JPRS ID: 9587 WEST EUROPE REPORT

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• Content Type: REPORTS

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- JPRS L/9587
5 March 1981 ~ =
: West Eur~ e R~ o~t
p ~
CFOUO 13/81)
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~ ~PRS L/9587
5 N[arch 19 ~ 1
. WEST EUROPE REPORT
(FOUO 13/81)
CONTENTS
- THEATF.R FORCES
FED~RAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
'ST~Rr1' Reports on Nuclear Arms on FRG Territory
(Wolf. Perdelwitz; STERN, 19 Feb 81) 1
- FRANCE
Nuclear Deterrence, Hostage Population Policy Reviewed
(Serge I+lei.nberg; STRATEGIQUE, Oct-Dec 1980) 8
ENERGY ECONOMICS
ITALY
Milan To Convert to District Heating Within 2 Years
(~tarco Garzonio; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 10 Jan 81) 19
COUNTRY SECTION
FRANCE
PS, UDF Officials on Mitterrand, Giscard Election Strategy
(L'E;CPRESS, 17 Jan 81) 22
PCF Seen Disturbed by Mitterrar~d's Strength
(LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSIOtJ, 2 Feb 81) 29
PCT~ Election Strategy Seen Failing To Win Voters
(Jacques Roure; L'~.XPR~SS, 31 Jan 81) 31
- a - [III - WE - 150 FOUO]
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PCF Letting Intellectuals Leave Party
(Jean-Francois Gautier; VALEURS ACTU~LLES, 26 Jan 81).......... 33
'AFRIQUE-ASIE' Hits Giscard Stances on Af ghanistan, Chad
(~ditorial, Simon Malley; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 16 Feb-Mar 81)......... 36
PCF Dissident Daix Talks on Party Intellectuals
(Pierre Daix Interview; PARIS MATCH, 2 Jan 81) 40
Polish 'Goof' Seen Costing CGT Dearly
(Claude-Francois Jullien; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 2 Feb 81)..... 42
Briefs
~ Delpey Book Coming Out 44
ITALY
Demoskopea Poll on Attitudes Toward ~ol:ttic3.ans
(PANOItAMA, 26 Jan 81) 45
. PSDI Leader Urges Government Action on Domestic Issues
(Pietro Longo Interview; CORP.IERE DELLA SERA, 2 Jan 81).�.....� 50
'IL MONDO' Poll on Institutional Reform
(Roberto Ippolito, Paolo Passarini; IL MONDO, 9 Jan 81)........ 54
_ Craxi Interviewed About PSI Program for 1981
(Craxi Interview; IL MONDO, 9 Jan 81) 64
Budget Minister on Medium-Term Economic Plan
(Giorgio La Malfa Interview; CORRIERE DRLLA SERA, 2 Jan 81).... 70
Finance Minister on Crackdown on Tax Evaders
(Franco Reviglio Interview; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 6 Jan 81)..... 74
Temporary Halt to Wage Indexation Sugge~ted
(Paole Onofr.i; CORRIERE DELLA SERA, 20 Jan 81) 79
Briefs
ISTAT Data on Employment 82
- b - .
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THEATER FORC~S FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
'STERN' REPORTS ON NUCLEAR ARMS ON FRG TERRITORY
DW191309 Hamburg STERN in German 19 Feb 81 pp 30-34, 218
[Report by Wolf Perdelwitz]
[Text] Sergeant Fuch is actually not a man to be afraid of. However, he
has a submachine gun in his hand and four soldi~rs around him with guns
ready to fire. And in addition, he has "arrested me tamporarily." Unknown
to me I drove my car right into a secret Bundeswehr maneuver and its equally
secret headquarters on a sports field in the woods. The five soldiers placed
some barbed wire around the car to prevent me from fleeing or discovering
even more secrets. A policeman freed me 1 hour later.
One cannot miss the fact that the forests north of Ravensburg are full of
"Pershing 1-A" nuclear missiles of the Bundeswehr's missilP squadron stationed
in Landsberg on Lech. The medium-range missiles have a range deep into
Poland or Hungary, and an explosive strength up to 20 times that of the
Hiroshima bomb. Between the Eifel Mountains and the Niederrhein there are
also lots of German "Pershings" whenever the other of the two missile squadrons
moves from Geilenkirchen into maneuvers--without nuclear warheads, because
" they are under American supervision in peacetime.
Another 108 "Pershing 1-A" missiles are held by the U.S. 56th Field Artillery
Brigade with headquarters in Schwaebisch Gmuend. Part of these missiles is
in a state of "immediate readiness" and continuously ready to be fired from
open spaces in the wouds in southern Germany: they are on launch sites that
change almost daily in an area that is 160 kilometers long arid 80 kilometers
wide, reaching from the southern Palatinate to northern Swabia.
Captain Joe McGraw, the commander of such a battery,~said to STERN: "We can
ctiange our .fi~ring position several times a uay, and after 15 minutes we will
be ready for action again."
The Bundeswehr and the U.S. Army together within a few minutes can fire the
"Pershing" missiles concentrated in the Niederrhein and southern Germany at
the programmed targets in the GDR and the states of Eastern Europe. These
missiles have a nuclear explosive strength of about 36,000 kilotons. There-
after the laun~vhers can be reloaded. In the target areas no human being would
be alive anyway--in 1945 less than 20 kilotons suff iced for the Hiroshima
catastrophe.
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In addition, there are 512 nuclear warheads which can be fired deep into tt~e
Soviet Union from the four nuclear-powered submarines subordinated to the
NATO commander in chief .
~iut that was not enough for NATO, because every week the Soviet Union replaces
two of its almost 20-year-old meditm~-range missiles, aimed against Western
Europe, with the modern SS-20 missiles. Western politicians and the military
report almost miraculous things about the new weapons: their launching
installations are highly mobile and therefore hard to f ight, the pro~ectile
- carries up to three warheads with 600 kilotons destructive power each over a
distance up to 4,5000 [as printed] kilometers. Intelligence experts, however,
cannot confirm that. They mention ~ust one warhead taith probably 50 kilotons,
adding that the missile can be launched only from positions which have been
speci~lly prepared with concrete in advance. -
Referring to these SS-20, which were spotted long ago by satellites, NATO
decided on 12 December 1979 to equip Western Europe with new medium-range arms.
Their range of 2,500 kilometers will be great enough to threaten for the first
time from Western Europe not ~ust the allies of the USSR, but the Western
Soviet Union itself. NATO decided in favor of 108 missiles of the "Pershing 2"
type and ~i64 "cruise missiles," _
This "counterarming decision" simultaneously contained the offer to the Soviet '
Union to negotiate on the mutual limitation of inediuni-range missiles as soon
as the limitation of intercontinental missiles, negotiated with Moscow at that
time in the "SALT II" agreement, had gone into effect. Were these negotiations
to produce an agreement during the development and construction of the new arms,
NATO would be prepared to renounce the stationing of the new missi~:s and
cruise miss iles. _
This seemed to be a clear deal for most government chiefs of European NATO
states. Federal Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the discoverer of the "missile gap"
and spiritual father of the counterarming idea, achieved agreement a few days
aft~r the NATO decision at the SPD congress. But the figuring of the Europeans -
did not work, the signed SALT II treaty was discarded by the United States.
Th.e Soviets felt cheated. In addition, they saw the threatening NATO counter-
arming decision developing into a second nuclear front in Western Europe--and
a most dangerous une, The counterarming is part of a new nuclear strategy
of the United States wtlich became possible due to the progress the Americans
achieved in missile construction: the big cities of the Soviet Union will no
, longer be the first targets of a U.S. attack, but rather military installations
and political headquarters--in "surgical strikes." The new projectiles are
so accurate that they can hit one single buYlding thousands of kilometers
away.
Mi~itarily this means that it would be possible to launch a f irst surprise
strike, the feared "disarmament strike," which the Soviet Union could not -
follow up with a retaliatory attack on the United States. The "balance of ~
horror," the basis of 35 years of peace, would thus be lifted. Nuclear war
would become more possible. According to the logic of the military, this can
only mean for the Soviets their continuing their a.rmament in the future even
faster and in greater quantity.
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- So the screw is turning and counterarming 3s becoming a fact. The first 160
"cruise missiles" will come to Europe as of the fa11 of 1984, the remaining
304 by the summer of 1988,
'Counterarming Makes Nuclear War in Europe More Likely'
. The largest part will be supplied by the U.S. troops in Germany: some 160
- cruise missiles. Some 112 more will be deployed on two U.S. bases in Great
Britain, 96 in northern Italy and 48 each in Belgium and The Netherlands.
The 108 "Pershing 2" missiles will be stationed exclusively with U.S. troops
in the Federal Republic. The Bundeswehr will also be equipped with
"Pershir~g 2," but the pro~ectil~,s will have a limited range.
The deployment places for the medium-range missiles on German territory have
been picked long ago, But the Federal Government refuses to te11 about them.
It probably wants to avoid having individual names or place: become emotionally
loaded "trademarks" in the increasing discussion ab~ut nuclear armament in
Germany--~uch as Brokdorf and Gorleben in the dispute about nuclear energy.~
The Americans, whose soldiers will be at the trigger of the new nuclear arms,
are less reserved with r~gard to n~ming places. The "Persi~ing 2" wi11 be
delivered to the three brigades of the 56th Field Artillery Brigdde in
Neckarsulm, Schwaebisch Gmuend and Neu-ulm, where they will replace the old
missiles by the summer of 1985. Part of these cruise missiles will move
around again on clearings in the woods south of Heidelberg--ready to be
- launched in 5 minutes.
The "cruise missiles" are supposed to be stationed in five to not mo~;.e than
seven U.S, camps in Germany and on airports not belonging to the Bundeswehr,
where nuclear arms are already deployed. Three positions are thus known
already: the U.S, air fields at Ramstein, Hahn and Spangdahlem. For the
remaining positions other than the U.S, camp in Bremen, the two British airports
in Brueggen and Laarbusch are suitable,
With these new missiles the deadly record of the Federal Republic will be -
increased even more: It is already the area with the highest density of
nuclear arms in the world.
The Americans would like to refine this arsenal still further: the new U.S,
President, Ronald Reagan, had barely been inaugurated when his secretary of
defense, C~~sper Weinberger, announced that the neutron weapons would be trans-
ported to Germany as well. Their "advantage" is that their radiation kills
as many people as conventional nuclear weapons while not causing the
devastating destruction which the latter does.
The protests against nuclear armament are increasing again even if the p~liti-
cal debate over nuclear missiles and neutron bombs is only in the begi:nning
stage in the Federal Republic. Peace researcher and ex-general of the air
force Alfred Mechtersheime of the Starnberg Max-Planck Institute says,
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"Counterarmament makes nuclear war in Europe more probable." And Dieter Lutz
of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Po1~.cy at Hamburg University
proved that even now enough nuclear weapons on long-range missiles are stock-
- piled i.n Europe to "bomb" the Soviet Union back "into the stone age."
