JPRS ID: 9633 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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~
JF'RS L/9633
27 March 1981
~i/est E u ro ~ Re o rt
p p
CFOUO 18/81)
_ F~~$ FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORl~AATIO~1 SERVICE
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NOTE
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JPRS L/9633 ~
~ rta~ ui~ .t ~ t~ 1
WEST EUROPE REPORT ~
(FOUO 18/81)
CONTENTS
ECONOMIC
- FRANCE
Nation's Space Technology Export Policy Projected
(Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 7 Feb 81) ooo.,.,.,.o....o,.
ITALY - - - . _
Concern Over EEC~s Agricultural Budget Cuts
(IL SOLE-24 ORE, 23 Jan 81) 4
SPAIN
Official Forecast: 0.5 Percent Growth, Two Million Unemployed
(C.A,NIBIO 16, 2 Feb 81) o ........................~......o..o.o. $
Government Works on VAT, Last Obstacle to EEC Entry in 1983
(CA,MBIO, 16 Feb 81) o..........o.....~....o..o.......o...o.o. 11
POLITICAL
FRANCE
Commentary on U.S. Quest for Support Over E1 Salvador
(Francois Schlosser; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 2-8 Ma.r 81) ,,.o. 14
Purpose, Long-Range Imnlications of Recent P~F Actions
(L'EXPRESS, 21-27 Feb 81; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
23 Feb-1 Mar 81). .................a.....o...............o.o.. 17
Recent Events Summarized, by Robert Schneider
Campaign Related Purposes, by Thierry Pfister
'Fascist' Tendencies, by Jean-Francois Revel
- ' a- LIII - WE - 150 FOUO]
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New PCF Tactics Vis-a-Vis Drugs, Imnigrants Noted
(LE~ LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION, 16 Feb 81} ,a,,,,,,a,ooo,,,,,, 25
SPAIN
Main Parties on Future RelaCions With Rea.gan Admi.nistration
(CAMBIO, 19 Jan 81) ..........oooa,.ooo....eoaaaooo.o..oooo.0 26
GENERAL
FRANCE
Ariane Launch Schedule Projected to 1985
~ (Pierre Langereux; AIR & COSMOS, 21 Feb 81) ,,,,..,,o � o0 28
-b-
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_ ~CONOMIC FRAIvCE
NATION'S SPACE TECHNOLOGY EXPORT POLICY PROJECTED
' Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 7 Feb 81 p 47
[Article by Pierre Langereux: "Atnbitions of National Space Export Policy"]
[Text] The results of a recent CNES [National Space Studies Center] survey of about
15 public agencies and French manufacturing companies'~ concerning space exports
~ wer~ disclosed by Jean-Gerard Roussel, CNES director of international and industrial
affairs, during the second meeting of the Space Club, which was held on 3 February
1981 in Paris under the chairmanship of Michel Bignier, ESA [European Space Agency]
director of space transportation systems.
French space exports for 1974-79 were relatively modest but encouraging Fr 50 million
for space equipment sold to various countries, particularly with the help of Prospace;
Fr 60 million for French equipment in Intelsat 5 satellites; Fr 70 million for the
French portion of Ariane launchers sold to Intelsat by the ESA and Arianespace;
and about Fr 150 million annually in the last few years from the market for tele-
- communications ground stations marketed by Telspace--thus representing most of the
French space exports in the seventies.
A definite increase in space exports has been evident since 1980, particularly with
the firm order for two more Ariane launchers by Intelsat and the options taken up
by other customers (for a rotal of Fr 5 million). The market for ground stations for
- receiving and processing data from observation satellites (SPOT [civilian observation
satellite] and LANDSAT [Earth Resources Technology Satellite]) also opened up last
year with SEP sales to Brazil and Bangladesh and two or three other. deals already
well uncierway. French industry also appears to be in a good position for bidding
on Arabsat telecommunications satellites.
= The French space industry expects even much better things in the future.
The report of the aeronautics and space group of the 8th Plan Industrial Commission
(1981-85) anticipates: Fr 4 to 7 billion for launchers, with Fr 1 to 2 billion
in exports; Fr 7 to 9 billion for satellites, with Fr 1.5 to 4 billion in exports;
*CNES, Arianespace, Prospace, Telspace, Satel-Conseil, MATRA [Mechanics, Aviation
and Traction Company], AEROSPATIALE ;National Industrial Aerospace Company], SEP
[European Propellant Company], Thomson-CSF [Thomson-General Taireless CompanyJ, Sodern,
EMD [Marcel Dassault Electronics], Crouzet, Souriau, ~ODETEG [Technical Studies and
General Enterprises Company].
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Fr 4 to 7 billion for ground stations, with Fr 3 to 6 billion in exports; or a
total of Fr 15 to 23 billion, with about half from foreign markets.
The CNES study for 1980-90 in turn notes "very likely" markets amounting to Fr 25
billion for satellites (out of a total of Fr 40 billion), with Fr 11 billion outaide
the United States and Japan, between Fr 2 and 3 billion for various goods and ser-
vices ar.~d Fr 0.7 billion for ground tracking equipment. The potential market for
launchers is estimated at 25 launchings in Europe (with a potential of 46), 20 in
the United States (out of 30) for civilian launchings only (1985-9~J) and 24 (out
of 45) for other countries and Intelsat. Direct television represents 4 to 18 launch-
ings (outside of Europe, the United States ar.d the USSR) and scientific sa.tellites
1 to 2 launchings per year.
Relying on the captive intra-European market, the European space industry could,
as a"relatively ambitious" but still accessible goal, be thinking of taking 25 to
30 percetit of the world market despite the already keen competition of the American
industry, which will be followed by that of the Japanese space industry within 5 years.
France's goai is to double its turnover for space operations through exportation.
"The French space effort, which naw amounts to about Fr 3 billion annually, should
~ have great success with exports," CNES General Director Yves Sillard stated, in
- the case of launchers (Ariane) and Satellites (SPOT, TDF 1, Telecom 1, etc.).
This ambitious space exports policy rests on five "pillars": 1. Improvement of
technical credibility by implementing the national plan for operational systems.
2. Increasing the competitiveness of products through innovative capabilities, appro-
priate technical assistance (through Satel-Conseil), an "aggressive" financing policy
and appropriate industrial organization (increasing the prime contractor's tasks,
mass production, etc.). 3. An effort to promote French space technology among poten-
tial users by every means possible (Prospace, companies and perhaps an "industrial
trade structure suited to exportation") and through geographic, regional and national
approaches (CNES experience in Africa). 4. Development of industrial capabilities
through a research and development program in keeping with ambitions. The CNES has
thus proposed that the French Government triple the research and developmEnt effort
for space, which will probably increase from Fr 35 to 120 million in the next few
~ years. The completion of a new major space program such as SOLARIS would support
such a move. 5. Dev~lopment of an "ind.ustrial marketing strategy" suited to poten-
tial markets classified into five categories--Europe, the United States, major inter-
national organizations (Intelsat, Inmarsat, NATO), new space powers (China, Japan,
Canada, Tndia), and other countries.
Such an effort obviously requires everyone's participation: publ~ic authorities,
industrial and space organizaCions, prime contractors and subcontractors.
Unfortunately, a certain amount of antagonism has been noted between prime contractors
and out�itters of equipn?ent. In response to the appeal for "unity" made by prime
contractors, who want to see their outfitters patticipate more actively in the com-
mercial effort required by the competitian, subcontractors expressed "grave concern"
about certain practices of leaders, which put them at a disadv,antage (competitive
practices, etc.),
~ 2
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In addition to these difficult relations between large and small companies, there
are also industrial reorganization projects on the national or European level,
recommended by some for thQ sake of efficiency, competitiveness, etc.
_ J.-G. Roussel also pointed out the "relative industrial spread," which results in
a European prime contractor accounting for only 25 to 30 percent of the turnover
from satellites, whereas in the United States a"major firm" in the space industry,
such as Hughes Aircraft, takes in 60 to 80 percent of the cost of a program tnrough
its subsidiaries.
_ The CNES, which has expressed its support for prime contractors, recommends a"reorgani-
zation of operations" in favor of large manufacturers, w~iile confining outfitters to
- "precise .slots."
It is "necessary to combine and coordinate the positions and operations of induStrial
prime contractors," according to Yves Sillard, who nevertheless does not believe
that large "industrial reorganizations" are appropriate.
_ On the other hand, we are seeing ne.w trarsatlantic partnerships being formed between
- American and French firms, particularly in the area of telecommunications, such
as MATFtA with Harris or AEROSPATIALE with Ford Aerospace.
