JPRS ID: 9248 WEST EUROPE REPORT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

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• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300080020-8
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9537
10 February 1981
i
I
Sub-S~harc~n A?frica Re ort
~
FOUO No. 708
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL ~iSE ONLY
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are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and
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mation was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are
_ enclosed in parentheses. Words or na.mes preceded by a ques-
~n. tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
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JPRS L/9537
10 February 1981
SU~-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT
FOUO No. 708
CONTENTS
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Chad Leader Rejecta Libyan M~erger
(4laiter Schwarz; THE GUARDIAN, 30 Jan 81) 1
France Trying to Counter Libya's ~hadian Intervention
~AFRI~UE-ASIE, 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81) 3
France Said Ms3king Libya Scapegoat for Its Own Aims
(Antania Bl~s; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 8-21 Dec 80) 5
South African Military Operatians Grow in Angola
(THE GUARDIAN, 29 Jan 81~......... 9
Success of Maputo Conference Examine~d
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEFNS, 5 Dec 80) 12
BENIN
People's Revolution of Benin After 8 Years
(Mariam Sys].e; AFRIQUE-ASIE9 8 Dec 80j~ 15
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUI3LiC
Ba~es of Regime Described as 'Extremely Fragile'
, (Jos-Blaise Alima; JEIINE AFRIQUE, 17 Dec~80) 21
_ ETHIOPIA
3riefs
Sov3ets, Cubans Slain 24
GHANA
Bri.efs
Losses I'rom Staee Enterprises 25
~
- a - L~II - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
rnn nr!~+rn~ . r r n.n
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~ GUTNI:A
BrieFS 26
World Bank Electricity Financing 26
Five-Year Plan
GUINEI`+-BISSAU
Briefe 27
Former Official's Suicide
MADAGASCAR
Financial Difficulti.es Report~ed
(Jacques Latremoliere; M,.ARCHES TROPICAIIX ET MEDITERRA.NEEP~S, 28
5 Dec 80)
Budgc~t for 1981 of 267'.17 Billion Francs Approved 32
~ (MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEllITERRANEENS, 12 Dec 80)
Country's Foreign Trade Figures for 1979
35
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 5 Dec 80).........
Briefs 39
Sugar Praduction 39
Military Equipment From DPRK ~
- MOZAMBTQUE
Br ie f s 40
~ Fishing Agreement With Spain Studied 40
Cigarette Pro~uction
NEIMIBIA
Nujoma Outlines Plans f~r Qpcoming Nonsligned Conference 41
(Frasmo Terrero; PRELA, 23 Jan 81)
NIGER
BCEAO Bulletin Discusses Overall Economic Situ?.tion
; (MARCHES TRUPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Dec 80) 43
SOUTH AFRICA
_ Defence Force Responds to Accusations of Atrocities
(TH~ GUARDIAN, 30.Jan 81) 45
UGAi~DA
Editorial Discusses Flection Process, Obote Regime 4i
(Editorial; MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 19 Dec 80)....
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ZA:RE
- Budget for 1981: Deficit of 640 Million Zaires
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 28 Nov 80) 50
Brief s
Inga II Power Station 52
Petroleum Prices 52
Refinery Capacity 52
Z T.M$ABWE
Interview With Prime M~nister Mugabe
(Robert Mugabe Interview; THE SUNDAY TIMES, 25 Jan 81)......... 53
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IIdTER--AFRIGAN AFFAIRS
CHAD LEADER REJECTS LIBYAN MERGIIt
LD301259 Londor. TFiE GUARDIAN in English 30 Jan 81 pp 1, 7
[Dispatch by Walter Schwarz: "Qadhdhafi's Honeymoon Turns Bitter"]
- [Er,:erpts] Ndjamena, Chad--In an interview taith T:iE GUARDIAN, the minister
- of the interior, Mr Mahamat Abba Said, who heads the provisional government
= in the absence of President Gueddei Goukotm i at the Islamic summit con-
ference, said that the Tripoli announcement had been badly translated
from Arabic, and exploited for political reasons by France.
_ "There can be no quest{on of political merger," Mr Abba Sai~~ said. "In any case,
- it is unthinkable without consulting the people. It (the coitmunique) was
~upposed to mean a natural unity between two peoples whose b?ood has mingled
foz centuries."
Chad's leaders, installed after the eight-month rebellion led by the defence ~
= mini~ter, Mr Hissein Habre, are now appealing for Western aid and palitical
support to :~alt the spread of Libyan influence--but so far, Ir'rance and other
- ~uropean countries appear to have decided on a diplomatic boycott, which
could further entrench the Li.byan~. "We are ready to cooperate even with ~
France, which has a large share of the blame for what happened to Chad," sai.d
Mr Abba Said. Other ministers said, that the French should take the lead
~ in helping to restore essential services and esteblish a diploma.tic counter- `
w~ight to the Libyans .
