JPRS ID: 9654 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ ' JPRS L/9G54
- 10 April 1981 -
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JPRS L/9654
10 April 1981
. ~ WEST EUROPE REPORT .
tFUvo 2o/si)
~ CONTE~! TS
TERRORISM
_ INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Sov:~et Responsibility in International Terrorism
_ (Giuseg~e Venosta; IL MONDO, 13 Feb 81) 1 -
Laurent Book on Terrorism Subject of Interview
(Roland Laurent Interview; PANORtiMA, 23 Feb 81) 6
- ITALY
Red ~rigades Terrorist Peci Interviewed
(Patrizio Peci Interview; PANORAMA, 16 Feb 81) 9
Activity of Armenian Terrorists =
(EUROPEO, 9 Feb 81) ............e 16
FCONOMIC
FRADICE
~2eport on 19$0 Aid to African, Indian Ocean TerritoriEs
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 27 Feb 81) 18 ~
ITALY
Trade With East Affected by Resumption of 'Cold War' _
(Nino Ciravegna; IL Pi0ND0, 20 Feb 81) 34
~conomists' C~pinions on Credit Restrictions ~
_ ~iIL MONDO, 29 Feb 81) 38
Luigi Spaventa, Luigi Spavent~. Interview _
Giovanni Guidi, Giovanni Guidi Interview ~
" Walter Mandelli, Walter Mandelli Interview
- a - [I~I - WE - 150 FOUO]
_ ~ cn~ nc~r~r ~ r r rc~ n~?rT v
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r�ux ur�r lci.ai, U5~ UNLY
. I.
POLIT'LCAL '
J FRANCE
- ` CGT Leaders Foresee Political: Financial Problems ~
(LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION, 9 Mar 81) 45
~ Chirac Detail~ Economi~ Plan, Savings, Budget Cuts
_ = (Jacques Chirac; VAi~EURS ACTUELLES, 9 Mar 81) 46
RPR Political Defections From Chirac Camp
(Chri.stine Orion; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 9 Mar 81) 50
Briefs
New SDECE Head 53
ITALY
Makno Poll on Government, Parties, Leaders
(Paolo Pas~arini; IL MONDO, 30 Jan 81) 54
GENERAL ~
ITALY
- A1-Qadhdhafi's Econcmic, Political In�terests in Italy
(Cesare Peruizi; IL MODNO, 30 Jan 81) 59
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TERRORISM INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
- SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -
' Milan IL MONDO in Italian 13 Feb 81 pp 28-32 _
[Article by Giuseppe Venosta: "From Russia With Terror"]
[T~xt] Pertini believes it, Haig is conv inced of it: terrorism
has its bases in the East. Is this really true? There is no lack
of ~vidence, although some dou~ts remain. And the KGB would
like
Not only San~iro Pertini holds certain convic*ions concerning the foreign matrix of
terrorism which has been raging over Italy and Euroge now for some time. In fact,
on 28 January, the new American secretary of state, Gen Alexander M. Haig, in his
first o.fficial address, echoed the Italian gresident's declarations and spoke on
th e"training, equipping, and financin~" of international terrorism. Thi~ time,
however, unlike Pertini, Haig spoke out clearly and named the Soviet Union.
The Soviets retorted with protests and denials. The Itremlin is an establishm2nt that -
= cloaks itself in a bourgeois respectibility founded on la~r and order [at home and] -
= on the planetarq scale as w~11 that stirs envy in the West's most staunchly
= reactionary circles. Nonetheless, thP Soviet Union has never repudiated the label~
attached to it as the nation whfch is leading the world revolution a contradiction '
? tha.t has ~rouse3 a good deal of suspicion. What, then, is ~he truth? Are there
actually terrorists coming in from the cold?
Perhaps the truth is known cnly to those who work on the third floor of a building,
- vaguely Moorish-Assyrian in its architecture, that stands at number 2 Dzerzhinsky -
- Snuare in Moscow. In the summer of 1972, a good part of the first general di.rector-
_ atE of the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or Conanittee for State Secur-
ity), which oversees the foreign operations of the Soviet secret police, was trans-
, ferred to a large, modern, barracks-like st~ucture on a turnoff of Moscow's
beltway; yet it is srill on Dzerzhinsky Square (site of the infamous Lubyanka
- Pr ison) that all vital decisions are made.
Or iental rugs, embroidered divans, mahogany wainscoting, a bedroom and ba~h shut off _
- from th~ rest of the premises: this is the headquarters occupied by Yuri Vladimiro-
- vich Andropov, 66, unriisputed boss of the ~GB, even though he has not presided
officially over the organization for the past 3 years. Once a telegraphist and movie -
- house f ilm operator, he served as Soviet ambassador to Budapest during the Hungarian
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uprising in 1956. On his desk stands a battery of telephones. One, the Kremlevka, ~
� connects directly with the Kremli.n. A second, the Vertushka, is reserved for com- _
_ munications with members of the political office of the communist party and the ~
Central Committee. The others are plugged into the nerve centers of the ~oviet
apparatus. Tall, with the courteous manners of a scholar, Andropov knows English
- fairly well and likes to flaunt his command of it before foreign guests at official
ceremonies. While it was certainly not Andropov who spilled one of the KGB's thou- _
_ sands of secrets, still something of the wnrld-wide activities pursued by his
secret service personnel has filtered through to the West. IL MONDO is now ab'le to
reconstruct at least three significant accounts which strongly tend to confirm.
Pertini's suppositions and H~?ig's certainties.
The Repentant Warrior _
Captured in September 1980 by the Israelis, Adnan Jaber, 32, until 1969 member of .
A1 Fatah among the most seasoried nuclei of Palestinian re~,istance and the group
guilty of massacring six religjous Jews (2 May 1980) on their way to Hebron, on
the o~cupied We~t Bank, to pray at the so-called tomb of Abraham revealed facts
on the ties bet-~�*c~n the Palestine Liberation drganization (PLO) and the Soviet
Union.
His Russian adventure began in March 1974 on an Aerflot flight from Damascus to
Moscow with 20 fellow Palestinians. The men were lodged in the village of Sokhod-
naya, 35 kilometers from the capital, where they w~re given courses in military
eraining and political theory from 0800 to ?600. Some of the instructors wore ~
uniforms, others mufti. Few spoke Arabic, hence there was a ne~ed for interpreters.
The Soviets trained the Palestinians in small units of 30 men each not to learn
guerrilla warfare but rather conventional military procedure. Only once were the
~ trainees taught how to storm a~building in the center of a city and take possession '
of it.
_ Jaber noted that during the course on telecommunications, the Soviet instructors
used radio equipment unknown in ~-ne Middle East. He noted also that the Russians ~
- never mentioned the Israelis by name but preferred to ca11 them "the enemy." More-
over, excpet for obligatory lessons in Marx~.sm-Leninism, they emphasized the crea-
tion of a. Palestinian state on the banks of the Jordan, not the destruction of
- Israel, in line with the United Nations' resolution.
Despite his dark deed at Hebron, one is little inclined to brand Jaber as a terror-
- ist. In committing Yeis criminal gesture, perhaps he f elt the exasperation of a -
thwarted patr3.ot determined to see his country liberated. But many ~ther rumors
have come t us from behind the iron curtain that have little to do with the eman-
cipation of oppre:.~Qd peoples.
