JPRS ID: 9664 USSR REPORT POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9664
- 15 April 1981
R
- US~R R
= eport
P~OLITICAL ~?~ID SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
- CF~UO 10/~ 1)
: F~IS FOREIGN B~OADGAST I~iFORMATION SERVICE
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~
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~ JPRS L/9664 -
15 April 1981
USSR REPORT ~
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS ~
(FOUO JO/~1)
CONTENTS .
INTERNATIONAL
Soviet~ Interpret Saudi Arabian History
(SAUDOVSKAYA ARAVIYA, 1980) 1
, Inter-Imperialist Competition in Latin America Analyzed
(V. P. Kyrychenko; UK,'tAYINS'KYY ISTOkYCHNYY ZI~URNAL, Jan 81)... 12
Book Views Prospects of Cooperation in Fighting International
Terrorism
(Ye. G. Lyakhov; PROBLEMY SOTRUDNICHESTVA GOSUDARSTV V BOR'BE
S MEZFIDITNAItODNYM TERRORIZMOM, 1979).......s 20
REGIONAL ~ =
Turlanens Study Use of Water, Land Resources
(K. Bayryev; TURI~NISTAN KOMMUNISTI, No 12, 1980) 22
- a - [III - USSR - 35 FOUO]
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INTEP.NATIONAL
SOVIETS INTERPRET SAUDI ARABIAN HISTORY ' -
Moscow SAUDOVSKAYA ARAVIYr~ in Russian 1980 (signed to press 20 Oct 80) pp 1-3, 99-
112, 271, 272
[Annotation, table of contents,preface and e~:cerpt from Chapter 2 from book ,
"Saudi Arabia (Reference Book~)", edited by V. V. Ozoling, Izdatel'stvo "Nauka",
_ Olavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, 15,000 copies, 272 pagesJ
_ [Text] The reference book contains detailed information about the geography, ~
- papulation, history, economy and culture of Saudi .Arabia.
Prtface ~
Ttie purpose of this reference book is to prnvide the reader with the primary infor-
~ mation regarding one of the major stat~s of th~ Arabian East, Saudi Arabia. This
book presents data on the history of ancient and medieval Arabia, the nature of the
- Arabian peninsula, the customs and traditions of the peop.le inhabiting it, and so
forth. At the same time, the authors of the reference book concentrated most of -
_ their attention on the modern socir~political, economic and cultural life of Saudi
Arabia. The 1960's an~3 1970's were an important stage of devel~pment for this
country. The process of tr~nsforming the Saudis from a backward,~semifeuda]
_ society into a capitalist one was accelerated in these two decades to a considerable
degree because of oil profits. The political and economic importance of Saudi _
Arabia simultaneously increased both among the Arab. countries, and in the world
in general,
This is the first publication ef a reference book on Saudi Arabia in our country.
- In their work the authors were faced with a lack of a lot of the necessary dara,
in particular, reliable statistics on certair, ~ubjects. The reference book has
employed materials both fram the national Saudi press and state institutions,
the Arab anc; Western press, and United Nation~. The group of authors also relied
on works of Soviet ozientalists. _
The authors of the articles are: 0. G. Gerasimov: Physical and.Geographical Essay,
Population, National Traditions 3nd Customs, Religion, Historical Essay, State
- Structure (except Armed F'orces), and PrESS; V. V. Ozoling: P~~troleum and Gas
Industry, Petrochemical Industry, Agriculture, Finances, Trade, Appendix (tables
- :3-6); G. 5h. Sharbatov: Arahic L~.terary Language and Modern Dialects of Arabia,
~riodern Saudi Literature; A. I. Yakovlev: General Characteristics [Economics], Acti-
~vity of Foreign Petroleum Companies and Governmer.t Policy in Area of Petroleum, Other
Industry, Transportation and Gommunications, Arm?d Forces, Education, Public Health,
Radio and Television, Sports and Appendix.
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- Contents
Page
~ 3
Preface 4
Country and Population 4
Physical and Geographical Essay 22
Population ~
National Traditions and Customs 3~
Arabic Literary Language and Mudern DialPCts of Arabia 43
Religion .
48
Historical Essay
~
113
~ Economics ~ 113
General Characteristics 126
Petrnleum and Gas Industry 134
Petrochemical Industry
Activity of Foreign Petroleum Companies and Government Policy ~~n 138
Area o� Petroleum 147
~ther Industry 162
Agriculture 1~2
Transportation and Cammunications 184
a Finances 191
- Trade
198
- State Str~xcture 201
: Administrative Divisior. and Agencies of Local Power 2~2
- Judicial System 203
' Armed Forces .
209
~ Culture 209
Educatiun 21g
= Mcdern Saudi Literature 230
- Information Agen.:ies 234
- Public Iiealth 240
Sports
243
Appendix 263
Index of Geographical Names 268
Index of Names
Government of Faisal (1964-1975)
After becoming head of state, Faisal began to work more decisively to modernize the
sys~em of state control and to strengthen his positions in the country. The king
issued a decree in November 1964 in which he concentrated the posts of prime
minister, minister of foreign affairs and supreme commander-in-chief in his hands.
The king's brother,Emir Khalid was appointed deputy prime minister, and in March
1965 the crown ~:rince.
Faisal's approach to power marked the beginning of the active development of the
_ country's economy and strengthening of coope.ration with Western countries. As far
back as October 1964, the industrial equipment imported into the country was
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_ ~reed of taxes. The government concluded contracts with a number of foreign
= compan~es to build petrochemical enterprises. It gave a French firm the concession
to explore and extract getroleum in the central region of the country and in the
- waters of the Red Sea under conditions that were more favorable than with Ar2mco
- EArab~an-American Oil Company], In 1965 the Italian firms began to build highwayg
and an i.rrigation dam in North Asir. The American companies obtained a contract to
build power plants and water distilling units. The construction boom in Saudi
Arabia promoted the more active involvement of the royal family members, sheiks of
the leading tribes and king's advisers, and representatives of the 1oc31 bourgeoisie
_ in enterprise. Your_g technocrats who had been educated in the i~r~iversities of the
1Jnited States and West Europe began to be appointed to the leading positions in the
- state institutions.
- The implementation of the ambitious programs for the country's development, however,
could not neutralize the dissatisfaction of the working masses and pstriotic forces
_ of Saudi Arabia. As long ago as May 1964, the ~,aorkers and office workers of the ~
Aramco enterprises in Dhahran and the.0etty Oil Company in the divided zone proclaimed
= a partial strike and boycotted the food stores and general services institutions of
the companies. Over 600 activist wcrkers, officials and journalists were airested
_ at the end of June 1964. As before, the arrests were made under the slogan of the
"control of communism." The patriotic forces united i.nto the National Liberation
Front continued their activity in the country. Branches of interArabian organiza-
tions, the Party of Arabian Socialist Revival(Ba'th), Movement of Arabian Nation-
alists, as well as different groups of "Arabian socialists" were active in Saudi
Arabia in addition to the Front.
In his f irst public statement in Novem:zr 1964, Faisal announced in particular that
- Saudi Arabia will respect the charter of the League of Arab States and will promote
the elimination of conflicts in the Arab world, and follow the resolutions of the
= conferences of nonalignecl countries. He supported thP solidarity ~f the Arab
countries, their struggle against the Israeli aggressors, and supported the demands
of the Arab people of Palestine. Saudi Arabia's policy in the Arab world was
_ formed under the influencp of general tendencies of Arabian nationalism and Faisal's
attempt to strengthen his position in the Arab world as a counterweight to the
progressive Arab regimes.
The question of the attitude towards the Yen~en revolution continued to be unresolved.
_ Uiplomatic relations were restored in March '964 between Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
= The situation in the Yemen Arab Republic became the subject of direct ne;otiations
between Nasser and Faisal at a number of conferences of the heads of states and
- governments of the Arab countries. In August 1965, an Egypt-Saudi agreement was
si.gned in Jidda on the Yemen question. It s4ipulated the end of military
actions, renunciation by Saudi Arabia of help to the Yemen monarchists, witYi~rawal
of Egyptian troops from the Yemen A~ab Republic, and holding of a c~agress of
Yemen representatives in November 1965 to def:ine the nature of the future state
structure in the country. Subsequent events showed,however, that Saudi Arabia
was not aUout to fulfill the arrangement on the Yemen question, and continued to
support the Yemen monarchists.
Analysis of the documents and official statements from the period of Faisal's
government permits the judgmerit that one of the founding principles for the
Saudi Arabian foreign policy became the spread of the idea of pan-Islamism. In
April 1965, Faisal convene~t the ~'orld Islamic Conference in Mecca chaired by the
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mufti af Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Muha~ed lbn Zbrahim. The conference discussed the
creation of an Islamic pact, that, in the opinion of Nasser and other Arab pro-
gressive leaders, was created to stop the wave of revol~utions in the Arab world.