In Ndjamena whQre the modern businese and residential areas have been com-
pletely devastated by seven months of shelling from both sides, no banks are
open and running water and electricity are scarce. Petrol (from Nigeria) is
_ sold to motorists in Spanish wine ~ars. _
Soldiers of variou~ civil war factions still occupy some suburbs. "The _
_ factions wi11 now ha~,~e to come together and form a unified army,1� Mr Abba
Said said but he admitted security in the country as a whole was still
"only at 50 per cent level." Ministers said little could be done without
urgent financial aid from the West. "M~ost oivil servants have not been
puid for over a year. There is no money and the Libyans haven't supplied
any yet," said Mr M'bailo Los~imian Naimbaye, the minister o� agriculture.
Libya and the Soviet Union have, however, sent in food and medical supplies.
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, ~
Mr Nai.mbaye said khat as soon as security was assured and essential services _
nnd baeic commerce restored, a timetable could be sPt for Libyan withdrawal.
"Obviously thie will happen faster ir we are helped from the West and
especially France which has the biggest responsibil~ty because i.t helpecl
Hissein 'rlabre all along while pretending to be neutral," he said.
COPYRIGHT: Guardian Newspapers T.imited, 30 January 19$1 -
CSO: 4420 -
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- INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
FRANCE TRYING TO COUNTER LIBYA'S CHADIAI~ INTERVENTION
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 22 Dec 80-4 Jan 81 pp 13, 1~
_ [Article--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]
~ [TextJ At Nd~amena, where the coalesced forces of the Transitional National Union
Government (GUNT) headed by Goukouni Oueddei have won a significant victory over
the No rthern Armed Forces (FAN) of the rebel Hi ssein Habre, French in~ervention,
which a short time ago seemed imminent, and the unstated aim of which w~~u1d tiave
been to save one of the Elysee's protege�, coul d no longer find any rational
justification. For calm has prevailed s~nce 1 5 December. in the Chadian capital, ~
si.nce His~ein Fiabre, figuring ouC the implicaC ions of his inability to impose
' "his" own rule against the legal government of the GUNT, which the neocolonialist ,
forces had encouraged him to do, abandoned his routed troops who joined together
and fled--perhaps tn order to attempt the ~ob one last time with the African
countries who were supporting the rremch initia tive.
Iii fact, on 13 December, the Elysee declared i tself /"seriously concerned by the
new deterioration in the situation"i in Chad resulting from the intervention
of flx~ned foreign elements. France warns against the pursuit of this inter-
vention and will lend its support to any colle ctive effort which the African
staCes may undertake to reestablish peace in Chad and preserve its unity and
m~intain its independence,"/ said the Elysee's comnunique. Up to now, French
military interventions in Africa rested on two j ustifications: an appeal from
one of tt~e ~overnments concerned, as was the case with Zaire, or the pr.otection
of French citizens in a"threatened" eauntry, the pretext invoked for. example in
the massive military intervention in Chad in 1 9 78.
'This time, neither of these two arguments capab le of being advanced, a new one
is fat~ricated: /"a collective effort of African states."/ The scenario w~s
being prepared for months--indeed since what today we can only call the false
departure of French troops from Ndjamena last April�--with the help of the Elysee's
most ser~~ile allies. T'hese latter have kept up an in:.r:~:asingly loud chorus
callin~ for the French to help. And, it is no coinc:~uence if the same day,
13 Uece.i;~ber, French television show-ad a gesticulating Omax Bongo describing the
I.ibyan chief of state, who is lending his suppo rt to the GUNT forces, as
"Hitler9.an," all tl~is in order to open].y call for French intervention in Chad.
At thF same time, troop movements were observed in Fran~e itself (in the Southwest
and Brittany) as well as in various French bas e s in Afr~ca (Gabon, Central Africa,
3
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th~ 1.ndi~ui Or_ean). As is customar.y, on 15 December the French Government halfwa~
denied che rumors circul.ating about an imminent intervention. It was said in
r'nri.s that L'rench overseas forces had not recei.ved any instructions nutting them _
an a special ~~lert sra[us. But, i.t was remembered, some units are always ready =
to isitervene ~oitho~at much advance noti~:e. _
(~nly one ques[.ion remained unanswer.ed: would P'rance tu?der Giscard ignore the
warni.n~ ~t~t out by the '1'ASS agency whfch, in a ~ommentary published on 13 December,
opined th~~t /"the atten~ts by imperialist ci-rcles aiming to create the conditions
f.or direct intervention in Chad are more and morF evident"?/ Would it take
a step which, this time, coul.d widen the war e~~n beyond the (;hadian border and
ran the risk aC the sarcie time of reducing cooperation wi.th Tripoli to naught,
at a time when France is experiencing the full fury of economic crisis, only a
few months from the presiden~ial elections?