The Lumumba University
Founded ~..n 1960 by Nikita IChrushchev, then secretary general of the CPSU, and bap- -
- tized the following year in honor of the Congo's assassinated prime minister, the
- Patrice Lumumba Universi~y was dedicated to friendship among peoples (six depart-
ments). As such, it was the Soviet Union's single educational institution authorized
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to accept foreign~ students (in 1957 only 150 specialized in Soviet studies; today -
there are an estimated 20,000 distributed among various schools). Lumumba Univer-
sity takes in annually some 5,000 foreigners coming from 92 countries, even though -
their diplomas are not universally recognized. Local academic authorities, of
, course, xefute the notion that Soviet universities only prepare them to ur:leash
_ revolutions all ot~er the world, and argue that campus sports rule out marksmanship -
as exce.ssively aggressive. Despite their claims, however, the real facts are quite
different. "
_ First of all, foreign Lumumba candidates are carefully selected by the KGB; what
_ parameters are supplied are unknown, but certainly t.hose accepted are not opposed to
- Saviet infierests. Secondly, although the courses in Marxism-Leninism are elective,
~ the non-Soviet students are discreetly pressured into attending zhem. It is for a
good reason that 25 percent of the student body consists of Russians, among them
propagandists and activists. "If parents want their children to be communists,
they should send them to Paris. If they want them to be capitalists, they should
send them to Lumumba," a former student of the Moscow university recently remarked
to IL MONDO. But not everyone agrees with him.
Qver the past 15 years, in fact, at least two of Lumumba's foreign students were
given front-page headlines for months because of the revolutionary activities. After
studying at the university in the 1960s, in 1971 RoYiana Wijiwera, leader of the
Liberation Front of Sri Zanka, headed an armed uprising in her country that ended
in a blood bath. The other was Carlos "the 3ackal," or Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, the
= terrorist most sought after by police all over the world, who masterminded a series
of kidnapings, massacres, and holdups. Having totally disappeared some time ago,
Carlos is thought to be a gues: of Libya's Colonel Muammar al-Qadhdhafi, Moscow's
valuable ally in the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East in general.
Ilich, or Carlos, arrived in Lumumba in the autumn of 1968 together with his brother
_ Lenin (their father, Jose Altagracia Ramirez, a wealthy Venezuelan lawyer, paid
unique homage to the father of the Bolshevik revolution by naming his three sons
Vladimir, Ilich, and Lenin). Apparently they were not very serious students; to
the contrary, Carlos lived a high life in Moscow on the generous monthly allowance
~ sent him by his father. But then the unpredictable happened: public enemy number
I of the future was expelled from the Soviet Union in the spring of 1968 for dis-
- o~�derly conduct at the gates of an African embassy, which he denounced for failing
to renew the exit visas for a group of its student nationals; he was seen hurling
an inkpot against the building and breaking a window. The incident ended in a Tr?ild
- West type of inelee and an exchange of blows between Carlos and a brawny Soviet -
policeman. Says his father, "In Moscow Ilich learned to loathe Soviet communism."
_ Western specialists in Soviet affairs, however, think differently: "His expulsion
was simply a ~phony] ideological ploy, enabling him to collaborate with the KGB in
more quiet secrecy."
Another disturbing type to nurture an ambiguous love-hate attitude toward ehe Soviet -
Union was Lee Harvey Oswald, who assassinated President John F. Kennedy (Dallas, 22
November 1963;. Wtiile he never attendEd Lumumba, Oswald nevertheless worked actively =
with the KGB, and applied for Soviet citizenship in 1959. When two psychiatrists =
= examined him for the Russian secrEt service, they pronounced him too abnormal and
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~ unstable to warrant a post iti the service. Returning to the United States in June _
1962, Oswald renewed his request for Soviet ciCizenship 1 year later. A.pplication
again denied. Then car~e Dallas. A~~cording to information received by IL MCJNDO, hia
crim e provoked a panic on Dzerzhi�r.sky Square. Was it possible that Oswald had been
; hired without headquarters knowj.ng it? A bombardier was promptly d~spatched to
Minsk, the last stop of Oswa?u's sojourn in the Soviet Union, and brought back to
Moscow a dossier on him, tab..t.ch elicited a sigh of relief; tlie documentation showed _
nothing that could compromise the Soviets. Al.l the same, the KGB, trembling with
fear, wondered whether the efficiency of its methods might have been deteriorating.
The Czechoslovak Trail
Lik~ the American CIA, the KGB, which commands five times as many spies as all West-
eri~. secret services put together, does not o�pQrate alone on the global ch~ss board.
Just as the Red Army exploits its Cuban, West German, and Sauth Yemenite subordi-
nates in sensitive regions of the planet (Africa, Middle East), Dzerzhinsky Square
. likewise has its "Negroes," the allied police forces of the Eastern Eur~pean sate-
llite nation~. The Czechoslovak trail abruptly came to light in 1978, thanks to the
Italian press, when Aldo Nioro, Christian Democratic presider~t, was kidnapped and ~
assassinated: one of the weapons used to kill him was found to have been made in -
Czechoslovakia.
. Since then, inany journals have ventured hypotheses and stated their convictions.
There has been talk of Giangiacomo Felrrinelli's visits to prague; of a base near
- Karlovy Vary aet up to train Italian terrurists; of the hospitality extended by _
Czech officiai.s (about 1949) to members of the Milanese Red rlyin~ Squa3ron, perpe- '
trators of various crimes not altogetner p~litical but all without confirmati.on. '
These charges were proved 10 years ago, but a*_ the time not even the most dogged .
Western warmongers paid more than pass3_ng atte�ntion, distracted as they ~~e~e by the
~ widespread yearning for decente aftr~ the dramatic show of Sov~et power in the
invasion of Czechoslovakia.
In addition to the Prague spring, 19b8 was the y�ear that marked the defecticn of a I
Czech general, Jan Senja, in the Unit~d States. NQ longer in ~anger of being tracked _
= down by the KGB, Senja gave the French weekly PARIS MATCH a long interview, in which
he decl~red that in the West, under Soviet direction, t.he Warsaw Pact countrie~ had
established networks of saboteurs primed to knock ou~ vital :.nstallations should a ,
- conflict eventually break out (including, ior example, a detailed plan to ble~a up -
L~ndon's underground with plastic explosives). Senja said also that foreign mili-
tants were being trained beh~.nd the iron curtain, and spoke about the Itaiians in-
volved, to general indifference.
a "The Czechs, too, will be good comrades in the [coming] f ight," a young Palestinian,
proud of his affill.ition with A1 Fatah, confessed .*.o IL MONDO, and continued: "But
they are c.ertainly nnt the best instructors in the East. What is more, in 1968 they
made it plain that they did know how to fight. Nor do the Soviets, with their
noses in the air whenever they encoiinter us Arabs... The best are the Vietnamese;
they really know their stuff." Yet the mysteries of P~ague are still unresolved
- and will probably reff~a.in so for a long time to come, or until the West is able to
cast at least a ray ot light on the East bloc's intended course of action should it
-~i,~ ~
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_ be proved that it holds the reins of terrorism on the international scale; this be-
_ cause the circumstances lend themselves to many contradicting interpretations.
As UNITA was quick to point out in its comments on Per~ini's 3eclarations (aparC
_ from Italy, Turkey, with its 1,000 kilometers of. common border with the SovieC Union,
is also a theater of terrorist guerrilla warfare), it is a matter of significance
that in September 1980, the terror inflicted by extrem~ factions on the Bosphorus
braugh~ to power a military ~unta favorable to the Atlantic Pact, therefore opposed
to Moscow. Equally true is the fact that the Red Brigades' bloody deeds in Italy, -
; espeeially the murder of Moro, have not only alienated Enrico Berlinguer's communist
party from the constituted government but also from any chance to lay the foundations
' for the historical compromise. The countless ways of the Kremlin are highly enig-
matic. What can be said about France, a country spared terrorism, Italian or Turkish
style, but where, with chronometrical precision, the Kremlin boycotts Georges
Ma.rchais' communists (Marchais is one of the most loyal of the pro-Moscovites) in
every electoral campaign bec~u.se the ~oviets insist on their demands which, being
extremist, are unacceptable to their French allies.
~ COFYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981
9653 =
CSO: 3104
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TERRORISM INTERNATIONAI, AFFAIRS
LAURENT B~OK ON TERRORISM SUBJECT OF INTERVIEW
Milan PANORAMA in Italian 23 Feb 81 pp 51-52 .
[Interview with Roland Laurent by Bruno Crimi: "Northeast Passage"]
[Text] A French author and newspaperman has some sensational
things ta say on internati~ns~ terrorism.
Saon aiLer 35-year old Roland Lau~ent completed his university
_ studies (he ol~tained his law degree in 1967), he was devoured by
two passions: novels about secret agents and the diplomatic '
. career. He chose to become newspaperman and to get involved in
real life with the affairs of international espionage. And, there-
fore, at 3east indirectly, with diplomacy. Having learned the
ropea for some years at PARIS-PfATCH, Roland Laurent .joined the
CANARD ENCHAINE, the satiricai weekly most feared by the political
establishment, for which he has been working for the last 10
years. Newspaperman-sleuth Roland Laurent is the author of a
- book, ~ust published in Nicp by Publisher Alain Lefeuvre, which
is creating quite a turmotl in France: "L'Internationale Terror-
iste Demasquee" [The Inten~ational Terrorist Unmasked].
T�~ith this interview whi~.~ he granted PANORAMA, Laurent goes beyond
the revelations contained in his book and tells of some unpublished
episodes which occurred while he was conducting his research on
international terrorism.
[Question3 Were you surprised by President Pertini's statements on French tele-
- vision that the sanctuaries o~ international terrorism are in the East?
[Answer] T was surprised by its form. I did not expact a Western head of State
to speak with suci~clarity and with such precise allusions. As far as the ~substance
- is concerned, on the contrary...
[Question) Did Pertini hit i'~ mark?
[Answer] I would say so.
[Question] The Italian president, however, did not furnish any proof of his
statements. An3, all in all, neither have thc parliamentarians who supported him.
Do you have anything to say on the matter?
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- [Ans~Ter] A few years ago, when General Haig was head of NATO, the organization's
Military Committee had requested from the aecret serv~ces of the individual countr~~
members a d~tailed report on terrorist activ~ties and on the connections among
tha various groups. A synthesis had been made, then, from which it clear~y appeared
that the larges t quantity of weapons employed by terrorist organization3 came
- from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Czechoslovaki.a. And it was accurately proven
that in Czechos lo~rakia (at Karlo~}? Va~y), in East Germany (at Wund~orf), in cuba
' (on the isle of Youth) and then in Lebanon, in Syria, Iraq and Libya there were
Craining camps for IRA terrorists, ttle Red Brigades and Prima Linea meaibers, for
the Basque ETA [Basque FaCherland and Libertq Group] ar~d Germany's Red Arm;~ Faction.
- [Question] You are speaking in the past tense. What is th~ present situation?
- [Answer] That ~eport has been recently expanded by a CLP investigafiion which con-
_ firms everything and supplies additional details~ This report from the American
agency is presently on Ronald Reagan's desk. Haig saw it, and seems to be
= extremely worried. To the point that at the SJtiite House they ar~ examinin.g the
~ possibility of a summit of NA~O countries on problems concerning terrorism and the
measures to be taken ta neutralize it.
- [Question] Wha t are th.e "additional 3etails" contained in the CIA reporti all about?
- [Answer] Details on how weapor.s are deli�~ered to terrorists in various counti�ies,
~ Italy includ~d: through the diplomatic pouch of some of the embassies of the so-
- called progressive Arab countries.
[Question] L;bya, for instance?
[Answer] For instar.ce...but that's not all. Tiie weapons utilized by terrorists,
- usually imported from the East, are n~ost of the t_iwe made to order. Namely, they
are specifically manufactured for terrorist,a an~ qr.iite often do not have a regis-
- tration number. Furthermore, it is definitely known that in countries like Libya
and in some Palestinian camps in Lebanon there are "bureaucrats," usually East
Germans, who wo rk full time at training future t~rrorists.
- [QuestionJ What is Tripoli's ir.terest in upsetting the stability of a country
= like Italy?
[Answer] Qadhdhafi plans to assume on a dominant role in international affairs.
And for him all is fair. but one should not forget two things: first, that
- Libya is only ~ne of the intermediaries in the strategy for creating chaos. Second,
that the Libyan leader could suddenly decide that the strategy of ~romoting
terrorism is not rewarding for him and could abandon this scheme.
[Question] It remains to be seen why countries of Eastern Europe, and Russia in
particular, int end to upset stability in Italy.
_ [Answer] Your country is in a strategic area of utmost importance. Fueling
terrorism there means evaluating the degree of psychological "restraint" of
the population, of the pol9ce, of the armed forces. And this is, obviously, fun-
- damental for the global atrategy of the orier.tal bloc.
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_ , i
_ [QuesCion] Even admitting that the orchestra leader of terrorism is in East~rn
Europe, Red Brigade and Prima L~.nea members are often arrested in France. Haw
do you account for that? '
[Angwer] Up to a few years ago, there was an organization which supported ter- '
- rorists, the Cr~mnuttee agai.nst Repression in Europe, whose members were intellec- ~
- tuals, lawyers, and even priests and ;judges. Later the committee was diss~lved, ~
but the sugporting network remained. And it is is not difficult to know that
- Italian terrorists find hide-outs in Paris and in the Lyon region, Spanish
[terrorists] in the Toulouse regioa and Perpignan and so forth. _
~ [QuestionJ TYie Action directe group, anyway, of �ers protection to Italian, German
_ terrorists, etc.
_ [Answer] True, but Action directe ie infiltrated by the French secret seYVice and ~
, does not have a very active organization, on the contrary... I
~
' [Question] Is it for this reason that Marco D~nat Cattin has been arrested?
- [Answer] Also L-or tt~is reason. I know for sure that Mareo Donat Cattin was "tailed" -
for about a munth. His �aay of setting up appointmen~s with his "contacts" had
upset the working methods of t::~ ~'rench services. He used to give three or four
different appointmen~ts to the sar~ie peY�son in three or four metro stations at a -
- time of light traffic. As the train approached, if he noted that his contact -
was waiting for him he would ge'c off. But if he realized that he was being ~
followed, he pretendeu not to laiow the person waiting fo r him. He would, then, _
meet the person at the next stop. Thus the French police did not manage to cat~h
- the men whom Donat Cattin used to meet. And they deci~ied to arrest him when they -
found out that he was about to leave French territory. ;
~ [Question] Terrorism in most lace~ i^ '
p ~ being hard hit. Is it reasonable to sup-
pose that it is being defeated?
- [Answer] I don't think so; Lerro�ism has entered the psychologi~~al mass reality.
_ Its actions provoke enthusiasm l.ii certain persons who are led tc, imitate the
"masters." I think thatthe future of terrorism does not concern so much the armed
- groups as much as the individuals. It is not outside the rE~alm of possibility
that to~norrow a physicist may succeed in building a 3ma11 atomic bomb or that
a biologist may isolate the germs of a serious infectious disease. And that with
these means one person alone may tlacl~ail a country or an entire population.