In August-September 1966, Faisal made a trip to the Muslim countries of Asia and
Africa. During the trip, he called upon their representatives to participate iA
_ the 1967 Islamic conference.
- The plans to set Ln an Islamic pact were rejected by Egypt, Syria, Iraq, the Yemen �
Arab Republic, Algeria and Lebanon. Attempting to exert pressure on Lebanon, the
- Saudis withd,rew their investments in the Lebanese bank Intra and thus bankrupt~d it.
The pan-Islamic plans ~~ere cuordinsted by Saudi Arabia and the United States with
whom relationships were on the upswing. In June 1966, as a result of Faisal's visit
- to the United States, an American-Saudi communique was published. In it, President
~ Johnson and the Saudi kir~g, noting the "international threat of communism," de-
cided to set up an "American-Saudi joint fund to figl~t against communism." As
stated, the purpose of the fund was to support the ~economic development of the "anti- .
comm~nist" cuuntries so that they are capable of withstanding the "attack" of
communism.
The active cooperation of Saudi Arabia with the imperialist powers against the
progressive Arab regimes elicited sharp dissatisfaction from the Saudi patriots.
Despite the official ban, widespread protest demonstrations took place in 1966 that
even encompassed the army. In September 1965, at the Air Force base in Dhahran,
a group of Saudi officers camE out against the British instructors who permitted
_ insulting statements about Nasser. The authorities arrested 35 Saudi ufficers and
- sergeants. In Jidda, Ar-Riyad and Dhahran, leaflets were distributed with the text
of a draft constitution an~ appeals to struggle for freedom, socialism and unity.
Police made a number of preventive arrests among the petroleum workers who were in
the forefront of the democratic movement.
In December 1966-Jatiuary 1967, a wave of sabotage and terrorism rolled over the
- country. Explosions damaged the transArabian petroleum pipeline of the American
= company, Tapline, the palaces of the emirs and the military facilities controlled by
the British and P.mericans. Attempts were made on the liv~s ~f the king's brothers,
Emir Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz the governor of the eastern province, Emir Sa'd al-Din al-
_ Jiluwi, and others. The royal family panick~d. All of its palaces were turned
into fortrssses, The entrances and windaws were lined with sandbag~. Protection
from the soldiers of the national guard ~as strengthened. Although the organization
that called itself the Union of the People of the Arabian Peninsula claimed ~11 re-
sponsibility for these acts, the government accused Egypt of training saboteurs from
the Yeme^.i emigrants living in the c~untry. It appealed to Br~tain and the United
States to support the struggle against the patriots. Arrasts were made in the
country among the officers, representatives of the intelligentsia, and the workers.
~ On 17 March 1967, in the capital, 17 Yemenis who were accused of being "agents of
Marxism and anarchy" were executed on the square in front of Faisal's palace. In
addition, a whole series of individuals were executed secretly.
The rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and the United otates, often to the detri-
ment of the idea of Arab solidarity that Faisal had appea?.ed for in his ascent to
the throne, caused a new conflict in the ruling family. Faisal's brothers, the
Emirs Sultan who was appointed minister of def~nse and aviation, and Fahd who
occupied the post of minister of foreign affair~, condemned the king's policy
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- leading to the underminin~ of Arab solidarity and subordination of the country to
_ imperialist powers. Faisal's positlon was complicated even more hy the fact that the -
former king, Sauc~ arrived in Cairo. He announced his claims to the throne and the
support of the Yemen republicans and Nasser's policy towards the Yemen Arab Republic.
Israel's aggression against the Arab countries in June 1967 made important correc-
_ tions in Saudi Arabia's policy. Faisal could not remain apart from the just
struggle of the Arab people without risking a significant underm3ning ~f his
authority both within the country and abroad. A detachment of Saudi troops was
~ent to Jordan. It participated in the military actions again~,t the aggressors.
At the conference of the heads of states and governments of Arab countries in
- August 1967 in Khartoum, Saudi Arabia agreed to give financial help to Egypt,
Syria and Jordan to eliminate the economic consequences of the Israeli aggression.
The meeting between Nasser and Faisal resulted in 3 new agree~rent regard_rig tlie
Yemen Arab Repbulic. According to this agreement, r,gypt began to withdraw its
troops From its territory. However, Saudi Arabia did not fulfill the agreement
and continued to support the Yemen monarchists. They made use of the withdrawal
- ~f the Egyptian troops and discord among the republicans to blockade the capital
of the Yemen Arab Republic, Sana. It is true that the two-month siege of Sana was
not successful for the monarchists. They wer,e driven out of the city and saon
completely defeated.
Tt~e military defeat of the Arabs in the conflict with Israel in 1967 and Nasser's
occupation with ttte attempt to eliminate the consequences of the Israeli
aggression afforded Faisal good opportunities to strengthen Saudi Arabia's role in
~he Arab world. In 1969 after national reconciliation and halting of the civil
war in Yemen, Saudi Arabia continued its attempts to strengthen its influence there -
by using the return of the monarchists to the Yemen Arab Republic and financial
aid to the war-torn country.
- In November 1967, South Yemen became an ~ndependent state, and in June 1969, the
left wing of the National Front came to power in Aden. It proclaimed a program of _
building a new life on a progressive base. The South Yemeni sultans and emirs who
had been thrown out of the country by the revolution took asylum in Saudi Arabia.
From ~here they m~de provocational sorties against the young republic. In November
1969, the Saudi Arabian troops seized the South Yemen boundary post of A1-Badi
_ that supposedly was on Saudi territory.
Negotiations took place in March 1970 in Jidda between rep~esentatives of Saudi.
Arabia and the Yemen Arab Republic. The Saudis officiaily recognized the Yemen
Arab Republic in July and the overthrown Yemen king, Muhammed al-Badr was expElled
from the country. tiowever, the relationships with another neighhor, Syria, were
complicated by the fact that the Syrians refused to permit repair of the Tapline
C~mpany's petroleum pipelinP that passe~ on their territory and had been destroyed
in May 1970. After the company agreed to increase the allocations to the Syrians _
for pumping oil, the repair work was done. In January 1971, pumping of oil was -
, resumed. During the conflict between the ,Tordanian authorities and the Palestinians
in September 1970, Saudi Arabia support King Hussein's government. In contrast to
Lebanon and Fuwait, it continued to pay its percentage of the aid stipulated by
the decisions of the Arab summit conference in Khartoum.
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The early 1970'swere marked by further activation of Saudi Arabia's policy in the
interArab arena. The growth of oil p-rofits, the ever increasing volume of ~inancial
- aid to the Arab countries, the active development of the country's infrastructure and
congtruction of new industrial facilities, modernizatioti of the armed forces and
inerease in the number of Saudi specialists who were educated abr~ad and in loc~l
higher educational institutions conv~nced Faisal and his followers [hat Saudi Arabia
could and should play a more active and independent role in the Near East. Faisal
also had a favorable situation because in September 19%0 Nasser, the presidefzt oF _
Egypt, died. He was the former acknowledged leader af the Arab national liberation
movement. The planned departure from fiasser's political heritage by the new , _
leadership headed by A. Sadat weakened Egypt's position in the Arab.world and t'~e
_ degree of its influence on the development of the situation in the Near East. Here
the Saudi leadership considered that the Arao-Israeli cunflic[ continued to remain
the dominant factor in the Near East situation and any attempt to strengthen its
position in the Arab world must 5e linked to the demands of the Arabs to eliminate =
the consequences of tt-~e Tsraeli aggression and recognition of, the lega~ rights of
- the Arab people of Palestine.
In September 1973, King Faisal made an official visit to the United States. The
Americans used this visit to oUtain assurances that the Saudis in the future will
provide regular and increasing supplies of crude oil to the United States. The ,
Saudi monarch used the visit to reiterate rhe dissatisfaction of Ar.-Riyad wirh the
~ diplomatic and military support of Israel by the United States. I~:e again raised
the question of sale of Phantom jets to the Saudi army which was protested by
Israel. The N;inister of Defense, Sultan Ibn Abdul Aziz,and the Miniscer of Foreign
- Affairs,Fahd iim 'Abd al-Azi~, also noted in their public speeches in 1973 that
Saudi Arabia cannot stand aside from the Arab-Israeli conilict. "Our duty is to
leave contradictions ~side, or at least temporarily forget about them, in order to
dedicate ourselves cumpletely ~o solving the maiu probiem, the str.uggle against
Israel," announced Fahd.
A new armed conflict erupted between Egypt ar?d Israel in Uctober 1973. On 21 Octo-
ber, Saudi Arabia decided to cut off oil exports to the United States and Holland
because of their support of Israel and additional military aid to it. During a
meeting with the American Secretary of State, H. Kissinger in November 1973,
Faisal announr_ed that ~audi Arabia intended to act?ieve complete withdrawal of the
Israeli truops from all occupied Arab territory, the liberation of East ~erusalem,
and satisfactica of the legal righes of the Palestinian people.
