JPRS ID: 9601 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300090023-4
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 23
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9601
12 March 1981 -
Sub-Saharan Africa Re ort
p
FOUO No. 712
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~a~
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JPRS L/9601
12 March 19 81 -
SUB-SAH~IRAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 712
CON TEN TS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
African Economy in 1980 Analyzeci '
(MAR(~IES TROPICAUX ET MEDI~RRANEENS , various dates) o.. o..... o 0 1
Results of Kampala Summit 'Limited But Crucially Important'
(AFRICA, Feb 81)...~...........~o......o .................oa.... 29
Kenya, Other African Tea Producing Nations May Accep~~ Quotas
~ (AFRICA, Feb 81) ..................o.~.......o.................0 31
ANGOLA
Briefs
Reported Cholera Cases 33
~
BENIN
Clzinese Assistance in Rice Gmwing
(MAR(HES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEFNS, 16 Jan 81) o . . . . . . . . . 3~
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
L
~ Briefs
Gran t to SNE 36
~
(~iAD '
Reasons for France's Failure To Intervene Militarily Noted
(MARCHES TImPICAiJX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 30 Jan 81)...........n.. 37
CON GO
Briefs
_ Coupling of Brazzaville-Alma Ata 40
FAC Aid 40
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
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' ETfiIOPIA
B rie fs
- ELF Seeking Political Settlement 41
Coffee Exports 41
Old Coins Withdrawn 41 .
FRG Agronomical Assistance 41 _
G'UINEA-B ISSAU
- Briefs
Portuguese Cashew Processing Cooperation 42
~ Mixed Fisheries Commission With USSR 42
KENYA
~ Mystery Concerning Hotel Bombing Remains
(AFRICA, Feb 81) 43
MOZAMBIQUE
Cubans Train, Give Technical Cooperation
(Miguel Rivero; PRELA, 12 Feb 81) . . 45
SENEGAL
Succession Believed To Be Going Smoothly
~ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 16 Jan 81) 47
Briefs
'"ew Government's First Meeting 51
PS Parliamentary Group President 51 .
Crude Phosphate Shipments ~ 51
Shrimp Fishing Control 51
Canadian Aid to Drought Victims 52
Japanese Aid 52 .
SIERRA LEONE
Briefs
IDA Credit 53
Hydro-Electric Projects 53
S OMALIA
Economic Situation Worsening Despite Great Potential
(Christian (haise; MARCHES TRUPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS,
30 Jan 81) 54 '
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TAN ZAN IA
Data on Plans for Development of Heavy Industry
(AFRTCA, Feb 81) ...................o.......o.....a...o........ 63
Data on Results of Government's Agricultural Programs
(AFRICA, Feb 81) ............................................o. 65
- UPPER VOLTA
Water, Ag~icultural Improvements in Fruit Production
(MA~~IES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 6 Feb 81) 67
Briefs
Soviet-Voltan Cooperation 69
Budget Deficit 69
Petroleum Shares 69
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
A FRI CAN E QON OMY IN 19 F30 ANALY ZE D
Paris MARCHLS TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRA~iEENS in French 23, 30 Jan, 6 Feb 1981
.[23 Jan 81, pp 176-180]
[TextJ West Africa -
Mauritania: a Difficult Recovery
Partially relieved by the ending of the war effort in the Western Sahara, the Mauri- -
tanian economy is still a long w~.y from a return to expansion.
The world steel situation is not facilitating the sale at high prices of the iron
ore from the Zouerate deposits, where extraction is declining sornewhat. The revival _
- of the mining sector, Mauritania's basic source of revenue, is conditioned upon the
realization of the plan to exploit the masses of low-grade ore in the Guelbs, ores
that will require on-site enrichment. The National Industrial and Mining Company
(SNIM) is looking for foreign financing, the cost of the project being estimated at
$500 million.
The financial difficulties are reflected in the deficit in the two budgets for 1980
' (6 billion ouguiya in income and 10 billion in expenditures) and 1981 (7 billion
in income and 10 billion in expenditures forecast), the deterioration of the trade
balance, the marked balance of payments deficit (-0.8 billion ouguiya for 1979,
despite foreigii aid grants) and the redistribution of the bills payable on the for- _
eign debt negotiated with the creditors (1 ouguiya = 0.095 French francs).
This state of affairs brought about the revision of the industrialization program
and the abandoning of the Rosso textile unit project, which was revealed by addi-
tional studies to be unprofitabl�~. -
The program to stabilize the public treasury includes, in addition to applying an
" austerity policy with res~a~ect to expenditures, obtaining a profitability for gov-
ernment-owned cornpanies. Tl~e year 1981 should be marked by putting back into oper-
ation the (imported) oil refinery at Nouadhibou, which was built 4 years ago
(for 6 billion ouguiya) and was never put into service, and the start-up of the
(also imported) sugar refinery.
In June 1980, the Terwan Dam in the southeast region of Adrar, was completed; it
makes possible irrigation of several hundred hectares.
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France is in the firs~t rank of Mauritania's trade partners, with 43.58 percent of
the imports and 27.89 percent of the exports in 1979.
Onc~ again the country was severely affected by drought, and food aid contributed
partially to feeding the population.
Senegal: an Especially Hard Year aiid Recourse to Emergency Financial Aid
Senegal continued to suffer the cumulative effects of a poor peanut harvest and the
= drought. The grain shortage incxeased (329,000 tons from 1978 to 1980), and Euro-
pean aid ~aas called upon. The year 1980 was a difficult one, and the situation of
the public treasury became critical to the point where in July an emergency finan-
cial aid from France was resorted to: 430 billion French francs, or 21.5 billion
CFA francs.
: Tiie trade balance in 1979 showed a deficit of 50 billion CFA francs and the balance
- of current payments showed a shortage of 33.7 billion. Interest payments on the for-
eign deb*. absorbed 15 percent of income from exports and 19 percent of tax revenues.
- Austerity measures were enacted; however, the 'ouciget for fiscal 1980-1981 (1 July-
30 June) is greatly increas~d over the preceding /ear: 193.4 billion CFA francs in
income (+24.4 billion over the initial preceding budget) and 191.8 billion in expen-
ditures, of which 22 billion (-2 billion) was allotted to equipment, the total to be
covered by borrowing.
The activities of 27 public institutions and 75 semi-private companies contr~.butes
at the 40-percent level to forming the gross domestic product. The National Office
of Cooperation and Assistance for Development (ONCAD), which among other things was
providing the collection and marketing of peanuts and handling a turnover of
100 billion CFA francs, and whose management had been the object of criticism, was
dissolved and replaced by a less monolithic organization.
The Bud-Senega? ~ompany, which was given over to export truck farming, was liquidated
wlien deviation was found in its production methods.
Early in October the floating dock which was built in Norway for Dakar-Marine and
which arrived in July was installed.
The Faleme iron ore exploitation project (reserves estimated at 450 million tons) is
still in the study phase; its completion would r~equire 215 billion CFA f.rancs. In
the Senegal-Kuwaiti Investment Company, capitalized for 500 million CFA francs, the
national ~.nterests arc intervening for S1 per.cent.
Si.nce May a natural gas cleposit located 40 km from Dakar has been supplying electric-
ity production; it is estimated this deposit will last 15 years.
In 1979, tl~e incomc from tourism rose to 16.7 billion CFA francs.
The installation of the Kaolack textile unit was the beneficiary of a 20-year loan of
- 1 billion CFA francs, granted by OPEC. Kaolack was also endowed with an industrial
center during the year.
The fourth Dakar International Fair, which was held from 28 November to 7 December
. 1980, was very successful, with the participation of 39 countries and 500 firms.
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In the fiscal area a remarkable showing of solidarity, to come to the aid of the ru-
ral world affected by the drought, was instituted (expected profit: 3.6 billion CFA
francs) .
The 1980-1983 public investment program was fixed at 320 billion CFA francs, at con-
stant prices; it is oriented chiefly toward the productive sectors.
Senegal continues to benefit from varied financial aid: United States, France (part
of which was used to absorb 11.5 billion CFA francs in debts to private enterprises),
West Germany, Arab countries. Under the STABEX [expansion unknown] procedure, an al-
location of 5.2 billion CFA francs, for the year 1980, was allotted to partial cover-
age of the losses of export income after the poor peanut season of 1979-1980.
Gambia: Contracts tiVith French Firms
'fhe Gambian budget for fiscal year 1979-1980 was set at 76.5 million dalasis in rev-
- enues (+17.7 percent) and 72.4 million in expenditures, or an expected surplus of
4.1 million dalasis (1 dalasi = approximately 2.60 French francs).
The Banjul rehabilitation program entrusted to the Gambia Utilities Corporation (GUC) ,
was financed, half by the African Development Bank (a loan of 16.5 units of account).
_ Various French firms obtained contracts for a total of $250 million, to complete var-
- ious industrial projects. The metric system went into effect oii 1 January 1981.
Guinea-Bissau: a Bauxite Exploitation Study
The study of exploitation of deposits and piles of bauxite in the southern region of
Guinea-Bissau includes removal through the port of Biba. To this effect an agree-
ment was sought witli Guinea-Conakry, which has over 30 percent of the world's baux-
ite reserves, for t}ie use of the projected railroad.
~Vit}i t}ie participat ioii of Guinean Oil and Mining (PETROMINAS) , a state-owned company, ~
oil prospecting is to start up in late 1981. Swedish aid will contribute to the
modernizatioil and expansion of small-scale fishing. The dispute with Guinea-Conakry
has still not receivecl an amiable solution; the question took on acuteness wit}i the
coming exploration tor off-shore oil.
Cape Verde: A new t'eriod of Drought and Development Centered on Fishing
For the fourth consecutive year the Cape Verde Archipelago was a victim of drought,
and international aid furnished indispensable food aid.
Uevelopment was cente:ec] on fishing. Japan is contributing toward equipping two ~
tuna boats; ~rance fias taken over the archipelago's maritime beacons; the European
Investment 13ank and the African Development Bank have granted loar.s to build a fish-
ing boat repair yarcl at Mindela (scheduled to go into service in late 1982) and the
Sao Vicente shipyarcl. 'flie last two developments, by providing an appreciable gain
in foreign currency, will make possible an 80-percent income supplement to the bal-
ance of goods and services. In addition, the French aid includes air cover, irriga-
tion tlie building of slaubhterhouses.
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Mali: A Foreign ~el~t Supportable Only tiVith Difficulty
A country with a basically agricultural str�ucture, Mali was again affected by the
drouglit; the grain shortage for the 1979-1980 season amounted to 250,000 tons.
The primary sector (agriculture and cattle raising) contributes 44 percent to the
formation of the gross domestic product. The record cotton harvest of 1979-1980 at
ginning furni..hed 56,500 tons of cotton fiber with a value of 43 billion Malian
francs. The producers' total revenue was established at 12 billian (1 Malian franc =
0.01 French franc).
_ Diversification of the Malian economy is sought in industrialization. Among projects
being studied are: a t}iird agro-industrial sugar complex at Bankoumana, 60 km from
Bamako in the Upper Niger Valley, having as its objective the production of 30,000
tons of sugar per year; a second cement plant at Diamou (SO billion Malian francs)
with a capacity of 260,U00 tons of cement per year; exploitation of the iron ore at
Bale (a decision provided for during 1981); the extraction of phosphates from
Tilemsi with a first unit of 30,000 tons per year, the installation to be completed
expected to arrive ~it 240,000 tons per year.
1'}ie 1980 budget was balanced at 70.8 billion Malian francs (compared to 77.8 billion
for t}~e preceding buclget), not taking into account taking care of the deficit car-
ried forward from former years.
At t~ie end of 1979 the foreig~i debt amounted to the equivalent of 185.6 billion
Malian francs, after the payment of debts granted by France, West Germany and Canada
in particul ar. Servicing the debt absorbs too large a share of export revenues, and
its adjustment is ori the agenda. Recent aid included an increased percentage of the
gift component.
The government is making every effort to redress the situation of the state-owned
companies in the direction of more economical and profitable management.
Less than 4 years after work started, the Selingue Dam on the Sankarani, a tributary
of the Niger fZiver, 130 km from Bamako, is supplying the capital with energy.
A new 1981-1985 Fivc-Year Plan is in preparation; it will probably take up again the
remainder of the actions programmed in the precedin~; 1974-1978 Plan which, because
it was impossible to obtain all of the hoped-for foreign aid, was only very partially
accomplished.
Guinea: Foreign Investment Solicited
Normalization of Franco-Guinean relations still remains to be perfected; however, the
financial contention was settled early in the year, and the French firms that had
been obliged to cease all activity received a total lump sum payment of 70 billion
Prench francs.
l1t present the Guinean ecoilomy is based on bauxite, the recognized reserves of which
amount tc 8 billion tons, the most important in the world. In 1979, 12 million tons
were extracted and 700,000 tons of alumina were produced (650,000 tons of it pro-
duced by ~ria, which is a partnership of the state and international aluminum firms).
In Julie 1980 an agreement was concluded with Algeria, Nigeria, Romania, American and
Swiss firms and Yugoslav publicly-owned firms to build a complex to produce
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1.2 million tons of alumina and 150,000 tons of aluminum from the Ayekoye deposit,
which is located in the northwest. The development of the Fria-Kimbo alumina pro-
duction gave rise to financing by the European Investment Bank, for one quarter of
the cost of the program evaluated at 23 million European units of account, or
6.9 billion CFA francs.
' In the field of iron ore, the project of the Guinea Iron Mining Company (MIFERGUI-
Nimba), a semi-private company including the state, Algeria, Nigeria, Japanese firms,
Yugoslav publicly-owned companies and the Spanish INI [National Ins~.itute of Indus-
try], deals with exploiting the Mt. Nimba deposit, near the Liberian border, whose '
reserves are estimated to be 1.5 billion tons, In the beg~nning the rate of extrac-
~ tion would be limited to 15 million tons per year and an agreement will be negotiated
with Liberia for removal of the ore. Off-shore oil prospecting is to begin in the
_ early months of the present year, 1981.
Guinea is desirous of receiving foreign capital to contribute to the expansion of its
mining sector and its industrialization. To that end a new Foreign Investment Guar-
antee Code went into effect at the end of April.
Relations with the African states are gradually being normali::ed, especially witb
Senegal, and in the course of the year Guinea joined the Gambia River Development :
Organization and the Mano River Union.
- No data has been furnished concerning foreign trade and the public treasury. The
foreign debt is evaluated at the equivalent of 4 billion French francs; servicing it
absorbed 27 percent of export revenue in 1979. The monetary unit, the syli, which
is not convertible, is depreciating from year to year. Its theoretical parity is
currently about 0.23 French francs. :
At the end of December the 1981-1985 Five Year Plan was announced. Totaling
38 billion sylis, it includes 6 billion allotted to pay off the public debt and
32 billion divided almost equally into three parts between agriculture, mining and
industry. The volume of annual investment forecast, 6.4 billion sylis, is tied up
with those in the 1g73-1978 Five Year Plan (2.7 billion) and the 1964-1971 Seven
Year Plan (1.3 ~illion), which did not attain the programmed objectives.
The Ivory Coast: Ilopes for Significant Oil Production
Confronted with the increase in its equipment imports, especially oil supplies, and
the stagnation of export revenues for agricultural production, the Ivory Coast since
1979 has shown a slowdown in its rate of expansion. -
Wit}i 529 billion CI~~ francs in imports and 535 billion in exports, foreign trade in
1979 releasecl a surplus balance of 6 billion CFA francs, against 2 billion in 1978
and 100 billion in 1977. 1'he general balance of payme;zts for the year 1979 also re-
flects this pause, with a deficit of 29.8 billion CFA francs, against a positive _
balance of 138 billion in 1978.
Agricultural production showed a 6-percent increase; the 1979-1980 coffee season
furnished 245,000 marketed tons; the cocoa season produced the record figure of
370,000 tons, 24 percent of which was processed by local industry. The edible oil ~
refineries produced 150,000 tons of palm oil, a record levPl (117,000 tons in 1979).
The Ivory Coast now ranks third in the world's palm oil production. Rice production
should reach 637,000 tons in 1985.
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- 'fhe 1980 operatir~g budget was balanced at 235.4 billion CFA francs (+11.1 percent);
servicing the debt absorbs 14.8 billion, an increase over 1978.
The special investment and equipment budget for the same fiscal year, 1980 was set,
for incorr~e and expenditures, at 312.8 billion CFA francs (+30.6 percent). Sixty-
five percent of it is drawn from domestic resources, the remaining 34.4 percznt ex-
pected to come from foreign aid.
At the end of 1978 the foreign debt totaled 968.8 billion CFA francs (+4.5 percent)
and servicing it corresponded to 14.7 percent of exports (11.12 percent in 1977).
tn September 1980 a 7-year loan of 35 billion CFA francs (700 million French francs)
was obtained from a consortium of French bar:ks..
In A1ay the government decided to defer the execution of 10 development projects for -
a total of 300 billion CFA francs, projects basically coneerned with infrastructures. ,
In March the hydroelectric dam at Bu;c (two thirds of Kossou) was was filled.
In 1979 'he industrial sector contributed 13 percent to the formation of the gross
domestic product. The total capital brought into play by Ivorian industry was
113.6 billion CFA francs as of 1 October 1979 (+20 percent over October 1978); the
accumulated investments accounted for 459.8 billion (+39 percent). The Ivorization
of capital is accelerating from year to year: 46 percent as of 1 October 1979, in-
cluding 33 percent public participation, against 37 percent 4 years earlier.
In July the first off-shore oil deposit (1 million tons) began actual exploitation;
a mucti more import ant deposit (provisionally evaluated at 250 million tons) was given
promi~laiice off Jacqueville, SO km from Abidjan. The country could attain self-suf-
ficiency in 1982 and, according to some experts, Ivorian oil production could equal
Gabon's production in 1985, which would be around 10 million tons.
~n agreement was concluded with Ghana and Upper Volta to improve the Black Volta.
Upper Volta: as~ified Among the Poorest Countries of the Third World
Despite meritorious efforts and international aid, Upper Volta, at a disadvantage
because it is landlocked, is still one of the Third World's poorest countries. The
1980 budget was fixed, in balance, at 35 billion CFA francs (-0.7 billion under the
1979 budget), including 22 billion in customs revenue.
Miong the development projects written into the budget were the dissemination of .
silkworm breeding, installation of a s~cond sugar complex, the building of a card-
board factory by tl~e Upper Volta Packaging and Packing Company (SEC.HV) in
Ouagadougou, requiring an investment of 1 billion CFA francs. During the year the
leather and hide sector was reorganized, collection and tanning being provided by
semi-public companics.
On 1 October the Poura gold mine, after years of slumber, was returned to activity; -
it contains 15 tons of inetal; exploitation would provide 16 percent of the budget
for several years and would account for 11.5 percent of the exports, the top posi-
tion in that area being held by cotton.
No progress was made in 1980 toward putting into exploitation the Tambao manganese
ore deposit, realization of which involves investment of significant capital and
construction of a railroad for removal of the ore.
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Nigur: Uraiiium, tf~c liasis for llevelopment and Reception of Extensive Private Capital
The entry into exploitation during the year of the Akouta Mining Company COMINAK)
strengthens uraniwn's contribution to the Nigerian economy, which for several years
has been benefited by the activity qf the Air Mining Company (SOMAIR). A third firm,
not yet in exploitation, completes the mining sector.