Th~ terrorist of tomorrow may, perhaps, be called Dr Strangelove. ~
COPYRIGHT: !)81 Arn~ldo Mondadori Editore S.p.a. Milano
9758 -
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T~RRORISM ITAyy
~
?tED BRIG.~ES TERRORIST PECI INTERVIEWED
- Milan PANORAMA in Italian 16 Feb 81 pp 140-147 -
jInterview with Patrizio Peci by Antonio Carlucci: "Why I Surrenc:ere:
[Text] The workers defeated the Red Brigades, says the
most famous of the "p~~nitents" in his first newspaper
interview. He asks that the government extend the same
- clemency given to the Black Brigades after the war. .
_ Patrizio Peci, Red Brigade column leader in Turin, speaks out after his arrest.
_ He is determined to cooperate with the 3udges. For 11 months Peci talked only
- with the investigating magistrates, the Carabinieri and members af his family:
_ Now he as agreed to answer PANORAMA'S questions.
In his first interview the repentant BR [Red BrigadesJ member ~explains why he has
decided to cooperate with the authorities by denouncing his ex-comrades, disclosing
Cheir hideouts and arms caches, He reconstructs the terrorist activities in
whlcl-~ he himsPlf participated and even those, such as the ambush of Aldo Moro and
" the five men in his party, which he was told about.
~ Peci complai.ns that the phenomenon of collaboration has not been encouraged and
rewaraed by ~he new laws and says clearly that he expects steps will be taken soon
_ to open Che doors of the jail for him and for those who followed his example.
He appeals to the youths w~o are about to take the leap into clandestinity Co
turn back.
But the ex-group leader also talks about the choice he made when he joined the Red ~
Brigades and he tells about the internal life of the terrori5t organization (from
- financial problems to recruiting~-even to summer vacations) the political
problems, and dissension within the BR. -
Question; Why did you ~oin the BR?
- Answer: Because I saw it as the only group that could achieve revolutionary
change of the injustices surrounding me.
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~
Question: How does an underground fighter live, but abova all how much does he -
need and how does he get money?
' Answer: It is impossible to give a precise figure. In any case, everything
- included (salary, rent, travel, clothing) let us say that 1.5 millf=~n lire per
month are needed. The BR e~ropriated property in order to get moi~ey. The -
money was first gathered in a central place and then redistributed. A very :
- careful budget was maintained in which shortages ox waste in general were not
- possible. This was true at the top as Well as among the organization's rank and
file.
Question: You pointed to Mario Moretti as a"spiritual father." What were your ~
relations with him? What influence did Moretti have in the Red Brigades? What
do you think of him today? Do you think Moretti is one of the top BR leaders?
- Answer: I knew Moretti in 1978, but I have never said tie was my spiritual
father. We met in several political meetings; nothing more. The top echelon
of the Red Brigades is the executive committee composed usua2ly of four comrades,
and Mo retti is one of them.
Question: A German terrorist, Hans Joachim Kiein, who years ago gave up the
armed struggle, told a German weekly that as far as he knr~ws MAretti and another
- BR member are reported to have quit the organization and taken refuge abroad. -
Answer: I think those statements are unfo unded.
Question: Why do the BR write so much:' Every time one of their hideouts is
discovered thousands of documents arc found. Your ex~comrades give the idea of -
a gru up o� graphomaniacs who are certain they wi11 pass into history.
~ Answer: It is Che best way to advarce debate throughout the entire organization _
without possib3lity af misunderstanaing and without violating the pr3nciple of -
- compartmentalization.
Question: Even the vacation s~.t,adule was found in a BR base~. How are vacations
organized in the Turin group, accor3ing to what plan, selecting what places,
appropriating how much money?
- Answer: The men went on vacation because in a certain sense they were "somewhat
obliged to." Actually, in summer, in addition to a lack of possible targets,
there was a lack of groups that made it possible to adopt disguises. The _
- irregulars (ed. note: BR members who were not underground, and who of ten worked
on securir~r) went on vacation as they wished; the regulars were given money to
_ rent a house in ~ tourist resort for about a month. -
_ Question: First there were the events of Corrado Alunni, then those of ~
Valerio Morucci and Adrian~ ~',randa, and finally those of the Walter Alasia -
~ group of Milan. Disagreements within the BR seem to be constant. When you were -
a member how were they resolvedY =
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- Answer: Tiie instrument was political debate. If that was not sufficient,
there was a delineation of the split. Then there was ~ wai~ing period, and F
- after that the dissidents were free to go. No one was ever forced to remain
- against his will. The situation was different for one who left without sayin~ _
= anything, carrying with him everything he could.
Question: What did you think as qou participated in murder or while in~uring _
a person? ~
~ Answer: From the human point of view there un~doubtedly was hesitation. But
~ political cansiderations overcame them. According to our understanding of
- politics, murder unfortunately was a form of struggle which, together with other
_ forms, would lead us to a society without exploitation. Therefore we saw murder
- as an act of ~ustice.
Question: Were you ever afraid to die? _
Answer: Fear of death is innate 3n every human being. I am no exception.
- Question: What kind of relations existed between the Red Brigades and the other
terrorist organizations? What did they talk about? -
- Answer: The relations~~the few that existed~~involved political confrontation.
Questivn: Who approved admission of irregulars into the Red Brigades?
Answer: Recruiting was done by other irregulars who already were in the
organization.
Question: But were there tests ~r examfnations to take in passing from the status
of irregular to regular?
Answer: Before becoming regulars, the irregulars were checked out in the practice
- of fighting.
Question: How many terrorists, including regulara and trregulars, can the BR
= count on today?
Answer: Overall about Z00. But my est3atate is made with reservations,
Question: There have always been considerable polemics concerning the international
contacts of the BR. With what foreign terrorist organizations were you in
contact?
Answer: W3th a11 foreign armed organlzations to same extent. But the.relat~.ons
were very unst~bstantial.
Question: How did contacts occur?
Answer: I don~t know because such contacts.were not part o~ my 3ob. ~
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_ Question: What was the purpose of contacts between the BR leaders and agents of
- tr~e Israeli intelligence service?
Answer: There was only one meeting. We immediately tcld the I~raeli agents
that we of the BR were not interested in certain relatians. . .
Question: D~d you ever feel you were a pawn of fiy intalligence agency? ~
Answer: No, absolutely not.
Question: Did you ever think of the possibility of g~tting political or military
aid from any foreign country? ~
Answer: From no co untry, in this phase.
Question: Were any brigade members trained abroad?
` Answer: The BR did not train abroad.
Ques~ion: In ~he attack on the DC headquarters in Piazza Nicosia in Rome, the
BR used a Soti.l.et Kalashnikov machinegun. Special training is needed in that
weapon .
- Answer: There was only one Kalashnikov in the BR, The person who used it _
obviously knew how.
Question: What does General Dalla Chiesa represent for the BR?
_ Answer: Undoubtedly he is one of the most important enemies.
Question: Why, after your arrest, ~lid you ask specifically to meet Aalla Chiesa?
Answer: He seemed to me to be th~.~ best person under the circumstances.
Question: What did you talk aouut during that meeting?
Answer: Of my availability as a"collaborator" because of the crisis in my
_ political thinking. -
- Question: Almost a year has passed s3nce the day of your arrest and the
decision to collaborate with the goverriment. Why did you make that choice?
Answer: ,~~~:~e all because I was convinced of the political failure o~ armed
- struggle~ The .;R began their guerrilla history start3ng with a practice of
armed propaganda that gradually developed. The objective was to sensitize the
proletariat, and then make them active participants. With the passage of years ~
(in the post-Moro period) ~~1.~ process of eonsciousness-raising was considered
started and there was the gradual passage from armed propaganda to a fighting
war. The organization adapted itself pol3tically and ~mil~tarily to this later -
_ phase, but we became aware that the pro~etariat was not participating actively: -
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The �amous mass organizations remained immobile on passive cansensus; in practice
the touted availability for armed struggle was a fiction. That is the historical
defeat of the political hypothesis we practiced: In fact, every premise of
= a Vanguard of the fighting communist organizations falls. In practice, to
- continue along that road means participating in a war by groups.
