JPRS ID: 9593 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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JPR~ Ll9593
- 9 March 1981
Wes~ Euro e Re ort
p p
(FOUO 14/81)
J
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- JPRS L/9593
_ 9 March 1g81
WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 14/81)
CONTEN~'S
COUNTRY SECTION
- FRANCE ,
Giscard Accused of 'Wanting To Be King'
tG2orges Mamy, et al.; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 2 Feb 81) 1
Poll: Giscard Shows Slight Gain in First Round
(PARIS MATCH, 13 Feb 81) 11
Criticism of Giscard's Foreign Policies Reviewed
(Francois Lebrette; VALEURS ACTUELLES, 2 Fe~ 81) 16
ITALY
Eurocommunism 'More Necessary' in Polarizing World
(Frane Barbieri; LA STAI~A, 17 Feb 81) 19
' SPAIN
Els Maulets: New Terrorist Group or Outgrowth of ETA
(CANiBIO 16, 2 Feb 81) 22
i
; - a - [III - WE - 150.FOU0]
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' COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
GISCARD ACCUSED OF 'WANTING TO BE KING'
Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 2 Feb $1 pp 21-25
[Article by Georges Mamy with the collaboration of Pierre-Marie lloutreland and
Alain Chouffan: "The Man Who Wanted To Be King--Georges Mamy Tells How the
Sweater-Clad Candidate of Seven Years Ago Has Been Transformed Inta a Finicky
Monarch Whose Vain Behavior in Matters of Protocol Does Not Make His Ministers or
Frenchmen Laugh Any More"]
[Text] The laughing is over. A few years ago, at the first signs of the sickness,
people spoke ironically about the nasty habits in matters of protocol and the
imitation "ancien regime" with which Valery Giscard d'Estaing spiced up his style.
After seven years this is no longer funny and now the Giscardian Republic's
monarchical bent is being treated very seriously. At least three recent works--
; those by Roger-Gerard Schwartzenberg, Thomas Ferenczi and Pierre Boutang--revolve
' around this theme. Articles and studies taking their cue from this neo-royalty--
~ which, for a Roger Philippe de Saint-Robert, is nothing less than "fascism with a
~ liberal face"=-are increasing in newspapers and magazines.
The foreign press is joining in the chorus. Already in December 1978 the serious-
minded English ECONOMIST had come out with a description of "the last emperor of
Europe," but his portrait was done with a certain amount of indulgence. But it
_ came back to the subject on 6 December 1980--"The Power of Giscard"--this t~:~~ w~th
headlines about the diamor.d affair from LE CANARD ENCHAINE and LE MONDE illustrated
on its cover. The 4 December issue of the German STERN discussed the "arrogant
management" of this "reign" under the title "Like God in France." On 5 January
the rightist Spanish CAMBIO 16 mixed the Basque quarrel into its criticisms,
; headlining its editorial "L'ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group], c'est moi,"
set off by a cartoon of Giscard in the process of examining a diamond with a
i jeweller's magnifying glass. After all, it has been a long time since the American
~ press cane out and reported all tlie rumors, gossip, and bits of news, sometimes
! true, often unverifiable, which made the rounds in France--not all of them were
; in writing--and which fashioned the image of a chi~ef of state transformed little
by little into a willful monarch, a playful autocrat in some eyes, a stuffy
~ bourgeois for others.
; In 1974 the average Frenchman would have been astonished if you had ventured to
, predict that the grand young man who worked so hard at being unconventional in a
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well-mannered way was to have such propensities. "Giscard d'Estaing will give
the inauguration ceremonies a less stilted style," announced the issue of LE MONDE
dated 24 May. In fact, the newly elected president got off at Clemenceau Square
that appointed Friclay so as to arrive at the Elysee Palace on foot. What a
change! A little later, still o;. foot and dressed in a suit, he was to go back up
the Champs Elysees from George V to the Etoile. People were ecstatic. And---a
~ charming touch--all the papers reported that all along Marigny Avenue two voices
had called out "Daddy!" The president's two daughters, Valerie-Anne and Jacinthe, '
were "passing that way" on their bicycles, dressed--with such simplicity!--in
"Giscard at the helm" campaign T-shirts. G~scard left his escort and gave his
. little girls a kiss. PhoLOgraphers immortalized the moment.
Yes, this style was meant to change everthing. The newly elected president
explained this calmly to the press. He wanted to be a"modern president," and
going towards the Arch of Triumph on foot was given as an example of the "new
formulas" to be sought: "To my way of thinking," he said, "protocol is the way in ~
which a people becomes aware of events which affect them. This new style will
not be only the chief of state's but also France's."
In October 1976 Valerie-Anne and Jacinthe, the same two daughters, accompar.ied
Daddy and riomma on the president's official trip to Iran where the shah received
them. But the girls were not lost in the crowd at all. Disregar3ing all repub-
lican tradition, they ranked third and fourth in the French protocol, preceding
Louis de Guiringaud, minister of foreign affairs at the time, and three ministers, _
Fourcade, Ornano, and Soisson. In two years--and even less, as we shall see--the
sweater and ordinary suit style had given way to a taste for showing off. Mr
Jourdain's habit was that of imitating an imaginary gentleman.
Is this too insignificant an episode on which to base a case? It is true that a
certain amount of the blame and some of the criticisms currently levelled at
- Valery Giscard d'Estaing should not be attacking him alone, or even mainly him. -
In fact it is the Fifth Republic's institutions, under which our country has
lived since 1959, which have legally established a system concentrating extensive
power in the hands of the president. De Gaulle was the first "sovereign" of this
personalized government; who could forget? But Maurice Duverger, in his work
entitled "The Republican Monarchy" published at the beginning of 1974, included
Pompidou in his analysis. "The second king in the dynasty is hardly concerned with
anything except big ups and downs," he wrote, stressing how exceptional the
General's charisma had been. Duverger added, however, that "President Pompidou
does much more governing than his predecessor and does in in a more authori~arian
manner. But the country does not feel like it is being governed." When referring
to the power of his principal adviser, did not one spealc of the "July monarchy?"
So Giscard, the "third king," has in one sense only carried on and increased activ-
ity started by the first two. But, apart from the fact that he was not inevi*_ably
forced by anything to further aggravate a bad practice oper. to criticism, Giscard
d'Estaing has fewer excuses than did his predecessors, quite simply because he
had promised to make efforts to do the opposite. On 17 August 1967, three weeks
after De Gaulle's "Long live free Quebec!" at Montreal, did not Giscard--then out
of power--say: "The distressing thing is the fear that the solitary exercise of
power, if it were to become the rule, does not prepare France itself to calmly
take on the broadening of ideas and national consensus"?
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So he arrived in the Elysee with the desire to be "different." He had already
played the accordion in public, competed in a soccer game, discovered the metro,
and shown himself in a sweater. It only remained for him to prove that he was a
really "progressive conservative," a genuine disciple of de Tocqueville, in short,
a modern man. Shaking hands with prisoners in the Lyon prison, reducing the Voting ~
age to 18 and several other gestures went in this direction. But the accumulation
of gimmicks quickly raised eyebrows. Having four garbage collectors over to
breakfast at the Elysee at 0630 was not in the best of taste. AdoFting a"presi- '
~ dential insignia" (the lictor's bundle, seal af tY.e Republic of 1792) was even
more surprising: his predecessors certainly used an "insignia"--the cross of
Lorraine for De Gaulle, his initials for Pompidou--but only for the pennant on
their official car. As for Giscard, he had it added to the flag on the Elysee
front wall under the pretext that it shows if the chief ~f state is there. Should
- not the f lag itself, the symbol of the republic, be enough?