As AEROSPATIALE Director of Ballistic and Space Systems Pierre Usunier said: "There
is only one kind of good cooperation, the kind that succeeds!"
COPYRIGHT: A. & C. 1981
ii,si5
cso: sloo
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ECONOMTC ITALY -
CONCERN OVER EEC'S AGRICULTURAL BUDGET CUTS
Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 23 Jan 81 p 3
_ Competition Is the Unly Recipe
[Text] A specialized Burssesl bulleta.n camments on the upcoming cuts which would
be proposed ~n expenditures for the support of agricultural markets in order '
to reduce by approximately 1,000 billion lire the community's annual total
expenses, of whicTi, it may be necessary to point out, the farmer's burden is
about 70 percent.Tn the same article, it was emphasized that, among the products
for which,reduct~ons or liznitations in subsidies were forecast, there were many of
prevalent or even exclusive Italian interest, like wheat, tomatoes, olive oil,
cattle (witi~ respect to the reward for cattle production), fruit products (with
respect ta the reward for marketing), tobacco, and wine.
Even if the possibility of reducing Common Ma.rket expenses sustained for various _
reasons in support of agricultural workers had already been suggested numerous
times in the recent period, the news worried the representatives of national
agricultural policies, especially in view of the delicate present e~onomic
condition.
As is well known, and has been stressed repeatedly from several parts for a
~ long time, the serious gap between the rate of increase in the prices of products
sold by farmers (8 percent according to IRVAM for the period from November 1978
to November 1980 and for all products) and that, remarkably higher and more in -
line with the general increase in the c~st of living, of the price of products
purchased, has created and is creating considerable difficulties in numerous -
- agr~cultural sectors.
'L'he net decline in real terms of agricultural prices (which, besides, turned
- into a very modest advantage for the consumer, since, in the same period from
_ November 1979 to November 1980 the consumer price index of food products increased `
by 16.6 percent namely at a rate not too different from that of the general
, consumer price index, which was 21.5 percent) up to r.ow has oniy had ma.rgina.l
effects on production and on foreign trade. Accordin~ to some recent, still
preliminary, INEA [National Institute for Agrarian Studies] projections, the
gross marketable agricultural production increas~d, in fact, approximately 2
percent in 1980, a not at all negligible result, particular?y in consideration
of the exceptional increases which took place ir. the 2 previous years.
i -
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= TfLe agricultural :Eood products deficit Lhen, appears, on the basis of the
Nove~mber figures, much less alarming (as we predicted, moreover, in a previous
article ~n tfiis paper) tizan tfiat previously announced by several press agencies
end our export problems are partially attributable to specif ic interrelated
situations (wine, preserves, vegetable and fruit produts, etc.).
Obviously, in the short term, it is essential to reduce or e"li~inate the
differences between the rate of increase in prices received by farmers for the
sale of tfieir products and that of the prices of goods purcha~ed, by raising the
former or lowering the latter (not an easy task). Furthermore, it will be up to
our delegation at Brussels, and in particular to the new minister of agriculture,
"to win" the best possible conditions for the Italian products. But to be
able to formulate, or even just to outline, a broad discussion, it is essential
to try to understand the contingencies which will prevail in the coming years for
Italian agriculture. It is our opinion that the situation ~f "great shargage"
may continue for a rather long time.
In the first place, it is probably that, at least during the next five-year period,
for the ma~ority of food markets, outside of contingency situations which may
- alwa.ys occure, conditions of excess supply over real deinand will prevail without,
therefore, part~cular pressures on grices. This opinion (totally contrary to
that whi.ch appea.red in Monday's CORRIERE DELLA SERA) is expressed also by FAO in
_ its publication "FAO Agricultural Commodity Projections 1975-1980", issued in 1979,
= which notes that the only products for which there may be structural conditions of
shortage in the supply side are those of natural rubber and fish. A correctiona
even quite sizable, in this state of affairs could occure, however, with the
defusion of "energy crops" (destined for the production of alcohol or other fuel,
as an alternativa to those derived from oil}.
I This phenomenon, however, may materialize (and only under specific conditions of
the oil market) in a substantial way, such as to reduce noticeab~y the supply of
agricultural products destined to be used as foodstuff only in the distant future.
Even if it is for a wide range of products, the EEC sets the levels of Common
Market prices independently from those in effect in world markets, it is clear
that, in the long run and for numerous reasons, the immobility in real terms of
world prices will tend to halt the increase of those of the Common Market.
Another consideration, more direct but in part connected to the previous one,
concerns the total amount that the EEC will, in the coming years, be prepared to
~ allocate to support agricultural markets. It is probably that the tendency
toward containment will go on; apart from Great Britain's position, which leans
in this dirPCtion, there is also the conviction that, at this point, European
farmers are no longer in a disadvantaged categary, needing, therefore, additiona.l
� subsidies (and the same, luckily, can be said for a large part of Italian farmers).
Furthermore, the recent entry of Greece i~to tb.e EEC and that of Spain, coming
so,ner or later, will influence the level of support available for Mediterranean
products (wheat, wine, olive oil, tomato~:s) presumably causing a reduction of unit
- prices (it is inconceivable, for instance, that in the future such a heavy
_ subsidy may be maintained for the transforrla.tion of tomatoes, when the Italian
production will be augmented by that o~ Spain and Greece.
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_ Finally, it muet be Laken into account that, for all those products for which the
qual~ty factor plays a ralevant role ~and, in particular, for produce and wine),
there w111 be increased campetiti.on from Mediterranean countries (Greece, Spain,
Algeria, Morocco, etc.), as well as from importing countries (as is. the case
of the United States for wine} wizici~ are gradually acquiring the necessary pro-
duction and marketing capabilities.
Therefore, there will still be ample room, both in the EEC and the world markets
for our agricultural products, but the possibility of fighting the competition
of foreign producers will depend, in growing measure, on the competitiveness of
our products from the standpoints of quality and price, since th~ Common Market's
protective conditions will diminish.
- A possible reaction to the consequences of the scenario described above is to
- limit ourselves to increasing the already high subsidies which, domestically,
are ueing carried out in supnort of agriculture, in order to counterbalance the
decrease in those of the Common Market.
Tfii:s is not, in our opinion, the correct strategy (needs for containment will be
~elt, a~qong other things, also in the domestic budget of the Italian government).
It is desirable, on the contrary, For public authorities to encourage, not to
oppose, tite existing movements for the formation of a more competitive agri-
cultural mark,et that is suhject to international competition.
For a long time Italian agriculture has been, due to the existing legislation,
a protected sector characterized by the si.multaneous nresence of efficient and
technologically advanced enterprises and by marginal enterprises (not only in
depressed areas), in which it is extremely difficult to introduce new productive
forces.
T~Te believe, therefore, that the time has come to begin favoring (in a fashion
xequired by the situation, of course) a greater mobility of resources (for example,
reducing the rigid conditions for farm leasings), in order to encourage the
formation of new efficient enterprises, in addition to those already existing,
- capa'ule of competing in international markets and of challenging fareign Froducers
- in domestic markets. Greater attention should be given, in chosing enterprises
worthy of receiving financial help, to considerations ef a productive nature,
often unfortunate]_y not regarded as prime considerations by public administrators
in charge of managing subsiaies to agriculture.
_ A move in the opposite direction may succeed in freezing some marginal situations
but could, in the not teo distant future, displace ample ~ector~ of Italian
agriculture.
7n r_onclusion, we believe it is true that agriculture is still a different sector
requiring special trea trnent, but just as true is *_ha .fact that it is becoming
a less different sector, for which we would be i~clined to apply the rules
wluch exist in the rest of the economic ~ystem.
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1 ~18~1'Ibl~it1011@ ~1 f'~dlt0 ~
. delle far~nigiie nel~ 1g79
Y. Pos~zione nella professia~e del capofamigba
20 ,
1e ~ 1. Distribution of family income
~6 ~ in 1979; by employment sector
- 12 of head of household
2. Agriculture
; 3. Business and Craf ts 15
.
~o ; , 4. Source: Bank of Italy
.
g ~ 5. millions of lire
:
8 ~.r 2 s Agncoltu~~
_ q 3 ..uu.. Industna e'Art~gianato
2 ~~t
_ ,
0
_ 0�2 2~4 4�6 6�8 B�10 10~12 12�15 oltre
4 Fonte~ Banca d' itaba , S mihorn c~ bre
_ ~ Evoluzione
della funzione di produziao~e
dell'agricdtura
~ 2p Indice 1970 c 100
6
Investiment~ 3 ~
- t40 Consumi intermedi 4
Val. ass.lordo at conto de~ fatton~
.......Ptoduztone brda vaxfibtlefi
_._Addett~7
Sup. agr~cota utdizzata 8 ~ ~Y.