King Faisal's position on tt~e Near Eastsettlement and his proclaimed embargo on
oil supplies to the United States caused a definite cooling in the relations between
the two countries. ~Iegotiations on the Saudi capital investments to the U.S, economy _
- were actually frozen. The Saudi Arabian government began negotiations with France
and Britain for the purchase of military airplanes, helicopters and other stores
and equipment. In order to exert pressure on Faisal, in early 1974 reports appeared
in a number of press agencies of the Arab and Western countries about plans to
break up Saudi Arabia that were formulated by the American special services back in _
August 1973, i.e., before the beginning of the October Arab-Israeli War. According
to these plans, the E1-Has a region where the main Saudi petroleum fields are located,
would be turned into a separate state formation and tt~en transferred to the wardship
of che Shah of Iran. In Hejaz, the power of ttie Hashemit.e dyciasty would be re-
stored, while Nejd would be transferred to the control of one of. the Saudids
who was against Faisal. Although such plans could hardly have been realized, they
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did not pass unnoticed by the ruling circles who appeal~d to France fur cooperation
in strengthening the Saudi security services. Rumors were also spread that the
United States did not exclude direct military intervention and occupation of the
oil fields if the energy crisis warsened and the economic interests of tne Western
paa~rs were threatened.
Some of the leaders of Saudi Arab ia supported the continued line that conformed to
common Arab interests, i.e., actually a continued embargo policy, King Faisal was
_ among them. Others leaned towards the most rapid halting of the embargo and develop- �
ment of relations with the United States. TheGTestern,especially American, press
intensified the spread of rumor5 about the possible domestic political attacks
againsC Fai$al which actually were one ~f the forms of U.S. pressure on Saudi
Arabi.a . ~
The oil embargo against the United States and Holland was lifted in March 1974. C1n
S April 1974, an American-Saudi communique was publiched on the readiness of the
United States to expand aid to Saudi Arabia in economics and to meet its demands
for military equipment. In this period, the United States began its "shuttle
diplomacy" to attain separate deals between Egypt and Israel. To a certain measure
~ ttiis remuved the Saudi criticism of Washington that it did not want to exert the
appropriate pressure on Israel. However, despite this, Faisal announced the possible
review of the decision to lift the embargo if the United States continued to un-
reservedly support Israel in the Arab-Israeli con�lict.
In early June 1974, Emir Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Azizvisited the United States. During the
_ visit, an agreement was reached on the creation of a combined commission for econo-
mic cooperation, working groups on cooperation in industrialization, training of
personnel, scientific and tecnnical research, etc. A. decision was also ma.de to set
up a commission to examine the already implemented programs to update the armed
forces in Saudi Arabia.
The U.S, president, R. Nixon, vis ited Saudi Arabia in the middle of June 1974 with-
in the framework of his Near East trip. In discussing the situation in the Near
East, Faisal again told the American president that "true and strong peace will ~
never reign in this region if Jerusalem is not freed and Arab sovereignity is not
re-established over it, if all occupied Arab territories are not liberated, if the
Arab people of Palestine do not achieve the right to return r_o their native land,
and if they are not given the right of self-determination." Faisal's statement
was evaluated by the Americans as a reminder that reJ.ations between Saudi Arabia
and the United States were linked to the Near East settlement.
The negotiations between Aramco and the Saudi Arabian government occupied an impor-
tant place in the Saudi-American cooperation in the early 1970's. Striving to
establish national control over the country's oil resources, Saudi Arabia attained
shares in Aramco stock. In October 1S,'2, an agreement was signed to transfer 25%
of Aramco stock to the Saudis for 500 million dollars in compensation. The payment
_ was to take place over 5 years. By January.1982, according to the formulated
sched~le, the Saudi government was to receive 51% of the shares. This percentage
was to be maintained until the end of the concession in 1999. Howpver, in 1974,
Saudi Arabia acquired 60% of the Aramco stock and began negotiations on the
complete transfer of the company into the hands of tne Saudis.
At the end of Julv 1974, negotiations were held between Saudi Arab ia and the United
Arab Emirates to settle mutual claimas in the region of the Buraimi oasis. On
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21 August during the visit of United Arab Emirates president, Zayid bin Sultan al-
' Nuhayan to Saudi Arabia, an agreement was signed on the boundary questions. Diplo-
m2.tic relations were established b etween the two countries. -
Normalization of relations with the United Arab Emirates was explained by tY~e
striving of Ar-Riyad to counteract the attempts of iran to strengthen its inf luence
in the Persion Gulf Arab countries. As is know~i, Iran signed an agreement with
Oman who had a poorly demarcated boundary with Saudi F?rabia. According to the
agreement, the shah sent h~s troops to Oman to fight the Dhofar rebels and obtain
tlie possibility of setting up an a ir force base on the boundaries with South Yemen.
In addition, Iran signed an agreement with the UAE and Qman for demarcation of the
continental shelf in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabia, disturbed by the strengthening -
- of Iran's political and military positions in the Persian Gulf region, also nurtured
plans to set up a military-~,aiitical black of Arab countries in this region. This
cuuld be viewed as a counrerweight to the Iranian penetration.
The departure from the previously proclaiuued pol:Lcy of oil boycott for ~he Un ited _
States caused a def inite dissatisf action in the country. It even encompassed the
Saudi army. In October I974, Saudi Arabia arrested a group of officers of the
national guard for preparing a state coup. At the end of 1974, the conflicts in ttie
royal family were again exacerbated due to the deterioration in Faisal's health and -
his passible abdication from power. Among the individuals who criticized the
domestic and foreign policy o� Faisal and the heir to the throne, Eniir Khalid, were
the brothers of the king, Minister of Internal Affairs Fahd and Minister of Defense -
_ and Aviation Sultan. They were joined by the young members of the ruling family
who demand~d that Faisal abdicate. from absalute power and accept a constitution.
Trying ta enlist the support of the army, Faisal increased the salary of all
- soldiers and officers, and also made changes in the command uf the armed forces.
On 25 March 1975, during the Muslim holiday, King Faisal was receiving the con-
gratulations of his relatives, the tribal leaders and Muslim theologians. He was
approached by his nept~ew Emir Faisal Ibn Musa'id. Instead of a greeting, he took
vut a gun and shot the king. When the dE~ense burst into the hall, the king was
already dead. In ~he first report on the murder of the king it was asserted that
Emir Faisal had gone mad, but in several months he was found normal. The court
sentenced him to death. He was publicly beheaded on 18 June 1975. .
The reason for the murder remained a secret. Some advanced the hypothesis that the
king was killed at the instigation of the Americans who were dissatisfied with his
_ policy in questions of the Near East settlement and cooling towards the Unite~ States.
Others asserted that it was a ven3etta. In 1966,Fa~isal Ibn Musa'id's brother was
- killed in an attempt to seizz a television sta~ion from a group of fanatics. In
his opinion, the station was transmitting programs that were incompatible with the
Islamic canons.
Saudi Arabia in the Second Half oL- ti~e 1970's
On 26 March 1975, the bzother of. deceased King Faisal, Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz was
proclaimed king of Saudi Arabia, and Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz became the heir to the
throne. In his first public statement, the new king spoke of tiis intention to
continue the domestic and foreign policy of his predecessor. On the occasian of
his ascent to the throne, the new monarch declared an afnnesty for the political
prisoners who assured the king ~f their loyal attitude towards the regime, and
who supported the creation of an advisory council. _
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On 31 March 1975, King Khalid appointed Emir Falid as first deputy ~inister, while
Emir 'Abdullah ibn 'Abd al-Aziz, the commander of the national guard was given the
� post of second deputy. The son of the murdered King Faisal, Emir Saud Ibn Faisal -
_ was appointed minister of foreign affairs, while the brother of the heir to the
tht'tme, Fayd Emir Nayf, became the minieter of the interor. On 3 April 197~,, _
King Khalid signed a decree to transfer to Fahd all his powers in domestic and _
foreign policy, at the same time acknowledging that the heir to the throne wa~
the most capable and experienced political figure in tlie royal family.
. A new, very numerous (made of 25 ministers) government of Saudi Arabia headed by
the king was formed on 13 October 1975. Seven key ministerial posts were trans-
ferred to members of the royal family. The remaining ministers were from the
~ tribal leadership or young technocrats. The only member of the royal family who
was removed from the cabinet was Amir ~Iusa'id Ibn 'Abd al-Rahman, the king's uncle
who under F~isal had been the minister of finance. This important post was give~i
to Sheikh Muhammed Ali Aba al'Khayl who was considered a person of undistinguished
origin. In the new government, Sheik.h Ahmad Zaki Yamani kept fur himself the posi-
- tion of minister of petroleum and mineral resources that he had occupied for over -
10 years already. Al1 the members of the new cabinet were full and equal. minis- ~
ters with the exception of three state ministers without portfolj.o.
