JPRS ID: 9622 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090044-1
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 44
• Content Type: REPORTS

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~ JPRS L/9622 .
23 March 1981
I~lear East North Africa Re ort
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(FOUO 1 1 /81)
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NOTE
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Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
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JPRS L/9 622
23 March 1981
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_ NEAR EASTlNORTH AFRICA REPORT ~
- cFOUO ii/sl)
CONTENTS
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Arab Investment Policy Criticized
~ (AL-WATAN AZ-'ARABI, 23-29 J an 81) 1
j ISLANIIC AFFAIRS
~I
lteligious Context of Iran-Iraq War I7iscussed
~ ( AI~-W~TAN AI~-' ARABI, 2-8 J an 81) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . 15
AFGHANISTAN
Afghan Rebels Want More Than 'Half-Hearted Moral Support'
(Renato Ferraro; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 1 Mar 81) .........o. 24
Ethnologist Interviews Nuristan Zeader of Resistance
(Mike Barry; I,E NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 26 Jan 81) 26
.
ALGERIA
! Briefs
uas Price A~reement 35
French Holdings Transferred 35
IRAN
Central Bank Chief Maneuvers for Return of Assets
(8 DAYS, 21 Feb 81) 37
Foreign Pharmaceuticals in Iran To Be Nationalized
- (I,A LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION, 23 Feb 81) 1~0
LIBYA ~
Plan To Buy UK Arms Equipment Reported _
(Victor Walker, David Tonge; FINANCIAL TIME5, 13 Feb 81).... Ltl
' - a - ( III - NE & A - 121 FOUO]
~ r~n i+r~r~~ r rc~~ n~rT v
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_ INTER-ARAx AFFAIRS -
ARAB INVESTMENT POLICY CRITICIZED
I Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 23-29 Jan 81 ~p 43-46
[Article: "Exclusive Report far AL-WATAN p:~-'ARABI: This Is How Arab Funds
_i Escape Abroad"] _
~ [Text] What is the vol~e of Arab investment in real
estate in Europe and the United States?
The assimilation of Arab funds in the homeland requires _
radical changes in economic and financial policies. How -
can we make up far the continuous drain on the oil wells"
AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI has obtained a significant economic document that was recently _
prepared by the Arab League about the flight of Arab funds abroa~. The document
deals with this phenomenon in figures; it deals with its magnitude and its future
repercussions. The study suggests that the assimilation of Arab funds in the home-
, land is one of the necessary solutions for facing the challenges of t~?e future
among which is th~ depletion of the oi1. The document also reviews Arab invest-
ments abroad: in EuXOpe and in the United States; it reviews the prospects of
~ these investments and the dangers that w311 ensue from them. The study~ suggests
numerous solutions for encouraging investtaents ir: Arab countries in lieu of in-
vesting the oil returns in the West especially.
~ The text of the document follows.
I -
i One of the most significant recent developments in the field of oil is that which -
; placed all the countries ef the Arab homeland without exception--those that produce
~ oil as welY as those who do not--on a single road ~or which there was no alterna-
tive. All these countries will be facing a new situation wherein the responsibility -
- and the results will be shared. It will shortly become clear haw the various Arab -
states--those that have a surplus of funds and those that have a dire need for
those funds--will have to fall in line and enter the scene of common action simul- -
taneously. This is based on the fact that those same Arab capital funds will `
find themselves faced with one alternative which in itsel� represents a real
cha.llenge that will knock on all Arab doors and open them. In order to clarify
this statement, this paper will attempt in wha,t follows to reveal the course that
Arab funds may follow 3.n international investments before the matter comes to the -
challenge. The paper will also afterwards identify the areas that will have to be
penetrated.
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Total investments in the world made by the OPEC countries by the end of 1978
amounted to about 168 billion dollars. From this sum the investment,; of the Arab
_ co~intries were estimated to be approximately 140 billion dollars. The following
table indicates the approximate distribution of OPEC's investments by the end of
19i~. ThE table clearly indicates that invesrments made in international money
markets and als~ in the local money markets af r_he industrial countries, and
- especially the United States, constituted the greater and the more significant
spnere for containing the surplus ~ril funds [that were designated] for investment
abroad.
The Estimated Distribution of OPLi;'s Investments by the End of 1978 (in billions
of dollars)
Billion Dollars
Financial investments in international marke*s 60 billion
Financial investments and direct irtvPStments in the
United States 42
Fi.nancial investments and direct investments in other
industrial countries 32
Loans and aid to Third World countries 1~
Loans to other countries (including easteri~ countries) 4
~ Financial contributions to international development ;
organizations 12 '
Total 16$ ~
There is no doubt that money markets abroad provide the oil countries with varied
opp~rtunities for making profitable investments. But these opportunities are tied
to a number of restraints that are inherent in the activity of these markets. To
find out the reality of this matter, it is necessary to follow briefly the existing
conditions in these markets regatding financial investments and also the existing
potential in foreign markets to realize direct productive investments.
Financial Invectments in International Markets
_ International markets are relatively recent markets whose history goes back to the
mid-sixtieso What is intended here are those debts that are supported. by inter-
national currencies and issued by governments and organizations of various nation-
alities. They are distinguished by the fact that they are not subject to the -
_ supervision of the monetary or fis;cal authorities of any one of the countries. -
These mark~ts are "a free financiatl zone" whose sphere of business is located out-
_ side the borders of Gtate~. The credit instruments that are represented by these
markets vary from short-term to mid-tenn and to long-term. International bank
certificates of deposit that are backed by the dollar represent the most important
short-term tools. The international bank lending market represents the foundation
of the mid�-term instrument, whereas international bonds regresent the long-term -
aspect of these markets. Since the aforementioned instruments are all exempt from
taxes to reduce prof.its and from restrictions on currency conversion, they hav~ be~n
- attracting the attention of international investors among whom are Arab investors.
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By observing the conditions of these markets one may conclude that their capacity
remains limited, especially with regard to mid-term and iong-te~ investments. In
this regard thn following facts appear [evident]:
1. According to the latest statistics the exi~r-Lng vc?lume of international certi- -
_ ficates of deposit that are backed b~ the dollar, and these are by nature short-
- term notes, does not exceed 27 billion dollars. It is also evi~ent that these
certificates are quickly affected by what happens in international dollar markets,
in particular, and in the interest rate structure on international currencies
in general. Accordingly, these certificates have to be adjusted continuously to
stay in step with the developments that take plac~ in these two areas. ~t is also
no secret that the pillar of investment in these notes is based on sufficient con-
fidence in the stability of the U.S. dollar or in the expectation tha.t its value
' will increase. This makes it impossible to build a stable investment course on
_ these certificates, not to mention the fact that the scope of this market is
- basically narrow and that it is not suitable for long-term investments.
' 2. The international bank loan market or the international currency market, which _
played a prominent role in financing the ma~or deficits in the balance of payments
~ of the industrial and developing countries, has less ability to groF~ now and, con-
sequently, less ability to absorb oil funds. In addition to the cautious selection
~
i methods that now and then prevail in those markets and limit the scope of thPir
-I business, there is a principal obstacle that basically limits treir direction.
_ This obstacle manifests itself in the tight capital foundations of the international
' banks that do business in those markets. These banks have become so saturated that
i it is no longer easy to borrow and then to lend more oil funds. The lending
~ limits to which these banks can go on the basis of current capital rules have
I reached in some cases disturbing propor:.ions. Since the expansion of the afare- _
mentioned foundations is not possible in the light of existing circumstances in
the international stock markets, it becotnes unll.kely that this market will continue
~ to absorb more oil funds at the same previous rates.
-i '
i 3. The value of existing issues in the international bond market approaches 85
billion dollars. It is important to note here in particular that in addition to
-j the tightness of this market, the dollar is still the principal currency of issue
; in it. This fact also makes investment in this market affected by the fluctuations
in the value of the dollar. This market is also fundamentally influenced by the
developments in the interest rates which are generally short-`erm. This market has
; also been suffering quite early from a basic in~dequacy that leaves evident nega-
i tive results on its growth prospects. This is the inability of its secondary mar-
kets to keep up with the issue activities in the international market. The absence -
of this group that is professionally and financially qualified to assume the
functions of dealing in international bonds and creating the markets that are
necessary ~or them is noticeable.
Financial Ircvestments i^. Foreign Markets
It is understood that compared to international markets local ~preign maxkets are
distinguished by their breadth and tfieir depth. At first, this makes them more
capable than they are to absorb foreign investments and exchanges of variQUS notes
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of indebtedness, consi:dexi,ng the l:iquidi,ty that ~.s guaranteed by thei.x secondaxy
marketa, Also the presence of governmental organizations that support the borrow-
ing organizations during crises gives the foreign investor a measure of assurance _
about the safety of the debt. To some extent, this represents an alternaCive to
- what interna~tional markets offer the foreign investor in the way of SP~'srity that
stems from tlne fact that they are free financial zones in the manner already
mentioned.
But one of the most distinguishing [characteristics]of local forei.gn tnarkets is
that investment in them is in fact subject to national superv~sion by the fiscal -
and monetary authorities of the countries in question. In other words foreign
~ inves~ments always remain subject to legislation enacted by the authorities or
to the rules and measure~ they impose. Tn fact measures to freeze or to confis-
- cate funds are no longer unlikely in the aforementioned markets.
Hence one must not be surprised wizen an observer finds that despite the vast
capacity of these markets, they did not succeed in attracting the necessary
amount of oil funds. Tn fact they did not achieve in this regard what the inter-
national markets ~chieved despite the essential inadequacies from which the latter
- markets suffer in the manner shown above.
- Investments in International Real Estate Msrkets !
Real estate investments are especially attractive to Arab investors inso~ax as
they do not require much management and professional experience in the way that
other investments require. Nevertheless, and contrary to the prevailing belief
in numerous Arab circles, the opportunities that are available to make profitable _
real estate investments outside the Arab region are in fact quite limited.
Actually, there is no real estate investment market in the known sense of the term, "
but there are numerous small markets that are divided and that develop quickly in
a manner that would not allow an investigator to keep up with them with the
required precision. It is also ::mpossible to make accurate quantitative estimates
about the volume of these market:~ even if an attempt were made to list the value
of first class commercial real e~~tate in the principal cities. This is the real
estate tl~~t is considered most atrractive to Arab i.nvestors. One may find an
indicatior; of the tightness of these ma�rkets by noting the volume of annual
business [~ransacted] in them. It has l~een found that business in the investment
- real estate market varies from 1 to 1.5 billion dollars a year in European cities
and that it is almost the same in the Uni.ted States. It is also noteworthy that
the best real estate is presently owned by western corporations, such as insurance
companies, retirement fimds and others. It is known that these corporations re-
frain from liquidating their real estate inveszments unless the temptations to
sell are quite considerable. T_t has been noted that the ~eal estate actiyity of
_ investors is still concentrated ot: commercial real estate and that the trend to
invest in land is still secondary despite the broad prospects that ~uch investments .
may achieve.
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Investment in International Stock Markets
There is no doubt that part of Arab funds will be directed to international stock
markets for two basic purposes: to diversify the components of investors'
investmpnt portfolio and to look for high returns.
_ If at first the markets appear to have a tremendous capacity to absorb Arab funds,
careful scrutiny of this matter will show that in practice the markets are much -
- tighter than they seem to be. Despite the fact that the market value of the
assets of the principal stock markets in the world approach about 1,200 billion
dollars, these estimates decline to less than half that amount with regard to
- their suitability to investment operations. When we surmise about what will be
available for investment, it becomes evident that these markets wi11 not absorb
~ more than 60 billion dollars. There is another exampie a1so: whereas the total
market value of the shares in circulation in the U.S. market amounts to
approximately 628 billion dollars, the ratio of U.S. stock that Arab f~mds can
acquire--without being sub~ect to the provisions of Paragraph 13 D of the U.S.
Stocks and Bonds Law for 1943* and taking into consideration the fact that there
is a minimum required for acquiring capital in U.S. campanies that are likely
- prospects for investment**--does not exceed 2.8 percent of the total value of
U.S. stock in circulation; that is, approximately 17.8 billion dollars. ~
It is evident that, regar~ling stock exchanges in general, a number of matters
_ must be taken into consideration, Such as the financial conditions of the com-
panies in question whose stock is being circulated, the liquidity of this stock,
the good quality of the stock [and its ability] to attract possible investors, ~
and also the legal and technical restrictions that are contained therein or
that are included in the laws that regulate the business of these markets.
~
Direct Investment Outside the Arab Hvmeland
In general, direct investments have recently been receiving increasing attention
from the various'oil export~ng countries due to the relative protection they pro-
vide against the dangers of inflation. Direct investment is simply the ownership
of a long-term productive investment asset.
This kind of investment assumes numerous forms in accordance with a number of
considerations. Some of these consideratiuns pertain to the investar himself, -
whereas others are related to the economic and legislative conditions that exist
in the host country. Without going into many details, the principal forms of this
- investment are as follows:
* Accordi:~~ to this paragraph, ever.y ir_vestor who owns more than 5 percent of the
issued stock has to register with the competent authorities. In this case numerous -
provisions and restrictions apply, especially with regard to the method of selling
the shares and trading in them.