On~ ~hing, however, was sure: the French Goverriment, from all evidence, has
learned no lessons from its repeated Failures in Ci.ad--and moreover...--, quite
to the cantrary, it is determin~d to continue to p13y its role as the gendarme ~
of western imperj.alism on the continent. CJoukouni Oueddei's victory in any case
oblif;~~s France to replenish its store cf poor excuses if.--as seems likely--it -
has no intention oL abandat~ing its private pres~~tvE in Chad. France will then
huve to face African and international opinion, which will perhaps be difficult
to allay.
COPYRIGIi'T: 1980 Afr.ique-As.'te
951.6 -
Csa: 4400
. -
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
FRANCE SATD MAKING LIBYA SCAPEGOAT FOR ITS 0[JN AIMS
- Paris AFI~IQUE-ASIE in French 8-21 Dec 8~ pp 40-41
[Article: "The Politics of the Jaguars" by Antonia Blis]
[Text] In the Libya of Qadhdhafi the imperialists have found a
convenient scapegoat. But France has still not renounced what
= it hae so well gotten under way; the dismemberment and recovery
of Chad.
_ Little by little the vice is tightening around Chad, torn by an endless war whose
~rigins can be found mainly in the repeated interferences and destructive policy of
th2 former metropole and which is fanned by interests which to a great extent go
beyond the belligerents themselves.
When, at the beginning of April France began to evacuate its expeditionary corps from
the Chadian capital, the second civil war unleashed in N~amena by the forces of
liissene Habre--then minister of defense of the National Union Transition Government
of Chad (GUNT) set up under the terms of the Lagos agreements o~F August 1979--had
been raging for more than a month. Everyone, or almost everyone recognized that the
French retreat was not based on a Pontius Pilate policy, but rather was a feint.
The French Government, serously discredited by its repeated interventions in Western
Sahara, in southern Zaire, and in Chad, had visibly elected to let a conf lict which
was supporting indirectly go from bad to worse and await the proper moment. A moment
when favorable conditions would permit it to intervene again, at the appeal of all
those among its satellites who can;~ot accept without fear the prospect of the
establishment at Ndjamena, the capital of a country which occupies a highly
atrategic position in Africa, of a regime which would escape the tutelage of French
imperialism.
For after the successive failures of each of its attempts to bring the Chadian people
into line, it is clear that only a Chadian national union government--in which the
former FROLINAT guerrillas, all factions combined, and despite the weaknesses and
inndequacies shown by this national liberation movement, would play a mov3_ng role--
ia capable, as has been suggested, moreover, by the Lagos agreements, of restoring
stability and peace to the country.
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i~ i; l{ OI~ ~_C C~ I AI~ iJ S tj O i\ i_`l
Sowin}~; Fati~Li.
But , af tEr tiav in~ search~d eve~y m;~ai.s--i:: ~f.s ~,1oug'~n to recall. L-he series of
, ~ , . ;
events ~vhi.cY~ occtirr~~r~otten, and especial.ly the
poverty and dependeYicc: y.n wl~~i.ch tne t..~n. Fasl.
~C.t i.~ n~~t ,~y ch~~i~ce that the Unit.ed Sc.a~es is so ostentatiously ~aorried over the
devel.opment of t~e s:i~~~atian in. Chad ~a~~~c1 the Libyan presence in gyps'country and the
i.ntenti.uns of Tri.poli .tn A.`_ri.ca. :~or is i+: a co:~nciden~e that ~ t which is
supplyinb--jusC as the Sud~~n ~aiu hFncef.oxtt-~ a~>;~3x'en~ly Israel as we1l--war ma~eriel
to the Armed Eorces oi thc 'dorth (FA1V) of Hissc~n:- Elabri, is predicting through the
daily E1. AfIfZAM an arined cof r'rontaLiun betweF'-n r-rance aand LiUya in Chad; and that
behincl the claimed massive 1,nt.erventi.on oi r.!-~P Libyans ir~ Chad oize can see, due to
the merger wlli~h occux~red c~~1 1 Septi~mber iaec~aeen i:ne Libyan Jamahiriya and Syria,
the hai.ld of. rioscow.
According to the l.ate.se news, c~n 19 Nc~vembei~, {:CtE: r'~nta~~rx 2stima.ted that from
�;~ppp to G,U00 Libyan solr-~e['::--u~hi.ch ~ould rep:.-esent almc'~:. a ~~nth of the regular
army of Tripol.i--were preparing to ~.ttack Ndja.u~et'~a. 'This "in.farmation" of which
the SJ.~(;~ll:�SC confir~nat3.un on the f;:~o?:nd. is sc~_11 lacking, we�re so enormous that
they wer.e received wi_tY~ ~the ~reaLest sc~p~i.cism even ~n F`r'ericti cir.cles well versed `
i.n Afric~~it :iFfairs, w~~o could not see Fiow Tri.roli could ~etach such a large part of
iLs army at. tYie very u~vr,~erit iahen larg~ concPilci~.t.i~~ls of 7,ibyan troops had been
repured to be 1.ocated an t~i~ ~~ypLlai7 alid ~mlisian frontiers.
_ ~
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.