_ The composition of the government that was formed in October 1975 reflected the
struggle for influence between the group of Emir Fahd who considerecl himself a ~
proponent of "evolutionary absolutism" and Emir 'Abdullah i_bn 'Ar~d al-'Aziz who -
was the acknowledged leader of the conservativp wing.
_ In December 1975, the government of neighboring Kuwait Pstablished control. over the
Kuwait Oil Company that belonged to the British Petroleum Company and the American ~
Gu1L Oil Company. This accelerated an agre~ment betw~en Aramco and the Saudis on an
analogous question. By 1 January 1976 Aramco was to ~ransfer its property to the
~ Saudi government, but this did not occur. ~s it turned out, because of the lack of
local personnel, operating experience and a marketing netti*ork outside the country,
the Saudi government could not successfully operate the Aramco enterprises. The
latter ref used to extract oil under conditions of the Saudi contract, and thus was
~ able to keep ~0% of the stock.
Saudi Arabia's foreign policy in the second half of the 1970's bore traces of the
influence of the conservative f ~rces controlling the situation in the country, ~1'he
Saudi Arabian government did no t hide its negative attitude towards the progressive -
Arab regimes, although it considered it possible not to concentrate on the contra-
- dictions existing among the Arabs in the unsettled nature of the Arab-Israeli con-
flict. In Ju1y 1978, when the siL�uaCion in the Yemen rey~ic~n became complicated,
- Saudi Arabia and Egypt convened an emergency session of the League of Arab States.
Five decisions w~re made to employ sanctions against the progressive South Yemen
- regime. According to press reports, under pressure by Saudi Arab.ia, the League
Council made a decision to cou~teract the "communist influence in the Arab caun- -
tries." The so-called Arab Front of Confrontation was also cre~ted. Military
plans were approved that their initiators intended to implement, The purpose of
the Front was to interfere in any Arab country where "communism is openly manifest."
The reactionary circles in Saudi Arabia tried to undermine not only the progressive
regimes. In July 1978, the Beirut weekly AL-EURBIYA puhlished a statement by the
z�epresentatives of the patriotic movements in certain countries oP the Arabian
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peninsula. It stated that in 1975 and 197b, Saudi Arabia "played the primary role
in breaking up the parliament in Bahrain and in Kuwait and unceremoniously inter-
, feres in the internal affairs of the YAR. Ignoring ~he disastrous situation of its _
- people, the Sa~idi government spends fabulous sums to ai~ rotten dictatorstiips in
Africa."
The statement of the patriotic forces of the Arabian peninsula underlines the threat
for the people in this region that is hidden in the crzation uf notoriou~ "safety '
blocks" in the regions of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.. Saudi Arabia was an
- active participant in the formulation of plans to set them up. -
~ In 1977 Saudi Arabia transferred troops to Zaire to fight the rebels in the Shaba _
province. Ar-Riyad gave ~inancial support to the puppet regime in South Vietnam
up until its downfall. Money flowed from Saudi Arabia to the anticommunist orgacti-
zations in West Europe. The Saudis supplied part of the resources colTected for
the preparation and conducting of the next conference of the World Antiicommunist
League in 1978. Together with the United States, the ruling circles in Saudi
Arabia attempted to exert pressure on the leaders of a numb2r of West European -
countries to prevent the participation of communists in their governments, other-
_ wise they ~hreatzned to curtial oil supplies a.nd the volume of equipment and arms
purchases. -
, When A. Sadat went to Jerusalem in Idovember 1977, the Arab world turned its gaze to
_ Ar-Riyad to find out what the reaction of tlte Saudi Arabi2n g~vernment would be.
The fact was that Ar-Riyad',s position in the Near East settlement question was
always distinguished by duplicity and definite inconsistency. Its support of the
- Arab countries confronting Israel, financial aid to them, and the requirement that
Israeli troops be removed frum all occupied Arab territories and that all legal -
rights of the Arab people of Palestine be satisfied on the whole complied with the
common goals of eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression. At the same
time, Saudi Arabia by using its financi. ' potent3.alities and increased authority,
after 1973 attempted to seize the initiative in searching for a solution to the -
Arab-Israeli conflict and find a solution tttat would strengthen its position and ,
the position of its allies in the Near East.
Ae the end cf September 1978, the U.S. Secretary of State, C. Vance travelled ro -
Saudi Arabia and attempted to sway Ar-Riyad to support the agreements signed by
A. Sadat and M. Begin at Camp David. The visit was f utile. The Saudis ref used to
- approve the separate deal that did not solve the main questions of the Near East ~
settlement. It therefore did not lead to the establishment of a just and strong
peace in ttie Near East.
- Saudi Arabia supported the f all 1978 initiative of Iraq to convene a meeting of the
heads of the AraU states to develop a program of counteraction to the Egyptian-
Israeli separate deals implemented under the patronage of.the.United States. In
= Novzmber it participared in the Arab summit conf erence after discussing with _
the other Arab countries the separate course of A. Sadat and the agreements he
signed at Camp David. It also participated in the work of the conference of mini-
sters of foreign affairs and economfcs of the Arab countries in Baghdad on ~ -
27 I~rch 1979. It f ormulated measures for an economic boycott and palitical sanc-
- tions against the Egyptian regime. According ta the recommendation of this con- -
ference, Saudi Arabia recalled its ambassador from Cairo and brok.e of~ diplomatic
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relations with Egypt. It supported the expelling of Egypt from the Organization
of Petroleum Fxporting Countr3.es, InterArab Investment Bank, Arab Monetary rund,
and other regional organizations. _
Sgudi Arabia participated in the conference of heads of c`rab states and governments
- in Tunis in Nobember 1979 that confirmed the negative evaluation of Egypt's separate
course in the Near East settlement. The Saudi Arabian government cori.r_inued to _
believe that without return to t~ie Arabs of all Arab lands occupied by the I~raelis
~ in 1967, including Ea;;t Jerusaler?, and satisfaction of the legal riglits of the _
Arab people of Palestine, a just and strong peace would not be established in the -
~Near East.
At the end of November 1979, a group of armed Muslin?s seized the Grand Mosque in
- Mecca and the pilgrims who were there. Accordin~ to Western press reports, this
group of Muslims attempted to attract the whole world's attention to the
- domestic politlcal situation in the country and the violation of the standards -
of Muslim law by the ruling dynasty and official circles. The attack was put down
by force. Sixty-eight participants in the mQSque seizure wer~ publicly beheaded in
the squares of eight Saudi cities. In February 19$0, there were riots aniong the
_ foreign workers and Shiite community in Saudi Arabia. They condemned the attempt -
- of the United States to involve the Saudis in an anti-Iranian plot. The participants _
in the demonstrations made demands of a political nature, including, restriction of
the monarchy's power and creation of a parliament.
Saudi Arabia regarded the Soviet Union's aid to the friendly people of Afghanistan
as a"threat to the Muslim warld." Led by thP American administration, Saudi
Arabia supported the antiSoviet propaganda campaign in the American press and a
number of Western countries. At the same time the Saudis were watchful of the in-
creased U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean and their intention to set up
bases in this region. They assumed that the American military bases and aircraft
carriers could not guarantee stability and safety, and moreover, could threaten the -
independence of the states of the Near and Micldle East.
COPYRIGHT: Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izdatel'stva "Nauka", 1980
9035
CSO: 1807 =
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INT~'RNATIO?~TAL
. L~1TER-Il~~~~.2AL~isT C0~�pETiTIOr1 II~ LATat AMERICA ANALYZED
Kiev UKI~AYL'~S ~ i~Yl' IS'IbRYCI-~1YY Z'r:U:iIdAL in Ukrainian No 1, Jan 81 (si$necl to oress -
- 20 Jan 81) PP 89-96 .
~ ~Article by V.P. Kyrychenko (Kiev} � "Intensification of Inter-Imperialist Competit
tion in Latin America in the 1970'_/
~T~xJ A charaateristic feature of contemporary Iatin American historical develo~
ment is a considerable increase in the struggle of a number of countries on the
continent towards the strengthenin~ of their economic and political independ~nce
and for social progress. Along with the achi~mements of true socialism. a rise of _
international communist and worker movement, this struggle undermines the positions
- of world imperialism cansiderably~ first of all its stronghold the United States.
?iowever, this course of historical development elicits violent imperialist anger.
trying at whatever cost to stop the national-liberation movements and resorting to
fl~rther neocolonial politics, direct export of counter-revolution~ etc. S~eaking
in Berlin at an international scientific conference �Joint struggle of the labor
and n3tional-liberation movements against imperialism, for social progress,� Polit-
- bureau CC CPSiJ membership candidate~ CC CPSU Secretary B.N!. Ponomar'ov stressed
that in ~~the 70 ~ s the problem of Iiquidating the whole neocolonial structure of -
exploitation became the order of the day" in response to which "imperialism '
attempted to ~repeat history'~ that is, again ~rovide itself with an opportunity
to freely exploit those countries which liberated themselves."~
- Internal economic problems of the whole capitalist system became ev~en more critical
in the 1970's. "In those years espec~,ally." noted the CC CPSU General Secretary,
L'SSR Stipreme Soviet Presidium Chairman L.I. Brezhnev at the 25th CPSU Congress,
"an economic crises en~pted in the capitalist w~rlde the acuteness and depth of which =
ev~en according to bourgeois activists could be compared only to the crisis at the
be~inning of the thirties. ~'2 Its considerable intensification brought forth an in-
crease in the expansian of intbrnational monopolies and an emphasis on inter- ~
impsrialist competition in developing countries. Latin America especially is one of
_ those regions where in the last few years competition is particularly evident.
