,
an optimistic view of the current situation could be likened to seeing only the
~ tip of the iceberg, and international security in the long term simply m~.y not with-
stand a collision with it. A sense of uncertainty is characteristic of realistic
circles in the United States. Just prior to his retirement, J. Nye declared: "I
believe that it would be no surprise if there were to be yet another nuclear explo-
sion in the world at the end of the 20th century."181
Despite this pessimistic forecast, there is no doubt that the likelihood of the
further spread of nuclear weapons would diminish considerably if the United States
and cther nuclear countries were to make an appreciable contribution to the relaxa-
tion of tension and nuclear disarmament, which the USSR has long been calling an
the~m to do .
Conclusion
An analysis oi American concepts and policy in the sphere of the nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons testifies that this problem has objectively occupied a most im-
portant place in the system of the United States' foreign policy priorities, ir-
respective of the concrete acts of this administration or the other.
This has been brought about by the fact that the threatening consequences of the
spread of nuclear weapons worldwide and the r~al possibility of such a process put
on the agenda the task of the formulation of a foreign policy course for the suc-
cessful solution af this problem. A study of different approaches to nonprolifera-
tion issues makes it possible to deter~ine policy parameters in this sphere in the
medium term and the long term.
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In the strategy aimed against the spread of nuclear weapons an important part con-
tir.ues to be pl~yed by problems of reinforcing the nonproliferation process pro-
vided for by the corresponding treaty: the further extension of the body of coun-
tries subscribing to it; making the treaty more universal; refining and increasing _
the effectiveness of the system of IAEA guarantees; placing all nuclear activity in -
all nonnuclear countries under international rontrol; establishment of the strictest
control over tahe operation of the most dangerous elements of the nuclear fuel cycle
connected with the production of fissionable material suitable for the creation of
nuclear weapons; insuring the physical ~rotection of peaceful nuclear facilities;
and a halt to interimperialist rivalry in exports of nuclear technology and mater-
ials. Al1 these measures are aimed at preventing the peaceful use of the atom and
_ atomic engineering itself becoming a channel for the proliferation of nuclear wea-
pons.
~ Without belittling the significance of the problems connected with the peaceful use
and further development of atomic engineering, it has to be emphasized that under
the conditions of the growth of material possibilities in the nuclear sphere the
center of gravity of nonproliferation strategy shifts from the technical to the
po].itical sphere. As a result the main efforts in the long term should be geared
to reducing an d, ultimately, nullifying the effect of the political and military
f~ctors in contemporary international relations which could still prompt countries'
aspiration to the creation of their own nuclear weapons. It is a question of policy
connected with the nuclear arms race.
The quest for a solution of nonproliferati~n problems by American scientists and
political fi.gur.�es points to the need for considerable adjustments to be made to U.S.
policy, the general and main result of which should be a diminution in the political
and military significance of nuclear weapons in the system of international rela-
tions. T.he direct interconnection between nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation
dictates the task of a cardinal reassessmei~t of traditional U.S. approaches to safe-
guarding the interests of so-called "national security." If Washington's policy,
which is based on the might of nuclear weapons, is pushing other countries toward .
acquiring these weapons, this means it is a threat to the security of the United
States itself. This conclusion is becoming the leitmotiv of the recommendations
of the supporters of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. The proposed mea-
sures in nonproliferation policy include a halt to the quantitative and qualitative
nuclear arms race, a reduction in existing arsenal5 of weapons, a complete ban on
nuclear tests, limitation of the use of nuclear weapons, realization of the ideas of
the creation of nuclear-free zones and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from over-
seas bases.