_ The minimum market value required for companies that ar.e likely prospect~ for
investm~nt [consideration] has been considered to be 500 million dollars.
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* Fu11 ownership of an existing pr~ject.
* The creation of a cempletely new project.
~ Participating with others in the creation of a new proje~t.
- * Owning a share in an existing project.
Each one of these forms has its advar.tages and ita dangers. Accordingly, choosing
one of these forms is a matter that is controlled not only by the investor~s
wishes, but there is also a number of factQrs that influence this choice in a
fundamental way.
It need not be said that this kind of investment represents the kind that would
most lfkely fulfill the requirements of Arab investment strategy insofar as it
is the form of investment trrat is most capable of containing the destructive
effects inflation produces on the va~ue of financial assets. In this case the
assets in which the Arab funds are invested axe productive assets and not merely
debts that others are liable for.
It would seem at first that direct Arab investments regard the industrially ad-
vanced countries to be the most suitable locations for making new direct invest-
ments. However, the practical facts do not arouse much optimism in this regard.
Actually, the advanced countries are still legally and p~ychologically unprepared
or unwilling to accept direct investmer.ts in their territories of the magnitiude
that Arab funds can and are being called upon to mobilize for this purpose. In
an attempt to keep track of the total obstacles that limit the capabilities for
the development of direct ir.vestments, it becomes evident that the following group
of obstacles deserve special mention. They are aimed at the investorts freedom to
pursue the following:
_ 1. To purchase a signif~cant share that would give hizn power in an existing
companX.
2. To sell his share in an existing company.
3~ To transfex funds to a speci.fic cvuntry fvr the purpose of making a dixect
investment in accordance with Paragraph I abave.
4. To tr.ansfer ~unds from a specific country as a result of the sale ~f his
- share accor3ing to Paragraph 2 above.
5. To transfer �unds from and to a specific country for the puxpose of lending
or borxowing to make a direct investment.
6. To transfer profits, taxes, interest or serVice fees realized from a direct
investment.
7. To supervise a particular company Uy means vf appoi~nting ceXtain persons to
its management .regardless of their nationality, or jto e�fect such superv3.si,on]
through any other means.
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8. To issuQ shares in the money market of the country where the investment takes
place.
Despite the fact that various officials in the advanced countries are candidly
admitting the import~nt ro~e played by the flow of direct fcr~ign investmen~s in
_ solving a set of similar economic pro~lems, what has been seen i.n practice
suggests that the flow of foreign invesrments will be made to assimme specific forms
and that dixect investments will either come under some supervision or will be
_ channeled into locations that msy not b~ consistent with the aspirations and the
interes~s of Arab investors.
Thus i.t becomes evident that the considerations that make the advanced countries
the most suitable locations for making direct Arab investments on a reasonable
scale do in practice ].ose much of their value. In fact, there are no indications
that existing re~trictions on direct Arab investments w:ill not be devel.oped fur-
ther so as to make them ever. more severe and more complex.
After this quick and brief review of the capabilities of the most important invest-
ment markets outside the Arab axea, we can record a number of rest:lts or facts.
' First, there is no doubt that foreign investment markets with their various tools,
modes and locations will absorb a concrete portion of Arab funds. However, this
Gr3.11 fall short of the levels that Arab funds are expected to reach.
Second, the existing and anticipated opportunity for making direct Arab invest-
I ments is in fact not open, especially with regard to those countries where Arab
funds are supposed to strive to acquire productive assets.
~ Third, the existing structure of Arab investments abroad cannot achieve, accord~
ingly, the Arab investment strategy that is represented in jthe effort to] find
other sources of income to serve as a substitute �or oil. The existing structure
of Arab investments abroad serves the goals. that are comprised in the refinancing
' projects rather well. These projects favor keeping Arab funds as a financing
' source to be utilized to cover the deficits in the current a~counts of advanced
countries. This investment structure is also being exposed to serious dangers as
a result of the wc~rld inflation on the one hand, and of the continuing instability
in the values of curr~ncies, on the other.
Fourth, the only opportunity that Arab oil exporting countries have for redistrib- I
uting their investments in a reasonable way in the interests of productive invest-
ments lies almost exclusively in making their investments, as much as that is
possible and as quickly as possible, in their homeland within the Arab area it-
self. In this regard emot~onal and patriotic considerations that are implied
herein do have now strong, objeciive, scientific support that imbues them with
sound economic logic. In fact these considerations have now taken a back seat to
considerations that are purely econotnic. In other words, it may be said that Arab `
oil exporting countries have "a strategic interest" in pursuing inside the Arab
region broad scale-investment activities with which they can complement their '
foreign investment activity on the basis of the fact that the la.tter (investment
activity) does not achieve this strategic interest for them. On the contrary it
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eludes this interest, and hence, the effort made by the Arab oil exporting
countries to reinforce their investment efforts inside the Arab region by var3ous
_ means is considered strategically justifiable and necessary. '~he statemen~ that
the Arab capacity to absorb these funds is limited has become in itself a strong
reason for developing that market after it had been an excuse for f.leeing it.
Requirements for the Assimilation of Arab Funds in the Homeland
_ The capacity [of Arab investment markets] to absorb Arab funds is to be increased,
and although this is not the place for a discussion about the Arab capacity to
absorb funds, the limitations of that capacity, the ways of ineasuring it and other
such matters that are usually discussed in economics literature and academic
_ efforts that deal with such matters, it would be appropriate to ma.ke a number of
observations in this regard.
_ * The Arab capacity to absorb funds is not static; it is dynamic, and its
activity is increasing constantly whenever any :~f its economic, technical or
human obstacles are surmounted.
* The total capacity of the Arab states to absorb Arab funds exceeds the
aggregate figures of the individual capacities of these states.
~ Whereas the limited capacity to absorb funds tends to have a negative effect on
_ an investment decision, a decision to invest does represent a significant positive
factor in the capacity to absorb funds.
* The notion of the Arab capacity to absorb funds is c~nstrued here in the broad
sense, and thus it differs from what is applied in economic ~nd financial circles
abroad. Whereas these czrcles concur that the capaci~y to absorb funds represent~
"the value of the total investment opportimities that can be utilized successfully
within a specific period," in the Arab economy [this definitionJ must go beyond the
word, "opportunities," and the term, "successfully." The [relevantJ standard
here is need and not opportunity. The projects whose creation is being callecl
for may not always have a rewarding and an immediate commercial retux~n. No one
_ is unaware of the tremendous volume of investments in infrastructure projects
that are needed by numerous countries of the Arab homeland.
Other Requirements for the Assimilation of Arab Funds in the Arab Homeland
On the other hand the assimilation of Arab funds in the Arab homeland not only
calls for, but also prescribes the introduction into the Arab homeland of radical
and significant changes that include the modes of in~~estment and financing. These
changes also include economic and financi~l policies as well as other existing
legislation :!n this regard. In addition, quantitative a:1d qualitative changes are
to be introduced into the current avenues of credit and investment. This is be-
cause the assimilation of Arab funds in the homeland will naturally cause a
simultaneous fundamental cnange in tlie commodity production market and in the
factors of production.
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_ As far as the production of goods is concErned, the nsture of Arab f~zds--as
large as they are--is such that it would require and would make possible the
establishment of a series of projPCts or industries which by their very nature
require large capitals. Such praj ~cts require that consumer markets be guarantee3
so that these products can be sold outside the regional borders of the project
itself. This in itself will be a factor that will directly destroy those barriers
that limit the expansion of the market; it also represents one of the practical
aspects for developing the Arab capacity to absorb funds. It is evident that
great care will be exercised in the aforementioned projects to ensure that the
market has sufficient scope for their products so that these projects can benefit
from the large-scale economics with the numerous savings that reduce the cost of
prociuction.
There is no doubt that the proliferation of major projects and various production
activities in the Arab homeland will further the ties of production among these
, projects. It will also increase existing and latent opportunities for invest~a~nt
! in the Arab economy, and it will attract a series of long-term investment
, initiatives, In this case the expansion of the market--which is one of the aspects
of growth in the capacity t~ absorb funds--will play a praminent role in the con-
I tinuation of this growth.
~
On the other hand the assimilation of Arab funds in the aforementioned manner will
make it incumbent upon the various parties to provide a suitable climate for
~ investment that would provide an adequate measure of benefits, terms and exer~ptions
to encourage the flow of investments to the Arab money markets, and this is what
~ we c~ri? 1 now discuss.
I
Arab Money Markets
i
i Anticipated trends indicate that the coming years will place the Arab region face
to face with a major challenge to which hitherto it has not been accustomed. On
the one hand we find that the Arab cour~tries that are principal producers of oil
i will continue to accumulate huge monetary funds even after the meet the financing
requirements for local development. It is inevit~ble that these resources will
i be invested to generate a permanent source of income, considering that the oil
I resource i~ depletable. Qn the other hand, f inancial and foreign resources will
continue to play a principal role in encouraging the development and investment
capacities of the ether Arab countries and in bringing about the success of their
efforts to improve their citizen s' standard of living.
Hence the ma3or cha11e?1ge that the Arab region will face lies in following a long-
term investment strategy that would achieve in a practical sense a deep-rooted
congruence between the interests of all the oil producing Arab countries and the
Arab countries that need capital. This matter requires intense efforts to overcome
the obstacles that limit the capacity of the Arab region to assimilaCe new invest-
ments that are generated by capital and oil funds. [WhPn we speak of] the capacity
to assimilate funds in this regard, we mean the ubility to use the financial aicl
that is available in addition to the ability to attract financing that is offered
on competitive, commercial hases through Arab money markets. Thus, e~;isting
investment procedures in the Arab region can join comparable procedures that exist
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outside the area, or they can compete with them in attractin~ Arab financiaZ
resources that are availeble fo�r investment. Such a view does in fact make the
role of Arab financial mediation an important one with regard to the effort to
- assimilate funds in *_k~e homeland and, accordingl.y, increase the volume and the
effectiveness of the tlow of private anc~ public capital into the Arab region.
� In recent years Arab oovernments that have funds have made increasing efforts to
direct part of their fir.ancial resources to the Arab countries that need them.
This was basically manifested in the development efforts of Arab official organi-
. zations and development corporations. It was als~ manifested in the efforts to
increase the volume of direct governmenti loans, aids and grants to support
3evelopment proj ects, to alleviate some of the difficulties that are the result
of a shortage of foreign currencies or to f inance some of these countries' basic
imports.
With regard to the f low of capital into the area on a commercial and a private
basis, available data indicate that this flow remalns limited. Organizational
- ~actors and ecnnomic policies in numerous Arab countries are considered responsible
for this, and, accordingly, it is not curious to find that most of the activity
of private capital in the region has con tinued to assume until the early seventies
the form of transfers sent to their country by citizens working outside their
country.
One of the most prominent indicators of the fact that the financial flow of funds
into the region on a commercial basis is limited may be the ~ncreasing volume of
_ loans that have taken place and that are still taking place in the interests of
Arab lenders (governments and private organizations) through international money
- markets. These are either Arab loans ma.de through international bonds or through
international bank loans. Th~s observation in itself is enough to indicate the
existence of a real shortage in the process of inediation between those for whom
liquidity is availab le and those who are actually creating the demand for financial
liquiaity through the Arab money markets and in a purely commercia~ standard.
Available statistics indicate that the volume of actual borrowing executed in the
interest of Arab borrowers in the international bond market between 1972 and 1978
in the form of public issues and private off ers amounted to about 1.5 billion
dollars. Algeria headed the list of Arabs who borrowed through international
bonds. Algeria alon e borrowed 1.2 billion dollars or about 80 percent of the
origina.l sum. In fact Algeria has anticipated the various developing countries in~
general in gozng to the international bond market as a borrower since 1972. It
- is known that the international bond market is considered one of the moxe advanced
international markets that is usually entered only by countries and corporations
whose financial posture is good and are acceptable to international invPStors,
and especially individual internat~.onal investors.
Available data also indicate that between 1971 and 1978 the volume of pub~ic and
' private Arab loans in the international bank loan market--these are loans with
floating interest and are in the Porm of collective bank loans--amounted to 14.5
billion dollars. These loans were financing specific projects, and they were
f inancing deficits in the balances of payments and in the regular and development
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budgets. It is noteworthy that this figure includes only those loans that have
= be~n announced. The banks guard the detailed conditions of many of the loans
- granted in this market with some secrecy. They do not announce those conditions;
sbmetimes this is accordin~ to the wishes of the borrower himself. Accordingly,
the actual figure for the total volume of Arab borrowing from the international
bank loan market in the period we are referring to may not be less than 15
billion dollars.