An Internal Question
Ac[.ually no foreign observer, nor any journalist has been able up t~ now to conf irm
on the spot the truth of the "information" which reports ttle firm presence of Libyan
sold�lers ir. Chad. In Paris they have gone so far as to suppose that tt wa~ ~ c~uistion -
of troops belonging to the Common Action Front (FAC) of Ahmat Acyl, the Chadian
minister of foreign affairs, which, trained in Libya, may have been confused with
those of the Libyans during their movement toward the northern part of Chad.
In any case, President Goukouni Oueddei, while confirming on 25 November that the
coalition forces of the GUNT enjoyed purely material_ Libyan aid, stressed in a press
conference that the war in Chad was a"purely internal question which threatens
neither its neighbors nor the equilibrium of the region." "We have signed agreements
with several countries, including Libya," he stated; "We have appealed fox the aid
of friendly countries in order to resolve in the bes* way possible our national
problem, This move is inscribed in the texts of the Lagos and Freetown (OAU summ:Lt)
decisions, which asked countries which had recognized the GUNT to suppress the
rebellion in Chad." For its part, a reaponsible official of the FAC of Ahmat Acyl `
told a French daily, LE MATIN, Chat Libya was providing a large amount of aid in _
food, medicine, and materiel, and also provided advisers to the fighters, who at '
present did not exceed a thousand. Finally Col (~adhdhafi, WI10 sen.*. several emissaries
to West African capitals, confirmed on 27 November that until now his country had _
not granted any direct military aid to the legal governmEUt of Chad, but that he
would cio so anyway if the GUNT asked for it,--a treaty of friPndship and alliance _
having been signed between TYipoli and the GUNT last 15 June engaging both parties
mutually to defend themselves against any act of foreign aggression and any threat
aimed at the internal security of either of them.
Denying the rumors t~at France and Libya had entered into discussion of a plan to
' aartition Chad, Col Qadhdhafi reaff irmed that his country favored the integrity,
sovereignty, and unity of Chad. While some assistance had been granted to the
Chadian Government, that was in accordance with the charter of the OAU and Kano and
Lxgos agreements, said the Libyan president.
~11 this dld not prevent the tone, after a period of calculated reserve, from rising
sharply in Paris, where cynicism competes with shamelessness. So on 19 November the -
French minister of foreign affairs stated to tiie National Assembly that "the situation
in Chad is more dramatic and more complicated than ever. The civil war which began
a long tj.me ago is the consequence of foreign interference which France had
denounced." After stating that the evacuation of the French forces last April had
responded to the desire manifested by the Chadian factions and to the desire
expressed by the African states at the ~ime of the Lagos meeting, Jean Francois-
Poncet continued: "At present serious intelligence has verified movement of troops
coming from Libya which appear to be numerous. The juridical basis of this inter-
f:erence i.s not cleaz-, any more than the assigned objective of these troops. The
French Govern.~nent will contim~e to follow the development of the situation with care
for reapect for the territorial integrity and independence of Chad. In this regard ^
- it will consider as detexmining factors tha reactions of the Chadian populat3.on and
that uf the African states. It would be surprised if the latter do not react to
the foreign incursions in this country."
7
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Fax oT~�rzcr.~. usF~ or~~..~,
Disst~asior~
SeverFZ1 days latc:r, dtiring a broadcas~ of France-tnte~, the I~rench mj.nister of
coopErz:tiu;i, Robert: Ga].ley, himse:lf touched on t~e'sub~ect. ~~eest~te3no~l~sn ~'Chad,"
he said, "is cacastrophic ror the populations. Th~ coux~try, _
exist. ~It i-5 z disturbing situat:Con, on the brink of deslabili~w~.tion, which
may increas~: `~Lzp hy step." ?n caae these soe~ches may not have been suffi.ciently
understoocl, and whiJ.e the French prime minister, Raymond ~Tessiveness~isnpreferable
French pol icy in P.f r~i.ca sa id to a Flemish ncwspaper : "~L~
to softness," on 25 November, four French Jaguar conibat aixcraft be~.onging to the
tacr.i_cai ai.r force assigned �or "~he protection of overseas French iTiterests" were
sE1nt to t.ibreville. The presence of these aircraft--which, armed with two cannon,
b~mUs, and missiles, have a f li.ght range of 4000 kilometers---"will remind the
counCries roncerned th~it Paris can intervene rapidly, particularly since more than
%+OU F'rench soldiers are already based at Libreville," com~mented L~ FIGARO.
And in addition, one mi.gl~t add, t~1so ineoth~r~nsarby bases~French soldier.s installed
a t Iiouar . lIl Central Af rica , and
Ac~tually I~rench ~~~~ac:~a-~s oi det.Prrcnce have never stopped, but today it is a threat
of. dirert. military intcrve.~tion fcom ihe former metYOpole which is taking shape; at
the sa.me time the:e is the danger of a dismembe-rmeni. of Chad which is becoming more
urgent, as a series of elEments tend to confirm� Fdtherewere ~tworqu~-te~separate
having insisted on the fact that, according t~ him,
sides in Chad, recently stated tY~at he had �oun.d a solution which he cou~_d not yet
unveil as it would make a certain nt~mbex of people jump. One can easily imagine
what is meant and wh~~ could have inspired the idea in the Gabonese president...who
has cippeared in France xe~ently.