120
= r--""y~ 1. Evolution of the production
tto ~ .���'i~~ function of agriculture
2. Base year 1970 equals 100
= e,...~�/
~o0 3 . Inves tments
4. Tntermediate consumptions
90 S. Reported gross value
~ 6. Gross marketable production
7. Labor
- 80
8. Farm land utilized
~0 9. Source: ISTAT jCentral
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 7B 79
9 Fonte El~bor,~z~o~ dah ISTAT (i nu~nen ind~ce fanno nter~ - Statistics Institute] (index
men~o all'evoiu~~or,~ de~ prezn 19i0) numbers refer to the evolution
_ of 1970 prices)
CO~YR~GIiT: 1981 Editrice Il Sole-24 Ore s.r .1.
4758
CSO: 31Q4
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ECONOMIC SPAIN
OFFICIAL FORECAST: 0.5 PErtCENm GRdWTH, T(nTTO MILLION UNEMPLOYED
- Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 2 Feb 81 pp 42,43
~Text~ The relentless advance of unQmployment continues. During 1980, 438,100
jobs were lost in Spain, although unemployment increased by 364,00. The differ-
ence is for the most~part accounted for by mandatory and voluntary retirements.
- The figures are already nearing red alarm proportfons--by the end of 1981 we will
be on the verge of 2 million unemployed--but what is even more worrisome is their
rapid rate of growth. Since the start of the economic crisis in 1975, and of the
start then of the major unemploymen~ trend, there has no* been as meteoric a rise
in the latter a~ the one that took glace in the last quarter of 1980. All hopes
, in this regard, such as the one the economic ministries had been trying to con-
vey, have been dashed by the official figures. The attempt to disguise reality
~ by basing the figures on unemployed from the age of 16 up, instead of from that
of 1~ as had been the norm until September 1980, will not succeed in covering up
~ problem that has gotten out of hand. Government sources have admitted to this
magazine that the situation will be explosive by the time 2 million unemployed
has became a reality. And this figure is just around the ~corner: Unless the
economic situation changes radically and urgently, the 2-million-unemployed
figure will be reached by February 1982, that is, within exactly 12 months.
Far from showing any signs o� recovering, the economic situation continues at a
standstill. According to the Banco de Bilbao, whose forecasts have characteris-
tically been extremely accurate thus far, the Spanish economy is currently
teetering at the ominous level of zero growth. More optimistically, the Ministry
of Economy indicates that it may be growing at a rate sligh~ly above 0.5 percent.
In ea.ther of these cases, and whatever happens between now and December 1981,
there are certain to be no jobs for the 140,000 persons coming of employmPnt
age--includinc; some 20,~00 women who will be seeking employment for the first
- time, to cope with fam~ly problems--in addition to which close to 150,000 jobs
will be lost.
An idea of the seri.ousness of the problem may be gained from the fact that, to
' avoid further job losses and allow the unemployment figures to be swelled only by
youths coming of employment age, the Spanish economy would have to grow at an
average annual rate of 3 percent, whereas all agree today that in no case will
it reach 1 percent.
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~
~ven the government's most optimistic foreca~t~ indicate that the 1981 growth
rate cannot reach Z percent. And to so much as approach that level, the govern- _
ment must hope that exp~rts, as occurred in 1980 with the century's record =
- harvest,� will lead the economy out of its present predicament. How? Th~hks
~ to the sharp drop of the peseta, which in f months and in absolute silence has
been devaluated aFproximately 15 percent. ~
The Ministry of Economy, concerned over the unemplo~ment outlook, has drawn up
a rep~rt on "Projection to 1985 of Spanish Economy's Employment Demand," the
results of whi ch have already been made known by the working group appointed to
the task by Jose Luis Leal when he headed that ministry. The results are so
- disappointing that tt;e entire issue of 3, 500 copies has been pigeonholed in the
v basement of the ministry and will be circulated only after tl:~ 16 pages contain- ~
ing these forecasts have been removed.
The report, to whi~h CAMBIO 16 has managed to have access, points out that even
under the most optimistic of hypotheses, namely, that the 5panish economy might
- grow at an average rate of 4 percent annually between 1980 and 1985--which is the
figure submitted by Prime Minister Suarez to the Cortes for the vote of con-
fidence--unemployment would not drop to less than some 1.5 million by the end of -
that period. To this funding must be added that growth at that as~umed rate is
seen today as absolutely utopian after the 19$0 setback and the 1981 forecast,
~ 1' EI ~aano q~e I lega -
~ 2 ~ 2000.000 ~w ~.~aoe
(3) Key:
wabbsis
P~
t.s3a.0oo 1. Forthcoming Unemployment.
, ~
2. 2,000,000 unemployed.
t3.34.000 ~tA4~.~
r,000
3. Pessimistic forecast.
4. Optimistic forecast.
t. .000
83tA00
~ 1.9T7 78 7'9 80 81 1.985
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In sum: The government's hands and feet are tied with regard to preventing the I
2 million unemployed trom becoming a reality in the near Future. And if it is
, going t~ prevent that figure--"whose psychological effects will already be disas~
trous," according to government sources--from growing beyond further containment,
it will have to speed up measures to bring the GDP ~Gross Domestic Product~
_ growth rate up t~ 4 percent by 1982. This currently appears to be little better
than impossible.
What is being done to address the problem? Mere patchwork measures that do
nothing beyond raising the scholastic age, lowering the retirement ag~, and minor
_ ineffective aids to stimulate employmPnt.
"Let us not hoodwink ourselves," says Jaime Garicano, deputy director general of
the Nati.onal Employment Institute, "the only way to stimulate employment is
through growth. The Ministry of Labor cannot generate job openings. It can
favor the creation of some jobs with juvenile employment programs, in the forzn
of subsidies and special aids to depressed zones, but the nation must be told
that jop openings are created by public and private investments."
_ In the vieW of officials of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce, there are bu t
two realistic options for addressing the unemployment problem: develop part-time
- work agreements, which is already provided for in the Workers Law but has not -
- been developed by the Ministry of Labor, and, above all, reduce the pressure _
being generated by Social Security on the creation of new job openings. "Social
Security, as it is currently being funded, is an infernal machine against employ-
ment and is caus~.ng more damage to employment than the economic crisis itself."
COPYRIGHT; 1979 Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
9399
CSO: 3110
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_ ~CONOMIC SPAIN
_ GOVERNMENT WORKS ON VAT~ LAST OBSTACLE TO EEC ENTRY IN 1983
Madrid CAbffiIO 16 in Spanish 16 Feb81 pp 42, 43, 44
~Excerpt~~ By March, the Council of Ministers expects to approve the new VAT
kValue AddPd Tax~, to enable Parliament to complete its enactment between April
and May. The VAT is the final part of the tax reform, and it was Fernandez
Ordonez himself who d~ew up the initial draft. This was later adapted more to
EEC norms, which required a second draft that is now being given its final
touches by the different ministries and departments concerned.
"The institution of the VAT is a European Community requirement. The EEC has
insisted unequivocally that Spain must institute the VAT from the moment of its
entry. For us, I must state clearly, it is an essential requirement," Robert
- Goergen, the EEC's director of taxation, said recently.
BesidES, however, the VAT can kill two birds with one stone. As of today, the
manner of funding Social Security--basxcally, through contributions by the
enterprises and the workers--has become a tax on employment, an obstacle to the
_ creation of job openings. In other countries (and this is the objective here as
well), the tendency is to fund the greater part of Social Security through direct
allocations by the state and, in some countries, the VAT is used to generate
these funds. Here, the Social Security funding authorities have already requES-
- ted that part ~f the VAT be allocated to the funding of a nortion of Social
Security.
- The VAT i~ to replace three current taxes (General Tax on Business Transactions,
Luxury Tax and Special Tax on Soft Drinks) as we11 as the Agrari.a.n Social
Security contributions. The principal one of these, the General Tax on Business
T:ansactions ~IGTE~, besides not being acceptable to the E~C, also has many
disadvantages that the VAT will resolve. Since it is a cascading tax on consump-
tion, its eftect increases with growth of the productive processes and the dis-
tribution of good~. This distorts the market, discriminates against small and
medium business, and fosters the concentration of enterprise.
_ Moreover, the IGTE does not affect lar~e sectors of the petrochemical, farming,
forestry, livestock, fishing and f~od industries, which distorts free competition
_ and the allocation of resources. The VAT will affect all sectors equally.