The antinuclear movement, which has been asleep since the times ot the Easter
marchers of the f ifties, received new impetus and has now also taken hold of ,
the SPD which threatens to become incapable of governing over this contro-
versial issue.
Since the Federal Government keeps the envisaged deployment locations secret
citizens' initiatives are forming everywhere in the country, as are resistance
groups. In the meantime, all the better guarded military bases are suspected -
of b eing nuclear depots, their locations being disseminated on dozens of
different maps. To go by what these citizens' ~aitiatives say, a nuclear
bomb is bound to be stored nearly behind.every bush in some regions.
~ But even without such exaggeration the map between the Baltic Sea and Bodensee
would be spotted like a child with smallpox if each nuclear weapons depot,
any command post and any military unit for nuclear weapons were marked with
a red dot. About half of these points--each by itself --would be good for a
destructive force of at least 1,000 kilotons.
A list which former U.S. Admiral Gene Larocque had compiled in his Washington
"Institute for Defense Information" contains more than 100 such spots in the
Federal Republic. He will publicize the list in April at a congress on nuclear
war in Europe" in the Dutch town of Groningen. Some copies are already circu-
lating in Europe.
German Starfighters Are Standing by Day and Night Ready for Mission--With
Nuclear Bombs
The member~ of some citizens' initiatives who once in a while bragged about
"their" nuclear depot in their vicinity are bound to end up r.acking their
bra~.ns if they stop to consider what the list from Washington really means.
Under the mission doctrines of the U.S, army for war and tactical nuclear
warfare--laid down in the field manuals FM 100-5 and FM 101-31--a11 nuclear
weapons and their command facilities simultaneously are first-rate nuclear
targets for the enemy. Armored units follow only in second place, concentra-
tions of conventional artillery in third, and minor headquarters, supply
lines or important bridges in fourth place.
The ].ist Eor th e U.S, admiral also contains the 42 battalions of the Bundeswehr
ground f.orces and the air force wings which, in "V case" ("defense case"--the
Bundeswetir term Eor war), are envisaged for nuclear combat. Some of these
units keep their nuclear weapo n~ ready for use all the time, day and night.
The four air force wings equipped with F-1.04 G"Starfighter" planes are equipped
with nuclear weapons under U.S. supervision even in peace. Eighteen of th e
36 planes of each wing have all technical facilities for dropping nuclear bombs.
_ They can easily be recognized in training flights: they are the only German
"Starfighter" planes which fly with four extra tanks under their wings.
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In eact~ wing, two planes eacl~ stand by ready for takeoff night and day, witti
preheated electronic equipment and warmed-up engines in special hangars at
the take-off and landing strips--a bomb of between 50 and 400 kilotons of
explosive force under their fuselage. Constantly in the neighborho~d of the
plane are two U.S. soldiers who have the code for activating the fuse of the.
bomb. German and American guards ~ointly guard the bunkers, surrounded by ~
double fences, and the airplanes, their guns loaded with one round in the
chamber. A security area around each "Starfighter" has been painted onto
the concrete flooring. The guards have orders to shoot immediately an~ at
anybody entering this off-limits space without a~thorization.
_ The two "Pershing" wings of their air force, too, have the real warheads on
some missiles even in peacetime. Both wings keep three missiles constantly
ready for launc~ing--three near Bodenfels in the Allgaeu region, three near
Arsbeck on the lower Rhine, These are small camps not even 250 meters in
length, surrounded by a firing range cleared of trees, double fence, external
lighting and television control, and secured by several guard tower;.
Anyone who serves there is badly off. A QRA ("quick reaction alert.") in the
past has lasted for 2 weeks before being relieved followed by 10 days of{.'.
Since the beginning of the year the change takes place weekly. D~ring that
_ period nobody is allowed to leave the small camp. Token alert is sounded
twice a day on the average, with this alert possibly lasting for several -
hours .
Everybody rushes to their combat positions with their equipment and loaded
arms. Part of them is on standby for 24 hours--called "limbo" by the soldiers.
The others, too, at best get hours of sleep each day--and this rarely in one
'piece.
The "Lance" Short-Range Missile Finds Its Targets, All of Them in Germany
The Americans in each German QRA camp who hold the c~de keys far activating
' the warheads have a more quiet life. During fine weather periods they lik~
to lie in the shade of the missiles, looking on as the Germans toi1. At times
small clou3s of hashish smoke climb up along the projectiles.
"Starfighter" "Pershings" are to bombard targets far away f.rom the border. The
other nuclear weapons of the BundeswEhr are to devastate only German soil:
"Lance" missiles, nuclear guns, and "Nike-Hercules" antiaircraft missiles.
More than 50 percent of the nuclear warh eads stationed in Germany is [word
indistinct] for them.
Each of the three German army corps has a"heavy artillery battalion" with six
launching carriages for the short-range "Lance" missile. They are stationed
in Wesel, Montabaur an~l Grossengstingen; another four tanks with launching
carriages are stationed in Flensburg, two Geilenkirchen. The U.S., Belgian,
and Dutch troops in West Germany, too, are equipped with "Lance" missiles.
These "Lance" missiles stationed in the Federal Republic alone can develop
more destructive force than all bombs and grenades of World I~Iar II lumped
to~ether--and all of the targets will be in Germany. -
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The Americans Are Always Present at Activation
The nuclear artillery of the Bundeswehr, too, preferably would blow up German
soil. In each of the 12 divisions--except for the airborne troops--six 203-~
millimeter tank howitzers are reserved for the "nuclaar rol_e" besides another
18 guns in each of the three corps. A11 told, several thousand nuclear
warheads are stockpiled in the Federal Republic, of which about 50 percent
are nuclear grengdes for the artillery. The greatly esteemed Stockholm peace
research institute Sipro estimates the total number at 10,000. Bonn
unofficially speaks of 5,000. According to data from Washington--�likewise
unof.ficial--2,500 of them are set aside for the Bundeswehr, S00 for the rest
of the European NATO troops, and 2,000 for the U.S. troops.
But there are members of the Bundeswehr general staff who assume that the
Americans are keeping at least another 2,000 nuclear warheads "on the side"
in their depots on German soil. Their suspicion was triggered by officers
club talk of U.S. officers: "If the Krauts (the Germans) do not use their
nuclear weapons we have plenty to cover their share as well."
~ Last year it was praisPd as a Western advance concession in disarmament that -
the Americans withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from the Federal Republic. This
does not, however, have anything to do with disarmamen t. So far it has been _
' necessary to maintain a supply of warheads in all possible magnitudes for any
we;,pon for any conceivable mission. Since it cannot be told in advance which
warhead will be needed in the end, a large part of the nuclear warheads had
to be stockpiled just in case--which possibly would never be needed. Wit'n
a new technology called "variation field" it is now possible to set each
warhead exactly for the desired purpose of use. This tends to save at least
one-third of the warheads--with the combat potential simultaneously being '
enhanced rather than decreased.
All nuclear weapons--barring the British airplane bombs at the Laarbruch and
Brueggen airfields--are the property of the United States. The weapons can be
activated only by Americans: two U.S. soldiers each per gun, missile or
- airglane, on constant assignment to each Bundeswehr nuclear unit, via radio
or telephone receive a group of letters or figures which they further code
in their "red suitcase" by means of the code on the spot--in the case of "Lance"
missiles, for example, to a four-digit code of figures.
Only when th is code is fed in does the power to use the warhead shift to the
Bundeswehr. As soon as war breaks out and the nuclear weapons are released,
the Federal Republic, which in 1954 abjured all nuclear weapons forever, by
the number of warheads then at its disposal will become the number three
nuclear power in the world,
How does a person feel who has "the finger on the trigg~r?" General Jobst von
Capelle of the lst German corps in Muenster: Any war i.s cruel. I cannot even
imagine the use. I also deem it impermissible1tto demana an answer to this
question now." And what does a battalion commar.der recommend whose nuclear
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targets are located somewhere in the area of Brunswick and Hannover?
Lieutenant Colonel Dinkelacker of the "Lance" battalion in Wesel told
STERN: "I do not believe that my soldiers devote much thought ::o it, uesides,
our targets are located much furthar beyond,.."
Later on in the officer's club he tells me musingly: "But after a11, Gei-many
is there as well, " namely, the GDF.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Gruner + Jshr AG & Co.
- CSO: 3103
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TIiEATFR FnRCES FRANCE
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, HOSTAGE POPULATION POLICY REVIEWED
Paris STRATEGIQUE in French No 8, Oct-Dec 1980 pp 63-76
[Article by Serge Weinoerg: "Hostage Population and France's Nuclear Deterrence"]
[Text] Serge Weinberg is the director of seminars at the .
Center for Defense Policy Studies in Paris. In 1977, he -
_ conducted a civil defense semit~ar at the ENA [National
School of AdministraCion). This article is an expanded
- version of a lecture given at that seminar. The author -
alone is responsible for the views expressed therein. _
France's nuclear strategy generates new discussions at regular intervals, These ~
recurrent debates are prompted by either technolegal developments or sudden
increased awar.eness of nuclear weapons. Questions about tactical nuclear weapor_s
in the mid-1970's have currently given way to the debate on the neutron bomb, and -
to a lesser extent, on civil defense.
1. Current Importance of the Debate _
Al1 these debates have a theological form: can the essential dogma, namely a
medium power's deterrence capability with the boCy of rules that ensure its cred-
ib ility,. be subjected periodically to additions, extensions, and ref inements with-
out causing the validity of its basic principle to be open to question?~1)
The protection of the civil population existed before World War II in the form of
passive defense. Approved as a priority matter in 1962 by tre Defense Council,
it eventually became actual law inasmuch as a decree dated 13 January 1965 assigned
responsibility for it to the Ministry of Interior.
Civil defense is thus not a new idea, far from it. But it now seems to have become
a topic of unusual current interest and importance. Some S or 6 yaars ago, it sur-
faced as a subject of study in certain "think tanks." For 2 or :i years now, when-
ever appropriations for the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, or General
National Defense Secretariat are examined during the parliamentary debate on the
national budget, several speakers inevitably question the government on its civil
defense goals and deplore the modest budgetary allocations for this policy which in
the final analysis no longer deserves to be called a policy. Following a recom-
_ mendation by th e Senate Finance Committee, civil def.ense equipment app~opriations
- were increased from 18.6 million francs in 1979 to 33.96 million francs--in program
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obligational authority--in 1980. These funds represent 0.38 percent of the mili-
Cary budget. These f igures alone are suff icient to underscore the faet that there
is actually no civil defer.se in France, ev.en though natural governmental inertia
does permit specific civil defense administrative structures to continue to func~
tion, but under itiadequate management and unadapted to actual needs.