_ Thus total Arab borrowing--public and private--from international money marke~s
from 1971 to 1978 amonnted to approximately 16.5 billion dollars. This is in
addition to the other international sources of capital tha.t are generally available,
especially in the form of credit terms o~fereu by suppliers and also short-~term
financing whose figures would be difficult to determ:i.ne because it is not possible
_ to obtain statistics in this regard. The anticipated trends indicate that these
borrowings are escalating. It may be useful to point out here that the increased
Arab borrowing from the internatioral money market in recent years has in fact
represented a course that is consistent with the different Third Wor1d countries
whose borrowings from international markets have increased considerably in general,
and especially af.ter oil prices were corrected in 1973.
International money markets have in fact not only ensured the long-term needs of
Arab borrowers, but they have also ensured the suitable investment outlets for a
significant portion of the accumulated surplus Arab funds, as has already been
mentioned. This is due to the multiplicity and the variety of investment terms
and marketing benefits that these markets can offer.
Thus it becomes clearly evident that the Arab region has seen an actual commercial
demand for mid-term and long-term borrowing. This is undoubtedly one of the indi-
- cators of the Arab capacity to absorb funds. This demand has been growing
steadily, and financing it has been ensured through the international money
markets. These markets are still ensuring thi~ demand for loans in larger volumes.
In return, the Arab oil exporting countries have amassed huge financial resources
after 1973, most of which were invested in the numerous outlets of the inter-
national money market and also in the local money markets abroad. This matter does
undoubtedly point to a real inad~quacy in the commercial flow of funds among the
Arab countries. It also points to the weaic presence of an Arab money market or
markets that would mediate between those who have the funds and those with the
actual commercial demand for longer-term funds. This weakness exists despite the
capabilities tha.t are available and the growing need to ensure this mediation to
achieve a financial balance in the Arab region as a whole.
Foreign Arab Investment in the Eighties
The rates at which Arab financial funds axe being atnassed, as these are indicated
by future trends, make it necessary now more than any other time in the past, that
a serious search be made into the ideal method for disposing o� these funds and
into devising suitable investment plans and strategies. Because of the latent
importance of this matter we must always be aware o� the real proportions of a
number of principal elements included in the task of plan.-~ing foreign investments.
- This is because investment prospects, standards and priorities do not in fact
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~
assume a specific form that remains constant or that is suitable for application
in all cases. These change with the nature of the investment, the nature of the
investor and the nature of the invested capital, as well as the Financial and
direct investment and even non-investment developments that are available in
foreign markets. It is also essential to remain continuously informed about tt:e
total proportions of the investment effort since this is the only guarantee thaC `
such an effort would be in good order, realistic and hence sound. Investing in a
specific location, in a specific form or for a specific period of time is in fact
an alternative to another investment in another location and for another period
of time.
The investment of Arab funds will face numerous choices and prospects with regard
to the location, the nature, the form or the duration of the iiivestment. However,
the multiplicity of choices and prospects does not necessarily mean that these _
choices and prospects will be enough to absorb the expected volumes of funds with
the efficiency and soundness that is hoped for, but [rather] it primarily means
that these choices and prospects are varied and that they consequently include a
large number of technical and non-technical considerations. Accordingly, making
an investment choice will sometimes be a delicate matter, and other times it will
be difficult. It is this that may in practice shrink these choices and radically
limit their practical worth.
If the period between 1974 and 1978 saw the onset of the accumulation of oil funds
to the poi:nt when these funds reached approximately 168 b illion dollars by the end ~
- of 1978 for all the OPEC countries, future indicatora--based on recent and
expected increases in oil prices and also the world conditions of supply and
demand for oil at present and in the future--point to the fact that the accumulation
[of funds] will take place at rates that are higher than those of the next few
years. In this regard it is expected that accumulated OPEC funds will rise to 90
billion dollars by the end of 1980 and that the sum total of these funds will
come to 308 billion dollars by the end of this year.
Expectations for the years after 1980 indicate tfiat the cumulative trend for these '
funds, most of which are Arab, will continue at least at the same previous rates.
It is thus expected that by the end of 1982 total OPEC funds will amount to over
450 billion dollars and to over 550 billion dollars by the end of 1985.
- In view of this expected accumulation of funds in the eighties, the need to draw
up new and suitable strategic plans for investing these funds ~s now n~ less
important than the need for any other plans devised by the Arab nation for its
short-term, mid-term or long-term future. It has'~become necessary to assimilate
in the homeland significant portions of these financial funds in the seventies.
From now on this cooperation will become a historical necessity that will thrust
itself on the various locations o~ the Arab economy both with regard to those
countries that have a surplus or those that have a dire need for those funds.
Whereas it will become clearer for those who have funds that prospects for safe
and profitable investments outside the Arab hameland will remain tight, the
_ Arab capacity to absorb funds wiil in return emerge as unlimited. It will be
_ possible to prave this by increasing the efforts to examine closely the oppor-
tunities and the needs that may be financed and that are suitable for investment
inside the Arab homeland.
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The need to devise new strategic plans for Arab investment abroad and for the
_ assimilation of more Arab funds in the homeland in the eighties will not anly be
a reflection of the larger volumes of accumulated funds that are expected, but
= this need will become an i~uportant part of tnose plans as a result of notable
~levelopments that have occurred and that will occur in international money markets.
These developments ~~Ti.ll have a direct effect on determining the form in which Arab
funds will be investEd in the future.
~
Conclusion and Suggestions
1. The present condition of the structure of Arab investments abroad does not
achie~=e the Arab investment stratEgy that is represented in finding real sources
of revP:iues that are ongoing and that wi1Z take the place of oil. The current
structure of these investmezts keeps the Arab fwnds as a financing source to be used
only in covering the current deficits of the countries of the world. This structure
is also sub3ect to tremendous obvious and latent dangers.
' 2, It thus becomes evident that the Arab countries that have surplus monetary
funds beyond their f inancial needs have a strategic interest in pursuing inside the
A~ab region broad-scale investment activities caitfi which they can complement their _
foreign investment activities. [It is evident] that the only opportunity which
these countries have to effect a reasonable redistributi~n of their investments
in favor of productive investments lies only in making their investments, as much
~ as that is possible, inside the Arab region itself.
~ 3. Thus the challenge that the Arab region is facing lies basically in the pursuit
' of a long-term investment strategy that would in practical terms achieve a deep-
~ rooted congruence between the intere~ts of the Arab oil producing countries and
i
i those of the Arab countries that need capital, This matter requires intense efforts _
so that the obstacles that would limit the capacity of the Arab region to absorb -
the new investments that are generated by the oil funds can be surmounted. In this
i context the capacity to absorb funds is the ability to use the financial aid that
! is available as well as the ability to attract tinancing that is offered on commer-
~ cial, competitive bases through the mediation of Arab money markets,
I
4. The rates at which Arab funds are being amassed, as indicated by future trends,
make it necessary, now more than any other time in the past, that appropriate Arab -
investment plans abroad be formulated quickly and that signif icant portions of
the funds be assimilated in the area through Arab money markets. This in fact will -
- not only reflect larger volurtnes of fund accumulation, but it will also be in part
~ the result of notable developments that will take place in money markets abroad,
5. It is not unlikely in the future that different Arab investors will compete _
with each other to benefit from investment opportunities abroad which will actually
be limited ~ust as we already mentioned. Accordingly, the minimum principal com-
ponents in the agencies that are responsible for Arab investments must be available
~ so they can confront those missions that must be confronted in Che future stage.
Briefly, those missions are:
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A. These agencies are to have adequate capabilities in the area of making -
_ financial. investigations and inquiries into the areas and locations of i.nvestment
abroad; they are to guide [investors] to them or to warn [investors] against them.
_ B. These agencies are to be capable of making investments in "real assets" tihat
would make up for the continuuus drain on the oil resources and would be consistent
with the national interest.
~ C. These agencies are to be of the caliber that would make them carry out relatively
major inuestment operations abroad that are consistent with the objectives that
have been set.
D. The preceding analysis leads simply to the affirmation that cooperation and
coordina.tion between various agencies that are responsible for the investment of
Arab funds abroad are important. As a preliminary step this coordination and
- cooperation can begin, for example, between a number of official investment
agencies that are geographically close--the Arabian Gulf and the Arab Maghreb,
for example. These are the agencies that in practice are responsible for the
management of the official reserves. A few formulas for such cooperation may be
proposed such as forming a league for the corporations or agencies that work in
the field of investments. These corporations or agencies would meet periodically
and regularly for consultations, for drawing up investment policies and fcr ;
coordinating their activities.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI -
8592 -
CSO: 4802
1~.
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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS
RELIGIOUS CONTEI~~ OF IRAtd-IRAQ WAR DISCUSSID
, Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 2-8 Jan 81 pp 16-19
,i [Article: "The Shi'ites and the Persians: The Persians Became Shi'ites but
I Refused To Turn Power Over to Descendants of 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib"]
i
! [Text] The Iraqi-Iranian war.. proved that national affilia-
~ tion i~ stronger than sectarian aff iliation. The imams of
I the prophet's family told the Persians, "0, people, show
I us the same love you have for Islam; no sooner were we beset
i by your love, than it became a disgrace to us.
-i
Ever since the Ottoman and French occupations Iran has been
I trying to obliterate the Arab character and national struggle
~ of M~ount f Amil in I,ebanon.
i
; War between two neighboring nations has not been a forbidden matter, an unlikely
' possibility or a unique phenomenon in human and political history since nations
~ cannot choose their neighbors, control their conduct and prescribe neighborly
manners to them.
But the growing fury of a di~pute and the reinfoxcement of a contradiction among
~ the groups and ethnic elements of one of the nations are matters of great concern
because they threaten the cohesiveness of that nation, they impede its growth and
' development, they weaken its character and they cause it to lose confidenc.a in it-
~ self. Finally, they divert it of the sense of being one nation and not nations or
~ groups that P~ght and contradict each other.
- What is happening today on the Arab nation's territory and borders is somettiing
of this nature. With all the signs of anxiety over the �uture of coexistence be-
tween two large nations such as the Arab nation and the community of Iranian
peoples and w3.th all the warnings about the danger to the security and the peace
of the eastern wing of the Arab homeland, the Arab nation's war with Iran is
neither curious nor surprising in the history of human or international relations.
But it ~s the paroxysm of contradictions and struggles among the ethnic elements
and groups that make up the Arab nation which arouses concern, grief and sorrow.
It is th3s paroxysm of contradictions and struggles that does in fact constitute
the real threat to the cohesiveness of the Arab nation and to its faith that it is
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a nation and not a group of tribes, sects or old families that ha~~e compromised
and reached a settlement or that are killing and fighting each other.
The appearance of one contradiction would be a natural and a self-evident matter,
but the flare-up of all the contradictions at once leads one to believe ratheY
strongly that there is a designed plan to kindle disputes and struggles; that
controversies are deliberately contrived and fihat there is an intention to dwell
on every dissimilarity and distinction in the Arab body.
It were as though planners were not satisfied with the fact that the remains of
the Arab nation are scattered into separate and divided entities and spurious
borders and barriers i.hat crop up here and there in the face of any rapprochement
or integration, so they are now trying to affect the Arab fabric most deeply.
They are trying to separate its warp from its woof; and they are trying to awaken
all the dormant grudges and sensitivites in its unconscious. Time should have
obliterated, effaced or at least benumbed those grudges and sensitivities.
Enflaming the dispute between the Sunnis an~ the Shi'ites is the latest addition
to the designed plan of carefully tearing apart the Arab nation and shaking its
organic composition. There is an untiring media and propaganda effort that is
concentrating on reminding the two sects day and night of the political fighting,
the sectarian and religious disputes and the ideological and mythological dif-
ferences that exist in their ancient history.
These latent contradictions that 1ie dormant beneath the surface of the mutual
peaceful coexistence between the two major Islamic sects in the Arab nomeland
used to appear until a few years ago as remnants of the hateful past. In fact,
this futile fighting and killing with which successive generations tia.ve been
preoccupied for many longs periods of time throughout history arou~sed laughter
and ridicule among the intellectual and educated ~nembers of both sects.
Today, Shi'ites in the Arab world are being addressed as a religious minority and
stirred up by outsiders on various broadcast wave lengths. On a social level,
they are being made to feel deprived and poor as though deprivation and poverty
were their exclusive domain simply because they are a religious or a sectarian
minority and not because deprivation and poverty are the lat of the vast majority
o~ the masses in Arab societies whe~her they are Sunnis or Shi'ites.
On the political lev~l the Shi'ites are reminded through the use of inflammatory
propaganda of the fact that they are second class citizens: under unjust Sunni
regimes they have all the duties but not all the rights. It were as though the
~ popular and the partisan struggle were aimed at getting human and constitutional
rights for the Sunnis only and not for the members of other sects and denominations,
or as though the aim of the struggle was to keep the members of these sects and
denominations the prisoners ef the Sunni majority or in the back of their politi-
ca1 bag.
On the denominational and sectarian level, the religious sentiments of the Shi'ites
are being addressed and enflaTned by retninding them of all the tragedies and mis-
fortunes in their history. All their emotional distress, their romantic inclination
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_ to be aroused and provoked to extremes are being exploited, and then all these
agitated hostilities are channeled into a collision course with their Sunni
citizens.