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The major problem being posed by the IGTE, however, is its distorting effect
on international competition, which is the reason the Europeans are making its
abandon;nent a prior condition to our entry into the EEC. Currently, with the
IGTE, Spain makes tax adjustments at the border, collecting lecies on imported
products and paying tax rebates on export products. The IGTE being a cascading
tax, the levies and rebates are closely tied to the magnitude of the goods-
production process, making adjustments inequitable. And the EEC member countries
accu se Spain of using this system to subsidize -�9panish exports while penalizing
imports (the famous "dumping" process? .
The insti tution of the VAT offers several advantages and has produced favorabZe
results in almost all of Europe. In the first place, it is an eve?i-handed tax on
foreign~trade and on employment. That is, it is not protectionist and does not
penalize employment, since it is based on the difference in value at the various
stages of consumption of produc ts, and not on whether much labor or much technology
has been used in their production.
The VAT moreover improves competition among enterprises by clarifying the tax
picture: With the IGTE, many enterprises underpaid the tax and were able to
undersell fraudulently. Now, each enterprise will declare, will compel others to
declare, and will be compelled by others to declare, thus reducing the risk of
fraud and facilitating market transparency,
Thirdly, it will compel enterprises to become more competitive abroad, and may
well even operate to improve substantially our balance of payments, as a result
of an increase in exports.
The implementation of the VAT nevertheless requires careful advance preparation.
Our entry into the EEC is not in vain, in that, with the VAT, protectionist
tariff s disappear and competition becomes more open. "This is our most impartant
decision of the 1980's," Luis Fernando Alemany, deputy director general of
_ Indi rect Taxation and one of the authors of the VAT project, has told CAMBIO 16.
"The stakes involved in the institution of this tax are high, and it therefore
requires much preparation, explanation and close monitoring," he adds.
Serious Difficulties
Busin essmen have for years been fearing the "tax storm" that is about to strike
them. "The implementation oi the VAT in Spain will raise very serious difficul-
ties in the current situation of enterprises and of the Spanish economy; hence,
the need for a transition period in which to adapt to EEC guidelines in this
- regard is absolute and must be taken into account to minimize the possible
traumatic effects on our productive apparatus," says a private CEOE ~Spanish
Confedera tion of Business Orqanizations~ document on integration into the EEC.
The Minis try of Finance is aware of this issue and is preparing, with the cooper-
ati.on of various economic specialists, a study on the effects the institution
of the VAT could have in each sector, with the intent of presenting a kind of
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White Paper or Book within 2 or 3 months. "The VAT will affect our future
ec~nomy tremendously," says Luis Fernando Alemany. "It will have a decisiva
impact on the production and distribution of goods, and on the entry of foreign
products as well as our exports." .
Furthermore, the tax authorities also favor the establishment of a transition
, period. Alemany thinks that after approval of the VAT by the Cortes, 3 years
will be needed to apply it fully. The first of these would be needed to develop
its norms and plan it; the second, to prepare the tax administration structure;
and the third, to e~cplain the tax to the taxpayers. This takes its implementa-
tion beyond 1 January 1983, the date planned for 5pain's entry into the EEC;
but an extension of the date for implementation of the VAT could be requested,
as Greece has just done.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
9399
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POLITICAL FRANCE =
CONA'IENTARY ON U.S. QUEST FOR SUPPORT OVER EL SALVADOR
LD051525 Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 2-8 Mar 81 p 36
[Article by Francois SctiZosser: "Sedatives for Reagan"]
[Text] A dangerous honor will probably be bestowed on the wretched Salvadoran -
peasants. Deeming that they are the target of "flagrant soviet adventurism," Reagan
- will take advantage of the situation to make :.nem pay for 5 years of American frus-
trations in Saigon, Luanda, Theran and Kabul.
The Salvadoran peasant has not been chosen by mere chance. Reagan's experts were
seeking an "excuse for a showdown" [suuet de crise] to very rapidly demonstrate
- their viril.ity. According to certain leaks, the National Security Council estab-
- lished precise criteria for the choice of victims. Everything had to take place at
spot where America enjoyed definite superiority, would run no major risk and could
_ produce adequate proof of "communist interference." Living not far from Cuba and
Nicaragua, the Salvadoran peasant was an ideal customer.
In order to convince the allies General Haig, the new Secretary of State, has skill-
fully organized a publicity.blitz over Europe. Waves of official delegations,
groups of high officials, experts and--confidentially--intelligence agents have
followed one another, some of them via the front doors, others via the back doors
of European chancelleries. Their attache cases overflowed with documents proving
that sizable arms supplies from communist countries have been reachin~ the Salva-
doran rebels via Cuba. Haig even insisted tihat the EEC stop sending humanitarian
aid--food and medical supplies--which could further the war objectives of "Marxists"
in the Salvadoran hills. And, above all, the White House envoys demanded that
- European governments deliver one by one a ritual statement of allegiance acknowleding
the existence of foreign interference in E1 Salvador and supporting the American ~
crusade.
The Intermediaries
The Europeans were embarrased, even annoyed. And, most of all, they were concerned
about other things--in Poland, a truce has been achieved--just--but it is fragile:
in the USSR, the 26th Congress, which will determine the guidelines of an economic
policy and the framework of Soviet diplomacy for the next 5 years has been taking
place. And since Monday, when Brezhnev admitted for the first time that the world
economic crisis has affected the socialist countries and simultaneously offered a
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number of unexpected strategic and military concessions, the Europeans have found
it difficult to get worked up in addition about some skirmish--alteit a bloody
= one--between rebel guerrillas and an overly repressive army somewhere in Central `
- America.
However, it has been realized in Paris and also London and Bonn that American feel- _
ings should not be hurt at this precise moment. Tribute has been paid. Jean
Francois-Poncet opened up first and said what Washing~on wanted him to say. France
has nothing to lose in E1 Salvador and Giscard has everything to gain by covering
himself with a part of Reagan's mantle of anticommunist toughness at a minimal price,
since he has been very strongly criticized on the eve of the presiden tial election
of his "softness" on the Soviets. On the following day it was Mrs Thatcher's turn
to submit but she did it less cynically and more honorably. She condemned communist
~ intervention but, largely following in the footsteps of the British press, expressed
digust with the butchering regime which Washington supports in E1 Salvador.
As for the Germans, they have been the most embarrassed. The Salvadoran guerrillas
are known in Bonn, where it is realized that not all of them are bloodthirsty com-
munist and, more particularly, that there are some staunch social democrats, members
of the socialist international, among them. Obviously, Reagan's wishes will be _
complied with so far as condemnation of foreign intervention is concerned but, at
_ the same time, the Germans will offer to act as intermediaries between the rebels
and those members of the Salvadoran government who are willing to accept such media-
tion.
A11 this means that the Europeans have gone through the motions of condemning arms
suppliers. They believe that they had to do this to calm the Reagan, team down.
They now hope that more serious problems will be tackled. Brezhnev's proposals,
which were made under the solemn auspices of the 26th Congress, cannot be dismissed
out of hand. Obviously, they could well divide Europeans and aggravate the existing
crisis between Europe and America. But it would be dangerously simplistic to assert
that this is their only objective. Even Reagan and Haig have taken note of them.
Hence the hesitation and embarrassed and contradictory commentaries, f or Brezhnev -
has simply offered to renegotiate the strategic arms agreement, which the Americans
have signed but not ratified, and extend military "confidence-building measures"--
information about troop movements, observation of military maneuvers on the spot
and so forth--to European Russia as far as the Ural Mountains. This is a plan which
the French have advocated for the past 2 years but whic:h the Soviet have hitherto
rejected forcefully and almost indignantly.
Systematic Arrogance
Brezhnev's proposal to freeze medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe is even more
significant. Of course it is unacceptable in literal terms~since it would confirm
the deployment of some 150 Soviet SS-20 missiles without any reciprocal concessions.
But talks based on Brezhnev's proposal could lead to an acknowledgemen t of parity,
which Helmut Schmidt would like to see accepted by both sides, through either the
dismantling of certain Soviet systems or the deployment of an equivalent number of
_ American devices in West Europe. All these subjects are politically explosive not
only in Germany, where the "antinuclear revolt" is in full swing, but also in the
rest of Europe.
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FOR OFFIC'IA1. USF. ONI,Y
Prior to their vis~ts to Washington, the most important European foreign ministers--
French, German and British--met secretly in Bonn. Europe fears that the White House
could step up the arms race in order to reestablish American strategic superiority
over the USSR. Z'he French and Germans have quite openly urged Washington not to
yield to this temgtation, which would lead to an even deeper and more lasting
deterioration of East-West relations. At Boston Fletcher School, Francois-Poncet
emphasized that it was no longer possible to imagine "a situation in which the
consequences of a rift in Europe would be accepted with a light heart." Further- '
_ more, the Europeans repudiate systematic arrogance--whether verbal or military--
. toward Third World countries in which the West has strategic or commercial interests.