Obviously ihe government has thus far made no clear decision on the problem of
protecting the civil population. Civi1 defense is a priority program bereft of
_ resourcas. It seems to be entrusted~to a few military officers and civil servants
whose apocaly.ptic con~ectures apparently arouse only themselves and, paradoxically
enough, find a sympathetic response solely among pacifist protesters.
Consequently ~ae consider it worth the trouble to dwell for a moment on tlie reasons
for the emerg~nce of a problem that ha.d been carefully hidden up to now. These
reasons appear to be varied in natuia:
a. Generally speaking,, the strategy of deterrence has not genetrated French sncial
consciousness as an absolutely patent truth. Discussed within ~he armed f.orces for
many years, and freq uently misunderstood by the verq persons who were assigned the
task of explaining it, this strategy gradually insinuated itself, yet quite imper-
fectly, into the reactions and strategic thinking of the administrat~ve and~'political
- establishment. But this gradual penetration happened at a time when the logicians
- of deter~ence were s omewhat cut off, for a long +time, from the political community
- whose reciprocal excommunieations have, until these past 5 years, rendered the con-
tribution to strategic thinking relatively feeble, thereby l~aving the specialists,
- mainly military, a clear field. A priority was thus naturally assigned Co anything
that could, on an essentially technical level, give deterrence its coherence and
= preserve its credib ility. Today, however, in our country, deterrence is a politi-
cal matter. We can now re~oice at seeing this or that politician~ Frhen it is not a
fe~~a others, either praise or criticize the' neutron bomb, or also ask for a sixth
y~ [nuclear] submarine. As a politica2 subject, deterrence is gaining general accept- ,
ance but is'liable to lose its soul in so doing if political pressures become more
intense. A politician, in a debate on defense policy, might probably find it hard
to argue in solemn terms: "No, the c ivil population must not be protected. In
so doing, France would be givi.ng the impression it was conceding that neterrence,
based on the concept of nonuse, may fai].. On the contrary, our defense posture
is sufficiently deterrent to make protection of the civilian population unneces-
sary. Any such pro tection would actually be an act of defeatism." Without yet
tackling the substantive problems, it must be acknowledged that a politician wlio
_ entertains some doubts today about civil defense's contribution to the policy
oi deterrence will have some difficulty expressing them.
The progress deterrence has made in people's minds has unquestionably h~d the posi-
tive effect of enabling them to ask new questions.. It has also raised the level
of argumentation a b it. After the comprehension phase, after acceptance of the
principle, comes the question: "And what if deterrence failed?" Psychology is
of major importance in the doctrine of deterrence; accordingly that doctrine cannot
e;,~ape, no more. than any other, the attrition of time that makes all concepts
short-lived in this day and age. It must periodically regenerate itself with new
technical or theoretical resources, if only to convince the enemy tha*. it is indeed
a vivid reality, eager to adapt itself to the strategic necessities of the moment.
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~ Yet these adaptations must not be allowed to be a mere "gesture" for d~mestic
purposes. }
b. In addition, a defense policy based mainly on dsterrence ~,s an exceedingly
centralized policy because the decisionmaking authority Selongs to a single entiity,
the technique to a few, the scientific knowledge to but very few. Hence protec-
tion of the civilian population could be the only aspect of that policy in which
continuity with thp nati.on may be found. Each ci~izen, hi�terto far removed from �
this abstract, ~emote, and terrifyiz~g weapon, feels he is a potential victim and
may have some difficulty resigning hi~self to being powerless because no one can
easily desert from a nuelear w~r. Has sufficient care and attention been given,
therefore, to the way each citizen could participate in that war?
c. The Soviet Union's c3~vi1 defense program is an additional good reason for the
- interest that should be ~aken in protecting the public. Despite th~ real difficul-
ties involved in assessing Che scopeo~ this Soviet program and especially the
efficiency of the organization that would have to implement it, it is, nevertheless,
possible at the pres9nt time to define the outlines of this effort.
The Soviet civil defense program was initiated more than ~SO years ago. It is
admir.istered by a special agency very closely linked to the party and rests upon
an organization of approximately 1(1~,000 persons. It is designed to protect both
peogle and the country's production facilities. The geographical location choseri
- for the latter at the very outset is based on seeurity requirements. A large-
scale program for dispersal of the Soviet production capacity has been successfully
completed. Evacuation, dispersal, and shelter plans for the population have been
developed. Information about these plans is ~distributed on a regular basis and
dri~ls are conducted periodically. Estimates of the effectiveness of this civil
defense system vary, but it can be assua~ed that 60 to 90 percent of the USSR�s
' civilian population,~2) a total of 150 million persons, cou.ld be protected against
radiation effects and weak overpressures. The annual cinil defense budget has
increased sharply since 1970 and is currently estimated to be in excess of 5
- billion francs. ~
What is the possible significanee of this Soviet effort? In a11 3~ikelihood, it is
motivated mainly by reflexes stimulated by the immense devastation of World War II
_ and the 17 million dead who taught the Soviet Union that cost of human life as
World War I had taught France. But beyond this "historical" reaction, and without
' dwelling any further on the reasons for this choice, we can but note the effecCs
of this poliey: it tends�to remove the Soviet hostage population from the interplay
= of deterrence and render that play partly inoperative, unless the number and
effectiveness of strategic weapons are further increased. This destabilizing
action probably has no effect on the dialogue with the United States because.the
number of weapons the latter can deploy, in spite of the limitations imposed by
SALT agreements, would enable it to inflict damage which the Soviet Union still
deems unacceptable. But what effect does it have on a medium power like France
whose financial resources limit its number of delivery systems an~ nuclear warheads,�
thereby precluding it from threatening to "vitrify" the USSR's whole terr itory
in an effective manner? It,would defin.itely�seem that protection of the Soviet
_ population would partly neutralize deterrence of the strong by the weak by giving
an advantage to surface area, to resources allocated or allocatable to defense,
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civil or not, and an extra advantage to authoritarian regimes capable of imposing
excess;ve defense costs an thzir economy and special restraints on their people.
Soviet civil defense policy is aimed at destroying the atom's equalizing power,
or "compensating" power according to General Pointer.E3~ Above all, however, it
appears to sign~fy that Soviet l.eaders consider nuclear war to be not only think-
able but possible, and that perhaps they do not recognize the language,.the
code of deterrence,.
d. The incorporation of tactical nuclear weapons into Fren~h strategy has now
made an exchange of nuclear blows conceivable, particularly alon~ the national
border; accordingly this has most likely generated an awareness of the need to
provide protection for civilians who would be exposed to the effects of this
warning strike. The yield and relatively short range of the Pluron missiles
actually preclude any a3surance that the French people will not be vulnerable to
radiation effects.
e. The last rea~on for the current interest in the civil defense debate lies no
doubt in the expansion of the French nuclear power program. Long-time advocates
of protection of the population are thus put~ting Cwo very different kinds of risks
in the same category, but are thereby creating an ambivalence about such protection
that is likely to justify its necessity much more effectively.
2. Civil Def�nse, Deterrence of the Strong by the Strong, Deterrence of the Strong
by the Weak
But what basically is ~he problem? The Senate Information Committee's recent
report prepared by Messrs Bonnefous and Marcellin flatly concluded that France
had to initiate the civil defense program it currently laeks. But the reasons
the two rapporteurs advanced in support of their conclusion do not clearly bring .
_ out th e problem's strategic dimensions.and consequently.are not directly convinc-
ing .
In actual fact, the main question that must first be answered is: What does a
civil defense policy contribute to a medium power's deterrence?
This question is so formulatedthat its first effect is to void any comparisons
with European countr.ies that have ~implemented an active civil defense policy, the
magnit ude of which, nevertheless, dese~ves mention: Swi~zerland, Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden.~4) The civil defense e~fort in these countries, whether they are
neutral or members of NATO, is fully justified by their "exposure" to a nuclear
_ strike they could not avo~d because the~ lack the means, and likewise to a con-
ventional attack, because the absence of national deter�rent forces makes their vul-
nerability to these two forms of aggression conceivable.
The U. S. civil defense program seems to be quite largely 3etermined by the desire
to retain stz�at~gic parity with the Soviet Union. The reorganization of the Ameri-
can civil defei~se administrative machinery and the 5-year program submitted in
1979 by President Carter to the Senate where it was cut in half, are a direct
response to the Soviet Union. But.the United States starts this "shelter race"
with a severe handicap inherent in its democratic status and the liberal character
of its econom3c system. It has not yet been able to plan any measures for protect-
ing its industrial capa~ity.
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As long as there is no glaring imbalance, the "shelter race" readily fits into the
escalation strategy. ~lithin the strategic parity established.by the SALT ag'ree-
ments--which include no provision on civil defense--the placing of populations in
shelters provides an additional echelon in rhe managment of the crisis by permitting
both a~lversaries to signal each other that they are prepared to go all the way~
inasmuch as they are placing their populations underground. From this standpoint,
- protecting tt~e eivilian population appears to strengthen deterrence by furnishing
a partial answer to the "contemporary strategy's ma~or difficulty whieh lies in
the fact that the threat of retaliatory attacks on cities tends to lose its psy-
chological credibilit proportionately with any gains made in its physical or tech-
nical credibility."~5~
But insofar as it shields~target populations from the exchange of potential nuclear
strikes, protection is destabilizing~6) for the same reason antiballistic missile
(ABM) defenses were before the SALT I agreements. In fact, civil defense and
ABM's have the same purpose, namely to deprive the nuclear strike of any effect.
The E1BM's operate at the fi~st strike level by destroying incoming missiles, civil
, defense at the retaliation capabili.ty level by shielding the target.
Civil defense thus appears ta be fundamentally ambiguous in its relations with
deterrence in that it strengthens the credibility of the threat while removiTig
its object. Such ambiguities are not rare in the other questions raised by
- deterrence, but few of them appear capable of challenging~the validity of the
very principle of the deterrent balance which has made it possible to maintain
peace in Europe for the past 30 years.
- It ddes seem,.however, that civil def~nse preparedness can have destabilizing
effect~ only if the Un~.ted ~tates Fver has the reeling that the Sov~iet Union's
effort has sueceeded in g3ving a large ma~arity of its population real, chances
of survival; that the arms ceil~ng imposed on both partners would preclude inflict-
ing unacceptable damage, and that this conjunction could permit the Soviet Union to
expect to gain more than it loses. The absence of any very precise data on this
subject will always give this assessment an impressionistic tonality. This lack of
precision is the rule in any politico-strategic analysis. But the subsisting 4ues-
tions are fundamen tal: Are Western officials able to seriously accept the use of
_ civil defense as a strategic means and not as a simple precaution? Are we really
sure that the Soviet.Union speaks the language of deterrence? Is it in the USSR's
strategic interest to speak that language or rather~is it not in its interest to
leave a margin of indefiniteness exist on this point?