Peyrefitte's Blunder
Then there was the change in tempo of "La Marseillaise," thz "depa:~ture tune"
which had accompanied Giscard's election campaign and was ~idopted as his personal
anthem, and there was the military troops parade from the Bastille to Republique
on 14 July 1974, and so on. People who t2nd to complain only ventured to say that
these gestures, these more or less symbolic little effects, were sacrificing what ~
was important for what was incidental and that not enough attention was being paid
at that time to the inflationary threat.
Only starting with the second half of 1975 was a gradual change seen in the style
and behavior of the new president. Certainly there had very quickly been many
rumors about the private life of the "young and dynamic" man. People would readily
have chalked them up to his justifiably rejectir.g narrow conventionality. Now
people are starting to discover Giscard's strange but imperious taste for the 18th
~ century, and particularly for Louis XV, to whom he wanted very much to establi~h
a blood tie.
At least one man was aware of this quirk: Alain Peyrefitte. As new minister of
culture he had been asked to lunch in Marcl'1 1974 at the Finance Ministry offices
and was a little surprised to find Pierre Gaxotte there. Giscard announced that he
thought it was a"scandal" that the reign of Louis XV, "the greatest king of
France," had sunk into oblivion. Since the tricentennial of that sovereign's
death was coming up, he wanted an exhibition on everything connected with the
monarch to be organized. Gaxotte was only there to provide support. But Peyrefitte, -
who at the time was unaware of the finance minister's and future president's claims
of descent, retorted that`in his eyes Louis XV was the worst and least loved of
the 40 kings who have made France, "and rightly so!" The occasion was cut short:
Pompidou died, the exhibition was deferred and held later, the theme being "The
Century of Louis XV" which also included 1789.
But Valery Giscard d'Estaing pursued his idea himself. He got hold of several
items from that exhibition--furniture and art works--which he later had put in the
- Elysee. This was the case with the set of sculptures representing Louis XV and
LaPompadour at Vertumnus and Pomona--set up in the foyer as well as the portrait
of Louis XV painted in Van Loo's workshop.
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Ah, that portrait. Giscard is so proud of it that he does not m:iss an epportunity -
to tell his visitors about it. It was like that on 15 July 1976. That day he was
receiving the president of the republic of Seychelles, JamPS Mancham, along with
two of his ministers. Four Frenchmen were present. When the honored guest rested
his glance on the monarch's features, ~he chief of state leaped at the opportunity -
to explain the reasons for the portrait's presence ther~, in particular that,
"Well, as you undoubtedly known Anne-Aymone and myself are descended from Louis X~'."
"Oh, it that so!" the other man exclaimed, surprised and interested. "But then we
know your cousins." Giscard's fa.ce darkened. But James Mancham insisted, "Yes,
you French think that Louis XVIT died. Eut that is not the case at all: he found
refuge in our country and married one of our women. T~Je know his descendants well:
the last unes run a restaurant c~hich iscalled 'Chez Louis XVIl.' Those are your
ccusins!" And he burst out laughing. -
But no lesson seems to have ~een learned on this score. However, although certain
~ people conc~ue a doubtft?1 ancestry--a fairly standard bastard lineage for all
that--for the �amily of Anne-Aymone, nee de Brantes, that does not apply on the
Giscard side. Even the Americans had just let him know it without further ado at
` that time. When malcing pre~arations for his off icial trip to the United States in
~y 19i6, the French President had had a request made that he be adnitted to
membersnip oF the "Cincinnati." The Society of the Cincinaat~., a very exclusive
on.e, includes onl.y descendants of families who Played a distinguished role in the
- War for Indeper.dence in the 19th century. And a certain Admiral/Count Charles-
Hector d'Estaing--de:-.;:ended, it is said, from a sergeant-at-arms (Dieudonne) who
saved King Philip Augustus from 3eath during the Battle of Bouvines (1214)--
played a very courageous part in t.hat War for Independence. Later on this man,
a constitutional monarchist and freemason who was nicknamed "Tin Platter" by his
adversaries, was to be g~.~illotined: though he was in favor of the [French]
Revolution, nevertheless he stood up for the queen which was his undoing. In
short, the role of this d'Estaino in the Amcricas was in no way questioned. But
everyone over there ~.new that all the Giscards had done was to "pick up" this
escheated title in 1922 without having any b].ocd tie ~aith the admiral. The
' French F~resident, however, insisted on the request to the point of asking to be
' admitted as a member for his lifetime, him alone, not transferable to his descen-
~ dants. He was refused. Since, however, the business was becoming embarrassing,
the Society magnanimously consented to make him an "honorary" member--not on a _
personal basis at all, but rather in his capacity as representative of France
which, itself, had played a very "dis~inguished" role in the War for Independent.
People started to talk about "foolishn~ss."
~ This upsurge of aristocra~ic behavior also surprised everyone because on 27 January
1975 th~ ~>r'esi.clent ~~E tl~e Republ.ic had decided that from that time on titles of
nobility of visitors to the Elysee would no longer be used except for the Count
of Paris and Prince Napoleon. Even some people in the Almanach de Gotha felt t his
measure was small-minded.
But something else--what was it?--was happening between the summers of. 1975 and ~
1976 which brought Valery Giscard d'Estaing baclc to his original elitism. He;:e
as well one witness was less surprised than others. This was Alexander Sanguinet ti
who already in February 1974 was telling about a conversation during which Giscar d
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had said, just as if it were the most natural thing in the world, that a country's
government ought to be the business of "a dozen or so persons who know what is
what." Since Giscard gave the Liberal Empire between 1860 and 1870 as an example, �
"Sangui" made the observation to him (as Sanguinette tells it) that since that time
there has been excessive industrialization, the growth of Marxism, the working
class, and so on. But he does not think he rattled Giscard.
Chamson Without His Green Coat
Besides, had Giscard really changed deep down inside when during the summer of 1974
he was making a number of youthful innovations? One incident gives cause to doubt
it. Perhaps people remember that he had banned cutaways from his investit~re cere-
mony; everyone was to wear suits. However, one of the people taking part hesitated.
The sash of grand master of the Legion d'Honneur--which he refused to slip on
around his neck--was to be presented to him in its case by Andre Chamson who was
replacing Admiral Cabanier, grand chancellor of the order, who was ill. But the
venerable, Chamson, then 74, is a member of the Acadmeie Francaise and therefore
wears a green coat, make no mistake about that! HowPVer, the morning of the cere-
mony the orders were the same for everyone, and the writer had dressed in gray like
everyone else. But the telephone rang. It was the chief of protocol from the
~ Elysee who amid his many efforts to gain Chamson's good will conveyed that in any
event the president wished Mr Chamson to change back into his green coat. The
member of the academy complied. The telephone rang again. Again it was the chief
of protocol..."Oh, no! Do not tell me that I have to change again tor thi.s young
man. If t~?at is what it is, I am not coming!" and he hung up. Ring! The chief
of protocol, embarrased, insisted. And in the end Andre Chamson was at *he
Elysee in a suit.