However, the search for the optimum course in the sphere of nonproliferation is en-
countering the bitter resistance of the military-industrial complex and the support-
ers of ~he nuclear arms race and the "from-a-position-of-strength" policy. The
approach of these force~ to such problems as nucl.ear disarmament and nonprolifera-
tion is characterized by aggressiveness of thought and, sometimes, an unwillingness
to understand that the presecriptions of the cold war are unsuitable for the solu-
tion of contemporary problems of world security and that nonproliferation issues
= demand a fundamental�ly different attitude than in the past. The endeavor to con-
- tin~ie the political confront~ti36n with the USSR and to retain the lead in the nuclear
ar-~~s race reflects the inability of America's ruling circles to adapt to the rapidly
changing world and Find the correct answers to the challenges with which it is
presentin~ the United States.
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The successful solution of tlie task of nonproliferation presupposes as an indispens-
able condition continuation of the policy of relaxation of tension and the achieve-
ment of mutual understanding and cooperation between all states. The cold war cre-
` ~Ced the baneful environment in international relations in which the proliferatiot~
process, which has extended to five states, began. It was precisely at that time
that nuclear weapons found a"legitimate" place in world politics and acquired open
and secret admirers in a number of nonnuclear countries.
The relaxation of tension made it possible to take the first steps on the path of
eradicating nuclear weapons from international relations. A number of important
American-Soviet SALT agreements was signed in the 1970's. Questions of the complete
banning of nuclear tests and the nonuse of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states
are at the examination stage. Relaxation of tension has afforded an opportunity for
countries with different social systems to coordinate efforts in the sphere of nu-
clear disarmament and the consolidation of international security. The close inter-
action achieved in the period of detente made it possible to foil South Africa's
preparations for testing a nuclear weapon in 1977 and demonstrated the broad possi-
bilities of the constructive cooperation of countries of West and East in the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the cur.rent stage of international relations,
when the question of a halt to the race in nuclear arms and their further nonpro- -
liferation is as acute as can be, there is no adequate alternative to the relaxation
~ of tension. The cooperation of countries in consolidating international security
is the arterial path toward removal of the threat of nuclear war.
The USSR's numerous ini~iatives and proposals in the sphere of a halt to the arms
race and disar~ament are contributing to the creation of an intarnational climate
conducive to the solution of questi~ons of preventing the further proliferation of
nuclear weapons and to their gradual exclusion from international relations. These
include proposals on the further limitation of and reduction in nuclear armaments,
a total ban on tests of nuclear weapons, a halt to their production in any form,
the convening of a conference of the five nuclear powers to study questions of nu-
clear disarmament, no first use of nuclear w~apons in relations between countries
which have signed the Final Act of the Conference on Se~.urity and Cooperation in ,
Europe, the strengthening of nuclear guarantees for the nonnuclear countries and
the nondeployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of states which dc not have
such at the present time and support for the creation of nuclear-free zones and
"peace zones" in different regions. A constructive approach to these initiatives on
the part of the United Statea and other nuclear powers could promote to a consider-
able extent countries` efforts to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear wea-
pons.
FOOTNOTES
1. "Material of the 25th CPSU Congress," Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 23.
2. "Documents and Material of the Soviet-British Talks in Moscow, 13-17 February
1975," Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, p 48:
3. "Visit of French President V. Giscard d'Estaing to the Soviet Union 26-28 April
1979: Documents and Material,'' Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p 2$.
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4. "For Peace on Earth. Soviet-American Summit in Vienna 15-18 June 1979: ~nCU-
ments, Speeches and Material,":Mos cow, Politizdat, 1979, p 63. -
5. PRAVDA 23 February 1980.
6. "Global'naya strategiya SShA v usloviyakh nauchno-tekhnicheskoy revolyutsii"
[U.S. Global Strategy Under the Conditions of the Scientific-Technical Revolu-
tion], Moscow, Mysl', 1979, execut ive editors G.A. Arbatov, V.V. Zhurkin and
V.I. Pavlyuchenko; G.A. Trofimenko, "SShA: politika, voyna, ideologiya" (The
United States: Policy, Wa�, Ideolo gy], Moscow, Mysl', 1976; "Aktual'nyye
problemy razoruzheniya" tUrgent Problems of Disarmament], edited by O.I. Bykov,
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SShA: [Mj.litary Strength and International Relations: Military Aspects of
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7. "To Preve:�t the ~pread ~f Nuclear Weapons," U.S. Arms ::antrol and Disarmament
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8. "Documen ts on Disarmament 1945-1959," Washington, 1960, vol 1, pp 1-3.