The 1979-1983 Five Year Plan proviries for 730.2 billion CFA francs in investment, in
constant francs, distributed as 52.63 percent public contribut ions and 47.37 percent
private capital. Its adjustments rest on the extraction and processing of urariifer-
ous ores, on the exploitation of coal with an objective of 200,000 tons in 1983 and
on putting the phosphate deposits into exploitation, with reduced-scale production
in 1983. -
During the year the Anou Araren Nigerian Coal Company (SONICHARj undertook the second
section of the work on the 36,600-kilowatt thermal power plant from the deposit whose
reserves are evaluated at 6 million tons. The total cost of the SONICHAR program
xepresents 64 billion CFA francs.
On 1 September the '1'era Dam, about 200 km northwest of Niamey near the Voltan border,
~ went into service.
The budget for fiscal year 1980-1981 (October to September) was fixed, in balance,
at 80.6 billion CFA francs (+11.75 percent over the preceding year); it includes
26 billion in investment expenditures. Servicing the foreign debt absorbs
8.7 billion, a strong increase (+107 percent). In the European Development Fund
Program for 1980-1984, Niger appears for the equivalent of 21 billion CFA francs.
As of 1 October the minimum basic wage was raised 10 percent.
Benin: Poor Management of State-Owned Companies -
The government of Benin is always reluctant to give out data calculated on the evolu- .
tion of the econom~c cycle: foreign trade, public treasury, balance of payments and
indebtedness.
The 1980 budget was fixed in income and expenditures at 33.8 billion CFA francs ~
(+20 percent); 90 percent from fiscal resources, it includes 2 billion for se.rvicing
the foreign debt.
Under industrialization, the factory of the Onigbolo Cement Company, in Oueme pro-
vince, 18 km north of Pobe, is in the process of construction. The firm, a semi-
public binational company (49 percent Nigeria, 42 percent Benin and 10 percent the
~Uanish partner) expects to have a capacity of 500,000 tons of cement per year.
British and Belgian financing has been acquired for the project of the Save Sugar
Company, which is also a semi-public company (Benin 49 percent, Nigeria ~+5 percent
and the English Lonr}io Company 5 percent); the cost of the program is estimated at
50 billion CFA francs. .
No decision was taken, nor was any fiancing obtained for the potential exploitation
of the phosphates at Mekrou, whose deposits may contain 5 million tons.
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Uuring tlie year the semi-public edible oil refinery at Bohicon (2.3 billion CFA
francs) was adapted for production of cottonseed oil, peanut or corn oil, karite
[translation unknownj butter and crab butter. A third brewery is under construction
in Abomey in the center of the country (S billion CFA francs) with, in the first
phase, a p roduction capacity of 150,000 hl [hectoliters] of beer and 50,000 hl of -
carbonated beverages per year.
The administrution is preoccupied with curing the poor management of the state-owned
companies: overabundant manpower, inadequate production and accumulated deficits.
Libyan interests are broadly represented in the Benin-Libyan Fishing Company and the _
Benin-Arab Libyan Mining Company.
Togo: Increased Phosphate Revenues
_ Togo's 1980 budget, within the framework of the austerity policy that had been adop-
~ ted, was fixed, in 1~alance, at 67. 3 billion CFA francs (+3. 79 percent) . The con-
tributiotl of the Togo P}iosphates Office was raised to 13.5 billion CFA francs
(+35 percent), and 22,3 percent of the expenditures were allocated to servicing the
public debt. With the same imperatives, and the imperative of the fight against in-
flation, the 1981 budget totals 70.7 billion CFA francs (+5~.02 percent); it includes
revenues of 6.6 billion (against 3.2 billion) from the Togo Agricultural Products Of-
fice. The finance law raised from 35 to 40 percent the tax rate on industrial and
commercial profits.
1'he indebtect~iess of tlte Togolese Hydrocarbons Company to Nigeria remains high and in
arrears as of 1 June 1980, representing $t.2 million, 2.1 million of which is inter-
- est; the Lome Refinery is supplied with Nigerian crude. The Tabligbo plant of the
, ~Vest African Multinational Cement Company (CIMAO) was completed during the year. A -
German loan of 5.5 billion CFA francs was obtained to finance the work of expanding _
the port of Lome.
The 1981-1985 F?e Year Plan totals 250.9 billion CFA francs in anticipated invest- -
ment.
Gl~ana: Indebtedness, Lack of Foreign Currency and Inflation are Compromisiiig the
Stabilization of the Economy
At the end of 1979 Ghana's outstanding foreign debt went up to $1.3 billion and the
- domestic debt was even larger: $2 billion, or 6.1 billion cedis (1 cedi - about
- 1.60 French francs). Inflation, which had reached 80 percent for the year 1979,
could not be brougi~t uiider control in 1980, and the economic situation remains bad. _
'I'he budget for fiscal year July 1980-June 1981 was fixed at 5.7 bi] lion cedis in in-
come ancl 7.3 billio~i in expenditures, including 2.5 billion in investment credits,
the deficit having to be covered by resorting to domestic and foreign loans.
I~or ttic: year 1980 the oil supply bill exceeds $1 billion, representing 36 percent of
thc export revenue. 1'his state of affairs justifies the necessity of maintaining
sevez�e limitations on imports, certain provisions of which, however, were made more
flexible in December. In FeUruary it was announced that natural gas had been dis-
covered. .
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An importaitt program to regeiierate and treat cacao trees is in progress, thanks to
foreigti aid, especially from the African Development Bank. Withholding from sale
stocks of cocoa from the 1979-1980 season brought losses equivalent to 13 million
pounds sterling.
Tn February an agreement was concluded with Nigeria for the exploitation of bauxite,
- piles of which are believed to contain from 550 to 600 million tons of reserves. In
December the discovery of a very important new auriferous deposit was announced.
Ghana's gold production, which was calculated to be 900,000 ounces in 1965, fell to
36?.,000 ounces in 1979, having produced, with the price rise, the equivalent of
$200 million in export sales.
In administration, the government launched a harsh fight against corruption.
N igeria: After the Overheating, a Resumption of Expansion and Reconstitution of the
Exchange Reserves
The top African producer, before Algeria, Nigeria stabilized its extraction of oil
at 2.1 mi?lio~l barrels per day. Its crud~ reserves are evaluated at between 20 and
30 billion barrels, or 3 to 4.5 percent of the world's reserves. N atu.ral gas re-
' serves are estimate~ at 2,125 billion cubic meters and are still not much exploited,
for lack of liquefaction installations; the Bonny plant (estimated cost $14 million) `
is still in the submitting stage of the work (for 1 April 1981) and will not go into -
service until 1982-1983. f~ere and now, a supply contract was concluded with a con-
sortium of European purchasers for 8 billion cubic meters per year for 20 years, be-
ginning in 1984-1985.
The federal budget for the fiscal period April 1980-December 1981 was fixed at -
11.8 billion naira in income (+2,4 billion), including 95 percent for oil, and at
11.3 billion in expenditures (+20.1 percent), whereas the budget for the preceding
fiscal year (April 1979-March 1980) had been established with a provisional deficit
(1 naira = about 8. 4 French francs) .
The 1980-1985 Fourth Development Plan totals 82 billion naira in investments, against
43 billion for the preceding plan. Its application should bring the growth of the
gross domestic product at an average annual rate of 7 percent.
As of 30 June 1980 ttie volume of the foreign debt represented the equivalent of
6 billion naira 0.8 billion over 12 months). In mid-July 1980 the exchange re-
serves, reconstituted since tlie period of overheating and inflation of 1978-1979,
reached the record level of the equivalent of 4.7 billion naira. The inflation rate,
which was 16.6 percent in 1978, went back to 11.8 percent in 1979.
The revival of the economy made it possible in May to liberalize the measu?~es limit-
ing various imports.
In all sectors, the economy resumed its expansion. Nigeria ranks third among the
suppliers of oil to France. It is 22nd among France's foreign customers, accounting
for 0.78 percent of its total sales. The balance of trade is largely positive for
Nigeria because of its oil supplies.
_ In June the federal government abandoned the projected dam and hydroelectric power
plant at Lokoja, at the confluence of the Niger and the Benoue, because of its very
high cost: 2.3 billion naira (over $5 billion).
1
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On the other hand, the plan to produce paper pulp and newsprint will be carried to
term; tt~e program unclcrtaken by the Nigerian Newsprint Manufacturing Company (NNMC)
in C:ul.abar, Cross (tiver State, concerns manufacture o� 100,000 tons of newsprint per
year (cost: $470 million).
During the year the Nigerian fleet w3s reinforced by the acquisition of new units
and an order for liquefied gas tankers. The management of the state axganization,
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) having come under various forms
~ of criticism, a study is being made of restructuring the company.
- In Nigeria's equipment effort, several French companies during the first quarter of
the year concluded very important contracts for supplies, which should contribute to
- balancing the trade between the two countries somewhat.
Liberia: Partial Adjustment of the llebt
For several years Liberia's financial situation has been greatly deteriorated. A
three-se:aester adjustment in the servicing of the debt was requested, and in December
the experts and creditors in the United States, West Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, Norway and Japan recommended that their governments grant a 9-year defer-
ment on settlement of the payments from 1 July 1980 to 31 December, with a 4-year
grace pcriod.
_ ~Vitti $215.5 million in income and $372.5 in expenditures ($126 million of this for
investment expenditures), the budget for fiscal year 1980-1981 includes a provisional
deficit of $157 million, tlie deficit reduced to $75.3 million by the profit from the
balance subsidies obtained, especially from the United States (cnmpared to an initial
deficit of $14.1 million for the preceding budget). Said budget takes care of
~ $20.2 million for servicing the debt.
N1hen the Tolbert regime fell the new administrative team found a treasury of only
~5 million and lia~~ilities of $700 million in debts, with fiscal income below the
budgetary fore~:.sts. It was also decided to go ahead with a forced loan in the form
of savings certificates compulsorily dedur_ted from wages.
Because of its iron ore resources Liberia ranks second among the world's producers.
Its exports from July 1978 to June 1979 totaled 20 million tons, a decrease in re-
lation to tiie corresponding preceding period, with a value of $286.4 million
(+10.6 percent because of the price rise). In July a contract to supply ore was
' concluded with F'aki.stan, to supply the Karachi steel mill.
lndependently of t}tcir aid to the equilibrium of the balance of payments and food
aici of rice, tl~e U~iitecl States strengthened their private investments in Liberia.
_ Moreover, the Interriational Monetary Fund in September granted a drawing facility of
% G5 millio~i UTS [expansion unknownJ to contribute to the recovery of the Liberian
economy.
Sierra Leone: the Importance of the Mining Sector
Sierra Leone possesses varied mining resources: iron ore, bauxite and diamonds.
A~thoubh the extraction and shipping of iron ore are conditioned by the European
steel situation, t}ie exploitation of bauxite heaps has been increasing appreciably
for the last 10 years. As fo.r diamonds, they are in first place among exports as
far as value is concerned.
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lluring the year Sierra Leone Uenefited from several loans from the French Central
Fund for Lconomic Cooperation [CCCE] and the International Finance Corporation [IFC]
for a total amount of 12.5 million leones (1 leone = about 4.1 French francs).
A French cement group has acquired a 40-perr.ent interest in the entity that will de-
_ velop the Freetown clinker-crushing unit (~20,000 tons per year).
[30 Jan 81 pp 235-37]
[Text] Central Africa
Cameroon: an Economy Radically Transformed by Oil
The Cameroonian economy, which until recent years was basically agricultural, changed
radically with the advent of oil, production of which has gone from 800,000 tons in
_ 1978 to 1.4 million tons in 1979 and will probably exceed 2.8 million tons for 1980. ~
Cameroon has become an exporter of crude, and the chronic foreign exchange deficit,
after fiscal year 1979-1980, was virtually absorbed with a negative balance of only
5 billion CFA francs, against a record deficit of 51.5 billion for the preceding
fiscal year. .
In the course of the year two new offshore natural discoveries were announced, lo-
cated respectively 8 and 15 km from the coast in the southwest area of the Dauala
waters.
In March, the National Hydrocarbons Company (SNH) was formed with capital. of 1 bi.l-
- lion CFA francs; this public institution, by managing the state's interests, is to
contribute to developing the oil riches. Then, in July, the Company for the Study
of Developing Cameroonian Natural Gas was founded, with the above-mention~d National
Hydrocarbons Company and the four oil firms operating in Cameroon, to build a lique- -
faction plant in Kribi after 1983 (expected date it will begin activity, 1987). Be-
tween now and then the crude refinery at Point Limboh, beyond Victoria, will go into
service this year, 1981.
Although the primary sector is still the traditional element in the economy, Camer-
oon in his recent years has strengthened its industrial potential (edible oil re-
fineries, a sugar plant, a cellulose production program, aluminum, refining). In
1979 the industrial activity index rose 18.6 percent, oil playing an approximately
� 65-percent role in the total turnovex.
- With 564,000 tons of exports of rough and finished lumber, forest exploitation ac-
counts for 11 percent of total exports for the year 1979.
Ttie budget for fiscal year July 1980-June 1981 was set, in balance and based on the
country's owii resources, at 246 billion CFA francs (an increase of 31.8 percent over
the year before); it includes 82.8 billion for investment expenditures (against
57 billion). The growth of the gross domestic product for fiscal year 1979-1980 was
calculated at 19.8 percent.
As of 30 June 1979 the foreign debt accounted for the equivalent of 238.5 billion
CFA francs, including an unused 52.2 billion of available margin. Since indepen-
dence, Cameroon has been the beneficiary of broad international aid, the accumulated
air totaling 450 to 460 billion CFA francs.
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'['he ac}iievements of the Fourt}i Uevelopment Plan showed a slowdown that will be dif-
ficult to catch up on. Mecliocre results were recorded for cotton, medium results
for cocoa, better results for the palm groves; in the sector of industry, mining and
energy, approximately 50 percent of the programs were executed.
With regard to infrastructures, apart from the straightening and modernization of the
railroad between Douala and Yaounde, the whole program includes building a modern
road between uouala and Yaounde, the financial plan for which (62.1 billion CFA
francs) was completed in May with international lenders.
Chad; a Weak Economy
The armed fighting between various groups ended with the de facto seizure of Chad by -
' Libya, a situation whose developments cannot be evaluated at present.
'I'he economy is weak and Chad is no longer Africa's foremost cotton producer. From
174,000 tons for the 1975-1976 season, the cottonseed harvest fell to 88,000 tons
for the 1979-1980 scason, 35 percent below the year before. Forecasts for the pres-
ent season are unfavorable.
No indication has been furnished on the condition of the public treasury for three
years; their state of depletior, requires a foreign influx that Libya will have to as- -
sume in the beginning.
The 1~78-1981 Five Year Plan, which involved 226.8 billion CFA francs in investment,
151 billion of it expected to come from foreign air, must be considered null and
void.
Central African Republic: French Aid is Essential
Putting the Central African economy in order again will require the sustained effort
and the significan* support of foreign aid, especially on the part of France.
The 1980 budget, established within a necessary austerity framework, was set at
25.4 billion CFA francs (1.8 billion below the preceding budget); fed nartially by
foreign balance subsidies (to 18 percent), expenditures include 4.6 billion for tak-
ing care of the debt.
Early in the year the International Monetary Fund granted special aid of 4 million
DTS in support of the economic programs for 1980. In addition, during the third
- quarter t}ic CEC granted aid consisting of 49 million units of account (14 billion
- CFA francs) and the sponsors' group decided in favor of granting new aid, with in-
creased participation by Iraq. Gabon also opened a credit of 1 billion CFA francs ~
to finance investmcnts by its nationals in Central Africa.
The 1980-1981 Interim Recovery Plan set up 45 billion in credits, the actions being
oriented mainly toward agriculture, which includes 80 percent of the nopulation and
accounts for the major.ity of the exports (cotton, coffee and tobacco). The planned
actions take up some c~ the actions written into the Third Five Year Plan (1976-
1980), which was revealed to be too ambitious and which after three years of execu-
tion achieved only 17 percent of the action that had been programmed.
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In 1979, production of uncut diamonds rose to 314,000 carats; 300,000 carats were ex-
ported, representing a value of 7.8 billion CFA francs. Production in the first
half of 1980 was calculated at 174,000 carats (+12 percent), worth 5 billion CFA :
.francs, including 1 billion in taxes to benefit the budget. No progress was shown
tow~rd the eventual exploitation of the uranium ore deposit at Bakouma.
A raise of the guaranteed minimum wage rate occurred on 1 May 1980.
Gabon: the Beginning of Recovery Within a Framework of Financial Strictness
T}ie cooling off--and in some branches, the crisis--that affected the Gabonese econ-
omy beginning in 1977, after the period of euphoria and uncontrolled expansion, was
taken advantage of Uy the Libreville government to make a better choice, in terms of
the International Monetary Fund recommendations, of centers for future development
by concentrating on gradual reduction of the foreign debt, in order to gain favorable _
reception from foreign lenders. Early results were achieved, greatly facilitated by
the contribution of tlie profit from oil taxation.
- 'Thus the Autstanding foreign public debt, which represented the equivalent of
575 billion CFA francs at the end of 1977, was reduced to 440 billion at the end of
1979 and was 365 billion at the end of 1980. The domestic debt was the object of a
moratorium and an adjustment of the payment period.
The gross domestic product for 1980 should reach, in real terms, the level of
720 billion CFA francs reached in 1977, after a decline to 539 billion in 1978 and
598 billion in 1979.
The general balance of payments, in deficit by 44 billion CFA francs for 1978, be-
came positive again by 10 billion for 1979 and should be very largely surplus in
1980, thanks to the commercial surplus (estimated at 300 billion and essentially the
result of oil exports).
The inflation rats was brouglit under control; at the end of 1980 it should be con- -
tained withiii the lU-percent limit. However, rising prices at the point of consump-
. tion is still worrying.
Balanced at 313.7 billion CFA francs (-14.3 billion), the 1980 budget included
42..3 billion in loans (63.4 billion in the 1979 budget). Under expenditures, the
servicing of the debt was 120 billion (-20 billion) and development actions were en-
dowed with 92 billion in credits.
The financial strictness policy adopted and followed is expressed by the increased
available budgetary saviiigs for investment, savings that went from 26 billion CFA
francs in 1979 to GO billion in 1980, with forecasts above 100 billion for each of
the years 1981 and 1982.
The 1981 budget was set, greatly increased, at 404.5 billion CFA francs (+90.8 bil-
lion) with 136 billion for ec~uipment credits; it provides for 15 billion in recourse
to loans.
Oil production incr.eased to 9.8 million tons in 1979; after stabilizing in 1980, ex-
traction should gradually decline beginning in 1981-1982, except for new and impor-
tant discoveries (in 5eptember, Elf-Gabon announced that two deposits had been lo-
cated). In 1979 oil accounted for 70 percent of the budget and, with 279 billion _
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CFA francs, it represented three fourths of export revenues. The government is also
- preparing to define the bases for "after-oil" development.
The 1980-1982 Interim Development Plan totals 800 billion CFA francs (at current
priCes) in programmed investment, including 300 billion assumed out of public funds
_ ~nd 500 billion to be covered by the private sector (134.7 billion for oil and 38.4
billion by manganese and uranium mining firms).
Following the demand, the Ogooue Mining Company (COMILOG) should increase its ex-
traction and exportatioti of manganese ore to reach 2.5 million tons, and the France- :
ville Uraniwn Mines Company (COMUF) should reach 1,500 tons of inetal content in
1980, filling one fifth of the French xequirements.
The agricultural situation remains worrisome and Gabon is still a very long way from
. self-sufficiency.
The two oil refineries, Gabonese Refining Company (SOGARA) and Elf-Gabon Refining
- Company (COGER), both at Port Gentil, are processing between them only about one
third of the national crude.
The financial situation of the Gabonese Cellulose Company (SOGACEL) and the Upper
Ogooue Sugar Company (SOSUHO), which meet dome~tic needs mainly, necessitated the
granting of budgetary subsidies and capital reduction measures. On 1 April a general
- wage raise was decided upon.