So his touchiness about protocol was incubating. The devastation that it caused
is found throughout 1976, and since then it has kept gaining ground like the hives.
A vain itch of the president, it is however more than just that. It interfered
with politics. It supports or covers us his selfish intereszs despite being made
to look like the "sovereign's" right, need or privilege. It is even to be feared
that it modifies certain government decisions.
When Giscard, contrary to all expectations, suddenly curbed the fervent regionalism
of his own friends and Jean Lecanuet's, a minister explained it be saying "He had -
the instincts of Louis XV," without meaning any mischief. Giscard was a de
Tocqueville pluralist to start with, but turned out to be a Bourbon-style central-
ist. But that was not the worst. Fanatical changes took place. People learned
that the ritual ~f official hunts--which will come up again--had been changed:
_ there were tables with tablecloths, chairs and all the trimmings for an outdoor
luncheon which his predecessors had not required. Giscard presided over several
- meetings held to work on changing the handwriting on menus, which had been unchanged
since the days of Fallieres (1906-1913).. He had "The March of the King's Guards"
played, he had a new coat of arms made up by the prince of La Tour d'Auvergne-
Lauraguais, and so on.
And guests at an Elysee dinner on 26 May 1976 verified what all of Paris was
_ already talking about. On that day Valery Giscard d'Estaing was hosting Imelda
, Marcos, the wife of the president of the Philippines and an important political
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figure in her own rigtit, t his table, and he had himself s~rved first. Of course
the old monarchs liad their meals alone. But De Gaulle and Pompidou had themselves
served last, as is the French custom, except at ceremonial receptions when the
host is served at the same time as his counterpart, the chief of state guest. As
for Giscard, thinking he was respec ing his "office" that way, had himself served
first even during private dinners and even before ladies.
The Luynes, who have some reason to think they are of better "birth" than the
Giscards, could not get over this aauveau riche behavior. They were invited to
Authon for an "intimate" luncheon--just the two couples--and they ~vatched as two
servants served Giscard first, then Anne-Aymone, and only then the duchess as the
third, and fin.lly the duke. There were to be stories about the same misfortune
occurring in the winter of 1980 at another (unidentif ied) ducal couple, with as a
bonus Henri Giscard d'Estaing, the eldest son who is more and more the dauphin,
being put into third place before the duchess. .'~nother example of the importance
the king attaches to good old French gallantry: Jacqueline Nebout, the only woman
at a polit;.cal luncheon, found herself relegated to the }~ottom of the table and _
wa.~ only served last, the excuse being that she was there in her capacity as
secretary general of a political party (the Radicals). And then there is the
"hole," the space opposite the president of the republic left empty when none of
the individuals present is of his rank. This is a practice in which De Gaulle
never engaged. Yves Guena, along with others, was al-,ie to say, "I was beside the
hole."
Four Chairs and Two Armchairs
Even Margaret Thatcher at the time of her visit was only served after our
~~sovereign." She was a woman, of course, but she was "only" prime minister. The
English press was quite shocked at this and an issue of NOW, the sale of which
Jimmy Goldsmith banned in rrance, reported this unseemly behavior which was falsely
attributed to right-thinking protocol. At the dinner hosted by the French in
India, Henri was served before Indira Gandhi, she also being "only" prime minister.
In Peking Jacinthe came ahead of Minisster of Foreign Atfairs 3ean-Francois Poncet
on the protocol list. On another level, people wer~ indignant and joked about
"official" or "semi-official" missions inappropriately entrusted to Anne-Aymone,
from the Joan of Arc czleUration in 1975 in Orleans to her recent trip to Egypt.
These pretentious stupidities can be laughed at. In fact a minister who is a
regular at these meals made this observation: ";1,.1s conduct, thank God, carries
within itself its own punishment; the president, who is served first, has in fact
to wait for the others to be served in turn. Therefore he is condemned to always
eating cold food." :
Perhaps it wi11 be said that these are fairly insigniiicant details. But is it
possible to exhibit this kind of behavior in 1981 without it being puzzling and
perhaps disquieting?
And would the job, its surroundings, its isolation and the weight of its
responsibilities inevitably lead to such bad habits?
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"We will see if Mitterrand is not just as much like a monarch as Giscard," Jacques
Chirac flung out one day. But he added, "After all, De Gaulle was like that:
~;nical, haughty, and pitiless. But you could talk to him. Giscard is trying
harder an.d harder to imitate De Gaulle, but you cannot even talk to Giscard."
These stories of inappropriately taking precedence are bound to lead to trouble
sooner or later. Along these lines they played a role in accelerating the
Giscard-Chirac split. The Chiracs, invated to the fort at Bregancon for Pentecost
weekend in 1976, found themselves there at the same time as the president's ski
instructor and his wife, and aZl four were put in ordinary chairs while the presi- ~
dential couple had the use of armchairs. Whose pride wouid have tolerated that?
But this "prince" who is surrounded by the kinds of defenses authority can provide,
taking pride in his appearance ann position, and creating silence around him, does
he at least make signif icant use of his extraordinary power? History shows us
several "great men" who in this way were able to help artists of their time, men
of the Renaissance, of the lIIth centruty itself, or Louis II of Bavaria in the
19th century. De Gaulle via Malraux had Chagall. Pompidou liked Vasarely, Agam,
deStael, Soulages, and others. As f~r Valery Giscard d'Estaing, alas, when he
had the good impulse to want to commission a portrait of De Gaulle, he resorted
to the pretentiousness of Chapelain-Midy. And his assistants, while they are
exaggerating about his bad taste, neglect contemporary artists and favor the 19th
century. Worse than that, they refused one by one legal gifts (gifts donated as
tax payments) from the families of Alexander Calder and Max Ennst.
- No, aside from his political duties, it is his glory, his pleasures, his personal
interests and those of his family with which Giscard is occupied. It has been
said that he has searches made for portraits of genuine d'Estaings. He has tried
to buy the portrait of himself as Louis XV painted by Christian Gaiiia~d for the
cover of Jean-Michel Royer's patchwork-quilt of a book, "A la maniere d'Un,"
Giscard is constantly striking a pose. When he returned to Orly from an "incognito "
trip to Chanonat, a photographex was there. When Reagan telephoned on the day of
his inauguration another photog~rapher was there, ordered of course. He keeps an
eye on everything, instructs journalists who he thinks are won over to his cause,
and so on.
For "Charities"
_ And he hunts. In fact he goes hunting more and more, sometimes taking off from the
Elysee during the week to ge shooting at Rambouillet, Chambord, Marly, or in
_ Sologne. The day after the Copernic Street attack he was out on the Count of
Beaumont's hunting grounds in Alsace. At Authon--under strict surveill~nce by
members of the Gendarmerie Mobile who, weapons in hand, turn back anyone out walk-
ing who looks like they are heading for the L'Etoile area--the secondary road
maintained by the department which runs alongside the property is blocked off when
his lordship is hunting. Without advance notice. Without sanction from a municipal
by-law or order of the prefect. The same thing at Marly-le-Roi. He has hunted in
central Europe and in Africa, accumulating trophies of "big ones" (bears, ele-
phants). Even hunters refer to this hunting mania unsympathetically: "He hunts
to kill." And this is not respectable, it seems.