9. "A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy," Washington, 1946, p VI.
10. Itiid. , p 41.
11. H, Alperovitz, "Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam," New York, 1965, p 227;
D. Horowi tz, "The Free World Colossus," New York, 1965; H. Feis, "Churchill-
_ Roosevelt-Stalin," New York, 1962. .
12. B. Gol'dshmidt, "Atomnaya problema" [The Atomic Problem], Moscow, Politizdat,
1964, p 47; "Memoirs," Harry S Truman, New York,~ 1956, vol 1, pp 529-544.
13. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer. Hear-
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14. "UN. Official Reports of the Ceneral Assembly, 15th Session," p 57. ~
15. W. Bader, "The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," New York, 1968,
p 10 .
16. C. Attlee, "~ailight of Empire," New York, 1962, p 18.
17. R. Barnett, "Who Wants Disarmament?" Boston, 1960, pp 29-30.
18. Department of State Bulletin, 14 June 1954, pp 926-928.
19. M. Willrich, T. Taylor, "Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards," Cambri3ge, 1974,
p 180 .
20. R. Rosecrance, "Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons," Netv York, 1964, p 264.
21. National Jowrnal Reports, 22 March 1975, p 421.
22. 85th Congress. 2d Session, Washington, 1958, vol II, pp 2816-2850.
23. W. Bader, op. cit. , p 27.
''3 24. Department of State Bullet3n, 5 May 1958, p 740.
25. 85th Congress. 2d Sessiun..., p 2827.
26. W. Bader, op. cit. , p 30.
27. L. Beaton, J. Maddox, "The Spread of Nuciear Weapons," London, 1962, p 55.
28. V.F. Davydov, T.V. Oberenko, A.I. Utkin, "SShA i zapadnoevropeyskiy "tsentry
sily [The Un~.ted States and West European "~enters of Power"], Moscow, Nauka,
PP 6 7-86 .
29. NEW YORK TIMES 18 May 1962.
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30. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, 1963, p 47.
31. For more detail see: A.N. Kalyadin, "Problemq zapreshcheniya ispytaniy i
rasprostraneniya yadernogo oruzhiya" [Problems of Banning Tests and the Pro-
liferation of Nuclear Weapons~, Moscow, Nauka, 1976, pp 167-1986. ~
32. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1965, pp 567-601.
33. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 23 June 1965, p 14062.
34. W. Epstein, "What States Go--And Don't Go--Nuclear," ANNALS, March 1977, p 19.
35. Ibid., pp 18-19.
36. T. Greenwood, H. Feiveson, T. Taylor, "Nuclear Proliferation. Motivations,
Capabilities and Strategies for Control, " New York, 1977, p 46.
37. Ibid., pp 15-18. _
= 38. NEW YORK TIMES 27 August 1977.
39. WASHINGTON POST 31 August 1977.
40. Ibid.
41. "Instant Research on Peace and Violence," No 1, 1977, p 42.
42. rbid., p 40.
43. DER SPIEGEL 31 August 1977. _
44. WASIiIN^TON POST 16 February 1977.
45. Ibid.
46. T. Greenwood et al, op. cit., p 27.
47. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 25 August 1977.
48. Ibid.
49. WASHINGTON POST 31 August 1977.
50. LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, September 1978.
51. An underwater nuclear explosion was recorded in 1979 off the coast of S~uth _
Africa whtch aroused the suspicion in UN circles that South Africa had tested
a nuclear device. At the insis~ence of African countries the United Nations
decided to conduct an investigation into the circumstances of the undeYtaater
nuclear explosion off the coast of South Africa. If th e results of the inves-
tigation show that South Africa was involved in it, this would be an entirely
logical finale to the West's "flirting" with bhe racist regime.