The Congo: Recovery, Thanks to Oil, and Measures to Reorganize Public Companies
The economic and financial situation in the Congo improved, thanks to oil, taxes on
which went from 15 billion CFA francs in 1978 to 20 billion in 1979 and 40 billion in -
1980. From 2.7 million tons in 1979, oil production should exceed 3 million tons in
1980 and, with recent discoveries, the level of extraction should be 5 million tons
in 1981, to reach 8 million before 1990. During the years 1981 and 1982 the oil in-
vestment progra iilvolves 1~0 billion CFA francs.
The 1980 budget, initially set at 86 billion CFA francs (+25.5 percent), was revised
in the course of the fiscal year and raised to 127 billion; revenues include 58.7
billion in oil taxes (taxes and duties on profits); under expenditures are 18.2 bil-
lion to service thc debt and 16.4 billion for investments. The 1981 budget, with
160 billion CFA francs, shows a strong increase (+43 billion); investment credits,
also appreciably increased, are up to 48.2 billion.
During the year the affluence of the public treasury made it possible to resume regu-
lar payments on the balances of the civil service and settle the arrears owed to the
suppliers.
After too long a pei�iod of substantial loss, the government was concerned with cur-
ing the lack of productivity on the part of the industrial firms in the socialist
state sector. Recovery measures, involving the budget taking care of liabilities,
tending to improve profitability, were taken in connection with several entities--
those most deficient.
As for the private sector, it continues to encounter serious difficulties because of
an irregular energy supply, shortcomings of the Congo-Ocean Railroad, unexpected
work stoppages and supply irregularities.
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In the state's socialist sector, 1980 was marked by decisions to set the Congo
Glassmaking Company (SOVERCO) in motion again and start up the Italo-Congolese Out-
fitting and Fishing Company (SICAPE) again; both are at Point Noire. In February a
contract was concluded with the engineexing company TEC~IIP [expansion unknownJ to
renovate the Point Noire oil refinery, which has a processing capacity of 1 million
tons of crude per year and was built between 1973 and 1978, but has never gone into
operation (cost: 34 billion CFA francs). The textile unit Congo Patterns (state
interest, 30 percent) is experiencing satisfactory activity. _
In 1979 the sales af the Congolese Lumber Office totaled 4.8 billion CFA francs
(+0.2 billion over 1978). Also in 1979, French purchases of Congolese oil repre-
sented 551 million French francs.
' During che year the African Development Bank granted loans totaling 10.8 million
units of account (2.9 billion CFA francs) to straighten the Congo-Ocean road and
develop palm groves.
It is not widely known that the Congo's foreign debt is evaluated at the equivalent
of 88 billion CFA francs, not including 79 billion in guarantees furnished in favor
of state-owned companies. The entire foreign and domestic debt is estimated at .
250 billion CFA francs, a considerable volume considering the productivity of the
Congolese economy.
The 1980 program, which is preliminary to the future Development Plan still to be
drawn up, involved 89.7 billion in investments, including 33.1 billion entrusted to :
the state, 7 billion in self-financing of publicly-owned firms and 45.5 billion in
foreign aid (obtai~ied to a limit of 40 percent).
Equatorial Guinea: a Difficult Revival
The budget for fiscal year April 1980-March 1981 was set in quasi-balance at
2 billion ekweles (1 ekwele = about 0.03 French francs). Balancing the economy will
require serious efforts to regain a production of 40,000 tons of cocoa and 300,000
tons of lumber.
lluring 1980 diversified aid ~aas dispensed by Spain, the International Monetary Fund
(5.5 million UTS in support of the economic stabilization program), the EEC (3 mil-
lion units of accouiit, or $4.2 million, to revive the economy), the African Develop-
ment Bank (500,000 units of account to modernize Bata International Airport), etc.
Indications of oil fiave been recognized off the coast.
Sao Tome et Principe: International Aid
Basically agricultural, the economy of the archipelago of Sao Tome et Principe rests :
on cocoa, production of which, of good quality, is around 8,000 tons. French aid
~vas strengthened and international aid also was increased. The African Development
Bank granted a loan of 1 million units of account to enlarge and modernize the
Sao Tome International Airport.
Zaire: the Lffects of Applying the Mobutu Plan are Still not Very Perceptible. The
Condition of the Foreign Debt is not Facilitating the Granting of Credits for Start-
ing up Again
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Zaire's economy is still a long way from the hoped-for recovery and the effects of
applying the Mobutu Plan (3.7 billion in zaires-currency over three
years) are still near.ly imperceptible. Agricultural production continues to decline;
the country is no longer an exporter of palm oil; however, shipments of 1980 coffee
will pick up again.
For 1980, GECAMINES' [General Quarries and Mines Company] production should be fig-
_ uxed at 420,0~0 tons of copper (+50,2 00 tons over 1979) and 14,400 tons ~f cobalt
(+400 tons); 1979 sales brought a profit of $572 million for copper and $783 million y
for cobalt.
For lack of raw materials and replacement parts, the manufacturing industry is uti-
lizing only 30 to 40 percent of its c apacity; the declines are especially signifi-
cant in the textile industry, the cement works and the brewery in the agro-food in-
dustry. !
~9ith mining products, the balance of foreign trade is positive: +$612 million in
1979 (agzinst +$551 in 1978j. The deficit in the balance of payments, -$324 million
in 1979, is estimated to be -$248 mill ion for 1980.
The crucial problem is still the foreign debt; it has accumulated rashly and servic-
_ Lllg it in 1980, not counting the arre ars, represented 26 percerit of the value of the
exports of the preceding year; this percentage would be likely to reach 33 percent of
the 1980 exports. As of 30 June 1980 the outstanding foreign debt represented
$4.7 billion, $0.9 billion for arrears in annuities and interest and $0.6 billion for
commercial arrears. The accumulation would represent 100 percent of the gross domes-
tic product.
_ After the two adjustments obtained from foreign creditors in June 1976 and November
1977, a new adjustment was concluded in December 1979; the agreements included an
extension of the repayment period, a consolidation of the unpaid arrears and a reduc-
tion in the intere~t rate. A new negotiation entered into in December 1980 for con-
solidation of t'.: bank debt and for obtaining new credits.
The budgetary deficit is chronic. The budget for fiscal 1980 was set at 3.3 billion
zair.es in income and 3.7 in expenditur es. The one for 1981 was set at 4.9 billion
in income and 5.6 billion in expenditures.
A new devaluation or the zaire-currency occurred on 22 February 1980, following the
preceding devaluation of 27 August 1979. The new parity amounted to 0.2625 DTS, or
about I.44 French francs (against 0.365 DTS, or about 2.04 French francs).
Oil product-ion (1 million tons in 1979), thanks to recent discoveries.in the marine
arca, slioulcl be 1.4 million tons in 1980.
Pral~co-Zairean tracle sl~ows a deficit for France: -78 million French francs in 1979
(against -153 million in 1978).
1)espite ttie tax advaiitages made possible by the Investment Code, contributions of
- foreign capital are still few and far between.
) The inflation rate, ~vhich was brough*_ down to 6.6 percent for 1979, thanks to the
successive devaluations of the national currency, during the first half of 1980 reg-
istered a new upswing.
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When all is said ai~cl done, despite the coutitry's enormous resources, economic and
fina~icial recovery remai~i depenclent upon actions being at the same time stricter and
morc cleter~nined.
[6 ~eb 81 pp 291-295]
[Text] East Africa
Kenya: Poor Prospects for 1981 and the Search for Foreign Investment
The year 1980 did not produce the expected recovery for Kenya, and prospects for 1981
remain poor. The growth rate was established in 1979 at current terms at 3.1 percent,
the lowest level since 1977, when it was 8.8 percent; taking the demographic
growth into account, per capita income showed a 3-percent reduction, whereas the
1979-1983 Five Year Plan, which was drawn up with a growth objective for the gross :
product of an average of 6.3 percent per year, was supposed to result in improving
- the per-inhabitant income by 2.8 percent per year (the population increase being es-
timated at 3.5 percent per year).
The budget for financial year July 1980-June 1981 was set at 6.3 billion Kenyan
s}iillings in revenuc (-0.6 Uillion below the preceding budget) and 7.5 billion in ex-
penditures (-0.1 billion). Moreover, 1 billion shillings from foreign resources were
assigned to the investment cr~dits (1 Kenyan shilling = about 0.6 French francs).
Already on the decline, industrial activity continues to be slow. Kenya's economy
rests mainly on exportation of coffee and tea and on sugar production. Development
activity involves production of soluble coffee from a Robusta variety, establishing
new tea processing units and expanding the sugar industry.
A loan of 1.4 billion Kenyan shillings was allotted by the World Bank to increase the
capacity of the Muhoroni sugar plant and to put in order all sugar activities under
the aegis of the Kenya Sugar Authority. Kenya is very anxious to receive foreign in- =
vestment.
Apart from significant food aid from the United States to partially remedy the food
shortage caused by the arought, Kenya benefited during the year from increased Ger-
man aid for equipment purchases, and in October from a credit of 241.5 million DTS to
support the development programs. Financial aid from Arab countries has amounted to
$261.7 million since 1974. L'EC aid for the period 1980-1985 was set at $211 million.
Uganda: at~ Urgcnt Appeal for International Assistance
Uganda's economy is still weak; it is supported by cotton and coffee, which, with
137,000 tons in 1979, furnished 97 percent of export revenue.
The budget for fiscal year July 1980-June 1981 was set at the equivalent of $1 bil-
lion in revenue and $1.3 billion in expenditures, the provisional deficit, -0.3 bil-
lion, being about tlie same as that forecast in the preceding budget.
The trade deficit is reflected, despite the contribution of foreign aid, in the fall
of the exchange reserves. To put the economy in order again, foreign investment is
being solicited; an agreement has already been concluded with Canada to put the
- Kil.embe copper-cobalt deposit into exploitation.
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For the year 1980, Great Britain doubled its financial assistance, bringing it to
4 million pounds sterling, and food aid contribu~ed to the subsistence of the popu-
lation of Karamoja, which was seriously affected by famine.
Tanaania: Among the Most Important Beneficiaries of International Aid
- Tanzania's balance of payments for fiscal 1979-1980 shaws a deficit of 2 billion
. Tanzanian slii~lings (1 Tanzanian shilling = about 0. 56 French fxancs) , against
1.1 billion for the previous fiscal year. As of 30 June 1980 the national domestic
debt amounted to 2.9 billion shilling s, greatly increased over the end of June 1979.
- The foreign trade deficit for 1979 was calculated at 5.2 billion shillings, triple
that of 1978; this imbalance inspired measures to limit the granting of import li-
censes.
'fhe budget for fiscal July 1980-June 1981 was set at 16.4 billion shillings in in-
come 12 percent over the previous budget); expenditures include 7 billion in in-
vestment credits percent).
~ The 1981-1985 Five Year Plan should result in national income r.eing increased from '
42.3 billion to 56.6 billion shillings in 1986 and, over the same period, an im-
provement in the per capita income of about 13 percent.
During the 1979-1980 season agricultural production registered a decline; forecasts
for the 1980-1981 season involve the following tonnages: sisal, 127,000 tons; cot-
ton, 78,600 tons; coffee, 57,600 tons; tobacco, 19,200 tons; cashew nuts, 94,000
tons; tea, 16,000 tons; cloves, 15,000 tons. Sugar production is estimated to be
130,000 tons (+15 percent) aiid will st ill be inadequate to meet the domestic demand
(200,000 tons). The Sugar Development Corporation (SUDECO) expects to bring its .
sugar production to 400,000 tons in 1980.
Tea exports, which in Tanzania current ly furnish 4 percent of its foreign currency
revenues, shoul reach 25,000 tons in 1985 and represent 1 percent of the world's
production. A program to develop sis al plantations has been perfected; fiber ex-
ports yield 4 billion shillings per ye ar.
From 1971 to 1980, production in the industrial sector fell about SO percent. Among
projects for development are the expansion of the Dar-es-Salaam refinery, which was
created in 1966 by the Italian government group, ENI [National Hydrocarbons AgencyJ;
the refinery will have a capacity of 7 50,000 tons of refined products per year, and
the decline in its production is accentuated from one year to the next because of ~
the aging of equipment. Another project is the exploitation in 1981-1982 of the -
Minj iiigu phosphate deposit in the Arusha region (with Finnish participation) .
In July, the Musoma biill (MUTEX) tsxtile unit began operation with a production po-
tential of 22 million meters per year. It will utilize 35 percent Tanzanian cotton
and its construction (6 billion shillings) has benefited from technical aid from the
Mulhousian Schaeffer Group.
In May the monopoly on imports was res erved for 14 state organisms, and the assets of
the Britis}i Lonrho Croup, which were nationalized at the end of 1979, were divided
between 19 state-owned organizations.
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The state's hold on underground resources ~vas strengthened. Natural gas exploita-
tion prospects (a deposit of 30 billion cubic meters in Songo-Songo, discovered in
1974) would make it possibl~ to manufacture fertilizer (Indian participation). Pros-
pecting has reveale~ nickel and cop~:er are in the Northwest, a region bordering on
~Buzundi, and very important deposits of iron ore.
, The deterioration of the national treasury is blocking development, and Tanzania is
still discussing with the International Monetary Fund ways of granting new aid.
- Tanzania is among the largest beneficiaries of international aid, which accounts for
an average of $600 million per year. Among the aid received in 1980, Algeria pro-
vided 160 million shillings, an intervention that is to form a model for action in
favor of the poorest countries, and China is included, for $13 million per year in
- the form of a loan intended to bail out the Tanzania-Zambia (TANZAM) Railroad, which
is in near bankruptcy. The United States are also donors, contr~buting to the de-
velopment of food production.
_ Tanzania is soliciting investment of foreign capital. To that end, tax advantages
are being granted and the guarantee of free transfer is being recognized.
Zambia: Copper Uominates the Economy
The Zambian budget for the fiscal year April 1980-March 1981 was set, in balance, at
848 m:_llion kwachas, an increase of 28 percent over the previous budget (1 kwacha = '
_ about 5.6 French francs), the revenues including the proceeds from foreign loans.
The mining sector's contribution to the gross domestic product represented 4.1 bil-
lion kwachas in 1979, a decline from 1978. With copper selling at higher prices, _
the financial situation of ths two mining companies was imprnved; exports of the
Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) during t he fiscal year April 1979-March
1980 came to 363,800 tons (-S percent), and those of the Roan Consolidated Mines
(RCM) to 178,500 tons (-35 percent).
Foreign trade forecasts for 1980 were established at 0.8 billion kwachas in imports
and 1.25 billion in exports, of which 1 million was for sales of copper.
Food crops are still inadequate, and for the t}iird consecutive year it was necessary
to import corn in 1980.
~ The African llevelopment Fund granted a loan of 8 million units of account (the equiv-
~ alent of 2 billion (:rt1 francs) for partially financing (9 percent) the Nakambala
sugar project (whosc total cost is evaluated at $ 21.8 million). The important cane
plantation program undertaken within the framework of the Third Plan by the Zambia
Sugax Company will make it possible to increase sugar protection by bringing it up to
200,000 tons per year.
Malawi: Gloomy 1981 Prospects
;
Malawi's operating budget for the financial year 1980-1981 was set at 170.3 million
kwachas in revenue (+11.3 percent over the previous revised budget) and 163.5 million
in expenditures (+22.5 percent), including 32.6 million to service the debt (1 Malawi
kwacha = about 5.4 French francs). Investment credits were increased by 7.7 percent. -
At the end of 1979 the foreign ~iebt represented the.equivalent of 382.8 million
kwachas (+31 percent over the end of 1978) and servicing it absorbed 11.77 percent of
exports (against 9.85 percent in 1978).
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Foreign trade in 1979 was brought to 328 million kwachas in imports (+15 percent)
and 190 million in exports (+20 percent); the deficit of 138 millions was 35 percent
higher than that of 19Z8.
_ With the contribution of 81.7 million kwachas in foreign aid, the 1979 general bgl-
ance of payments presented a surplus of 3.8 million (against a surplus of 15.3 mil-
lion in 1978). At the end of 1979, foreign currency reserves represented 3.8 million
kwachas, or $,..9 million, 80 percent below the end of 1978.
The economy's prospects for 1981 are rather gloomy. Tobacco is the main export.
Under the heading of possibilities for development are a potential coal exploration
(reserves evaluated at 38 million tons) and bauxite exploration (28.8 million tons);
exploration for uraniferous ores; the plan for production of ethanol by the Gil Com-
pany of Malawi (estimated cost $8.2 million, implying foreign financial contribu-
tions); and study of a new cement works at Kasungu.
Rwanda: an Economy Supported by Coffee and Tea
At establislied prices, the growth of Rwanda's gross domestic product was calculated
at 6 percent in 1979, sl.ightly higher than the objective of 5.9 percent of the 1977-
1981 Five Year Plan.
Thanks to coffee exports, the trade balance for 1979 showed a slight surplus, against
a deficit of 3 billion Rwandan francs in 1978 (1 A.raandan franc = 0.047 French
~ francs). Likewise, the general balance of payments showed a slightly positive bal-
, ance.
At the end of 1979 the domestic debt totaled 3.5 billion Rwandan francs, correspond-
ing to 4 percent of the PIB [gross domestic product], a total below the year's ex-
_ ports.
The 1980 ordinary hudget was set, in balance, at 11.2 billion Rwandan francs (+22
_ percent) and th~ development budget was s~t at 2.2 billion; its source includes 1.2
billion in domestic loans.
The economy depends on coffee and tea; coffee exports for 1980 will be about 24,000
tons (-6,500 below 1979), estimated revenues being 7.3 billion Rwandan francs
(-4.5 billion). Production of manufactured tea will represent 6,100 tons (against
5,800 tons in 1978). The Rwandan Tea Production and 1Narketing Company (SORWATHE) is
to double the capacity (from 1,300 to 2,600 tons) of its processing plant in
Cyohoba-Rukeri.
Despite measures to increase coffee and tea production, the economy is stagnant. In
the course of the year Rwanda benefited from diversified foreign aid, including emer-
gency food aid.
Burundi: Development Centered on Agro-Food
~uruiidi's budget for fiscal 1980 was set at 14.6 billion Burundian francs, including
4.6 billion in investment expenditures; it includes a provisional deficit. (1 Burun-
clian franc = 0. OS French franc) .
In 1979, production of Arabica coffee was improved by 16 percent. Early in June, the
Bujumbura Textile Complex (COTEBU) unit went into operation, with Chinese assistance;
it has a production capacity of 9 million meters of cloth per year.
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An African Development Fund loari of 8 million units of account (corresponding to
2 bilZion CFA francs) will reinforce the means to finance the development of the
Ruzizi Valley. Aid from the Axab Bank for African Economic Developmer.t (BADEA) will -
contribute to the development of the sugar refinery industry by establishing a sugar
refinery in the Mosso region, in the southeastern part of the country.
In addition, Burundi is basing serious hopes on eventually exploiting nickeliferous
- ore deposits in the Musongati region, whose reserves would be sufficient for 20 years
o~ activ~ty.
Ethiopia: an Economy in a Slow Recovery
A relative lull in Ethiopia has made possible the slow recovexy of a ruined economy.
The deficit in the trade balance has been brought down from 44G million birrs in 1978
(1 birr = about 2.1 French francs) to 317 million in 1979, or $153 million. Thanks
to foreign aid, the general balance of payments as of 30 June 1979 showed a surplus
balance of 78 millioii birrs ($38 million).
Also as of 3Q June 1979, the foreign debt amounted to 1.2 billion birrs ($586 mil-
lion), SO percent of which is owed to the World Bank.