- First of all there is the clash on the continent between United States interests on
_ one side and Japanese and '~'estern ~ropean interests on the other. Iarge resources -
in valuable mineral and agricultural raw material, a promising market fox ready-made
products, a wide field of activity for foreign capital provide the monopolists with
favarable opportunities to obtain maximal pmf.its in this area of the world.
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_ Be~ause the United 3tates consider Iatin America part of their sphere of influence
they ,+,ry to prevent competition in the area.
The fall of the colonial system following the rise of. the national-liberation
movement~ and the emergence of young independent countries markedly decreased
imuerialist opportunities in Asia and Africa. ~aw material and energy and currency
crises forced countries such as '.~lest Germany, France, Italy and Japan to look for
new sou rePS o� income~ new spheres of capital allocation with the result that in
the 1970's the issue of a new division in spheres of influence in the capitalist
world became the order of the day~ including also Iatin America. In addition~
the so_called small stat,es lcountrie] of Western Elarope ~.nd such countries as
the South African ~.epublic, Canada, Is~ael, and Australia also "noticed� I,atin
America, which led to a fl~rther increase of inter-imperialist struggle there. Not
only individual countries, monopolies and banks oppose each other but also whole
economic state blocs.
- All of this confirms V.I. Lenin~s position that "to the numerous 'old' motives of
, colonial politics the financial capital added the struggle for raw material sou rces,
for capital export, for 'spheres of influence' that is spheres of convenient
agreements~ concessions~ monopolistic profits, etc., and finally fo: an economic
_ territory in general."3 U.S. competitors are trying to take advantage of the
conflicts between the 'Jnited Sta tes and the Latin American states striving to
escape the ilorth Arraerican dictates by changing the direction of their external
- economic ties. All this affects the acuteness of the inter-imperialist stnaggle
in the region now. Concurrently~ under the pressure of old and new competitors,
the United States are trying to change tactics. find new methods and measures for
preserving their positions. lheir competitors are not far behind, continuously
renewing their expansion a.rsenal in the Latin American countries which, in tu rn~
- also increases the inter-imt~erialist competition on the continent.
La.tin America was and remains the chief ob3ect of U.S. neocolonialism. In 1979
private U.S. capita.l investments in this region were estimated at 30 billion dollars,
which amounts to two-thirds of all foreign private investments there. The U.S.
military-industrial complex obtains there 50 to 70 percent of its strategic raw
material.4
Economic dependence of continent countries on the United States was caused by the
expansion of American monopolies. Thus, in 1977 percent of industrial production
on the continent fell to the lot of North American companies~ of which close to
90 percent in chemical industry production~ 80 percent metal working and machine
construction.5 The monopolistic U.S. capital controls a third of the manufactu ring
and. ~our-fifths of the region~ mining-extraction industry. ~terprises which belon~
to the United States yield one-fifth of the gross national product and provide the
same fraction of export for Latin American countries. This provides the U.S. mono.~
polies w3th huge profits: for each inv~ested dollar American imperialists receive
three to four and even more dollars, whereas in (~nada they receive 92 cents, and in
inlestern ~rope 62 cents.E In 1971-1978 American inv~estors pumped out of the con-
tinent 35 billion do~.lars which is more than the total sum of their capital in
the region.7
The series of perceptible defeats for U.S. imperialism in Ptorth-Eastern Asia and
Africa, a rise in the national-liberation movement in Latin America, and the
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policy of a numbe r of cour~tries on this continent ~o chan`e the direction of their _
- external economic ties promoted a marked w~eakening in U.S. positions in the region
at the beginning of the seventies. Although iri the post-war period United States
aon tinue to re tain first place in Iatin America as to the extent of capital invest-
ment, state and private credit and foreign trade~ still the specific weig~it oi' U.S.
monopolies in the tota.l sum of foreign financing sources and in foreign trade of
continent countries began to decrease to some extent. TYiis may be explained first
of all by an increase in ~he foreign economic expansion oP T~lestern Elxmpean
countries and Japan in this region.
A flirther rise in the inter-imperialist struggle in Latin American countries
characteristic of the sev~enties f.~ attafnin~ special acuteness and tension in industry,
credit and foreigri trade, or in the struggle for spher~s of capital application,
markets and raw ma.terial sources. Special activity pa.rtieularly in the struggle
= for spheres o� capital application may be noted in the neocolonial actions of
countries members of the Elxrogean Fconomic AssociatiQn LEEA,J. ~~Tithin the frame-
work of this organization a series of specialized organs were created back in
t'ne sixties for the stimulation of economic ties with Iatin American countries. -
They are the Eliropean Committee for Cooperation with Latin America and numerous
Latin American sections in the EEA commissic~n. In 1972 a special committee within
the ~ropean Economic Asso~iation was created the "EEA Andean Group~'. All
these organs systematically discuss problems of economic ties with countries of the
continent, especially "assistance" programs~ iYlvestment and trade expansion and
coordination, deal wi~.h tra~e and economic delegations~ missions, experts, hold -
meetings with Lcounti-y~ representatives. etc. During the 1970's leaders of the
~ropean Economic Association visited all Latin American countries with the goal -
- of establishing contacts with official and business circles of the v3rious states
on the continent.
In their strubgle ~~ith the U.S. monopolies the EEA countries take advantage of
the dissatisfaction of Latin American countries with American imperialism. Along
with this in the battle for Latin America they offer relativ~ely higher cotrnnodity
competitive power. more specific (comgared to the United States) terms of delivery
for certair. types of industrial equipment and machinery~ more favorable conditions
~ for obtaining credit and loans~ etc. One of the comparatively new ways of
penetratin~ Iatin America by capitalist countries of T,lestern LUrope ~s their
utiliza.tion of the continent~s integrati~n processes as well as various regional
economic groups. especially the Andean pact.
_ Table 1 which provides data on the rise in private investment of developed
capitalist countries on the continent in the 19^0's testifies to an increase in
the inte~-imperialist stru~gle for spheres of capital application in Iatin
Ame rica .
Table 1
Countries 1970 1972 1974 197d 1978 1980*
USA (mill.dol.) 12961 14897 19~+91 2573y 27142 3p16p
Ehgland (mill.pounds)497.3 479�3 491.1 501.2 540.8 551.9
taest Germany(mill.marks)3300 37~~ 47p~ 52~4 6620 70g2
Japan (mill.dol.) 559 989 2510 3301 4026 5p6~
- 14 *accordin? to oreliminary data
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'�~testern European and Japanese monopolies directed their capital into the manufac-
turinp industry~ since the fall of export prices for raw material, comparatively -
low work prnductivitv~ the rapid development of the scientific-technical revolution
led to a decrease in profi~s from Latin American extracting industry a traditional -
sphere of foreign capital allocation. Hiding behind the slogan ~~help in the
continent's industrialization"~ 1~lestern ~.iropean and Ja~a.nese inve,tors met ~rith
relatively insignificant social-political opposition. To some extent the Latin
American countries favored manufacturing industry investment~ introducing add~.tional
privileges for this purpose. This provided U.S, competitors with new profits.
?~!estern Elxropean and Japanese monopolies applied a series of ineasures towards the
regulation of their activity in continent countries so that at least on the surface
it vrould not be associated with the undisguised, predacious exploitation oi'
natural and human resources of the region by the U.S. monopolies. Some coricessions
_ were also made to the local bouxgeoisie with a long-range goal of securing their
support. Making the local lar~e capital and technical intelligentsia representa�-
tives oart of the cooperative effort, this symbolic national enterprise ~'flag
raising� to some ext~nt weakened the counter-action towards foreign investors. -
Pretending to be peacemakers, bearers of progress, ?lestern E1~ropean, Canadian and
- Japanese monopolies~ retaining their predatory essence, in many instances influence
the economic situation in Latin American countries by working out recommendations
for their governments regarding trade, additional politics and currency-~financial .
ope ra tion s .