These cancentrated addresses to the Shi'ites were accompanied by the awakening o~
religious emotions, and they were in keeping with the plan that sought to drive
the wedge of a contrived contradiction between Arabism and Islam. But this con-
trived provocation of the Shi'ites in Iraq, in the Arabian Gulf and in Lebanon
reached its peak only after the religious clergy in Iran succeeded in overthrowing
the monarchy and the regime of the Pahlavi dynasty.
- The Overthrow of the Alleged Trusteeship
The religious v~eil was removed, and the religious establishment in Iran set it-
, self up as the protector of the sanctuary for the "persecuted" Shi'ite sect,
- relying on the historical denominational relationship between Arab Shi'ites and
; the Shi'ites of Persia. While the "expert theologian" Khomeyni was promising
Yasir 'Arafat that he would end the role of "the Iranian policeman" in the Gulf
and reconsider the question of the three islands that Iran usurped from the United
j Arab Emir~tes in 1971, Khomeyni's ayatollahs were distributing roles [among them-
; selves]. Rohani was asking for Bahrain; Khalkhali was threatening to destroy Arab
regimes; Beheshti was organizing tr~e al-Da'wah [Appeal] Party to overthrow the
Iraqi regime through the use of violence and terror; and Ghotbzadeh, the chief of
~ radio and television, ~as broadcasting three programs in Ara_~ic to arouse the senti-
; ments of the Shi'ites in Iraq and in the Gulf.
i
~I This Persian "trusteeship" may have succeeded in sensi.tizing Arab Shi'ites to what
' was happening in Iran more than it did succeed in turning them against the Arab
' regimes. The evidence is that all the provocation programs and plans yielded
nothing but individual incidents such as aborted political assassination attempts
~ in Iraq. The denominational provocation in Kuwait end~~d with the exile of Sayyid
i 'Abbas al-Mihri and his Persian family from the country; Muhammad Hadi riadrasi was
' exiled from Bahrain; and there was a limited demonstration in the eastern re~ion
' of Saudi Arabia.
i
Pictures of Khomeyni have now disappeared or almost disappeared from the markets in
I the Arabian Gulf. They had awakened in people's hearts a spontaneous enthusiasm
- for his regime, not because of "repression and terror" as Ghotbzadeh's broadcasts
were claiming, but rather as a result of the symptoms of ~hakiness, fragmentation
and chaos in Iran itself and as a result of the religious revolution's devastating
' failure after almost 2 years to come up with a political Islam in a revolutionary
and a contemporary context.
Then came the Iraqi-Iranian war and established the practical evidence that the
Persian trusteeship of the Arab Shi'ites was invalid. The Shi'ite revolution did
not occur in Iraq, and "the minority" in the Gulf did not take action.
It is no secret that the Iraqi forces that are fighting inside Iranian territory
as well as the ~orces of the popular army that are gua,rding the supply and munitions
lines behind the cor~uat lines include large numbers o� Axab ShiTites in Iraq. Those
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people are fighting side by side; they are fighting enthusiastically, forcefully
and with the same spirit of self-sacrifice and heroism with which their Sunni
comrades in arms are fighting.
It 3.s no secret that thousands in the Iraqi armed forces who lost their livea while
putting down the al-Barzani rebel~ion were Arab Shi`ites. They were killed by
insurgents' bullets that settled in their hearts and in their bodies. These
_ bullets were supplied by Iran. Arab Shi'ites were killed by shr~pnel from the
bombs and the rockets that the Iranian forces were firing from ~;ehind the bordexs.
National affiliation prevailed over alZ the claims of the alleged denominational
trusteeship and the poisonous propaganda it broadcast over the air and across the
= border. Credit here is due to proper political and national education. This is
a point in favor of the Ba'th party in its steadfast struggle to make the young
generations' awareness of their national affiliation overcome all th~ obstacles of
- regi~nal, racist or denominational sensitivities and grudges. This is the only
way a sound and healthy Arab society can be built.
The fact that Khomeyni's regime has concentrated on the Ba'th Party is only a tacit
recognition of the party's ability to penetrat? denominational sensitivities a~.d
historical grudges to add young Shi'ites to its ranks in Iraq and Lebanon. The
Persian campaign against the party was intense to the point of suggesting to its
_ supporters in Lebanon that they carrq out a physical liquidation campaign. The
victims of that campaign became a number of Shi'ites who insisted on continuing
their struggle in the ranks of the party as evidence of their preference for a
broad nationalist affiliation to all other narrow affiliations and ties.
- The Persian trusteeship of Arab Shi'ites is not a new phenomenon. It goes way back
_ into Islamic history, and it goes to the heart of religious and denominational
disputes in Tslam. It is interspersed urlth and overlaps these disputes with hidden
_ and evident racial and pol~tical movements and ideological, psychological and
- social differences.
If the opportunity is not available h~re for a detailed and an accurar_e review of
history, which would be contained in the thoughts and written works of a careful
_ and scrupulous researcher, we must pause at certain significant historical junc-
tures of the Shi'ite denominational movement in order to explain the Persian-Arab
_ relationship.
Ever since the [beginning of] man's known history Iraq has been the scene of an
Aryan-Semitic dispute in all its military, politiical, religious and cultural forms.
The Persian-Arab relationship comes tinder the framework of this dispute. In fact,
it is one of its most prominent stages and features since the Persians are Aryans
and the Arabs, Semitic. However, an awareness of this racial distinction is neither
evident nor understood in Islamic history.
In the year 3,000 or 2,000 B.C, the Elamites, an Aryan people that had settled in
the mountains of Khuzestan or Arabistan, exchanged destructive invasions with the
- Akkad and Sumer, then with the states of Babylonia and Assyria in Iraq until the
kings of Assyria were able to crush the state of Elam in the 7th century B.C.
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Never again were they to stand on their feet. History is repEated itself. One
of the decisive battles was fought between Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon and the
Elamites on the banks of the Karkheh River which was recently the scene of
savage fighting between Iraqi and Iranian forces.
Then the Persians under the leadership of Cyrus, who was immortalized by the Shah
- a few years ago, invaded the Chaldean Empire and demolished it in 539 B.C. Their
- occupation of Iraq came to an end when they retreated in front of Alexander of
Macedonia in 331 B.C. But then they returned to Iraq and established their king-
doms in the cities. The reign of the Sasanid Empire came to an end with the Arab
Islamic conquest when Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas scored a decisiue victory for the Arabs
in the battle of al-Qadisiyah in 636 A.D. (16 Hegjra).
The Arab Islamic conquest was not the first time that the Arabs had come into con-
_ tact with the Persians. This conquest was preceded by confrontations the most
important of which had been the battle of Dhi Qar in which the Arabs were vic-
torious. That battle had given the Arabs their first sense of national aware-
ness during their pre-Islamic state.
Persians' Predominance over the Arabs
After the battle of al-Qadisiyah and the Arab conquest of ~exsia, the Persians
adopted Islam, but they never forgot their defeat in al-Qadisiyah. When the
Persian Abu Lu'lu'ah killed Caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, who had led the Arab
armies to liberate Iraq, he declared in a reference to the battle of al-Qadisiyah,
"'Umar had broken my heart!"
,ti �
The Arab-Persian struggle with all its racist features, its cultural dif~exences
and its religious backgrounds continued under the Islamic umbrella. From the be-
ginning the Persians had felt supei�ior to the Arabs, and they had magnified the
significance of their defeat at their hands. However, they were not satisfied with
adopting a negattve posture towards the Arabs. They learned the Arabic language,
and they involved themselves in the substance of political Arab disputes. For the
vast ma~ority the goal of such participation and interference was to conspire
against the Arabs, to overthrow their government and ultimately to take over power.
Arab society is a devout Isla~nic society. In the Fersians' effort Lo achieve their
_ political goals, the only thing they could do was to ride the tide of religion.
At the same time they did everything fn their power to kindle political and
denominational disputes among the Arabs. The source of their extreme resentment of
the Umayyad state was its devotion to its Arab character. When the iFinayyad ruler
was overthrown, the Khurasan army in the countries of the Arab Maghreb resozted to
killing every Arab prisoner whose name was Mu'awiyah, Marawan or Sufyan.
The Persians ha.d more prominence under the Abbasids than under the Umayyads.
They became min3,sters under the Abbassids. The Arab caliph was the sovereign, but
it was the Persian ministers that had the executive power. However, it was when
the Persians immersed themselves in the heat of the struggle between the Sunnis and
the Shi'ftes that they truly revealed thetaselves to the Arabs.
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- Arab Shi'ites are almost the first political par*_~ in Islam in today's sense
[of a political ~artyJ. At the outset under the administr2.tion of Caliph 'Uthma.n
ibn 'Affan the Shi'ite faction was centered around claiming the succes~ion for
'A11 ibn Abi Talib, may God be pleased w~th him. It ~�as a politicaY disp~~te _
- between the ma~ority and the Shi'ite minority over the right of the prophet's _
- family to the succession.
The Shi'ite movement assumed its organizational and propaganda framework in the
'Umayyad age. Its martyr al-Husayn ibn 'Ali ibn Abi Talib had given the movement
in Karbala' its revolutionary and vengeful impetus. Nevertheless, it had remained
until that time with its political, reformist framework.
- The theological and ideological sense of the Shi'ite faith emerged early under the
_ Abbassid caliphate and became crystallized in the ideas and individual interpre-
tations of Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq who was a contemporary of Caliph al-Mansur. If
openness and independent judgments are the two p rincipal features of Shi'ite
- thought, independent ~udgments opened the door wide to immoderation in explaining
- and interpreting [matters] to the point of [generating] conflict, contradiction _
and fabrication. Accordingly, this Ied to the creation of scores of Shi'ite
groups or groups that are considered Shi'ite. Perhaps the most important of these _
are the Ismailis, the al-Shibayis, the al-Kisanis, the al-Nusayris and the Agha
Khanis.
The Persians adopted the Shi'ite message in the Abbassid age. They had a negative
influence on it, contributing to the fragmentation of Shi'ites into factions and
groups. Because of their pre-Islamic religious, philosophical and cultural back-
grounds, they exaggerated [their negative influence on the Shi'ite faith] to the
point that some of these groups may be classified as inventions that have n~ re-
lationship whatsoever with the substance if Islam. The history of the literary
movement wl::':h opposed Arab supremacy is full of Persian political and literary _
names that include ministers from al-Bannecide and the people of Sahl as well as
the poet Abu Nuwas.
Despite this Persian enthusiasm for adopting the Shi'ite faith, the Persians never
ut~lized their prestige and their executive power to transfer the succession from
the Abbassids to the 'Alawis. Tn fact, they did everything in their power to
prevent any conciliation between those who subscribed to the succession going to
the prophetfs uncle and those who subscribed to the succession of the prophet's
immediate family. The positi~n of the 'Alawi imams on the factionalism of the
Persians fluctuated between going along with them, being lenient and accepting
them or opposing, reprimanding and rebuking them to the point of condemning them
' for exaggerating their appeal and over explaining and interpreting it in a manner
that is removed from the spirit and the substance of the pure religion. One time
Imam 'Ali ibn al-Husayn ibn Zayn al-'Abidin exclaimed at them in a Hashemite fit
of anger, "Oh ye people, show us the same love pau show for Islam. No so~ner were
we beset by your love, tilan it became a disgrace to us."
Not only did the Persians use the Shi'ite faith as a vehicle to achieve their
political ob~ectives, but they also turned it into a shield for their distinctive
Persian character to make it easy for themselves to take action within an Islamic
framework to achieve their racist ob3ectives. _
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The state of the Buwayhids was the first separatist Persian state. It turned
the Abbassid caliphate into a nominal institution, and it tried to transfer its
institutions, its landmarks and its cultural centers to Persia. But despite
its predilection to the Shi'ite faith, it never thought of handing over the
government to the members of the 'Alawi family. All that it did was devise the
al-Husayn-style funerals.
After the state of the Buwayhids and the state of Khwarizm Iran, the Persian Vizir
Mu'ayyad al-Din ibn al-'Alqami, the m~.iister of al-Musta'sim Billah began writing
to Hulagu the commander of the Mongols encouraging him to invade Baghdad. Hulagu
, di3 in fact follow the advice of another Persian, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, and he
overran the city in 656 Hegira. The number of his victims came to 800,000 ~
residents of the city, both Sunnis and Shi'ites.
; Then the al-Safavid Dynasty in the Persian region of Azerbaijan flourished in the
latter part of the 15th century A.D., and it was a perf.ect example of Persian
i racism. Its sultans made the Persian language the official language, and to re-
duce the resentment against them, they approached the Shi'ite scholars and used
~ force to impose the Shi'ite faith [on the people]. However, they did damage to
i the 12th al-Ja'fari denomination to which most of the Shi'ites belong today.