As far as the immediate future is concerned, the question is how far the new Wash-
ington administration will go to appease the American rights's most exaggerated
phantasms--it is known that many of Reagan's followers dream about "bringing" Castro
"to heel." Will the present incursion into E1 Salvador be sufficient to calm them
down? Will Reagan go so Far as to subject Cuba to a military blockade? This would
be tantamount to risking a resumption of cold war in Berlin, in the heart of
i:urope, at a time when Brezhnev's undoubtedly self-seeking but not insubstantial
proposals could make it possible to explore some paths less dangerous to all con-
cerned.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Le Nouvel Observateur"
CSO: 3100
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~'OLITICAL FRANCE
PURPOSE, LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT PCF ACTIONS
Recent Events Summarized
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 21-27 Feb 81 pp 71,72,74
~Article by Robert Schneider: "P C F: The Fascist Offensive"~
~Text~ Suddenly, from ihe balcony of the Palace, the Parisian dance hall in
vogue, on Rue Faubourg-Montmartre, CGT ~General Confederation of Labor~ stickers
and Marchais badges are flung upon the stage and a chant arises: "Cho-cho-cho,
chomage, ras-le-bol!" ~Down with unemployment, we have had it up to herel~. There
is confusion under the multicolored laser beams. A broadcast is interrupted.
The program "20 Years-To What Use?", being broadcast live over Antenna 2 and
Europe 1 on Monday 16 February, ciedicated to 7,617,000 ~French peogle between
the ages of 17 and 25, and having hardly begun, was terminated--censored by 150 -
communist and CGT militants.
After cries of "Racism to the bulldozer!" and calls to the denouncement of drug
users, abrupt censorship. After Poujadiste demagoguery, provocation. Has the
PCF CFrench Communist Party~ lost its head? Or could it be the ~victim of tact-
less zeal on the part of some restless local elected officia3.s? No. These power
bids are planned bids. A general, systematic offensive has been r3ecided at the
highest party level.
Vitry-sur-Seine, communist electoral stronghold in Val-du-Marne, on Christmas Eve
night: In a matter of minutes, in the presence of the mayor, Paul Mercieca, some
50-odd PCF militants ransacked an immigrant workers center into which 318 Malians
had just--temporarily--moved. The attackers had been divided up into specialized
coxnmando units. One unit seized the director of the center and stole 600 keys,
another ripped down the telephone lines, another sabotaged the electric power
panel,and still another destroyed the boiler burners, while a bulldozer demol-
iahed stairways and walled up doorways.
Montigny-les-Cormeilles, in Val-d'Oise, another communist stronghold, on 7 Feb-
ruary: The mayor, Robert Hue, girded by his tricolor municipal sash,c~emonstrated
at the head of a delegation beneath the windows of an alleged drug trafficker,
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~
demanding his denouncement in the name of public morality. A big-time traffic-~ -
ker7 lVo, a Moroccan laborer. The evidence? An accusing letter which the mayor
had been carrying in his pocket for 10 days. It had been "written" by a woman -
neighbor of the Moroccans, Hassa Benachour, a member of the PCF... who does not
know how to write~.. and at whose home police later found, on 18 February, a
large quantity of dreigs, though they had~not found any at the Moroccan worker's
home. Hue, who had suddenly labeled the quiet nearby town of Patte d'Oie
_ d'Herblay "a triangle of death by overdose" and called upan the population to
form watchdog committees to report traffickers and addicts, had never before
- indicated having the least problem in his township. These "revelations" preceded
_ by a few days a meeting that was held in Val-d'Oise by the PCF secretary general.
Paris, 16 February: The perturbers entered the premises of the Palace using
. false invitations. A woman of around 40 years of age led the operation. From
the balcony, she negotiated with the organizers of the show. If they would agree
- to the presence of a CGT representative on stage, the broadcast could resume.
The response by Jean-Pierre Elkabbach, manager of public relations of Antenna 2: -
"I refuse to negotiate under duress." The broadcast did not resume.
Most of the 33 youths who had been selecte:i to take part in the program's debate -
are furious against the demonstrators. Even though they shared the same ideas.
The first questions, in any case, showed that the sampling had not been "rigged"
to please the Government. They dealt essentially with unemployment--half of
these youths were unemployed--and with the attitude of adults in their regard.
"We had spent the entire afternoon Sunday preparing our questions," one of them
explains. We had a lot of things we were going to address. The program's .
quiz masters tried hard to have us talk of politics and sexuality. But non~ of
us were interested in those issues." Another says: "After the occurrence, I
remembered that our "colleagues" who belonged to the CGT, the Communist Youth,
and Communist Students--they were six in all--had not opened their mouths
throughout our preparation. Of course not,~becausp they knew the broadcast would
not take place. We were well had by them."
Little Fears and Big Cowardices
While the program organizers drew the guests, which included Minister Monique
Pelletier, toward the buffet that had been laid out in the Privilege, the fancy
nightclub located in the basement of the Palace, Edmond Maire, another guest _
participant in the debate, who had remained behind in the program hall, tried
to dialog with the youthful perturbers. Which did not prevent the leader of the
CFDT ~French Democratic Confederation of Labor~ from being accused the next
mornic~g by Georges Seguy "of having let himself be duped to the point of appear-
ing before the youths to side with the Government and management." The CGT
leader was more adroit when, addressing tt~e substance of the occurrence, he said:
_ "Suppose the Polish television network had organized a debate on youth in Poland -
- from which it had tried to exclude the most representative Polish union: Soli-
darity. We would have heard in France a concert of imprecations... But when
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it is donQ by the French television netwurk again~t the most representative _
union federation, they find ~t normal. And when the CGT protests and demands
the right to speak, it is sabotaging the broadcast." ~
A good argument, except for the fact that the CGT and the PCF had not been
excluded: Their members were among those invited to debate.
Vitry, Montigny, the Palace: Tfiree sensatio:ial "hits" approved publicly "without -
reservations" by Marchais. But not isolated actions: The mayors of Aulnay-sous-
Bois and Champiqny have announced they will accept no more immigrant workers.
~ The mayor of Dammarie-les-Lys is demanding--vainly--the expulsion of immigrants
from one center; the mayor of Ivey, the estab].ishment ot a foreign infants quota
_ in vacation camps. Worse, at Saint-Denis and at Nanterre, IiI1~1 ~Low Cost Housing
Program~ housing is being denied to Antilleans, hence to Frenchmen guilty of
being Blacks. At Villeurbaine, Communist Youth has requested its members to
furnish the organization's leadership the names of lycee students who take _
drugs. (See subsequent article herein by Jacques Derogy and Jacques Roure).
And thus we have: the "party of the working class and of the international prole-
tariat" attacking the weakest of workers: the immigrant workers; the "party of
freedoms" calling for false denunciations; the "party ot revolution" positing
- itself as the champion of the moral order, the spAkesman of racist France, the
France of little fears and big cowardices. Who will their next victims be?
This is certainly not the first time the PCF attacks the values it claims to
defend. Its history is filled with acts that contradict its doctrine. This
same cynical and violent PCF had so diligently tried to appear reassuring during
the pe~iod of the joint platform as to have almost succeeded in making itself
forgotten. It is not all that long since the time of ".democratic socialism in
the colors of France," of the friendly hand extended to the Christians, of the
friendly hand on the shoulder o� the small businessman and the merchants. At
that time, only "Big Capital" occupied the bench of the accused. It is not .
all that long since the time when the MRAP ~Movement Against Racism, Anti-
Semitism and for Peace~, close to the P~F, attacked Jean-Marie Le Pen, president
of the National Front, because one of its posters affirmed: "One Million Unem-
ployed Is One Million Immigrants Too Manyl" Today, perhaps ingenuously, we are
rediscovering the PCF's true nature. TY~e parties are unanirnous in the~r con-
demnation. The socialists, unaoubtedly because they are the most disappointed,
are among the most merciless: L'UNIT~, the PS ~Socialist Party~ weekly, carried
the headline: "PCF: Its Hands Dirtied"; the party's executive board flatly
accuses its ex-partner of "behaving like a little extreme rightist group."
The noncommunist left no longer hesitates to speak of "Red Fascism." Fascism is
the bringing together of authoritarianism, corporatism and nationalism. Its
methods: coarse attacks, hodgepodge, calls for false incrimination, contempt for -
the adversary... The portrait shows resemblance.