A;narked rise in the inter-imperlalist stnaggle for the continent's markets in the
= 1970's was outlined by the old-time competitors the United States and ~g~.ish
monopolies . -
Contrary to previous years, in the 1970's English monopolists began to actively
allocate their capital into new branches of manufacturing inchistry, first of all
into machine constru~tion and petroleum chemistry. Thus a large petroleum-. -
chemical combine in San Lorenzo (Argentina) was b~ailt and is controlled by the
= English monopoly "Imperial Chemical Inciustriesn. F~terprise branches began to crop
up more frequen~ly with considerable experience in the organization of internal
zonal trade. Tl~e "Rolls ~pvice I~Iotors" company for aviation carrier construction
established in Brazil became one of the fawrite suppliers for aviation constnzction
compa.nies in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. British monopolies are particularly
insistent on expanding their positions in large Iatin American countries such as
Argentina, 3razil and Mexico.
A weakening of influence in former colonies and dependent countries i.n Africa, an
increase in the competitive struggle between the United States and member countries ~
of the EEA forced also rrench monopolists to look for new markets in Latin America.
At the beginning of the 1970 ~ s twenty to twenty-eight percent of all private French
investments in developing countries were directed to the continent. In ~razi~
alone ther~ are more than 300 active French firms. A special commission was
created to prepare recommendations for "economic cooperation� with Latin America
*.~rhich advised in one study the review of politics towards countries of the region,
to make them more flexible with consideration of specific peeuliarities of each.9
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Of course, other capitalist countries of TrlQStern Eur~pe also have �their� interests -
in Iatin Amprica. riowever, the strongest West~rn ~l.iropean imperialist rivals ta
_ the United ~tates on the Iatin American cox~tinent are the monopolies of the
= ~'ederated Republic of Germany. They not only renewed their pre-war positions iri
the region, but also increased them considerably. Appearing at first as United
States corp~ration partners, ?~lest German firms later began to demand "equal
opportunities" in Latin America openly and even spoke out against the hegemony of
- America.n monopol',ies on the continent. Although U.S. investments are considerably
larger than tho;ce of. T~Test Germany, American companies are faced t~ith a serious and
_ strong competit~~r.
The continuing and ~rowing expansion of Japanese monopolies in Latin America is
based on such factors as the rapid development of the country's economy~ urgent ~
_ needs for many ty;aes of natural raw material, difficulties with the sale of
industrial prochicts~ a sharp increase in land prices and cniel internal legislation
on restricting invest:nent activity in connection with the pollution of natural -
environment. In "the battle for Latin America" the Japanese monopolistic capital -
utilizes various measures and methods: providing continent countries with large,
- long_term credits for building important industrial facilities, considerable
~ purchases of traditional Latin American export goods. extensive participation in -
mixed companies~ partnership with local businessmen, etc. Japanese industrial
proctucts noted for their hi~h quality are of great competitive value.
The period researched is characterized bv an increase in the inter-imperialist
struggle for Iatin American markets. This, in turn, is stimulated by the stxvggle
of ca.pitalist countries for spheres of capital allocation in the re~ion. Although
the Unit,ed States continue to maintairi t,he leading role as the ~oods exporter
on the continent markets, noticeable changes did occur in the correlation of forces.
The EEA corporations are particularly successflxl in competing with American
- monopolies~ thanks mostly to their branch structure of capital export characterized
by allocating fUnds into comparatively new and promising branches of Iatin American
industry. In addition this promotes an increase 3n the export of machines and -
equipment essential for these branches from the Ew'.,A countries.
~ata in Table No. 2 testif~ring to the increase in the struggle of inter-imperialist
countries for Latin American markets provide the cj}mamics of their export to
the continent ( from the total sum of capitalist export into the countries
of the region).~
Table 2 -
Countries_~cporters 1970 1973 1975 1978 1980*
United States 46 la1a, ~.2 3~ 36
- ~'E~ countries 31 30 32 36 38
Japan g
Other countries 15 ~12y ~ ~ 21
$ 5
~accordin~ to prpZiminary ~3ata
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T'he inter-imperialis't stru~gle on the continent is also evident in the �ir?ancial
sphere since the meaning of banks and bank credit acquires particular importance
durinF the conduct of economic expansion politics by foreign corporations. Banks
in particular assist the monopolists act~vely in their neocolonial politics~ ta
withstand the acute compotitiv~ stru~gle more successflilly. T~n~s, the English
nank �Eank of L~ndon and South America", 'n'est German banks ~~Dresden Bank"~
Ikutsche 3ank~ are conductina an active attack on the Vorth Amerlcan banks and
their branches. ~'rench banks '~Banque ~'rancaise et Ita.lienne pour la A~,~erique du
Sur�~ "Ilanque Placional pour le Commerce et 1'Industrie", and "Banque ?~otschild�
have their branches in almost all countries of Latin A~erica. Japanese financie.rs
joined this stru~gle at a relatively later date. Large banks such as "N~itsui"~
�P4itsubisi"~ nSumimoto and "~lidzi" gradually shifted to extensive financial
- operations in Latin American countries.ll
Inter-imperialist struggle increased also in the patent markets. Concentration of
scientific-technical revolution achievements in the hands of foreign monopolists
gives them ~n opportunity to obtain high profits. F~iglish monopolies alone obtain
an annual income of almost 2.3 million pounds from the sale of ~~tents and l.icenses
in the re~ion.12 ~nall w~onder, then. that the struggle on patent markets is
becominp mors tense. In recent times the income of U.S, monopolies from the
_ realization of licenses increased by more than double. ~glish~ '~Test German~
:rench, Italian and Japanese monopolists spare no effort to attain licensino
agreements ~h�ith Latin American �inns. For example, the Italian monopoly ~~Pirelll~~
circumvented U.S. companies and made an agreement for provid:i.ng "techt~ia~l assis-
tance� to the following companies: �Conciustores Electricos'~ (I~"exico~ p
- Industrial Brasileira" n ~ Com ania
(Brazil), and Compania lndustrial and Commercia7. de
- Condustores" (Argentina).13
Inter-imperialist stntggle in energy and raw material sources, of �ahi.ch the lion's
share was previously centered in the hands of U.S. capita~., is becomirig more acute. '
In the 1970~s EEA countries especially became comparatively 1ar~e consumers of
the continent�s mineral and agricultural raw material and this, in turn, provoked
counter-action on the part of U.S. monopolies. Also increasing is the competitive
- str.ug~le for predominance 3n extraction and processing branches of iron ore, crudz
oil and atomic raw material, for establishing control over the most valuable and
promising types of raw ma.terial. An example is the inter-im
for crude oil in Latin America which Periali.st struggle
provides more than half of all primary
energy sources of the continent. Among monopolies involved with crude oil
extraction and processing in the region a leading place is occupied by the
Rockefeller companies "Standard Oil of New Jersey'~~ ''Standard Oil of. ,^,alifornia
and others~ which in 1972 extracted 36 percent of the crude oil on the cont~nent.
P7ore than 40 branch companies of this group, such as "Creole Petroleum Co.
11Esso"~ "International Petroleum�, "Iago Oil and Transport" and others are, i.n fact,
active in almost a11 Iatin American countries.l5 Since the beginning of the
~97o's U,3. monopoly positions were also attacked by the AnglQ-I~itch comp~ny
'~??oyal Dutch Shell which controls one_fourth of the crude oil extraction in
- Venezuela and has 4~ branches on the continent.16 Other foreign companies try to
follow closely, especially nGulf Oil Corporation", "iexaco�, '~Nobil Oil Corp.
~'Cxidental Petroleum~~, '~Phillips Petrnleum~' and '~Continental Oil".
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- Of course~ i.t w~uld ~e erroneous to see massive and continuous conflicts and
aompetition in the inter-imperialist stnaggle on the Iatin American rontinent.
Imperi.alas't tendencies towards conspirac3r, to the union of ~he3r forces against `
the growing national_l~.beration movement must also be considered. In addition tc~ -
the narrow, covstous interests of +~he na,tional bourgeoisie of each country.
- common imperialist interests exist in the name of which competitiveness and ~onflict
ane sometimes forgotten and union of forces is achieved for the sake of a cc,mmon
goal. "There are tra~ tendencies," stressed V.I. I,enin, "one which makes the union -
of all imperialists inevitable~ the second which pits somo imperialists against
others, tvro tendencies, neitrer of which has a strong foundation. "1?
Dlone of tYie ca.pita.list efforts are able to liquidate imperialistic competition.
As was stressed at the 25th CPSU Congress: "Gov~ernments of capitalist countries
make one effort after another to ease off the competition...But such is the nature
of imperialism that each tries to attain superiority at the cost of another~
forcing his s~ill ~pon a othe~. Disagreements appear in new forms, competitiveness
ezupts with new fcrce.
- ~'conomic, political and ideolo~ical imperialism expansion in Latin America promotes
_ a strengthening of the democratic and anti-imperialist struggle on the continent.
This stru~ale is taking place in a qualitatively new international situation which
is characterized by a growth in the power of socialist countries. Z~e marked
successes of socialist Glxba in building a new society are a vivid example for the
- peoples of the re~ion.