Iiavin~; ta'.~.e.n in~o c~onsideration all the serious threats and risks of d~smemberffient
whicil tlie continuatic~n af Ta~~fat~hela~reeraen~LSignedaon 28sNovemberrat omeebyer-
sistin~ in his reftis~~l. to y
Goulcoun~ Oueddri, the pres:I.dent of the OAU, and the leadersruns~themriskrof.tates of
Cl~te ()r1U suhcommittee on Chad (Benin, Congo., Guinea, Togo),
~ seeminf; once more iLke a tzansmission belc enabling France to realize its designs
i.n ChHd and to place this country back und~x ~he foreign thumb.* For it goes without
say~lnh that thE implemencation of this agreemen~, which provides for the imposition
of a cease-f.ire on 15 December., at Nj~~nay could be of a nature to encyurPge ~
process of normalization and, b~zers of
tiheocantinentl~ast prcvisi.onall uIl the
rug our from under tlle aestabi
*llescribing t ih as
gree~ent as "unrealis~ic," the head of the FAN loo~ced for loop-
holes while aski.ng 'r".lrst far the denuncWhpioac~ord~g to himlwer.ehthe~presidentaofon"
ancl r_he notorlous agen'ts" of 'Pripoli, ~ eneral of tt~e OAU, Mr Edem Kodjo.
Ben.in, N,athi.eu Kerekou, and the deputy secreta-ry--g
Waen one b~c~omes aware that the members of the dA~ subcommittee reconunended the
immediat.c. ~,rithdrawal. of the foreighef situation,htheade~ands of Hissene~HabreXdid~ely
wor.ried about the development of t
nor seem ver.y serious, to say the least. Unless they are a cover for a still more
sor.ciici nu^.neuver.
COPYR~G~iT: 1980 Af.rique-Asie 8
610E
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INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY OPERATIONS GROW IN ANGOLA
LD291505 London THE GUARDIAN in English 29 Jan 81 pp 1, 24
[Unattributed report: "South Africa's Secret War of Terror"]
[Texr.] South Africa's military operations in southern Angola have grown to such
an extent that it is now waging a full-scale war far from its ocm borders.
Apart from increasingly frequent incursions into Angola with regular ground and
air forces, the South Atricans are also using covert units which, posing as anti-
government guerrillas, are engaged in a brutal campaign nor~h of the border between
Namibia and Angola.
The war followed South Africa's decision to make angola its "front line" against
guerrillas of SWAPO (South-West African Peoples Organisation), the liberation
movement fighting Co wrest control of Namibia from Pretoria.
In the five years since the Angolan civil war the South Africans have rEpeatedly
c.laimed that their operations in Angola are conducted entirely by regular forces,
specifically aimed at SWAPO camps and installations and usually ordered only in
di.rect response to SWAPO strikes in Namibia.
R~ports from Jonathan Steele in the Angolan war zone, where he has seen the
devastation wrought by the South Africans, and from Nick Davies in London, piecing
- together the stnry of South Africa's secret "buffalo regiment," paint a very
different picture. {Steele's 1200-word report, Davies' 1900-word interview with
mercenary Edwards are published on p 15 of this paper.]
- Davies' investigation, based on interviews with a British deserter from r..he
~ "buffalo regiment," more formally known as the 32 battalion, show that 5outh
- Afrir_a has decided that an essential part of its war is the deliberate killing and
terrorising of Angolan civiliar~s in any area where SWAPO migh.t find support or
help.
A further. refinement is that the covert units of 32 battalion pass off much af
Cheir dirty work as that of UNITA, the Angolan liberation moveme~it which was
def eated in the civil war but which hangs on in that country in unofficial alliance
wi.th the South Africans.
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South Africa r.h�s gains a political bonus, in addi.tion to any military ob~ectives
ach~eved, by pro~ectl.ng the image that UNITA's popular support and fighting power
are ttnimp~fred, wtiereas most observers believe that both have greatly diminiahed.
Steele's report makes equally clear that, while the South Africans have attacked
the few SWAPO install.ations within their range, most of their recent assaults t?ave
been on purely A.ngolan targets--villages, roads, bridge~ and military camps.
The r_onclusion from the two r.eporCS must be not only that the restraint South F
Africa claims to be observing are pure fiction but that the scale of the suffering
and destruction ir~f.licted by its forces --both regular and secret--goes well beyond
what has been previously publicly known.
In his tour of souther.n Angola Steele reports that South African attacks are
directed at least as much against Angola as against their official ene~y SWAPO.