Charles Fiterman, the party's number two leader, said in reqard to the Antenna 2
broadcast: "Once again it is the thieves who are yelling 'Thief!'." Actually,
the PCF behaves continually as the aggressor who cries "Ag~ressort." It rejects
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immigrant workers, in order, it says to better struggle agai~st ghettos. It
calls upon its youth to in�orm against drug addicts, in order to save the addicts
themselves, even where these are imaginary ones. It prevents a television broad-
Cast from con tinuinq, in order to defend freedom of information~ These are the
truths as we read them in L'HUMANITE, as they are being taught in the cells.
Apparently, the French people are not being taken in by communist semantics. Ac-
- cording to a Public S.A, poll published by PARIS-MATCH, 42 percent of those polled
disapprove of the Montigny occurrence, 15 percent approve; 19 percent of the
communists expressed themselves against it, and only 14 percent for it.
At Villeurbanne, in the Rhone, the accusations against the Lycee Pierre-
Brossolette will not gain a single vote for the PCF'. Oii the contrary.
The PCF isolated, rejected, misunderstoodl This pleases it. It is being
attacked, it tells its militants, because it is right. Alone against all the
rest. And the more it is isolated, the more it will assert it is right. Marchais
_ thinks this is the best way to close the party ranks again. The fact that the
party's image is being damaged in the opinion of the mass public is unimportant,
because it is no longer a question of rising to power. Marchais, unlike his
Italian and Spanish counterparts, views the policy of the Soviet Union's Communist
Party as being on the whole positive. Leonid Brezhnev undoubtedly convinced him,
during his recent trip tc Moscow, that, for the future of international communism,
- ~t were better tnat the PCF not rise to power with an Atlanticist socialist ally.
Marchais is pursuing two complementary objectives: bring about the defeat of
Mitterand and, exploiting the consequences of the latter's new defeat, recover
the number one position on the left.
- Nine weeks away from the presid2ntial election, the situa~tion looks rather bad
- for the communist candidate. Aftex 4 months of campaigning, he has not gained an
inch of terrain: The L'EXPRESS-Louis Harris TABLEAU DE BORD still shows him at
17 percent of the expressed voting preferences, while Mitterand's percen~age is
steadily increasing.
Voters must therefore be won over from the PS or from among the malcont~nts on
' all sides, from "the popular strata." Hence the chosen targets: the masses in
~ outlying urban areas, in areas where the.masses rub shoulders with the imm~tgrant
= workers, in areas where there is fear, in areas where unemployed youths may be
taking to drugs.
Will this communist demagogy pay off electorally? Is the PCF likely to win the
votes of the "little Whites" who are seduced by the simplici.ty of Marchais' idea~
and by the fo rce of the communist machine? "Yes," responds a Giscardian minister
_ elected from a popular circumscription. "PCF slogans are carrying. I kx~ow that
if I were to fight them in my newspaper, I would not be supported by my consti-
tuents." "No," says a PCF official. "Those to whom Marchais' arguments can
appeal are rightists, and these," he says, "will never vote for him." '
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~ Within the PCF and the CGT, some voices are making themselves heard. At Montigny,
some teachers have distributed a tract "against denouncement," accusing the PCF
of using the methods "of another side." At Nl~ontfermeil, in Seine-Saint-Denis,
the CGT calls "scandalous" the communist mayor's ref~sal of positian-au~horixec~
housinq to a municipal employee b~cause he is an immigrant. At Marseille, CGT
militants deplore their union's call to vote for Marchais. At the Renault plant
in Boulogne-Billancourt, the CGT members are demonstrating together with the
- Moroccan workers "against the PCF's racist policy."
The pursuit of presidential votes being carried out by Marchais for a near-term
~ objective is thus generating disapproval on t~e part of many teachers and union
leaders, the PCF's traditional intermediaries. Is the PCF's future being
- sacrificed by its secretary general for his own personal. score?
COPYRIGHT: 1981 S.A. Groupe Express
Campaign Related Purposes ~
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 23 Feb-1 Mar 81 pp 27-28
- ~Article by Thierry Pfister: "Communists: Reasons for the Escalation"~ ~
~Excerpts By waging a conventional electoral campaign, the PCF ~French Commun-
ist Party~ would have run the risk of being sidelined. Through its sensational
initiatives, it is re-centering attention on itself.
Although the PCF's balance sheet is far from being "positive on the whole," it _
cannot on the other hand be said that the Vitry bulldozer, the Montigny denounce-
= ment and the TV commando have generated a unanimous reproof. Even the PCF's
most traditional adversaries feel compelled to distinguish between its unaccept-
able methods and the substance of the problems it has raised. To hear ~ean Cau
on Antenna 2, on Thursday, justify the issues of the new communist crusades was
an experience.
Attacked on methods, the communists are responding on substance. They are by no
means being naive: In the battle they are waging, the immigrant workers, drugs
and youth unemployment are mere pretexts. The row is classically political and
allows everyone to take up again his traditional role. This is why the PCF
leaders are not fearful of pursuing the escalation. They are in fact not as
disappointed as they say they are over the general mobilization that has taken
place against them. It is a situation with which theX are familiar and which
_ they know how to exploit.
The militants actually find it easier to close ranks when the party takes the
position of the victim of an "aggression." And it is especially necessary tc~
generate such a reflex as the day of voting approaches, in view of the lack of
dynamism being shown for some months now by the party cells. Moreover, the
unanimous c~iticism of the methods being used by the PCF enables Georges Marchais
to justify his claim of a"three-way consensus," that is, of an alleged agreement
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among Giscard, Chirac and Mitterand. Furthermore, the current activism of the
cor.ununists is enablin.g him to affirm tli~at his party is avoiding an "unprinci-
pled political game" the unpopularity of which has been evidenced by the success
of Coluche's candidacy.
= True, the most politicized of the PCF's membership, especially among the working
- class, rejects this oversimplification. ~he style it imparts to Georges Marchais'
campaign cannot therefore be expected to stop the erosion of the communist posi-
- tions within the "workers aristocracy." Howevzr, the PCF leadership expects to
compensate, and in fact to more than compensate, this loss by the mobilization of
the most disadvantaged strata of the proletariat, those that are especially feel-
- ing the effects of the competition from immigrant workers and that are seeking
- security. A conventional electoral campaign would clearly have exposed the PCF
_ to the risk of being put out of the running. This risk was intensified particu-
= larly after the en~.ry of Francais Mitterand then that of Jacques Chirac into the
- campaign. The PCF's spectacul,ar actions have indeed focused attention dgain on
its positions.
= The undemocratic nature of the communist initiatives has not been, for the PCF,
the most difficult of things to come to terms with politically. It has had long
- experience in this regard. In actual fact, the socialists risk, indirectly,
at least as much~finding themselves out on a limb, since they will have to
explain why only yesterday t'.:ey were proposing to entrust ministerial responsi-
_ bilities to men having such little respect for pluralism.
To its fellow-travelers, the PCF leadership evokes for support the historic and
ideological traditions of the communist movement. It recalls, for example, that
the Chinese communists demolished the opium dens during their Revolution. It
can also play on the moralistic attitudes of militants who, because they believe
in the possibility of the birth of a"new human being,� ascribe human weaknesses
--alcoholism, drug addiction...--to the structures of capitalist society.
The ex�~rience of the socialist countries has shown that the institution of new
productional relationships is not in itself sufficient to resolve these issues.
But the days are long gone when the PCF undertook to comment on this point.
L'HUMANITE just barely permitted Francis Cohen to recall discreetly, on the eve
. of the 26th congress of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, some of the essential
economic problems that arise in the coun tries of "real socialism": too highly
- centralized and imperat.ive planning; too low productivity; confusion between the
right to work and the right to a uniform wage... The genre of article tha~ will
make it gassible to affirm in 1 year or in 10, should the circumstances so
require it, that the party has always remained true to itself has not changed
and has proven itself clairvoyant.
COPYRIGAT: 1981 "le Nouvel Observateur"
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'Fascist' Tendencies
Paris L'EXPRESS in French 21-27 Feb 81 p 73
~Article by Jean-Francois Revel: "Toward a Society of Stool Pigeons"~
_ ~Text~ Since the start of the PCF ~French Communist Party~ commando actions,
how many political leaders have fallen into the trap and gone on the defensive!
"But no, we are not for drugsl," they have cried out in chorus, as if drugs were
- the real problem, as if the PCF were attaching the least i.mportance to drugs!