Question: Was it after you arrived at these conclusions that you decided to
collaborate with the government?
_ Answer: Starting with that assessment, there is no possible halfway. Let me
explain: If the hypothesis of armed struggle is considered correcC, then shooting
. must take place. But if that does not happen, and it is considered that armed
" struggle is damaging for the class itself, then it is necessary to do everythin~
_ possible to stop it. To fail to do it means three things: To be an indirect
- accomplice of future armed actions; to passively permit other comrades to take
the road of armed struggle which is destined to defeat; to create a situation in
which the government can criminalize forms of independent struggle by the working
class, which are not part of a power system, with the pretext that society is
faced by potential "terrorists." Therefore, my decision collaborate remains
- more than valid, so much so that it was a decision made by more than 100
comrades.
' Question: What do you think of the government~s attitude toward those who ;
' collaborate?
Answer: The government has begun to face the possibility of surrender (that is ~
- what it comes to in reference to the use of arms as a form of political struggle)
~ of inembers of the communist fighting organizations by issuing Che Cossiga law
- (ed. note: the measure that provides for reduction of penalties far those who
= cooperate with the law) which was supposed to be the first. sign of its own wi11-
ingness. I say a first sign because that law is not applicable in the least
possible way except in some minor cases~ Nor could the government, to tell the
truth, have done much more at that time because it was in a situation which in
- some ways could have been described as weakness in dealing with the armed
struggle. The present situat3on is different. ~
Question: How?
Answer: Taday the surrender of entire armed sectors :Ls a real fact (among the
most significant examples is the t~tal surrender of Prima linea [Front Line~)
and their willingness to fight those tenacious pErsons who do not want to admit
- defeat of their political plans. Aside from this new situation, it is a
matter of going further, since it is a political error to delay: This impasse :
permits armed organizatior.s (within which undoubtedly there is a collective ,
or subjective debate on tY~z possibility of surrender) to hold on to the comrades
_ who continue in the armed struggle by force of circumstances since they see no
' pract3cal way out.
Question: Did your attitude convince others, or even independently of th3.s,
is there a willingness to specifically collaborate wi.*_hin the oiganizations?
J
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- Answer: Within tr~e fighting orgau:izations there now exists a tendency which
recognizes the political-militar.y defeat of armed struggle. This Cendency, `
however, is not conceived in cleai terms also beca.use there is st.'Sl no reply that :
would cau~e underground groups to defect. -
Question: The kidnaping of Judge Giovanni D'Urso has demonstrated that terrorism ~
- is still capable of striking. Can you say something to those who are about to ~
- take the leap inCa the underground, or who have been engaging in terrorist _
activities~for some time?
Answer: I do not think I can say much to the comrades who sti11 militate in
_ the communist ~fight3ng organizations. They are capable of choosing, of
understanding whether, if beginning with the present situation it is possible
to continue with some hope of victory. Certainly, ta continue fighting only '
to avoid admitting defeat is horriblel Y do not understand their logic in
changing the problem of choice of more than 100 comrades, reducing it to that of
two or three comrades who are branded as "infamous" or "new traitors," when the -
recollection should still be fresh of their long militancy and their generosity
f rom the human as well as political point of view. To thus reduce the problem -
_ and not seriously discuss the validity of armed struggle means that their total -
- annihilation =s merely a question of time. This statement naturally is directed
only to the fighters.
Question: Therefore you believe you can speak only to those who are still on -
the sidelines of underground groups ~
Answer: To tho se comrades who are app~roaching armed struggle~ whose number
cannot be very large, I say, they sh~uld consider it well since they would be
_ going to fight for a cause that cannot be resolved with weapons. ,
Question: What d~ you expect from *hose who must judge you ~or the murders you i
canfessed?
Answer: To see the ~roblem only from the po3nt of view of 3ndividual responsi~ -
- bility is not right, and the ml~ter is not seen in its real terms. Here, first -
of all, it is a matter of having the courage and the socio~political conscience _
- to take steps capable of defeating the fighting organizations and to rescue
many youths who, believing that they can improve this society, have made more
drastic choices. W:Lth new measures, the government would not demonstrate
weakness: Rather, anything but, It is not by chance that the officials who
are most involved in the inveatigations of the armed organizations and all the
police forces, who cert~inly cannot be accused of weakness, are oriented in -
this direc~ion.
Question: But wha~ should these measures be? Are you perhaps thinking o~ -
expatriation or amnesty for the terroriats who have collaborated?
Answer: In ancient Greece~~we are talking about 2000 and more years ago~~- _
every political "crime" was punished by ex31e. But without going too ~ar
- back into history it is sufficient to think o� clemency for the fascist -
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- criminals who committed horrible crimes 40 years ago. We all know whaC positions
= they prer_~ntly hold. ~Great Bxitain uses tr.e ''crown witness." The lattPr
example does nut precisely fit our case, but it can give us an idea of how to
~aso~.v~ the problem without being too shocked. Thc~se who maintain that public _
_ opinion would not understand are in bgd faith. More than an exaggerated searCh
- for punishment, .*_re paople want to live with 3ustice without being surrounded
' by violence, and they wa~t to rescue the youth.
Question: Did you ever r~_ceive direct threats in ~ail?
Answer: No, but that is not the problem. To receive them would be something
pathetic and would demonstrate the impavQr~shment of spirit by those who seek
- to make them. The problem is to guarantee us all that peace and serenity
necessary for survival.
- Question: But then what are the concerns of today?
Answer: They are three. The first: Our particular presence in jail opens a
basic contradiction in th~ institution itself. If we were to be gathered into
a single building, we would become, together with the guards, an attractive
target that would be difficult to defend militarily. If instead we were in
separate sections in any ~ail, there could be a repetion of what happened at
Nuoro.
Question: The second?
Answer: It is the mr~rbid curiosity that surrounds us and that is normally
transformed into a campaig~ of deni.gration against us.
Question: And the third?
Answer: It was not an easy and painless choice to denounce our comrades-in~arms.
_ That choice is the weight we wi~l carry for the rest of our lives, but it was
and is the price, even though very high, that is to be pa3d to avoid further
and useless bloodshed. Therefore, assessing these problems overall, there is a
= collapse of the absurd hypothesis t:~at he who chose t~~ c^'1laborate was motivated
by opportunism. Certainly, each of us desires to be released as soon as _
possible, but this is a distinct human tactor. Who is the prisoner who does
not wish to be released?
- Question: What will you do when you leave pr3son? Are you already thinking =
about how the life of an ex,terrorist would be?
Answer: One problem at a t~me! We want to get out first.
Question: Some weeks ago you appeared for the first time in a court of ~ustice
- as a witness. But you must face the ~udges as a defendant, on the same basis
as your ex-comrades. What wi11 your attitude be?
Answer: My behavior is and wi11 be what it is now, As far as ~ am able, I
will clarify the individual and collective responsibilit3es, And I will once
more clearly explain the reasons for my choice.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Arnoldo Mondadori Editore S. p. A, Milan
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TERRORISM ZTA~Y
ACTIVITY OF ARMENTAN TERRORTSTS
Milan EUROPEO in Italian 9 Feb 81 p 11
jArticle: "The Nitro Is Armenian, But It Has a Russian Accent"]
[Text] We reveal the secrets of a terrorist organizati,on
operating in Italy.