Coffee is the main resource, accounting for 70 percent of the exports with a value
for 1979 of 605 million birrs ($292 million). A coffee-tree orowing development pro-
gram has also been undertaken on the high plateaus.
African llevelopment Fund aid has been given to develop tea production ($9 million).
lluring 1980 Etliiopia was the beneficiary of diversified i;~terriational aid and Euro-
pean aid consisting of grain and skim milk, the grain shortage having been figured
at 358,000 tons.
Somalia: an Economy Still in the Pastoral Stage
The inflation for 1979 in Somalia was 19 percent. Also in 1979, the balance o� trade
caused a deficit of over 1 billion Somaii shillings to appear, or the equivalent of
$140 million (1 Somali shilling = about 0.70 French franc).
The general balance of payments for 1979 showed a surplus balance representing
$8 million, thanks to foreign aid, four fifths of which came from Arab oil-producing
- countries.
At the end of 1979, foreign assets amounted to $150 million, and servicing the deb~
absorbed about 7 percent of exports in 1979. -
During 1979, Frenc}i purchases of Somalian products totaled 15 million francs, and
French sales were calculated at 31 million.
~s a matter of priority, foreign aid was devoted to the programs for consolidating
agricultural complexes. During the year the International Monetary Fund granted a
facility of 11.5 million DTS in support of the financial recovery progr.am.
In September, the Juba sugar refinery went into s2rvice; undertaken in 1977, the
sugar complex will be completed in 1984, and its potential of 70,000 to 100,000 tons
of sugar will make it possible to meet the population's needs.
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Under infrastructure projects is the Bardera Dam and hydroelectric power plant, the
cost of which is evaluated at $ 500 million and for which foreign financing is being
sought. An important subsidy has already been granted by the EDF [European Develop-
ment Fund] .
Djibouti: Important Arab Aid
The 1980 buclgtt of the Republic of Djibouti w~as established in balance at 12.1 bil-
lioi~ Uj ibouti francs (1 Uj ibouti franc = 0. 025 French franc) . As in 1979, important
aid was granted by the Arab oil-producing countries, especially by Iraq, for the most
part in the form of gifts.
In Juiie, the satellite telecommunications ground station at Ambouli went into service;
tr~e 25-percent capital share held by France Cables and Radio was transferred to the
Republic of Ujibauti, which brought all the activities together.
The Djibouti port development program aimed at building a container terminal for a
cost of ~ billion Djibouti francs, is being partially financed by West Germany and
Saudi Arabia.
. Indian Ocean
i
' Madagascar: a Deteriorating Financial Situation
Madagascar's general budget for fiscal 1981 was set at 267.2 billion Malagasy francs
(a decrease of 10.4 billion) and investment credits were fixed at 8 billion.
Execution of the 1978-1980 Three Y ear Plan is bringing about increased equipment im-
ports and exacerbation of the deficit in the balance of trade. Trade for 1979 in-
volved 135.3 Malagasy francs in imports (+35.8 percent) and 83.8 billion (-3.9 per-
cent) in exports, which were rather poorly diversified and were basically agricultur-
al products. T he cteficit increased considerably, going from 12.4 billion in 1978 to
- 51.4 billion. '~r the same reason, the negative balance of the general balance of
payments became heavy, at'158.6 million DTS, against 2.5 million in 1978.
Also for 1979, the growth of the gross domestic product was established at 10.3 per-
cent in actual value, and tlie inflation rate reached 14 percent, against 6.5 percent
irt 1978.
The overall foreign debt increased, going from $580 million at the end of 1979 to
_ $690 mi�llion as of 30 June 1980; it will probably.go to $1 billion at the end of
1981. Its cost, which accounted for 25 percent of 1979 exports, will be 28 percent
iii 1980 and 30 perccnt i~i 1981 .
Mucli i~iterriational ~11CI is being granted, especially French aid, which is established
at 7.5 billion Malabasy francs for 1981. In June, the International Monetary Fund
~ranted two credit facilities, the first for 64.5 million DTS in support of the 1980
and 1981 development programs, and the second for 29.2 million as a mechanism for
compulsory depreciation financing of the 1979 export revenues.
The 1979-1980 rice season furnished 244,000 tons. A plan for reviving cotton produc-
tion was drawn up, with an obj ective of 65, OCO tons for 1985.
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Under the heading of industrial developments to be realized in the near future are:
the Southern Madagascar Textiles (SUMATEX) unit at Toliara, at a cost of 6.5 billion
Malagasy francs (completion in April 1981); expansion of the Bata-Malgache plant (11
billion), in which the ~tate's capital share was raised to 34 percent; the Antsirabe .
- cetrient works, on which construction is in progress (4.5 billion); the soy oil refin~
ery at Antsirabe, which will be operational in 1982, with a production potential of
12,000 tons of oil per year, etc.
In 1982, the large Andekaleka Dam (30 billion Malagasy francs) will be completed;
- the energy supplied will make it possible to supply a steel mill at Moramanga (es-
timated cost 29 billion) and beginning exploitation of the nickeliferous ore deposits
(~5 billion Malagasy francs), with the participation of South Korea.
Among the projects under study are a new cement works at Solara-Toliara, with a ca-
pacity of 500,000 to 1 million tons per year; an important paper mill in Mahatsiatra
(17. billion); and the prospect of exploiting bituminous sandstone.heaps, which at
Bemolanga are estimated to be between 2 and 3 billion tons; the heavy edible oil de-
posits at Tsimiroro, evaluated at 9 million tons.
Taxation was strengthened by the 1980 finance law, which brought the tax rate on com-
pany profits to 45 percent. Measures were taken to put state-owned companies in or-
der with a view to remedying their poor management and improving the.ir productivity.
Comoro Islands: Intensified French Aid
In the Comoro Islands, climatic disturbances affected the 1980 clove and vanilla har-
vests (165 tons against 190 in 1979); the Comoro Islands are the second largest pro-
_ ducer in the world after Madagascar, the product being, moreover, of first quality.
The primary sector (agriculture and fisliing) had a 40-percent share in forming the
gross domestic product.
The operating budget for fiscal 1981 was set at 3.2 billion Comorian francs (+12.9
percent over the previous operating budget), with a 1.5-billion recourse to foreign
aid. The equipment budget was set at 940 million Comorian franr.s (the Comorian
franc corresponds to the CFA franc) and was supplied essentiall~~ by foreign aid:
the EEC, China, Kuwait, etc. French aid has been intensified since 1979, to support
_ economic and social development measures.
BADEA granted a loan of $8 million to expand the port of Mutsamudu, and the African
Development Fund intervened in the financing of the modernization of self-employed
fishing.
Mauritius: Sugar Production Affected by Cyclones Necessitated Diversification '
The Mauritian economy is still dependent on sugar, the contribution of exported man-
� ufacturing products still being inadequate. The 1979-1980 sugar season furnished
687,000 tons; exports totaled 645,000 tons, including 507,500 tons to the EEC (Great
Britain, 64.9 percelit; France, 7.3 percent), the United States accounting for 8.8
percent of the total shipments. The 1980-1981 season, affected by the cyclones, will
amount to under 500,000 tons.
Foreign trade for 1979 involved, in value, 3.4 billion Mauritian rupees in imports
and 2.1 billion in exports (1 Mauritian rupee = about 0.57 French franc); the 1.3-
billion deficit is 19 percent than the balance of trade deficit for 1978 (1.1 bil-
lion).
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Also in deficit (-0.7 billion), the �iscal 1980-1981 budget was set at 3.1 billion
in revenue and 3.8 billion in expenditures, including 1.5 billion in investment cred-
its. Serv:icing the debt absorbs 20 percent of the tax revenues.
In ~eptember the International Monetary Fund granted a facility of 35 million DT5
over a period of 12 months for equipment purchases, against a commitment to limit
the deficit in the general balance of payments to the equivalent of 75 million DTS
and to lower Lhe inflationary spiral.
_ Partial financing of the dam and hydroelectric power plant under construction in the
iiortheastern part of the Island is being provided by the European Investment Bank
and loans from the Arab oil-producing countries.
The Seychelles: an Economy Centered on Tourism
The economy of the Seychelles is the beneficiary of contributions of foreign currency
procured by tourism. The reception equipment is strengthened by the building of a
state-owT~.ed hotel, financing for which is being partially covered by the EEC and a
subsidy from the French Aid and Cooperation Fund. A 1977-1981 Five Year Plan im-
plemented; no indication of its state of advancement was furnished.
Sout}iern Africa
Zimbabwe: Liberal Option Maintained a.nd an Appeal for Foreign Investment
In Rhodesia, before the independence of Zimbabwe, the growth of the gross domestic
product had been calculated in 1979 at 12 percent at established prices. Foreign
trade showed a deficit of 190 million Rhodesian dollars (against 178 million in
1978). Rhodesia's Five Year Plan totaled 3.5 billion Rhodesian dollars, at 1979
prices, including 1.2 billion expected to come from foreign aid.
Zimbabwe, which su~~ceeded it, }ias maintained the economy's liberal option by appeal-
ing to foreign ~,ivestment. The foreign debt left by what was fQrmerly Rhodesia
represented the equivalent of 300 million Rhodesian dollars, a slightly higher vol-
ume.
The budget for fiscal 1980-1981, the first since independence, was set at 1 billion
Zimbabwian dollars in revenue and 1.4 billion in expenditures (+16.4 percent over
the previous Rhodesian budget), the deficit of 0.4 billion being about the same as
_ the Rhodesian 1979-1980 budget (1 Zimbabwian dollar = about 7.2 French francs).
Tlie increase in the gross domestic product for 1980 should be 4 percent in actual
terms, and the inflation rate should be below that of 1979, when it reached 12.5 per-
cent. Distribution of the dividends of companies to non-resident shareholders was
limited to 50 perceilt of the profits, after taxes.
For 1980, agricultural production forecasts totaled between 1.6 million and 2 million
tons, the needs being evaluated at 0.8 million tons. The surplus will be exported to
Zambia, Angola and Mozambique. About 30 percent of the production is supplieci by the
traditi.o~tal black sector.
~ Mining production for 1980 is evaluated at 420 million Zimbabwian dollars (+30 per-
cent), with gold and silver predominating. During the year and after independence,
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Rio-Tinto Zinc announced its intention to in~:st 5 million pounds sterling in its
~imbabwian mining subsidiary. South African investments are evaluated at 1 mill~on
rands .
In 1979 the industrial sector contributed 24.8 percent to forming the gross domesti~
product; this participation should increase in the next few years.
As of 1 July the minimum wage was raised in agriculture, mining and industry.
South Africa: a Prosperous Economy and a Record Trade Surplus
South Africa is enjoying a flawless prosperity. The rise in the price of gold, the
increased exports of agricultural products are expressed by a record trade surplus
and exchange reserves at their highest level. In 1979, the growth of the gross do-
mestic product was figured at 6.5 percent in actual terms; the improvement for 1980
is estimated at 7.20 percent, also in established terms. In relatioii to the dollar,
the South African rand (about 6 French francs) increased in value during the year by '
10 percent.
Foreign t~ade showed a surplus of 2.3 billion rands in 1979, against 1.1 billion in
1978. Gold supplies 60 percent of the exports. Exports of wool from the 1979-1980
season accounted for 206 million rands (+15 percent) and exports of agricultural pro-
ducts for 1980 are evaluated at 1.8 billion rands (+0.4 percent).
Total sales of mining products were 9.8 billion rands in 1979 (+42 percent, the im-
provement resulting from the rise in prices),�69 percent of which was gold. Forty-
three different ores were exported.
For 1980, the investment volume should register an increase of 13.3 percent for the
whole, the volume in the private sector expected to improve by 22 percent over 1979.
Also, monetary reserves are at a record level: $7.7 billion at the end of July
1980. The budget for fiscal year April 1980-March 1981 was set at 13.1 billion
rands (+14 percent); it includes recourse to domestic borr~wing for 2.2 billion
(+32 percent).
At the end of the first l~alf of 1980, the ecoiiomic situation was satisfactory aiid
prospects for tlie second half were favorable.
� Production of oil from coal is developing and is meeting some of the needs. In Oc-
tober a deep well revealed a natural gas deposit 150 km southwest of Mossel Bay.
Studies have been uiidertaken into c~xploitation of a gold and uranium supermine near
Welkom, in t.he free state of Orange. ~
The work on doubli~ig the capacity of the ore tanker port of Richard's Bay will bring
its potential for loadi~ig coal in 1985-1986 to 44 million tons per year.
Namibia: a Uranium Producer
The Namibiati economy is clomi~iated by the mining sector: copper, diamonds and urani-
um. Rossing Uranium Ltd, a subsidiary of Rio-Tinto Zinc, itself produced at Rossing
more urani~.un oxide than all of South Africa, nearly 5,000 tons per year.
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Botswana: the Diamond is the Principal Resource
In 1979, Botswana's diamond exports represented 181 million pulas, a sharp increase.
(The pula, whose parity corresponds to the South African rand = about 6 French
fratics.) Botswana is among the foremost producers of jewelry diamonds. A new mine
will begin exploitation in 1982 at Jwaneng.
Foreign trade involved 419 million pulas in imports and 352 million in exports in
1979. Tlie general balance of payments shows a positive balance and foreign currency
reserves at the enct of 1979 represented the equivalent of 211 million pulas, against -
125 million a year earlier. Although the gross domestic product improved in current
terms, the inflation rate rose: +14.4 percent in 1979 against +7.5 percent in 1978.
The budget for the fiscal year April 1980-March 1981 was set in eacess of 18 million
pulas, with 237 million in revenue and 219 million in expenditures, including �
72 millions to service the debt. In addition, the development budget was set at
166 million pulas. Over the 1975-1980 period, EEC aid totaled 19 million units of
. account.
Botswana decicied in Marc}i to again take charge of its railroad connecting Zimbabwe
to South Africa and Zambia, the former Rhodesia to provide the management.. But
- Bots~vana's actual repurchase of its railroad will require large credits and will have
to be spread out until 1985. Work on the new Gaborone International Airport will be
undertaken this year, 1981.
Lesotho: an Economy Linked to South Africa
Early in 1980 the maloti, Lesotho's national currency, nominally replaced the South
African rand (parity, $1.22). The budget for fiscal 1980 was set at 200 million
rands.
= In the course of the year uraniferous ore deposits were discovered. The work now in
progress on the .iew Maseru International Airport will probably be completed at the
end of 1983. The economy remains linked to that of South Africa in every way.
Swaziland: Persistent Inflation
Over the period July 1978-June 1979, the rate of inflation was 12 percent in Swazi-
land; according to tj~e forecasts, the level is likely to rise even higher to 15 per-
cent in the following 12 months.
The budget for fiscal year April 1979-March 1980 was set at 115 million emalangeni in
revenue (the lilangeni--emalangeni in the plural--is tied to the South African rand),
and at 169 million in expenditures. The provisional deficit, 54 million, was higher
than in the previous budget (29.million).
tingola: a Still Prccarious Economic Situation, Despite the Growing Contribution of
Oil
Angola's economic situation is being reestablished very slowly, despite the growing
= contribution of oil, whose 9-million-ton production should double in 1985 when de- .
posits discovered in recent years are put into exploitation. The Angolan National
Oil Company (SONANGOL) at the end of 1980 began production at the new Soyo II deposit
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in tlie nort}iern part of t}~e country. In July Elf-Aquitaine obtained a contract for
offshore exploration and exploitation in case a discovery is made; American firms,
- however, are still very much present.
The state's agricultural domain is encountering difficulties in reaching the produc-
tion objectives that were assigned to it. For 1980, coffee exports are evaluated
at 48,000 (-20 percent), or one quarter of 1973 coffee exports; export revenues for
1980 are estimated at 160 million kwanzas (1 kwanza = about 0.15 French francs).
In 1979 the Angola Diamond Company (DIAMANG), 77 percent of whose capital is held by -
the state, exceeded 1 million carats (700,000 in 1979); the 1980 production should
reach 1.5 million carats.
Fraiice is one of Angola's important suppliers; its sales for 1980 will probably be
500 million francs; however, the Eastern countries still occupy first place in
Ang~lan foreign trade.
The Benguela-Lobito Railroad was technically reconditioned to provide removal of the
- cooper ore from Shaba arid Zambia, but security problems continue to arise.
In March the Angola Manganese Company was nationalized; the accumulated exploitation _
losses exceeded the capital.
Mozambique: a Timicl Turn Toward the LVest
Mozambic{ue's budget for fiscal 1980 was established at 15 million contos in revenue
and 37 million in expenditures (+51 percent), including 20 million in equipment cred-
its (the conto = 1,000 Mozambican escudos = about 150 French francs). Since 15 June
1980 the new currency, the metical, has replaced the Mozambican escudo (1 metical =
0.15 French franc).
Foreign trade for 197y totaled 18.6 billion meticais and 8.3 billion in exports (the
metical defined on tlie basis of 33 units for 1 dollar). The principal exports are
cashew nuts, cotton, sisal, copra, tea, sugar and shrimps.
A cotton plan was drawn iip, having as its objective a production of 166,000 tons of
cottonseed; that production had fallen in 1979 to 50,000 tons. The sugar industry
is runnin~ into many troubles, chiefly because of the lack of equipment and replace-
ment parts; the coritribution of cane, however, has been more regular and more signif-
icant since 1979.
_ In the agricultural sector, the state-~wned firms were dissolved and their activities,
w}iich were reorganized and placed under better control, were divided among the more
specialized organizations.
A plan to enlarge the Cabora-Bassa hydroelectric power plant is under study. Built
in 1967 and partially financed by France, West Germany and South Africa, the plant
supplies Sout}i Africa with energy in addition to filling Mozambican needs.
After having for years, since independence, centered its development on assistance
from the Eastern countries, Mozambique is now turning more toward the West. Tracie
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'1'rade with Fra~ice shows a surplus in favor of France, with nearly 138 million francs
in French sales in 1979, against 53 million in purchases of Mozambican products.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RESULTS OF KAMPALA SUMMIT 'LIMITED BUT CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT'
London A~RICA in ~nglish No 114 Feb 81 pp 12, 13 '
[ Text ] e~ W,ere the stone that was meeting, President Obote outlined
thrown away. Now, we may be ~five areas in which they had reached
the cornerstone of a new spirit of under- common agreement. First, they all
- standing in East Africa', laconically realized the need for nation building as
remarked Wilson Okwenje, Uganda's an essential prerequisite to regional
Minister of the Public Service and cooperation. It is m this context that
Cabinet Affairs, on the eve of the they pledged to help in the process of
historic summit held in Kampala national reconstruction in Uganda.
during the middle of January. The Secondly, they discussed security
summit, hosted by President M~lton and peace m the region as well as in
Obote and attended by Presidents each state. According to sources, an
Daniel Moi of Kenya, Julius Nyerere ~mportant consideration was the
of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of secunty of Uganda which is still
Zambia, marked the re-entry of threatened by remnants of Amin's
Uganda into the orbit of African diplo- forces in neighbouring countries. It is
macy as it heralded a new era of co- anticipated that the four leaders will
operation among East African states. ~ek the cooperation and agreement
It was an emotion laden affair: Presi- of Sudan and Zaire in this regard.
dent Kaunda of Zambia knelt down Perhaps, the most ~.entral issue of
with President Obote to pray on the their parley evolved around the East
apron of Entebbe Airport as he p~~nCommunity(EAC)whichwas
amved. Crowds reached near hysteri- ~nsummated in the Kampala Declara-
� cal points when President Nyerere - tion of 1969. Defunct since 1977, the
`our liberator' - greeted them at highest authority of the EAC
Kololo airstrip m downtown consisted of the Presidents of Kenya,
Kampala. With evident emotion, Tanzania and Uganda. The distribu- :
President Moi told his colleagues that tion of its assets and liabilities has been
the best gift that they could give a major source of misunderstanding
Uganda in 19$1 would be to help between the three member-countries.