90 .
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52. See also V. F. Davydov, "Nuclear Threat at the C~pe of Good Hope," SSHA:
EKONOMIKA, PULITIKA IDEOLOGIYA No 12, 1977.
53. WASHINGTON POST 31 August 1977.
54. "Near-Nuclear Countries and *_he NPT," SIPRI, Stockholm 1972, p 28.
55. NEW YORK TIMES 30 April 1977.
56. TIME 12 April 1976.
57. BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, June 1969.
58. NATO'S FIFTEEN NATIONS, February-March 1978, p 62.
59. Z. K~1ic~zad, "Pakis~~a~d the Bomb," SURVIVAL, November-December 1979, pp 244-
250.
60. LE MONDE 25 August 1978.
61. NUCLEAR NEWS, August 1978; LE MATIN 25 August 1978.
62. ARMS CONTROL TODAY, October 1979, p 5.
63. "Near-Nuclear Countries and the NPT," SIPRI, Stockholm, 1972, p 51.
64. NATO'S FIFTEEN NATIONS, February-March 1968, p 64.
65. Ibid.
66. NEW YORK TIMES 12 September 1975.
67. NEWSDAY 28 June 1979.
68. NATO'S FIFTEEN NATIONS, February-March 1978, p 64.
69. A. Pierre, C. Moyne, "Nuclear Proliferation. A Strategy for Control," New
York, 1976, p 20; SURVIVAL, May-June 1976, pp 116-117. -
70. L. Dunn, H. Kahn, "Trends in Nuclear Proliferation," Hudson Institute, 1976,
pp 48-50.
71 NATO'S FIFTEEN NATIONS, February-March 1978, pp 62-64.
72. Ibid.
73. ANNALS, March 1977, p 42.
74. E. Lefever, "Nuclear Arms in the Third World. U.S. Policy Dilemma," Washing-
ton, 1979.
75. k'OREIGN POLICY, Winter, 1976-1977, pp 147-148.
76. REALITIES, September 1966.
- ~ 91
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77. A. Wohlstetter, "Spreading the Bomb Without Quite Breaking the Rules," FOREIGN
POLICY, Winter 1976-1977, pp 88-96.
7g. W. Epstein, "Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control," New Yvrk,
1976, p 234.
79. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1978, p 602.
80. D. Gompert, R. Garvin, M. Mandelbaum, J. Barton, "Nuclear Weapons and World
Politics," New York, 1977, p 229.
81. L.I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Lenin's Way], M. Politizdat, 1978, vol 6, p 510.
82. TIME 2 June 1975.
- 83. Ibid.
8~#. A. Pierre, C. Moyne, "Nuclear Proliferation. A Strategq for Control," New
York, 1976, p 56.
8~. S. Keeny, "Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices," Cambridge, 1977, p 972.
85. ANNU~.?~S, March 1977, pp 110-121.
87. T. Greenwood, H. Feiveson, T. Taylor, "Nuclear Proliferation. Motivations,
Capabilities and Strategies for Control," New York, 1977, p 190.
88. "Nuclear Proliferation," p 37.
89. Ibid. , n 76.
4~1. Ibid. , p 261.
91. A. Pierre, "Nuclear Politics," New York, 1972, p 341.
92.. S. McCracken, "The War Against the Atom," COMMENTARY, September 1977, pp 33-47.
9~. THE W~RLD TODAY, April 1978, pp 125-126.
9~i. "World Armaments and Disarmament," SIPRI, Yearbook, 1977, Stockholm, 1977,
pp 36-37.
- 95~. "Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices," p 282.
96. A. Ribicoff, Market-Sharing Approach to the World Nuclear Sales Problems,"
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1976, pp 764--787.