The Italian secrei services say they have nothing to hide, no Soviet connection up
their sl~eves. The other viewpoint is that they are blind only because they do not
want to see. For political reasons, the secret services are said to have decided not
to look too far in the direction of tl~e USSR, Czechoslovaki~: and some Arab movements
- when it comes to finding out wfi at Italian terrorism~s international connections are,
= ~Yho is right? The answer is not easy. But EUROPEO can now state that something more
than mere hints are coming out concerning the Armenian terrorist organization that has
made attacks in Rome and, more recently, in Milan,
1'he English acronym is ASALA, which stands for Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation
of Armenia. It is known as the Secre* Army to "experts." ~t was formed in Lebanon in
December 1974, where more than 200;OC0 Armenians live. It is celebrating its anniver-
- sary on 24 April, when the Turks com~nitted their great massacre of Armenians in 1915.
- But it has also claimed attacks as the 3 October group, because two of. its terrorists
were arrested in Switzerland on 3 Uctober 1980 (Suzy Mahseredhjian, 24, an American
of Syrian origin, and Alex Yenikomeshian, 30, from a good middle-class Lebanese family).
- In April 1980, their chief held a press conference in the old city of Sidon, Lebanon;
he wore a stocking cap to make himself unrecognizable and introduced himself under his
nom de guerre of Hagob Hagobian. He claimed more than 40 attacks in western Europe
alone, including the bombings of th~ Turkish offices in Rome and the attack of 17 April
1980 on the Turkish embassy in Italy, where the bomber was seriously injured.
The connection wit,~ ~he USSR is obvious in ASALA's very program: Turkey is enemy
number one. This enn~ity wr~s so pronounced that for a while the Turkish government
~ was convinced that ASALA was a Greek-Cypriot organization. But a series of investi-
gations disproved that idea. ther, it was discovered that the origins of this
terrorist group were to be found in the serpentine Lebanese civil war and ~n the clash
of factions in that war. The Secret Army had chosen its allies and protectors in two
Palestini.an extremist groups: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FPLP}
of George Habhash (the same one who "lent" missiles to Daniele Pifano) and the Marxist
Popular Democratic Front for tfi e Liberation of Palestine [MPDFLP]. Both groups are
- fellow travelers under the leadersfiip of Yasser Arafat's PLO [Palestine Liberation
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Organization] and axe $upported by t:he pro-Soyiet states o� S~.x~a, L~hya~ and -
South Yemen,
What the Secret Army wants is very explicit: a�ree Republic of Armenia, One did
= exist far a couple af years after tFie Russian revolution, but it was invaded by
the 5oviets, who took 4/5 of the territory, and by the Turks, who took the rest.
'I`he ~ecret Army~s "intermediate objective" is to take this remaining 1~5 �rom
Turkey and give it to tfie USSR. TTiis ddes not displease Nl~scow, and it is a
_ threat to NATO.
To increase the threat, the Se~ret Army fias allied itself with a small grot~p of
Kurds (the Kurdistan Workers' Party), which is also pro~Soviet and bent on lo~ping -
- off a part of eastern Turkey, To complete the picture, both ~roups have su~ported -
the Soviet inva$ion of Afghanistan.
These are not the only indications, Tt is said that there is a lot of money available,
lavish publications (always published in Beirut~ and especia~ly ~ierce hostility �or
the moderate Lebanese Armenian Party, Tasfinak, wfiicfi is financed largely by 1lmmerican
Armenians in California (the state Ronald Reagan is from).
This hostility is supposed to fiave alerted the Italian intelligence services.
_ Suspicions began to solidify when tfiey realized that among the Secret Army's objec~ -
tives were the Ttalian offices o~i the Tolstoy Foundation, an organization dedicated
- to helping refugees from the USSR and which could, in particular, help Soviet Armenian
refugees go to the United States, The Secret Army want to'~lock tliis .route.
Was this what President Pertini was thinking about wlien he linked Turkey and Italy
toget~her as prime targets for foreign-led terrorism, when fie was interviewed on
- French television?
COPYRIGEIT: 1981 Rizzoli Editore
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~
- BCONOMIC FRANC~
= REPORT ON 1980 AIll TO AFRICAN, INDIAN OCEAN TLRRITORIES
Paris MARCIiES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRENEENS in French 27 Feb 81 pp 470-474
[Text] In 1980, low prices fox tropical co~nodities reduced the resources of
. most African countries ~t a time when their ~etroleum purchases have become
more expensive. This imbalance is added to the permanent one, caused by a
series of poor harvests, some unsuitable economic structures and ambitious
programs. As a result, several countries have payueent problems, often
_ exacerbated by excessively short-term loans.
_ In a report of its 1980 ~ctivities, the CCCE [Central Fund for Economic -
_ Cooperation] noted that, for this reason, in addition to the conventional sid
granted as discounted loans, whi~h increased 25 percent during the fiscal
year, it also expanded i.ts long-term "second window" loans. At the request of
the French government, it has made available through this window exceptional
aid amounting to 536 million francs in the form of three loans to Senegal, -
Upper Volta and the Tvory Coast. The loans made in 1980 totaled 2.6 billion
francs, as compared ~aith 1.6 billion in 1979. In addition, operations have
been extended to Ghana, Angola and Mozambique. _
. Growth of Operations
a) Commitments
Since 1975, the volume of commitments for soft-te~a~ loans from the Central -
Fund increased an average of 26 percent annually, so that in 6 years, it has _
increased fourfold in current francs and 2.5 percent in constant frsncs. It
amounted to 1.5 billion francs in 1980 and its ceiling was raised to
2 billion in 1981. ~
Evolution of First Window Commitments from -
1960 to 1980 in Constant Francs
- (Index of 100 in 1980)
Average 1960-1964 41 1974 40 .
Average 1965-1969 44 1975 50
- Average 1970-1974 41 1976 61
Average 1975-1979 69 1977 69
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- 1978 79 1980 100
1979 89 1981 119 (estimate)
- Second wi.r~d~w loans were offered in 1975 to make available, at conditions
similar to the market, long-term additional resources to the most advaiiced
nations or to finance very profitable operations. After an extr.emely br~.sk
start, these loans decreased appreciably. They more than doubled in 1980,
_ amounting to almost 1 billion francs.
Including joint financing venturAs, in real terms, the overall volume of
- Central Fund commitments, stable from 1976 to 1979, rose 46 percent in 1980;
it has about quadrupled since 1974.
- Evolution of Second Window Commitments and Overall
Commitments From 1974 to 1980, in Constant Francs
(Index 100 in 1980)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Second Window Commitments 24 79 61 58 41 100
Total Commi.tments 23 39 59 66 70 69 100
The fo~.lowing indicates this evolution in millions of current fra.ics:
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Loans:
First Window 650.9 800.4 965.6 1,200.4 1,499.5
Second Window 613.6 521. 521. 399.5 1,094.5
Joint Financing 7.8 17.9 6.5 2.6 7.
Total 1,272.' 1,339.3 I,493.1 1,602.5 2,601.
b) Payments
The increase in commitments a~ain affected the volume of payments in 1980. The
_ latter rose to 1,65 0 billion francs, partially because of the effect of the
immediate payment of 38 0 million as exceptional aid. On the other hand,
because of the 5 year grace period usually given to borrowers, reimbursements
will not rise uztil ~98Z. Net payments, almost 1.4 billion francs, increased
83 percent in 1980 (in miLlions of francs):
1975 1976 1g77 1978 1979 1980*
_ Payments 359 582 793 991 1,016 1,647
Reimbursements 230 243 241 253 259 261
Total Payments 129 339 552 738 757 1,386
*Estimate d figures
The Central Fund, whose net resources were reduced prior t~ 1975 because its
operations remained stable, ras again recome an essential source of capital for
Africafl nations at a time when they are having very difficult treasury
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problems, both in external financing and their public finances.