! These are glimpses and intervals of Persian history with the Arabs and with Arab
Shi'ites in particular. There is not enough scope here to review the Persian
additions to the Shi'ite groups. Th?se additions led some of the groups to stray
from the true substance of the religion and aroused many religious and bloody
disputes not only between the Sunnis and the Shi'ites, but also among the Shi'ites ~
themselves.
-I Despite all this, the modern Arab awa.kening stayed away from sectarian and
denominational sensitivites after the Arabs recovered from the fires of Ottoman
cdlonialism and from the fires of the Persian political and religious trusteeship
before the Ottoman colonialism.
During the revolution of the twenties (1920) Iraq, which fc.~r several centuries
=I had been the scene of denominational and racial disputes between the Persians _
i and the Arabs, stood with its Sunni and Shi'ite citizens against the plans of
British colonialism to affirm its Arab character. The Shi'ites took part in
-I drawing up the political program of the mode~~n Iraqi Arab state. -
I The Shi'ites in (Jabal 'Amil) in south Lebanon have Arab origins and belong to
; the 'Amilah al-Saba'iyah tribe that emigrated from Yemen to the outermost parts
of Syria after the destruction of the Ma'rib dam.
_ Shi'ite religious scholars and intellectuals from south Lebanon took part in the
appeal for Arab nationalism during the final days of the Ottoman Empire and they
were represented in the secret conferences that have been held since 1877. In
fact, the scholar al-Sayyid Muhaumiad al-Amin demonstrated his extremist Arabism
at the Damascus Conference by advocating revolution. He took part in pledging
allegiance to Prince 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri, as prince of Syria.
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When the banners of the independent Arab state were unfurled ~,n Damascus in 1918,
the citizens of (Jabal 'Amil) were at the forefr~nt of its supporters. That
support was an expression of their faith ln their deep-rooted Arab affiliation, _
but it subjected them to the wi:ath of the French who imposed on them a heavy fine
of 100,000 pounds in gold. But this did not dissuade them from this faith desp ite
the aspecr.s of backwardness, deprivation, poverty and feudalism that enveloped
their region.
Today, Khomeyni's Iran is trying to obliterate the Arab character of (Jabal 'Amil)
by reviving the narrow sectarian spirit in the hearts of its residents and young -
people and giving the armed Amal Movement a sectarian nature. This placed the
Amal Movement in a heated confrontation with the national parties and forces and _
with the Palestinian Revolution, and it encouraged Sa'd Haddad, the pioneer of
cooperation with Israel, to clai.m that the militias of the Ama.l Movement were tak-
ing part in his "victorious" attacks on Palestinian positions.
There are three factors that control the Persian appeal to the Arab Shi'ites in
Iraq and in the Gulf to rebel against the regimes and the societies where they
live with their blood brothers and their historical brothers.
� The first one of these factors is the lack of political experience in the ruling
establishment in Iran. This establishment believes that it would be easy to set
up Khomeyni as the leader of the Muslims in the world simply because he overthrew -
the government in his country. The ruling establishment in Iran believed that it
would be easier [than it turned out to be] to export Khomeyni's revolution with
all its chaos and its impotence to the Islamic world and especially to the neigh-
boring Arab countries. This lack of political experience is mixed with Persian
ignorance of the nature and substance of the Arab National Movement.
Arabism in modern Arab history has been a factor that fostered harmony among the
denominational and racial groups of Arab society; it has been an incentive as
- well for confronting the inherited backwardness and the imperialist attack. Des-
pite the failures and the setbacks of the national movement, it would be silly to
accept the Persian charge that the national movement is an ignorant, an
atheistic or a non-believer movement. It would also be silly to accuse the Arabs
of abandoning their religion, for Islam is at the heart of Arab heritage, Arab -
thought and the Arab character.
The second one of these factors is the belief that there is a Shi'ite minority
near the oil wells that can be aroused and persuaded to become a tool of Khomeyni's
regime for imposing his influence on the Gulf, just as the Shah tried to turn the -
rebel al-Barzani into a Trojan horse in Iraq.
It would be futile to imagine that the Shi'ites in Iraq or in the Gulf can be Ied
blindly, simply because radio appeals are made across the borders. Because of
the development programs and the accelerating growth these Shi'ites are aware o�
- their national role and position :~espite all the denominational influences. So
f ar their general demeanor seems to indicate that they are not prepared to abanc~on
this position and this role and to become a tool of provocation and instigation.
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i
i
~
The third one of these factors is the fact that the Persian character, with all
its psychological and religious outcomes, harbors emotional tendencies that make
' i*. rely on illogical, unrealistic or irrational unruliness, thus ma.king domestic
; or foreign Persian political action appear to be arbitrary and placing Iran
repeatedly in a position that is at odds with that of its true friends and perma-
nent neighbors. In this case [its friends and neighbors] are the Arabs themselves.
This happened under the administration of the Shah who set himself up as the
protector of the Gulf, proceeding from the position of "Persianizing" Aryan Iran
and [maintaining the Persian] racist historical hostility for the Seznitic Arabs.
This is happening today with Shi'ite Iran with all t he haughtiness and the condes-
cension it harbors under its garb for the Arabs, "the people who eat grassho~,pers
and who drink the milk of the camel"--according to tre propaganda publications
that are distributed these days to the Iranian armed forces.
One of the aspects of haphazard Arab action may be the fact that among the Arabs
- there are thase, like President al-Qadhdhafi, who do not perceive the gravity
of the Persian threat to the Arab character of Iraq and the Gulf. He d~sregards
all his nationalist premises to proclaim his loyalty to and his sympathy with his
"relative" Khomeyni, as he says, and to proclaim his willingness to finance the
Iranian war ma.chine to fight the Iraqis whose relationship to him should come
first, if he is really serious about considering himself one of the Arab national-
ists.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 AL-WATAN AL-ARABI
8592
CSO: 4802
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AFGHANISTAN
- AFGHAN REBELS WANT MORE THAN 'HALF-HEARTED MORAL SUPPORT'
LD041849 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 1 Mar 8I p 4
[Report by ReYiato Ferraro: "Afghanistan Asks West to Make Political Intervention
for Peace"]
[Text] Ravenna-- Is Afghanistan a forgotten genocide? Now, scarcely 14 months since
the Soviet invasion, the massacre of Afghan patriots is continuing amid t},~
democratic world's indifference. Afghanistan has vanished from the front p;~ges of
- newspapers, the anti- imperialist movements which brought crowds onto the streets
to demonstrate against the French military presence in Algeria and the American
military presence in Vietnam are silent, showing that the decline in interest is
_ equally beneficial to both superpowers. Europe seems more impotent than ever.
To shake public opinion out of this torpor the Ravenna Republican Youth Federation
held a meeting yesterday, in conjunction with Amnesty International, attended by
Afghan guerrilla leader Hashmatullah Muj addedi, "foreign minister" of the National
Liberation Front--the organization which groups a large section of the partisans.
(Mujaddedi) quoted an ancient Persian poem: "If Afghanistan dies, it is the end
for the whole of Asia." The resistance to the Soviet invasion, he stated, is not
the Afghan people`s p rivate affair. Russian imperialism has always aimed at access
to warm water and is now also aiming at control of the oil routes--the lifeline
of the European and Japanese economies. "If the Europeans do not now take action
to help us and halt Mosr.ow's exparisionism, they will have to take action tomorrow
- to protect their energy supplies. It will p robably be too late to prevent World
War III."
There is a political problem: the Soviet plan to destabilize the West by an armed
- threat to the crude oil which supplies the Western countries. (Muj addedi) accused
the West of suicidal shortsightedness: "It is vital," he said, "to aid both
Afghanzstan and Pakistan--the Red Army's next target. The problem is not new, nor
does it date from the December 1979 invasion. Moscow has been intervening in Kabul -
_ for 3 years. First it replaced King Zaher by Daud, then Daud by Taraki, then
Taraki by Amin, then Amin by Karmal, and the West did nothing."
- It is now a humanitari.an matter. The war, (Mujaddedi) stated, has already killed
1 million people and made 5 million people homeless. The Soviets raze villages
to the ground, deport the inhabitants, wipe them out with napalm, and torture the
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partisans and bury them alive: "So far Europe has only given us half-hearted moral
support. It has made very little practical attempt to support the Afghans, it has
merely supplied some aid to the refugees who have fled over the border. This is
ttot enough either from the moral or the political viewpoint."
The guerrillas assert that they will rout the Soviets as they did the British 100
years ago. "The entire people are taking parti in the resistance, while the Russian
soldiers are demoralized and are fighting badly because they know that they have
been sent to give their lives not to defend a fraternal country, as P~oscow`s -
propaganda maintains, but to attack a peaceful people of shepherds and peasants," '
(Mujaddedi) said.
[Question] How long will the Afghans be able to go on fighting if the West does
not end the occupation with a political intervention for peace?
The guerrilla leader did not specify how long: "We have enough courage and arms _
to fight against the enemy's armor," he said, "but we are not capable of countering _
the helicopter-gunships now being sent in by Moscow. To pierce the titanium armor
we need surface-to-air missiles, and so far nobody has been prepared to give them
to us."
= In conclusion the Afghan leader urged public opinion, the parties and the govern-
- ment to wake up, to defend peace and the principle of peoples' self-determination.
As an initial measure he requested the formation of an Italian solidarity committee.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
CSO: 4404
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AFGHANISTAN
~ ETHNOLOG~ST INTERVIEWS NURISTAN LEAD$R OF RESISTANCE
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 26 Jan 81 pp 96-101
I
~ [Article by Mike Barry: "Nuristan: The New Afghan Resistance"]
i [Text] "We will leave only a million Afghans alive; that is enough to build
socialism." This statement was made during the summer of 1979, in other words
~ several months before the Soviet invasion, by an Afghan officer, the commander of
the Pol-3-Charkhi concentration camp, near Kabul. The Soviet press quoted him
to stress the change in the strategy of the Soviet army against the Afghan
_ resistance. Indeed tl-,e massacres and the poundings from the air continue, but
interspersed with efforts to win over the rebel native groups. This is notably
the case in the province of Nuristan, on the frontier with Pakistan. Mike Barry,
- an ethnologist and expert on Islam (see his article "The Stages in the Afghan
Shipwreck" in our Issue No 792, 14 January 1980), spent several weeks there last
November. He was able to talk with guerrilla leaders, to travel with a caravan
of resistants, collecting the new anti-personnel mines dropped by Soviet heli-
i copters in the field, and aid in the reunification efforts in the resistance
movements.
Inaugurating a new strategy in the colonial war in Afghanistan during last summer
and autumn, the armored helicopters of the Red Army dropped mines the size of a
child's hand, equipped with an aileron so that they would glide and not explode
I on striking the ground, all along the eastern frontier of the country, and on the
ridges in Nuristan in particular. They blend in perfectly with the terrain. Some,
made of dark-green plastic, were scattered in pastureland, while others, khaki-
~ colored, peppered the deser.: plains or dusty tracks, dropped with precision by the
Soviet pilots. Of limited puwer, these mines are designed to blow off the foot
~ which strikes one at the ankle.
This systematic scattering was designed to discourage the resistants from
returning home, for the Afghan partisans, operating from Pakistan, are trying to
resupply the frontier districts with grain, since farming has practically ceased
because of the bombing. However, since the Soviet troops emptied the Kunar
valle~ of its population and stepped up their pressure on the Paktya peasants
from the air in order to force them in turn to take the path of exile--more than a
million Afghan refugees are already crowded into Pakistani camps--the routes
approaching the country are j amme:d and the interior is empty. However, the
~ province of Nuristan, adjacent ta Pakistan, protected by its mount~ins, is still
struggling to prevent this suffocation, and the peasants pi~k their way among the
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mines with loads oF flour and salt for the interior. At the end of November, just
before the first snowfall, the partisans agreed to let me join one of their
caravans.
Beginning at dawn, a stream of traffic filled the steep path winding beneath the
peaks on which snow could already be seen among the dark clumps of pines. Oaks and
mulberry trees generously watered by the Indian monsoon rains, the mcuntains in
Nuristan, with their sumptuous forest adornment, contrast with an ar.id Afghanistan.
A shepherd pelted a herd of bleating goats with pebbles to force them up the
Pakistan road. ~ao mountain men in white berets--the typical headdress of
Nuristan--followed, pushing a donkey loaded with live chickens trussed by their
feet, which he would sell on the other side of the frontier.
Tumbling down the track in the other direction, my companions jogged along, bent
under their load of sacks of grain purchased in Pakistan. Farther down, in the
shadow of the pines, their wiv~s, exhausted, divested themselves of their rattan
baskets at the edge of the stream. One of them modestly hides her face in her
sleeve, but she wears a shoulder strap supporting a Kalishnikov rifle. After the
last mine drop 20 days earlier, the shepherds reopened the road by throwing stones
to eXplode the yellowish booby-traps. Shattered and twisted, the little mustard-
colored artifacts are strewn along the tracks in groups, a few centimeters apart.
Peeping out from beneath a bush, a still-intact fin bore the date of manufacture
and a cyrillic initial stamped in black ink, the signature of the oppressor.