97. A. Murphy, "Nuclear Power Controversy," Englewood Cliffs, 1976, p 145.
98. R. Betts, "Parano~ds, Pygmies, Paria~is~ and Nonproliferation," FOREIGN POLICY,
Spring 1977, p 173.
99. T. Greenwood et al., op. cit., pp 94-97. ~
92
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100. S. Baker, "Nuclear Proliferation: Monopoly or Cartel?" FOREI~I~T POLICY, Summer
1976, pp 202-220.
101~ "The Washington Papers," No 57, vol VI, 1978, pp 68-79.
102. M. Guhin, "Nuclear Paradox," Washington, 1976, p 68.
103."Postures for Nonproliferation: Arms Limitation and Security Policies To Mini-
mize Nuclear Proliferation," London, 1979.
104. "Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and the International Atomic Energy Agency,"
Washington, 1976.
~05. J. Tuthill, "The Decisive Years Ahead," Paris, 1972, p 65.
106. See V.F. Davydov, "'Year of Europe'--Year of Contradictions," SSHA: EKONOMIKA,
POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 3, 19 74, pp 74-79.
- 107. H. Kissinger, "American Foreign Policy," New York, 1974, p 60.
108. "Armaments and Disarmaments in the Nuclear Age," SIPRI, Stockholm, 1976, p 60.
- 109. R. Mc.Namara, "The Essence of Security. Reflections in Office," New York, ?968,
p 144.
ll0. H. York, "RacP to Oblivion," New York, 1971.
lll,. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE 8-9 May 1976.
112.. H. Morgenthau, "A new Foreign Policy for the United States: Basi~~c Issues,"
BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS vol 23, No 1, 1967, pp 7, 11.
113. FOREIGN POLICY, Spring 1977, p 162.
114. S. Lens, "The Doomsday Strategy," PROGRESSIVE, February 1976, pp 12-35.
115. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE 31 May-1 June 1975.
llb . Nuclear Proliferation. ..Hearings, p 38.
117. BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, April 1975.
- 118. W. Epstein, "Nuclear Proliferation in the Third World," JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS, No 2, 1975, p 189.
119. "Detente or Debacle: Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Relations," New York, 1979,
PP 72, $6.
ZZO. Nuclear Proliferation..., Hearings, p 13.
12q. See also V.F. Davydov, "Nanproliferation of Nuclear Weapons," SSHA: EKONOMIKA,
POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 5, 1977.
93
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122. "Postures for Nonproliferation," pp 27-39.
12~. T. Greenwood et al., op. cit., p 58.
~
124. Ibid., pp 59-60.
125 . Ibid . , p 60 .
126. PACEM IN TERRIS, Santa Barbara, vol 2, 1974, p 109; J. Gara, "Nuclear Prolifer-
ation and Security," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 1970,
p 39.
127. FRANCE NOUVELLE 17 May 1976.
128. A. Pierre, "Opportunit~es. for Disarmament," New York, 1978, p 51; "Arms
~ Transfers and American Foreign Policy," New York, 1979, pp 6, 58.
12~. A. Pierre, C. Moyne, op. cit., p 58.
130. D. Gomper~, R. Garvin, M. Mandelbaum, J. Barton, "Huclear Weapons and World
Politics," New York, 1977, pp 70-71.
131, Nuclear Proliferation..., Hearings, pp 13, 19y WASHINGTON POST 8 March 1976;
NEW YORK TIMES 28 July 19~6.
132.. PRAVDA 1G September 1978.
133. A. Larson, "Questions and Answers on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," New York,
196$, pp 26-32.
13/+. R. Ulman, "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1972,
p 671.
135. A. Marks, "NPT: Paradoxes and Problems," Washington, 1975, pp 4-6, 25.
136. W. Epstein, "Nuclear Proliferatian~. Failure of tlie~Review Conference," SURVIVAL,
November-December 1975, p 260.