Intiernational bank loans, becau~e they are often paid immediatel3~, in recenC -
years added to the euphoria of countries with substantial resources because
of high coffee and cocoa prices. Paid in installments as the projects are
being carried out,Central Fund loans then seemed very limiting. In reality, -
they were an assurance of resources during less affluent periods.
This assurance remains: in late 1980, the 4.2 billion francs committed but
still to be paid guarantees the continuity of Central Fund financing in the
- coming, apparently austere years. `
As of 31 December 1980, the vol.ume of C�ntral Fund cmuunitments, including
what still must be paid out, a~ounted to 10.3 billion francs, up 30 percent.
Cooperation Tailored to the Situation in Borrower Countries
Loan Conditions
In recent years, the Central ~und has ~dapted the conditions for its assistance _
to the various countries involved an~i the programs financed. In 1980, it
established new operating methods which deal with the inadequate national
resources in some countries where it operates. Four types of loans are made: -
Normal, first window loans--1,343.8 million francs;
Soft-term first window loans: 155.7 million francs;
Normal , second window loans--558.5 million francs; .
Exceptional, second window loans--536 million francs.
a) Despite steep interest rates on the market, the normal, first window loans =
have, because of the French government's intervention, been approved with more -
- favorable conditions than last year's--average rate of interest was 5.8 percent,
for an average length of 16 years, 4 months.
b) As in 1979, a portion of soft-term loans, with an interest rate below
2 percent (1.5 percent for 10 years and 2 percent thereafter) for 30 years, with
- a 10 year grace period, was again reserved for th~ poorest countries or those _
experiencing exceptional difficult ies. E ight countries have benefited--
the Central African Republic, Upper VoZta, Niger, Mali, Senegal and the
Comoro Islands. _
c) Normal second window loans have been granted for an average length of
almost 14 years, at the rate French national credit charges for its industrial
financing. The rate is, in theory, decided when the contract is signed, but
borrowers have the option of chosing the rate in effect at the time of
payment.
Because of the situation in African countries in 1980 and the high cost of money,
19 or most second window loans were mixed with first w indow aid to attain an
interest rate compatible with the projects' potential for profits.
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Most financing dor~e in this manner involved energy, industrial and highway
projects in Zaire, Gabon, Cameroon, Madagascar, Senegal and Guinea,
d) France made exceptional aid available to African countries because of
their difficulties in 1980. In the beneficiary countries, ~his aid entailed an
effort at ec onomic and financial restructuring, to lay the foundations
graciua 11y for better development, within the programs set up with the IMF
[International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank.
The Central Fund was involved in related studi~s and, in this area, made -
available exceptional long-term aid, from its own resources or with the
French government's guarantee.
Three countr ies benefited in 1980: Senegal received 80 milTion and 200 million
francs; the Ivoxy Coast, 206 million and Upper Volta, 50 million. The
80 million franc loan to Senegal and the 50 million franc loan to Upper Volta
were put together w ith reduced interest rates from FAC [Aid and Cooperation
Fund] which lowered the rate to a level similar to first window loans.
Area of Activity
Although several of the most developed countries in its area had difficulties
in 1980, the continuing fundamental problem for the Central Fund is the ~ ~
- extreme poverty of most African peoples south of the Sahara. In all, the -
34 countries where it operates had, in 1978, for a population of almost
= 150 million inhabitants, an average income of $305.00. Fourteen countries with
80 million inhabitants have an average income of $180.00 and 8 countries with
30 million inhabitants have an average income of $270.00. For this reason,
the Central Fund has, since 1978, substantially increased aid to the least- _
developed countries, and increased it by two-thirds in~1980.
The Central Fund has started to ].end again to the Centxal African Republic
(50 million francs) and expanded their operations in Zaire (235 million in _
1980), Burundi (60 million), Sierra Leone (32 million) and Mauritius
~65 million). The new c~untries have increasingly become borrowers, even ~
though the Ivory Coast (421 million), Senegal (409 million) and Camero~n
(313 million) head the list of countries financed.
Sectors Financed and Methods of Financing
The very limited development of African nations in the last decade means that
most aid should be allocated to projects providing real growth. Increased
production, which eases the old debt load, is one requirement for financial
equilibrium.
- In 1980, the Central Fund i~mains committed to its priority of encouraging
product ion in rural areas, although it also finances modernization of infra-
structures when they hinder economic expansion.
The Central Fund, in 1980, allocated a sizeable portion of its aid to -
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rehabilitation programs--nearly 500 million francs were allocated for such _
operations because in some countries affected by economic disorganization, -
it was necessary and more profitable to restore and modernize installations
than to begin new projects. _
- Finally, since inadequately prepared programs often limited the expansion of
financing when quality implementation and management of the planned installations �
. were needed, five new study projects or sectorial programs were financed
according to procedures established in 1979. A personnel training section
and a maintenance of installations section were included in many loan
proposals, especially those involving transportation networks. In all,
113 groups of experts were sent from headquarters for 1,490 days to assist
agencies overseeing the effectiveness of operations financed.
There were 82 such operations in 1980, plus 5 joint ventures and 4 exceptional
loans to supplement the financing of some 40 projects.
Agroindustrial, electrificatian and road investments were particularly large
in 1980. -
_ Geographic Breakdown of Central Fund Aid
(Loans and Joint Ventures)
(Classification by countries, by ave~age income in 1978)
_ (In millions of francs) ~ -
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Tota3.
(5 years)
From $110.00 to $220.00 .
; Niger 134.7 113.7 81.7 245.7 110.1 685.9
Upper Volta 38.3 40.7 17.1 85.8 187.8 369.5
Zaire 20. 22.6 10. 12.2 234.8 299.6 .
Mali 55.1 44.3 42.3 57.5 42.3 241.5 -
Guinea 1.3 23.2 151.3 175.8
Rwanda 5. 28. 1.2 54.3 30.5 119.
Burundi 3.9 1.8 15. 60. 80,7
Chad 50.6 11.6 12.8 .2 75�2 -
Sierra Leone 15. 31.5 46.5
Miscellaneous (G) .3 (2) 4.4 (1) 4.8 (2) 6. 29.1
(3) 2.7 (3) 2.4 (4) .1 (3.) 8.4 ~ -
Total 310.6 267.7 188.2 513.6 862.7 2,122.9
~ FOOTNOTES
- 1. Cape Verde
2. Comoro Islands
3. Guinea-Bissau
4. Somalia ~
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Geographic Breakdown of Central Fund Aid
_ 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Total -
(5 yeara)
From $220.00 to 330.00 ~ -
_ Madagascar 2.9 6. 149. 94. 131.9 383.8
Togo 72. 3.2 32. 9.4 60.4 177.
_ Mauritania 158.9 6.6 1.3 166.8
Benin 13. 210 39.9 40.1 38. 152.
- Central African Rep. l0 50. 51.
Haiti 20a
_ 20,
Total 87.9 31,2 379.8 170,1 281.6 950.6
From $330.00 to 550.00
Cameroon 267.6 24108 453.8 314.3 313. 1,590.5
Senegal 83.3 14404 185.4 140.1 408.6 941.8
Congo 27. 42. 55.7 37.5 162.2
Djibouti 32. 32.