Clearing the slopes, where the green artifacts blerid with the trees, is even more
dangerous. The goats step on the scattered booby-traps and lose a foat, and the
herds have been devastated. The shepherds, the majority of them children, come
unexpectedly upon piles of little bombs. In a Pakistani hospital, two adole::ents,
in the midst of a crowd of Afghan amputees, showed me their identical stumps:
one of the boys, after having stepped on a mine, fell forward, striking a second
= with his hand. On the same day, his companion h~d just picked up a bomb by the
fin to remove it from his path, when he stepped on another.
Beyond the mined sector, ai~~r several hours of travel through a forest with its
- trees shattered by the bombs, our caravan reached the first village. A few houses
of rough-hewn planks, embedded in mud walls, were scattered among formless heaps
of dried mud and whitewashed timbers. Two families were camping in the ruins.
Men in berets, draped in skimpy shawls, welcomed us, hands on their hearts, and
sold us--at a very high price--two chickens for the evening meal.
- Here the incendiary rocket attacks date back to the days (1978-1979) of the pro-
Soviet President Taraki. The last peasar.ts left in the village guard the
property of those who have fled to Pakistan: it is forbidden to steal a rope bed
- or a stool from an abandoned hovel. But the contours of the wheat fields, over-
run with weeds, are already blurring. An Afghan v3.llage, abandoned to the
elements, crumbles and disappears rapidly, again becoming a part of the mud and
thickets fram which it emerged.
On the other side of the stream, a little wooden mosque with galleries sculptured
in abstract patterns was accidentally spared by the rockets. The little columns
reveal tracery which once represented serpents, the symbols of the supreme god
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Imra. Annexed and conver.ted to Islam by force by an emir of Kabul as late as 1897
--it was then that the country took the name Nuristan, which means "Luminous
Country"--the people of Nuristan demolished the stiff ~ffigies of their gods, but
coritinued to put up sanctuaries such as this, carved with magic ornaments whose
pagan mystique they sense in some obscure way.
The rest of the villa~e has lost its lintels and balconies, its wooden porticos,
carved with stars and stylized lotus flowers, to the bombs. Before the war, the
caste of craftsmen, the famous "bari," decorated all the houses in this way,
transforming the poor hamlets of Nuristan into what seemed at first glance unreal
- palaces of lace. "That's all right," one of the survivors assured me as we sat
around a campfire, "we know how to rebuild it all."
Th e next day, while the majority of my companions left us, each at his own
' village--with the exception of a single grouping which was intact, all of these
hamlets were bombed and now house only a fraction of their normal population--we
reached the bank of the great river which forms the central valley of Nuristan.
j On the bank, at a crossroads, a group of inen wearing berets and baggy pants, with
_ gaunt faces and shaggy beards, Kalishn3kovs in their shoulder straps, stood
~ deferentially around a very old man, only slightly stooped, wearing a long brown
~ cloak.
~ As unique as its geographic cradle, the resistance in Nuristan draws on a
j tradition of insubordinate independence, and has created the Af~han partisan
j organization which is the best source of hope today. The three great valleys of
; Nuristan--the main being that of the Kamdesh--had a population prior to the war
i of some 160,000 souls, a fraction of the Afghan population of 17 million. But
i in the Kamdesh valley, as in the adjacent ones and the camps in Pakistan where
there are refugees from Nuristan, the creation of an impressive political struc-
; ture by the armed peasants is being seen.
~
- The first province to rebel against the pro-Soviet dictatorship of
Nur Mohammad Taraki, Nuristan put the Kabul forces to flight in the autiunn of
1978. However, Taraki had sent fresh troops when, in the month of August, the
i population attacked the prefecture with axes, forced the prefect to flee and
i plundered his arsenal of Kalishnikov rifles. In addition, a number of recruits
~ went over the resistance immediately, taking their weapons with them. The
= government had sent them to combat a"Chinese invasion," and then they heard Arab
shouts of "Allahou Akbar!" resounding from the cliff heights, cries which in no
way sounded Chinese to the ears of the good Moslem soldiers. Then Pashtun
irregulars, members of a tribe traditionally hostile to the people of Nuristan,
joined the partisans they were supposed to fight, with the rifles provided by the
regime.
The government forces had to beat a retreat, but their retaliation was bloody.
Six Soviet advisers were still in Kamdesh, the capital of the province, when the
planes sprayed the surrounding mountains with napalm--proof of this is now
_ definite (see subheading "Soviet Napalm" below). Hostages taken at random were
sent in trucks to the regional concentration camp in Jalalabad. (I met an old
shepherd who had been subjected to electrical torture in the presence of a Soviet
adviser: they wanted him to admit that he worked for the CIA! He was released
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18 months later, under Babrak Karmal.) Finally, the evacuated city of Kamdesh
was bombarded with incendiary rockets. Today, the tail of a tran>port helicopter
which was shot down projects from blackened beams there, like a scarecrow. An
overturned truck and a tank which tumbled into the river bear witness to the
battles which raged all along the regular road. The troops of the regime en-
trenched themselves in the fort at 3arikot, in the southern part of the territory
of Nuristan. Supported by Soviet aircraft, they are still hanging on there today.
Once liberated, the central valley of Nuristan organized its defense in 1978.
- The partisans blocked the road running along the river with ~piles of debris. No
tanks can get through. On the tops of the ridges overlooking Barikot, several
- hundred young people, relieved every month, lying in ambush in stone shelters,
.fire at every head which appears above the crinolations of the fort. The Soviets
reLUrn their fire without much success. But since the invasion, the new armored
helicopters have been making murderous raids on the valley. The machines hover a
few meters above the ground and machine-gun:the village populations. Their
titanium armor makes them invulnerable to the defenders' fire. This is a heli-
- copter which nothing can shoot down except missiles, which the resistance forces
do not have. They harrass, exhaust and discourage the fighters, making them
doubt their staying capacity. The people of Nuristan are asking themselves when
their turn will come, following the defeat of their neighbors in Kunar, to the
south.
Despite the repression, the heart of the territory of Nuristan has remained since
1978 under the administration of a supreme council, headed by Amer (Chief) Tang,
a bearded patriarch with a hand-carved walking stick. He travels among the
villages, surrounded by his escort, and never goes to Pakistan. He is at the
present the incarnation of the continuity of the nation of Nuristan on its own
soil. Here, the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul has not had enough time to kill enough
notables, and has been unable to destroy the village structures or crack the
tribal psychology.
- li~e lljast, C'lle gr~ybeards Ot i~lllTl~~uii~ Slt Wlttl HIi1~I Tang, CO:.S~ILUL1i~b ^~O~I'~1~1-
ment, a court and a council of war simultaneously. The ancient pagan Nuristan,
pre-feudal, accorded prestige only to notables who spent lavishly and generously
- on celebrations, and who redistributed their accumulated wealth in the villages.
At present it is the family of Amer Tang which enjoys unchallenged autonomy.
Indeed, this patriarch is defended from Outahs, the high priests of G'ish, the
god of war, a line venerated despite the conversion to Islam less than a century
ago. However he retains his high rank because he is linked with a tradition being
lost under the governors of Kabiil: he has distributed the whole of his family
assets to the resistance movement. At the present time, the majority of the
leaders in the supreme council belong to Amer Tang's lineage: the commander in
chief, Anwar Khan; his brother, Wakil Kabir; and their cousin, Shah-Wali Shefa,
the organizer of the refugees in Pakistan. With an iron hand and obstinacy unique
in Afghanistan, the supreme council has founded a national fund (Sandouq-e-Melli)
for the nation of Nuristan at war, which has by force of circumstances become the
remarkably modern treasury of a rebel peasant commune. First of all, the council,
with the agreement of the Islamic clergy, confiscated for this holy war the
income of religious foundations. Then it imposed taxes on goats, cattle, the
ladies' jewelry which the people are leaving to sell in Pakistan. Finally, it
takes its portion from the refugee allocations~
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In fact, until the autumn of 1980, the Pakistani government was paying 4 rupees
(2 francs) per day for each registered refugee, with a maximum of 50 rupees per
- family. The refugee from Nuristan paid Z rupee per day to the national fund. The
recent reduction in the Pakistani allocation from 50 rupees per refugee per month,
due to the overwhelming influx of fleeing Afghans, seriously reduced this source
of income for the fund, which is now asking only 1 rupee per month. However, the
fund benefits from the income from fines imposed by the council court. I asked
the official in charge, Shah-Wali Shefa, if a refugee from Nuristan could refuse
to pay. "Impossible. He would be expelled from the tribe and his family."
In the valley, witnesses told me about the verdict in a recent trial. A young
"mujahid" had carried off, with her consent, the daughter of a notable, a
cantankerous old man who refused to give the younger man her hand. The amused
judges ruled that the lovers were justified, but beca~sse of their violation of
Islamic law, they sentenced the fine young man to sell his goats to the benefit
of the national fund.
It was with the resources of this poor fund that the people of Nuristan opened an
office in Peshawar and are financing a newspaper, SADA-YE NOURESTAN (The Voice of
, Nuristan), one of the best resistance papers, published in Persian and Pushtu
and carried by porters not only to the frontier region on the east but also to
central Hazaradjat. (The KGB prints a pirate journal, FREE AFGHANISTAN, giving
~ false bank account numbers to which to send contributions to the resistance.)
j In the interior, the resources of the fund serve to feed the combatants at the
; front, and above all, to buy ammunition (often bad hand-made cartridges) for the
i precious Kalishnikov r.ifles recovered on the free market in Pakistan. These
; rifles, moreover, are national property (melli). The automatic rifles remain at
the front for replacement soldiers to use, while those relieved depart for a
fixed period of rest. The wounded are evacuated to Pakistan. If their condition
I warrants it, they are flown to hospitals in Peshawar, where the hospital costs
j are paid by the fund.
' In addition, the fund maintains hostels along the route for refugees. For eastern
j Afghanistan is being emptied of its people via the free valleys in Nuristan, a
~ veritable bleeding of fugitives leading to the death of the country.
Consequently the primary concern of the supreme council is to maintain a constant
_ exchange between Nuristan in exile and that surviving in the interior, to prevent
the strangulation of the fatherland. For many Afghan families from the Northeast,
separated from their homeland by hundreds of kilometers of mountain tracks, exile
in Pakistan is permanent. On the other hand, the families from Nuristan move
constantly between the refugee camps in the Chitral region in Pakistan, where they
resupply themselves with grain, and their villages, on the other side of the
mountains, where ttiey go to pasture their herds--for there is no space for their
goats and their cows in the overcrowded pastures of Pakistan.
In Chitral, Sha-Wali Shefa, who represents the refugees, one of the few citizcns
of Nuristan who speaks English, adamantly defends the cause of his people, tries
to extract max~mal quantities of tents, blankets, powdered milk and liquid cash
from the representatives of the interna*_ional community. The strict tribal code
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of honor prevents him from enriching himself: his cousins oversee him, and
moreover, corruption has not yet poisoned the leaders of the Nuristan ethnic
group as it has so many of the Pashtun tribes, demoralized and splintered by exile.
The sums recovered by Shah-Wali go to the national fund. But he meets with a
lack of understanding on the part of United Nations officials, whose colonial
goodwill is tinged with stubborn pettiness. The Westerners want to know why a
given number of registered refugees does not correspond with the number of
refugees answering the roll call, and they threaten to cut down the allocations,
requiring that the fugitives stay in the camps under their control. Shah-Wali
explains that a certain number have had to return to their land in order to
pasture their animals. "But then," official logic retorts, "they are no longer
refugees!" How can Shah-Wali make them understand that the shepherds return to
_ the camps, that others depart for their homeland, that a whole people are refusing
to abandon their land?
The resistance in Nuristan, courageous though it is, may have remained of purely
local importance. But it plays a strategic role in the eastern areas of the
country. It also benefits from the exceptional political clairvoyance of its
leaders--its commander in chief, Anwar Khan, the nephew of Amer Tang, in particular.
It was these leaders of Nuristan who took the initiative in August of 1979 in
rallying various resistance movements in the interior in a kind of federated
front, independent of the parties in exile in Peshawar. First the Hazara people
in the mountainous center allied with the people of Nuristan, and then in 1980,
the Pashtuns from Kunar and Wardak joined. In addition, the leaders in Nurist-an
have won the sympathy of a number of intellectuals in Kabul, some af them leftists,
and in some cases even former Maoists.
Thus there has been an implicit development of a sort of internal front, the
ramifications of which extend to the capital, as well as along the eastern fron-
tier and into the very heart of Afghanistan. This does not mEan that there are
not tensions among the various allies in this front. In addition, the regions
adjacent to Nuristan, such as Panjshir and Badakhshan, preferred to give their
allegiance to an integrist party in Peshawar which offered the advantage of
supplying them with weapons (the Djami'at-e Islami), making collaboration in the
field difficult. Finally, the fact that the Nuristan leader Anwar Khan has the
affections of a number of leftist Afghans, and has even become a kind of symbol
for many intellectuals and students in Kabul as well as abroad, automatically
makes him suspect in the eyes of the conservatives and the integrists, although
he remains a devout Moslem.