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_ Also enormous "displays of game" are regularly brought to the Elysee. "This game
is sold for Mrs Giscard d'Estaing's charities," you are told without bein~ con-
vinced. ~ther presidents had their charities, which did nor_ expect to receive
that kind of a take. Besides, the Elysee's budget is generous, and secret funds,
it is said, make it healthier still.
It seems that because of "charities" the custom of presenting the "questa" (baskets
of ham, sausage and cheese) has been done away with. The "questa" was presented
e~very two years by the representatives of the council of the ,~dnorra valleys who
came te s`~ow allegiance to their joint sovereign, the French president. Now they
hand over a check. For "charities." The previous presidents had the custom of
distributing those tasty g~ods to the staff of the Elysee. The staff found that
nice and misses the tradition.
So the suspicion arises that these rich "lords" might actually be miserly and
stingy like the ~aorst nouveau riche petty bourgeois. Giscard went 15 years without
paying his dues to the Er'A [National. School of Administration] Alumni Association
before the treasurer deciaad in 1968 to exempt him, because he was going to be
Forced to kick him out~ The episode is of little interest. But it is closely
akin to memories of Valery's friends during adolescence.
Here is testimony that is clearer and with more substance. Two or three times a
year at Authon Valery Giscard d'Esta ing engages about 20 farmers from the village
as beaters for hunting. He pays them each 50 francs for the day. If they want
to carry oFf a pheasant in the evening they are docked 25 francs. If they would
rather have a hare, that is 50 francs, the cost of their whole day. In 15 years
these beaters have only been invited one time to have an aperitif in the chateau
courtyard.
While we are on the subject of the L'Etoile chateau at Authon in Loir-et-C~ier, this
is the time to start clarifying a f ew things. In a statement made to LE NOUVEL
OBSERVATEUR in 1976, Giscard asserted that this property belonged to his wife who
had bought it f rom one of her aunts. The actual situation, as verifi~d from
puUlic property records, is quite d ifferent:
1.-The property of the L'Etoile chateau, which currently covers 505 hectares and _
90 ares, is registered as belonging to Giscard and his wife together.
~.-The president also owns in his own name: the La Bressiliere mill (27 hectares),
bought in 1975 f rom Louis Chauve2on, the mayor of Authon; the La Goudonniere vine-
years (62 ares); and Vaunas Wood (10 hectares) which is still providing the seller
with a lifetime annuity.
3.-Anne-Aymone Giscard d'Estaing owns in her own name a piece of land one hectare
and 26 ares in size, which was bought in 1968 from Armandine Herve, who is still
living at the age of 82 and receives about 500 francs a month from the president's
wife as a lifetime annuity.
Therefore, Valery Giscard "Estaing is the sole or joint owner of 542 hectares.
At the ti.me of the first purchase in 1964 the property covered 453 hectares. It
went from 455 hectares in 1966 to 487 in 1970 to 505.90 in 1972. It reached its
present area in 1975.
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Scarely two kilometers away as the crow flies, in the northern part of the commune,
are the 661 hectares of the Fresne chateau, the property of Paul Sauvage de Brantes,
Anne-Aymone's brother. People in the area say that Paul does not have much of a
talent for farming.
No Answer from tae President's Wife
At any~rate the property is not all under cultivation and the owner has obvious
need of ready cash. So for 15 years he has been selling off little pieces of land
from time to time. In 1977, for example, he wanted to sella sizable farm to its '
� tenant farmer. SAFER [Real Estate and Rural Development Company] went along with
that and wrote to the president's wife to ask her to join with it in setting up an
agricultural property group, the system introduced by Giscardian agriculture ~
specialists as the experimental program to be expanded. Strangely, SAFER received
no answer. But at the last moment Paul de Brantes took his farm off the market:
Anne-Ay~one had intervened so that the family property would not be broken up. A
few months ago, Paul put the whole Fresne prop erty up for sale through an agency
in the southwest. Buyers came forward: one for the forest, and SAFER for the
fields (at 20,000 francs a hectare). ~~ut nobody wanted the chateau on the sale
of which the owner had put only one condition: that it not be sold to an African.
And then suddenly at the end of the year the whole thing was again taken off the
market. In the area there was not the slightest doubt why: Giscard did not want
to run the risk of causing the slightest fuss and it was he who put everything on
~ ice. We will see what happens after the presidential election.
' Bssides, who apart from Giscard and his relations could have purchase it? "Since
he has settled at Authon, all the nobility and gentry in the area have been holding
their heads up high again," pepole say at the Loir-et-Cher farmer's union. La
Chauviniere chateau in Boulay, the neighboring commune, was bought on 7 July 1980
by Prince Guy de Faucigny-Lucinge; Le Hetre chateau, also nearby, was acquired by
the Clermont-Tonnerres. They are cousins. At Le Temple a member of the De
Talance family, farmer-owner of 230 hectares who raises pheasants and partridges
commercially, was authorized by the committee on ccncurrent holdings to get a
70-hectare piece of land back which had been allocated to a farmer who supported
200 farm workers.
So the ill will is spreading. By bidding for everything being sold he is making
prices go up," groan the farmers, who know that the notary, who deals with real
estate sales, has in fact had instructions along those lines. "We ourselves
cannot buy any longer. So we do not have enough land." However, they do not
even seem to know that the Giscards themselves are buying land even beyond the
, country's frontiers: in Greece, at any rate, and perhaps elsewhere.
But how do you reach Anne-Aymone Giscard d'Estaing's heart who must, with an
i easy mind, consider herself as the "equal" of every farmer. There is a reason
~ for this: just like them, she is registered at the Loir-et-Cher Farmer's Mutual, .
as an agricultural farmer of about 50 hectares of the L'Etoile property. She
pays her contributions as a farmer, of course. Consequently, she is entitled to
all kinds of government asistance which are dispensed as compensatory farmer income;
she was awarded 1,200 francs in 1974, for example. And when she is old enough
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she will have the right to a farmer's pension currently estimated at 12,000 francs
per year. She will even be able to claim annuity compensation for leaving the
business.