Ugandans 'to realize the freedom they In Kampala, however, a way out of
won nearly 20 years ago'. President the impasse seems to have been found.
Obote turned to his brother Presidents 'I'he meeting agreed that Presidents
and promised that he. would follow Moi, Obote and Nyerere should re-
Kenya's policy of Harambee (pulling constitute the East African Authority
, together), Zambia's humanism and which would make a fresh appraisal of
Tanzania's self-reliance. the assets and liabilities of the EAC.
In their one-day meeting the Presi- Ministecial commitees of the three _
dents discussed issues of reactivating countries would be established to look
cooperation between their countries. into the disposal of the assets of the
At a press conference after the EAC.
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Although there was no firm commit- The two Presidents, as we ll as Presi-
ment in Kampala to re-constitute the dent Obote, belonged to an amorphous
EAC, it was evident that a new grouP of African leaders, the Mulun-
political will had been established to gushi Club, through which they co-
produce new ancl greater forms of ordinated policies on c~operation and
couperation in the region. Perhaps, international affairs. It was under th'e
the leaders needed more time to auspices of the Mulungushi Club that
consider what structures of East the three leaders led Afnca's offensive
African cooperation could be set up, a~ainst British military colloaboration
especially in view of the fact that each w~th South Africa at the Singapore
of the three countries had entered into Comms~nwealth summit in 1971. And
new alliances since 1977. Tanzania and it was during that summit, Amin seized
Zambia, for example, already belong power in Uganda forcing President
to another regional grouping, the Obote into exile in Tanzama. :
Southern African Development Co- Onl~+ a few days before the Kampala
ordination Conference. summtt, President Moi was host to
President Obote at a meetin in the
Fraternity Kenyan border town of ~ebuye, :
where they discussed bilateral coopera-
Another item that the Presidents tion. It was President Obote's first trip
discussed concemed the East African outside Uganda since his return to
` Shipping Line which belonged to their ~ower. The Webuye meeting estab-
four countries. They decided to meet lished the outline of cooperation bet-
again to consider reports received by ween Kenya and Uganda, especially in
mmisterial committees of the four the fields of transport and trade, as
countries regarding the sale of shipping well as stamping out smuggling bet-
vessels and other assets. 'There was ween the two countries. An immediate
no disagreement', President Obote result of the meeting was the resump-
said, adding: 'our meeting was very tion last month of rail traffic between
cordial and brotherly.' Uganda and the Kenyan coastal town
The atmosphere of fraternity was of Mombasa. ,
also blended with nostalgia and remin- An invisible result of the Kampala
- escence. For President Kaunda it was summit was, sources say, the easing of
the ~i~st ~ime he had visited Uganda the strain in the relations between ;
sinr. December 1969 when h~, and Tanzania and Kenya, whose common
Presidents Nyerere and Mobutu of border has been closed since 1977. It is
Zaire, were guests at the famous UPC not unlikely that Presidents Obote and
Delegates Conference at Lugogo Kaunda deployed the confidence that
Stadium, which adopted President ~ they each en~oy with Presidents Moi
Obote's Common Man's Charter. and Nyerere to facilitate the :
Presicient Nyerere had not visited emer~ence of a new chord of under-
Uganda since 1970, while it was standm~ between Kenya and
President Moi's first visit to Uganda as Tanzama. It is understood that given
Head of State. the spirit that was forged at the ~
Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere Kampala summit, it may not be long
refused to extend diplomatic recogni- before the Kenya-Tanzania frontier is
tion to the regime of Idi Amin and re-opened.
since 1971 had I~ttle contact with the The mutual suspicion and mistrust
military dictatorship. Zambia gave that tended to characterize inter-state
considerab(e material support to the relations in East Africa is no more. ~
Uganda National Liberation Army in Althougli the results of the Kampala
~ the fight against Amin, while President summit were limited, they were
Nyerere committeci a large part of the crucially important for future
Tanzanian People's Defence Force coo~eration in the East and Central
(TPDF) in the war against Amin. Afncan region. A political will towork
together was re-born. �
- COPYRIGHT: 1981 Africa Journal Ltd.
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
KENYA, OTHER AFRICAN TEA PRODUCING NATIONS iKAY ACCEPT QUOTAS
London AFRICA in English No 114 Feb 81 pp 97, 98
[Text] pME African countries, in parti- is the possibility of increasing tea
S cular Kenya, are engaging in exports from China. Some 52,000
dynamic ex~ansion programmes of tonnes of Chinese tea sold at low
tea pr~duct~on, at a time when tea prices in 1979 - and sales, parti-
prices are falling and productian is cular~ly to the US are growing.
exceed~ng demand. Although the UNCTAD predicts that by 1984 the
world market is depressed, Kenyan supply of tea could exceed demand by
tea is highly competitive, and the 57,000 tonnes, and this figure could
dilemma for the Afncan producers at continue to rise.
the tea talks held in Salisbury, Zim- This is the market situation that
babwe at the end of November has faces the `new producers' of Africa.
been whether to accept ~uotas which Kenya has the most impressive ex-
will restrict ex~ansion in order to Pansion schems of tea production,
bring about untted producer action but Tanzania, Malawi. Mozambique
and to boost the price of tea. and. Uganda also produce signifirant
World tea prices have now fallen to amounts. Kenya cunently exports
the fevel whereby nearly half the total 65,000 tonnes of tea per year and its
output is being grown at a loss. The planting programme has a production
1979 prices reached lows at between target of 100,000 tonnes. The Kenya
~ SS and 95 per kilo, and despite a small Tea Development Authority has inr
recovery in recent weeks, 1980 figures tiated a system of tea-growing small
are still well below prices that allow holders co-ordinated through the
producers to meet rising costs. The government - and the success of this
World Bank predicts that by 1985 tea scheme has made other African coun-
w�ill have suffered a 21% decrease in tries reluctant to accept the export
its real value. quotas demanded of them by the
Low prices are aggravated by high other tea-producing countries, parti-
production, and the 1980 world pro- cularly India and Sri Lanka.
duction figure has been estimated by
t6e US Department of Agriculture at a DIfflCtilt
record high of 1.81 million tonnes.
This is 2.6% higher than the 1979 level
of 1.77 tonnes. While prices have been The distribution of export quotas
falling production costs have risen was the subject for discussion at the
gnady, so that many producers have Zimbabwe meeting. The producing
telt the need to increase production countries had already met in May last
even further in the pursuit of cost- year and decided upon a 740,000
effectiveness. Prices are then further tonne global quota - but the al-
depressed. location of quotas in November
An additional threat to the market proved to be as difficult to agree upon
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as was expected from past experience. India and Sri Lanka, but the Kenyan
Quotas are generally decided upon programme is digging deep into the
using a histoncal basis - looking at tea economy, and the labour question
past production ~gures. But wFule becomes an increasingly important
Indian and Sri Lankan exports are political factor affecting the w~lling-
declining, Kenyan exports are in- ness to accept export quotas.
creasin~ and the quotas tend not to Finally, the producers have to con-
take this into account. Unless there is sider the~r relationship with the con-
some ad.justment in favour of the sumers. The eventual tea agreement
African countries, quotas could boost W>>1 be a producer-consumer agree-
the dwindling positions of the tradi- ment, in accordance with the Inte-
tional producer countries, to the det- ated Programme for Cbmmodities
riment of African producers. How- ~pC) set up by UNC'TAD IV in
ever, it was felt that some progress Nairobi (1976). I'ormer colonial ries
had been made in the discuss~ons - allow the big multinational tea com-
but it remains to be seen just how panies to reap the benefits of a verti-
much compromise is required of the cally integrated system. Thus, while
African nat~ons in order to effect real tea pnces stay low the largest tea
agr~ement. company, Brooke Bond has announ-
ced total profits for 1979-80 at
Benefits �37.2m. Furthermore any rise in tha
price of tea is not absorbed by the
The benefits to the market in gen- companies, who relate their pro~t
eral, to be gained from a tea agree- margms Co the retail price of tea,
ment are considerable. One UNCT~.D which has in fact risen substantially in
official reported that a 5% decrease in the past year.
production is estimated to produce a With the Euro~ean markets reach- .
25% increase in the price of tea. ing saturation pomt, and n~ew markets
According to UNCTAD this multip- developing in the Middle East the role
- lier effect is particularly high for tea, of the tea companies is having to un-
in comparison with other commodi- dergo certain changes. With this in ~
:ies -:..id can have the opposite mind ~t is all the more important for
effe_ in that~ a 5% increase in pro- the tea producers to gain some bar-
duction causes a 25% decrease in the gaining power, and to do this a united
- tea price. If these calculations hetd producer front ~s required. .
true, then higher tea prices could be If Kenya can effect a compromise
relatively eas~ly attainable for the tea with the traditional tea producing
producers. countries even though this may restrict
But the Zimbabwe talks had a poli- the ,full developments of a hitherto
tical as well as an ~conomic side. Tea successfulteaproductionprogramme,
production is highly labour intensive then agreements may well be reached
- and the need to keep production v~rhen the countri~s re-convene in May
high for this reason was felt to cause this year. If this is the case then the tea
cuntlict in the weighing up of the producing countries will be on very
relative importance of pnce over muchstrongergroundwhentheymeet
production. This is a crucial factor for the consumer countries for negoUation
the traditional tea prociucing countries, ;n September.�
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Africa Journal Ltd.
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ANGOLA
BRIEFS
REPORTED CHOLERA CASES--The conservative Lisbon newspaper A TARDE has stated that
about 12 cholera cases have been registered in Luanda, but that the local press
has been ordered ro maintain "strict silence" on this issue. [Text] [Paris MARCHES
TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 20 Feb 81 p 447]
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BENIN
CHINESE ASSISTANCE IN RICE GROWING '
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81, p 138
[Text] The Chinese agro-technical mission, on last 28 November officially handed
over as a gift to the S~ate of Benin the rice-growing areas of Malanville [Borgou]
and of Deve [Mono]. With the compZetion of those two areas the program of realLzing
1000 hectares in rice cultivation, anticipated se part of the Chinese cooperation,
has been completed.
In fact, it was on 30 December 1974 that a protocol of ~greement signed between the
People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Benin anticipated on the
one hand the development by means of appropria~e hydro-agricultural works of 1000
hectares of rice plantations in Benin by the Chinese agro-technical mission, and
on the other hand the popularization of the modem techniques of rice culture among
the peasants by the exploitation of the developed areas in a primary campaign.
Chinese cooperation was given on several levels:
Development: 516 hectares of rice plantations were developed at Malanville, 150
hectares at Deve.
Agricultural Water Infrastructures: At Malanville, a protective dike 5830 meters
long was constructed, 2 pumping stations for irrigation and 1 station for drainage
were installed with a total flaw of 2.35 cubic meters per second; at Deve a pro-
tective dike 1140 meters long was constructad and a pump~.ng station was installed
for a total drainage capgcity of 0.6 cubic meters p~r seaond.
Construction: Granaries, hangere, drying areas and offices were constructed, :
covering abou"t 3460 square meters at Deve and 10,470 square meters at Malanv~lle.
Exploitation: The Deve area is expl.oited cooperatively. It has benefited from the
cooperation of the Chinese agro-technical mission for the supply of seed, fertil-
izer and fuel. As for the area at Malanville origina~ly eaploited cooperatively,
since 1976 it has been operated by the National Irr~gation and Hydro-Agricultural
Development Company [SONIAH] with the aid of the Chinese.
Training: The Chinese mission took care of the training of many Benin technic~ans
and workers in the Deve aad Malanville areas during the time of the worl~s. -
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Equipment: The Chinese party aupplied the two areas with large shipments of agri-
cultural machinea, tools and of spare and detached pieces for the exploitation af
- those areas. On the 1000 hectares of developed land, it will be possible to grow
- 2 cropa of rice per year, with an average qield of 3 tons of wet rice per hectere~ -
or an annual pxoduction of 6000 tona of wet rice on those lands.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris 1981
~2,116
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CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
BRIEFS
GRANT TO SNE--Following a favorable decision from the EDF [European Development
Fund Committee], dated 13 January, the European Community Commission is preparing
to authorize a grant of 550,000 ECU [European Currency :Jnit] to the Central African
Republic to finance the improvement of the National `~Jater Company (SNE) operation. ;
' The intensifying of SNE technical services will be effected by equipping the buildings
and the warehouses, providing appliances and tools (especially pipes, meters, emer-
gency transformers, etc.), and technical help. The work will be carried out under
state supervision and the supplies purchased after an international appeal for bids.
Established in 1975, SNE is responsible for running the existing four town water mains
b ut has run into equipment difficulties since its incep tion. The project aims at
' making it possible for SNE to fully carry out its work, 3n particular, keeping mains
in good condition, repairing leaks, proper functioning of the water meters, and
installing new circuits. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRAN~ENES in
French 23 Jan 81 p 199] 8870
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Q3AD
REASONS FOR FRANCE'S FAILURE TO INTERVENE MILITARILY NOTED
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Jan 81 p 227
[Text] For his last speech on French television before the coming presidential _
elections, Valery Giscard d'E staing discussed foreign policy. As usual, he
was specific, moderate, subtle and yet firm, with perhaps a hint of coolness
at having to explain complex problems to the noninitiated and to discuss major :
topics affecting life and international relations when Mr Reagan has just
officially taken office in the United States.
_ The president almost lost, or pretended to be about to lose, his patience when
he had to explain African policy and particularly France's attizude toward
recent events in Chad. Were there two French policies about Africa, one which
led to intervention at Kolwezi and another which allowed Colonel Qadhdhafi free
rein to defeat Hissein Habre in Ndjamena and try to annex Chad to the Libyan
Jamahiriya?
The president, who accepted complete responsibility for French policy in Africa,
answered straightforwardly. France intervened militarily not only at Kolwezi,
but also in M~auritania and Chad in the past, only at the request of their
legitimate governments when their countries' stability was threatened from
the outside. Because this rule, a categorical imperative, was respected, none
of the appropriate, representative international organizations, the United
Nations or the Organization of African Unity, then protested the French
initiatives.
Chad's situation was completely different. The African nations most deeply
; involved had, at Lagos, favored forming a national union government, a '
transition government of course, but one which as long as it fulfilled its
mission, was the legitimate government of Chad. Moreover, the parties in -
Chad had unanimously stated that the presence of French troops hindered the
- search for an acceptable solution and thus, on 22 August 1979 requested that ,
_ France withdraw its military contingent. On 23 August 1979, the French
Council of Ministers stated that France was prepared to evacuate its troops,
~ which it did with no loss of human life in the spring of 1980. Immediately
after this withdrawal, the civil war began; it ended with President Goukouni
Oueddei's appeal to Colonel Qadhdhafi, the sending of massive contingents from
the Libyan Army and/or the Islamic Legion, equipped with ultramodern weapons
and Hissein Habre and his supporters' withdrawal from Ndjamena.
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rutc urrl~ltu, u~n ~NLr
;
Why did France not intervene when it had done so repeatedly in Chad from
1969 until 1972, dnring the presidency of General de Gaulle, then
Mr Pampidou and again in 1978, when Mr Giscard d'Estaing was president?
France then gave military aid to Chad at the request of legitimate Chadian
government~ threatened by an external force. In 1980, Chad's legitimate
government asked for Libya's support. If France had opposed this militarily--
and lost some of its soldiers--against the wishes of the Chadian government
in power, it would have been condemned immediately by the UN and the OAU
and called upon to withdraw its troops. What would the political objective
be of such a military intervention? Without fail, it would have been criticized
for helping to place one of France's proteges in power, like the complaints
voiced when Emperor Bokassa was deposed.
French military intervention in Chad would have been a major political mistake
and those who favored it are, stated Mr d'Estaing, "irresponsible adventurers." `
However, is France therefore resigned to the fait accompli and as passive
as the critics of this policy claim? No, answered the president of the
oublic. France criticized Libya's violation of the commitment "on its
r" made in Lagos not to interfere in Chad's domestic affairs and condemned
.roject to merge the two countries even before the African heads of
:'.:e in Lome adopted the same position.
The African nations and the president of Chad must exert pressure on Libya to
withdraw its troops. Moreover, events show the wisdom of the French position
since voices are being raised in Chad itself opposing the projected merger and
Libya has already backed away somewhat, conceding that it cannot take place
witt~out consulting the Chadian peopleo Because of their patriotism,
Mr d'Estaing is confident that the Libyan presence in Chad will only be _
temporary--even though the famous Aozou strip annexation goes back to 1973--
and that Col~ne~ Qadhdhafi's dream will never become reality.
The African nation.: which felt threatened by such circumstances then had to be
reassured. France tried to do this and the president of the republic renewed
the commitment to come to their aid if they requested it. France has the
military means and the political determination. Reinforcing French contingents
in the Central African Republic proved this.
Since Chad, a current topic, was for the most part discussed in the debate on ~
" French policy in Africa, the president of the republic addressed two current
~ criticisms of his foreign policy: that France is allegedly too sensitive to
economic considerations and that it would support or continue to support foreign
political figures of questionable morals. _
Mr d'Estaing considered the first criticism, which is not made by the French
opposition alone, totally unfounded. Returning to relations with Libya, he
noted that the size of trade relations with that country did not prevent him
from risking a break when he condemned its intervention in Chad and strengthened
French garrisons in the Central African Republic.
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As for France's partners, the president of the republic pointed out that he
did not choose them. One constant of French policy is to recognize nations, _
ndt individuals, and to cooperate with all nations which desireit,whatever
their politi^.al options.
Was it a lack of time? At the end of the broadcast, the president was less ~
convincing about these last two points than when he stated that any destabili-
zation attempt was a true "crime against Africa" because it deterred it from
what should be its first objective, its ecnnomic development and that the -
African need for security alone justified French military aid if requested
by legitimate governments.
COPYRIGHT: F~nP Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981 -
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~
. CONGO
BRIEFS
COUPLING OF BRAZZAVILLE-ALMA ATA--Following a conference with the Brazzaville deputy
mayor, Mr Gabriel Emouengue, the USSR ambassador to the Congo recently announced that
hereaf ter AZma-Ata and Brazzaville are sister cities. The friendly relations be-
. tween the two towns will have an impact on several areas, particularly in the economic,
socio-cultural and technical spheres. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENES in French 23 Jan 81 p 200] 8870
FAC AID--The French minister of cooperation, representing FAC (Aid ar~d Cooperation
Fund) and the Congo in Brazzaville have just signed three f3.nanciai agreements :
totaling 170 million CFA francs (3,400,000 FF). The first relates to agriculture,
the second to public health and the third to French financial participation in the
Brazzaville centennial celebration which took place last October. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Jan 81 p 200] 8870 "
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ETHIOPIA
BRIEFS
ELF SEEKING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT--An official of the Eritrean Liberation
Front [ELF], Yusuf Berhanu, stated in Copenhagen on 6 February that the
Front was now ready to engage Ethiopian troops in combat despite their high
numbers in the province: 120,000 men trained by the Cubans and the Soviets
and equipped with Soviet weapons. The Front official acknowledged that the
EEC had so far provided appreciable assistance to Ethiopia, but he added
that "we are now attempting to stop it." He also said that his organization
was still hoping to find a political solution to the conflict and relies on the
United Nations to support its efforts in this respect. (Text] [Paris
MARCHES TR6PICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 p 386]
COFFEE EXPORTS--According to the Minis.~er of Coffee and Tea Development
- Yehualashet Girma, Ethiopian coffee exports reached 87,000 tons in 1979, .
for a to tal amount of $342.8 million. Again according to thQ minister,
exports should reach 100,000 tons during the present harvest. Coffee
constitutes Ethiopia's main hard currency source and employs dir~ctly or
indirectly about 7 million workers. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
Mediterraneens in French 13 Feb 81 p 386]
OLD COINS WITHDRAWN--OId coins bearing the effigy of Haile Selassie which
had remained in circulation until now, representing a total value of
$19 million, were withdrawn from circulation on 23 January. They can be
exchanged at all banks for new coins minted in 1978. [Text] [Paris MARCHES -
' TROPICAUX ET MEDIT~RRANNEENS in French 30 Jan 81 p 263]
FRG AGRONOMICAL ASSISTANCE--According to the terms of an agreement signed on
27 January in Addis Ababa, the Federal Republic of Germany has decided to
allocate $1.5 million to the Addis Ababa University for the establishment
of an Agronomical institution in Awassa, capital of the southern province ~
of Sidamo. [Text~ [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French ~
6 Feb 81 p 322]
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GUINEA-BISSAU
BRIEFS
PORTUGUESE CASHEW PROCESSING COOPERATION--A delegation constituted by various -
managers from the Portuguese CENTRALTER brewe`ries has arrived xn Bissau to study the
_ feasibility of setting up a mixed company for the industrial processing of cashews.