Fightin~ a~ti~~el.y against imperialist attack. progressive governments of a number
of 5outh American countries under w~orker influence are expropriating and nationa_
lizing U.,~. monopolies' properties, restricting and regulating their activity,
attempting to introduce uniform conditions for foreign capital allocation~ equal
economic relations with the United States and other imperialist states so as to
establish a new international economic order; they are developing economic
_ integration, introducing progressive social transformations in the interests of
the poor masses~ are a~eating regional economic organizations withou~t the partici- -
pation of the United States~ are expanding a mutually convenient cooperation.
and economic~ scientific and cultural ties with the USSR and other socialist
countries.
Our country~s Leninist external politics~ the readiness of the Soviet govex~nment
to provide help to nations fighting for their independence respond tc the living
interests of cou:~tries on the Latin American continent. �1iti'e, comrade L. I. Brezhnev
stated from the 25th (:PSU Congress trihunal, "supnort the aspirations of these
countries towards stren~thenin~ their politica2 and eeonomic independence and
- welcome their greater role in international life. "~9 ~he continent's prooressiv~e -
forces are relyin~ on this su,pport in thEir continuously ~xowin~ anti-imperialist
StI'1] ~;~I.P..
- ~~~~~'s
1. P'{.AVDA, 21 Oct 1980.
2. ~eports of the 25th CFSU Congress, 1976~ p 3~ �
- 3. `J.I. Lenin, "Imperialism~ the :-ii~hest Phase of Capitalism~� Collected
~lorks, vnl 27~ p ;9b.
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t~�. IZ'JE^TIYA. oct 1978; U.Pd. "-~ultinational Corporations in ?~Jorld D~velopment,
rlew Vork, 1979, P 187.
5. Td0?~LD Ff2oBL:~~'.'~?S AND SOCIALISM, i1o 11 ~ 19~19 ~ p 49.
6� PftAVt~A, 29 3ep 1979 . -
7. LATIN AMEf?I~A~ No 2~ 1980, p. 85.
8� Calculated by the author from: Survey of ~.irrent Business, 1970_1980;
Britain's Business, ~970_1980; Britains Inte rnational Inv~estment Position,
1970-1980; Overseas T~ansactiuns, 197o-1980; Deutsche Au ssenpolitik~
1970_1980; The Japan Economic Review, 197~-1980. -
9� Survey of Glarrent Business~ no 8~ 1976~ p 4L#.,
90. Calculated by the author from: U.~T. Monthly Eulletin of Statistics~ 1970-
= 1984; Yearbook of International T~ade Statistics, 1970_1980; CEPAI,,
~studio ~conomico de America Latina, 197o-1980.
_ 11. See: �Latinskaya Amerika: Valyutno_finanso voe polozhenie v 70-kh godakh�
Llatin America : a.irrency-financial situation in the 70 ~ s,7; ~~Triostrannyy
kapital v yekonomike Latinskoy Ameriki" LFo reign Capital
in the Economy o�
Latin Americ~~ 19~8~ pp 10q_110.
12. THF, T~M~'S, Nar 19, 197~3.
- ~ 3� Z. I. P,omanova ~~'~Tovye yavleniya v bor'be za latinoamerikanskiy ok"
_ LA'ew .Developments in the StrugPle for the I?3tin American Market ,
LATI~I7KAYA A.~._"~R,IKA~ '~TO 5, 197~, P�49.
14� I~a. Ehergia en America Latina. Lima~ 1969, p 13�
, 15� ~ee E.g. ~ II I~IA r";exico, 1979, de Sept. ~ 3.
16. Petroleo y',lineri~ de Venezuela~ 1971 ~ t3a 275� -
1?� V.I. Lenin~ ~:eport on foreign policy at the combined meetin
Central F.xecutive rommittee~~ and ?".oscow Soviet,N!ay 14, 19~gfT~oZl~~nion _
e A313.
_ ~s� ~eports of the 25th CPSLT Congress~ p 39.
f9. Ibid., p� 23.
COPY~.IGHT: Vydavnytstvo �Plaukova Dumkan~ "r.tk~~ns~kyy istorvchnvq zhurnal 19-31
9443 -
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INTERNATIONAL ,
,
BOOK VIEWS PROSPECTS OF COOPERATION IN FIGHTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM _
Moscow PROBLEMY SOTRUD~IICHESTVA GOSUDARSTV V BOR'BE S MEZHDUNARODNYM TERRORIZMOM
in Russian 19i9 (signed to press 5 Sep 79) pp 1-2, 158
[Table of contents and brief description of book by Ye. G. Lyakhov]
� [Excerptj Title Page: _
Title: PROBLEMY SOTRiIDNICHESTVA GOSUDARSTV V BOR'BE S MEZFIDUNARODNYM
TERRORIZMOM (Problem of State Cooperation in the Fight with
International Terrorism)
Publisher: "l~eezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya"
Place and year of publication: Moscow, 1979
Signed to press Date: 5 Sep 79 ~
Number of Copies Published: 15,000
Number of Pages: 168
= Brief Description:
This book examines the nature of international te~rorism and analyzes interstate
measures, conventions and agreements concerning the fight with international terror-
~ ism. It shows how disturbing current developments, such as plane hijackings, kid- _
napin~ of diplomats, explosi~;ns in embassies, the sending of letter-bo"mtss, etc., de-
mand more effective cooperation between states in combatting international terror-
ism.
Table of Contents Page
Introduction 3
Chapter 1. On Defining International Terrorism 12
J.. Problems of def ining the concept of "international
terrorism" 12
2. Terrarism as an international crime 33
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Chapter 2. Basic Causes of International Terrorism 67
1. Criteria for research 67
- 2. Reactionary concepts of the sources of ir.ternation.al
terrorism 72
3. Basic causes of international terrorism 84 -
�
Chapter 3. International-legal For~ and M~eans of Combatting Interna- _
tional Terrorism 98 -
1. Problems of legal contractual state cooperation in
combatting international terrorism 101
2. The idea of an international criminal court 142
Conclusion 154
Footnotes 157 -
COPYRIGHT: "Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya", 1979
CSO: 1807
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REGIONAL
TURKMENS STUDY USE OF WATER, I,E1NU RESOL'RCES
Ashkhbad TURICP~NISTAN kOr4IUNISTI in Turkmen No 12, 1980 pp 68-72
[Article by K. Bayryev: "Legal Norms of the Utilization of Land and Water"]
[Text] The Leninist decree "on the land" played a great role in the socialist
changes carried out in our country. This decree, which was accepted by the 2nd
Al1-Russia Congress of Soviets, was not only a legal act on the nationalization
of land on a socia].ist basis; but was also one of the most important state measures
directed at basically changing agriculture, and at rationally using and conserving
the land and water resources of the country. The Communist Party and Soviet
government is logically activating Leninist principles for tk~e consequential
utilization and conservation of natural rea~urces apprepriate to the changing con-
ditions of modern times. .
The legal organization for the preservation of nature rests on th~ basic law of
the country. According to the Conetitution of the USSR and the Constitution of the
- Turkmen SSR, the land, the wealth under the land, the water resources and the
forests are the property of the state, in other words, the property of all the
people. Acc~rding to this, the ob~ects of n~ture must be ut3lized in a planned
manner in order to increase the social wealth and raise the degree of the popula-
tion's material and cultural standard of living. Means of broaden3iig land reclama-
_ tion and chemicalization and instituting complex mechanization to production pro-
cesses have been presented in decrees of the XXVth congress of the CPSU. The
propitious natural conditions in our country are being safeguarded by a number of
legal technically organized means. Measures aimed at defending and conserving
~ natural resources, organizing the utilization of land and water and establishing
responsibility for all kinds of legal violations have been formulated in the
enacted laws.
i
As is known, the March Plenum (1965) of the CC CPSU began a new phase in the devel-
opment of the Leninist agrarian policy of the party. In the period after this
_ plenum the agriculture of the country made a great stride forward economically and
socially. Some of the pressing questions pertaining to agriculture were resolved,
the material-technical basis was laid, mechanization and land reclamation devel-
- oped with a faster tempo. On the basis of mutual economic cooperation and the
integration of agroindustry the transition of all agriculture to the present
industrial base by means of the further specialization and construction of agricul-
tural production is the true way for the ratianal use of land and water. These
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_ and similar successes gained were analyzed in detail and approved at the Nocamber
- (1979) Plenum of the CC CPSU. Along with this the Plenum of the Central Committee
noted the existence of shortcomings in agriculture and stressed that the further
d2+.!~lopment of agricultural production depended to a great ~xtent on the rat3dt1~1
use and conservation of land and water.