_ Total 277.9 386.2 661.2 542.1 759.1 2,726.5
More than $55~, ~0
Ivory Coast 342.1 410.5 202.6 174.2 42104 1,550.8
Gabon 104.4 160. 73.4 147. 178. 662.8
_ Mauritius 33. 47. 3.1 54. 85. 202.1
Seychelles 23.2 3. 13.1 39.2 -
_ Total 479.5 640.7 282.1 375.2 677.5 2,455.
General Total 1,255.9 1,325.8 1,491.3 1,601. 2,580.9 8,254.9
{Excluding multicountry operations)
Sectorial Break",wn of Central Fund Loans in 1980 .
(In millions uf L-rancs and pe rcentages)
_ Average
1980 1976-1980
(Millions of (Percentage) (Percentage)
- francs) -
Rural development 782.3 30.1 30. -
Mining 10~. 3 4. 2 7, 5
Industry-handicrafts 205.5 7.9 10.9 ~
' Electricity 463.1 17 . 7 17 , g
Tourism 83.1 3.2 3,
- Productiv~ Sectnr Total 1,642.3 63.1 69.2
Railroads 59. 2.3 7, :
_ Roads, ports, airports 481.3 '18.5 9.5
- Telecommunications 7.10,9 g, l g.
_ Urban equipment 106. 6 4.1 2,,5
Total public equipment 857.8 33. 27,
Total financial operations 100.5 3.9 3.8
General total 2,601. 100. 100.
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1) Rural development was allocaCed 782 mi]_lion francs. With 30 percent of
the commitments, rural development has, by far, remaine the largest area of
- activity. Low-interest, 30 year loans, were granted on a priority basis to
raising food crops, breeding fish and developing forests.
- Large programs to process local commodities are being carried out in ~
Madagascar and Zaire. E_
Several of the projects financed are experimental or, as in breeding fish,
the application of the results of previous pilot projects, As an example,
a program to mechan~ze peasant farming will experiment, on a limited number of
farms, with vehicles adapted to the savana area; a pilot project will encourage
small animal, short-cycle breeding firms and a program to dig 400 wells will
help determine how to organize a village water supply system rationally.
~ The purpose of a reforestation project, financed with the World Bank, is Co
achieve better forest management.
2) Mines, industries, electricity and tourism will receive 860 million francs.
_ Loans for generating and transmitting electric energy, especially to develop
hydroelectric resources were much larger in 1980 than in 1979.
- The following were the major industrial programs: expansion of an aluminium _
factory in Guinea, mining a tin deposit in Zaire, expansion of a cement -
- factory in Senegal, expansion of an oil refinery in Madagascar, doubling the _
- Poubara hydroelectric installations and hydroelectric development in _
Champagne, Mauritius.
Moreover, PROPARCO, the firm set up by the Central Fund to promote and finance
medium-size firms in Africa began to operate on a regular basis in 1980. French
and African industrialists studied more than 100 proposals and 13 were _
approved for financing. PROPARCO commitments rose, by the end of the year, to -
8.6 million francs for an estimated total investment of 244 million francs.
3) Public works received 858 million francs. In Central Fund pledges, roads
and truck routes in 1980 took on exceptional importance beside the more
frequently financed r~:ilroads, ports, airports and telecommunications.
_ Cameroon thus obtained, from the first and second windows, 220 million francs
for a heavy truck route Douala-Edea-Yaounde, which will allow for regular
traffic among its major cities. More than 100 million francs have been
alloca~ced to airports so they can accommodate new heavy-load cargo planes.
- Joint Financing
Through joint financing, the Central Fund collates its experience with that of
. other institutions for development to benefit borrower countries. The
- development of restructuring programs in 1980 allowed for renewed contacts
with the French ministries, the IME and the World Bank group. -
_ In 1980, under the heading of its ordinary operatians, the Central Fund made .
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loans amounting to 2,058 million francs and had an average participation of
36.5 percent in financing investments of 5.64 billion francs.
_ The principal partners in these joint financing ventures were: public
_ bilateral aid (380.8 million francs or 6.7 percent~ especially Arab financing;
multilateral aid (937.3 million or 1~.6 percent), especially the World Bank group
(463.6 million) and the EEC (EDF [European Developmenic Fund] and the BEI
[European Investment Bank] - 269.7 million);grants (747.4 million or 13.3
percent, 176.6 million from the FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund] and 98.4 million
- from the EDF)~export credits (775.8 millio~ or 13.~ percent); medium-term
= local loans (127.2 million or 2.3 percent); and finally, its own funds
- (616.6 million or 10.9 percent).
Loans Granted by the Central Fund in 1980 to African and Indian Ocean Nations
(In 1,000 French francs)
I - Productiv~ sectors
11 Rural develoament 520,280
a) Food crops 94,270
Non-irrigated:
- Ivory Coast: National experimental pro~ram to 30,000
mechanize peasant agriculture
- Upper Volta: Program to spread draft animal 2,000
cultivation during the 1980-1981 harvest
Niger: Integrated rural development in the 12,000
Dosso Department
Niger: Integrated rural development in the 18,000
Maradi Department
Irrigated:
Upper Volta: Development of the irrigated pilot 2,600
area of Bagre (supplementary financing)
- Upper Vol~ : Expansion of the Lanfiera truck 20,000
garden area
Mali: Building of the Costes Canal and re?ated 7,000
projects by the Office of i�i:.ber (supplementary financing)
_ Niger: Feasibility study about using the underground 2,670
water of the Tarka Va;.ley for agricultu:al purposes
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b) Export crops 62,400 -
Cotton:
- Central African Republic: Repair of roads and paths 6,.000 -
in cotton-growing areas in the center of the country
(north of Bangui) `
~Central African Republic; Emergency program to 24,000 -
deve lop cotton production (SOCADA)
Rubber :
Ivory Coast: Rubber tree planting program in _
Rapides Grah in southwest Ivory Coast, third phase
- SAPH [African Rubber Plantation Compa~y]:
First window 18,000 _
Second window 6,000
Misce llaneous:
- Upper Volta: Experimental cashew ~rowing pxogram 8,400
in southwest Upper Volta `
c) Stock raising 69,680
Ivory Coast: Project to develop cattle raising in the 40,000
north of the country (second phase)
Ivory Coast: Pilot pro ject to raise short- -
cycle animals in southeast Ivor_y Coast: -
First window. 11,200
Second window 8,000
Ivory Coast: Making medium-tarm loans to stock 6,200
raisers involved in the preceding project
- Mauritius: Pilot projects in stock raising and 3,000
the agriculture sector
Mauritania: Integrated assistance plan for Gorgol 1,280
stock raisers
d) Agroindustries; 244,530
Cereals:
Guinea-Bissau: Technical and training aid for the 8,400
Cumere agroindustrial complex
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Mali: Construction of a multipurpose mill and a .
- fectory for livesCock feed at Koulikoro _
First window 10,000
Second window 5,000
Cotton:
Madagascar: 1980-1981 program to develop cotton 39,000
production: factories to gin cotton
Togo: Construction of two factories to gin 24,000
~ cotton at Lama-Kara and Notse =
_ Sugar: _
Mali: Studies and preliminary operations to set up 3,300 -
a sugar ref inery
Zaire: Enla.�ge the sugar refinery of the Sugar
Company of Kwilu N'Gongo -
First window . 29,900
3econd window 85,100 '
Miscellaneous:
Cameroon: Expansion of the Soca-palm factories 22,000
~ which produce cooking oil -
Ivory Coast: Construction of a cc+''fee processing 10,000
facility at Aboiso (Unicafe) (SPcond window)
Rwanda: Construction of a quinine sulfate 6,000
extraction plant at Rirambo (1