Tomorrow, the communi:~ts cou'~d just as well declare inadequate the fight against
cancer and organize the lyncliing of a family of Senegalese street sweepers,
accusing tnem of knowingly thwarting basic research in molecular biology, with
the complicity; of the socialists, of course. Would we then see the minister of
public health or the socialist deputy from the locality involved pour forth with
- pious, justificative explanations? When we see the fear the PCF inspires without
even being in power, we can well imagine what it would be if one day they should
take power.
= This pusillanimity is being compounded by golitical error. P.nd yet, it is not a
matter of a remote and complex problem of international policy. It is a matter
- of local occurrences that are taking place under our very eyes and and wnich
a every citizen can understand.
After the Palace expedition of the Marcha isian youths, who prevented by force
a television debate from taking place, Pau 1~uiles, national secretary of the PS
~Socialist Party~~ declared that, t~ avoi d exposing themselves to this sabotage, ~
thP organizers of the debate should have ~.ncluded in the broadcast "all the
political elements," r~ead: the PCF' as wel l. Which boils down to advising an ~
advance capitulation to intimidation. As if one could rightfully ignore
that no sooner would that capitulation have been in place than the intimida~-
tion upped another notch! Even when the communists are invited to take part
in debates, tr.ey continue to claim they have been excluded. Did not Jean-Marie
Cavada furnish proof, figures in hand, in the "Big Debate" of 3 Feb~ruary on TF 1,
that Georges Marchais' hours of presence on the TV screen had not prevented him
from claiming he was being banned? Censorship, for the ~communists~, is when .
others talk. How many times have they no t succeeded in having eliminated from -
debate telecasts the interlocutors they di d not like? Did they not claim they -
had been kept out of an "Apostrophes" in te rview with Solzhenitsyn, in 1976, when
in fact they had been invited to take par t? Th2ir re~l objective, however, was
to hav~ prevented entirely the taking Qla~ e of that program.
After the intervention by the PCF assaul t units against the Moroccan "drug
traffickers," the editorialist of an even i ng newspaper wrote: "We must credit the
PCF with being consummate in the art of r a ising--thouyh badly=-real.issues."
This is a gift one must also recognize in T.3enito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler and
Augusto Pinochet. In pointing up the fai 1 ure of the economy and the existence of
anarchy in their respective countries, th e se three men "raised real issues,"
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- "badly," no doubt, yet with "a consummate art..." This is the kind of "faulty
liaisons" that, coming from the pens of otherwise knowledgeable commentators, can
- give rise to the frenzied desire to disregard the evidence that there is a
- Fascist party, an only one, in France today among its major parties: the PCF'.
- There are periods in which the Fascism of the PCF is veiled, and ot5ers in which
it flaunts itself, with deliberate intent, and with an aggressiveness that
borders on provocation. Why and to what political end? An initial explanation
that is rather widely accepted is that the communists are panicked�by:a drop in
the polls which, if confirmed by the 26 April vote, would mean a collapse of a
seriousness and swiftness wholly unique in their history. As a result, they are
Qut to get votes by resorting to the most sordid racist demagogy. By now com-
pletely sterile intellectually, incapab]:e of ptoducing a single new thought of
their own, the communists are now constantly pirating the thoughts of others: in
this case, they have resorted to kindly philosophical help from Jean-Marie F,e Pen,
- who was dog-paddling around alone in its 0.5-percent extreme right wing. They
have also borrowed the theme of security and that of the fight against drugs, old
favor.ites of Alain Peyrefitte and of the majority, just as they have borrowed
from this same majority the issues of participation, civil and military nuclear
development, and human rights, and from the socialists that of self-management
by the workers.
According to a second explanation, also compatible with the first, the communists,
in their desire above all to bring about the defeat of Mitterand, are behaving
intentionally as h~s more and more unacceptable allies. Thus many voters might
- in fact reason: "I would vote for Mitterand, but he could not govern without the
communists; and the communists are decidedly too wild and too dangerous to be
the least bit dependable." Furthermore, to clearly demonstrate that an alliance
would be politically not feasible and a catastrophe, the communists are attacking
the most violently those socialists nearest to them. Thus, the PCF is seeking
to raise its own score with the voters while mortally wounding the socialist
candidacy.
Lastly, there is the historical explanation, which must never be forgotten, the
, unchanging fact which LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR kindly recalled in its 16 February
headline ("The Communist Police"). The PCF is a police party which seeks to
establish a police state. The "Letter on Expansion," for its part, cites
communist draft law 2213, which says among other things; "Prevention is the rule
in regard to security. It theretore appears to us,necessary to associate the
different peoples' categories involved (the police, but also the associations of
parents of students, tenants; the professions, etc.) in forms that can embody
these preventive activities, and specifically the block-patrol method, which must
be expanded." This is the well-known~technique of grid-control and constant
espionnage of the population, as it~is exercised in Moscow, Prague and Havana.
The PCF is the vanguard, on a small scale, of the society to which it Ieads:
a society of stool pigeons.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 S.A. Groupe Express
9399
CSO: 3100
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~
POLITICAL FRANCE
NEW PCF TACTICS VIS-A-VIS DRUGS, IMMIGRANTS NOTED
Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXF'ANSION in French 16 Feb 81 p 2
[Article: "Why the PCF Is Going to Step Up Its Campaign On Drugs, Immigrants and
Safety"]
~
[Text] By exposing a family to public prosecution, a family which he suspected
(on the strength of someone's accusation) of engaging in drug trafficlc3.ng, all
that Robert Hue, the communist mayor of Montigny-les-Cormeilles (Val d'Oise) was
doing (by direction) was putting PCF legislative proposal ~~2213 into practice, a
document which has gone completely unnoticed and nevertheless reveals the communists'
new tactics. In particular it reads: "Prevention 3s the rule in the area of
safety. That is why it seems necessary to us to involve the various interested
categories of the population (policemen, but also associations of parents of
school-children, tenants' associations, professional organizations, etc.) in the
forms thati these preventive activities can take, particularly the technique of
- black patrolling which should be more widespread." This text, which secondarily
- recommends incorporating the PJ [Criminal Investigation Police] into the Ministry
of J'ustice, stresses the nead to grant mayors more extensive authorities in the
safety area.
Comment: The PCF is going ~o keep going along these lines with an intensive
poster campaigr~ which will touch on the problems of immigrants, drugs, morality
and safety in jumbled f ashion, thereby responding to the anxieties of the "silent _
ma~ority" and taking away votes from the RPR [Rally for the Republic] in particular.
(Involving the population in crime prevention is faithfully copied from what goes
on in this regard in the USSR. At the Matignon the observation is also made that
up to now the PCF has attacked immigrants only from countries which are on bad
- terms with Moscow, including Mali.)
COPYRIGHT: 1981. Groupe Expansion S.A.
9631 -
CSO: 3100
- � 25
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POLITICAL SPATN
NiATN PARTTES ON FUTURE R~I~ATTONS WTTH REAGAN ADMTN~57.'RATxON
Madrid CAMBTO 16 in Spanish 19 Jan 81 pp 53, 54
[Text] The co~un~sts and social~,sfis th~nk that now that Ronald Reagan 3.s in the
White House the European countries, including Spain, wi11 l.ose autonomy, and that
Spain's wobbly democracy wi11 perhaps not be able to completely absorb the impact.
Qn the other hand, the Democrat3c Center Union believes that with the fo~+tn~r Ho11y-
- wood cowboy as ~ts President the United States is going to strengthen the framework
of its economie and political cooperation with Spa3n; and the Popular A17,iance
party believes that with the new U.S. President a decade of conservatism is probabl}~
_ beginning, which could extend to Spain for the 1983 eleet3ons.
The country's four majoxity parties with parliamentary representation can also not
agree among themselves as to how fio face the problems for the nation wh~.ch they
anticipate from the neur Ameri.can President. Whi1e Ramon Tamames, PCE [Spanish
Communist Party] deputy and town counci,l7.or of the Madr:td municipal3.ty warns
that we must be on our guard w~th Reagan, because i~ w~e are not very careful he
will get us in~o NATO, Fernando Moran, ~,n~ernat3,ona1 affairs advisor of the
PSOE [Spanish Socialist Party] th~nks that he would not dare to go so far, "much
as he would like to," and that whether Spa~,ri wi11 ~oin the Western defense bloc
or not w~11 depend more "on Spain~s attitude than on foreign pressux~~s."
Moran states: "What the new Aiuer~.can admin3stration does have is a tendency to
discipline allied and friendly countries and to take away their capacity for
intervening in local conflicts ~etween countries favoring the United States or
the USSR. Tn this sense it is very probable that both Spain and Europe in coming
years ar.e going to lose a large part of their autonomy to the leader of the bloc,
that is, to the United States."