France's interest in developing a program for protection of the population appears
in a somewhat different ligh~. A medium power's deterrence rests upon that country's
ability to infli~t, in spite of limited �resources, damage that the enemy considers
unacceptable. If the enemy disperses its population and thereby increases the
effozt the medium power has to make to acquire an optimum retaliation capability,
Chus perhaps imposing standards that are beyond the medium pawer`s~means, it can-
not be inferred therefrom that the med~ium power has to reci~procate and protect its
people and make their survival possible. We already know the medium power's limita-
tionse A medium power cannot deprive an enemy superpower of the means of mortally
wounding it: its small territory and modest resources make this objective unattain-
- able against the superpower's tremendous destructive capacity. At most, a
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large-scale civil defense effort would make it necessary for the enemy to intensify
its action against the mediiun power's terzitory, thereby certainly inflicting even
- much heavier damage which, however, could then nullify any hope of gain for the
enemy. On the other hand, a relatively effective civil protecCion program--one
that would provide minimal protection against a counterforce strike as well a~ an
ant:~cit ies ~t~ike--would help reduce the medium power's casualty rate to a very
apprec~.able extent .
Three conclusions emerge from this rapid analysis:
a. The hostage population concept is inoperative for the weak power in a strategy
deterrence of the strong by the weak.
b. Apart from the fact that a very large civil defense program may well be beyond
the med ium power's means, it ean occasion a st~ike of much greater magnitude against
which it offers no absolute guarantee.
c. A relatively effective protection program se~ms consistent with the balance
of the medium power's resources and interests.
The second matter which appears to warrant exploration is that of our deterrence's
credibility. Can deterrence lastingly remain Che al.l-or-nothing, that moment of
absolute tsuth beyond which no thought has been given? As a.matter of fact, every-
thing is happening as if people's minds had stopped thinking of anything beyond
the apo calyptic vision on which deterrence is fo~mded, deeming it useless to
pursue th~ir reasoning any burther because that would interfere with the deter-
rent effectiveness of the apocalypse. Keepin~, the unthinkable unthinkable appears
to have become an.end in itself. But just as the principle of deterrence is
based on anachronistic thinking, so may the credibili~y of deterrence be strengthened
by the possibility of imagining the unthinkable.~~)
The strength of. the nuclear myth is, in fact, such that it may inh ibit the person
who will, when the time comes, have the responsibility of opening fire with
nuclear weapons. Not only is the~e nothing to be gained from making nuclear
~ weapons "commonplace" by likening their employment Co that of conventional weapons,
but also anything that increases the plausib3.lity of the use of strategic nuclear
weapons strengthens the chances for peace.
Hence the "descent into shelters" may help in managing the crisis by demonstrating
our de termination.to go all the way, and by having the derivative effect of re-
ducing particularly the massive and disorganized exoduses, the uncontrollable
reactio ns of the population, actions that are liable to make the government's room
to maneuver even narrower.
_ 3. W'h at Prorection for the Population of France?
What does protection of its civilian population impl.y for France?
First of all, a suitable civil defense warning system. The Civil Security
Directorate estimates the siren network currently covers only 55 percent of the
population. Even if the remote-control system that activates all sirens--through
six general warning centers linked to 42 warning dissemination offices and 4,000
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sirens--were completed, there would still be need to provide coverage for the urban
popuation and replace defective equipment. The tota]. cost of this first pro-
gram would be 28.3 mi111on francs (1 980 estimate). Modern communications equipment
could provide effective coverage of rural areas where the cost of coverage by sirens
would be exhorbitant. 'I'he radioactive fallout warning telephone system (~STARR)
would use the automatic capabilities of electronic switching systems. STARR could
be employed for various types of d is asters. Its estimated 1980 cost was 30 million
francs. Capital expenditures for merely the warning system--undoubtedlp the least
expensiv~ aspect of civil defense- -would represent approximately twice the amount
of current annual civil defense appropriations.
Protection itself poses more comp"lex problems. The French policy established in
1964~8~ ca11s for keeping the civil populations in place. This policy is no doubt
prompted by the desire to avoid a massive exodus fxom urban centers, a situation
that is liable to disorganize the country's operation for a very long time. In
theory, it would be desirable .if those civilians living near key military centers
_ and in the largest urban centers-- th ere are 103 such centers each with more than
103,000 residents; they constitute priority targets for the enemy--could be
"unlocked," in other words, sent to nearby less densely popu~lated areas. This
desirable "unlocking" would necessi~ate highly elaborate planning inasmuch as it
would require each resident of a me tropolis to have a"second address," a veritable
emergency country residence prepared to receive him. The complex~ity of this plan-
ning which would h ave to incorpora t e inter al ia, such matters as routing, traff ic
' control, resupply, and security.in the abandoned areas, appears to be unattainable
in the immediate future in view of the civil defense administration's present
res~urces.
~1t this stage, it is essential, in fact, to recognize the physical limits of our
ambitions. The tight budget is one such constraint. We shall discuss it later
when examining the cost of shelter programs. But while the tight budget might .
eventually be appreciably~ "loosened"-~-the present modest appropriations would permit
this without any ~real difficulty--it is absolutely necessary to give the administra-
tive instrument the means of implementing this policy. The scant interest shown
- to date in civil defense has not made it possible to give competent agencies the
image and resources that would ens ure effective action.~9)
Nevertheless, a special effort has been made these past 3 years to strengthen the
, General National Defense Secretaria t a~tached to the office of the prime minister,
and actions are currently being taken in favor of prefectural defense offices. If
it is acknowledged that civil defense complements deterrence and eontributes, to
its credibility, it will be necessary not only to make a financial effor~t but also
to define a policy for administrat ive procedures. Without such a policy, the new
rules and regulations, inevitably t ranslated into plans, surveys, and circulars,
_ will rapidly experience the same fa te as most of their counterparts. In short,
they wi11 be scrupulously pigeonhol ed with no further action.
While the aforementioned "unlocking " solution is theoretically desirable, it is
hardly realistic with our present resources being what they are. Coasequently,
the only remaining solution is to p rovide local shelt~rs for the civil population.
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' To be quiek abo~it it, there are two types of shelters: those designed to withstand
high over�pressures exerted by the detonation's shock wave, and tho~e designed 'co
ptotec.t persons from radioactive effects (radiation effecta and ra~ioactive dust).
- The first kind would cope with two types of threat: the anticities strike, and the
counterforce strik~ for peopl~ living close to military targets, near Brest, for
example, which is opposite Ile Longue [nuclear submarine base].
The second kind of shelter would protect all of the civil population against radio-
active fallout produced by one or the other of the two abov~-mentioned strikes.
The first kind of st~elter requires a highly specialized type of construction. As
for the second kind, to quote from the prime minister's 18 Mareh 1964 directive,
"the dangers from radioactive fallout are among those that can be--at a certain
distance from ground zero--couatered by means that are normally available to all."
- At Che present time, this protection would be effectively provided by existing
shelters, and particularly basements, located more than 2.6 kilometers away from
ground zero of a megaton bomb. '
There is no question that protection capable of withstanding rather high overpres-
sures would be desirable for the entire population, but this possibility is apparently
not realistic at this time for financial reasons.
In 1977, the Public Safety Directorate completed a summary cost analysis of a civil-
ian protection program.
Following are some of the results of that analysis (1977 figure).
ITEM~ COST
Sur~ey of fallout shelters in }.00 departments at 150,000
francs per department 15 million
Preparation and equipping of fallout shelters, accommodating
55 a~illion persons at S00 francs per person 27.5 billion
Increased cost for shelters withstanding blast pressures of: '
a. 0.14 bar: for 4.2 million persons at 280 francs per person 1.176 billion
b. 0.35 bar: for 4.2 million persons at 870 francs per person 3.654 billion
c. 1 bar~l~~: for 1.2 million persons at 4,900 francs per person 5.88 bi1l:Lon
Relief centers withstanding pressure of 3.5 bars: 150 centers
at 11.16 mill.ion francs per center 1.674 billion
Shelters each accommodating 500 persons anu withstanding pres-
sure of 1 bar: 1,000 shelters at 2.94 million francs per
shelter 2.94 billion
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100-bed hospitals withstanding prr.ssure of 1 bar: 1,000 hospitals
at 2.94 million francs per hospital 2.94 b illion
~
GRAND TOTAL 45.779 billion
The Senate Finance Committee estimated the updated 1980 cost of this program to be
90 billion francs.~ll) -
s
This cost analysis rests upon one basic eatablished fact, namely that shelters -
currently exist which with some slight upgrading or modification--insulation,
- obturations, and ventilation facilitiea--can provide effective protection against -
radioactive fallout. The same is true of wholly underground basements in dwell-
- ings. In many cases, no installation of underpinning is necessary, unless the
shelters are to be made capable of withstanding overpressures.
A regulation, ~amely, the nonrescinded decree of 24 February 1939, would, if -
enforced, s erve to obtain the following minimal cha*acteristics of a shelter pro-
viding protection against radioactive fallout and overpressures below 1 bar:
a. Walls and ~eilings of such construction as to withstand collapse of the build-
ing;
b. Dense enough t~ prevent heat, smoke, and carbon monoxide from entering the _
shelter in the event of fire;
c. A radiation shielding factor of at least 40 and of 100 or higher if possible.~12)
In the absence of strict enforcement of this regulatiun whose increasedcost has been
estimated to be 2 to 7 percent of the construction cost, empiricism is called for
in evaluating the means currently at our disposal. Under a computerized program
developed by the Public Safety Dir~ectorate's Standing Group on Emergency Measures
Planning, a survey of existing shelters was begun in 1978. Because of insufficient
- funds, it h as been completed in only seven departments, but is scheduled to be
completed in ].7 other departments in 1980.
The present status of the national budget reali.stically precludes expecting any
large allocation of funds to a shelter program. The Senate Information Comm~ittee's
report atates 3 billion francs would be required over a 15 year period. This
requirement is not likely to be reflected in conerer.e terms in the proposed 1981
budget.
- We must conclude, therefore, that, if the need for this program is acknowledged,
it will be implemented over an exte~ded period of time and will require systematic
help from private financing. It is essential, moreover, that the decree of
24 February 1939 be really enforced and possibly updated.
This ~ffort would be meaningless, however, if it is not combined with an effective
p~bY'ic information program. The fear of making the public afraid only results in
fostering the spread of the most fantastic and erroneous 3.nformation. There is �
currently a unity of views on France's defense. This makes the task of keeping
citizens informed much easier, as shown by the experience with the expansion of the
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nuclear power program. This public information effort is indispensable to implemen-
- tation of a protection program that would very likely be totally ineffective withou
it. The facilities for distributing such information exist. This first ges~ture can
b~ the occasion ta signify the profound agreement which exists between the coutltry
and its leaders on the defenee of France.
- This analysis undoubtedlp leaves us With a sense of frustration in that civil
defense preparedness does not oPfer, far from it, that 100 percent assurance which
- would enable us to secure ourselves against any form of aggresaion or retaliation.