~
137. PRAVDA 10 September 197E.
138. T. Greenwood, H. Feives.on, T. Taylor, "Nuclear ~ro~.~. eration. Motivations,
Ca abilities and Strate ies for Control " New Yor~C 1~P9~77 i~~ati:~n~
- P g ~ > > > P 62 `
- 139. L. Dunn, "No First Use and Piuclear Proliferation," INTERNATIONAL JOURNALIST,
Summer 1978, p 584.
140. A. Ye, Yefremov, "Yadernoye razoruzheniye" [Nuclear Disarmament], ~Ioscow,
Mezhdunar. otnosheniya, 1976, p 244; THE TIMES 21 February 1968.
141. NEW YORK TIMES 12 Decembe.r 1978.
- 94 ~
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142.. R. Falk, "Proli~eration as World Order Problem," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY,
Winter 1977-, p 84.
1,43. Nucle~r Proliferation: Future U.S. Policy Implications, Hearings, House
of Repr~sentatives, October-November 1975, p 33. �
144. SURVIVAL, November-December 1974, ~ 265.
, 145. R. Falk, R. Tacker, 0. Yoimg, "On Minimizing the Use of Nuclear Weapons,"
Princeton, 1966, pp 80-81.
146. R. Falk, "Beyond Internationalism," FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1976, p 108.
147. D. Gompert, R. Garvin, M, Mandelbaum, J. Barton, "Nuclear Weapons and World
Politics," New York, 1977, pp 129-130.
148. T. Greenwood et al:., op. cit.,'~ 62.
149. D. Gompert et al., op. cit., p 128.
150. P. lloty, A. Carnesale, M. Nacht, "The Race To Control Nuclear Arms," FUREIGN
- AFFAIRS, October 1976, p 132.
151. Ibid. ,
152. B. Russett, "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons," WORLDVIEW, N~vember 1976.
- 153. D. Gompert et al., op. cit., p 130.
154. L. Dunn, op. cit., p 579.
155. T. GreenGrood et al., op. cit., p 63.
156. Ibid.
157. NEW YORK TIMES 13 June 1978.
158. INTERNATIONAL HERALV TRIBUNE 14 June 1978.
159. See V.F. Davydov, "Guarantees to the Nonnuclear Countries and Washington's
Position," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA No 4, 1979, pp 35-44.
160. "Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docimments," January 1980, Washington, 1980.
161. J. Carter, "Why Not the Best~ New York, 1976, p 178.
162. FORTUNE 23 October 1978, p 136.
163. "West European Nuclear Energy Development: Implications for the United States,"
' Washington, 1979, p 57.
95
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164. BULLETIN 0~ ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, October 1978, p 60.
165. ORBIS, Summer 1978, p 340.
166. WASHINTON POST 9 January 1979.
167. FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1979, p 93.
168. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1978, pp 876-877.
169. THE WORLD.TODAY, April 1978, p 136.
170. FORTUNE 23 October 1978, p 128.
171. FOREIGN AFFAIRS No 3, vol 57, 1979, pp 477-478.
172. Ibid., p 493. ~
173. J. Nye, "Nonprolifera~tion: A Long-Term Strategy," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Agril
1978, p 621.
174. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Fall 1978, p 63.
175. Washington's hope that the uniiateral measures w~uld win international recogni-
- tion at the conference to review the nuclear fuel cycle was ultimately not
justified. Its recommendations essentially only reflected the diversity of
interests among both the industrially developed and ttee developing countries ~
in the approach to questions of spent fuel conversion and breeder reacCors.
The NFr: YORK TIMES of 26 February 1980 wrote that the final report of the .
International Review of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle conference "was a blow to the
administratioL."
- 176. BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, September 1978, p 63.
117. INTER DEPENDENT, July-August 1978.
178. BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, October 1976, p 11.
, 179. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1978, pp 618-6.20.
180. F. W. Neal, "Detente or Debacle: Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Relations,"
New York, 1979, p 70.
181. INTER DEPENDENT, July-August 1978.
COPYRIGHT: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1980
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