The delegation is supported by the Portuguese Institute for Economic Cooperation.
CENTRALTER is already Guinea-Bissau's main partner in the Bissau brewery and has a
bank account amounting to 100 million pesos (1 peso~0.14 French francs) in Bissau,
_ which could be used as part of the capital for the new enterprise. [Text] [Paris
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERKANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 p 369]
MIXED FISHERIES COMMISSION WITH USSR--A Soviet delegation led by Vladislav Krizhevski,
deputy minister of fishing industry, arrived in Bissau on 5 February to participate
_ in the 4th session of the mixed Soviet-Guinean fishing comanission. [Text] [Paris -
MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 13 Feb 81 p 369]
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N'OR OFF'~('IA1. IJSN: ONI.Y
KENYA
MYSTERY CONCERNING HOTEL BOMBING REMAINS
London AFRICA in English No 114 Feb 81 p 27
[ Text ]
ENYANS began the New Year search for Aksali, who went missing
K with a jolt and a great shock fol- after the explosion. On 7 January, the
lowing a bomb expiosion which des- Kenyan authorities came up with a
tro~ed one of the dining wings of statement that the so-called Aksali
Nairobi's world famous Norfolk Hotel had conclusively been estabiished to
on the night of 31 December, killing be a 35-year-old Moroccan by the
' some 15 people and injuring 85 others. name of Oaddura Mohammed Abd-
Although it was not the first bomb el-Hamid who is also a member of the
tragedy that Kenyans have suffered Popular Front for the Liberation of
(another killed scores of people at a Palestine (PFLP). According to the
Nairobibusterminalshortlybeforethe statement Ouaddura alias Aksali tvas
bruta~ assassination of the controver- based in Europe since 1973, from
sial politician J. M. Kariuki) the fears wherehetravelledunderseveralaliases
that surrounded the explosion in- includ'mg that of Mohammed Haj
creased as it became apparent that it Quddu.
~ may have been the work of inter-
- nat~onal tenorists. RAVA~Btl011S
For a country that has prided itself
on its stability the fears were not mis- The GovernmenYs findings thus
taken as an~+ sign of insecuriry is likely further established that Hamid arrived
- to have pol~tical and economic reper- in Kenya on 23 December aboard a
cussions in the country. As the dead flight from Rome and subsequently
were being buried and the wounded checked in at the Norfolk Hotel.
treated, the question was being asked: Hamid, whom the hotel reception
who planted the bomb and why? 1fie clerksconfirmedwas`Arab-looking,is
possibility of the explosion b~mg the said to have casually strolled out of the
work of internal dissidentswas immed- hotel on 31 December after handing in
iately discarded when the Interna- his room key on that morning. He is
tional Police Organisation (Interpol) supposed to have gone straight to the
was called in to the investigation. airportwhe;ehetookaflighttoJeddah, -
Eventually, it was found out that the Saudi Arabia. With these revelations
_ bomb had actually been planted in a terrorism became the centre of inter-
room in the hotel occupied by a man by est for the bomb explo'sion investiga- ~
the name of Muradi Aksali who had a tors. The reasonwhyPalestinianswere
Maltese passport. The Kenya police thoughttohavebeenbehindtheexplo-
. with tl~e help of Interpol, mounted a sion was said td go back to 1~9'75, when
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Kenyan authorities arrested 5ve Pales- and rescued the hostages. ~
+inians who, it is said, were just about to gut inspite of this Kenyan record
bomb an Israeli jetliner~boutto landin the Palestinian Nadonalists, the
Nairobi from South Africa. ~alestinian Liberation Organisation
ThePalestinians,whoaresaidtohave (pL0) denied responsibility for the
beenarmedwithrocketsandlaunchers Norfolke~cplosion.APLOspokesman
which they secretly pirated into the Mahmoud Laradi said: `We had
country, were silently handed over to nothing to do with the incident and
Israel which tried and jailed them. neither did any of the Palestinian
Speculation that the bomb explosion ~em1la groups.' By absolving his
was just the beginning of Palestinian organization along v~nth others the
repnsals for this incident was further ~mb mystery only grew deeper.
mad~ more credible by the fact that p new dimension was added to it
among the five tenorists two from an Italian connection. Some
Germans were released from Israeli observersandafewinvestigatorsfound
jails towards the end of last year. In a~~ny themselves wonderin~ whether the
case it ~s an open secret that the PFLP rpetrators of the cnme could have
_ has an operational relationship with ~en the Red Brigade aiming at the
the West German-based urban tenor- chai~nan and president of the giant _
ist group the Baader-Meinhof. Fiat group, Giovanni Agnepi who was
then in Kenya on a game viewing safari _
Entebbe enroute to South Africa. Agnelli,
whose private executive jet captain�
The explosion, however, is not the died in the explosion and whose ca
only incident in which Kenya has pilot was injured, is said to have been
crossed roads with the Palestinians. In originally booked at the Norfolk but
1976 the country helped Israel to later transferred to another hotel. But
rescue hostages hijacked by Pales- the mystery, despite the Kenya
tinians in a French jetliner at Entebbe Government's subsequent statement
airport in Uganda. Kenya then gave condemning the bombing, still
Israel~ commandos fuelling facilities in remains. � -
a r:d in which they killed the hijackers -
' COPYRIGHT: 1981 Africa Journal Ltd.
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MOZAMBIQUE
CUBANS TRAIN, GIVE TECHNICAL COOPERATION
PA131451 Havana PRi:LA in Spanish 1345 GMT 12 Feb 81 -
[Report by special envoy correspondent Miguel Rivero]
~Text] Maputo, 12 Feb (PL)--Isidro Diez, economic advisor to the Cuban Embassy
in Mozambique, revealed that over 4,000 Mozambicans have been trained as techni-
cians or skilled workers by Cuban personnel, or have received training in Cuba.
The Cuban representative added that one of the fundamental tasks of Cuban coopera-
tion is the education and training of Mozambican personnel.
Cuban cooperation was begun in 1976, shortly after Mozambique proclaimed its
independence. The first group of specialists was composed of 10 cattle techni- :
cians, but in recent years the number of Cubans in Mozambique has multiplied a _
hundredfold and today they cooperate in 25 key sectors of the economy of this
African country.
Cuban cooperation is most noticeable in agriculture, f ishing, education, public
health, su~ar industry and cormnunications.
tldalberto Diaz Gonzalez, Cuban advisor to ~he Mozambican Fi.shing Ministry, said
that a training center has been eestablished for ship captains, technicians and .
engineers, with the participation of Cuban technicians.
Adalberto Diaz is ronsidered to be the "dean" of Cuban specialists since he has
been working in Mozambique since 1977.
Cubans are helping teach the process for preserving shrimp and have also stationed
seven brigade chiefs here for the maintenance and repair of the Mozambican
fishin~ fleet.
When I arrived at Dtozambique, there were only four Cubans involved in fishing
activities. Today we have 59 technicians and specialists who work in personnel
trainin~ ancl we wi11 soon form a new group. The number of collaborators in the
fishing sector will soon exceed 100, Diaz Gonzalez said.
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Meanwhile Cuban Ubaldo Acuna Despaigne, national advisor in me.chanization in
Mozambique, said that a school for operators, med ium size equipment technicians
- and mechanics has been established in Tete Province, under the direction of
Cuban teachers.
~ In the agricultural sector, Cuban technicians have worked on this decade's long-
range plans ds well as the implementation of 10 large projects, which are already
in progress. ~
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SENEGAL
SUCCESSION BELIEVED TO BE GOING SMOOTHLY
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 16 Jan 81 pp 119, 120
[Text] Senegal is decidedly an exceptional country on the African continent.
Not only did her president decide freely to quit his office, but his power
. transfer went most smoothly, contrary to the pessimistic forecast of the pro-
phets of misfortune. Moreover, the principal actor in this great premier of
African politics surrounded the event with an atmosphere of dignity and seren-
ity Chat left no one indifferent.
"To Save Our Nation From Poverty and Immorality"
The event took place on 1 January in the courtroom of the Supreme Court.
The Prime Minister Abdou Biouf was introduced to the highest authorities of
the magistracy in the presence of all political, diplomatic and economic Dakar.
After two speeches, one studded with multiple quotations by Chief Justice
Ousmane Goundiam and the other a vibrant appeal to democracy by the president
of the Bar Moustapha Seck, Kel~a Mbaye, the first president of the Supreme Court
then took the floor. His message contributed in a decisive way to maintaining
for the event this elevation of thought and expression that struck everyone in
the audience. With his independence based on internation.ally recognized compe-
tence and high public offices, President Keba Mbaye said what the Senegalese of
all opinions needed to hear:
"Every one of us must bury his personal ambitions and forget his old quarrels
to 'gird his loins as a brave man,' in the exclusive interest of the Nation. -
"Our permanent objective should be the consolidation of democracy, notably by
the adoption of a modernized electoral system, provided a priori and a poste-
riori jurisdictional control which will leave no doubt as to the genuineness
of the voting results.
"Governors and governed, members or nonmembers of political part~.es, must accept
withaut mental reservations, the principle of rotation of the chief of the
affairs of state. These affairs are nobody's personal pQSSession. They belong
to the people who delegate their temporal administratian, not to a master as
we tend often to think on this continent, but to a servant. _
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Let us decide to oust and discard without complacency and in case of
need to punish without weakness, those who ruin or do disservice to this
country: the corrupt and the antinationalists, the crafty and lazy. Let us
cUltivate honesty and courage at work. Let everyone at the post where he is,
from the minister to the orderly, from the head of an enterprise to the
laborer, th~.nk that the destiny of the nation is on his shoulders alone. Let
us invent a system which will reward in the future only competence, work and
integrity.
"Let us unite in brotherhood, to be better acquainted with one another, to
appreciate and like each other, and remain always interdependent. Let no one
be excluded. Moreover this will not prevent anyone from retaining the origin-
ality of his ideas and the specificity of his methods. There will be no need
for a search for an illusory and misleading unanimity, but rather the construc-
tion of a faultless and positive national solidarity working toward a concerted
action whose sole aim is to save our nation from poverty and immorality and to
instiLUte social justice. The luxury of division will be for later times."
Then Abdou Diour took the oath which made him the second president of the
Republic of Senegal. Diouf went directly to the low courts where he was wel-
comed by his preder_essor before the latter went into a retirement which, with-
out any doubt, will be very active.
A True "Boss"
For the second consecutive evening, the Senegalese found themselves in front of
their television sets to listen to the first message of the new president. Half-
an-hour later, when his picture went off the sc reen, all of them, even his oppon-
ents, had the same conviction: the discreet and efficient administrator had given
way to a true "boss," a statesman whose ideas are clear and whose will is firm.
Abdou Diouf ~egan, as was proper, to render a warm homa~e to his predecessor,
"a prestigious chief, a historical man with exceptional qualities." Then, in
a sentence, he turned the page of history: "I feel for my master admiration
and loyalty but, as he has taught me, the disr iple's fidelity and the master's
inspiratiori in no way does away with their respective personalities."
From this point, the chief of the state spoke for himself:
"From today on," he said, "I'l1 accept the challenge of the 1980's."
These challenges are energy, drought, education and employment. "I'll always
tell you the truth. The truth is that there are no mysteries and no miracles.
Our country must live according to its means The success of our recovery
program requires the pursuit of a policy already started of stringency,
austerity, budgetary economies, a struggle against bad management, waste, mis -
appropriation of public funds and corruption."
The president then clearly presented the priority objectives of his policy.
First the control of water: large, medium and small dams, drilling, and wells
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will allow the bringing into general use of irrigated cultivation and the
struggle against desertification. In thefield of energy, more than in the
limited resources of oil, lignite, peat and uranium, the future of Senegal
lies in wind energy and especiaily solar energy: "We must come straight into
solar civilization."
The education sector "is more than a high priority for the government." I~ne-
diate solutions will be provided for the young university graduates who do not
find jobs. A general educational congress wi11 gather all concerned parties in
order to take stock of the orientation law and to adopt it to our immediate
needs. The challenge to employment will be met by modernizing agriculture,
creating agroindustrial units, and setting up a system which will permit the
public officials who can do so to adapt themselves to the activities of the
primary and secondary sectors." -
The chief of the state ended the statement of his program by taking a solemn
pledge to "g,uarantee polxtical pluralism and respect all liberties. The open-
ing up of democracy will be consolidated and reinforced. But the republican
order will rule, thanks to a firm, just and vigorous authority in a strong and
respected state."
The message ended with a call for work and courage which was addressed to all
categories of the population and "to all expatriates, businessme~n, investors
and technical assistants for whom Senegal is a secon3 fa therland."
2 Years To Succeed ~
When he launched this appeal, Abdou Diouf had already designated the two men
who would be his nearest associates. Habib Thiam, the prime minister, who has R
two fundamental qualities t~ support the new president's action9 he is an old
friend of Abdou Diouf and will faithfully implement Diouf's major political
and economic orientations. An experienced militant of the Socialist Party
(the leader of the parliamentary group), Mr Thiam will maintain cohesion among
its memrers. Jean Collin, who reportedly had intended to retire from politics,
will become secretary general of the presidency of the republic with the rank _
and title of minister of state. This Senegalese by adop tion has the reputation
of being a hard worker. Ruling the apparatus of state control, he will relieve :
the president from concern about seeing to the proper working of the adminis-
tration.
The new government had been known since the evening of 2 January. There were
, less surprises than expected. The "barons" of the regime kept their ~osts and
ranks as ministers of state, a title given also to Moustapha Niasse, who remained
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ~ao departures had been expected: that of
~ Jean Collin and Amadou Cledor Sall, the latter le2.ving the Ministry of Armed =
Fo~rces to dedicate himself full-time to his duties as chairman of Dakar's _
Mui:icipal Council. Oumar B~, whose activities in the Ministry of Urban Affairs
and Housing were divisive, and Ousm.ane Camara, a long time incumbent of thp
Ministry of Higher Education, also left tho government.
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Among the newcomers, two are well known on the international scene: Falilou
Kane (commerce) was a brilliant secretary general of the OCAM; Medoune Fall _
(interior) was the representative of Senegal at the United Nations. Oumar
_ Wele (urban affairs) and Djibo Ka (information and teleco~mnunications) are
reaping the rewards of their devotion to Senghor, respectively as secretary ~
gene ral and principal private secretary of the presidency. The latter is
also the main leader of the Socialist Youth. The secretaries of state retain
their prerogatives, for the most part technical. The minister of state for
equipment found himself associated with Samba Yella Dip, a secretary of state
who will be in charge of hydraulic problems.
President Abdou Diouf did not lose time in setting up his team. He could not
_ allow himself to prolong the transition period. He has anly 2 years from now
until the next presidential and legislative elections to assert himself and
- retain in 1983 by popular consent the post that is his today by virtue of the -
Constitution. Those wl~o know him well are aware that he is capable of accept- -
ing the challenges that he has clearly analyzed. One must hope that he will find
a loyal backing on the home front and the necessary support on the international
scene so that, while accomplish ing the profound reforms which are necessary, he
- will at the same time preserve Senegal's national identity within the boundaries
of law and liberty.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie. Paris 1981
9765
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SENEGAL
BRIEFS
NEW GOVERNMEnT'S FIRST MEETING--The Senegalese head of state, Mr Abdou Diouf, who
presided at his first council of ministers meeting 13 January, made known to the
- new governmental staff the spirit with which the leadership of state affairs was to
be conducted. According to SOLEIL DE DAKAR, it is a question of organizing a united
work team, capable of rising above cyclical difficulties and proceeding with Pre-
sident Senghor's work. From this standpoint, t`.e administration should be an effective =
administration of development, animated by the spirit of justice. Instructions given
in this regard bear upon: young graduates; lack of employment to which a solution
must be found, educational problems which the general states meeting next 28 January
under the head of state's chairmanship should make it possible to look into, as well
as the shortage of indispensable produce which must be averted and the marketing
campaign oF agricultural products which must be carried out under the proper con-
ditions. Mr Abdou Diouf also informed the council that the next national holiday will
be celebrated on 4 April in Dakar and no longer at Louga and that he would return
during the first quarter on an official visit to Sine-Saloum. The new Senegalese
prime minister, Mr Habib Thiam, emphasized that one of the main tasks of the govern-
ment is the implementation of the medium term economic and financial recovery plan.
- [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Jan 81 p 189] 8870
- PS PARLIAMENTARY GROUP PRESIDENT--On 9 January, Mr M.amour Ousmane Ba was elected pre-
= sident of the Socialist Party Parliamentary group (in power). In this post, Mr Ba
replaces Mr Habib Thiam, the present prime minister. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Jan 81 p 189] ~3870
CRUDE PHOSPHATE SHIPMENTS--In 1980, the shipments of crude phosphates from the
Senegalese Phosphate Company in Taiba were as follows: Europe: Germany: 91,555 tons;
Spain: 6,100 tons; Finland: 200,118 tons; France: 140,080 tons; Great Britain:
394,042 tons; Greece: I70,400 tons; Yugoslavia: 35,898 tons; Total: 1,038,188 tons. -
Outside Europe: South Korea: 3,000 tons; India: 11,1951 tons; Japan: 98,836 tons;
Senegal: 37,468 tons; Total: 251,255 tons; Total as of 31 December 1980: 1,289,443
- tons. [Text) [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Jan 81 p 189]
8870
SHRIMP FISHING CONTROL--Following a reFnrt given by the regional fishing inspector,
a systematic control of shrimp fishing exploitation received serious consideration. -
- The use of dragging devices has been forbidden on the Casamance river and its tri- _
butaries and letters will be sent to fishermen whose number may not exceed 25,000.
The payment of bonuses to agents who have made seizures is also anticipated. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERREINEENS in French 23 Jan 81 p 189] 8870
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CANADIAN AID TO DROUGHT VICTIMS--Following a three-day visit to Senegal, Mr Pierre
Trudeau, Canadian prime minister, left Dakar on 13 January. The Canadian prime -
minister made known his country's ~ecision to give SenEgal $5 million in food supplies
to help people suffering from the drought. Canada, moreover, has stated that it is
willing to give kindly con~i3eration to any request from Senegal for the increase
- of its research ability in the energy field, within the framework of its new Canadian
research fun~t in non-oil producing developing countries. Canada, the general state-
ment points out, has decided to make its contribution of $10 to $20 million in
addition to the $9.7 million already received by the OMVS (Senegal River Development
Organization, uniting Mali, rlauritania and Senegal). Senegal and Canada have finally
decided that the joint cooperation committee between the two countries will hold
a meeting in Dakar in April-May 1981. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET -
MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Jan 81 p 190] 8870
JAPAlvESE AID--In accordance with an agreement signed 16 January between Messrs Ousmane
Seck, Senegalese minister of economy and finance, and Sonoo Uchida, Japanese ambassa-
' dor to Senegal, Japan has grantesi Senegal 500 million yens (around 480 million CFA
- francs) in non-rei'undable financial aid. This donation is to enable Senegal to ~
purchase trucks and oil trucks within the framework of its program against the drought.
[Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 23 Jan 81 p 190] 8870
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SIERRA LEONE
BRIEFS ~
IDA CREDIT--The International Development Association (IDA), a World Bank affiliate,
has just g~anted Sierra Leone a credit of 9.2 million DTS ($12 million), Co finance
a third integrated agricultural development project in the country's eastern portion.
- This will make it possible to consolidate and increase the help given to small farmers
throughout the eastern area of the country. [Text] [MARCHES TROPICAUX ET -
MEDITERRA~JEENS in French 23 Jan 81 p 197] 8870
HYDRO-ELECTRIC PROJECTS--The government of Sierra Leone foresees completing several
hydro-electric projects, namely: -one of 304 megawatts at Bambuna -one on the Mano
river within the limits of the Mano River Union -one ~zi the Saint-Paul river which
would comprise five dams -finally, several micro-stations. An information brochure
on all these projects is available at the Centre Francais du Commerce Exterieur
(CFCE), 10, avenue d'Iena, Paris (tel. [phone]). [Text] [Paris MAI~CHES TROPICAUX
ET MEDTTERRANEENS in French 23 Jan 81 g 197] 8870 -
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SOMALIA
ECONOMIC SITUATION WORSENING DESPITE GREAT POTENTIAL
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 30 Jan 81 pp 231-234
[Article by Christian Chaise: "Somalia 1981: in a Hostile Environment, Internal
Tensions and Serious Economic and Financial Difficulties"]
~ [Excerpts] A country on the edge of the brink! That is the way Somalia looks at
the beginning of 1981, after the proclamation of the state of emergency and the
reestablishment of the Supreme Revolutionary Council on 21 October 1980, the llth
anniversary of the assumption of power by the military.
~ President Mohamed Siad Barre certainly has been careful to entrench himself behind
Article 83 of the constitution. The proclamation of the state of emergency is
nonetheless the end of the timid experiment at democratization begun 18 months ago.
Of course, it was to consolidate a government which was vacillating more and more
that President Siad Barre decided to assume plenary powers for an indefinite period.
- Perhaps never has the situation in the country been so serious, because of the con-
junction of three dangers: tension on the border between Somalia and Ethiopia, the
burden of the Ogaden refugees, and an economy subject to terrible difficulties.
The Burden of the Refugees
Tension between Somalia and Ethiopia has not only exacerabated tribal rivalries and
precipitated Magadishu's alinment with Washington. It has also led to the arrival
in Somalia of floods of refugees fleeing from the fighting which ravages the Ogaden
area. Last October, according to the latest statistics published by the Somalia
authorities, 850,OQ0 persons (90 percent of them women, children, and old men) had
found refuge in 32 camps spread along the border.
Taking into account refugees spread throughout the country with relatives or friends,
there is a mass of more than 1.5 million refugees who have fallen on one of the
poorest countries of the globe.
Poor, and even miserable, Somalia certainly is without a doubt, since in 1978 its
gross national product (in current prices) jusr reached $407 million, reflecting a
slow but consistent decline since the beginning of the 1970's. As production de-
_ clined still further in 1979 and 1980 in the agricultural, industrial, and fishing
sectors, this tendency can only be accentuated. At the same time, as the popula-
tion increases regularly (it went up from 3.5 mil~ion inhabitants in ?975 to 3.7
million in 1978 and no doubt has gone beyond 4 million by now), we are looking
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at a process of absolute pauperization, with per capita annual income threatening
to slide soon below the threshold of $100. ~
= Futthermore, as the Ogaden region continues to be emptied of its population littls
by little, the moment is near when the refugees will represent nearly half of the
Somali triUa] population. That is, one person out of three in Somalia will be a
refugee. At prEaent this proportion is more than one out of four, which already
constitutes a world record. It is easy to imagine the risks of epidemics and fam-
ize which the presence of these refugees constitutes, despite the humanitarian aid
from the international community (essentially the European Community and the United
States).
- For 1980 this aid should reach the figure of $132 million. However, beyond that ear-
marked for just the refugees present in the camps (the others are a burden to be
- borne by the Somali population, which is ttself, however, threatened by famine in
certain regions), international assistance is notoriously insufficient.
In a general sense the burden constituted by the refugees weighs increasingly heavily
= on Somalia, and their presence, which is nowhere near coming to an end, threatens -
to accelerate the dissolution of an economy already in bad condition.
The minister of planning himself recognized that only 45 percent of the investments
scheduled to be made in 1979 had in fact been carried out, because of the problem
of the refugees, and that it will be the same in 1980 and 1981. The 3-year plan
for 1979-1981, which provided for expenditures on the order of 7 billion shillings
_ (a shilling is officially worth F 0.69), in all probability will suffer the same -
fate a~ the 5-year plan for 1974-1978 (which it is supposed to complete). The 5-year
plan was only 61 percent achieved for two reasons: the terrible drought of 1974-1975
and the conflict in the Ogaden region.
Oil Crisis and Fo.d Deficit
This refugee drama therefore strikes with full force a country which, like all Third
World countries which are not producers of oil, is suffering seriously from the diz-
zy increase in the price of crude oil. ?mports of oil products, which amounted to
28.6 million shillings in 1973, reached 1i~0 million shillings in 1978. However,
two important f actors, one positive and the other negative, have had an impact
since then.
First of all, at the beginning of 1979 there was the entry into service of an oil
refinery constructed near Mogadishu by Iraq, according to a joint venture scheme
_ (the two countries each owning half of the capital).From its first year of activity,
the refinery, whose capacity is 1,350 tons of crude oil per day, has processed
250,000 tons annually, purchased from Iraq for the most party, with a loan of $20
million from the Islamic Development Bank.
thanks to this refinery Somalia, an importer of crude oil, in 1979 became an ex-
porter of refined products (26.6 million schillings, or nearly 4 percent of export
receipts). In 1980 the refinery should normally have operated at full capacity,
thus covering all of the needs of the country for fuel.
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This did not take into account the conflict which broke out at the end of September ~
1980 between Iran and Iraq, forcing Baghdad to halt its exports totally. The
Mogadishu petroleum complex is only able to process Iraqi crude. Thus, the Somali
Government had to ration gasoline and import refined products, a luxury which iC _
was only able to afford with urgent assistance from certain f riendly countries.
Parallel to the oil crisis, the Somali economy has been the victim of another and
quite as serious ailment: the shortage of f.ood, particularly cereal grains, which
has created fears of a famine in the north of the country. Food self-sufficiency
was the number one economic objective of ~the new regime. A date had even been
established for its achievement: 1980. Following the 5-year plan 1974-1978, the
present 3-year plan moreover places the accent on the development of agriculture,
to which it will provide 22,6 percent of total expenditures.
However, the wax~ in the Ogaden area which began 3 years ago, the arrival of a
crowd of thousands of refugees, and the drought which affected the entire Horn of
Africa in 1979 and 1980 put off to a faraway future the prospects for food self-
sufficiency. -
Thus, for the crop season 1979-1980 (1 February to 31 January) the quantity of corn
and sorghum sold by the farmers to the Agricultural Development Agency (ADC), the
state agency charged with the sale and importation of cereals, was 2 percent less
than that for 1978-1979, which itself was 14.5 percent less than for the preceding
harvest. In 1979 the ADC was therefore forced to import 15,000 tons of corn
, (30,000 tons in 1977), which were added to a gift of 20,000 tons of corn from the
= United States. For 1980 the cereal deficit wi11 probably reach 100,000 tons, a
sign of a new deterioration of the situation.
Somali Agricultural Production
(in thousands of tons)
In the case of corn anci sorghum, the available figur~es concern the purchases made
by the ADC from the farmerc, The figures therefore only represent about half the
: real production, the other half being kept by the farmers for their own consumption
and to supply a parallel market.
By Season (February to January)
1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1979/80
Corn 31.7 30.0 21.3 9.1 8.6
Sorghum 19.5 10.0 51.6 53.2 52.3
Bananas 106.0 96.6 65.2 69.7 72.2
Sugarcane 370.0 333.3 320.0 311.5 261.2
Sesame 11.2 6.6 9.8 8.0 3.0
Cotton 1.7 1.6 4.4 2.3 2.7 '
In the case of bananas, the output per hectare has fallen from 27 tons in 1970 to
12.5 tons in 1979. For sugarcdne the output was 89.5 tons per hectare in 1978, be-
fore falling to 86.1 tons in 1979.
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Regarding livestock, the latest figures for all livestock date from 1975: sheep and
goats, 24.7 million; cattle, 3.7 million; camels, 5.3 million.
The problem is the same for sugarcane, with production, which has declined steadily
for several years, down by 16.1 percent in 1979 compared to 1978 (and down by
almost 30 percent in the last S years). Thus, it is diff icult to obtain sugar,
even in the stores in the capital, despite a massive increase in imports (78.4 mil-
lion shillings worth in 1978 against 4.4 million shillings worth in 1975).
The dizzying increase in purchases of oil and of food has had the logical result of -
aggravating the chronic deficit in the trade balance. In 1979 this deficit reached
the record level of 1,813,500,000 shillings, against 1,043,200,000 shillings the
previous year (for an increase of nearly 75 percent). For 1980 the first estimates
w~ere even more discouraging. The level of covering imports by exports thus went
down from about 40 percent in 1978 to 27 per.cent in 1979 (it was still near 55 per-
cent in 1975). ~
Parallel with the considerable increase in imports, exporr_s in effect suffered a
noticeable decline of 3.2 percent in 1979, which can be explained by their very struc-
ture: 90 percent of Somalia's exports to foreign countries consist of only two
products: cattle and bananas.
,
The production of bananas, which amounted to 140,000 tons in 1970, was no more than
106,OOO~tons in 1975 and 72,000 tons in 1979, three-quarters of which was earmarked
for export. From year to year bananas represent about 10 percent of export receipts.
However, this is nothing compared to the importance of livestock. Somalia in fact
is a country of nomads and livestock breeders, with a pastoral type of economy. In
- spite of the drought, which pushes more and more nomads taward the cities in the
south of the country, livestock raising is still the livelihoosl of more than 70 per-
cent of the pop~ilr~:ion. In 1979 the sales of livestock thus represented 71 percent ~
of the total o: exports (82.8 percent in 1978). However, although livestock raising
constitutes the principal source of wealth in the Somali economy, it is becoming
increasingly fragile, due to the drought which periodically aff ects the region. The
drought of 1974-1975, for example, decimated livestock and seriously damaged an
economy which was entirely dependent on this activity.
Since their accession to power the military have made a major effort to diversify
the basis of the economy by developing industry, which was non-existent up to that
time. However, the results are hardly encouraging. The industrial sector, which
contributes about S percent of the GNP, only involves about 15 small factories whose
function is the processing of fish, meat, and certain agricultural products.
A System of Parallel Importation
The Somali economy is also more and more dependent on the remittances of Somali
workers who have emigrated to the Arab countries, who support large families, and
provide a system of supply parall~l to the official system. The emigres. in eff ect,
refuse to send their money back to Somalia through the banking system, because of
the low rate of exchange (officially, a dollar is worth 6.23 shillings). They
prefer to deposit their savings in accounts opened abroad, which are then used by
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Somali merchanta to import consumer goods whose sales price in Mogadishu is fixed
in terms of the black market rate of exchange (where the dollar is presently worth
' 13 or 14 shillings).
The Foreign Trade of Somalia .
(in millions of shillings)
1977 1978 1979
Exports (FOB) 449 689.1 (+53%) 667.4 3.2%)
Imports (CIF) 1,296 1,732.3 (+34%) 2,480.8 (+43.2%)
Of which "f ree f oreign
exchange" totalled 477.4 217.4 (-54.5%)
Commercial Deficit -847 -1,043.2 (+23%) -1,813.4 (+73.8y)
The direction of the Somalia's foreign trade follows very logically from the very
special structure of its exports: livestock represent the main element of exports
(71 percent in 1979) and are almost completely destined for Saudi Arabia, a country _
which is by far Somalia's best customer. Bananas are the second largest source of
export receipts (11 percent in 1979); Italy is Somalia's largest customer, each year
purchasing between 75 and 90 percent of the total amount of bananas exported.
Destination of Somali Exports
(in percentages)
1976 1977 1978
Western Countries 30.1 17.6 8.6
Of which: Italy 28.3 14.5 8.0
West Germany 0.1 0.9 0.4
African Countries 8.6 2.5 0.7
Soviet Union 3.6 3.5 0.15
China 2.5 0.6 0.9�
Arab Countries 53.6 72.6 89.7
Of which: Saudi Arabia 51.3 66.5 85.7
(The role of France in Somali exports is so slight that it is not taken into account.)
[Additional table on following page] .
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_ (The situation is totally differEnt in terms of ~the countries which are sources of _
Somali imports, wi~ere the Western countries have the lion's share.)
Sources of Somali Imports
(in percentages)
1976 1977 1978
Wastern countries 53.0 54.1 62.9
Of which: Italy 25.7 28.3 29.8 -
West Germany 6.9 5.2 10.4
Great Britain 5.7 9.2 9.5
United States 4.4 0.8 2.5
France 1.4 1.27 0.661
- African Countries 11.3 6.9 11.6
Of which: Kenya 7.3 2.9 4.6 -
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 14.4 i4.0 1.2 :
China 7.3 6.5 3.3
- Arab Countries 3.4 3.7 11.0
1 0.87% in 1979
(In 1978 the principal import items were transport equipment (19%), machinery (11%),
petroleum products (7%), and sugar (5%). The role of the Arab countries should in-
_ crease as the petroleum requirements of the country grow.)
This system, called "free fareign exchange" [franca valuta], makes it possible to
make up for the lack of foreign exchange from which Somalia suffers, in order to pay
for its imports. Instituted in 1975, it has become fairly widespread, and 28 percent
of imports in 1978 were financed in this way. However, beyond the fact that it can
only be a temp _ary makeshift, especially in an economy which calls itself socialist,
this system has at least two damaging consequences.
In the first place, the government and the banking system lose all control over im-
ports. Moreover, such a system feeds inflation, since it tokes into account the rate -
of exchange of the shilling on the black market. This perhaps explains the accelera-
tion in the increase of prices noted over the last few years in Mogadishu, whieh is
much higher than the official statistics show (which report a 10-percent increase in
1978 and a 24-percent increase in 1979). In 1980 the price of basic food products
(rice, spaghetti, meat, sugar, vegetablea) practically doubled, whereas the various
sources of income have not changed for years (this is particularly the case for the
_ prices at which the farmers sell their produce to the state).
- Faced with the growing discontent of the peogle, General Siad Barre announced on
21 October 1980 a general increase in all wages. The salaries of civil servants
were raised by 30 percent for the lowest and 5 percent for the highest. In the
abs~nce of a highly unlikely increase in productivity, everything leads one to be-
lieve that these measures will be financed once again by resort to foreign assistance,
and therefore by increasing an already very large level of indebtedness.
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A Catastrophic Financial Situation
In 1978 the external debt was estimated at about 3 billion shillings (or about
$4~0.8 million, 21 percent higher than the year before), against foreign exchattg~
reserves of $132.8 million. The rate of debt service (the ratio is equal to the
_ relationship between payments of interest and capital and the total value of ex-
ports) was 7.9 percent. The public debt, for its part, has increased five times
since 1972, and each Somali now owes an amount of money ~reater than his annual in-
come!
Financing the Development Plan 1979-1981
(in millions of shillings
and in percentages)
Millions
_ of Shillings Percentages
Domestic Financing 2,584.8 36.4
National Budget 1,900.6 26.8
Other Public Finance 565.1 8.0
Private Financing 119.1 1.7
External Financing 4,518.5 63.6
Gifts 2,068.5 29.2
Loans 2,035.0 28.6
' Suppliers' Credits 415.0 5.8
Total 7,103.3 100.0
The 100 percent achievement of the objectives of this 3-year plan supposes an annual
growth of about 6 percent for 3 years, whereas the economy has been in a recession
for about 10 years.
Foreign aid is of considerable importance, since the 3-year plan for 1979-1981 de-
pends for two-thirds of its financing on external assistance, half of it in the
form of grant aid. This grant aid is essentially made up of aid from the EEC within
the framework of the Lome Convention. Somalia has belonged since 1959 to the ACP
group (African, Caribbean, and Pacific states associated with the EEC) and should
receive, in the framework of the Fifth FED, between 73 and 83 million European units
- of account, of which more than half will be for the financing of the BaYdera dam
on the Jubba River.
The Somali authorities are even more dependent on this external aid as the resources
of the state stagnate. In 1980 the development budget was 8.6 percent less than
that for 1979. This tendency threatens to be longlasting, because the government
has decided to follow a very strict budgetary policy, in order to reduce the in-
crease in prices and the defi~it in the balance of payments, which was 531.6 mil-
lion shillings in 1979, whereas in the previous year there was a surplus of 51.2 mil-
lion shillings.
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Somali Public Finances
(in millions of shillings)
1977 1978 1979 1980
Rec.eipts 882.3 1,413.9 1,689.8 1,946.1 (+15.2%)
Expenditures 1,019.3 1,563.0 1,838.0 1,792.1 _
Including routine outlay 211.4 198.4 273.9 250.3 8.6%) -
. B3lance -137.0 -149.1 -148.2 +154
N.B. For 1980 the figures are only estimates.
Among the decisions under consideration are the introduction of new fiscal measures =
- (in order to increase state receipts) and the reduction of routine expenditures of
the ministries. (It remains to be seen if that will be compatible with an increase
in the :;alaries of civil servants.) However, the most important measure--and the most _
significant from the political point of view--concerns a possible reform of the
economic structure as a whole.
Faithful to their socialist professions of faith, the military had undertaken, after
the coup d'etat of 1969, to transform the economy and place it on the road to
socialism. Agriculture, animal husbandry, and the largest proportion of embryonic
industry are still in the hands of private interests, but the banking sector and for-
eign trade have been nationalized. At the base of the Somali economy are state agen-
c~es which, in the sector where they are in charge, determine the requirements and
- undertake the corresponding purchases. Created to put an end to speculation, these -
- agencies have been conceded to have a formidable level of efficiency--at developing
shortages, the black market, and corruption!
On several occasicns, and particularly on 21 October 1980, the chief of state has
alluded to a r.rorm of this system whose failure is evident. In the long run this
could even involve denationalization, a progressive liberalization of the economy.
Even if they still call themselves supporters of socialism, the Somali leaders
seem in effect to be convinced that the present system cannot allow the country to
develop itself and get out of the present state of misery.
However, whatever the economic system in place, the Somali will always have to -
take into account sociological and human realists which can only change very slowly.
Despite a progressive increase in the level of urbanization (on the order of 25 per-
cent today), about three-quarters of the population are nomads living in the bush.
The Somali economy will therefore remain for a long time a pastoral economy extreme-
ly vulnerable to drought.