The Ambtions of "Riton"
We should al~o tallc about the son "Riton," Henri Giscard d'Estaing, 24 years old. -
Within shooting distance of the area we have been di~cussing, between Marchenois
and Vendome, he is preparing, as he quite simple says, to be "the youngest deputy
in France," with the help of the pref ect Charles-Noel Hardy, Giscard's former
cabinet member in the I'inance Mi.nistry. He has launched a newspaper, the LOIR-ET-
CHER HEBDO; which must have already cost a billion oldfrancs. Last November he ~
managed to be pr esent at 18 opening ceremonies in Vendome during a single Balzac
Fortnight, whose actual cost has been estimated at 54 million old trancs (rather
than the 12 million which was reported) . He is a subject that wi11 merit further
discussion, unless some obstacle gets in his way. The current centrist-UDF deputy
for Vendome, Jean Desaulis, who Henri and his family are counting on sacrificing, _
remains to this day completely determined to stand for office in ~983. But wi11
he be able to hold out? ~
On 22 .January at thP Academie Francaise, when the speeches welcoming Marguerite
Yourcenar as a new member were coming to an end, the entire gathering--this
happened spontaneously--rose to applaud. Excepfi for Valery and Anny-Aymone _
Giscard d'Estaing. As if homage were being paid them, or as if they were something
other than common people, common people meaning even members of the academy.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 "le N~uvel Observateur"
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COUNTRY SECTIUN FRANCE
POLL: GISCARD SHOWS SLIGHT GAIN IN FIRST ROUND
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 13 Feb 81 pp 40-41
' [14th PARIS MATCH Public Opinion Poll]
[Text] Beginning this month, as the competition grows more intense, PARIS MATCH
~ will publish its presidential election public opinion poll twice monthly. For the
second ballot, the current poll shows that while positions have not changed on the
Mitterrand/Giscard matchup, if Chirac were a majority candidate against the social-
~ ist leader, he would lose a point. Qn the first bal?ot, Giscard gains points no
- matter who the other candidates are, which would apparently hurt Michel Debre.
Among the opposition, Mitterrand is regaining some ground, while Marchais is con-
solidating his position. This poll was made after the televised oaths of Valery
' Giscard, Marie-France Garaud and Michel Crepeau, but before Chirac officially de-
clared himself. It should be noted that on the first ballot, the mayor of Paris
' would achieve his best score if he were the only Gaullist representative and his
worst if Michel Debre and Marie-France Garaud ho~.d steady. However, according to
our surveys, he has dropped when compared with the January poll. Finally, one
I out of every two voters currently believes that Jacques Chirac is right to declare
his candidacy. Some 12 percent believe he has a chance of winning. On the other
hand, one voter out of three.believes he has little chance. The net decline of
" ~ Michel Debre and a close analysis of resgonses concerning the candidacy of Jacques
Chirac would tend to show that the majority voters are more and more inclined to
vote "yes" from the very f irst ballot.
� First Ballot: Giscard With the Three Gaullists
If the presidential election were held today and the following candidates were
on the f.irst ballot, which one of them would you vote for in each of the six cases
below?
~ 1981 Out of 100 supporters
_ January February PC PS RPR UDF
i
, Valery Giscard d'Estaing 28 31 1 4 31 89
Francois Mitterrand 24 24.5 5 84 1 1
Georges Marchais 16 17 92 - - -
~ Jacques Chirac 11 10 1 2 56 2
Michel Debre 6 2.5 1 - 6 4
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(cont.)
Marie-France Garaud 4 4.5 - 2 4 3
1 ecolog~st candidate 6 ~ - 5 2 1
1 extre.r.~e lef t candidate 3 2 - 1 - _
1 extreme right candidate 1 0.5 - - -
rfichel Crepeau 1 1 ~ - -
- No response 11 14 4 8 5 5
Abstentions 5 8 1 2 2 2
1 Socialist Party ~
Z Rally f or the Republic
3 French Democratic Union
If Debre Drops Out
1981 Out of 100 supporters
January February PC PS RPR UDF
Valery Giscard d'Estaing 30 31 1 4 31 91
Francois Mitterrand 25 25 6 84 1 1
Georges Marchais 16 17 91 1 - -
Jacques Chirac 13 11 1 2 61 4
Marie-France Garaud 5 S, - 2 4 3 _
1 ecologist candidate 6 ~ - 4 2 1
1 extreme left candidate 3 2 - 1 -
1 extreme right candidate 1 1 - - ' -
Michel Crepeau 1 1 - - - -
No response 13 14 4 8 5 4
Abstentions 5 8 1 2 2 2
Chirac As Sole Gaullist Candidate
1981 Out of 100 supporters
January February PC PS RPR UDF
Valery Giscard d'Estaing 31 33 1 4 34 93
Francois Mitterrand ~ 26 26 6 86 1 1
Georges Marchais 17 17 92 1 - -
Jacques Chirac 13 12 1 2 61 5
1 ecologist candidate 8 8 - 4 3 1
1 extreme left candidate 3 2 - 1 -
1 extreme right candidate 1 Z - -
Michel Crepeau 1 1 2 1
No response 13 15 4 8 6 4
Abstentions 6 9 1 2 2 3
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Second Ballot: Giscard a�nd Mitterrand on an Equal Footing
. If, on the second ballot, the candidates who won on the first ballot were the fol-
lowirig, for which one of them would you vote?
~98i Out of ~100 supporters
January February PC PS RPR UDF
'G~alery Giscard d'Estaing 50 50 4 5 91 99
Francois Mitterrand 50 50 96 96 9 1
No response 11 13 16 4 10 1
Abstentions ~ 14 15 20 2 8 2
~OCT NOV DECJANV FEV MARS AVNIL MAI JUINJUIL SEPT OCT MOV DEC JAMV FEV
~ i . ~ ~ ~
� ~ 57 b7 ' ~ ~ I ~ 57 I ~ ,
VGE ~ ~ '
54 ~
53 52 I I 53 ~ 52 ~ ;
i . ' . . .
.......j...........,.........~..........f..... 50 ~
47 I ~ 47 .
, i
~ j ''t~~~ ~ ~
; ,
MITTEARAND'��43.....J��� "1''�..42r''��I I �.,~p� i 13: ~ I
I I .40.
- Mitterrand Bear~ Chirac
1981 Out of 100 supporters
January February PC PS RPR UDF
~
- Jacques Chirac , 40 39 6 4 93 76
Francois Mitterrand 60 61 94 96 7 24
No response 16 17 17 3 11 18
~ Abstentions 16 18 19 3 6 14 -
Over 20 Percent Undecided
Is your mind made up?
Overall Out of 100 supporters
PC PS RPR UDF
Yes 68 70 82 70 77
No 20 21 14 20 17
, Do not know 12 9 4 10 6
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- Instructions on Second Ballot
If your candidate cannot be listed on the second ballot, will you follow the in-
struCtions he gives at that time?
Overall Out of 100 supporters ~
PC PS RPR UDF
Yes, definitely 29% 37 33 34 38
Yes, probably 24% 31 24 32 26
No, probably not 13% 9 16 16 1S
No, certainly not 13% 12 11 8 12
Do not know 21% 11 16 10 9
Do You Approve of Chirac's Candidacy?
It is generally thought that Jacques Chirac will be a candidate in this presidential
election. Do you believe he is right to be a candidate?
Overall Out of 100 supporters
PC PS RPR UDF
Yes 46 38 41 77 54
No 30 39 40 14 33
Do not know 24 23 19 9 13 _
If Yes , Why?
It is noi-malfor the RPR to have a candidate in the presidential election. 51
He is the besC representative of the Gaullist family. 15
He strengthens the chances of the maj ority. 13
He is in thebest position to win. 12
Do not know 9
If No, Why?
He divides the Gaullist family. 21
He favors the election of a leftist candidate. 9
He should wait for the following presidential eZection. 9
He ha s little chance of being elected. 52
Do not know 9
The r esults given here are from a poll condueted on 29,30 and 31 January 1981, using
- a national sampling of 1,000 representing the French population over the age of 18.