- Probably, the disorganization in the Afghan resistance reflects the distintegra-
tion in the society, the general collapse of the political structures prior to
1978. From the communist coup d'etat in April 1978 to the Soviet invasion in
December 1979, the Muscovite advisers of the dictators Taraki and Amin in fact
undertook the e;termination of the Afghan elite in a methodically atrocious
fashion. Notables, the Islamic clergy, Westernized intellectuals, technical
cadres and government employees died in the Pol-e Charkhi concentration camp near
Kabul, buried alive by bulldozers or dumped into cesspools. It is true that this
policy ended in two defeats: instead of crushing the population with terror, it
caused it to rise up in generalized revolt, and it created an administrative
vacuurn which the Afghan Communist Party, as small as it is incompetent, has shown
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itself incapable of filling. Now that it has taken the government of the country
in hand, the USSR has had to modify its methods temporarily and to tolerate Islam.
According to the most recent reports, Kabul has tried to win over the resistants
in Nuristan by promising respect for tribal customs. The rejection of the
N~iristan leaders was immediate.
With only a handful of exceptions, the intellectuals and cadres who survived
Pol-e Charkhi, suffering from trauma, prefer exile in Europe or the United States
to participation in the resistance. Without a doubt they are fleeing the regime,
but in order to crowd into the hotels in Peshawar to await visas. The resistance
parties in Peshawar are headed by leaders with often mediocre intellectual back-
grounds, hopelessly split between an integrist faction and a pro-Western nationalist
faction, the political and strategic defeat of which is obvious but which has the
monopoly on foreign financial aid. Thus it is to the peasants with nothing,
coming out of a broken society, that the task of building and defending a country
beginning from zero has fallen. And there is nothing to guarantee the final
success of their efforts. As Nuristan commander Anwar Khan has stressed: "The
- intellectuals are fleeing, and it is we men of the mountains who must do every-
~ thing."
In this dark beginning of the year 1981, more than 12 months after the invasion
of their country by the Red Army tanks, the leaders of the peasant resistance in
Nuristan are faced with the following harsh political realities.
The refugees dre not at home in Pakistan, and they must submit to the constraints
and choices of the government which is their host. Now Pakistan is one of the
most vulnerable nations in the world. It is supported by no military alliance.
Its air space is regularly violated by Soviet planes, while its eastern frontier
is threatened by India, the government of which is hostile to it. Pakistan does
not dare to provide the resistants with the anti-helicopter missiles which they
_ need and free passage of arms across its territory still remains officially pro-
hibited.
Pakistan has officially recognized six resistance organizations in Peshaw~..,
allowing them to establish offices and bank accounts and to receive fund~. No
Afghan organization in the interior can follow in their footsteps without the
specific authorization of the Pakistani gov~.rnment. The six parties are a drain
on foreign aid: they channel the aspirations of the refugees--and thus their
existence is essential to the Pakistani government--but they inexorably divide
the resistance movement. Let us try to imagine the status of the French resistance
movement in 1940 if the government in London had simultaneously recognized six
rival bodies at the same time. Today, the Pakistani government, which has not
succeeded in getting the six parties to unite--the famous alliance established in
_ March of 1980 broke up in December--would hesitate to recognize a seventh body,
dynamic and acceptable to a large proportion of the refugees though it might be.
These quarrels demoralize the refugees, who talk more and more of a return to the
old king, Zaher Shah, as their only hope. In the memory of the people, the reign
of this monarch, who was in fact rather indifferent to the fate of the people,
_ begins to seem like a distant golden age. "Where is Zaher Shah?" a very young and
pathetic Nuristan shepherd asked me one day, near the ruins of the hunting lodge
of the former king. "In Rome," I told him. "Is that very far, Rome? Might he
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r~ux urrlultiL u~~ uivLY
come back?" Fourteen years old, he had hardly known the reign of this monarch
who was overthrown in 1973.
The most serious political error of these parties was demanding the submission of
the resistants who came to ask their aid, Now the reality of the Afghan resistance
is a network of valleys like that in Nuristan: autonomous organizations defend
their territory, such as Kunar, Paktia and Panjshir.
It was into the midst of this situation, an impasse for months, that the Nuristan
commander Mohammad Anwar Amin, called Anwar Khan, appeared on the scene. A
young 40, invariably wearing the national white beret, with a stiff military
moustache but laughing eyes, very devout but ferociously anti-clerical, Anwar Khan
appeared as the only Afghan military commander known and followed beyond the
narrow limits of a political organization or ethnic group. He has committed him-
~ self to no party, and the program of the integrists who urge an "Islamic republic"
of the Iranian type, in which the mullahs would dominate, is unacceptable to him.
The ingenious idea of Anwar Khan, beginning in August 1979, was to propose the
- alliance of the sma11 people of Nuristan with the vast.Hazara ethnic group, some
400 million souls strong.
- Breaking with centuries of tradition, Anwar Khan proposed that the Shiites in the
center of Afghanistan cooperate fully with the Sunnites in Nuristan in a common
struggle: to seal the alliance in blood, the combatants �rom Nuristan have even
gone to die on the Hazara front.
But this alliance between the Hazara, a minority of Shiites, and the people of
Nuristan, recently Moslemized pagans, could not lay claim tc representing the
basic Afghanistan ethnic graup, the Pashtuns. The support of the Nuristan-Hazara
movement by the martyred people of Kunar, entirely Pashtun, profoundly altered
_ the political status of the resistance. Henceforth, a major faction of the
majority ethnic group stands behind, and thereby consolidates, the union of
internal resistance movements.
The Kunar co~unity in exile has moreover the same structures as that of neighbor-
ing Nuristan. A patriarch has become the symbol of the ethnic group:
Shamsoddin Madjrouh, a descendant of the prophet. But his son,
Bahaoddin Madjrouh, the dynamic counterpart of Anwar Khan in Kunar, vividly
contrasts with the athletic Nuristan war chieftain. A refined intellectual, with
a degree in philosophy from the university of Montpellier, and a faculty dean in
Kabul, Bahaoddin Madjrouh has been handicapped since a leg injury in a car accident
long ago, and directs the resistance of his people from his refugee's room ir~
Peshawar, A paradoxical collaboration has developed between the two leaders.
Anwar Khan, the man of action, devotes himself to brilliant political schemes,
while Bahaoddin Madjroun, the cloistered thinker, urges guerrilla operations above
all. In his view, the internal resistance launched by Anwar Khan should remain
free cooperation between autonomous comma..ders, flexible enough to allow collabor-
ation with certain war chieftains sti11 formally affiliated with parties.
Consequently it would be too soon to set forth a political program.
But as 1981 dawned, the internal union founded by the Nuristan leaders brought a
triumph: it remains desperately poor on the level of equipment., but it is richer
by an office in Peshawar. The Pakistani government has recognized it. This is
perhaps a new year of hope.
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r'UH ur r l~lnu v~...L
Soviet Napalm
A number of types of incendiary bombs have been dropped on Afghanistan since the
troubles provoked by the pro-Soviet coup d'etat in April of 1978. They include the
following:
A. Incendiary rockets. In Nuristan, where the majority of the houses are built
of wood, I was able to see with my own eyes that the majority of the villages in
the Kamdesh ~,~alley are charred in part or entirely. The beams and joists pro-
truding from the ruins are blackened. Witnesses report projectiles dropped by
helicopters, giving off an odor of "powder" (baroui). The villages then burned.
Dates: 1978 and 1979.
B. "Phosphorous bombs." The Khyber hospital in Peshawar, Palcistan, is treating
atrociously burned children, including a number 6f young girls whose faces look
"melted." The Pakistani doctors thought at first it was napalm, but the military
surgeon who heads the hospital, Brig Gen Nawab Khan, concluded after examining the
wounded children that it was "a mixture of phosphorous and sulfur." These
"phosphorous bombs" were perhaps in fact incendiary rockets. The young girls
cannot give evidence: their tongues were burned. The wounded came from the
province of Nangrahar (in the Jalalabad area), in the eastern part of Afghanistan.
Date: end of January or early February 198C.
C. Napalm. Questioned on 17 March 1980 at the refugee camp in Kababian, Pakistan,
three Pashtun women told me they fled a bomb "which burns our fruit trees" after
falling from the sky "like gasoline" (tel-ware). They came from the Sorkh-Rod
~ valley (Jalalabad area) in the eastern part of Afghanistan. Date: February 1980.
Descriptions of a bomb "which burned a forest right up" were given to me in
March 1980 by refugees from Nuristan. I was able to visit the terrain last
November. This is what I saw: on the slope of the mountains facing the town of
Kamdesh, on the other side of the river, dead and brownish pines make streaks
through a dark-green forest. According to local witnesses, whose stories were
consistent and were cross-checked, containers (bilar) fell from helicopters on
- this forest, which shot up in flames, spreading an odor "like gasoline" (tel-ware)
over the valley. At that time the resistance fighters held the ridges, while a
government garrison occupied the market town of Kamdesh. The unanimous reports
said that six--or seven--Soviet advisers were in Lhe garrison. Other bombings
"like gasoline" occurred in the forests rising above the road from Kamdesh to
Mirdesh. I explored these areas: long black corridors zigzag through these
forests. Over a width of 30 meters and a length of 200 to 300 meters, all the
trees on the slope were dead and totally blackened, the ground was covered with
charcoal and ash from disintegrating Iogs. I counted three burned strips of this
sort along the road i followed. The peasants hid one of the containers of this
"gasoline" in a cave: the heavy oblong bomb split without exploding, letting the
liquid zscape. liowever on the inner walls, the jellied petroleum left a sticlcy
blackish deposit. There is no doubt: this was indeed napalm. Date: October-
- November 1978.
Has there been a change in strategy? Napalm has not been used in Nuristan for
more than a year.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "le Nouvel Observateur"
5~57
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ALGERIA
BRIEFS
, GAS PRICE AGREEMENT--Last month SONATRACH (Societe Nationale Algerienne des Hydro-
~ carbures~ and the British company British Gas Corporation signed an interim agree-
I ment on the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to be produced by the corporation
beginning in 1981. The agreement covers a 9 months period and anticipates a
quarterly increase yielding an average fob price of $4.60 per million BTU for LNG
, exported from the Arz~w (ex Camel) liquefaction plant during the first 9 months
j in 1981. The price will reach $4.80 per million BTU on July 1, 1981. The interim
~ agreement just concluded should enable SONATRACH and British Gas Corporation to
reach a 5-year agreement which would extend the 15-year contract signed in 1964
~ for exports from the "Camel" plant which, with an annual production of 1.5 billion
cubic meters of natural gas, delivers in liquefied form, the equivalent of one
billion cubic meters to Great Britain, and 500,000 cub ic meters to France. This
i Algerian-British interim agreement is th.e first of its kind to be signed while
~ similar negotiations begun over a year ago by SONATRACH with its two main customers
EL PASO (USA) and GAS DE ~'RANCE, appear bogged down (MTM 5 Dec 1980, p 3330) .
, [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 2 Jan 81 p 17] 6445
I FRENCH HOLDINGS TRANSFERRED--The Algerian Ministry of Finances has made public on
24 December 1980 a decision concerning the transfer of accounts opened in the name of
French nationals who have left Algeria. The Algerian Government decided to authorize
the transfer of holdings in waiting accounts and in final departure accounts in the
~ name of French nationals who have left Algeria. For p ersonal savings accounts the
transfers are made directly by the banks upon request by individuals. The announce-
i ment states that business accounts will also be transf.erred upon request, but after
~ verification of the tax situation of the company involved. When the account is the
~ object of a legal partial freeze, the non-frozen part of the account may also be
transferred. A separate decision will be made concerning accounts opened in the names
of banks and insurance companies, in conformity with the recent agreements between
France and Algeria. The French Foreign Ministry i.r.,a,icated on 26 December that addi-
' tional details on the transfer conditions and the amounts of French holdings the A1-
gerian Government decided to release will be known during the first half of January.
The Quai d'Orsay added that the extent and the practical aspects of this decision
will be evaluated after the number of interested persons becomes known. A report
presented to the French National Assembly in 1965 and concerning the budget of the
Department of the Interior mentioned 927,000 persons as having been repatriated
from Algeria. The French Treasury Department added th at the total amount of frozen
, holdings belonging to repatriated nationals added up to 70 million dinars (1 dinar
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is worth about 1.15 f rench f rancs). Observers assume that the recent decision
does not cover this total amount. The Algerian decision is the result of negotia-
tions between the two countries. On 24 June 1976, six working groups were created
to resolve the differences between France and Algeria: emigration, individual
situa.tions, financial differences, property and activities of the French in Algeria,
social security, archives. At the conclusion of the official visit to Algeria
~ of the French Foreign Minister Mr Jean Francois-Poncet on 17 and 18 September
1980, the final report mentioned *_he soon-to-be-announced Algerian decisions con-
cerning the frozen accounts. [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French
2 Jan 81 p 17] 6445
CSO: 4400
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IRAN
CENTRAL BANK CHIEF MANEUVERS FOR RETURN OF ASSETS
i
~ London 8 DAYS in English 21 Feb 81 pp 2-3
i
i
[Text]
That Iran desperately needs the claims, circled war>>y with the Iranians.