Guillermo Medina, UCD [Democratic Center Union] deputy from S~.ville, also takes
note of th3.s sense of leadership and d~scipl3ne, though he does not~express it in
such harsh words. "It 3.s evident--he told CAMBTO ~6--that we are entering ~,nto
difficult times, hard times, and that the United States, w~,fih or without Reagan,
in a crisis period, is going to want to know if we are its friends, and to what
degree." According to Guillermo Medina, it wi11 nofi be worthwhile to take amb~guous
. positions in the comi.ng years, although th~ ~mer~,~a~s axe not go~ng to so much as
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lift a finger to make us enter NATO. "'The decision--he comments--is going to come ~
from t.he Spanish people, but the pos3tion which we adopt will determine hc,w we will
be treated afterward by the American administration."
.Torge Verstringe, speaking fer Popular Alliance, is of essentially the ~ame
opinion. "The Americans--he ~ays--are not going to so lve our problems for us, and
Spain wi11 only jo~.n NATO and the EEC when we have a stable coherent government
which approaches these topics backed by a broad, stable and ~natural' ma~ority.'r
Something that concerns the pol3tical parties almoat as much as ~oining NATO is -
what the attitude of the new Amer3can administration is going to be regard~ng the
signing of the ~reaty on Amer~can basea in Spain, which must be renegotiated this
_ year.
- "My personal opin3on, wh3.ch agrees with that of a large group of inembers of my
party--says Ramon Tama~nes--3s that with Haig as secretary of atate the Americans
are going to try to make the new treaty a k3nd of conduit 1ead~ng directly to
NATO. If a maneuver of this type 3s detected, the PCE wi11 start a campaign to
- prevent the agreements from being signed."
Fernando Moran of the PSOE, in his turn, thialcs it unlike7.p that the United
States wi11 try to introduce new ~tems into the bases questions, and that Spa3n,
if i�t ~egotiates seriously, should forget economic and armament compensat~ons
and insist that the treaty contatn a guarantee to defend thYs country in case of a
border conflict--with the North African countriea, for example.
Guillermo Medina of the UCD believes that at p~esent the Un3.ted States ~.s not
going to try for a stronger m3.13tary treaty, but that it e~.11 tr}* to reta3n certa3.n
facillties that it already pos~ess at the Ro~a, Torrej on and Zaragoza bases. The -
UCD deputy from SEVille also thinks that under Reagan the framework of commerc~al,
industria7. and pol3tical cooperation 4rith the United States wi11 probably be
expanded, since Republ3can adm~.nistrat3ons s3nce Eisenhower have trad~t~.onally been
favorably predisposed toward Spain.
On the other hand, the PSOE th3,nks that condit~ons r~1,at~,ng to commerce and i.ndustxy
are probably going to continue as befare. "The Americans--says Fexnando Moran--
usually h~ve been much less sensitive regard~ng import t ariffs on Spanish shoes
or on the topic of granting licenses Co our fishermen than on issues of a mi.litary
and strategic type."
Thi~s is not the belief of conmtunist Ramon Tamames, who thinks that we should be
_ a bit wary with Reagan, since his government is bef~ng formed with persons from
the extreme right, and that h3s econo~ic policy, with it s emphasis on reducing
public spending, cutt~ng back on social services and lowering salaries is going
to htave serious repercussions on our country. According to Tamames, the usual
mechanism for ~nfluencing economic pci.licy 'tas we already know, is the Trilateral _
Comm~.ss~on, wh~.ch has Span~sh memDers~" xn any~ case, Tamames doe,s not s~~ Rona~,d
Reagan as compl~te~y bad. He sa}~s, '~T da not th~,nk that he ~s go~,ng to ~k~ up
- a governmen~ of 7,unat~cs."
COPXR~GHT: 1979, Informac~on y Rsv~,stas, S.A.
8131,
CSO: 317.0
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GENERAL FRANCE
ARIANE LAUNCH SCHEDULE PROJECTED TO 1985
Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 21 Feb S1 p 33
~Article by Pierre Langereux~
~Text~ The new Ariane launch schedule projected to 1985 has just been set
- jointly by the ESA ~European Space Agency~, the CNES ~National Center for Space
Studies~ and the Arianespace Company for the production and marketing of European
launchers.
According to the agreement signed last year between the ESA and Arianespace, the
Ariane launchings will be carried out as follows:
Flight test launchings (LO1 through L04) under the launcher development program
and the first six operational launchings (L5 through L10) of the "promotional
series," which is sched~led to end in 1982, will be carried out under the respon-
sibility of the ESA.
The first five operational launchings (LS through L9) will be carried out by the
CNES for the account of the ESA, while the last of the "promot~onAi. seri~s"
Iaunchings (L10) will be by Arianespac~ for the account of the ESA. The CNES
launching team will actually have been transferred to Arianespace.
The succeeding operational and commercial launchings, beginning with L11., which
is scheduled for the beginning of 1983, will from then on be under the responsi-
bility of Arianespace.
The Ariane launcher's new mission-timetable to 1985 currently involves 30 pay-
loads, 17 of which are on firm Iaunch-orders, 10 on tentative orders (some with
$100,000-deposits) and 3 potential orders (for European clients).
In addition to these, potential launch-orders are being negotiated with INTELSAT
for the Intelsat 5 and Intelsat 6 satellites, with INTELSAT (Canada), with
Austral~.a for the Domsat sai~ellites, and with the American companies: GTE, ATT,
HCI and Southern Pacific Company.
- 28
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ARIANE LAUNCH SCHEDULE TO 1985
_ (Source: Arianespace - February 1981)
.
~ D~te Tir Fusi~ Sablllt~~ Et~t
- ` (1) (2) (3) (7)
1979 2q d8cembre L01 ARt ~4~1�~ eessi en vol (pss ds eatellite) Succle
1980 23 m~t L02 AR1 Plrewheel (ESA) + OSCAR 9(AMSAn Echec
1981 luin�Juillet L03 ARt Meteo~et 2(ESA) t APPLE (Inde) F
Octobre L04 AR1 MARECS�A (ESA) F
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DBc~mbro LS ARt Exotat (ESA) F
1962 Flvrier L6 AR1 MARECS-B (ESA) + Sirlo 2(ESA) F
Avrll U AR1 ECS-1 (ESA) ou Intalsat 5/FB F
lwn LB AR1 ECS-1 (ESA) ou Inteleet ~F8 F
Octobre 19 AA1 Inrolset 5/F7 F
Dicembre Lf0 AR1 InMlsat 5/FB F
1983 Fdvner Ltt ,4R?J3 (5) Llbro
- Avrll ECS-2 (ESA) F
luln Telecom-1A (France) + MARECS-C (ESA) F+ R
AoGt ~~y~
Oetobro Teleeom-1B (Frence) + RCA�H (USA) F t R
- DBcsmbre Arabeet�1 (Llpue Anbe) + We~t~r 6(USA) R+ R
1981 FAvrler Librk
Avril Spot (Frence) + Viking (Subde) F{~ F
luin ou SATCOL-1 (Colombla) + Areb~at-2 R+ R
AoOt N�SAT (Aliemagne) F
- Octobre SATCOL-2 (Colombi�) + TELSAT (Suisa~) R+ R
Deeembre TDF-1 (Fnnce) F
1985 FBvrier ( 5~l.ibn ou L-SAT (ESA) p
Avrll�mal RTL (Luxembourp + TELSAT 2 ou ECS-3 R+ P
luillet GI~1T0 (ESA) R
Septembre AR4 e~6~~~^ ( 5; Lfb~e ~ dspul~ ELA�2 F
Ocrobre
D~esmbre Libre
Key:
1. Launch.
2. Rocket.
3. Satellites.
4. First flight test (no satellite).
5. Free.
6. Fxrst Ariane 4 flight test since ELA-2.
7. Status: Succes =Successful
Echec = Failed
F = Firm
R = Tentative
P = Potential
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Military satellite launchings are also planned for the Ariane launcher: military
telecommunications satellites for the United Kingdom (BMS) an~3 for NATO (NATO-3
D and E).
. In addition, several other launchings for the ESA are now being planned, dates
_ for which have not yet been set: the ECS-3, Meteosat and Hipparcos satellites.
This, however, does not take into account the future European satellites, the
building of which has already been decided (ECS 4 and 5), or very probable ones
(ERS 1 and 2, Spot 2, etc.).
For the 1981-1985 period alone, some 20 firm launchings are expected as of now,
- auguring well for the future of the launcher..., provided the flight tests end
up successful!
COPYRIGHT; A.& C. 1981
9238
CSO: 3100 END
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