Even though relatively effective, such security seems, nevertheless, to be beyond
the means of France's present budget. And that should be enough to daom it.
' Yet, because of its contribution to the credibility of deterrence, it would seem
wise to install the minimal administrative machinerq and provide incentives that
~ would make th3s protection program achievable, even if it has to be stretched out
over a very long period. Public information, the combination of coercion and incite--
men t should create a degree of dynamism that would appreciably improve the current
situation. But the pursuit of these even modest goals demands increased political
awareness and a clearly explained choice.
FOOTNOTES
1. See L. Poirier's article, "Letter to Claude Le Borgne on a Few Strategic
= Difficulties," STRATEGIQUE No. 4, 1980.
2. In 1970, aecording to UN statistics, the Soviet Union had approximately 125
cites with a population of more than 100,000.
3. Lucien Poirier, "Des Strategies Nucleaires," Hachette, 1977, p 37.
4. For these countries th at do not have to bear the cost of building a nuclear
force, civi.l defense's share of the military budget, though variable, is sharply
higher th an France's 0.84 per~ent in 1980: Switzerland: 6.57 percent in 1980;
Sweden: 2.26 percent in 1980; Denmark: 4.8 percent in 1978; and Norway: 4.1
percent in 1978.
5. Lucien Poirier, "Des Strategies Nucleaires," 1977, p 365.
6. See W. Panofski's article, "Mutual-Hostage Relationship Between America and
Russia," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1973.
7. "No line of argument can sufficiently explain the contradictory attitude that
consists in staking everything on deterrence, onlyto then ignore what would happen
if deterrence failed." A. Legault and G. Lindsey "Le Feu Nucleaire" [Nuclear
Fire],Seuil, p 143.
8. Prime minister's directive of 18 March 1964 on informing and protecting civil-
ians in wartime against the effects of radioactive �allout.
9. See ENA seminar on "Civil Defense," 1977, pp 6-11 and 25-31, and Senate Infor-
mation Report No 236, 1980, pp 59-69.
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10. 1 bar = pressure of 1 kg/cm2. ~
Table of Protection Effectiveness at 1 Bar
Explosion yield Minimal distance Minimal distance for
for surface burst air burst, height of
burst: 3300 meters
1 kiloton 250 m 350 m
2~0 kiloton 680 m 950 m
500 kiloton 2.06 1~ 2.78 km '
1 megaton 2.5 km 3.S km
11. The overall cost also includes capital expenditures for the warning system
and emergency relief facilities (relief columns, UISC) that represent a very small
part of this total (SO million francs),
12. (rays)
(40 or 100)
COPYRIGHT: 1980, STRATEGIQUE
8041
CSO: 3100
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ENERGY ECONOMICS ITAI'Y
MILAN TO CONVERT TO DISTRICT HEATING WITIiIN 2 YEARS
Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 10 Jan 81 p 10
[Article by Marco Garzonio: "'Teleheat': Free Linkups and 20 Percent Savings on -
Oil Heating"] ~
[Text] By the end of next year, houses and offices in the eastern part of Milan
will be connected to the district heat distribution net which will convey re-
claimed heat (now no longer wasted) from the Tavazzano and Cassano d'Adda elec-
tric plants. So as to have no doubts regarding the veracity of the proposal,
the directors of the companies involved in the pro~ect ann~unced, in a promo-
tional manner, the price offered to the individual: district heating will cost
40 lire per "unit of ineasure of home calories," and link up to the network will
be performed without fee.
A comparison that ough~ to convince even the most skeptical of the whole plan's
benefit is brought forth by the planners themselves: today, citing early-1981
prices, that "calorie unit" using heating oil, costs 50 lire in fuel alone.
Ranging from the family budget to the co~aunity budget, the data on savings in
energy, furnished by the technicians, provide an impressive picture: during the
startup phase, the savings will be about 700 million tons of oil per year, which
translates into 300 billion lire in the balance of payments.
The sense of optimism (which is labeled as reality by the planners), is one of
the main highlights of the pro3ect, which is feverishly being brought to a con-
clusion for the region by the technicians of "Lombardia Risorse." As is known,
the region commissioned "Lombardia Risorse, a public participation company, to
come up with an energy savings plan. The company replied with a long-range plan
to "teleheat" 3.65 million inhabitants (over a third of the whole of Lombardy),
of which 3.2 million are located in the Milan metropolitan area. These days are
the days that mark the passing from plans to concrete technical and financial
measures. The deadline is getting nearer: by January, Region President Guzzetti _
and Mayor Tognoli must go to Brussels t~ obtain funds from the EEC, funds which
have been earmarked before the holidays for the district heating program in Lombard~.
Phase One--The completion of the first ma~or slice of the net, beginning at Milan-
East is explained by the technicians referring to ob3ective conditions: it is in
that part of the city that the two plants of Tavazzano and Cassano are located.
The heat generated by their equipment and brought to M31an via pipeline is capable
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of satisfying the heating needs of 78d,000 inhabitants by the Tavazzano plant
and 390,000 inhabitants by the Cassano plant. The first section to be completed
will be *_he pipeline frameworks which cannect the plants producing the heat to
the city's pumping plants. _
ria a � AFFori ~ ~~~2 cam
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Key:
1. Electric plant
2. Ma.in hospital
3. Armed forces
4. Central station
5. Pumping plants
6. Zones not linked to distric t heating system
Again, to the east, are located the o trer plants, smaller in size, from which to
recover heat: they are SISAS, an ent er~rise in Pioltello and the AMNU furnace on
Via Zama. From these, 115,000 and 20,000 inhabitants will be servic~d respective-
- ly. Another smaller plant, located north-northeast is the Pirelli unit, which
will meet the needs of 25,000 inhabitants.
The initial phase of the recovery for Milan-East and the construction of the dis-
trict heating network (with links with the more isolated parts of Pavia, Mantova,
Brescia and Cremonaj will require 9 years, from 1981 Co 1989, to complete. The
financing needed for the pro3ect totals 897 billion lire, spread out over the
- years: 20 bi~lion this year, 113 in 198?., 208 (1983), 149 (1984), 159 (1985),
155 (1986), 62 (1987), 26 (1988) and 3 in 1989.
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West- 'I'he inhabitants of the zone west of the city and its hinterland will have
to be patient. Objectivel.y speaking, no work can begin there for some years.
Plans, in fact, call for work to begin there during a second phase, namely from
1986 to 1992. For these other pro~ec~s, a portion of the more than 1 trillibn
~ire will be set aside out of a total estimate of 2 trillion lire to be used _
for the entire district heating program for all of Lombardy.
In the western part of the city (where 1.61 million inhabitants will be serviced),
- at the present time there are only a few plants able to produce enough heat to
make recovery worthwhile. Up to the present, the experts have been able to focus
only on the Turbigo electricity producing plant, which is not that near the city
to begin with.
Center--Some zones in the historic cenCer of the city will be left out of the
district heating program. Basically this involves the older sections of the city,
with clusters between Porta Romana, Porta Vittoria and Porta Venezia and a strip
which, from Ticinese, extends to Garibaldi and Farini.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 Editoriale del "Corriere della Sera" s.a.s.
9209
CSO: 3104
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COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PS, UDF OFFICIALS ON MITTERRAND, GISCARD ELECTION STRATEGY
Paris L'EXPRESS in French ].7 Jan 81 pp 63-66
[Debate between Lionel Jospin--Socialist Party--and Michel Pinton--French Demo-
cratic Union--mediated by Roland Cayrol: "Giscard-Mitterrand: Who Will Win?"]
[Text] Autumn 1980: on~ could look in vain for someone in
the political world who would be ready to bet more than a
couple of sous on the defeat of Valery Giscard d'Estaing in
the presidential election. The predictions are overwhelming,
to such a point that the Giscardian strategists are worrying
abo ut it: the electorate of rhe head of state might lose its -
sense of urgency. January 1981: everything is changed. As
they say at the racetrack, Francois Mitterrand is "coming up
- fast." He is pressing hard, catching up, and even overtaking
Giscard in one of the polls.
Meanwhile, two new political facts have taken place. First, _
Mitterrand has overcome the Rocard phenomenon. Unofficially he
has been a candidate since 9 November, and he will be so officially ~
on 25 January. Next, on 30 November in the second round of seven
leg3slative byelections, the PS jSocialist Party] progresses _
witfi four wins instead of two losses, whereas the UDF [French
Democratic Union] suffers a setback with no wins in two outings.
How does one interpret these movements of public opinion? To
answer, we have arranged a~meeting, with the part3cipation of
~ political analyst Raymond Cayrol, director of political studies
at the Louis Harris Institute, between Michel Pinton, the
general deputy of the UDF, and Lionel Jospin, the national
secretary of the PS.
L'EXPRESS: Even now, after a few po11s and some preliminary elections, some
believe that Giscard can be beaten. Is this your opinion?
Michel Pinton: Wait and see if he will be a candidate. That said, the outcome
of the election is not a certa3.nty for anyone, and it never has been. The last
byelections do not reveal anything to us as to what will happen in the
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presidential election. In a byelection, one can forgo all restraints without
risk. It has no forecasting value, either in the future vote counts, or in the
outcome of the presidential candidates. Everyone has forgotten that there were
some very bad legislative byelections for the ma~ority in September 1978: they
followed our success in the general elections by 6 unnths and preceeded our
success in the European elections by 8 months. To compare elections of a different
nature and stake has no meaning, it is propaganda.
As to the polls, they appear to me, especially at the present time, to indicate
the anxiety and perplexity of public opinion: how are we going to respond to the
worldwide economic difficulties? It is neither change nor continuity that the
French will seek in April 1981, but definite assurance regarding their anxieties.
Lionel Jospin: In the current trend reversal, which appears to me extremely clear
- --Glscard's decline, Mitterrand's rise--the November byelections played an
important part. The defeat of the UDF candidates and the upsurge of the PS have
revived a dormant idea: Giscard can be beaten.
- In the past, too much importance has b een given to the poll s. As long as
Francois Mitterrand was not the Socialist Party candidate, they could not give a
realistic picture of what the ratio of forces would be at the decisive moment.
The closer the election comes, the more one observes--what could be anticipatad,
even when too many people on the left were pessimisCic--that the struggle will be
extremely close,
Finally, there is of ten a lag in the time between reality (unemployment, inflation,
inequalities...) and the perception the people have of it. The state of
- discontent, which was like a state of suspension in a liquid, is no doubt in the
process of "settl ing" and crystallizing. To the detriment of President Giscard,
who is more and more candidate Giscard.
L'EXPRESS: Can the gaiil.list electorate "change direction?"
M. Minton: Since De Gaulle fias departed, the gaullist electorate has dispersed.
Let us speak rather of the RPR (Rally for the Republic) electorate. In the first
round it wi).l be divided between several ma~or3ty candidates, but when the tim2
for choosing a so ciety arrives, it wi11 choose on its own accord, as in 1974 and
1978, the candidate of freedom, It cannot be attracted by Mitterrand, the
permanent adversary of General de Gaulle and his legacy.