- Great potential nevertheless exists in the agricultural and fishing sectors. With
its 8 million hectares of arable land, principally in thesouth, between the Jubba
and Shebelli Rivers--a region often called the Somali Mesopotamia--Somalia can.
hope to achieve self-sufficiency. Regarding fishing, it is abnormal that sales of
_ fish should represent less than 1 percent of export receipts when the country has
2,800 lan of coast. It is true that the Somali, nomads back into the mists of time,
are culturally unfamiliar, even hostile, to this kind of activity.
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However, it is in these two areas that the only chance of salvation f~r Somalia rests.
Oil? Everyone dreams of it, but the exploration carried out has not been successful.
Regarding the uranium found in the center of the country, it seems that it will only
be exploitable with ~3ifficulty.
Nonetheless, all the efforts of the Somali, added to international aid--as important
as that may be--will be no use if one imperative condition is not satisfied: the
return of the refugees to their country, in the Ogaden. This return could not,
of course, take place until af ter the establishment of true peace in the Horn, which
won't happen tomorrow. Peace seems to be further off than ever, and Somalia, totally
isolated as it faces its Ethiopiar_ and Kenyan neighbors, feels obliged to devote an
important part of its meager resources to defense.
In 1979 military expenditures reportedly r~presented nearly 40 percent of the routine
- budget. It is no secret to anyone that the largest part ~f the aid given to Somalia
by the conservative Arab countries (with Saudi Arabia in the lead) has been used for
the purchase of armaments, in the name of the defense of Islam against the Soviet
menace, but to the detriment of the struggle for development.
~ The Place of Fr3nce
And France? It is necessary to recognice that its place has long been insignificant
in Somalia. In 1979 French exports to Somalia only amounted to F 31 million, or
less than 1 percent of the total of Somali imports. Regarding imports by France
of Somali products, these are nearly nonexistent.
The relations between the two countries suffered for a long time from the problem
of Djibouti, but they seem henceforth to be frankly good, as was demonstrated by
the participation--as an observer--of President Siad Barre at the last Franco--
African conference in Nice, in May 1980. Somalia expects a great deal from France,
and not only antitank missiles or helicopters produced by Aerospatiale.
- Thus, TDF (Telediffusion de France) and Thomson-CSF should install color television
in Somalia, following the choice by Mogadishu of the "Secam" process. France should
also finance the construction of a cement plant at Berbera (F 150 million), which
will produce 200,000 tons of cement per year. France will also participate in the
financing of a pharmaceutical factory at Mogadishu. Pari s will also provide $250 mil-
lion for the construction of the Bardera dam, for which the total cost is estimated
~ at more than $500 million.
Above all, it must be hoped that French firms--small and medium-sized--which pro-
duce consumer goods will become interested in this country which, for its part,
only asks to strengthen its relations with France.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et ~ie Paris 1981.
5170
CSO: 4400
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TANZANIA
DATA ON PLANS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF HEAVY INDUSTRY
London AFRICA in English No 114 Feb 81 pp 79-80
[ Text ] HEN Tanzania gained her major industries were either nation- ~
~ independence in 1961, there alized or caane under the control of
were oniy a few industries in the the Government. Theperiod follow-
country, mainly dealing with pro- ing the Zanzibar Revolution and the
cessin~ of a~ricultural products, such Anisha Declaration, therefore, wit-
as ma~ze, nce, cotton, coffee, tea, nessed the strengthening of produc- ~
tobacco, coconut oil and fibr~. There rion activities in the nationalized
were also a few canning and bottling industries as weU as the estat~lishment
industries for products such as meat, of new industries.
fruits, beer and soft drinks. To a large The old industrial pattern was
extent, most of these firms were run changed to place greater emphasis on
with foreign capital, under foreign the development of manufacturing "
management, unl~z~ng cheap local industries, providing such items as ,
labour. textiles, building materials, chemH
By 1961, there were about 230 such cals, food products as well as ~he local
firms in the country with capital of not processing of primary products before
more than $25,000 each. The only they were placed on the inter-
sizeable industries the country in- nation2~ market. Hence concrete
herited from the colonial era were, plans were made to establish
among them, the East Africa Tobacco industries using cotton, hides and
Company which had in 1966 become skins, palm oil and oil nuts.
the British-American Tobacco Com- The country's industrial achieve-
pany (BAT), the East African ment during the last 15 years can be
Brewenes, the Coca-Cola plant, the viewed from the increase in the
- Metal Box Company, Tanganyika number of industries, the rise of
Packkers Limited and Bata Shoe employment figures in the industrial
Company. sector, the value of industrial pro-
However, a new era in industrial duction and the change in the general
development in Tanzania started in economic pattern of the country. In
1965 for Zanzibar and Pemba islands, 1967, the tot.al number of industrial
following the 1964 Revolution and in firms in the country was 440. By 1974,
1967 for the mainland after the pro- this 5gure had nsen io 520 - a jump
nouncement of the Arusha Declara- of 16pe r cent or an annual growth
- tion. Following the Declaration all rate of 2.1 per cent.
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The number of people employed in the spread of industrial activities all
- industrx likewise also doubled from over the country and the increase of
35,300 in 1967 to 72,400 by i975.11ie emplayment opportunities in this ~
vale . of production in industries went sector. At the time of independence
up from the 1967 figure of $165.2m in mainland Tanzania, industries
' ' which was I9.5 per cent of the GDP, were concentrated in certain centres
to $488.4m in 1974, rePresenting 27.7 only. Dar Es Salaam, being the main
~ per cent of the GDP. In terms of the port and the capital of the country,
total national income, the industrial continued to attract most of the major
sector contributed 8.5 per cent in 1967 industries. However, from 1970 on-
as compared to 10.6 per cent in 1974, wards, major firms mushroomed also
basing the figures on the prevailing in areas out of Dar Es Salaam. The .
market prices. Governmenc is determined to pro-
mote their development in later
- Progren~me ~ years, taking into consideration plan-
ned~ industrial zones.
Tanzania is currently undertaking a By so doing, the southern and
twenty-year industrializat~on south-western parts of the country,
programme with priority being piaced which have the least number of in-
- on the establishment of heavy dustries, would also accommodate
industry to ma?~ufacture plants, large industries, notably for proces-
machine tools and other capital goods sing cashewnuts, production of
- necessary for the development of cement, farm implements, canned
other sectors of the economy. In meat and steel.
order to achieve this, the Govern- Dodoma, Tanzania's new capital, is
ment intends to make use of the viewed as a potential industrial cen-
country's mineral potential, parti- tre, taking inro consideration its
_ cularly iron and coal deposits located geographically central position and its
in the south-western part of mainland easy accessability from all corners of
- Tanzania. The long-term industrial the country.
plan s~ells out the need for building a In the islands where industries have
basic industrial infrastructure in order in the past been concentrated in
to meet th� ;oals of socialism and self- Zanzibar Town, Pemba has also
relian~~ . started to benefit from a number of
Since the ~rimary priority of the new industries including salt, toilet-
plan is to suffice the internal market, ries, furniture, plastics, teztiles and
the development of industries dealing c(ove oil factories.
with food processing, shoe making,
t~xtiles and building materials Generally, Tanzania's long-term
becomes a must. Another priority is industrial development plan projects
given to the metallurgical industry, an annual production rise of nine to 12
which would help in the manufacture per cent in the period 1975 to 1995.
of plants and various materials, in- For the period between 1976 and
- cluding building ware. The chemical 1981, the production value has been
industry, under the long-term plan, is estimated to grow from $177.2m to
geared at producing, among other $348.1m.
things, enough fert~lizers for agri- Job opportunities are expected to
cultural needs. Paper and printing increase by eight per cent or 130,000
industries have also been pro~ected people by end of 1981 bringing the
for vigorous development. number of employees in mdustry to
- The plan's objechves also include ,q~~~ ~
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_ TANZANIA
DATA ON RESULTS OF GOVERNMENT'S AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS
London AI'RICA in English No 114 Feb 81 pp 83, 85, 87, 89, 90
[ Text ] ~ORE than 90 per cent of Tan- certificate-level students in agricultural
zania's 17.5 million people are institutions. The following financial
peasants who liye off the land. Agri- year their number rose to 1,940, an
culture generates some 50 per cent of tncrease of 20 per cent. ~
the total gross domestic product and In 1978/79, 40 students were spon-
accounts for about $0 per cent of total sored far training in agricultural
- export earnings. As a basis for mean- sciences overseas, and the Govern-
' ingful agricultural development, the ment was considerinL ~ponsoring
Government decided, at the early about 270 students during the current
- stages of independence, to launch the season; and a year earlier a diploma
ujamaa villages programme under course in irrigation was introduced at
which scattered manpower is being the Nyegez~ Agricultural Training
brought together into communal vil- Institute in the Lake Victoria region of
lages, ~n an attempt to speed up the Mwanza. This institute is intended to
country'ssocialandeconomicdevelop- solve the critical rnanpower shortage
ment. in modern irrigation techniques.
Alongside the programme, the Fate has played some part in making
Government is striving to eradicate the advancement of agriculture a
the association of farmwork with major concern of the Government.
punishment, mainly fostered by slavery The serious drought of 1974/75 com-
andco(onialism,orasadegradingoccu- pelledtheria:~ontospendTShs.945m
pation. Thus all sectors of Tanzanian on food imports. Th~s substantially
society have been orier.ted to feel part shrank ttie foreign exchange purse,
of the land, and under the 1967 'Edu- and led to an intensive campaign to lay
cation for Self-reliance'po licy, almost a more concrete foundation to cor~tend
all schools are required to engage in with future natural disasters. Farming
some form of agricultural production. was undertaken on a more vigorous
The Government also runs agri- scale, embracing even workers in
cultural training institutions from urban centres whose parastatal institu-
which emerge personnel whose ser- tions and government ministries
vices are crucial to the development of acquired land in the outskirts of the
the a~ricultural sector. Such institu- towns to til1.
tions include the University of Dar Es So enthusiastically did the peasants
Salaam which offers courses in agri- respond to the campaign that regions
culture and forestry. The focus is on like Arusha, Rukwa, Ruvuma, Iringa
improved farm techniques, to replace and Mbeya were faced with problems
_ traditional methods that are relatively of over-suppiy of crops which their
_ more energy-consum~ng and modest storagc facilities could not
inadequate. In 1977~78, there were, accommodate. Tabling ~ the 1979/80
respectively, 637 and 994 diploma and estimates in the National Assembly,
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N'UK UFFICIAL USE ONI,Y
the then Minister for Agriculture John animals.'I'he Government is aLso striving
_ Malecela said the nation had reached a to improve the capacity of the animals
stage where it was no longer necessary through breeding and the training of
to ~mport maize - the main staple. both them and their operators. In
'T.'he trend with regard to ma or cash addition, programmes would be in-
crops is also heartening. Co~ee har- troduced to expaud the use of animals
vests shot from 44,900 tonnes in other than oxen, such as donkeys and
- 1976/77 to 54,769 in 1978/79. Wo*ld mules, for draught purposes.
prices were not very encouraging, An onslaught against foot and
however, as reflected by the drop in mouth disease, as well as against the
the contribution to the national eco- tse-tse fly is also underway. Launched
nomy from TShs. 1,$52,2m to TShs. late last year, it embraces three projects.
1,303.3m during the two seasons. The first, to cost TShs. 21,599,000,
Overall, the unfavourable world involves~ construction of a research
market situation precipitated a drop laboratory for foot and mouth disease
by 20.9 per cent in the contribucion of at Temeke in Dar Es Salaam. It will be
the agricultural sector to the nat~onal partly funded by the International
economy. Development Agency (IDA).
_ Under the second project, to cost
CUSh1011 aboutTShs. 12,Sm, a tse-tse fly research
laboratory would be constructed at
Tanga, and equipment for the labora-
Earnest efforts are being made to tory has already been received from
ensure that production is both quanti- the United States Agency for Inter-
tatively and ~ualitativety increased to national Development (USAID).
cushion the p~nch of falling prices. The TShs. Sm will be spent on a second
price of cotton for instance, is anti-tse-tse fly project in Kagera
expected to drop from TShs. 2,422.$0 Region (formerly West Lake), one of
a bale in 1978 to TShs. 2,300 this year, whose features would be the construc-
while a drop in the price of coffee is esti- tion of 15 dips.
mated to fall to TShs. 1,680 per 50- In a speech to a seminar of local
kilogramme bag from TShs. 1,836.. financial institutions last year, former
Prices of tobacco, tea sisal and cashew- Agriculture Minister John Malecela
nut~ ~re, however, expected to rise. dwelt upon six points: better use of
c.egions have been directed to pre- land resources; imgation development
pare comprehensive agricultural in order to reduce the nation's depen-
nlans, and agencies charged with the dence on rain-fed agricultural produc-
manufacturing and distribution of tion; encouragement of inechanized
agricultural inputs have been told to large-scale village communal farming;
ensure that the items reach peasants in better distribuUon of farm inputs;
good time. Execution of the latter reduction of post-harvest losses and
~ obligation is nonetheless handicapped strengthening of credit facilities to
. by Poor transport infrastructure, small farmers.
whichalsuhamperssmoothferryingof ~e Minister emphasized the crop
crops from production to buying authorities, parastatals, the Rural
centres. DevelopmentBankandotherbanking
In I~i[arch this year, ihe Ministry of ~ti~tions would continue to constitute
Agriculture formulated a national agri- the basic institutional infrastructure to
support agricultural development in
cultural mechanization policy to guide the country. `In fact, these institutions
and direct peasants throughout the ~ even detemune the pace of develoEr
country. This stresses, among other ment by their atUtudes and action
things, the use of drought animal power towards agriculture', he said. �
and implements in areas not affected .
by the tse-tse fly and where there is
already a tradition of using draught
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UPPER VOLTA
_ WATER, AGRICULTURAL IMPROVEMENTS IN FRUIT PRODUCTION
Paris MARCHES TROY ICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Feb 81 p 312
[T~xt] A recent bulletin in COLE-ACP (No. 19, December 1980) contains interesting
news about certain agricultural improvement pro~ects in Upper Volta and prospects
open in the fields of fruit production and market gardening.
With regard to the Volta basin: the master plan for improvements has only been
partially approved. There are development possibili.ties both in the valley of
the Black Volta (particularly in the Sourou basin and upstream) and on the White
Volta (most of the improvable part of which is under the Bagre project) and its
- tributaries. It i s estimated that the overall potential for irrigation in the
valley of the Black Volta is around 20,000 hectares.
Overall exploitati on of the Black Volta-Sourou complex is in fact conditioned, in
terms of irrigation, by the priorities set out in the plan for harmonious utiliza-
tion of water res ources, and psrticularly completion of the hydro-agricultural dam
at Samendeni, 36 km northwest of Bobo-Dioulasso.
- A new study, also financed by the FAC [Aid and Cooperation Fund]n examines the
- elaboration of the master plan for development of the Black Volta in relation to
development of the Sourou. This study, which is in the hands of GERSAR, involves
= among other things identification of a number of pilot projects that could ultimately
be the object of f easiblity studies (about 3,000 hectares) and determination of the
best site for the control dam called for in the Sourou-Black Volta improvement
package. Complet i on of this study is expected in mid-1981.
According to Mr G eorges Sanogoh, the former Voltan minister for planning and
cooperation, "it s eemed more logical to plan agricultural improvenients on the Sourou
in the larger framework of improvements under way on the Black Volta. ~ao com�.le-
mentary studies on hydro-agricultural improvement possibilities in the Sourou valley
in connection with the study of the regulation of the Black Volta upstream are under
way. We think we can get precise figures on the total of investments needed, at
least with respec t to the water storage need capacity needed to pursue operations
on the Sourou. As an example, the area reserved for the cultivation of cane is on
the order of 4,000 to 5,G00 hectares. In other areas, we have reserved about 10,000
hectares for the cultivation of wheat and the two rotation crops of soya and kidney-
beans, 8,000 hect ares for maize, and 2,500 hectares for market-gardening products."
With respect to the Comoe basin, it is anticipated that the master development plan
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effectuated in 1975 will be updated to take into account the abandonment of the
plan to extend the area of sugar cultivation by 4,000 hectares and to set out
the new agricultural guidelines of the Gomoe-Yanon zone, whose potential is on the
artler of 10,000 hectares (cultivation of rice and fruit). The first study had _
called for the construction of a dam at Badadougou with a capacity of 150 cubic
meters.
_ With respect to extension of the market-gardening and fruit cultivation area of ,
- ~anfiera and creation of an experimental irrigation sta.tion, these have been under-
taken in the Sourou by the Voltan Union of Agricultural and.Market-Gardening
Cooperatives (WOCAM) with money provided by FAC and the Central Fund. The financ-
~ ing of various other market-gardening projects with new money from the Central Fund
is also envisioned.
Concerning Market-Gardening and Fruit Cultivation
Since 1970, Upper Volta has seen the development of a rather dynamic market-gardening
~ sector, aimed at supplying the urban centers and off-season export of fresh produce
to Europe. Presently, several centers, managed by WOCAM, have nearly 600 hectares
in production.
More recently there has been development of fruit production oriented primarily
toward supplying urban centers. ~ao centers, near Bobo (the Kou valley) and Bazega
(80 ~cm from Ouaga) are operating with about 40 hectares each.
The Central Fund will loan Upper Volta 8.4 million French Fr (420 million CFA Fr)
for the financing of trial operation of a cashew plantation. The fund had already
financed in 1979 a feasibility study of this project carried out by the Institute
for F'ruit and Citrus Research. Plans are to plant 1,500 hectares in the first stage,
of which 400 hectares would be cultivated by village collectives.
- COPYRIGHT: I'.~.ne Moreux et Cie Paris 1981
9516
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~
UPPER VOLTA
BRIEFS
SOVIET-VOLTAN COOPERATION--The Voltan minister of foreign affairs and cooperation,
Lt Col Felix Tientarboum, received Arkady Kazansky, the Soviet Ambassador, on
26 January and discussed with him the renewal of the protocol on cultural coopera-
tion between the two countries, along with the possibility of a resumption of
activity by the TASS Agency in Upper Volta. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET
MEDITERRANEENS in French 6 Feb 81 p 311] 9516
BUDGET DEFICIT--Volta's chief of state, Col Saye Zerbo, and the director of the
Military Committee for Recovery and National Progress (CNfftPN) held talks on
27 January with important officials of the big Voltan labor confederations. This
meeting was an Upper Volta's budgetary predicament. According to the report of the
paymaster-general, Mr Theodore Sawadogo, the country had a budget deficit of
15,904.69 million CFA Fr on 30 November 1980, 5 days after the military coup that
on 25 November overthrew Gen Lamizana. At the end of November, Voltan Government
revenues were on the order of 29,099.4 million CFA Fr, of which 26,856.99 million
was 1980 budget revenue and 2,242.4 million was from the previous budget. On the
- same date, Qxpenditures were evaluated at 45,004.09 m;llion CFA Fr. According to
- Mr Sawadogo, Volta would not have been able to meet its obligations if resort had -
� not been made to treasury transactions for 22,711.52 million. Meanwhile, Upper
Volta also benefited from advances from the Central Bank of the West African States
- (BCEAO) totalling 2,919 million CFA on 24 November, of which 653 million still
= remains to be paid back. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANE~NS in
French 6 Feb 81 p 311] 9516
_ PETROLEUM SHARES--Increase in Voltan shares in SIR. The Upper Volta Council of
Ministers on 14 January adopted a commerce ministry report and gave its approval
for Upper Volta's participation in an augmentation of the capital of the Ivorian
Refining Company (SIR), which should go from 2 to 7 billion CFA Fr. Voltan partici-
pation in SIR's capital should increase from its present 6 percent share to 10
percent, which will cost the country 580 million CFA, Fr, plus-39.2 million CFA Fr
for inscription rights. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in
French 6 Feb 81 p 312] 9516
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