Land reclamation work enters into the complex of ineasurPS to improve ~he condition -
of the land and to raise the yield of sowing areas. In the decree accepted on 16
- June 1966 by the CC CPSU and USSR Council of Ministers "Qn the broader develogment
of land reclamation in order to take an abundant and steady harvest of ~rains and
similar agricultural products", and in later decr~~s of the party and government a
broad program for land reclamation is put forth. Those using the land must observe
~ne laws pertaining to iand and water, preserve the soil by all means and raise -
= the yield o� every hectare, szruggle against erosion, follo~a the agricultural
rul~s of cultivating and sowing, use manures and toxic chemicals cautiously and
apply the land reclamation measures logically. As for those using water, tha}~ are
rPSponsible for the water sources being in th~ best condition, for the rational
use of water resources and for preventing water impurity or diminution of water
_ supply. An equivalent responsibility is shouldered by those exploiting under- -
ground wealth or animal wealth. -
_ All of these measures take into consideration ecological demands which are activated
_ by the interaction between society and nature, because of the ma~or infiuence of
- society on nature in the sphere of exploiting nature's bounty, and which arise from
the necessity of detailed legal regulation. The ecological question is dependent
on the character of ensuring the national use of land and water as the basic means -
- of agricultural production. Stressing the necessity to conserve land wh3ch is used
for agricultural needs and is productively exploited, comrade L.I. Brezhnev said
at the Third All-Union Congress of Kolkhoz Workers "conserving the soil is the
work of our entire society. One must view any kind of dama~e to the land as having
been committed against society. Whoever viola~es the land or treats it carelessly
~ weakens the original material basis of the people's well-b eing."
'Ihe question of ensuring the rational use of and protection of agricultural lands
- and the rational exploitation of water for agricultural needs has special importance
at the present time. A special place in the law is given to the exploitation of
land for agricultural needs. As stressed in the principles of the law regarding _
land, lands recognized as appropriate for agricultural needs must be given over,
f irst of all, to agricultural enterprises, organizations and administrations. At
the same time, the applicable law forbids cutting down on the amoiint of land or
making it less fertile.
Unfortunately, however, in some kolkhozes and sovkhozes of our republic there are
situations in which irrigated lands are carelessly exploited. This brings wetness
_ to one part of the agricultural land, and L-he soil undergoes erosion. In such a
situation a part of the land is lost to agriculture and reduces the possibility of
increasing the production of agricultural products. For example, as a result of
the careless use of irrigated lands in some rayons of Ashkhabad Oblast 11.4
- thousand hectares were lost to agriculture in 1976 and 61 thousand hectares in
1977.
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One also comes across data on land in sovkhozes and kolkhozes being snapped up in
order to illegally increase the size of private plots or by giving private plots to
families with no relationship to the enterprise. For example, in 1979 on the Engels
_ kolkhoz in Vekilbazar Rayon it turned out that parcels of land were divided up and
given to non-kolkhoz members. Only after a criticaZ article appeared in the press
- were such practises forbidden and illegally allocated lands were returned to the
kolkhoz.
A negative situation such as illegally taking agricultural lands for other purposes
- must categorically come to an end. According to the laws, special decrees of state
- organs are authorized to allocate land parcels for state and society needs at
certain times only~ after taking economic plans into consideration. In the law it
is explained t~at the wa~ is open to allocate the lands which are being used by
kolkhozes, sovkhozes, agricultural enterprises, organizations and administrations
only under special circumstances. Taking lands used by kolkhozes can only be done .
with the permission of a general meeting of the ko lkhoa members. Taking p~rcels
of land from the state, cooperative or social enterprises, organizations subordinate
to sovkhozas, the Union or the republic can be done nnly with the agreement of the
users of the land and the relevant ministries and departments of the USSR or the
- Turkmenistan SSR.
y Comrade L.I. Brezhnev said: "We must look after the land very carefully, we must
divide and allocate land for the organization of enterprises cleverly and econom-
ically, we cannot get around this. Together with this, we muat not reduce the
size oi productive areas but must constantly increase it."
The laws on taking land from kolkhozes and sovkhozes for needs other than agri-
culture must be rigidly carried out, because it must guarantee th e interests of
the users~of the land and contribute to the stability of the laws on using lands
for agriculture.
In the period of the bv.ilding of communism the development of social production and
urbanization and the raising of the material and cultural level of the population
of the countrp has increased the need for water to a great extent and stepped up
the importance of exploiting water rationally and protecting it. The extent to
which water can be guaranteed to enterprises in our republic and the careful pro- _
tection of water resources possess decisive importance. Because of this a very
great role is played by the V.I. Lenin Karakum Canal. The canal has changed the .
republic socio-economically and refreshed its image; significant possibilities
for further increasing irrigated areas have opened up. Irrigated areas in the
- cana]. zone have increased twn and one half times and have reached 450 thousand
hectare~--in other words, with the coming of canal water irrigated lands in the
republic have reached 950 thousand hectares . In the first years of the establish-
- ment of the republic irrigated lands totalled roughly z50 thousand hectares. This
achievement came about as a result of the great tempo of the building of water
holdings. '
Reconstruction of the traditions of irrigation under conditions wherein water is
always drying up in the republic and the orderly explo:Ltation of water posses _
primary importance. Great attention is given Co the planned organization and
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rational exploitation of water resources. This, in its turn, etrengthens the
possibilities for the preservatior. of water resources. Tie ~ational exploitation
tlf water which is the most valuable natural resource is a major economic quest~.on
in our republic. At the present tempo of conquering new lands, it cannot be
assured fully that these lands have sufficient water resources to extract a
maximal harvest. tiuch water is lost because of the negative situation of the
irrigation network in some areas, and because the irrigation network silts up.
One meets situations where the laws on water utilization as specif3.ed in the plan
and the norms and rules for using water are not fulfilled. There are means for
the further improvement of the situation of land reclamation and for economizing
on water connected with progressive principles in irrigating crops. _
One of the in~portant problems in our republic is the developmen~ of collector-
_ drainage networks under conditions of irrigated farming. The area in our republic
covered by collector--drsinage networks is over three thousand hectares. However,
in some rayons of our republic the condition of the collector-drainage syst~m does
not satisfy present needs. Scientists have shown that when the soil becomes saline
cotton productivity drops by 20 percent. As is known, treating this question care-
lessly does great damage to the enterprise; earlier, hundreds of hectares of fertile
soil were not subject to yearly crop rotation and the yield of agricultural crops
. worsened. Because the collector-drainage network is still insufficient and due -
to the poor condition of existiag collectors, crop fields in different parts ~ecome
damp and most of the lands become saline. The work of preventing the moisturiza-
- tion and salinization gives a good result when combined with measures to fight
water and soil erosion, to use agro-technical and sanitary-technical measures, to
plant protective tree zones, and with sjmtlar special measures from the rules of
the codex of the Turl~eniatan SSR on water.
- However, in some cases, because the work is done superficially aad carelessly, lands -
are not protected ecologically and ponds and irrigation ditches fill with toxic
chemicals.
As stated in article 117 of the code on water of the Turkmeni`stan SSR, it is
obligatory on state water propietor systems, directorates, kolkhozes, sovkhozes as -
well as enterprises, organiza~ions and administrations, to prevent danger to water
from manures and toxic chemicals and to comply with the regulations on the use of -
toxic chemicals. In our opinion, it is necessary to str.enghtea responsibility for
the rational exploitation and preservation of water resources and, with the goal
of preserving land tracts in good condition, to work out economic stimuli for the
exploitation of land and water.
- Since water is a gift from natur~ we must do away with the careless use of crop
- water and--in some conditions--even reduce wateriag of cotton. Such a"principle"
, of work does great damage to the ~conomy. Because of this it is necessary to in-
crease the law's power so that the water not be exploited carelessly.
There are a number of articles in the Criminal Code of the Turkmenistan SSR on
_ carefully looktng after land and water and conserving them. Responsibility for
- unauthorized owner~hip of land or water, for the criminal use of irrigated lands,
or the unauthoriaed use of state-held lands, for the damage of water control equip-
ment or parts, is penalized. For example, for unauthorized possession of land any
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produce is confiscated and the fine for the guilty is 500 rubles, fcr careless and
criminal exploitation of irrigated ~and, the guilty are fined up to 500 rubles,
~tid for the unauthorized use of water control units, the fine is up to 50 rublee.
If the regulations on exploitation of land and water are violated and material
damage is done to the state and the users of the laud, the guilty organizations or
men are obligated to pay compensation for the full extent of the damages. Pr3nci-
ples of soviet civil law on t~e basis of the relevant articles in the Civil Cvde
of the Turlmienistan SSR on payment of damages are applicable. In violating rsgula-
tioa.on the rational exploitation of land and water, guilty enterprises, organiza-
tions, administrations and citizens, as a means of establishing appropriate r espon-
sibility for the use of land and water, can be deprived of the possibility of using
a tract of land or source of water.
_ Ho~ever, in violating the regulations on the ratioaal use of land and water and
the conservation of water resources, it is necessary to note that the guilty have
evaded responsibility. In many cases such useless facts are to be decided om only
with the agreement of the parties. Oae must prevent the attampte to evade
responsibility for violating the regulation on exploiting water and land and
strengthen the question of control.
9676
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