My only fear is that the RPR candidates will be led to a rhetoric so excessi.ve
during the campaign that they will contribute to turning away some of their
constituents from this natural cho3ce. The blossoming RPR candidacies, and the
lengths to wfi ich their intense albeit ridiculous competitio n could lead them,
can only be detrimental to the majority.
L~EXPRESS: And dangerous?
~ M. Pinton: They could be.
L. Jospin: There are two gaullisms, The gaullism of 1945, partaking in the great
structural reforms, contributing w~ith the socialists and the communists to the
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restoration of French independence; and the conservative gaullism of 1958 which
runs into the Giscard regime. It is difficult to know which message the gaullist
electorate will choose to follow. Some recent polls allow one to believe that
at least one-fifth of this electorate could ch~ose Mitterrand.
Twelve years after the general's departure, there is no "captive" gaullist
electorate. Especially because the RPR leaders are compelled, for their own -
political survival, to remain aloof from the head of state. Besides, their
constituents are also undergoing the crisis.
- M. Pinton: The choice is not between the crisis and somPthing else which is not
- the crisis . If you were in power, you would also ha~~e tc: take into account
unemployment, inflation, and the foreign trade deficit.
L'EXPRESS: Would a possible Mitterrand victory be above all the victory of an
alternative policy to that of Giscard, or above all the victory of the malcontenr_?
M. Pinton: I have the impression that for Jospin it w~uld be above all a victory
of those voting against.
, L. Jospin: One cannot arbitrarily separate the negative motives, the fear of -
unemployment, anxiety about the future, wfiich are the reasons for gett3ng rid of
Giscard and the positive reasons which make us want a new policy, The positive
aspect will win over 3f we are capable of transforming the reject~on reaction one
finds in a movement of publ3c confidence into the possibilitq, for a soc3alist
president, of effectively coping with the so far great unresolved problems.
Roland Cayrol; Only the socialist wavering these past months has let us forget
the electoral polarizat3on and the leftist progress~.on of the past 10 years,
~ which are expla3ned by socio~ogica:. reasons. Since the uncertainty about the -
socialist candidate has been lifted, tfie left has regained its normal level, and
the great fact3ons have resumed their regular outl3nes.
- But, beyond the sociology, a fringe of the electorate is defining itself much
more according to political cr3teria and is choosing at leas~ as much "against~'
as "for." This is where the gaullists' attitude is interesting, since, being
_ very close to the Giscardian faction, in the past they have had a tendency to
keep themselves away politically. Already in 1974, about 15 percent of the
Chaban-Delmas voters voted for M3tterrand 3n the second round.
M. P3nton: Mitterand r_ecently declared that he could on1.y be elected if he
obtained at least 22 percent of the first-round votes. Granted. Tn the second
round, the communist votes, estimated today at 16-17 percent, plus those of the
lesser candidates of the extre,me left w311 not be enough, He would still nead
many other votes such as the RPR to succeed. In other words, to convene an odd -
coalition of voters who are not, if one bel3.eves those who are speaking for them,
close to agreement on anything.
I understand we11 Mitterrand~s strategy: in the present circumstances, h3s best
chance is to lead a low-key, catch~all campaign. He can only be elected by
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accideiit, on a vague platform which will not turn away those voters with
- opposing ideas. If he is involved in a highly visible debate on precise topics,
we will then see the contradictions of his candidacy explode.
L. Josptn: I am not so sure that Giscard cares that much for the limelight. As
- for r_he rest, who is speaking of a coalition? There is no ownership of the
elect~rates. We ~;re not addressing ourselves to the party leaders. The presidency
of tne republic is the only power in France which has a unitary character.
M. Pinton: I was speaking of a co alition of votes, not a coalition of the
political staffs.
L. Jospin: Taking into account the policy you are conducting, a majority o.f the .
French through their vote can benefit by change. If they do it by electing a
socialist president, I do not see how you can arbitari'ly declare that their votes
are contradictory.
- L'EXPRESS: Can one foresee what the communist voters will do?
L. Jo spin: Faced with inconsistent instructions from the PC [Communist Party]
leadership in the No~rember byelections, the communist voters systematically
chose the Union of the :eft. We are no longer in 1978 at the time of the
legislative elections: the rift in the left has now been in ex3stence for 3 and
1/2 years. The voters, including the communists, have begun to become accustomed
to this situation. The leadership of the PC has not succeeded in convincing its
voters and its militants that we "turned to the r3ght." In 1981 you will no longer
have the shock of rupture to help you, as in 1978.
M. Pinton: No, in 1978 you still had not really suffered the shock to which you
refer. The communist voters voted massively for the socialist candidates. This
time, the deterioration of the PC-PS relations will be much more painful to the
French. Especially because it will not be a question of a protest vote as in the
byelections, but the selection of the ~man who will d3rect French policy. On what
_ great alternatives are the PC and the PS in agreement today? None.
L. Jospin: In 1978, the dynamics of the first round were broken, not the overall
balance. If a majority decides in favor of the socialist candidate in 1981, that
will cre.a;.e a new dynamic and will ~mean that the conduct of change in France is
entrust~d to the Socialist Party. Tt will thus be around the great designs for
which t!y tt,e social3st candidate stands that French policy will be conducted.
M. Pinton: That would not be a desire for change, but a combination of refusals
- and equivocations.
L. Jospin: Our policy 3s clear and above all positive, The commzinists will find
it diff icult to withdraw their support. On the other hand, I do not see how your
policy can unite a majority and keep the right from splitting. If one keeps the
disastrous ledger of these 7 years...
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L'EXPRESS: ...That is not the sub~ect of this debate!
~
L. Jospin: Right.
M. Pinton: Besides, the balance is largely positive.
~ L'EXPRESS: Are the "lesser candidates" too numerous? Which ones trouble you?
L. Jospin: It would not be acceptable for democracy if there were only 4
- candidates; if there were 40 it would be catastrophic. The problem is finding
the middle ground. When one is competing in the first round, one is more bothered
by his friends than by the others. But it is certainly their right to run for
election.
R. Cayrol: Each "lesser" candidat2 does not represent much. It 3s the total of
all their votes which can, for e-rample, make if difficult .for Mitterrand to score
higher than 22 percent.
L. Jospin: What do you want us to do about it? We are not going to proceed~
through int3midation. It 3s up to us to get across th~.s simple idea: in the
first round the socialist candidate must be leading the left, for he alone can beat
_ Giscard .
_ M. Pinton: Tt would be a pity for so many candidates who have so little to say
to all the French to enter the elect3on. But, in the absence of solutions
compatible with democratic princ3ples, it 3s better to suff er the abuses of
freedom than to threaten it. �
L'EXPRESS: It has been said many times that the Coluche candidacy was a sign of
_ the weariness of public op3nion with the political debates. Is th3s your
opinion?
L. .Tospin: Pub13c opinion is n~t an abstract reallty~ I do not see why the
indiv3duals who make it up would be very enthusiastic in the face of the
unemployment, tfie inflation, the block~d future of the young, the scandals, the
scorched-earth policy conducted by the leadership of the PC, the lowering of
certain institutions like the parliament.... We, socialists, have conducted
an internal debate that we consider democratic, but which sometimes has gotten off
track.
The interest in the forethcoming elect3on will be very great, I~11 bet on it.
And, at the moment when the French wi11 have to take a position on fundamental
- issues, they will not choose a comedian.
M. Pinton: For years I have heard it said that it is necessary to renew the po
_ pol3.tical dialog wh3ch wearies the French. However, these dialogs have never
played much part in any election, whatever they m3ght be. Don~t confuse certain
appearances with reality. The French are a people made skeptical of speeches
by a long history. At the moment of decision, they always turn toward the one
who tells them the truth. To tell the truth today means to give solid reasons
for hope. I emphasize the word "solid."
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- R. Cayrol: In the public opinion studies one can detect a recent reinforcement of
a certain disinterest in politics. It concerns first of all Paris and the very
large cities, but also the younger votersPffect"ihasltaken placeerial class and
the workers. This is where the "Coluche
L'EXPRESS: Through certain recent elections, above all the electoral success of -
Margaret Thatcher in Britain and the triumph of Ronald Reagan in the United States,
- a wave of conservatism has been mentioned. Do you see this in France?
M. Pinton: No, the world is not heading toward a new conservatism. That does not
have a chance. During the better days of expansion, two political currents have
sometimes confronted each other. One of them, conservative, attached itself to
- the past, with all that this implies such as the continuation of privileges and
in~ustices. The other wanted the wealth due to expansion to be distributed as
widely as possible. It is this second great trend which has won nearly everywhere.
But the society--should one say social-democratic?--which has resulted is The -
reaching 3ts limits. Look at Sweden and the United States, for example.
allocation of more and more diverse social benefits on a more and more equal
' basis has brought about the development of a tentacular and inefficient
administration. The wave of general welfare has exhausted i,tseZf. Both because
the crisis has dried up the sources of opulence, and because it has exasperated
citizens subjected to an encroacfiing bureaucracy.
The new world economic conditions imply a contrary mAVement: that individuals and
groups be given the opportunity of undertak3ng heavy responsibilit3.es, that mora
~ room be left for freedom. There is no evolution toward conservatism, only the
ebb and flow of socialization and movement toward greater freedom.
It is the direction in which France 3.s going today. The PS is 20 years late with
its plan. It is running against the current of h3story.
L. Jospin: It is true that the crisis, the result of Che pol~tical and social
policy conducted especially in France, can create a conservative reaction 3n many
social classes because it induces fear of the future. What a paradox! Some
people would thus be tempted to clioose the conservatives, whereas it is precisely
the conservatives who are hindering the people from conserving what they have
acquired: the full employment gained after the war, soc3.a1 security, the large
collective sexv3ces of education, transportation, and health...! Many people are
- thus searching forotess ofediscoveringcthislalter~nativeew3th theSSocialist f this.
They are in the pr c
- Party.
M. Pinton: You are ~ustifying what I was say3ng earlier about the lag between
the pol3tical dialog and avetnow enteredna~new erats�Yo or~inawithin antiq ated
were still in 1960. We h
frameworks.
L. Jospin: Tt is believed that you are a party which manages conservatively a
society as it has been structuxed since the Popular Front and the liberation.
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- In fact, you are a party of "restoration,~' somewhat as if the Restoration wanted
to return to the conquests of the French revolution. You want, under the pretext
- of going ahead, to go far back, over 50 years of social conquests.
M. Pinton: We are trying on the contrary to invent, to imagine what the future
will be. It is not Mitterrand who has undertaken without presuppositions an
elaborate analysis of the year 2000; it is Giscard. Can you see Mitterrand
asking himself about the year 2000? It wo+.ild cause laughter.