The s ampling was set up using the quota method. The following criteria were taken
into account; sex, age, profession of the head of the family, category of the -
commune, region (Z, e, a, t). Attention is drawn to the following points: Inasmuch
as the election will not take place for 3 months, the country is not in the real
psychological and political situation of a presidential election. Results for all
the French people must be interpreted in the light of this remark. Concerning
results analyzed by political sympathy (determined by the following question: ~
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"To what political grouping or party do you feel the closest? the RPR, UDF, PS,
MGR [presumably Revolutionary Leftist Movement], PC, extreme right, extreme left,
ecologist?") Since the �eference samplings were by definition limited compared with
the overall sampling of the French people, the statistical margin of error is large.
One must therefore retain only the trend and not.the absolute value of the figu~es.
This remark is a general one and applies to all polls of this type.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 by Cogedipresse S. A. -
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
CRITICISt^. OF ~ISCARD'S FOREIGN POLICIES REVIE4IED
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 2 Feb 81 pp 19-20 ~
~rticle by Francois Lebrette7
~ext7 "To assemble in a meetin~ all of the countries which~ right or
wron~;, are accused or suspected of interfering in Afghanistan's flomestic
affairs." Spectaculax~ this proposal~ issued over television on 27 Janua,ry
~ by the president of the republic, appears as the legical outcome of a dip-
lomatic ballet begun 6 months a;o.
~ Let us review the various stages.
On 1~ Ma.y 1980~ the pro-S oviet ~overnment of Kabul proposed to Iran and _
Pakistan "bilateral ne~otiations" aime~d at endin? "armed and any other form
of interference" in Af;hanistan�s affairs; the Soviet Union and the United
S tates were to guarantee the a~reement. In plain language: the interna-
tional community would recognize the Kabul regime and abandon all Af,~han
resisters, excluded from the negotiations, to their fate. _
On 15 May, the member countries of the Warsaw Pact, ~!eeting in the Polish capi- _
tal called for a"~aorld conference" to eliminate "hotbeds of international
tension." Accordin~ to S oviet Foreign Affairs Minister Gromyko~ it was
necessar,y to have a mee�tin~ of the "principal nations" by re~ions; a con- ~
ference on Af;hanistan would naturally be included in this framework. French
Foreign Affairs Minister Jean Francois-Poncet immediately declares that this
proposal must be studi.ed "seriousl,y" and "discussed with its authors."
Cn 19 May~ Giscard d'Estain~; met with the "principal author," Leonid Brezhr.ev
in Warsaw. He conveyed the french position to the Soviet official summarized
ar the end of the meeting as follows:
'~fy preference is for a summit meeting of the principal countries involved."
His spokesman, Jacques Blot~ further stated that such a meetin~ could not
take pl~.ce before 19$1. The answer was then giv~n the next day by Soviet
ambassador Tchervonenko in Paris.
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"Interestin~ proposal."
l1t the Venice summit meeting on 22 June, Giscard d'EStaing informed his
allies of a telegram from MoscoTa announcing a partial withdrawal of Soviet
troops .from Af~hanistan. A geod-will gesture ~ the F~nch president thinks.
A deception~ the CIA asserts, pointing out~ on the contrary, an increase in
the Russian presence.
However, the significance of the new developments was not underestimated
Last Tuesday, Giscard d'Esta.ina; stated:
"The Soviets have withdrawn some of their forces but, in the last analysis,
have not carried out any action aimed at complete disengagement."
~ Was the summit he was proposin~ malce it possible to relaunch that action?
S omething new has been added to his proposal: since Moscow would refuse
the presence of any Afghari resistance group in such a summit, the Kabul
~overnment should by the same terms be excluded. The immediate reaction of
an Af~han refugee in Paris:
"This would not be a compensatin~ action but a deception. The pro-Soviet
;overnment would be represented by the Soviets and the Af~han people by no
one!"
As fax as French diplomacy is concerned, the important thing~ therefore, is
to be~in negotiations. Pursuant to a principle which Francois-Poncet out-
lined the da.y followin~ the W arsaw summit before the Ptational Assembly:
"There will be only a. political conclusion to the crisis."
Mrs Nia.rie-Fra.nce Garaud considers that attitude the unequivocal acceptance
of a fait a.ecompli. On the eve of the speech given by the president of the
republic, she made the following statement on Television Station 2 during -
_ a pro~;ram entitled "Puttina the C ards on the Table":
"His forei~n polic,y is akin to a strategic withdrawal from positions not -
prepared in advance. And this ~enerally ends in Bordeaux."
The criticism was aimed as much at the initiatives taken toward Moscow as
at France's apparent ultraconservatism in the Chad a.ffair.
; "l,iha.t would we have accomplished in ;oinF there?" the president of the re-
i public answered the next da,y.
i
~ There was no question of his committing "the major political error" which
would have been involved in intervening "in a country torn b,y civil was and
whose le;itimate ~overnment would have opposed the entry of French forces."
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It was then a display of force to ~o along with the a posteriori condemnation
- of the Lib,yan intervention and subsequently enter into negotiations. Thi~
- is what was done on 24 January, rrith the Libyan minister of information re-
ceived in Paris.
W as this really the only solution? During the same television program~
Giscard d'Estain~; incidentally ~~ecalled the conditions under which Emperor
Bokassa was overthroKn in Central Africa:
"Where was he? Wher.e was he? He was in Tripoli."
This was clearly done to point out that France sometimes manages to inter-
vene without the endorsement of the "legitima.te government~" and even in op-
position to it. But, on that occasion, it was a question of overthrowin~ an
arbitrary and, ver,y probably~ criminal emperor in absentia. In Chad it would
have been necessary to oppose a Libyan armada led by severa.l hundred in-
structors from the GDR,
To justify France's abstention~ the president of the republic and supreme
head of the armed forces according to the constitution made the followin~
statement:
"We would have lost tens and hundreds of inen."
CGPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeuxs actuelles"
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COUNTRY SECTION ITAI,y
EUROCOMMUNISM 'MORE NECESSARY' IN POLARIZING WORLD
l~ LD191027 Turin LA STAMPA in Italian 17 Feb 81 p 3
; [Dispatch by Frane Barbieri: "Eurocommunism:. War on Three Fronts"]
; [Excerpts] Madrid--Deposed secretary general of the Unified Socialist Party
of Catalonia Gutierrez told me that "there will be a dramatic struggle for
Eurocommunism at the coming PCE Congress." However, it will be made dramatic -
; not so much for the inevitable Soviet broadsides as for the internal opposi-
tion and--let us admit it--for the state of crisis within Eurocommunism itself.
~ "Either Eurocommunism takes a decisive step forward or it will die," PCE
executive co~nittee member. Ramon Tamames said. The crisis concerns both
substance and methods. The entire concept of Eurocommunism is limited to the
~ formula of socialism within democracy, socialism within freedom and socialism
; within pluralism. It lacks satisfactory formulations on social and economic
, forms, on the model of system to which the democratic and pluralist path
should lead. There are growing suspicions among coirm?unists that the pregalence
! of pluralist democracy will by no means lead to a revolutionary step beyond
capitalism in a socialist direction. Among noncotmnunists the vague formula
prompts suspicions that democracy is regarded merely as a tool for gaining
! power, since the conununists have had to forgo outright revolution.