Within that larger campaign is the "secret war"--almost entirely directed against
v111agers--waged by, among others, Trevor John Hdwards, the British mercenary who
has told his story r.o THE GUARDIAN and to 1'hames television, who will broadcast
an i.nter.view with him ~onight.
Edwards served with 32 battalion for nine months, came on leave to Britain at
Christmas and theii decided to desert to tell his tale. The result is the first ~
r~ccount of this shadowy unit.
On pap~r there is nothing to distingutsh 32 battalion from the dozens of other
South African untts figh~i.ng in Namibia against SWAPO. But, unlike any other
units, 32 9.s al.mos~ en~irely composed of foreigners.
It has a few ~outh African regulars, Uut most of its white NCOs are m~rcenaries,
many of. them B.rieish, and its ranks are filled with Portuguese-speaking black
An~olans, all. recrui.ted from the FNLA--another Angolan liberation movement which,
ltke its ally, UNITA, was also a loser in the Angolan civil war.
Occasionally, el.emen~s of 32 battalion e.nter Angola in a"regular" manner--in -
South African de�ence force uniforms, carrying normal military identiey papers
and dog tags. and US1T1& standard weapons. But, most of the time--and the unit aims
Co have two companies in Angola continually--they fight a very different kind of
war.
Dressed in unmarked camouflage uniforms, under strict nrdei~ to carry no documents
at 1lly type, and usi.ng East European weapons, they move into Angola for sweeps
through groups of. villages. White officers and NCOs black their faces. A typical
operation, as described by F.dwards, would involve a formation of one or two pla-
toons moving through a village area gunning down men, women, children, and live-
stock.
A.sked yes~erday to comrnent on the gist or Mr Edwards' story, the South African
ambassador in London, Mr Marias Steyn, said: "From what we have been told cf ~iie
contents, it seems ro be such a concoction of untruth, to a large extent emanating
fr.om a sin~le individual w:tth the moral fibre of a deserter, that we feel it is
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impossible to comment on it unless we have seen the full text and hav~ had a _
~ chance to analyse the full extent of the distortions published, even though
unWittingly, in your newspaper." ~
- Ear.li.er this week in Luanda, Angola's deputy minister of defence, Coior~el David
Moises, bave details of a number of South African "special operation~" seen from
the Angolan side.
- During 198G, he added, there had been 925 reconnaissanc~ flights over Angola, 18
air attacks, and 33 assaults by airborne troops.
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COUNTRY SECTIOPI INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIR6
SUCCESS OF MAPUTO CONFERENCE EXAMINID
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 5 Dec 80 p 3363 =
[Text] The Conference for the Coordination of the Development of Southern Africa
(SADCC) did not achieve the results hoped for by the member countries (Angola,
Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe), who
had invited potential aid donors to the capital of Mozambique from 26-28 November
(of MTM of 28 November 1980 p 3176).
' Nonettieless, the importance of the foreign delegations made of this meeting, which
- was disappointing from a financial point of view, a di.plomatic success. Thirty
cc~untries and 18 international agencies came, in fact, to Maputo at the invitation
~ of Botswana, which presided aver the meeting.
Ln the final communiq~ie, it was indicated that the initial financial engagements
promised by international money lenders totalled $650 million for the next 5 years.
` The 97 pro.jects in the transportation and communications sectors presented by
the nine African countries carried a price tag of almost $2 billion. But a certain
number of governments and development agencies made known their intention to fur-
nish supplen~ental credits in the near future.
Ttie speakers strongly supporCed the strategy and goals of the Lusaka Declaration
of last April lst entitled "Towards Econamic Liberation." They also expres~ed
their support for the program o~ action aimed at promoting regional economic devel-
opment and reducing the dependence of souther Africa on the Republic of South
- Africa (RSA).
- The Conf.erer.ce was brought to a close by the speeches of the Finnish Mix~ister
of ~ducation, Paer Stenbaeck, the Italian State SECretary for Foreign Affairs,
Aristide Gunnella, Joaquim Chissano, the Mozambique :`'.inister of Foreign Affairs
and, lastly, Musi, the Botswana Minister of Finance. The latter estimed that
considerable progress had been made towards economic liberation, but that the strug-
g1e would be long. He declared that he was very satisfied by the level of inter-
national participation and he felt that this conference was a positive contribu-
tion to the larger dialogue with an eye to the creation of a new international
economic order.
It must be emphase2ed th.at the conference was, finally, not called in order to or-
- ganize an engj.ne of war against South Africa. The countries bordering on the latter
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hesitate more than others before the more or leas dangerous consequences which
open hostility towards the RSA could have for their economies. They attempted
rather to show that they existed, that they had a potential which was not to be
taken J.ighLly and that southern Africa was not only limited to the Rep~b.~ir of ~
Sou th Africa.