L. Jospin: You are chattering about the yea.r 2000 to avoid speaking of the
present. As to your policy, it takes us back to the thirties. I guarantee you
that ~his would make no one laugh.
R. Cayrol: The remarks both of you make revolve around the importance of the
word "security," one of the words which currently reverberates most in public
opinion. It is true that the progress of antistate and antibureaucratic sent:.ment
is measured very closely. But the renunciation of certain types of state
guarantees, the lifting of price controls...are judged severely by the same voters
who would be in favor of a less state-controlled evolution of society. This is
where there can be an overlap between policy and the anxieties of the French. In
fact, one sees in public opinion opposition to an evolution that is too statist
and at the same time a demand for more state guarantees against the hazards of a
- noncontrolled liberalism.
L. Jospin: To free and to protect, that is the synthesis of this contradiction
that we socialists are trying to accomplish.
M. Pinton: The conversion from theory to socialist practice has merely enlarged
the bureaucracy everywhere.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 SA Groupe Exnress
9 745
CSO: 3100
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COUNTRY :~ECTION FRATICE
PCF SEEN DISTURBED BY MIT'I'ERRAND'S STRENGTH
- Pari~ LA LETTRE DE L'EXPANSION in French 2 Feb 81 p 2
~ext7 The Communist Farty is concerned over the continued mediocre score
beine,~ atta.ined by Marchais in the polls. The party's strate~ists have re-
studied the polls taken at the time of the European elections a.nd have noted
that the results coincided with the foreca.sts (20 percent). This time the
polls are giving a result closer to 15 percent instead of 20. The,y do not
want to believe what has happened but axe concerned nevertheless. Below
1~3 percent, the candidate's personal integrity would be seriousl,y ques-
~tioned, althoiiah, in the absence of any obvious successor~ Marchais could _
lose his power without losin~ his title. We would "presidentialize" him~ a.s .
is said in the party apparatus~ where "stron~; men" remain discreet~ like
Plissonnier and Gosnat. Now the part,y's "haxd" wing (with which Marchais
ha.d to affiliate to retain his position) advises that, if the presidentia.l
elections are a failure~ it will be the result of a.n excessively "opportun-
istic" attitude durin~ the past i0 years. Meanwhile, the number one order
of the day is still to see that Mitterrand is defeated. The socialist
leader's increased strength is being taken seriously enough to li#ht counter-
fires. Persona.l attacks against Giscard are said to be aimed at convincinr;
the militants that "Marchais was not playinP; alon; with Giscard." As for
revivin~ the problem of communist ministers in the government, this is a
repetition of a tactic put to the test in 197~: to fri~hten the centrists
a.nd lead them away from Mitterrand.
The Communist Party fears that Mitterrand's (possible~ success would bolster
the Socialist Party whose "credibility would be enhanced" by his accession
- to power. Whereas, in the opposition, the Socialist Party would end up
splittir~ between those who want to govern and those who want to construct -
~ socialism.
Commentary _
- There are two observations to be made in this regard:
1. According to information received by the Mir.istry of I nterior, it is to
be expected t.hat there will be a harder line taken by Washin~ton and~ simul-
- taneously~ a sterner attitude by M oscow toward all European communist par-
ties, includin; the PCF.
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2. To judge by Andrieu's reaction at the "Press Club" last evening--one
which was not understood by those in attendance--Jospin's answer (carefully
written) relative to the communist ministers seems to have struck home.
COPYRIGHT: 1981 G roupe Expansion S.A.
8568
cso: 3ioo
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COUNTRY ~~ECTION FRAPICE
- PCF ELECTION STRATEGY SEEN FAILING TO WIN VOTERS
Paris L'r^~CPR~5S in French 31 Jan 81 p 75
~rticle by Jacques Roure7
~ext7 "Giscard is public enemy number l." The cr~wd, ~athered under the
hu~e circus tent set up on 27 January in Levallois-r'erret~ applauds in de-
li~ht. When Georges Marchais~ takin~ up the phrase uttered a week earlier
in the senate ("~nough of a republic of castles and gifts, of a state made
up of cousins and friends, of a clan of costly relatives and princes:"),
personally attacks the head of state, there is delirium.
With rer~ard to Francois Mitterrand, a privileged target of the Communi~t
Party directorate for more than 3 years~ Marchais launches ~,few barbs:
"I n his case~ it is no longer a question of haziness ar fo~; it is the
_ blackest ni?ht." But the socialist leader is no longer accused of "swinging
to the riP;ht." Henceforth~ it is only the right which is trying to get rid
cf him, A question of nuance. ?~cun on 20 January, the new turnabout
M archais is making--one morel--is being confirmed.
C an it be that the hour of leftist rediscoveries has sounded? On the con- _
trar,y. "All tha,t is a matter of tactics," a communist leader says. Marchais
has not cha.n~;ed his strate,y: to torpedo the Socialist Party in order to
restore the Communist Party's traditional leftist spot as number l.
The communist candidate has merely chan~ed his tactics. This was done fol-
lowinP two careful readin~s~
1. That of reports issued by the paxty's federal leaders which have been
piling up on his desk. Reports whose tonality was confirmed by the Central
Committee on 12 Januaxy. The militants are ready tc~ mobilize. For Marchais
against Gisca.rd. But not aP;ainst Mitterrand. In short, the antisocia.list -
crusade is continuin~ to trouble the communists. So much so that, for many
months, it was Mitterrand and not Marchais who appea.red a,s the anti-Gisca.rd
cand.idate.
2. That of polls. Despite an active campa.i~n conducted for three months, Mar-
chais is not taking off. VotinP intentions in his favor are remainint; lower
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than those traditionally achieved by the Communist Pa.rty: 17 percent, ac-
cordinp to the late:t scoreboard--L'EXPRFSS-LOUIS HARRI~-FRANCE--published
~ on 24 January. And this is accordin~ to the most favorable hypothesis as
far as he is concerned~ that in which Coluche would not be a candidate.
The secret hope of forestallin~; Mitterrand is disappearin?. W orse: Althou~h
the socialist candidate appeared to be the only one capa,ble of beatin; Gis-
card the second time around, many communist voters may be tempted to vote in
' a pra.ctical way--that is, for Mitterrand--from the first time axound.
As for carr,yover votes~ they alone are a condemnation of the antisocialist
policy bein~; pursued by Marchais: nearly two-thirds of his voters are pre-
pared to vo+,e for Mitterrand~ accused only a fex weeks at;o of having fa.llen
"to the ri;ht of Giscard." At the risk of increasin~ his party's malaise and
_ obliged to change course three months before the presidential election, Mar_
chais found nothin�; better to do than brina out the old bu~bear of communist
ministers. The recipe is xell-tested. In 197~, it had fri;htened moderate
voters who were ready to vote for the S ocialist Part,y and thus assured the
failure of the left. _
This time~ he thinks, the trap sl-,ould work still better~ since, after the
harder line taken b}- the communists and 3,years of controversy~ the division
, of power between the two leftist parties is no lon~er in the lea.st credible.
Wha.t can Mitterrand do? He has answered that in advance in his book, "Here
and Ptow." If he wins, parliamentary elections will be held al~na the way.
The majorit,y who will then govern France Will be "those whom universal suf-
fra~e will have sent to the National Assembly." The socialist leader seems
determined to say no more in this regard. But will he still be able for
ver,y lon~; to evade this essential question which, as he knows~ is his Achil-
les' heel and which Giscard's spokesmen ask him every da,y; "Wit}~ what ma-
jority will he t;overn in case of victory?"
If Mitterra.iid says "no" to the communist ministers~ Marchais will be h~rd
put to show his constituents--at long lastl--that it is not he who is di-
vidin~; the left a.nd preventin.~; it from joinin~ forces to win but~ rather~
the socia.list candidate. If Mitterrand says "yes," he cuts himself off from
the center left and from part of the Gaullist voters determined to vote for
_ hi.m the second time around. If he persists in not answering, he disappoints
both the left and the riaht.
"If we show that Mitterrand is the candidate of the undecided~" a Central
Committee member says, "he will lose his presti;e." And then~ the commu-
nists think, some af the votes. Marcha.is is askinrr for nothin~ else. But
he, in tizrn~ through a series of vacillations, risks losing all credibility.
At least in the eyes of many of his electors.
COFYRIGHT: 19R1, S.A. Groupe Express
856~
cso; 3100
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- COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
PCF LETTING INTELLECTUAL.S LEAVE PARTY
Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 26 Jan 81 np 27-28
[Article by Jean-Francois Gautier: "Leaving in Droves"]
[Text] The PCF is letting bothersome "intellectuals" leave.
A gentle purge. But even outside the party the dissenter.s
preach Communist doctrine.
"I don't want to leave the PCF. The French Communists are changing; they'll
surprise you yet. There are a few of us who feel something growing which could
very well be a tidal wave which will astonish you."
These lines of last 17 October were signed by Mr Antoine Spire, former party _
executive and formerly in charge of "Editions Social.es." The promised "surprise"
came 11 weeks later. The same Mr Spire announced on 7 January, "I am no l~nger
a member of the Party."
Mr Spire was not mistaken in announcing a"tidal wave": on 19 Jar.uary his name
was among 45 "critical communists" who decided to explain their departure in a
- manifesto. His resignation followed those announced in December of novelist
Helene Parmelin and her husband, painter Edouard Pignon, as well as those of
novelists Robert Merle and Raymond Jean, of producer Antoine Vitez and of poet
Eugene Guillevic.
At the end of October, three Communist advisers in Paris, among them Henry Fizbin,
- were relieved of their duties within the party for having criticized Marchais.
Just like the writer Jean Kehayan, "discharged" 5 days before them.
Parmelin and Pignon are not new to this opposition. Already in 1957 they signed
a manifesto which noted "ethical problems" after Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest.
Pablo Picasso's intervention was necessary to keep Marmelin (at the time a
journalist at "I~'Humanite") in the Party.
This fact is noted in "The Stalinists" (Fayard.), a work by Dominique Desanti, who
resigned in 1957 alon~ with her husband, Jean-Toussaint Desanti, professor at the
- Advanced Teacher Training School. They followed close behind Annie Kriegel, actor
Gerard Philippe and his wife, Yves Montand and Simone Signoret. Jean-Paul Sartre,
party supporter wh~ followed their lead, had also stated 6 months before leaving
that he carried on the struggle "in the Party and for the Party without breaking
- rank."
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The PCF is used to these waves of desertions. Its leaders repeat the same phrases
when the "intelleotuals" ~ump ship. In April 1978 while Jean Ellenstein was
leading the dissenters' way, Marchais announced to the Central Committee, "We
are a democratic party, not a discussion group."
T~aenty-two years earlier Maurice Thorez said to the same coimnittee that no matter
what the "intellectuals" thought, the "avant-garde ranks of the working class"
must not become "a club or a school of controversy."
Andre Gide, another sympathiser, wrote in his "Return From the USSR" in 1937:
~ "The party considers intellectuals who are attracted to communism to be 'unstable
elements' which can be used, but with caution."