~ $4bn Of /fS 8SS@tS that the At least a dozen US bankers are involved
~ in the billion-dollar bargaining, and there
despite the hostage deal, iS Stlll are not enough chairs. Several bankers are
ho/ding, was graphically Ul1d6t- left sitting impatiently on the carpeted floor
lined by President Bani Sadr in a � the corridor. Conversation ~s terse,
speech last week on the second Suarded. As Nobari told 8 Days:'There is a
lot of anger and misunderstanding:
anniversary of the revo/ution. In fhe Both sides are battling over how much
last year, lran's foreign exchange interest the US banks owe Iran for the 13
I reserves plummeted from $lOm to months that Iran's $l 2bn assets were frozen
~ ~4m, Wf]iiz industrial OUfPUt by Carter. The Americans say only 1 l per
Slum ed b 30-40 er cent. In this cent, but the Iranians are claiming 22 per
P y p cent. Although nearly $8bn werc returned
~ @XC/USIV@ interview W!tl1 T~M on 20 January - most of which was sent
McGIRK, Iranian Central Bank back co rvew York from London
governor Ali Nobari reflects on ihe immediately to pay off Iran's old debts -
bltf@fhBNeStOfth@hOSf296t8k?n9. Nobari accused the Reagan administration
and the US banks of deliberately blocking
~ the remaining S4bn in assets, in apparent
ALI REZA NOBARI, Iranian Central violation of the hostage agreement signed
~ Bank governor, was in London last week for
! talks with United States bankers about the by Tehran and former President Jimmy
many financial claims of the hostage ~rter.
agreement that have yet to be settled Fundamentalist Premier Mohammed Ali
between Tehran znd Washington. After Rajai, who signed the hostage agreement
~ engaging in financial guerrilla warfare for for Iran, is a political foe of Nobari and
over a year in the international capital moderate President Abol Hassan Bani
markets, this was the first time that Iranian Sadr. Nobari and Bani Sadr oth openl~
and American bankers had met face to face. opposed the hostage agreeme , bu! as the
' The meeting was held in the white marble Central Bank governor adds c ndidly: ' We
offices of an Iranian bank deep in the City of didn't have much choice. Iran w~as xt w�ar,
London. Ever since gunmen raided the our foreign reserves were gett g low, and
- Iranian embass~~ in London, tiank has all our self-assuring slogans c uldn't hide
taken precautions; the sign outside the the fact that Iran was totally isolated '
huilding is disc:eet and visitors are screened Nobari womes that this isolation could
in the lobby by security guards. Upstairs, harm Iran's chances of getting its mone~~
representatives from the leading US banks, back if the Reagan administration, pla~�ing
- tall men in immaculate suits carrying ilight to anti-Iranian sentiment now running high
bags stuffed with balance sheets and legal ~n America, decides to ~ontest the
agreement. Without European support for
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NObari: N w~s understood that the US irom getting back its acccls? -
would ::ntreeze the arms they were A lot. He hasn't gone ~o thc US courts to -
termed 'properties' ic ~ political reasons ask for an attachmcnt waiver. Since Reagan
- took office, there have bcen 500 to 1,U00
, lran's financial claims, says Nobari, new legal claims on ]ran's assets. lf Reagan _
America may kee~ thc remainder of lran's had done this on 21 January, as we
assets 'ransum' forever. If that is the case, understood, we would've had one billion
Iren may have no legal recc~urse - in a dollars more now.
- frank di~cussion with 8 Days Nobari reveals We've just been informed that Reagan
that President Carier never officially signed won't direct the US banks to give us our
_ an Executive Order unfreezing Iranian unattached money in America and overseas
assets. Nor has Reagan. unti126 February, whereas the deadline for -
Qaestion: No Executive Order? How is that the escrow account at the Bank ot England
possible? is 19 February - clearly he's taking his
Answer: The last twa days, 18 and 19 time, allowing more attachments to pile up.
January, were really historical. There was a This contradicts the Algiers declaration.
lol of nervous tension, nobody slept. At the Reagan was also supposed to unblock our
last minute we were told in Tehran that weapons. This was clearly understood. (The
- Carter s Executive Order had not arrived. US government stopped the delivery of -
The Americans claimed that they hadn't $400m in weapons and military hardware
~ enough time to see if tne Execptive Orders that Iran has already paid for.)
- would lift the freeze legally. So Carter never How clearly?
- rcally said': hereby cancel my order of 14 Very. But for political reasons, the word -
November, ]979: ~ 'armaments'wasn'tused.That'sbecausewe
lt endcd with the understanding that once were fighting Iraq and the US wanted to
the hostages were released, Carter would stay neatral in the contlict. The phrase used
order the US banks to give Iran back the was 'properties', but it was clearly -
money. But time ran out. Then came understood that this meant armaments. .
Reagan. So far, he hasn't given the banks Have any US firms with legal claims against
any orders. And the banks are telling us that lran oRered to drop their atlachments in
- they can't move until a White Hcuse exchange for being allowed back inside the
directive comes. So one kind of freeze was country?
� lifted, but it's bcen substituted for another No, they haven't. And 1'm sure they don't _
one. want to return. Even if they did, there
Have an~� problems arisen in your talks with would be barriers put up by the Iranian _
Carter never really said `1 h~reby cancel my 14 _
November freezing order'. The understanding was
~hat once the hostages were re/eased, Carter would
order th~ ~1S banks to give lran back the money. But
- time ran out. Then came Reagan
- US bankers here in London? government ar~1 people. lranians feel
Yes. It was my understanding even ur to betrayed, cheated by this hostage deal. Just
yesterday (]0 February) that the money in a month ago, the newspaper headlines said
the Unitcd States and overseas unattached Iran demanded $24bn. Now Iranians are
by Icgal claims - around $4bn - would be gradual;y understan~ing that only one tenth ~
available immediately to lran. Yesterday of their original demand was met. Part of -
(after the first :ound of talks with US the blame will fall on (Premier Rajai'sj
- bankers), I was very angry and bitter to find government. The rest will be directed
out this wasn't true. For example, Iran had towards the US. So the situation isn't ready
SSOOm at the Bank of America in London: for the US firms to come back.
on 12 November 1979, the bank Some of their claims are totally
transferred this money to San Francisco,so exaggerated. Santa Fe Drilling Company, ~
that when Carter froze the assets two days for example, left four oil rigs in Iran, worth
later, the $SOOm was stopped. There is no about S4m. So they took us to court. First
_ attachment on that money but they're not they asked for $?Om, then $130m and now
giving it to us. they want S324m - just for four rigs!
_ [s this under direct instructions F~om the You say the hostage deal may weaken
= Reagen administration? Rajai's government. It's been said that Beni -
Yes, l think so. Sadr - whose side you're on - has been
LegaUy, v+�hat has Reagan done to keep Iran gathering a power base in the army to
3~
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moster FupM?rt for an e.rntual military� Algeria acted as a kind of guarantor for
coup against the fundamentalists. Is this the agreement, but if the US backec ~.ut,
rarrrcC! technically Algeria would be helpless. As
Look, I'vc knc~wr, Bani Sadr for ~cn years. for the Bank of England, they're impanial.
ln Paris, we s~ent night aftcr night in a small They can't act as our agent and push the US
room, staying aw�ake till dawn, talking and government.
talking. Believe me, he wouldn't do that. The only chance would be for Iran to stop
, Bani Sadr hasn'~ changed his opinions sinct making silly mistakes, as we have done, and
those Paris da}~s. He still thinks pawer try to end our isolation. Around the world,
should not be concentrated. ThaCs why he even in the US, people sympathised with
never set up his own politi:al party. Many the Iranian revolution. When A}�atollah
~ supporters reproach him for this. Some Khomeini was in Paris, they loved him. We
cven say, 'Mr. President, why don't you were like the Poles who are today fighting
come back to Tehran on a tank?' But he's Russia. But we made mistakes and this
tried to stick to his principles. Bani Sadr ehanged the picture. The hostage-iaking,
~ isn't the stuff of military dictators. the executions, these are less than
Was Iran tricked by Washington? Did justifiable in western culture.
~ Rajai's government realise ]ran would only Iran must regain its legitimacy. 7"hat way
j end up with $2.8bn out of al2bn? we can count on public opinion to back us
~ The Rajai government embarked on a against the United States. Look, we haven't
~ process. lf, at the beginning, someone had even got our own money back. I,et the
j told him that the US wasn't even going to world decide: Is it Iran who wanted ransom
- i abide by the four hlajlis conditions Rajai or the United States?
would have refused. But once they started An attorney in the office of Abourez~,
the negotiations, there was no stopping. Shock and Medenha!!, rhe frrm M�hich is
That's my analysis, but maybe Rajai sees it handling Irnn's afjnirs in ~he US, ~old 8 Days
I, differently. To be fair, though, there wasn't thar the Sa~,. Fe Drilling Compony~'s -
much other choice. origina! claim was for $76m nnd had not so
I Are the Americans reneging on their end of jor been amended.
i the deal specifically to destabilise the Iranian
government?
Yes, I'm convinced of that. And what's
more, the banks dragged out negotiations -
I deliberately, they were fed up with Carter.
j So Iran's in a tough position. What can it do
if ihe 19 February deadline (tor the Bank ot
England escrow account) expires without
Reagan taking any action?
~
~ COPYRIGHT: Falconwood Publications Ltd
ISSN 0144-1841
~I
I
~ CSO: 4920
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IRAN
FOREIGN PHARMACEUTICALS IN IRAN TO BE NATIONALIZED
Paris LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 23 Feb 81 p 4
[Text) The chemical firms in Germany suspect imminent nationalization of several
affiliated North-American and European pharmaceutical outfits in Iran. These are:
- Pfizer and Warner-Lambert, an American firm, and the European companies of Hoechst,
Bayer, Achering, Marck, Boehringer and Rhone--Poulenc. The German firms are as much
concerned about the procedures stipulated in the text presently being prepared in i
Tehran as they are about the loss and turnover of some 230 million French francs i
belonging to European firms. i
Zhe text reads: Unce the firms have been nationalized, they could make use of the
manufacturing process without compensations or claims. Iran then could obtain the
chemical-base materials from cheaper sources such as the Soviet Union...; something
which would have an impact on its commercial ties to foreign outfits already affec-
ted since the revolution.
Comment: The Rhone-Poulenc firm, for one, is less pessimistic; hecause the control
of its management has so far been only in the area of naming new Iranian administra-
tors. ~
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Groupe Expansion S.A.
CSO: 4900
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LIBYA
PLAN TO BUY UK ARMS EQUIPMENT REPORTED
LD131445 London FINANCIAL TIMES in English 13 Feb 81 p 34
~ [Dis~patch by Victor Walker in Athens, David Tonge in London: "Libya Negotiating _
i $1~~0 ~UK Arms Purchase" ]
i
i [Text] Libya is negotiating to buy about $100M (43 million pounds) worth of -
i British military equipment .through a Greek construction company, Edok-Eter,
_i which says the equipment is for army firing ranges.
i Edok-Eter sa s the ro'ect will be a oint venture with a
Y P J j group of British manu~-
facturers which will supply closed-circuit televisions, automatic scoring, safety
; and other specialised equipment involved.
I
' Edok-Eter refused to identify the British companies bu~t said the contract was for
, a total of $200M (86 million pounds) divided "about evenly" between equipment and
~ construction costs.
The ranges are to be built in various parts of Libya and the contract could be
signed next month. Edok-Eter is to handle construction work and on-site manage-
i ment.
I
I Concern
The company denies a report in Athens that it is also involved in negotiations on
' an ammunition plant for the Libyans. The report suggests that this would also
~ involve British equipment.
In London. British officials reacted with concern at the possibility of military
equipment going to Libya. That country's attempts to merge with Chad and last
year's killing of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's opponents in Britain and elsewhere cause
cor.siderable reluctance to assist in arming Libya. -
The department of trade says export licenses would be required. It classes equip-
~ ment for firing ranges in the category of "appliances for use with arms and appa�-
ratus specially designed for land, sea or aerial warfare." -
But department officials said they had no knowledge of any such deal.
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~ This weekend Mr Ioannis Paleocrasses, Greece's acting minister of co-ordination,
visited Libya to discuss a Greek proposal that Greek construction companies
ahould pay with work for Libyan oil.
Edok-Eter is one of the four major Greek companies involved in ~rojects in the
Middle East and Africa. The cempany says that it has "about half a dozen" pro-
~ jects underway in Libya in connection with that country's $60BN five-year develop-
ment plan.
Training
The company also says there is no direct connection between this latest deal and
the inter-governmental talks. Greece has long been training a small number of _
Libyan soldiers at its army cadet school.
COPYRIGHT: The Financial Times Ltd, 1981
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