Ic is in this sense that the vaRt public relations operatian which the Maputo
Conference to some extent constieuted was a success whose far-reaching consequence~
are still only dimly perceptible. -
A Di~?logue with Europe _
One can already take note however of the tighte~ing of links between the EEC and
the "Nine" of Southern Africa, in spite of the refusal of Mozambique, the host
country, to adhere to the Lome Convention. Seven countries of the Eiiropean Com-
munity were represented at ministerial level and, according to Claude Cheysson,
European Commissary in charge of Development, this massive Eur.opean presence has
a"ma~or. political significance" which the regime in Fretoria shouYd be we11 aware
o f. .
Cheysson emphasized }~owever th~t he did not understand Angola's and Mozambique's
hesitations, given the "fantastic advantages" repxesented by membership in the ACP
- (Africa-Cari.bt~ean-Pacific) . He polnted out th.at countries with si_mi].ar reg~nPS,
such as Ethiopia, adhered to the Convention.
_ I3ecause of these ress r~ations, Angola and Mozambique cannot benef.it directly from
ttie sums made available to the European Development Fund (FED) for ttie entire
sour.hern Africa regioa: at least $100 million for Lome II (in point o� fac~ prob-
ably more, because Tanzania does not belong to the southern region as defi.ned by
the EEC). ~~owever, Angola and Mozambique will derive indirect advantages since
~ tt~ey ar.e the nattiral outlets to the Atlantic and Indian oceans of ~he six countries
wedged into the zone.
- Cheysson indicated that the EEC was participating for example in the first phase
of repairing the Benguela railroad in Angola, the shortest route to the sea for
Zaire.'s Shaba Province and the Zambian Copperbelt. It will furnish in this respect
rolli.ng stock ar?d upkeep to Zaire and Zambia, members of the ACP Comm~nity, to which
it is linked by the Lome agreements. This stock wi?i obviously� not stoop at the
frontier. Cheysson emphasized to AFP.
The European comanissary also admitted that there existed difficulties between the
Federal R~pubJ.ic of Gexmany, Angola and Mozambique because of their privileged
links witt~ the German Democratic Republic, which was a"bilateral" problem.
T.n spite of the resexvations which these difficulties can raise on both sides, it -
is thought, AI'P writes, in European diplomatic circles, that the dia:logus engaged
at Mapt~to between Europe and southern pfrica is "exemplary" for North-South
3a -
relati~~ns .
France: A Positive Response
As far as France is concertied, which was presented at the Conference by O~ivier
Stirn, tt~e State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the latter declared that Paris
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woul.d respond positiv~ely to the appeal of thc southern Africa "Nine." The minister
did not c.ite deta:iled financial co~itments for the 97 pro~ects presented, which
will be entruaCed to the study of experts. But he po3nted out that, �or the last
I$ monttis, the aum of operations underway or planned by France in southE~rn Airica
totallEd nearJ.y one billion French francs.
Let ua rnention that a ser3es of financial protocols have recently been signed or �
are under negotiation with Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, Botswana and Zimbabwe.
The "Caisse centrale de cooperation economique" (Central ~und for Economic Coopera-
e:ion) is also henceforth empowered to f inance operations in Angola and Mozambique.
Tt~e Frenci~ State Secret~ry also took note of the initiative undertaken 3ointly with ~
Belgium, Canada, the United States, the FRG and the United King~om .for the creation
of a"concerted action for devel opment in Africa," An "ad hoc" coumnittee met more-
_ over in Bonn at zhe beginning of the year to discu~s rail transportation in So~.ithern
Africa.
Stirn lastly a�firmed that France wished to see this region of the globe "complete
its liberation and he evoked similarities in the collective approach to problems
between Europeana and Africans. The French State Secretary was received on 26 Novem-
ber by President Samora Machel, *aith whom he avoked the perspectives of Southern
Africa. It should be recalled that tha Mozambique Minister of Foreign Affairs car-- ~
ried ouC an official visit to Paris several months ago.
COPYRIGH'r: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1980
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BENIN
- PEOPI,E'S REVOLUTIUN OF BENIN AFTER 8 YEAR5
r
Paris AFRIQUE-A5IE in French 8 Dec 80 pp 27-29
(Article by Mariam Sysle: "The Revolution Catches Its Breath"]
['fext J Last 30 November the People' ~ Republic of Benin ce7.ebrated the e:LgYith
anniversary ~f tile Revolutionary Muvement of National Liberation--~�~hich was launched
on 26 October 1972 by progressive elements of the national armq, supported by the
patr�iotic forces of ti~~e country. The revolution took concrete form on 30 NovembPr
1.972 wi.th the speech containing the program of the Revolutionary Military (GMR).
' Two years J.ater., on 30'November. 1974, there was the proclamation of the choice of
the path of scientific socialism, which was to lead to the creatj.on, on 30 November
1975, of an advance guard party, the Party of the People's Revolution of Benin
(YRPT3) .
it is el~ese last 3 dates, Pach one marking a stage in the search for a deepening of
, the revotutionary proce.ss, which have been used to mark the national day of the
cc~~antry. Tt is a country which is new in some respects, aIl of whose efforts are
aimed at achieving real independence, to affirm its identity, and to install a
society cl.eansed c~f all the stains of the past.