Strategy
It emerges that the PCE's democratic foreign policy has not been reflected in
~ internal party democracy. Thus Eurocommunism has remained incomplete and
, unilateral, failing to involve party members in it as an idea and as a form
of action. Dynamic deputy mayor of Madrid and prominent economist Ramon Tamames
; said: "party strategy remains in the secretary general's hands: there is no
; discussion at an all-party level, and therefore the party is losing its
~ enthusiasm." -
i -
I The youngest member of the PCE Executive Committee, Tamames suggests that
i the secretary general be replaced by a collective secretariat (which would
; still have to be elected by the Central Committee on the basis of various
' lists presented at the congress, instead of a single list drawn up by the
' executive committee), Tamames argued as follows: "Looking at the matter
; calmly, I would say that the concen�tration of all power in the leadership
makes Carrillo a venerable tribal patriarch, so that th e whole world believes
~ that the secretary general is the only man in the PCE." He added emphatically
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that "bureaucracy is making th e party mediocre; the war veterans and former
exiles sti11 hold imp~rtant posts in the bureaucracy: the party's central
organization has not been sufficiently rejuvenated."
Eurocommunism is in a state of crisis as a result of the convergent attack of -
the Soviets and the confusion within its own ranks. What are the outlooks?
I discussed this with Manuel Azcarate, who was the first, while still in exile,
to introduce the idea of "a different kind of co~unism within the framework
of the European community," at a PCE meating in Paris in 1973.
[QuestionJ What is the nature of the crisis of Eurocommunism?
[Answer] The international situation in which the word and concept of
Eurocommunism took shape was very different from the present one. Then there
was a shining horizon for the European left. _
[QuestionJ When and why did this horizon becoxne darker�?
[Answer] Th~ basic fault lies with the leftwing forces in France, or rather
with the way in which the union was broken.
[Question] Then other reversals followed. ~ .
[Answer] We have th e very grave international crisis, the return to the cold
war, plus the social frustrations and the lack of prospects.
[Question] The problem is whether Eurocommunism is stil~. valid in this new
si~uation.
[Answer] The crisis and tensions are driving toward a swing in the direction
of traditional truths. Peopie are again regarding the world as split into two
camps. If. the United States exerts pressure on one side, the answer lies
in support for the other bloc.
[Question] Do you consider it inevitable?
[Answer] No, on the contrary, it is a way oF avoiding reality, The world
must not be regarded as split into two camps. For us alignment means shutting
yourself in a ghetto from which you cannot change things.
[Question] jdhat is the way out of the ghetto?
[Answer] Eurocotrmiunism is in a state of crisis, under pressure of circumstance,
b ut at the same time it is becoming more necessary than before. We cannot _
- deal with the new pressures and tensions in Europe with traditional communist
culture. When people began to talk about Euroconanunism the trend barely
existed and the word seemed almost ridiculous. Now the situation is justifying
the term, because the autonomous Europeanist trend is growing strong~r in
Europe,
[Question] Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how strong the leftwing forces'
role becomes....
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[Answer] Europe's role cannot grow stronger without the leftwing forces as
_ a whole becoming stronger. To achieve this it is necessary to overcome the
historical split of the twenties, not through a return to Lenin-Kautsky type
debates .
[Question] How can this be achieved?
[AnswerJ It is the kind of rapprochement which perhaps [former PCI directorate
member] Amendola was the first to envisage: a rapprochement b etween two
self-critical approaches to our past, the social democratic and the communist.
Thus the situation would make the major guidelines of Eurocommunism emerge.
Old Ideas
; [Question] Where do you put the USSR in this framework?
[Answer] The USSR is logically belligerent toward Eurocommunism. Even
_ Kissinger says that a Euroc ommunist party is more dangerous than a Stalinist
- one. The two superpowers are opposed to it. Very specifically, the USSR, not
only for ideological reasons but also for political reasons, is opposed to
Eurocommunism because it does not include Western Europe in the system of
blocs. This has repercussions in eastern Europe too, where progress is being
made by thb. idea of a synth esis between soc3alism and democracy, as shown by
Poland.
[Question] Moscow'~s "belligerence" is in fact becoming more aggressive and
dangerous at the moment.
~ [Answer] Moscow is exploiting the tendencies toward the return of old ideas
~ and alignments within the communist parties, therefore in some countries we
are in the midst of a battle--:~ot only, I would say, for the defense of
Eurocommunism, but primarily for. the development and extension of the concept.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editr. LA STAMPA S.p.A.
CSO: 3104
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I COUNTRY SECTION SPAIN
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ELS MAULETS: NEW TERRORIST GROUP OR OUTGROWTH OF ETA
Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 2 Feb 81 pp 34, 35
[Text] Last 13 January a group, as yet unnamed, kidnaped Luis Suner in Alcira.
Sun2r, according to last year's Treasury lists, is the richest businessman in the
country.
The police initially aimed their investigations at the Basque Fatherland and
Liberty Group (ETA (p-m]), and even thought ::hat a small independence group that
' , emerged 2 years ago in Valencia and Alicante might be behind the kidnaping.
That group, called "Els Maulets," advocates the armed struggle, and with technical
support from some major terrorist organization, perhaps ETA (p-m), could have
carried out the kidnaping. Several days later, the police rejected that theory.
' Nonetheless, CAMBIO 16 wanted to find out who belongs to "Els Maulets," the
' Valencian ETA, so il wrote this report.
i
, "Els Maulets" consists of a little over two dozen Valencian and Alicantean youths
' from 18 to 25 years of age. It is an aggressive group that advocates independence.
~
The members consider the Democratic Center Union (UCD) a neofascist and neocapital-
ist party. The Spanish Workers Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Spanish Communist
Party (PCE) disgust them. Only the military wing of the ETA provides them with a
certain guarantee of being a national liberation group with clear ideas and
, weapons always ready to be put to use in the struggle for their ideals.
"Els Maulets" is the Valencian ETA. Its origins date back to the eighteenth
century. During th~ War of Succession between Archduke Karl of Austria and Phillip
V of the House of Bourbon, in 1717, the majority of Valencian peasants and
' artisans took the archduke's side in the conflict.
~
~ Their battalions were known as "maulets," derived from the Latin word "maula,"
~ which can mean a base lower class man or a
~ , , person who hides out in the woods
~ (guerrilla).
Today's "Maulets" first became known in the summer of 1979 through a series of
political slogans painted on walls in Valencia and Alicante, calling the people
"to arms."
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OE course no one paid any attention, but they continued to believe that the only
political solution for Valencia is the armed struggle, and thar socialists and
communists are noC going to promote such a movement. ~
Therefore, ~hey are preparing for. battle. Alrhough police told CAMBIO 16 afteY the
kidnaping of Valencian industrialist Luis Suner that Che "MauleCS" are still too
"green" to undertalce such an adventure, they claim that very soon they will be as
well known or. even more Eamous than the Basque ETA itself.
For now their actions have been limited to attacking businesses, stores, bookshops
and the automobiles of people associated with the Valencian extreme right. They
have also burned Spanish Elags and the bluc-striped Valencian flags during
holidays such as Las Fallas in 1980, trying to reach the masses with their message.
However, the most "military" sector of "Els Maulets" believes that this type of
activity is not. enough, and that they must begin to act in earnest, with real
pistols and machineguns, with dynamite and "goma-2" explosives, if possible.