- The PCF has never hesitated to let those who are no longer useful leave. During
~ difficult times the party particularly protects its internal structure, the hidden
part of a two-tiered system. Party leaders know from experience that this apparatus
can rapidly generate fresh troops.
In his "Internal History of the Communist Party" (Fayard), Philippe Robrieux -
wrote of the condition of the Communist Party in 1939, several weeks after the
Soviet-German pact. The CGT (General Confederation of Labor) had lost half of its
members; 27 of the 72 Communist deputies of the Popular Front had resigned. By
the end of the year there was no longer a general secretariat or a political office.
Robrieux wrote, "At the base, there were only a few pockets of militantism,
several hundred, probably less than two thousand in all. And aC the top the
Comintern bureaucracy which continued to operate."
This efficient bureaucracy rebuilt the PCF during the war. It took advantage of
the times to liquidatP party opponents. It ended hostilities by taking power and
counting its members by the hundreds of thousands.
The first voluntary departures date from 1928 wh.en the French party was wavering
between the Stalinist and Trotskyite trends. Moscow's orders, transmitted by
Stalin's bureaucracy, were to campaign against the socialists during the April
1928 elections and to keep the communist candidates in the second round of voting
- against the Socialist Party. To this the French leaders added a sort of rather
unacceptable "common program" so that the socialists would be sure to reject it.
After the elections, "Action Francaise" admitted, "The communist tactic was the
salvation of many of the moderate candidates."
The PCF hardened its stand the next year. In the middle of a general salary
hike it centered its campaign around the crises of capitalism. It tried a
general strike. Party rank and file, confused, decreased by four-fifths. Sixty
members from the political office elected in 1926 left. In November 1929, six
town councillors were ousted for opposing the "International's line." In less
than 2 years the latter purged the PCF of its divergent tendencies. It could now
= gear up for what would become the Popular Front.
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The circumstances surrounding the largest departures (1928, 1939, 1956, 1968)
vary. But each time contributions from Mosr.ow made up for the lack of dues.
And w ithin a few months the internal apparatus was able to rebuild the membership.
In 1978 Marchais repeated that the communist leadership "would adamantly oppose
everything that attacks damocratic centralism in order to question its policy,
usefulness and existence."
More clearly: the Communist Party calculates all the bearable risks but it will
_ never play *_he stalwart leaders, executives and high-ranking members against
the "intellectuals"' doubts.
Desanti noted in her book that after 1968 the communists recruited "young members,
and even disillusioned students, who were tired of their small, powerless groups."
The PCF's main attraction is its "power machine," which, even if only relatively
powerful, is at least maintained permanently.
- In an intensive analysis of the communist phenomenon "The Illusions of the West,"
(Albin Michel), Claude Polin, professor at the Sorbonne, wrote: "Never s~nce its
beginnings in Russia in 1917 has communism been so strong or so powerful through-
out the world, despite the fact that Stalinist horrors are known and denounced;
the slightest deviator is sent to the Gulag, and the Kremlin's imperialism is
decried everywhere."
Polin suggests this: "It is because liberal society doesn't hide the fact that
its dream is the same as that of communism (to reconcile man with nature and
other men) and that it is in a much worse position than Soviet society for ful-
filling this dream.
On an ideological ].evel and from the viewpoint of communist leaders, the exedus
of the party "intellectuals" is more of a tactical advantage than a reverse.
When resigning, Spire affirmed, "I remain a communist." Like Ellenstein, Garaudy
and Kehayan, he will defend on the outside the ideal learned on the inside.
COPYItIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs actuelles"
9720
CSOP 3100
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- COUNTRY SECTION FRANCE
� 'AFRIQUE-ASIE' HITS GISCARD STANCES ON AFGHANISTAN, CHAD
- LD241051 Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 16 Feb-Ma.r 81 pp 10-11
[Editorial. by Simon Malley: "Giscard's Miscalculations"]
[Text] Aside from its sEemingly overzealous secretary general [Habib Chatti, sec-
retary general of Islamic Conference Organization] who, without even bothEring to
consult the Muslim heads of state present, hurried to French's television's micro-
phones to express his "favorable reactions," the Third Islamic Summit in al-Ta'if
totally ignored French President Giscard d'Estaing's proposals on Afghanistan put
forward in his television interview on 28 January. There is no doubt that Habib
Chatti, who had not even had time to examine the text of the French president's
speech, still less to gather the Islamic leaders' impressions and views, simply
- forgot the elementary rule th at any secretary general--of any regional or interna- _
tional organization--should observe: Not to take any political stance unless it
- reflects the views of all member states in the form of specific resolutions or a
general "consensus." -
Habib Chatti's responsibility seems even more serious when you realize that the over-
whelming majority of heads of state received the French head of state's intervention
coldly not to say with irritation and even hostil:.ty--an intervention made at a
time when he knew for a fact that the affair was on the summit's agenda and that -
the Islamic heads of sta~te and sovereigns were to study it and take the necessary -
measures to find a solution likely to contribute to its settlement. What was Gis- -
card's intention? To inspire or influence the summit? To guide it or take the
place of the countries more directly concerned by this affair? "The fact is," a
Gulf head of state confided, "that the Western leaders, and in this case Giscard
d'Estaing, sti11 thi~k that we need their 'paternalism,' their 'advice as our sen-
iors,' in seeking a particular formula for settling problems which concern our re-
gion. They want to continue treating us as 'childreti' or as subjects of the mother
country. Why did Giscard choose this precise moment to intervene when he knaws that
Pakistan was intending to call upon the Islamic summit to study a plan which had -
s upport from Indira Gandhi's Indian Government? Did he want to deprive us of an
- initiative or was he simply trying to abort any solu~:ion other than Ihis?"
This feeling predominated in many Islamic delegations, so much so that French dip-
~omats were clearly uncomfortable, while the Americans and Brit3sh were pleased and -
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the West Germans were sarcastic. Pakistani diplomacy chief Agha Shahi, for his ,
part, was furious: It is urithinkable," he confided in one o f his Arab colleagues.
"The French President knew very well, because we had already informed him, that
Kabul had finally agreed to a representative appointed by UN Secretary General _
Kurt Waldheim taking part in the negotiations. That was a major step forward--a
remarkable one in view of the Afghan Government authorities' known stances. We
also knew that the Soviet Union had not opposed our approach. Of course, there
were still questions to be settled but we had high hopes of succeeding...Giscard
d'Estaing's i.nterference is both inopportune and dangerous...." Agha Shahi added:
"What irritates us even more is that the French Government never received our con-
sent to its intervention. I was not even informed of this plan...."
It was not until the French president's "explanatory" telephone call to his Yaki-
stani counterpart on 31 January, that the latter consented reluctantly to say that
some aspects might be conside ~ed "positive" while the Pakis~ani press continued to
regard the French initiative as "inopportune." Haw and why did Valery Giscard
d'Estaing take this initiative? Why did he take it at that precise moment?
The following are the hypotheses gathered from some delegations representing both ~
progressive anci conservative regimes: _
1--Having been subjected to cutting and sarcastic remarks from some of his poli-
tical rivals regarding his "predictions" concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Afghanistan, the French head of state wanted to give the impression that he
would and could play a role in settling the Afghan affair and that it would be
wrong to think that he no longer has any audience in the Third World. Being con-
vinced that his proposals would receive the backing of Islamic leaders in al-Ta' if--
on what bases and for what reasons?--he went ahead. He did so rather too quickly,
rather too hastily. Neither reports from his diplomats in al-Ta'if nor t?ie flat-
tering articles published by sections of the French press which back the Giscardian
government, can change that fact.
The HERALD TRIBUNE's correspondent in al-Ta'if wrote on 29 January: "The partici-
pants in the al-Ta'if su~nit were surprised to learn of the existence of this p?an
frorn the radio instead of it being put forward and discussed through diplomatic
channels." The correspondent explained that official Western and Islamic circles
think Giscard's plan ha s very little chance of success.
British weeklv THE OBSER~IER, for its part, stated clearly that an expanded confer-
ence such as President Giscard d'Estaing is proposing would further complicate the
negotiators' task.... As for the official reactions in some Western capitals,
there was no ques tion of their being negative or hostile, for rzasons of solidarity
- in face of the Soviet Union.
2--On the basis of reports from a senior_ Quai d' Orsay official sent to Moscow
shortly before Giscard announced his plan, the French head of state had calculated
that the Kremlin could not react in a hostile way since one of the sine qua non
conditions posed by Kabul and backed by Moscow for bringing about a gradual with- _
drawal of Soviet troops was the end of all foreign interference (Totably Pakistani, ~
Iranian, Chinese and American) in Afghanistan. In proposing a conference which
would aim to find an acceptable solution to that particular problem, would the
Elysee not be taking a step in the right direction?
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Valery Giscard d'Estaing's main mistake was first his wish to ignore the fact that
the USSR would never agree to an international conference being he].d without the
presence of Afghanistan--the first and sole power concerned by this foreign inter-
ference--and, second, his pretence of disregarding one crucial question: Why
should such a conference include countries which have nothing to do with this ques-
- tion either directly or indirectly? What reason would there be for France and
Britain to attend this conference? That could only place it under the auspices of
the Security Council's five permanent members. Would not internationalizing the -
conflict as Giscard seems to wish--by placing it under the authority of the most
. important UN body--mean placing Afghanistan's future in UN hands?
The Elysee`s maneuver is really too obvious for it to be backed by progressive and
- democratic international opinion.
"It is paradoxical to see Giscard's government trying to take the initiative in a
plan aimed at ending'foreign interference in an independent state when it has con-
stantly been responsible for so many interventions in Africa over the past 7 years...."
~ This statement,by a black African head of state reflects several diplomats' and ob-
� servers' opinions gathered immediately after th e French president's proposal~ were
- made known in al-Ta'if.
People were also wondering whether the French president who is known to snare U.S.
strate gic views, has not been subcontracted by the United States with, of course,
the hope of consolidating France's position as a world power, as well as gaining
prestige.
_ Such a~ypothesis is all the more likely since Paris has definite designs on the
Gulf and the Indian Ocean where it l:as an aggressive military presence, as wit-
nessed by the many warships patrolling that region in coordination with the U.S.
and West German armada.
3--Third hypothesis put forward by the Islamic leaders: The Giscardian government's
fear of seeing the Afghan affair settled without it, in other words in the frame~-
work of an agreement which would not include France but in which the only partners
would be the two super-powers. In other words a return to bilateral Soviet-U.S.
dialog. Could that anxiety be allayed by this complex and impracticable plan which
has been unveiled with the aim of showing the Muslim world the intention both to
_ "combat Soviet strategic designs in the Middle East" and to help this Muslim world
solve its pr~blems through French influence? "We do not intead to be mobilized in
an anti-So viet campaign," one African minister stated, "in or