In R years, a very shorr period of time, a long road h~s been traversed, and there
is not one sector of the political, administrative, socio-economic or cultural life
of the country which has not been the ob~ect of radical reforms. One recalls, for _
- ex~mple, that since 1973 local organs of the people's government have been estab-
lisi~ed at the level of the villages or quarters of the cities, o� the commuaes, of
the ciistricts and of the provinces,. On 26 Oetober 1976 it was the turn of the
~~rmy tu undergo profound changes with the creation of the People's Armed Forces
; (FAP), ~onsisting of 3 constituent corps: the peopl~'s militia, the pub].ic security
forces and the national defense forces.
'Che Constitution
At the sa?ne time, with a view to attaining mastery of the economic sector, almost
130 statQ enterprises have been created since 1974, in all branches of the economy -
- concerned (banks an:l insurance companies, commerce, agriculture, ind(ustries,
transport, etc.). The imperialist-mercenary aggression of 16 January 1977--its
crushing failure and the combative and spontaneous people's mobilization which it
provoked thro~ighout the whole country were to prove tt~e so].idity of the foundations
_ of the new regime--did not slow down the course of the efforts undertaken. Quite _
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t:o lhe concrary. Cn Augusr 1.977, the new constitution of the country was adopted
aFtf~r having been discussed and submJ.ttPd to the comments and criticism of the _
p~~~ople. It was the same t:hj.nb with the fi:st three-year plan of economic and social
development (1978-1~79-1980)--the first such plan even completply prepared by the
Iieninese thc~mselves. Shortly afterwards, the educational refor.m program~ entexed into
eCfnrc.. ('I'hi.~s i.s known unc3er the name of [he New� 5chool and is aimed at ptitting
~tt e~iid to t1~e former system of elitist schools, cut off trom tne realities and needs
of ch~c ~ountr.y, which made their own people into foreign officials.) In the same
direction, a considerable amount of work has gone into favoring the development of
national languages. SigniEicant results have already been achieved iri this area9
with ht~ndreds of peopl.e being taught to read and write in their resnective languages.
I'rom the beginning eff~orts were also made, aimed at a permanent mobilization of the
people ar.ouncl concrete slogans, such as national construction; increased production,
with agriculture given a priority (in each school, in each production unit, respon- _
sibi.l.ity for ar~ agric�ltural or animal husbandry project has been assigned); and
finnlly patriotic, ideol.ogical and generalized perliminary training.
A Serious Partner
A.11 observers are unanimous in recog~izing that there are few points in common _
remainin~ between the Benin of today and the Dahomey of yest~rday, with the latter
~~ibject as ft was to incessant convulsions, to permanent regional and tribal
struf;gles, and where corruption, nepotism and fraud reigned on a large scale.
The cleaning up oE the management of public affairs and finances has made the
RPB--which since 1972 has ended the budgetary subsidy granted by France since ~
- i.ndependence--a ser.ious partner in the eyes of international financiaZ bodies.
Regar.ding its ecoiiomic ach~ievements, they are undeniable, as attested by the con-
struction of a whole series of projects, including, to name only the most important,
the cemenC works at Onigbolo, the sugar complex at Save, the mixed oil plant and
thc corn f].our mi11 at I3ohicon, the extension of the port of Cotonou, etc.
_ Enc~~iutagin~Z progress has also been made in all se~tors. Compared to 1972 the rate
oi growch of. the r.ural sector has gone fr.om 5.9 percent to 9.7 percent in 1977.
A muct~ more important boom has taken place in the industrial sector, where the rate
of prowth, which was 9.1 percent in 1973, reached 61.2 percent in 1977. At the
same t:tme the rate of growth of the transport sector went from 10.3 percent to
117.9 perr.ent; tt~at of the commercial sector, from 16.1 percent to 133.6 percent.
(Let u~ note in this connection that, if foreign comanerce remained dominated by
thelJestern countries, the diversification of trade with the states of Africa, Asia
aild Eastern Europe is tending to develop quickly.)
In the r.ourse of the period from October, 1972, to Decemher, 1979, thanks to an
active cind decentralized industrialization effort, more tha~1 8000 new jobs were
- created. This development was accompanied, it goes without saying, by measures -
Eavorable to the nearly 72,000 salaried workers in Benin. The increase in the
nat[onal operational budget, which went from CFA F 26 billion in 1979 to about
CFA T' 33 bill.ion in 1980, made possible at the beginning of this year the unblocking -
of Che contributions of government employees, be~inning 1 January, and the
eff.ecti.v~ application of the general statute of permanent employees of the state,
ns well as that af the people's armed forces, with fiscal effect as of 1 October
1980. At the same time the guaranteed minimum inter-pCofeasional salary--the SMIG
--for a.ll workers in the private sector was raised by ].5 percent, with effect as of
- 1 January 1981.
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Populfir Partir.iprition
Pi.nally,