- For Lhis purpose, in mid-1980 a sector. of "Els Maulets" proposed to blow up lhe
statue of Gc:neral Franco in the Plaza del Pais Valenciano in the capital of Turia. `
The idea was r~o place 2 kilos of "goma-2" under the belly of the horse on which
the general's tigure sat, and blow it sky-high. ~
Strong pressure Er.om the political sector squelched the idea, but the "military"
sector of "Els Maulets" prepared new activiLies. These included robbing a bank to
obtain funds, and using Molotov cocktails to attack a book store and the
delegation of the Ministry of Education and Science in Valencia.
The three armed actions had to be carried out in a synchronized fashion, because
the latter two were to serve as decoys to divert police attention so that the bank
robbery, from which they hoped to reap a large booty, would go off without a hitch.
Five minutes before the attacks, when Che three armed commandos were already
prepared to go ahead, the chief of the "Els Maulets" political sector sounded the
- order to retreat. A couple of days later, in April 1980, the "military" and
"political" sectors of "Els Maulets" decided to split up. Since then, the military
ETA uf the "Maulets" has become completely isolated from other political organiza-
tions, and has devoted itself exclusively to preparing for the armed struggle.
' "Your magazine doesn't seem to have much faith in us," said one of the members of
the "military" secr_or of "Els Maulets" when CAMBIO 16 tried to contact them so
they could explain publicly the short- and medium-term objectives for the armed _
struggle.
"We are the only Valencians who are fighting for the independence of our country,"
stated one of the group's spokesmen when they finally agreed to an interview. "The
other. political parties are bands of traitors and collaborators."
The "military".sector of "Els Maulets" acknowledged having contact with ETA. "They
have not been official contacts, but private ones," revealed the source. Despite
those contacts, the same person emphasized that there is no collaboration between
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"Els Maulets" and ETA. "ETA's struggle," they pointed out, "is in the Basque
Country, and that of 'Els Maulets' is iri the Valencian Country."
when this magazine asked them why, as an armed group, they have still not seen any
action, they seemed very irritated. "When we split from the rest of the organiza-
tion in the middle' of last year we had to start from scratch. Now we are in the
formaLion stage; we are acquiring channels of information and means for preparing s
commandos, training guerrillas, obtaining financing and purchasing weapons."
At a certain point in the interview, Luis Suner, the Valencian industrialist wh o
was kidnaped last 13 January, was mentioned. "Ttte only thing we can say,"
indicated the "Els Maulets" spokesmen, "is that it was not our group. It wa s
_ probably a kidnaping planned by criminals. The fact that no political group ha s
taken credit for the action confirms our theory."
"How many people do you think you will have to kill to achieve the independence of _
the Valencian Country?" CAMBIO 16 asked at one point. The two "terrorists" of "Els
Maulets" changed color and gulped several times. One of them got up from the table
and headed for the door without a word. The other fol~lowed. The interview was over.
The Valencian ETA prefers to be called "Maulets" rather than ETA. Nevertheless,
- their admiration for the Basque terrorists is a constant in the short history of
the Valencian terrorist group.
In the summer of 1979, after the blue flag replaced Che four-striped flag t o
- represent Valencia, ~nd after what they considered .the "advances" of the Valencian
righl, a group of six people met at a cafe near the General Union of Workers (UGT)
Valencian headquarters and discussed the need for an armed struggle.
That was the embryo of "Els Maulets." After that initial meeting, another 10 people
joined the organization directly, and the members of the group emulated eac h
o[her, saying they were "ready for anything," even taking up a machine gun if
necessary.
The small nucleus of guerrillas in power is made up of for, er members of th e -
Popular Socialist Party of Valencia, Socialist Germania, the Spanish Communis t
Par[y and some independents, as well as former members of the nonparliamentary
leftist parties.
Their political principles exclude any formal program, and they have set fort h
_ just a few minimal guidelines necessary to remain together and take joint action:
absolutely no pact with the authorities, no to the Valencian Autonomy Stature, ye s
to "workers and peoples" self-government, and~yes to the revolutionary struggle.
With this theoretical baggage, "Els Maulets" began to make itself known i n
Valencia. Every weekend a group would go out in two cars to paint pro-Valencia n
slogans on walls. A couple of months later, in the fall of 1979, the capital o f
Turia was plastered with these slogans. "Maulets, to arms," "Spain is deceiving
- us," and "Neither France nor Spain, Catalonian Country," are some of the mos t
common ones.
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In early 1980, Che organization began to consolidate itself. The number of inembers
was on Che rise, and "Els Maulets" gained a reputa~ion as a proindependence
organization wi~h a clear tendency toward the use of ar.ms to impose its ideas if
necessary. It. was in [.he beginning of 1980 when the organizing group made contact
with di�ferent collectives of "Maulets" that had been emerging in various parts of
Valencia. They all attended the annual rally held on 25 Apri1 in the Valencian
bullring, where numerous groups of "Maulets" not controlled by the founders
appeared.
There, overcoming the initial mistrust stemming from the possibility of police
infiltration, contacts were made for a subsequent coordination through a"Valencian
Taula" (board of direcrors). In addition to the "activist Maulets," who are more
or less clandestine, this board of directors would comprise the Independent Left
of Castellon, Popular Unity of Vinaroz, the United Left of Gandia, the Independent
Socialists of Jativa and five council members from Villafranca dels Ports.
The organization has become increasingly radical. The "Els Maulets" graf�-iti now
not only call Eor the armed s~ruggle, but also come out in favor of the ETA armed
strugglE~ and praise some oE its actions. "Els Maulets" is coming closer to the
armed struggle, and some commandos have decided to rake up weapons immediately.
In this climate of radicalization, 11there is also tension. One sector, the
"political" sector of Els MauleCs, believes that the independence of the
Valencian Country can be obtained through mass actions and the political struggle.
This group favors the creation of a political structure similar to Herri Batasuna
for Valencia. The most radical group advocates the cr.eation of a closed, clanJes-
tine paramilitary organization which will form commandos, train t;hem and prepare
to begin tne armed struggle. .
The idea of blowing up the Franco statue in April of last year aggravated internal
conflicts, and the "militar.y" sector, the Valencian ETA, lett the organization Lo
Eorm an armed group, although it has not yet taken action.
The political sector, on the other hand, has formed an assembly. It is a radical,
pro-independence organization, in the manner of Herri Batasuna. Last 18 January at
~ a meeting held in the Valencian town of Perellonet, the old "Maulets" met with the
Communist Movement of the Valencian Country, the Workers Party, ~he Revolutionary
Communist League and the d'Esquerra Front, as well as other independence groups.
The resulting coalition intends to adopt L-he name "[lnitat Popular del Pais
Valc~ncia" [Popular Unity of the Valencian Country]. It rejects the constitution
and the Valencian Autonomy Statute, and some of its members openly favor self-deter-
mination, while others are For independence. In this context, the majority of the _
groups that signed the Perellonet document feel that the armed struggle of the
military "Els Maulets" and the political struggle of Popular Unity can complement
each other, as do the military ETA and Herri Batasuna.
- Copyright 1979: Informacion y Revistas, S.A.
8926
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